Report Navigation

Country Reports

Nations in Transit

Nations in Transit 2017

Turkmenistan

Country Profile

Regime Classification: 
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
Image Graph showing the Selected Country Flag

Nations in Transit Score

(1=Most Democratic, 7=Least Democratic)
Score Evolution: 
NIT Country Rank: 
29/29

Quick Facts

Capital: Ashgabat
Population: 5.37 million
GNI/capita, PPP: $15,760
Freedom in the World Status: Not Free
Press Freedom Status: Not Free
Net Freedom Status: n/a
Democracy Score: 
6.96

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

NIT survey year

2017

National Democratic Governance

7.00

Electoral Process

7.00

Civil Society

7.00

Independent Media

7.00

Local Democratic Governance

6.75

Judicial Framework and Independence

7.00

Corruption

7.00

Democracy Score

6.96

NIT survey year

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

National Democratic Governance

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

Electoral Process

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

Civil Society

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

Independent Media

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

Local Democratic Governance

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

Judicial Framework and Independence

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

Corruption

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

7.00

Democracy Score

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.93

6.96

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s).

 

Score changes:

Corruption rating declined from 6.75 to 7.00 due to evidence of total state capture, extending from petty bribery at the local level to embezzlement at the highest reaches of the government, and new evidence of nepotism for the president’s family.

As a result, Turkmenistan’s Democracy Score declined from 6.93 to 6.96.

Executive Summary: 

Turkmenistan is a rentier state ruled by an authoritarian regime that utilizes natural resource revenues to invest in political patronage and fund pervasive security structures. On taking office in 2007, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov tried to present himself as a reformist by improving the country’s relations with foreign governments, while passing laws and issuing declarations that paid lip service to political liberalization, human rights, and the market economy. At the same time, Berdimuhamedov claimed that Turkmen statehood was too young and its people too unprepared to manage drastic political changes. He extolled the benefits of a “step-by-step” approach to both political and economic liberalization. In practice, this has meant that his reforms have remained superficial, attempting to project an image of change and prosperity to the international community without bringing lasting benefits to the wider population. The regime has continued violating basic human rights, jailing outspoken activists, and allocating valuable government and business positions to members of the presidential family.

In 2016, the president responded to a severe economic crisis by strengthening his and his family’s institutional position through the enactment of constitutional changes that removed the age limit for presidential candidates, extended the presidential term from five to seven years, and abolished term limits for the presidency. To deflect local and international criticism of such changes—which effectively established a presidency-for-life—Berdimuhamedov created the position of ombudsman for human rights. The president also empowered his family members by appointing them to prestigious positions in both the public and private sectors. In 2016, Berdimuhamedov’s son, Serdar, was elected to the parliament and also appointed to a deputy ministerial post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although nepotism is not a new phenomenon in Turkmenistan, it is new in presidential politics. Former president Saparmurat Niyazov built a cult of personality, but he was an orphan and also failed to promote the career of his only son, who did not live in Turkmenistan.

The stability of the Berdimuhamedov regime is partly ensured by its success in politicizing public resources and leveraging them for political advantage. Controlling resource revenues allows Berdimuhamedov to manage the bureaucracy through non-merit-based appointments, career advancements, or regular firings. However, the regime’s persistent use of easy cash from resource extraction has increased its fundamental vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations. As global energy prices have fallen in recent years, revenues from oil and natural gas exports in Turkmenistan have plummeted. The country’s GDP grew by only 6.2 percent in 2016, compared to 10.3 percent in 2014.1 Depressed foreign assets have also led to a current account deficit of 13.3 percent of GDP2 and have reduced the state budget in U.S. dollar equivalent from $33 billion in 2014 to $17 billion in 2016.3

In an effort to hold on to hard currency, the government has banned the sale of U.S. dollars, delayed the payment of public sector salaries, introduced mandatory monetary “donations” from the public, and increased taxes on the private sector. Many private firms have shut down under the pressure of economic stagnation and governmental interference. To shift the blame for the crisis, in 2016 Berdimuhamedov not only fired government officials but also jailed them for usually unidentified “shortcomings in the workplace.” Although these problems were triggered by low gas prices, the underlying causes of Turkmenistan’s economic crisis are fundamentally structural. In particular, Turkmenistan’s economy struggles from the government’s intrusive intervention, a general lack of diversification, overreliance on hydrocarbons, and a weak private sector.

Outlook for 2017: President Berdimuhamedov has put in place constitutional changes to ensure the longevity of his rule. However, he has yet to comprehensively address the worsening socioeconomic crisis, which is challenging the stability of his regime. Berdimuhamedov needs enough cash not only to pay voters’ wages and cover the costs of mega-projects but also to buy off members of the ruling elite who might otherwise question their allegiance to the president. Berdimuhamedov’s idiosyncratic personnel policy could, in this sense, lead to the defection of more or less prominent cadres. As economic hardship persists, the regime could face pressure from both Turkmenistan’s disenfranchised masses and, significantly, some disgruntled members of the ruling elite.

National Democratic Governance: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

 

  • Turkmenistan is a textbook example of a state with a widening gulf between its legislative dictates and its governance methods. The constitution stipulates that Turkmenistan is a democratic, secular state that takes the form of a presidential republic and guarantees separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.4 In practice, however, Turkmenistan is ruled entirely by the presidency: the parliament serves as a rubber stamp for presidential decisions, and the judicial system is appointed and directed by the president. The stability of the state is ensured through various means, including the politicization of public resources, political patronage, recurrent elite purges, inducements to key public institutions, and coercion. Political patronage allows the regime to provide favorable treatment to family members and regime supporters who then promote the status quo. Conversely, continuous purges of the elite dissuade mid-level officials from cultivating their own power bases to challenge centralized authority.5

  • In 2016, growing socioeconomic difficulties and the decreasing popularity of his leadership motivated Berdimuhamedov to secure his post and institutionalize his authoritarian rule by amending the country’s constitution.6 This is the sixth amendment to Turkmenistan’s constitution, which was first adopted in 1992.7 State media justified the latest round of amendments by claiming, “[Turkmenistan’s] extensive political, social and economic reforms … necessitated changes to the constitution.”8 Moreover, the government not only makes Berdimuhamedov a prerequisite for a successful democratization but also the sole guarantor of future political, economic, and social developments. As stated on the government’s website, “the democratization process in Turkmenistan develops on the basis of continuity … and the current constitution is important for the gradual and consistent deepening of democratic reforms.”9 As a result, the new constitution grants Berdimuhamedov a de facto right to rule Turkmenistan for life. Specifically, it eliminated the age cap of 70 for presidential candidates and extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years, while putting no limits on the number of possible reelections.10

  • To offset the increased powers he granted to himself, Berdimuhamedov introduced new provisions on human rights, political freedoms, and political pluralism. By eliminating the stipulation of 15 years of public sector experience from the list of eligibility requirements for presidential candidates, it became possible, at least on paper, for anyone to run for the presidency.11 Similarly, Article 17 of the amended constitution recognizes political pluralism, ensures the necessary conditions for developing Turkmenistan’s civil society sector, and treats public associations equally before the law.12

  • The amended constitution also includes a whole new section on Turkmenistan’s economic, financial, and credit systems. While reaffirming Turkmenistan’s commitment to the principles of market economy, Article 13 stipulates that “the state shall regulate economic activity in the interests of the individual and society.”13 This speaks to Berdimuhamedov’s “step-by-step” approach to both political and economic liberalization, which goes “without haste and steadily,” as he said in his first year in office.14 This not only provides a legal basis for state intervention in the economy but also hints at the fact that Turkmenistan is unlikely to liberalize in the near future. The country’s rich natural resource endowment and the regime’s predatory behavior make the government reluctant to relinquish its control over the economic sector. Limits on economic diversification, innovation, and entrepreneurship leave the large youth population unemployed and prevent progress, and may contribute to socioeconomic instabilities associated with a “youth bulge.”

  • Faced with a severe economic shock caused by low gas prices, the president also embarked upon major institutional reshuffling in 2016. The most radical changes included the elimination of the Ministry of Oil and Gas and the State Agency for Managing Hydrocarbon Resources. The official reason for this abrupt move was “to improve the management of the resource sector.”15 It is possible that the ministry and the agency were in fact failing; their elimination might have been the only solution to their poor performance. Transferring institutions’ responsibilities to the Cabinet of Ministers and the state-owned hydrocarbon companies may also help to minimize costs.16 However, this decision may also be aimed at strengthening state-owned companies by expanding their jurisdiction and reallocating scarce resources among elites loyal to Berdimuhamedov.

  • The decline in commodity prices and gas volumes traded entailed a corresponding decrease in the regime’s capacity to access hard currency. In January 2016, Russia ceased its import of Turkmen gas.17 This is a sharp decrease from the 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) Gazprom bought in 2009, and the company has no plans to revive the deal until the end of 2018. As a result, exports from Turkmenistan fell by 41.5 percent in the first quarter of 2016 even after falling by 38.5 percent in 2015.18 Gas revenues in Turkmenistan are decreasing even faster than the volumes sold. Iran pays for Turkmen gas in barter exchange, while the large volumes of gas provided to China do not bring foreign currency but, rather, count towards repaying Turkmenistan’s $8 billion debt accrued for construction of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline and developing the Galkynysh gas field.19 As a result, the country’s GDP in 2016 grew by only 6.2 percent compared to 10.3 percent in 2014.20 Declining export revenues have widened Turkmenistan’s trade deficit to 13.3 percent of GDP.21The state budget has plunged from $33 billion in U.S. dollar equivalent in 2014 to $17 billion in 2016.22

  • Decreasing resource revenues put pressure on Turkmenistan’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as the general availability of cash. Consequently, the government banned the exchange of foreign currencies and put a limit on how much cash individuals may bring into the country or send abroad. This has revitalized the black market for foreign exchange. In particular, families whose children study abroad struggled to exchange currencies to cover university expenses.23 The lack of cash also resulted in public wage arrears.24 Even after salaries were transferred, many public servants could not withdraw their money, as Turkmenistan’s banks and ATMs lacked cash and had daily withdrawal limits of 500 manats (about $150).25 To raise extra cash, the government plans to issue state bonds and give them out to civil servants in lieu of part of their salary.26

  • Economic and financial crises further complicated Turkmenistan’s effort to host the 5th Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games in Ashgabat in 2017. Turkmenistan has spent over $5 billion constructing the Olympic Village, and another $2.3 billion on a new international airport, a questionable investment for a country with few tourists.27 Insufficient funding has led the government to collect money from business owners and public sector employees. Specifically, private firms have been asked to donate about $10,000, while civil servants were required to “donate” one month’s salary.28 The construction of these large-scale projects was also linked to significant human rights violations, including the forced evictions and illegal demolition of 10,000 homes in Choganly district in 2015.29

Electoral Process: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

 

  • Political pluralism in Turkmenistan is only tolerated on paper. Existing legislation either fails to be translated into practice or has requirements that are impossible to meet. Articles 1 and 2 of the Law on the Election of the President of Turkmenistan guarantee presidential elections based on alternative, free, and equal nomination of candidates, and equal opportunities for all candidates in the election campaign.30 However, as past presidential elections have illustrated, Turkmenistan merely imitates a true democratic choice while following the Soviet practice of compelling full participation and close to unanimous support for the winning candidate.31

  • The 2017 presidential elections will feature, for the first time in Turkmenistan’s independent history, various candidates nominated by three political parties: the Democratic Party, Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and Agrarian Party. 32 Although the latter two exist ostensibly as alternative parties, they do nothing to counterbalance the ruling regime. A multiparty system, for the Berdimuhamedov regime, does not necessarily entail the potential for opposition. These parties follow the political agenda of the president, and so the appearance of political plurality is cosmetic only.

  • A conclusive victory is guaranteed in 2017 for Berdimuhamedov based on past electoral results. For instance, in 2007 Berdimuhamedov received 89 percent of the votes in a campaign against 5 contenders. In 2012, he had 7 competitors who combined received less than 3 percent of the votes.33 These results are not surprising knowing that candidates for presidential elections in Turkmenistan are not self-nominated. They are first scrutinized and then appointed by the administration of the president and the Ministry of National Security. They are chosen on the basis of their loyalty to the president and unpopularity among the public.34 Meanwhile, requests of opposition parties residing abroad to participate in the presidential elections are ignored by Ashgabat.

  • There are numerous legal obstacles to organized political activity. To register and compete in the presidential elections, candidates need to be nominated by a political party or collect 50,000 signatures. In addition, they have to be native born, live in Turkmenistan for the past 15 years, and have no criminal record.35 Meanwhile, the Law on Political Parties requires a party leader to have over 1,000 members, represent his party in all five regions, report all party members’ names to the Ministry of Fairness, and allow the officials of this ministry to attend party meetings.36 Such strict regulations in practice prevent opposition parties in exile from participating in the elections, while complicating citizens’ endeavors to start new parties and compete with the ruling government. Any attempt to create a real opposition or to start an alternative political party is crushed. Individuals like Sazak Durdymyradov37 and Geldimyrat Nurmuhammedov,38 who found the courage to challenge the regime and followed the excruciating bureaucratic process to register their parties, were forcibly admitted to a psychiatric hospital and rehabilitation center, respectively.

  • Turkmenistan’s only national election in 2016 was a clear illustration of how the government keeps the public in the dark. On 20 November, parliamentary elections were held in Akhal and Mary provinces to replace members of parliament (MPs) who were previously disqualified. State media reported that “the most worthy, highly respected and most publicly trusted compatriots” ran for office in elections with a variety of alternatives.39 However, there was no initial coverage of the elections, or which MPs were removed from the parliament and why.40 Similarly, state media neither mentioned the names of candidates nor the newly elected MPs but simply announced the results of the election.41 Since the president’s son, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, was one of the elected MPs, it is possible that media were reluctant to cover such news.

Civil Society: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

 

  • Since his first day in office, President Berdimuhamedov has tried to present himself as a reformer by cooperating with the international community, adopting the language of democracy and human rights, and passing laws promoting international standards. The Law on Public Associations, introduced in May 2014, gives Turkmen citizens the right to join or establish organizations and guarantees state noninterference. In reality, stringent registration requirements and strict government control have continued to inhibit the formation of a healthy and independent civil society in Turkmenistan since the legislation was enacted.42

  • Instead, the Turkmen government has continued to promote government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs) in support of regime propaganda. These so-called public organizations are part of the national movement called Galkynysh (Revival), which includes the Democratic Party, Women’s Union, Organization of War Veterans, and Magtymguly Youth Organization, among others. The movement is hosted in a lavish, government-owned building, which is supposed to become “the center of public life.” As members of Galkynysh have said, “such a facility will provide the necessary conditions for fruitful work.”43 Their housing in such a building indicates the extent to which the public and civic sectors are co-opted and controlled by the government.

  • The Law on Public Assembly, adopted in July 2015, nominally allowed public gatherings. Yet, it also listed preconditions that made such gatherings pointless. For instance, individuals and registered organizations can arrange public rallies if they inform the relevant authorities in advance and agree on the venue. Similarly, people cannot assemble near government buildings or public places but must exclusively use designated venues.44 Such laws strengthen government control instead of allowing citizens to practice their rights to gather and communicate their concerns to decision makers.

  • Turkmenistan co-organizes and participates in events promoting democratic principles, including the European Union (EU)–Central Asia Rule of Law Platform. As part of this initiative, in April 2016 the Turkmen government, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and EU representatives organized a seminar on civil society development in Turkmenistan.45 To guarantee people’s political rights and freedoms, the Turkmen government claimed to follow a step-by-step process of establishing governmental and public institutions.46 Although such seminars and discussions can result in cosmetic legislative reform, they do little in terms of changing local reality. Unregistered organizations still cannot organize any events, while those wanting to register cannot do so due to legal and administrative constraints. Since civil society organizations have to register any assistance they receive from abroad, they choose not to apply for external funding to avoid further complications with the government.47 Instead, they compete for scarce funding provided by the few foreign embassies in Turkmenistan.

  • In light of growing socioeconomic grievances and with a view to consolidating the power of the executive, the Turkmen secret services have stepped up police operations against dissident groups abroad. For example, starting 12 April 2016, Akmuhammet Bayhanov, a political dissident living in Russia, was openly shadowed, threatened, and even attacked by unknown men. He and his family living in Turkmenistan received warnings not to interfere in the government’s business.48 After escaping the country in 2013, Bayhanov founded an opposition group called Hereket (Movement) and openly condemned the Turkmen elite through statements online and on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).49 Bayhanov’s recent publication of his memoir, Lost Souls in Ovan-Depe, might have been another reason for the government’s persecution.50

  • In another case, exiled dissident journalist Chary Annamuradov has lost all four of his brothers, allegedly in retaliation for his work. On 2 September 2016, his last living brother, Altymurad Annamuradov, was taken away, questioned about his brother, and brutally beaten by unknown men. Two days after the incident, he died from his injuries.51 Although the regime in Turkmenistan is known for its notoriously brutal treatment of nonconformists, the fact that dissidents living abroad are being attacked is something new and worrisome.

Independent Media: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

 

  • Turkmenistan’s media is another key area where implementation of official policies is simply not taking place. Both print and broadcast media serve as propaganda machines to promote the regime’s ideology. Most news outlets only describe the president’s activities and domestic and international visits, while providing no coverage of domestic socioeconomic issues. Although the Law on Mass Media that was adopted in 2012 was drafted with the help of the OSCE and met international standards, its implementation has failed to uphold these principles. On paper, the law guarantees media independence and freedom for citizens to use any media outlet to receive information and to share their views, while prohibiting government censorship and control.52 Since the law forbids monopoly over the press, President Berdimuhamedov renounced his role as the founder of major print media organizations in January 2013. Nevertheless, he maintained full control over the media by transferring this authority to the Council of Ministers.53 This legislation did nothing to register new organizations or to end self-censorship among national reporters.54

  • In addition to the absence of a strong national media, Turkmenistan also lacks proper coverage by foreign broadcasters. To be able to visit the country and report, foreign media must get official accreditation. However, the decision to provide authorization is political and arbitrary. For instance, RFE/RL has submitted applications for accreditation several years in a row but has failed to receive approval.55 When foreign journalists finally manage to enter the country to cover a major event, monitors restrict their access to undesirable places and people. Reporters meeting with unauthorized individuals risk being fined, jailed for 14 days, or deported.56 Meanwhile, opposition or alternative media channels, such as the Turkmen branch of RFE/RL, Chronicle of Turkmenistan, Alternative News of Turkmenistan, or Gundogar, are blocked in Turkmenistan.

  • The government has also continued to monitor, harass, and restrict the freedom of movement of local journalists working for foreign media. Journalist Saparmammed Nepeskuliev, arrested in July 2015, remained in prison throughout the year on falsified charges.57Journalist Soltan Achilova suffered organized attacks by police and the Ministry of National Security.58 Khudayberdy Allashov, a reporter for RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, was arrested on 3 December 2016. He was severely beaten by Dashoguz police in order to force him to confess to possessing a banned tobacco substance, which can result in seven years in jail.59

  • In addition, citizens who share their concerns about domestic socioeconomic hardships on social and foreign media outlets face ruthless consequences. When 62-year-old Galina Vertyakova complained on social media about being forced by authorities to darken her windows with black paint, she was arrested on fabricated charges and now faces up to four years imprisonment.60 Similarly, Dunyagozel Jumagulyyeva spent 15 nights in jail after giving an interview to Radio Azatlyk about her inability to find a job.61

  • Television is the primary source of political information and entertainment, and the government retains control of all seven TV channels: Altyn Asyr, Ashgabat, Miras, Ovaz, Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan Sport, and Yaslyk.62 The only way for Turkmens to receive independent foreign news and TV programs is through satellite dishes. However, in 2016 authorities continued a policy of dismantling the dishes, which had been initially proposed by Berdimuhamedov in 2007 and fully came into force in March 2015. Officials assert that dishes “distort the architectural-urban image of cities.”63 In reality, though, the removal policy is intended to block people’s access to independent foreign media. Instead, the authorities suggest that the public install cable TVs, which come with regulated programs that are easy for the government to shut down.64

  • The internet is growing as an alternative platform for accessing and sharing news in Turkmenistan, but it still remains strictly controlled. Turkmenistan ranks 177th in the world for fixed-broadband subscriptions, with just 0.06 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Only 15percent of Turkmen use the internet.65 These results are among the lowest in the world. Turkmens’ online access is also constrained by the extremely expensive cost of internet service. For example, the monopolist communications provider Turkmentelecom charges $169 for a 10 megabytes-per-second internet connection.66 Thus, few Turkmen can afford internet access, and those who can complain about the low speed.

  • Authorities also monitor online activity, and block and hack sites presenting dissent. The government collects the personal information of all internet users, as individuals visiting internet cafes must present their passports in order to access the facilities, while those using mobile internet have to provide their personal data when buying a SIM card. Moreover, Berdimuhamedov ensured his immunity from public criticism on the web by making it illegal for citizens to share information that insults or defames the president or calls for violent changes of the constitutional order.67 For instance, Turkmens residing abroad who have visited, liked, or left comments on Radio Azatlyk’s Facebook page were accused of criticizing the president and were told that their families will be detained at the prosecutor’s office until they return back to Turkmenistan.68

Local Democratic Governance: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

 

  • Turkmenistan’s constitution differentiates between local governance and local self-government. The former includes the People’s Council and municipal government, or hakimlik. The municipal government is an executive body led by a governor, or hakim. These are appointed by the president to serve as an extended arm of the central government by enforcing the constitution and decrees of the president, cabinet of ministers, and the parliament.

  • On the other hand, local self-government consists of councils (gengesh) whose members are directly elected by citizens living in their respective administrative units. From among its members, the council elects an archyn, who manages the council and is accountable to it. Councils are meant to be independent and govern local socioeconomic development, budgeting, and tax collection.69 Although the new constitution recognizes and guarantees this independence,70 councils continue to represent the regime’s interests.

  • The amended constitution did remove a provision stating, “Governors are the local representatives of the President.”71 Nevertheless, this change in wording will have minimal effect on the deeply rooted practice of governors serving the president. Since they are still appointed and dismissed by (and accountable to) the president,72 governors have no incentive to serve the interests of their constituents. Municipal government activities remain punitive. Instead of acting in accordance with the law, authorities follow verbal orders from the center and, for example, demolish houses or cut trees,73 all in the interest of the small elite sitting in Ashgabat.

  • Loyalty and connection to the regime are the determining factors when being hired for government positions. For instance, relevant agencies conduct background checks and genealogical history before appointing anyone to government offices. During Niyazov’s presidency, applicants had to submit information about their family history, namely, the preceding seven generations of ancestors. Under Berdimuhamedov, this requirement was reduced to only three generations. Candidates may be dismissed not only for having relatives with a criminal background, or who have engaged in dissident or journalistic activities, but also for showing initiative.74 Officials in Ashgabat do not look favorably on local authorities who make independent decisions or suggest solutions to existing social issues.

  • Faced with mounting socioeconomic difficulties in 2016, Berdimuhamedov has continued his predecessor’s practice of reshuffling and firing cadres. He organized government meetings in all five regions where he fired officials in large numbers. For instance, from January to August 2016, a total of 60 hakims and their deputies across the country were fired, while 56 officials received administrative penalties.75 Usually, before any decision is made, the Chairman of the Turkmen Supreme Control Chamber and the Attorney General conduct on-site meetings and produce reports. These two monitoring bodies can make a significant profit because officials may risk being sacked based on their insights. Following these inspections in 2016, all six hakims in Ashgabat retained their positions, while seven officials in the Dashoguz region and twelve in Balkan lost their jobs.76 Since hakims in Ashgabat have closer ties with controllers, it led to speculation that they were able to preserve their positions by bribing the prosecutors. Meanwhile, the deputy hakim of Gubadag district77 and hakim of Tejen city were jailed on undisclosed charges.78

  • Lower-level officials are also blamed for the country’s economic problems and are expected to fix them, while not receiving the resources, incentives, or independence necessary to do so. For example, the Dashoguz region’s hakim received a warning for limited success in the agricultural sector and for failure to adopt policies promoting economic growth and social benefits.79 Some public officials, including the hakim of Birata district in Lebap, are currently under house arrest.80 These sacked officials have no legal means to challenge the judicial decisions or protect their rights.81 Instead of addressing structural problems, Berdimuhamedov shifts the blame for the country’s difficulties by pointing the finger at lower-echelon officials.

  • While Ashgabat inhibits the ability of regional governments to make or even influence decisions, governors have to execute policies and face the discontent of their constituents. Regional officials and heads of public agencies have organized meetings to inform provincial civil servants about deducting parts of their salaries to support the motherland, the president, and the Asian Games. During the meetings, there have been arguments and even fistfights between participants. Attendees were also told to sign letters declaring that payments were made on a voluntary basis.82 Given the economic difficulties and high unemployment in Turkmenistan, citizens do not want to risk their jobs. As one citizen

  • a correspondent from Turkmenabat shared, cleaning personnel in a kindergarten who make 560 manats ($160) per month were told their monthly contributions were 200 manats.83 Usually, local officials are not in a position to explain the reasoning behind certain decisions. As they avoid naming any single official to be held accountable, bureaucrats explain everything by saying “the order came from above.”

Judicial Framework and Independence: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

7.00

 

  • As part of the 2016 constitutional changes, Turkmenistan also passed legislation establishing an office of the ombudsman for human rights. The office will become active starting 1 January 2017.84 President Berdimuhamedov admits that there are human rights abuses committed by government officials, and claims that the ombudsman will be important “in combatting arbitrariness of state officials and the use of official powers for personal gain.”85 The parliament (mejlis) will elect the ombudsman from three candidates proposed by the president, using secret ballots and a simple majority. The law guarantees the ombudsman immunity and independence, as well as transparency of his or her activities, powers, and core functions. The ombudsman is required to submit annual reports to the president describing the human rights situation in the country.86 However, it is unlikely that Berdimuhamedov will have any incentive to suggest a qualified candidate and grant him or her the necessary powers to challenge his regime’s human rights abuses. At best, it will serve as a tool to eliminate officials who have fallen out of favor.

  • As expected, the creation of an ombudsman for human rights was welcomed by the international community; the representative of the UNDP in Turkmenistan called it “an important step … on the path of democratization.”87 However, as experts noted, given the country’s repressive political environment, it is unlikely that the ombudsman will have any real leverage over authorities violating human rights. It is also unlikely that the fate of the ombudsman will differ much from that of the National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, which was created in 199688 but has never fulfilled its mandate. When citizen Umida Jumabayeva, for example, appealed to the National Institute regarding her son’s inhumane treatment during his military service, she was attacked, beaten, and doused with acid by unknown men.89

  • The Law on Courts guarantees the independence of judges from intervention by the legislative and executive bodies.90 However, in practice, courts are unable to function or fulfill their constitutional duties due to systematic, top-down pressure.91 Even under the amended constitution, Article 100 states that the president continues to appoint and dismiss all judges.92 Courts regularly side with the regime by jailing outspoken critics or human rights activists on false charges. This may explain why Turkmenistan has the second-highest per capita incarceration rate in the world after the United States, imprisoning 583 people per 100,000 population.93

Corruption: 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

7.00

 

  • Although nepotism and corruption are deeply entrenched in Turkmenistan, favoring family members is new to presidential politics. Unlike his predecessor, who was an orphan, Berdimuhamedov has an extended family and deliberately promotes his relatives to high-ranking positions. On 15 July 2016, Berdimuhamedov issued a special decree appointing his son, Serdar, as Deputy Minister to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lead the newly created Department of International Information and Communication.94 Serdar was also recently elected to the parliament in a special election to replace MPs who were disqualified.95 Previously, he was on the management team of the now-eliminated State Agency for Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources96 and served as a deputy minister of agriculture. He also owns several businesses, including factories and a chain of hotels.97 Now that the president can constitutionally rule past the age of 70, Berdimuhamedov does not seem to have urgent plans to hand the presidential office to his son.98 These appointments are hence well-planned moves to upgrade Serdar’s professional portfolio, so he could lead the country in the event of his father’s premature death.99

  • Berdimuhamedov also has three sisters: one allegedly controls healthcare, and the other higher education.100 Both of these sectors are highly corrupt, making them profitable to control. Although Turkmenistan’s constitution guarantees access to professional education based on one’s individual abilities, young people must pay large bribes to be admitted to national universities. A few months before the start of the official admissions process, universities develop a list of applicants whose acceptance is guaranteed. This includes candidates whose parents have money or connections in agencies with control and supervisory functions, such as the deputy prime minister’s office, the Ministry of National Security, or the Attorney General. Only 3 to 5 percent of applicants are admitted on a merit basis.101 For instance, in 2011 the head of the Pedagogical School in Dashoguz, Jumanazar Mamedov, was charged with large-scale corruption along with several teachers, middlemen, and someone who gave bribes. Over eight years, he had allegedly pocketed half a million U.S. dollars, while sharing the rest of the money with the heads of the Dashoguz hakimlik and local officials from the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor’s Office, and Ministry of Education. These were the institutions that provided a “roof,” or protection, to this highly lucrative college.102 However, given the profitability of the scheme, the president’s family decided to redirect the money flow to Ashgabat by directly appointing the heads of regional professional schools. The Ministry of National Security ensures that this is a smooth process, from making the list of admitted students to delivering the money to the presidential family.103

  • Corruption has become the norm and is widely practiced among the higher and lower echelons of the Turkmen government. While those in top positions can misappropriate larger amounts, doing so is substantially riskier. On 17 June 2016, Bayram Gurbangeldiyev, a high-ranking official in the state oil company Turkmenneft, committed suicide allegedly after being pressured to sign papers accepting financial irregularities caused by his predecessor.104 Alternative News of Turkmenistan (ANT) reported that his last letter revealed evidence of the systematic theft of oil in large volumes. The individuals involved in this criminal scheme include members of law enforcement, the Supreme Court, customs, tanker fleet, and managers of tank farms and gasoline stations who received their share in domestic or foreign currencies. Prior to this incident, ANT reported that Gurbangeldiyev had sent several written complaints to law enforcement units but never received a response.105

  • The current financial difficulties have further exacerbated the level of corruption in Turkmenistan, and authorities have come up with rules that are impossible for people to follow. According to recent regulations, individuals selling their apartments should receive payment only in manats. To detain owners for engaging in illegal transactions, law enforcement officials often send fake buyers to make deals with apartment owners in U.S. dollars. Because it is not possible to buy dollars in official banks, the police trace those who exchange currencies in the black market. This creates a profitable opportunity for authorities to fine, confiscate foreign currency, and even jail people for breaking the law. 106 Moreover, when traveling abroad, Turkmen citizens are allowed to take only $10,000 in cash, and making bank transfers is impossible. Hence, individuals taking extra U.S. dollars abroad have to bribe officials in order to avoid serious criminal charges.107 In addition, since June 2016, nationals receiving remittances are being paid solely in manats using the official exchange rate, which is 3.5 manats to $1 USD, while the unofficial rate has reached 6 manats.108 This makes it profitable for government officials to restrict access to the official rate. As a result, the currency black market reinforces corruption and vice versa.

  • In addition, municipal governments have tweaked orders coming from Ashgabat to raise extra cash for themselves. To illustrate, the government continues to enforce the installation of gas meters across the country. However, authorities not only make families pay for these counters but also for the pipes that connect the counters to natural gas points. Officials charge twice as much for the same type of pipe as the market price. Households that fail to buy and install these pipes have to pay a 150-manat fine. Furthermore, in order to sell more pipes and make more money, officials connect houses to the furthest point instead of linking households to the closest connector.109

  • The economic and financial difficulties in Turkmenistan have also negatively affected the private sector. Recently, Aleksandr Dadayev, head of the state-created business organization Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, gathered medium- and large-scale companies and asked them to help their motherland and the president during hard times. Amounts requested ranged from $50,000 to $100,000 per month relative to the value of the contributor’s contracts with the government. When asked if these contributions could be later returned to business entities or subtracted from their taxes, government officials could not make such a promise. Instead, the officers threatened to “cut off oxygen” to those firms refusing to pay.110 Since sustaining a profitable business in such unfavorable conditions is extremely difficult, many companies have decided to shut down their operations.111

Notes: 

1 “The growth of main macroeconomic indices is registered in Turkmenistan in 2016,” Turkmenistan: the Golden Age, 13 January 2017, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_eng/?id=7362

2 “Asian Development Outlook 2016 Update: Meeting the Low-Carbon Growth Challenge,” Asian Development Bank, 2 September 2016, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/197141/ado2016-update.pdf

3 “За два года госбюджет Туркменистана в долларовом эквиваленте сократился почти вдвое” [In two years, the state budget of Turkmenistan in dollar equivalent decreased by almost half], Chronicles of Turkmenistan, 07 November 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/11/za-dva-goda-gosbyudzhet-turkmenistana-v-dollarovom-ekvivalente-sokratilsya-pochti-vdvoe/

4 Oleg Stalbovskiy and Maria Stalbovskaya, “A Research Guide to the Turkmenistan Legal System,” Hauser Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law, 01 March 2014, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Turkmenistan1.html

5 Annette Bohr, “Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism,” 8 March 2016, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/turkmenistan-power-politics-and-petro-authoritarianism

6 “В Туркмении отменили возрастную планку для избрания президентом” [Turkmenistan abolishes the age cap for presidential candidates], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 14 September 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/09/v-turkmenii-otmenili-vozrastnuyu-planku-dlya-izbraniya-prezidentom/

7 Shohrat Kadyrov, “В Туркменистане готовятся увековечить институт авторитарианизма: Очередная конституционная реформа – путь к пожизненному президентству Бердымухаммедова,” [In Turkmenistan, preparations to make the institute of authoritarianism permanent: The next constitutional reform - a path to presidency for life for Berdymukhammedov,” Neft’ Rossii, 14 March 2016, http://www.oilru.com/news/505892/

8 Myrat Haitov, “Конституционная реформа в Туркменистане – качественно новый этап в развитии общества и государства” [Constitutional reform in Turkmenistan - a qualitatively new stage in the development of society and the state], Turkmenistan: the Golden Age, 25 March 2016, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=10658

9 Ibid.

10 “В Туркмении отменили возрастную планку для избрания президентом” [Turkmenistan abolished the age cap for presidential candidates], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 14 September 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/09/v-turkmenii-otmenili-vozrastnuyu-planku-dlya-izbraniya-prezidentom/

11 “Constitution of Turkmenistan,” Neutral Turkmenistan, 15 September 2016, http://www.parahat.info/law/parahat-info-law-01wn

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 “President of Turkmenistan says democratization of society next priority task,” Turkmenistan.ru, 28 December 2007, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/en/node/6574

15 Casey Michel, “Why Did Turkmenistan Scrap the Ministry of Oil and Gas?,” The Diplomat, 20 July 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-did-turkmenistan-scrap-the-ministry-of-oil-and-gas/

16 “The Ministry of Oil and Gas abolished in Turkmenistan,” Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 17 July 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/en/2016/07/the-ministry-of-oil-and-gas-abolished-in-turkmenistan/

17 Catherine Putz, “Russia’s Gazprom Stops Buying Gas from Turkmenistan,” The Diplomat, 6 January 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russias-gazprom-stops-buying-gas-from-turkmenistan/

18 “Туркмения экономит валюту, ограничив к ней доступ” [Turkmenistan hoards currency, limiting access to it], Reuters, 20 July 2016, http://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUKCN1001XV

19 “Туркменистан вводит ограничения на валютном рынке” [Turkmenistan sets restrictions on the foreign exchange market], RESCUE, 28 July 2016, http://rescue.org.ru/ru/news/analytics/1698-turkmenistan-vvodit-ogranicheniya-na-valyutnom-rynke

20 “The growth of main macroeconomic indices is registered in Turkmenistan in 2016,” Turkmenistan: the Golden Age, 13 January 2017, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_eng/?id=7362

21 “Asian Development Outlook 2016 Update: Meeting the Low-Carbon Growth Challenge,” Asian Development Bank, 2 September 2016, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/197141/ado2016-update.pdf

22 “За два года госбюджет Туркменистана в долларовом эквиваленте сократился почти вдвое” [In two years, the state budget of Turkmenistan in dollar equivalent decreased by almost half], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 7 November 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/11/za-dva-goda-gosbyudzhet-turkmenistana-v-dollarovom-ekvivalente-sokratilsya-pochti-vdvoe/

23 Yowshan Annagurban, “Salaries of teachers in Lebap are delayed,” RFE/RL, 07 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/27972272.html

24 Ibid

25 “Daily News: Sept 22, 2016,” RFE/RL, 22 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28006989.html

26 “У Ашхабада закончились деньги» [Ashgabat ran out of money], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 02 October 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/10/u-ashhabada-zakonchilis-dengi/

27 “Туркменистан: видимость благополучия” [Turkmenistan: the appearance of well-being], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 06 October 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/10/turkmenistan-vidimost-blagopoluchiya/

28 Подайте на… дворцы [Apply to… the palaces], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 17 May 2015, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2015/05/podayte-na-dvortsyi/

29 “Upcoming Asian Games led to massive forced evictions,” Amnesty International, 28 October 2015, https://amnesty.org.ru/ru/2015-10-28-turkmenistan/

30 “Закон Туркменистана ‘О выборах Президента Туркменистана’” [Law of Turkmenistan “On the Election of the President of Turkmenistan”], Asgabat.net, 26 December 2016, http://asgabat.net/stati/zakonodatelstvo-turkmenistana/zakon-turkmenistana-o-vyborah-prezidenta-turkmenistana.html

31 Annette Bohr, “Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism,” 8 March 2016, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/turkmenistan-power-politics-and-petro-authoritarianism

33 “Президентские выборы в Туркмении: восьмеро (не) против одного” [Presidential elections in Turkmenistan: eight (not) against one], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 12 February 2017,

http://www.chrono-tm.org/2017/02/prezidentskie-vyiboryi-v-turkmenii-vosmero-ne-protiv-odnogo/

34 Ibid.

35“Turkmenistan Adopts New Law On Presidential Elections,” RFE/RL, 01 June 2011, http://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan_adopts_new_law_on_presidential_elections/24212399.html

36 Annette Bohr, “Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism,” 8 March 2016, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/turkmenistan-power-politics-and-petro-authoritarianism

37 Yowshan Annagurban, “Berdymukhammedov states that the elections will have multiple parties,” RFE/RL, 15 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/27989934.html

38 “Former Minister released from jail,” RFE/RL, 22 July 2013, http://www.azathabar.com/a/25053290.html

39 “Состоялись выборы депутатов Меджлиса по некоторым округам” [Elections of deputies to the Mejlis held in some districts], Turkmenistan Today, 20 November 2016, http://tdh.gov.tm/news/articles.aspx&article3314&cat15

40 “О прошедших выборах депутатов меджлиса” [About the last elections of deputies of the Mejlis], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 21 November 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/11/o-proshedshih-vyiborah-deputatov-medzhlisa/

41 Ibid.

42 “Review of Turkmenistan Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, 1 March 2016, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/TKM/INT_CCPR_ICO_TKM_23454_E.pdf

43 “Гражданского общества Туркменистана заселили в отдельное здание” [Civil society of Turkmenistan settled in separate building], TURKMENISTAN.RU, 02 04 2011, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/ru/articles/35839.html

44 “Review of Turkmenistan Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, 1 March 2016, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/TKM/INT_CCPR_ICO_TKM_23454_E.pdf

45 “В Ашхабаде обсуждены приоритеты развития гражданского общества” [Priorities of civil society development discussed in Ashgabat], TURKMENISTAN.RU, 27 April 2016, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/ru/articles/41655.html

46 “В Туркменистане состоялся семинар по проблемам развития гражданского общества” [Seminar on the issues of civil society held in Turkmenistan], Gundogar, 27 April 2016, http://gundogar.org/?022500000000000000011062016040000#16847

47 “Civic Freedom Monitor: Turkmenistan,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), 10 October 2016, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkmenistan.html

49 Ibid.

50 Akmuhammed Bayhanov, “Туркменистан: накануне принятия новой Конституции зачищают оппозицию за рубежом” [Turkmenistan: on the eve of a new constitution, purges of the opposition abroad], EurAsia Daily, 25 August 2016, https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/08/25/turkmenistan-nakanune-prinyatiya-novoy-konstitucii-zachishchayut-oppoziciyu-za-rubezhom

51 “Turkmenistan: Dissident’s Brother Dies After Beating,” Human Rights Watch, 17 October 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/17/turkmenistan-dissidents-brother-dies-after-beating

52 “Закон Туркменистана О средствах массовой информации” [Law of Turkmenistan on the mass media], Turkmenistan: the Golden Age, 22 December 2012, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=3063

53 "President of Turkmenistan wants specific founders for newspapers and magazines", TURKMENISTAN.RU, 25 01 2013, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/en/articles/17034.html

54 Witaliy Wolkow, “Новая конституция Туркменистана: «косметический омбудсмен и пожизненный президент” [The new constitution of Turkmenistan: “cosmetic” ombudsman and president for life], Gundogar, 5 December 2016, http://gundogar.org/?02470517137000000000000011000000

55Turkmenistan, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014,” U.S. State Department, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=204415&year=2014#wrapper

56 Annette Bohr, “Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism,” 8 March 2016, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/turkmenistan-power-politics-and-petro-authoritarianism

57 Gozel Hudayberdiyewa. “Release Nepesgulyýew immediately!” RFE/RL, 06 July 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/27841833.html

58 “Туркменские спецслужбы продолжают преследовать независимого журналиста С. Ачилову” [Turkmen intelligence agencies continue to harass independent journalist S. Achilova], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 15 November 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/6060

59 “Radio journalist arrested, beaten in Turkmenistan,” Committee to Project Journalists, 6 12 2016,

https://cpj.org/2016/12/radio-journalist-arrested-beaten-in-turkmenistan.php

60 “Туркменистан: За комментарии в ‘Одноклассниках’ пенсионерке ‘шьют’ уголовное дело” [Pensioner faces a mocked-up criminal case for comments on Odnoklassniki], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 30 October 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/5962

61 “За интервью радио Азатлык женщина-туркменка отсидела 15 суток” [Turkmen woman jailed for 15 days for interview with Radio Azatlyk], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 22 November 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/6096

62 “Turkmenistan: Parliamentary Elections 15 December 2013 Needs Assessment Mission Report,” OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 12 September 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkmenistan/104831?download=true

63 “Turkmenistan authorities ban satellite dishes,” Civic Solidarity, 19 April 2015, http://civicsolidarity.org/article/1080/turkmenistan-authorities-ban-satellite-dishes

64 Darya Kudrawseva, “Туркменистан без спутниковых тарелок” [Turkmenistan without satellite dishes], Gundogar, 05 December 2016, http://gundogar.org/?02450515746000000000000011000000

65 “The State of Broadband 2016: Broadband Catalyzing Sustainable Development,” Broadband Commission, 01 September 2016, http://broadbandcommission.org/Documents/reports/bb-annualreport2016.pdf

66 “Turkmenistan recognized as the country with the most expensive Internet rates,” Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 05 August 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/en/2016/08/turkmenistan-recognized-as-the-country-with-the-most-expensive-internet-rates/

67 “Закон Туркменистана о правом регулировании развития сети Интернет и оказания интернет-услуг в Туркменистане” [Law of Turkmenistan on legal regulation of the Internet and the provision of Internet services], Turkmenistan: the Golden Age, 20 December 2014, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=7948

68 “Some are accused of criticizing the president on Facebook,” RFE/RL, 30 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28024589.html

69 “Конституция Туркменистана (новая редакция)” [Constitution of Turkmenistan (new edition)], Neutral Turkmenistan, 15 September 2016, http://www.parahat.info/law/parahat-info-law-01wn

70 Ibid.

71 “Конституционный пир во время чумы тотального произвола” [A constitutional feast in a time of plague of total impunity], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 22 February 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/02/konstitutsionnyiy-pir-vo-vremya-chumyi-totalnogo-proizvola/

72 “Конституция Туркменистана (новая редакция)” [Constitution of Turkmenistan (new edition)], Neutral Turkmenistan, 15 September 2016, http://www.parahat.info/law/parahat-info-law-01wn

73 “Конституционный пир во время чумы тотального произвола” [A constitutional feast in a time of plague of total impunity], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 22 February 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/02/konstitutsionnyiy-pir-vo-vremya-chumyi-totalnogo-proizvola/

74 "Turkmenistan Streamlines Local Government", Institute for War & Peace, 7 June 2010, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/turkmenistan-streamlines-local-government

75 “Туркменистан: Бывший замхякима осужден на 15 лет” Turkmenistan: Former Deputy Mayor sentenced to 15 years," Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 12 September 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/5629

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 “Бывший хяким города Теджена взят под стражу” [Former hakim of Tejen taken into custody], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 05 05 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/4952

79 Mahmud, “‘Arkadag’ is conducting a ruthless purge,” Radio Azatlyk, 01 10 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28025609.html

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 “Daily News,” RFE/RL, 06 October 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28005644.html

83 Merdan Saryyev, “Turkmenistan: ‘Part of salaries will be deducted’ for Asian Games,” RFE/RL, 30 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28024466.html

84 “С 1 января 2017 году вступает в силу Закон Туркменистана об омбудсмене” [Law of Turkmenistan on the Ombudsman to come into effect January 1 2017", Turkmen State News Agency, 30 November 2016, http://www.tdh.gov.tm/news/articles.aspx&article3449&cat15

85 “Туркмении нужен омбудсмен против произвола чиновников” [Turkmenistan needs an Ombudsman against the arbitrariness of officials], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 16 January 2015, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2015/01/turkmenii-nuzhen-ombudsmen-protiv-proizvola-chinovnikov/

86 “С 1 января 2017 году вступает в силу Закон Туркменистана об омбудсмене” [Law of Turkmenistan on the Ombudsman to come into effect January 1 2017", Turkmen State News Agency, 30 November 2016, http://www.tdh.gov.tm/news/articles.aspx&article3449&cat15

87 “В Меджлисе Туркменистана обсудили законопроект об уполномоченном по правам человека” [The Mejlis of Turkmenistan discussed the bill on the Ombudsman], TURKMENISTAN.RU, 10 July 2016, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/ru/articles/41839.html

88 “Туркменский Национальный институт Демократии и Прав Человека” [Turkmen National Institute of Democracy and Human Rights], Science.gov.tm, http://www.science.gov.tm/organisations/human_rights_institu/

89 “Туркменистан: открытое письмо по поводу нападения на мать, искавшую справедливость” [Turkmenistan: Open letter regarding attacks on a mother seeking justice], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 03 June 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/06/turkmenistan-otkryitoe-pismo-po-povodu-napadeniya-na-mat-iskavshuyu-spravedlivosti/

90 “Закон Туркменистана о суде” [Law of Turkmenistan on Courts], International Labour Organization, 2016, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/84137/93357/F844375246/TKM84137.pdf

91 “First Minister of Culture: The Democratic Party is an unlawful organization,” RFE/RL, 08 December 2011, http://www.azathabar.com/a/24415801.html

92 “Конституция Туркменистана (новая редакция)” [Constitution of Turkmenistan (new edition)], Neutral Turkmenistan, 15 September 2016, http://www.parahat.info/law/parahat-info-law-01wn

93 Peter Wagner and Alison Walsh, “States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2016,” Prison Policy Initiative, 16 June 2016, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html

94 Yowshan Annagurban, “Berdymukhammedov's son Serdar elected as deputy,” RFE/RL, 23 November 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28134591.html

95 “Бердымухамедов-млавший избран депутатом парламентом” [Berdymukhammedov the younger elected member of parliament], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 23 November 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/6103

96 “Сердар Бердымухамедов получил назначение в МИД Туркменистана” [Serdar Berdymukhammedov receives appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 18 July 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/5356

97 Цесаревичи: Самые перспективные дети постсоветского пространства [Little Caesars: The most promising post-Soviet children], Lenta.Ru, 17 January 2016, https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/01/17/goldenyouth/

98 Yowshan Annagurban, “Berdymukhammedov's son Serdar elected as deputy,” RFE/RL, 23 November 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/28134591.html

99 “Сердар Бердымухамедов получил назначение в МИД Туркменистана” [Serdar Berdymukhammedov receives appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 18 July 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/5356

100 “Оппозиция Туркменистана раздражает родственный бизнес Туркменбаши” [Opposition of Turkmenistan irritated by business of relatives of Turkmenbashi," YouTube, 26 December 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZqroUGBKk2I

101 “Особенности национального поступления в вузы и техникумы Туркменистана” [Peculiarities of enrolling in universities and technical schools in Turkmenistan], Alternative News Turkmenistan 19 January 2017, https://habartm.org/archives/6332

102 Ibid

103 Ibid

104 “Нефтяная мафия, или Почему повесился начальник Управления магистральных нефтепроводов” [The oil mafia, or why the head of major oil pipelines hung himself], Alternative News of Turkmenistan, 29 June 2016, https://habartm.org/archives/5277

105 Ibid

106 “В Туркменистане действуют законы, которые невозможно соблюсти” [In Turkmenistan, there are laws that can not followed], Chronicle of Turkmenistan, 27 September 2016, http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/09/v-turkmenistane-deystvuyut-zakonyi-kotoryie-nevozmozhno-soblyusti/

107 Ibid.

108 “В Туркменистане ограничили продажу валюты” [Sale of currency restricted in Turkmenistan] RBK, 20 July 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/finances/20/07/2016/578f64e19a7947a841a044c9

109 Sahra Ghulam Nabi, “Dashoguz: Locals complain about officials' enforced purchase of pipes,” RFE/RL, 29 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/turkmenistan-dashoguz-gaz-olceyji-gural/28021597.html

110 Yowshan Annagurban, “‘Oxygen’ is being cut off for Turkmen entrepreneurs,” RFE/RL, 13 July 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/27856024.html

111 Sahra Ghulam Nabi, “Balkan: Due to ‘voluntary taxes,’ multiple private businesses have shut down,” RFE/RL, 28 September 2016, http://www.azathabar.com/a/turkmenistan-balkan-aziya-oyunlary-asgabat/28018756.htm