Countries at the Crossroads
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Accountability and Public Voice(0 = WORST, 7 = BEST)
Civil Liberties(0 = WORST, 7 = BEST)
Rule of Law(0 = WORST, 7 = BEST)
Anti-Corruption and Transparency(0 = WORST, 7 = BEST)
As Nigeria enters the seventh year of its latest effort to build democratic rule, the country remains trapped at the political crossroads, vacillating between democratic consolidation and the slow road to decay and dissolution. With an estimated population of 130 million growing at nearly 3 percent annually, and an oil output of 2.5 million barrels per day increasing to 4 million by the end of the decade, Nigeria should be taking its rightful place as the giant of Africa. Instead, the giant was brought to its knees by 20 years of brutal and corrupt military rule, which left a legacy of executive dominance and political corruption in the hands of Nigeria’s so-called godfathers – powerful political bosses sitting atop vast patronage networks who view the government primarily through the lens of their own personal enrichment. Since President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999, he has undertaken a number of marginal reforms seeking to reverse this situation. At the same time, however, he has increased his personal hold over the ruling Peoples Democratic Party and refused or been unable to promote the most important reforms to secure democratic consolidation, such as ensuring the independence and probity of the electoral commission or respecting the independence of the legislature through the budgetary process.
Freedom in Nigeria remains protected more by the nation’s immense size and massive diversity than by the actions of its government. The lifting of military rule in 1999 opened the public arena to a host of nonstate actors, producing a renaissance in civil society and the media. Labor unions regained their place as the leading public advocate amid an explosion in the number of civic associations and nongovernmental organizations. Journalists, meanwhile, grew increasingly bold in their political coverage, forcing the removal of two speakers of the House and a Senate president after exposing their corrupt practices. Moreover, with some 250 ethnic groups speaking myriad languages and split evenly across the Muslim-Christian divide, Nigeria’s sheer cultural complexity evokes an environment of constantly shifting alliances and ready balances that tend to check the authoritarian inclinations of the country’s political elite.
Yet the Nigerian government remains distant from serving the interests of its people. Politics at the federal, state, and local levels of the Nigerian federation are dominated by the powerful mandarins who built vast patronage networks during the military days and who now use political office to expand these networks and their personal fortunes. Moreover, many of these so-called godfathers have been cultivating personal militias to secure their positions, prompting a local arms race in some regions, particularly in the oil-producing Niger Delta. Even though several governors are under indictment for money laundering abroad and others are being investigated at home, the bonanza continues at public coffers for these power holders, while basic public infrastructure in many parts of the country remains as dilapidated as it was under military rule. Electricity, for instance, is available to less than half of the population and is on for as little as two hours per day in some areas, while many major roads are nearly impassable, and health clinics face a severe shortage of trained staff and supplies.
To his credit, President Obasanjo has kept the military loyal under civilian control and has undertaken a number of key macroeconomic reforms—including some privatization and paying down the nation’s exorbitant foreign debts—that have fostered moderate GDP growth. He has also set up anticorruption machinery at the federal level. Yet the president has been unable or unwilling to attack the heart of the corruption empires of Nigeria’s godfathers through the government-controlled oil industry, their monopolization and exploitation of government contracts, or their subversion of the nation’s electoral system. Indeed, the president has shown a growing willingness to play their game. He appears inclined to build such a network himself to ensure his tenure beyond his constitutionally limited second term, which ends in 2007. While politicians wrestle endlessly for control, most Nigerians suffer from declining health, poor education, and a lack of employment standards. In fact, the British government has declared that “Nigeria has some of the worst social indicators in the world.”
For freedom and democracy to continue to grow in Nigeria, the government will have to make some tough decisions that work against the interests of many of the powerful men who dominate the nation’s political landscape. These reforms will become even more difficult as the potentially explosive 2007 elections loom near and virtually impossible if the president’s supporters are successful in amending the constitution to extend his time in office, which is likely to require the cooperation and heightened the influence of the godfathers.
The bitter fruits of Nigeria’s flawed 2003 elections came to harvest throughout 2004 and 2005. The drama of the July 2003 coup in Anambra state, where the governor was arrested by what seem to have been rogue police on behalf of an estranged godfather, continued with a string of stunning revelations regarding the extent of election fraud in 2003. While mediating between the governor and the godfather, President Obasanjo (who has close ties to the godfather) told the media that both men admitted to rigging elections in their state. They were both subsequently suspended from the ruling party, and in 2005 an election tribunal overturned the governor’s election. As of late 2005, however, the governor remains in office awaiting an appellate court decision on his case, and the former godfather in question has been readmitted to the ruling party.
A similar drama played out between the governor of Plateau state and his political opponents. Community anger over reportedly rigged elections followed by inflammatory actions and corruption by the governor ignited Muslim-Christian tensions in the state, leading to religious riots in several cities across Nigeria and prompting the president to impose six months of emergency rule in Plateau starting in May 2004.
Worryingly, the president himself appeared to grow less interested in accountability and free elections in 2005. Early in the year he packed the leadership of the ruling party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), with his supporters, who then ensured that backers of the president’s main rival, the vice president, were unable to vote in the PDP party congresses from October to December 2005. This move has ensured that the president’s supporters will have a lock on determining who can run in the PDP primaries in late 2006.
Meanwhile, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) shows little interest in addressing its vulnerability to rigging. Despite stating that the outcome of the 2003 elections was primarily the result of “how much money exchanged hands,” the new INEC chairman later announced that international monitors will not be permitted for the 2007 elections. He also said that the commission intended to introduce electronic voting, but opposition parties voiced concern that the machinery would be even less transparent and prone to more centralized rigging. In addition, because campaign finance laws are minimal and largely not enforced, the president’s supporters will hold an overwhelming advantage as the 2007 elections approach, having both access to state funds and the power of the presidency. INEC also remains chronically underfunded, receiving only 13 percent of its budget appropriation in 2005.
Opposition parties control 8 of the 36 states of the federation, but are too divided to pose much of a challenge to PDP governance. The opposition is generally free to campaign on the pages of newspapers and to some extent in the private televised media, but the government has grown increasingly willing to prevent them from holding rallies in the capital and major cities across the country. In some states and in the rural areas more generally, opposition parties face formal and informal harassment when they organize and campaign. The states of the Niger Delta have proven particularly inhospitable to opposition events; a major opposition figure, Marshall Harry, was assassinated there in 2003. Televised media, especially the public stations, generally carry positive news about the government, although opposing views are occasionally aired. Hostility to opposition within the PDP over 2004 and 2005, however, grew far worse among the factions jostling for control, particularly between those loyal to the president and those connected to the vice president.
Rotation of political offices among Nigeria’s ethnic groups and geographic regions has become a firmly entrenched principle of politics. The leading political parties are widely multiethnic, due in part to progressive election laws, and they typically rotate elected offices and party positions among members of their own party across the main regions of the country. Cabinet offices and leadership positions in the National Assembly are also distributed to mirror the 36 states of the federation, and state-level offices are similarly distributed across intra-state divides. Critics of President Obasanjo’s purported third-term bid, however, have argued that it would violate the rotation principle and jeopardize the fragile stability that this principle has afforded.
The legislatures and judiciaries at the federal and state levels remain largely beholden to the executives, although important pockets of independence have grown. The National Assembly mounted an impeachment effort in 2004 that fizzled after several months, and both the National Assembly and state assemblies contain a number of members truly dedicated to reform who have launched investigations into a number of allegedly corrupt practices. The Supreme Court for its part has shown a dogged determination to protect its independence and to defend the rule of law in Nigeria.
The key source of the executives’ institutional dominance remains their monopoly of public funds. The presidency collects the revenues first (particularly from oil), and even though the National Assembly passes a budget to allocate the funds, the president has refused to release the budgeted amounts every year and instead has released funds as he has seen fit. Governors in turn receive their states’ portions of the oil revenues first; they have used this control as leverage against their assemblies and judicial branches. Within this context, the civil service remains troubled by political patronage and advancement by personal loyalties rather than through objective standards of merit, although some state and federal bureaucracies have improved their performances, as has the military in this regard.
Civil society has grown vibrant in recent years, managing to make its voice heard on a number of important issues, such as fuel price hikes, and some minor legislation. The National Assembly has proven increasingly open to civil society involvement. Perhaps the most important civil society–led legislation is the Freedom of Information Act (see “Anticorruption and Transparency”). Politics overall, however, remain dominated by the Big Men, and civil society groups have to continue to clamor for respect and recognition from many government actors. Moreover, President Obasanjo’s bid for a third-term is prompting many civil society groups to return to organized opposition, a move that will close some of the doors in government that have opened to civil society in recent years.
Nigeria’s fabled independent media remain largely vibrant, particularly on the internet, which is awash in competing political visions and investigative journalism. The print media, however, have increasingly fallen prey to bribery, especially as media houses often refuse to pay field reporters under the expectation that they will raise their own funds. Government harassment of journalists, which was largely absent in Obasanjo’s first term, has reappeared in the last two years. The State Security Service’s closing of the Insider Weekly magazine and arrest of its production manager in 2004 for releasing several articles critical of the president was particularly telling, in that the issue that prompted the arrival of the SSS and the seizure of 15,000 copies alleged that the president was planning to amend the constitution to allow himself a third term in office. In addition, the Bayelsa Broadcasting Corporation and African Independent Television were both closed for periods of 2005 for televising stories on subjects that were deemed politically sensitive. Many journalists feel increasing pressure for self-censorship.
Use of torture by Nigerian police and security services remains rampant, despite condemnation of these practices from the upper echelons of the government and spirited efforts by civil society groups to alter entrenched patterns. Police and military brutality also remain standard practice, particularly in the militarized Niger Delta region, where peaceful, women-led protests against multinational oil corporations’ lack of investment in their communities were met with gunfire on several occasions in 2004 and 2005. Security forces frequently fire indiscriminately when in hot pursuit of suspects. The government occasionally prosecutes unjust police behavior, such as the four police officers who fired at Abuja market traders over nonpayment of bribes in 2005; however, the prominence given to this case by the media underscores the infrequency of such prosecutions.
Ethnic and religious militias, sometimes supported by state actors, also engage in an array of torture and violent practices. State-sponsored enforcers of the Sharia criminal code, known as the Hisbah, are notorious for practicing summary justice that typically involves corporal punishment. Ethnic militias associated with oil smuggling networks are particularly violent and known to murder opponents both within and outside their ranks. The president spearheaded a successful disarmament and amnesty program in the Niger Delta in late 2004, but the program was allowed to lapse and the participating militias had largely rearmed with more modern equipment by late 2005.
Prison conditions across Nigeria remain abysmal. Most inmates do not come to trial for 10 years on average, and police evidence is often poor or fabricated. Policemen are frequently open to hire for a range of noble and ignoble activities, including political skullduggery and criminal gang dealings. Consequently, arrests are often arbitrary and financially motivated, and judicial redress, much less appeals, can often take years unless the individual has powerful political connections. In response to these concerns and to overcrowding in the prisons, the Obasanjo administration announced in January 2006 that it would release 25,000 prisoners, roughly half the entire prison population, who had already served longer terms than they would have received through sentencing had they been brought to trial, or who were too old or sick to be public security concerns. Amnesty International hailed the move as an important step forward, but the structural problems in the justice system remain largely unaddressed.
With regard to women’s rights, Nigeria remains a firmly male-dominated society. Only 24 of the 469 members of the National Assembly are women, and women face significant discrimination in the workplace. President Obasanjo has made some effort to reduce this trend by naming an increasing number of women to high-level positions in his government, including four ministerial positions, most notably the power position of Finance Minister. Women’s organizations across the country have also increased their political advocacy, winning important legal battles that expand women’s protections under the Sharia code, such as the internationally covered case of Amina Lawal, who would have been stoned to death for adultery had she been convicted. At home, however, women face regular brutality; the New York Times reported that one-third of Nigerian women surveyed had responded that they have been beaten by their husbands. In addition, women’s legal rights to property, particularly land, are denied on occasion.
International news coverage over the last two years of Nigerian prostitute-smuggling rings to Europe has brought increasing attention to the scope of this problem. Most of the women are fooled into thinking that they are joining guestworker or exchange programs and then forced into prostitution once they arrive in Europe. The federal government has declared its intention to eradicate the smuggling rings. State and local authorities, however, have been far less willing to become involved, and the police remain on both sides of the issue.
Ethnic-based discrimination is a perpetual problem in a society as diverse as Nigeria’s. Political elites have enshrined ethnic balancing as a political principle, but Nigerians outside the political arena face a more difficult picture. Officially, the constitution condemns ethnic discrimination, but individuals typically derive their citizenship based on the state of origin of their parents or grandparents. Nigerians living outside their home states are, therefore, typically deprived of a range of citizenship privileges, such as running for political office, even if they have lived most of their lives outside their states of origin.
The Nigerian constitution also calls for a principle known as federal character, which is generally applied as ethnic quotas in government hiring. Private companies that do business with the government must also feature ethnically balanced employee profiles in line with federal character standards, and government contracts account for a significant portion of all Nigerian economic activity. Federal character practices have generally led to a more ethnically diverse profile in government hiring and, to some extent, among corporate leadership. Southern Nigerians, however, have historically enjoyed higher income and education levels, and some have complained that federal character has been used primarily to give northerners preference in key positions in business and government; in response, northerners point to southern dominance of the civil service.
Religious freedoms are also a controversial subject in Nigeria. From one perspective, Nigeria allows a level of religious self-determination that is rivaled by few nations of the world, in the sense that each state of the federation is allowed to implement its own religious and traditional legal codes and public policies. Muslim majority states in northern Nigeria have implemented their own interpretations of the Islamic Sharia code and promulgated religious-inspired policies such as banning alcohol, while Christian majority states in the south have passed Christian-inspired policies as well, such as providing public funds for Christian festivals or events. The federal constitution prohibits a state religion, but the federal government provides funds for a range of religious activities such as pilgrimages to Mecca for the Hajj and to Jerusalem for Easter.
The appropriate limits of self-determination of the states, however, are deeply disputed across the federation. The most notable problem has been the case of Christian minorities residing in Muslim-majority states who have argued that they face religious discrimination and persecution. The 12 state governments that have implemented the Sharia criminal code (in addition to the civil code that has been in force since 1979 in most Muslim-majority states) officially claim that most provisions of the code are not applied to Christians, who have recourse to the secular courts, but policies such as alcohol bans have universal effect. Moreover, the Hisbah militias have enforced their interpretations of the Sharia on Christians as well as Muslims, and instances of Hisbah-led violence against Christians in the Sharia states have been reported. Overall, however, rights abuses by the Hisbah appear to have declined since 2003. Muslims living in Christian-majority states have also been targeted for reprisal killings after minor disputes have ignited inter-communal clashes elsewhere in the federation.
Civic associations are generally allowed to form and function freely, and by and large most Nigerians belong to several such groups, including community associations, religious organizations, and a range of trade and professional associations. Trade unions are heavily regulated by the government, but union leaders have been at the forefront of opposition to a number of Obasanjo administration policies, most notably fuel price hikes. In response to union activism, the Obasanjo administration pushed the National Assembly to introduce legislation in 2005 to break up the umbrella union of all Nigerian trade unions, the Nigerian Labour Congress, but the assembly has yet to pass it.
Union and other public demonstrations are generally allowed, but the government has prohibited or blocked them on occasion. Several unionists and opposition figures have been arrested at these protests, including Nobel laureate and opposition leader Wole Soyinka briefly in May 2004. Security forces fired on peaceful protesters on several occasions over the period of this report, as noted in the case of women’s movements in the Niger Delta, or in the case of ethnic-interest rallies in the Igbo, Yoruba, or other regions. Most worrisome, however, was the government’s de facto admission in 2005 that the machinery for the notorious death squads active under General Sani Abacha in the 1990s has apparently not been dismantled, and that hitmen from these squads – some awaiting trial – have been returned to duty at the Directorate of Military Intelligence and other state security services.
Nigeria’s judiciary continues to be vulnerable to compromise through bribery and political influence. Starved of funds and intimidated by the executive for decades, many judges have lost their independence. The national body charged with administering to the judiciary, the National Judicial Council (NJC), has made some efforts to crack down on these practices, and the National Bar Association continues to be an important critic of and advocate for judicial development. The appointment and promotion processes in particular have seen some improvement through NJC action, and several judges have been dismissed for impropriety. Notably, the NJC suspended the two judges who gave initial legal backing to the Anambra coup (see above), in which a political godfather paid an assistant inspector general of the police to arrest the Anambra governor in an effort to force him to resign.
Yet the Anambra fiasco underscores the fact that only the most high-profile and brazen breaches of the rule of law typically get remedial attention, while the bulk of the system remains deeply susceptible to compromise. Moreover, both the federal and state executives have shown an increasing selectivity in enforcing court judgments over the past two years, as well as a willingness to overstep their constitutional authority. The president set the tone in this regard when in May 2004 he declared a state of emergency in Plateau state and suspended the governor, deputy governor, and state assembly for six months, placing the state under a military-style sole administrator in the interim. The National Assembly quickly moved to authorize the president’s declaration after the fact, but the Nigerian Bar Association argued that these dismissals far exceeded the president’s constitutional emergency powers and that the attorney general admitted that they had been made under a defunct 1961 law.
The Supreme Court remains the most trusted judicial body in the federation, after several landmark rulings in the early part of the decade. Because of this trust, however, it has been overburdened with a crush of appeals cases. Thus, the court ruled on the suit brought by the losing candidate for the 2003 presidential election only in July 2005, although part of this delay was attributed to the election tribunals themselves. Supreme Court analysts have also been waiting to see if the four new justices appointed to the court in mid-2005 by President Obasanjo will continue in the path-breaking role of their predecessors.
Under Nigerian law, citizens are presumed innocent until proven guilty, although some Nigerian interpretations of the Sharia criminal code place differential burdens of proof on men and women in certain circumstances. Once an accused person has entered the system, he or she is rarely afforded legal representation. A number of human rights organizations across the country try to offer legal assistance, but they are capable of reaching only a small percentage of the total number of cases in the country. Moreover, persons can remain in detention for more than a decade before coming to trial (see “Civil Liberties”).
Presidential control of the military and internal security forces has remained fairly constant over the past several years, but legislative oversight and civilian defense capacity have grown slowly. In the field, the security services remain unpredictable, using deadly force unnecessarily on occasion and harassing the public by demanding bribes at security checkpoints. In a particularly egregious incident of indiscipline, army and police officers have even leveled their guns at each other over an interpersonal dispute, turning a Lagos neighborhood into a war zone for two days in October 2005.
The Nigerian constitution clearly states that all Nigerians have the right to own property. An important exception is property that sits upon mineral, oil, or gas deposits, which is owned by the federal government. Moreover, the 1978 Land Use Act effectively placed all land under state control, creating a difficult network of government licensing astride traditional communal approaches to land tenure, which together remain in practice across the federation. This arrangement allows the federal and state governments to revoke property rights with relative ease and without engaging in a deliberative legal process. This has been most evident in disputes over control of oil-producing lands, but housing contracts awarded under military regimes or other instances have also been arbitrarily revoked without judicial decisions.
President Obasanjo has made anticorruption a central priority for his administration. In 2000 he established the Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), which has sweeping powers to investigate and prosecute public corruption. The ICPC, however, has made only a handful of arrests of prominent individuals, primarily in connection with a bribery case involving several state high court justices. Consequently, the president in 2003 created a second anticorruption commission, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which was originally tasked with tracking down the many “419” or financial fraud networks and other scams that had become Nigeria’s fifth-largest foreign exchange earners by 2004. The EFCC soon gained tremendous credibility with the public, such that it was tasked with a wider array of anticorruption responsibilities. In early 2005, the EFCC even arrested the inspector general of police for stealing public funds and leveled charges against two governors. The education minister and the Senate president were also forced to resign in mid-2005 over corruption allegations—raised by the president himself on national television—although neither individual has so far been prosecuted.
Since 2003, the federal government has been publishing the revenues and budget allocations of the federal, state, and local governments on the internet, which has improved overall transparency in budgetary matters. The president’s Due Process Unit also received international recognition of its work to improve the quality and transparency of government contracts issued under capital projects, which account for roughly 15 percent of the total federal budget. In addition, Nigeria signed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2003, under which the government promised to undertake elaborate auditing and publication of oil revenues over the course of 2005 with civil society and media oversight. This information is to be released in early 2006; Shell—the largest petroleum corporation active in Nigeria—is working with the government through EITI and has been releasing data on its oil earnings and payments to the federal government.
These laudable efforts have begun to chip away at the edges of corruption in Nigeria, but the overall system remains deeply compromised. Federal government contracts are routinely inflated to provide kickbacks for officeholders, and contractors frequently provide substandard or nonexistent services. State and local-level corruption has been far more brazen. The British government in 2005 accused two Nigerian governors of money laundering, jailing one of them while in London for surgery (yet who somehow managed to escape Britain while on bail). The EFCC investigated both cases and arrested one governor after he was impeached. Details of many of the 36 governors’ foreign assets have begun to circulate in the media, including lavish properties in Britain and the United States.
Nigerian media reports allege that powerful politicians own an array of front companies, particularly in the oil industry, that receive preferential treatment in access to buying and selling control of oil prospecting zones and other profitable enterprises. Moreover, roughly 10 percent of Nigeria’s oil is being bunkered—stolen from pipes by rogue militias and criminal gangs in the Niger Delta region and resold on the black market. Many observers of Nigerian politics, Human Rights Watch among them, indicate that these bunkering empires have connections to some of the nation’s most powerful figures, as well as allies within the military and oil corporations themselves. Such grand corruption filters down throughout the system, such that Nigeria stood as the sixth most corrupt nation in the world on Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index.
Officeholders are required to submit declarations of assets to the Code of Conduct Bureau, but these declarations are not made public. The bureau, which has a wide mandate to probe the ethics of public officers, has been largely dormant. Moreover, public officeholders are not required to retire from their corporate positions, and their businesses regularly contract with the government despite the obvious conflicts of interest. The president himself remains owner of Obasanjo Farms, which has done business with the government and for which he reported $250,000 in monthly earnings in 2004.
Worryingly, some of the gains made in building anticorruption machinery were in danger of politicization by late 2005. The EFCC in particular was showing a disturbing tendency to investigate prominent political figures who were opponents of the president. Other important transparency mechanisms have been restrained: The auditor general’s office has been largely quiet since early 2003 when the auditor general was removed after he released a report decrying fiscal irregularities at all three tiers of government. Private accounting practices, for their part, also remain problematic.
A new Freedom of Information Act passed the House in 2004 and is likely to pass the Senate in 2006, which would provide citizens and public advocacy organizations outlets for requesting government documents and information. Whistleblowers will also gain some protections under the Freedom of Information Act, but at present they enjoy no formal legal cover. Government agencies in general retain a culture of secrecy, and officers are often reluctant to share even mundane information.
- Proper checks and balances should be restored to Nigerian democracy by giving the legislatures control of revenue collection, appropriation, and allocation agencies and processes so that the assemblies truly have the power of the purse.
- The independence of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must be assured. This can be achieved in part by giving the INEC direct access to a guaranteed minimum percentage of the federal budget, extending the tenure of the chair to an 8- to 10-year term (subject to impeachment), giving opposition parties significant oversight of the election process, and allowing domestic and international election monitors substantive watchdog roles. State electoral commissions, now often heavily manipulated by local politicians, should be absorbed into INEC.
- The party primary process should be reformed so that candidates must win their nominations through competitive, open elections sanctioned by the INEC, which should monitor and regulate party finances and election expenditures.
- Political opposition and opposition parties should be allowed to organize and hold peaceful public rallies and events without unreasonable government interference or prohibition. Opposition parties should be given formal oversight roles in the legislatures, including substantial voice in the anticorruption oversight committees.
- Government harassment and detention of journalists should stop, and the media houses should be encouraged to institute standards and oversight practices to expunge bribery from Nigerian journalism. Civil society groups should be given the government access and oversight privileges that are expected in a free society.
- The federal government should undertake a sweeping reform of the police, the security services, and the prison system; torture in particular should not be tolerated, while perpetrators of torture should be investigated and punished.
- The federal government should investigate the persistence of Abacha-era death squad machinery in the security services, dismantle any that are discovered, and dismiss officers who are known to have taken part in these units.
- Federal and state governments should undertake comprehensive efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militias across the country, focusing on those in the Niger Delta in particular, while dismantling the oil-bunkering networks and prosecuting the political kingpins who benefit from them.
- The government should respect the rights of Nigerian unionists to organize, peacefully protest, and strike, and should refrain from dismantling the Nigerian Labour Congress.
- Implementation of constitutional and legal provisions must be improved, especially regarding women’s rights.
- The President and the National Assembly should work with the National Judicial Council and the Supreme Court to undertake a sweeping reform of the Nigerian judicial system. Particular attention should be paid to giving the judiciary direct access to its portion of the budget, with a minimum guaranteed percentage, and control over all logistics necessary for its proper functioning.
- All Nigerians should have access to free legal counsel in the secular, Sharia, and customary courts when they have been accused of criminal offenses. The government should sponsor an extensive public education program, particularly in the rural areas, that alerts Nigerians to their fundamental rights.
- The federal government should undertake a comprehensive review of land ownership in Nigeria and reform the system in a manner that better protects individual property rights and that protects poorer, traditional, and communal landowners.
- The National Assembly should develop Nigeria’s conflict-of-interest laws so that public officeholders must resign all other positions of employment before taking office; the assembly should conduct an independent review of the privatization process to date.
- To assure increased balance and depoliticizing of Nigeria’s anticorruption efforts, the ICPC should be moved to the control of the National Assembly, while the EFCC should endeavor to refocus its activities to its original mandate, perhaps by moving the higher profile political cases to office of the attorney general. The Code of Conduct Bureau should be reformed and should publicize the declarations of assets of all public officers. Independent state-level anticorruption machinery should also be established as required in the original ICPC law.
- The president should expand the Due Process Unit and give it authority to review all procurements under government contracts across the budget. Civil society groups should continue their participation in the unit’s review process.
- The office of the auditor general should be moved to report directly to the National Assembly, with an extended term of office and a guaranteed budget to help ensure its independence.
- The Nigerian government should fulfill all its obligations under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in a timely fashion and require that any corporation, foreign or domestic, that does business in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria be a signatory to the EITI.
 Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman, eds., Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), ch. 1, 328–57.
 Nike Sotade, “A Nation in the Grip of Darkness,” The Guardian (Nigeria), 9 January 2006.
 “Nigeria,” in Country Profiles: Africa (London: Department for International Development (DFID), 4 January 2006), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/nigeria.asp.
 “Obasanjo Tackles Ogbeh over State of Nation,” Vanguard (Nigeria), 19 January 2005.
 “Disquiet over Proposed PDP Convention,” The Guardian, 12 September 2005.
 “Iwu to Tackle Polls Fraud,” The Guardian, 13 July 2005; “CDD Statement on Expressed Intention to Bar Foreign Monitors from Nigeria’s 2007 Elections” (London/Lagos/Abuja: Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), 28 September 2005).
 Ndubisi Obiorah, ed., Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria: Prospects and Strategies for Reform (Lagos: Heinrich Boll Foundation, January 2004).
 “2007 Elections Shaky –INEC Boss,” The Tribune (Nigeria), 7 September 2005.
 Reuben Abati, “Kano, Plateau, and the Agents of Violence,” The Guardian, 14 May 2004.
 See, for instance, incidents reported by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ); “Nigeria” in Attacks on the Press in 2004 (New York: CPJ, 2005), http://www.cpj.org/regions_06/africa_06/africa_06.html#nigeria.
 “SSS Defends Raid on Magazine, Rights Group Disagrees,” The Guardian, 7 September 2004.
 “The Closure of Bayelsa State,” The Guardian, 12 December 2005.
 “Nigeria: Despite Reforms, Police Routinely Practice Torture” (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW], 27 July 2005.
 “One feared dead as soldiers quell women’s protest in Isoko Local Council of Delta State,” The Guardian, 18 February 2005.
 Sharon LaFraniere, “Entrenched Epidemic: Wife-Beatings in Africa,” The New York Times, 11 August 2005.
 Jibrin Ibrahim, “Affirmative Action in Nigeria” (London: Overseas Development Institute, Inter-Regional Inequality Facility, 11 July 2005), http://www.odi.org.uk/inter-regional_inequality/papers/Policy%20Brief%2015%20-%20Nigeria.pdf.
 “Court Remands NLC Leaders in Prison,” ThisDay (Nigeria), 15 October 2003; “Wole Soyinka Detained by Police,” BBC Online, 15 May 2004.
 “News in Brief,” Nigeria Today Online, 14 November 2005.
 “NJC Suspends Nnaji over Order on Ngige,” The Guardian, 25 March 2004.
 Nigerian Bar Association, “To Save Democracy,” The Guardian, 9 June 2004. See also Constitution of Nigeria, Section 305, for president’s power to declare a state of emergency.
 See the Constitution of Nigeria, Section 44 (3).
 “Rivers Communities Shut Shell Facilities,” The Guardian, 17 August 2005.
 “ICPC Arrests Akwa Ibom Chief Judge,” The Guardian, 21 April 2004.
 “2004 People and the Environment Annual Report” (Lagos: Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 27 May 2005), http://www.shell.com/static/nigeria/downloads/about_shell/2004_rpt.pdf.