Bahrain

Not Free
71/100
Key Developments: 

June 1, 2017 - May 31, 2018

  • In July 2017, the partial internet shutdown in Diraz came to halt after over one year, without any acknowledgment from the regulatory authority to consumers (see Restrictions on Connectivity).

  • The license of one ISP was revoked for failing to implement the unified filtering solution (see Regulatory Bodies).

  • Forced self-censorship remained a problem, with authorities interrogating and threatening local journalists, bloggers, and activists (see Content Removal and Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation).

  • At least 27 people were arrested, detained, or prosecuted for their online activities, seven of whom received prison sentences totalling 207 months (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).

  • For the first time, some users received prison sentences of five to six years for retweets. In August 2017, a man was sentenced to six years in prison for retweeting an alleged insult to the king, the harshest sentence ever for the crime (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).

  • Online anonymity was compromised when authorities set a deadline for the annual re-registration of all SIM cards before mid-2018 to avoid disconnection (see Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity).

Introduction: 

Internet freedom in Bahrain improved slightly in 2018 due to the lifting of the partial internet shutdown in Diraz. However, the continued censorship of human rights defenders, online journalists, and opposition websites, as well as the jailing and torture of activists for social media posts, posed serious restrictions to online freedom and human rights.

Although Bahrain has among the highest internet penetration rates in the world, government efforts to quell unrest have impinged on internet freedom. In 2011, the government initiated a violent crackdown, with the support of Saudi Arabia’s military, on peaceful protests that called for greater representation of the majority Shiite population in the country’s Sunni-led government. Since then, authorities have suppressed online dissidents with censorship, arrests, intimidation, and torture. In June 2016, the government renewed its widespread crackdown on Shiite leaders and the political opposition, dissolving the main opposition groups of al-Wefaq and Waad, imprisoning opposition leaders, and interrogating and threatening internet users who are critical of the government.

Hundreds of websites remained blocked. The list of banned topics for online discussion continues to grow, and includes discussions on regional politics as well as criticism of the royal family. The authorities have cracked down on online criticism of the Saudi-led war in Yemen, as well as expressions of support for Qatar since the government severed diplomatic relations in June 2017.

Bahrainis still use social media to call attention to human rights abuses, but the government has severely restricted media coverage relating to human rights. Al-Wasat, the only independent newspaper in the country, has remained suspended since June 2017, leaving internet users increasingly dependent on foreign news sites. The authorities have used interrogations and intimidation to force some users to delete content, alter the tone of online posts, or even leave the country for their safety.

While social media has proven more difficult to censor, authorities often use social media posts as evidence in prosecutions against opposition leaders. From June 2017 to May 2018, seven internet users were sentenced to a total of 207 month in prison. One user was sentenced to six years in prison for retweeting an alleged insult of the king, the harshest sentence ever handed down for the crime. Arrests and prosecutions for insulting the king or defaming the government under the country’s harsh penal code continued. Human rights groups have documented multiple instances of torture used against online activists, often to extract confessions.

Obstacles to Access: 

Bahrain is one of the most highly connected countries in the world. Competitive prices for broadband data services have led to high levels of mobile internet penetration. A partial internet shutdown in Diraz that continued for over a year was lifted in July 2017 without any acknowledgment from the regulator. The license of one internet service provider (ISP) was also revoked for failing to implement the unified filtering solution.

Availability and Ease of Access

Bahrain has risen rapidly in the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) ICT Development Index (IDI),1 and ranked first in the Arab region in 2017.2 Internet penetration stood at nearly 96 percent by the end of 2017, according to the ITU. Bahrain had 2.36 million mobile subscriptions at the end of 2017, a penetration rate of 163 percent. Broadband penetration was at 164 percent or 2.37 million subscriptions, of which 93 percent consisted of mobile broadband.3

Prices for mobile broadband are among the lowest in the region (US$21 for 10GB).4 Fixed-line broadband subscriptions with a 20 Mbps connection cost BHD 20 (US$26), ­less than one percent of the average Bahraini’s monthly income, with similar prices for mobile internet.5 Speeds have also increased, and the current average download speed is 37.3 Mb/s; 74 percent of files are downloaded with a speed exceeding 10 Mb/s, according to a 2017 report.6 An audit indicated that 100 percent of the population is within reach of 3G and 4G mobile networks.7 Batelco, a state-controlled ISP, began offering “superfast” 500 Mbps speeds to residential subscribers in 2016,8 while 4G LTE mobile subscriptions have been available since 2013.

Internet access is widely available in schools, universities, shopping malls, and coffee shops, where Bahrainis often gather to work and study. Adult literacy is at nearly 95 percent, and Bahrainis possess a high level of English language proficiency.9 The government provides free computer training programs, which had served nearly 17,000 citizens by September 2017.10

Restrictions on Connectivity

From June 23, 2016 to July 30, 2017, authorities implemented an “internet curfew” in the town of Diraz. The curfew was imposed when security forces besieged the town after protestors staged a sit-in around the house of Shiite cleric Issa Qassem.11 A violent crackdown on the sit-in on May 23, 201712 left at least five dead and dozens injured.13 Mobile data connections were disabled and fixed-line connectivity was heavily disrupted every day between 7pm and 1am.14 ISPs initially claimed the disruptions were due to a technical error, but later advised customers to contact the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA).15

One report estimated that residents spent over US$900,000 on telecommunications services that they never received over the 13 months of the daily internet shutdowns.16 The report did not calculate the additional impact on small businesses, which could not process payments during the hours when service was blocked.17 No action was taken by the TRA to address consumer complaints about the shutdowns, despite widespread criticism from the media18 and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).19

Although there is no centralized internet backbone in Bahrain, all ISPs are indirectly controlled by the government through orders from the TRA. Service providers connect to numerous international cables and gateways provided by Tata, Flag, Saudi Telecom, Etisalat, and Qatar Telecom, among others, making the country less prone to unintentional internet outages.20 TRA is working with the telecom companies to establish the National Broadband Network (NBN), which is supported by a single fixed fiber-optic network. The TRA aims to have the NBN ready by 2019.21

ICT Market

Batelco, Zain, and VIVA are the three mobile phone operators, and also serve as the main ISPs, along with Menatelecom, the fourth largest ISP. In December 2017, VIVA acquired Menatelecom.22 In total, around 15 ISPs operated at the end of 2017.23The government has a controlling stake in the largest ISP, Batelco, while other ISPs are owned by investors from the private sector, including non-Bahraini investors.

In April 2017, the chairperson of the TRA board announced a plan to establish a national fiber-optic broadband network, allowing all service providers to share fiber-optic infrastructure built by Batelco.24 The plan includes splitting Batelco into two entities: one that will continue its retail services, and another that will become the National Ground Cables Company, which will own the infrastructure and provide wholesale services to the licensed telecom operators.25 The splitting process is being monitored by a committee that includes members of the Ministry of Interior, National Security Apparatus (NSA), and the Defense Force.26

Regulatory Bodies

Mobile phone services and ISPs are regulated by the TRA under the 2002 Telecommunications Law. The TRA is responsible for licensing telecommunication providers and for developing “a competition-led market for the provision of innovative communications services, available to all.”27 Although the TRA is theoretically an independent organization, in practice its members are appointed by the government and its chairman reports to the Minister of State for Telecommunications. The Information Affairs Authority, which regulates the press and publications,28 merged with the Ministry of Information Affairs (MIA) in December 2016.29 In August 2016, the TRA issued a decision ordering all telecommunication companies in Bahrain to purchase and use a unified technical system for blocking websites (see Blocking and Filtering).

There have been no reported instances of ISPs being denied registration permits. In February 2016, the TRA revoked the license of the small mobile and fixed-line provider 2Connect.30 Among other issues, the company had failed to “provide a lawful access capability plan,”31 which would allow security forces to access metadata about communications sent over its network.32 In December 2017, the TRA revoked the license of another small ISP, Bahrain Broadband,33 following a notice period, for failure to comply with several TRA regulations, including failure to implement the unified technical solution for filtering and blocking, and failure to remain continuously connected to the central management system.34

Limits on Content: 

A significant level of coerced self-censorship was noted during the coverage period, with users curtailing their online activities after being interrogated and threatened by authorities. With the ongoing suspension of the country’s only independent newspaper, independent journalism continued online, but outlets often avoided covering controversial topics. Online journalists who criticize the government face intimidation and potential arrest.

Blocking and Filtering

Political content is widely blocked, and authorities ramped up censorship after the 2011 prodemocracy protests, in which online media played an important role. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services are freely available, although authorities have blocked a number of messaging and livestreaming apps.

In May 2017, authorities blocked several websites, including the Qatari outlets Al Jazeera, Al Sharq, and Al Raya.35 In June 2017, the website of Qatar Airways was also blocked.36 The move took place in the wake of a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and several Middle Eastern countries after hackers posted a fake report on the Qatar News Agency website and social media accounts, in which the emir of Qatar appeared to praise Hamas and call Iran an “Islamic power.” Several countries, including Bahrain, severed diplomatic relations with Qatar following the incident.37

In June 2016, authorities blocked the communications app Telegram, which was popular among independent media, political opposition, and protest groups in Bahrain.38 Lualua TV, an opposition news outlet based overseas, had four URLs associated with its website blocked within one week.39 The same month, authorities banned two Shiite organizations and blocked40 their websites: Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, the country’s main Shiite opposition group, and the Islamic Enlightenment Society (Al-Taweya), a prominent Shiite religious organization.41

Several livestreaming services remained blocked during the coverage period,42 such as PalTalk and Matam.tv, which have been used to conduct political seminars43 and broadcast Shiite religious ceremonies, respectively.44 The live-streaming service Periscope was still available in mid-2018. A crowdsourced list of 367 blocked websites indicated that 39 percent of sites blocked as of August 2018 were political in nature, while 23 percent related to the use of tools to bypass blocking and censorship, such as anonymizers and web proxies.45

Other blocked websites include Bahrain Online, a prominent online forum;46 the Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI); the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR); Bahrain Mirror, a popular news site; and Al-Quds Al-Araby, a London-based newspaper.47 A report from November 2015 indicated that more than 85 percent of Bahraini websites are hosted outside of the country,48 despite excellent infrastructure. Even if they are blocked, websites hosted overseas are less vulnerable to being removed at the behest of the government and remain accessible to Bahrainis with access to censorship circumvention tools.

Multiple state organizations, including the MIA and the Ministry of Interior, can order the blocking of a website without a court order. The MIA blocks websites that violate articles 19 and 20 of the Press Rules and Regulations, which include material judged as “instigating hatred of the political regime, encroaching on the state's official religion, breaching ethics, encroaching on religions and jeopardizing public peace or raising issues whose publication is prohibited by the provisions of this law.”49The publication of false news is deemed a crime according to article 70 of the same law. The Press Rules and Regulations were originally drafted for print media and do not specifically address online content, although they are referenced in regulating the internet. Thus, any site that criticizes the government or the royal family is vulnerable to blocking. An updated list of blocked websites is regularly sent to ISPs, which are instructed to “prohibit any means that allow access to sites blocked.”50 Licenses of ISPs may be revoked by the TRA for failing to cooperate with the MIA’s blocking orders.51

In August 2016, the TRA ordered all telecommunications companies to employ a centralized system for blocking websites managed by the TRA.52 The order is related to a US$1.2 million contract awarded in 2016 to Canadian company Netsweeper to provide a “national website filtering solution.”53 Netsweeper has since been identified on nine ISPs in the country, and filters political content on at least one.54

The decision-making process and government policies behind the blocking of websites are not transparent. The list of all blocked websites is not available to the public. In addition, webmasters do not receive notifications or explanations when their websites are banned. When trying to access a blocked site, users are only informed that the website has been “blocked for violating regulations and laws of Kingdom of Bahrain.” Although the law does technically allow affected individuals to appeal a block within 15 days, no such case has yet been adjudicated.

Content Removal

Website administrators can be held legally responsible for content posted on their platforms, including alleged libel. In February 2016, the Interior Ministry stated that WhatsApp group administrators may be held liable for spreading false news if they fail to report incidents that occur in their group.55 The spread of false news that damages national security or public order is a criminal offense punishable by up to two years in prison.56

In May 2017, an article about the deadly crackdown on the protest in Diraz was removed from the website of Turkish news outlet TRT World one day after it was published, in the wake of a complaint made by Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry to the Turkish government.57 In November 2017, the progovernment newspaper Akhbar-Alkhaleej removed an op-ed article about corruption from its website after its print publication.58

In January 2017, the government claimed that it had met with Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat to remove unidentified “inappropriate content.” According to transparency reports, neither Google, Facebook, Twitter, nor Snapchat removed any content based on requests from the Bahraini authorities. Twitter did receive two removal requests in the first half of 2017, but did not withhold any content.59

Authorities also use extralegal measures to forcibly remove online content. Through arrests,60 prosecutions,61 and torture,62 security forces have coerced many online forum moderators to permanently shut down their websites.63 After being interrogated by security forces in May 2017, activist Adel Al-Marzooq deleted all content he posted on Twitter between March and May 2017. He had reported extensively on the Diraz protest and crackdown (see Restrictions on Connectivity).64Opposition lawyer Ebrahim Sarhan also deleted all of his tweets between February and May 2017 following an interrogation, and later fled Bahrain to continue his activism abroad.65 Twitter accounts operated by the opposition have also been temporarily or permanently shut down due to government supporters reporting them for violating the platform’s policies, including 15 accounts that were targeted in February 2018.66

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Newspapers must obtain licenses from Bahrain’s mass media directorate in order to disseminate electronic media on websites or social media, according to Decree 68/2016.67 The law does not detail what criteria is used to grant or renew the one-year license. Additionally, newspapers may not post videos over two minutes in length and are forbidden from live streaming video. The law also stipulates that electronic media must reflect the same content as their printed counterparts, effectively limiting other multimedia content. Furthermore, outlets must provide a list of their social media accounts and website addresses, as well as the names of those who oversee them as part of the license application, exposing employees to possible monitoring and coercion. Under the existing press law, media professionals face six months of imprisonment and/or a fine of BHD 5,000 (US$ 13,260) for publishing without a license.

In June 2017, the MIA ordered the indefinite suspension of Al-Wasat, Bahrain’s only independent newspaper. 68 The MIA initially temporarily barred the outlet from using electronic media tools in January 2017, effectively shutting down its website and social media accounts for three days.69 The move occurred one day after Al-Wasat published a headline story about the execution of three political prisoners. The MIA claimed the outlet was "inciting a spirit of division and harming national unity." At the end of the reporting period, the outlet remained offline and some of Al-Wasat’s reporters had begun reporting news on their own social media accounts, including on Instagram.70

The authorities are known to manipulate online content in order to fabricate greater public support for government policies. According to the watchdog group Bahrain Watch, the government has hired 18 public relations (PR) firms for promotional campaigns since February 2011, representing at least US$32 million in contracts.71 At least one PR agency was contracted to provide “web optimization and blogging” services,72 while others were hired for online reputation management.73 The New Yorker reported in 2018 that the PR firm Bell Pottinger provided its Bahraini clients with a list of the most effective dissidents and activists on social media “at a time when Bahraini officials were imprisoning and torturing people who spoke out against the regime.”74 In October 2014, another PR company tried to persuade the Huffington Post not to write about the United Kingdom’s investigation of torture allegations against the king’s son.75

Progovernment blogs like Citizens for Bahrain also spread propaganda.76 Authorities have urged progovernment users to post about certain topics.77 In January 2014, the prime minister and the minister of telecommunications held several public meetings with progovernment users to encourage them to “defend Bahrain’s ruling system.”78 In December 2017, the government launched a Twitter campaign celebrating the anniversary of the king’s accession to the throne, during which a king emoji was automatically added to posts, including tweets using #Bahrain.79

Similarly, an “army of trolls” has been active on Twitter since 2011,80 when hundreds of accounts suddenly emerged to collectively harass and intimidate online activists,81 commentators, and journalists who voiced support for protests and human rights.82 Progovernment trolls have been moderately effective in silencing or reducing the activity of opposition voices both inside Bahrain83 and abroad.84 The commentators have also played a role in spreading information that is controversial or false, in order to distort the image of protesters, spread hate and conflict, or discredit information posted on social networks.85 For example, in October 2017 trolls hijacked a Twitter campaign raising awareness about Bahraini child prisoners. Unknown users posted messages to justify the imprisonment of children, accusing them of being trained by their families to be terrorists.86 In another example, in June 2016 trolls defended the decision to revoke the nationality of Isa Qassim, the foremost Shiite religious authority in Bahrain. Researchers said 50 percent of tweets distributed using #Bahrain were bots and trolls tweeting anti-Shiite messages. In a period of 12 hours, over 5,000 sectarian tweets were registered on the hashtag. 87Twitter suspended 1,800 bot accounts related to the manipulation campaign.88

Research from 2013 also revealed connections between the Bahraini government and “extremist” accounts on Twitter and Facebook, which advocated violence against both the government and protesters.89 It was also revealed that the government impersonates opposition figures on social media in order to send malicious links, such as IP trackers, to anonymous government critics that can be used to identify and prosecute them.90

The state also issues official statements warning against the discussion of certain subjects and the “misuse” of social media.91 In June 2017, the Ministry of Interior warned against “any show of sympathy or favoritism for the Qatar government or objection to Bahrain’s action” over social media, and warned that such displays could lead to a jail term of up to five years and a fine.92 The MIA issued a similar warning to media outlets against publishing anything that “condones or justifies Qatari policies by any means.”93 Previously, in January 2016, the Ministry of Interior threatened to take action against any insult or “negative discussion” of the Saudi executions of Nimr Al-Nimr, a prominent Shiite cleric, and 42 other men.94

There are some government restrictions on online advertising, but many opposition websites continue to operate nonetheless. While it is difficult for blocked websites to secure advertising, popular sites such as Bahrain Mirror (390,000 views monthly) have not faced significant financial pressures. This is due to the fact that most Bahraini opposition websites are run with limited resources and are often self-funded. Furthermore, the websites continue to receive large amounts of traffic from users within Bahrain through the use of proxy services, dynamic IP addresses, and virtual private network (VPN) applications. While the government blocks access to circumvention tools, including workarounds such as Google Page Translate, Google cached pages, and online mobile emulators, internet-savvy Bahrainis are often able to bypass the restrictions.

The internet remains the main source of information and news for many Bahrainis, particularly those active on Twitter and Facebook.95 For example, in May 2017, social media users were the only sources to cover the attack on the Diraz sit-in. However, internet users often exercise a high degree of self-censorship, particularly as investigations of users’ online activities have been launched at workplaces and universities.96 On Twitter, online forums, and comment sections, most people use pseudonyms for fear of being targeted by the authorities.97 Many share content privately on social media instead of publicly. Activists often stop tweeting following detentions and interrogations, and those who return to the platform after being detained frequently avoid controversial subjects.98

Digital Activism

Activists rely on digital tools to bring attention to protests and human rights violations, given restrictions on press freedom and the lack of international media coverage on issues within Bahrain, which is compounded by the fact that many prominent journalists are barred from the country.99 In August 2017, online activist Yousif Al-Jamri shared to Twitter a video appeal to the king to end the interrogation sessions he endured from the NSA, which included death and rape threats, and to protect him from further threats of arrest. He also shared evidence of the NSA summoning him for further interrogation. His posts gained wide attention and were circulated across social media,100 and, eventually, the inspector general of the NSA announced an investigation into Yousif’s allegations (see Intimidation and Violence).

In addition, the Coalition of February 14 Youth protest movement continues to use social networks101 to organize protests and bring international attention to local causes.102 YouTube videos are uploaded to document police attacks on civilians and testimonies of torture,103 and relatives or friends of detainees regularly use Twitter to campaign for their release and to provide updates about prison conditions.104

Violations of User Rights: 

Violations of user rights in Bahrain were rampant, with at least 27 users arrested, detained, or prosecuted over the coverage period for their online activities. In a troubling development, users were prosecuted and convicted to harsh sentences for retweets. Collectively, 207 months of prison sentences were handed down to seven users, while others remain on trial or in detention. There was also an increase in incidents of torture against online activists to force them to suspend their activity.

Legal Environment

Bahrain’s legal environment presents many obstacles to internet freedom. According to article 23 of the constitution, freedom of expression is guaranteed, “provided that the fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people is not prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism is not aroused.”105 Article 26 states that all written, telephonic, and electronic communications “shall not be censored or their confidentiality be breached except in exigencies specified by law and in accordance with procedures and under guarantees prescribed by the law.”106 The Press and Publications Law of 2002 promises free access to information “without prejudice to the requirements of national security and defending the homeland.” Bahraini journalists have argued that these qualifying statements and loosely-worded clauses allow for arbitrary interpretation and, in practice, the negation of the rights they claim to uphold.107

In February 2018, the cabinet endorsed a draft amendment to the penal code that would increase the maximum prison sentence for posting private news, comments, or images deemed defamatory from one year to three years, and would increase the maximum fine from BD 500 (US$1,327) to BD 10,000 (US$26,5333). The amendment has been referred to the Council of Representatives for their review.108 The Council’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and National Security Committee has in turn reviewed the amendment and recommended its passage in May 2018.109 However, it was still under discussion at the Council at the end of the reporting period.

In April 2017, the king approved a constitutional amendment to allow civilians to be tried in military courts.110 When military courts last operated in this manner during a state of emergency in 2011, judges handed down long prison sentences of 15 years to life for bloggers. In addition, the public prosecutor has begun using a legal provision that calls for the prosecution of parents when their children are arrested for criminal activities, such as “misusing social media.”111

Online censorship and criminal penalties for online speech are currently enforced under the 2002 Press and Publications Law,112 which does not specifically mention online activities, but has been applied to digital media. The law allows for prison sentences from six months to five years for repeat offenders, for publishing material that criticizes Islam, its followers, or the king, as well as content that instigates violent crimes or the overthrow of the government.113 In addition, the 2002 Telecommunications Law contains penalties for several online activities, such as the transmission of messages that are offensive to public policy or morals.114

However, sentences can be longer if users are tried under the penal code or terrorism laws, especially in relation to social media, where the press and publication law is not used.115 For instance, under the penal code, any user who “deliberately disseminates a false statement” that may be damaging to national security or public order may be imprisoned for up to two years.116 Under article 309 of the penal code, any “expression against one of the recognized religious sects” or ridicule of their rituals may be punished by a fine of BHD 100 (US$266) or prison term of one year. The government has used these vague clauses to interrogate and prosecute several bloggers and online commentators.

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

Between June 2017 and May 2018, at least 27 individuals were arrested, detained, or prosecuted for their online activities. While many were still on trial as of May 2018, 207 months of prison sentences were collectively passed down on seven Bahraini users during the coverage period.

The Electronic Crimes Directorate publishes official statistics on cybercrime cases each year, although it is difficult to determine which cases are related to political, social, or religious speech protected under international law. There were 697 cases brought forward in 2017, including 80 cases of defamation, 301 cases of electronic fraud, and 299 cases of “misuse of electronic devices.”117

Nabeel Rajab, one of Bahrain’s most prominent human rights defenders and an active Twitter user,118 has been in and out of prison since 2012 for his online speech. In February 2018, he was sentenced to five years in prison, after a trial that lasted more than a year, on charges that included “spreading false news during a time of war,” “insulting a neighboring country,” and “insulting a statutory body” (article 216).119 The charges were based on 2015 Twitter posts, including retweets of posts by human rights organizations,120 about the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen and the alleged torture of detainees at Jaw prison.121 The court handed down the sentence despite the prosecution’s failure to prove Rajab’s ownership of the Twitter account in question.122 Separately, in July 2017, Rajab was sentenced to two years in prison for “disseminating false news, statements, and rumors about the internal situation in the kingdom that would undermine its prestige and status,” in relation to television interviews he had granted. The Court of Appeal has upheld both sentences.123

Moreover, on September 12, 2017, Rajab was interrogated for Twitter and Instagram posts he allegedly made in January 2017, even though he has been held in prison since June 2016 with no internet access.124 He was charged with “spreading false news,” “inciting hatred against the regime,” and “inciting non-compliance with the law.”125 Rajab is the president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, an NGO that remains active despite a 2004 government order to close it.126

Other opposition leaders continued to face arrest and interrogation for their online activities:

  • In February 2018, the general secretary of the political society National Democratic Assemblage was interrogated for hours over his tweets on allegations of “tweeting to incite protesters to demonstrate.”127 He was later released.

  • In October 2017, opposition leader Ebrahim Sharif was charged with “insulting the Ministry of Information” on social media in relation to a tweet he posted in August 2017.128 In January 2017, he was interrogated for criticizing the executions of young men on Twitter.129 And in March 2017, he was also charged with “inciting hatred” against the regime and against “factions of society”130 for a tweet criticizing authorities for dissolving political opposition societies.131

Other individuals were also subject to arrests, fines, and prison sentences for their online posts, including on social issues:

  • In June 2017, opposition activist Hasan Abdulnabi was fined BHD 50 (US$132) for “misuse of telecommunication devices.”132 Abdulnabi has lived outside Bahrain since 2011 and had his nationality revoked in 2015.

  • In January 2018, a man was sentenced to three years in prison for posting 27 tweets that were deemed insulting to a judge who had previously ordered him to pay a fine in a separate case.133

In February 2018, the twitter account @Emp_Bahrain, known as Repentant Deputy, garnered attention for criticizing the prime minister and his associates.134 The account claimed to be supported by several government officials, and praised the royal court minister while calling for the prime minister to resign and for the king’s son, Nasser bin Hamad, to succeed him.135 In February and March 2018, six people, including a progovernment television broadcaster and an employee of the Electronic Crimes Directorate, were arrested for running the Twitter account.136 However, they were later released because the account remained active while they were detained.137 In March 2018, the prime minister implicated government employees as running the account,138 and the minister of interior announced strict measures to address social media accounts that were “spreading rumors and putting the social fabric and civil peace at risk.”139 Following this, six people were arrested, including one who was detained previously,140 for “creating malicious accounts to publish abusive comments of people”141 and for “misuse of telecommunication tools and the disseminating of data and information through social media sites that affect the personal lives of others.”142 Despite the arrests, the account remained active until July 2018, when it shared that it was hacked and controlled by allies of the prime minister.143 At the end of the reporting period, the accused in the case had not yet stood trial.

At least seven other internet users are still serving prison sentences for earlier online activities, including Ahmed Humaidan, Hussain Hubail, Sayed Ahmed Al-Mousawi,144 Hussain Khamis, Yousif Al-Amm,145 and Abduljalil Al-Singace. Al-Singace, a prominent human rights defender and blogger, has been serving a life sentence since 2011 on charges of possessing links to a terrorist organization aiming to overthrow the government,146 disseminating false news, and inciting protests against the government.147

In November 2017, former member of parliament Khalid Abdulaal posted an apology on Twitter to the king, the crown prince, and the prime minister after years of legal harassment and paying large fines to suspend a two-year prison sentence.148 He had been sentenced in June 2016 to one year in prison for “insulting the Ministry of Interior” on Twitter in 2014 and received another one-year sentence in May 2015 for denouncing the use of torture to extract confessions. As a member of parliament, he was immune from prosecution at the time he published the statements.149

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

Several reports have documented the government’s use of spyware against dissidents. In November 2015, new evidence showed that Bahrain had used the Remote Control Systems (RCS) from Italian cybersecurity firm Hacking Team. The spyware allows remote monitoring, including recording phone calls, logging keystrokes, taking screenshots, and activating cameras, among other functions.150 Malicious links are often sent from Twitter and Facebook accounts impersonating well-known opposition figures, friends,151 or the accounts of arrested users.152 In October 2015, at least four cases were recorded in which opposition members received emails containing malicious spyware.153

Given that the authorities have been quick to identify social media users who operate under a pseudonym, many users are concerned about restrictions on the ability to use ICTs anonymously. The TRA requires users to provide identification when registering new telecom connections, and the government prohibits the sale or use of unregistered prepaid mobile SIM cards.154 In July 2017, a TRA regulation that allows individuals to purchase no more than 10 prepaid SIM cards from a single service provider came into force. Under the regulation, people must be physically present when registering SIM cards directly with service providers,155 who must verify the identity of all subscribers on an annual basis, including through fingerprinting,156 which is justified as a security measure to help solve crimes.157 Service was cut for unregistered users in June 2018 for postpaid services, and will be cut by March 2019 for prepaid services.158

In January 2017, the government ratified the Arab Treaty on Combating Cybercrime, a set of standards developed to stem the misuse of telecommunications devices, financial fraud, the promotion of terrorism, and access to pornographic content online. While Bahrain passed a computer crimes law containing many of the provisions in 2014, the treaty establishes new rules on the retention of user data and real-time monitoring of activities, as well as a mechanism for sharing information between signatories to help combat transnational crime. The lack of strong human rights standards in the treaty may increase the scope for privacy infractions once it is transposed into local law.159

Since 2009, the TRA has mandated that all telecommunications companies keep a record of customers’ phone calls, emails, and website visits for up to three years. The companies are also obliged to provide security forces access to subscriber data upon request from the public prosecution, while the provision of the data content requires a court order.160

Cybercafes are also subject to increasing surveillance. Oversight of their operations is coordinated by a commission consisting of members from four ministries, who work to ensure strict compliance with rules that prohibit access for minors and require that all computer terminals are fully visible to observers.161

A Cyber Safety Directorate at the Ministry of State for Telecommunications Affairs was launched in November 2013 to monitor websites and social media networks, ostensibly to “ensure they are not used to instigate violence or terrorism and disseminate lies and fallacies that pose a threat to the kingdom's security and stability.”162 Officials had earlier created a unit to monitor social media and foreign news websites to “respond to false information that some channels broadcast” in 2011.163

A 2014 computer crimes law (60/2014) criminalizes the illegal access of information systems, illegal eavesdropping over transmission, and the access and possession of pornographic electronic materials.164 It also criminalizes the encryption of data with criminal intentions. Observers contend that “criminal intentions” could include criticism of the government.

According to company transparency reports, Bahrain submitted one user data request to Google,165 six user data requests to Twitter,166 and three user data requests to Facebook167 in the first half of 2017. The companies refused all the requests.

Access to websites of popular VPNs like Hotspot Shield, Express VPN, and the Tor Project are blocked, which makes it difficult to download client applications. However, the connectivity and functioning of the VPN clients and Tor browsers remained unaffected during the coverage period.

Intimidation and Violence

Violence and torture against online activists and journalists at the hands of authorities is common in Bahrain:168

  • In February 2018, blogger Sayed Ali Al-Durazi was arrested for “inciting hatred against the government” and the royal family. Authorities allegedly beat him and forced him to delete his social media accounts. He was found guilty in May 2018 and sentenced to two years in prison.169

  • In August, 2017, online activist Yousif Al-Jamri published a video alleging that he was subjected to physical and psychological torture at the NSA, threatened with rape and reprisals against his family, and forced to insult religious figures he reveres.170 He was subjected to further intimidation after posting the video and the NSA repeatedly summoned him for further interrogation, which he refused.171 Authorities then requested that Al-Jamri log an official complaint about his treatment, which apparently was not been acted upon by the end of the reporting period.172 Fearing reprisals, he reportedly fled Bahrain.

  • In September 2017, Rawan Sanqoor was arrested for tweets about the alleged denial of medical care to her imprisoned brother, Ali Sanqoor, and her communications with the International Committee of the Red Cross.173 She was held in detention for about a month, was allegedly isolated from others, and was denied visitation rights.174 She was released in October 2017, and has since made her Twitter account private.

  • Rights activist Ebtisam Al-Saegh, who documents government torture and other abuses with the advocacy group Salam for Democracy and Human Rights, has endured reprisals for her work. In May 2017, Al-Saegh was detained at the NSA and allegedly blindfolded, beaten, and sexually assaulted; her attackers also interrogated her about other activists and her association with the UN Human Rights Council, and attempted to coerce her to use her Twitter account to announce her retirement as a human rights activist.175 Instead, in July, she denounced the abuse of women by NSA agents and criticized the king on Twitter.176 Hours later, plainclothed officers, without a warrant, raided her home, confiscated her phone and national ID card, and took her into custody. She was released in October 2017, but now faces terrorism charges in connection with her July tweets.177

Progovernment internet users frequently post photos of protestors on social media in order to identity and punish them in “electronic witch hunts.” Government services and housing can be withheld from those accused of participating in protests, and some have seen their employment terminated for their political activities.178

Technical Attacks

Cyberattacks against both the opposition and government supporters are common in Bahrain. In June 2017, hackers took over the foreign minister’s Twitter account for approximately four hours and posted a stream of photos of casualties from the government’s crackdown on prodemocracy protests in 2011, along with the caption “What the petrodollar media doesn't show you."179 Opposition news sites Bahrain Mirror and Bahrain Al-Youm came under cyberattack in August 2016180 and January 2017, respectively, in apparent reprisal for their coverage of political events.181 In April 2017, the website of the only remaining opposition party, the National Democratic Action, was subjected to repeated cyberattacks.182

Government institutions are also targeted. Authorities observed around 23,000 hacking attempts and 23 million malicious emails sent to government systems during the first quarter of 2017.183 In April 2017, the website of the Bahraini Football Association was compromised by a Palestinian hacker who criticized Bahrain for hosting a representative from Israel during the FIFA Congress in May 2017.184

Notes: 

1 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “ITU releases annual global ICT data and ICT Development Index country rankings, November 12, 2015, https://goo.gl/doJ1Ic.

2 International Telecommunication Union, “CT Development Index 2017, accessed August 2018, http://www.itu.int/net4/ITU-D/idi/2017/index.html.

3 Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Bahrain (TRA), “Quarterly Market Indicators – Q4 2017,” https://bit.ly/2vJUojj.

4 TRA, “Bahrain Telecom Pricing International Benchmarking,” July 2018, https://bit.ly/2KBRxhJ.

5 Batelco, “Mobile Internet Packages,” accessed February 10, 2018, https://bit.ly/2njoS89, and Batelco, “Home Internet Packages,” accessed February 10, 2018, https://bit.ly/2FzctbM.

6 TRA, “Outdoor Mobile Coverage at 99% of Population in The Kingdom, TRA Publishes 2017 Mobile Network Quality of Service Report,” Jan 07, 2018, https://bit.ly/2MtcZXY.

7 TRA, “4G Download Speed increases to 23% Compared to 2014 According to TRA’s latest Kingdom-wide Mobile Audit Reports,” December 19, 2016, http://bit.ly/2hQEwo1.

8 “Batelco First and Only Telecom to Provide Superfast Fibre Internet 500Mbps,” BizBahrain, August 2, 2016, http://bit.ly/2qsjMVY.

9 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “Measuring The Information Society, 2014 http://bit.ly/1xrVMi8.

10 Bahrain e-government, “Qudurat Training Program”, accessed February 10, 2018, http://bit.ly/1IQ1YMI.

11 Amnesty International, “Bahrain: at least one dead and hundreds injured as government violently cracks down on opposition,” May 23, 2017, https://bit.ly/2w0r5tG.

12 Local Issues Editor, “Security developments in Al-Daraz and the closure of roads leading to the area,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, May 23, 2017, http://bit.ly/2rLlbJg

13 AP, “5 killed, 286 held in Bahrain raid on Shiite cleric's town,” ABC News, May 23, 2017, https://bit.ly/2N2Rttu.

14 Bahrain Watch, “Press Release: New Investigation Finds Bahrain ISPs Imposing “Internet Curfew” in Protest Area,” August 4, 2016, http://bit.ly/2s6xIX6, and Bahrain Watch, “Ongoing Internet Curfew in Diraz for more than 100 Days,” October 7, 2016, http://bit.ly/2s0huiX.

15 “The TRA and the telecommunications companies claim that there is a defect in the network to cover the isolation of Diraz by authorities,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, July 12, 2016, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/32464.html.

16 Bahrain Watch, “Internet Shutdown in Duraz Ends”, Accessed February 10, 2018, https://goo.gl/iBD6xN

17 Economic Editor, “Shutting down the Internet from Northwest Bahrain is damaging Bahrain's drive towards a knowledge economy,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, July 4, 2016, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1133752.html.

18 Economic Editor, “Shutting down the Internet from Northwest Bahrain is damaging Bahrain's drive towards a knowledge economy,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, July 4, 2016, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1133752.html.

19 Bahrain Watch, “Coalition of NGOs sign a Letter Demanding Internet Restoration in Diraz,” August 28, 2016, http://bit.ly/2r82pxI

20 TRA, “Bahrain’s Internet Ecosystem: 2012 Overview,” December 2012, http://bit.ly/2qsaPwd.

21 TRA,“TRA and Telecom Operators in Bahrain Work Towards Achieving Single Network,” March 31, 2018, https://bit.ly/2MxY02r.

22 VIVA, “VIVA Bahrain to acquire Menatelecom from KFH Bahrain,”December 23, 2017, https://www.viva.com.bh/content/-34.

23 TRA, “2017 Annual Report: Fostering Ingenuity for a Smart Tomorrow,” Page 33, Annex A, accessed August 13, 2018, https://bit.ly/2MsaFot.

24 “Technical committees from Batelco and the Telecommunications Authority in preparation for the liberation of the terrestrial network,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, April 7, 2017, www.alwasatnews.com/news/1227945.html

25 Sandeep Singh Grewa, “Batelco restructuring business into two separate entities,” GDN, March 30, 2018, https://bit.ly/2nNON89

26 “A committee comprising representatives of the defence and interior ministries and the national security apparatus oversees the dismantling of Batelco into two companies,” Bahrain Mirror, May 3, 2018, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/46935.html

27 TRA, “Vision & Mission,” accessed August 10, 2018, http://tra.org.bh/en/about-us/vision-mission.html.

28 In June 2013, Mohamed al-Rumaihi was named President of the IAA, replacing Fawaz al-Khalifa who remained Minister of State for Telecom.

29 BNA, “Royal decree regulating the Ministry of Information Affairs,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, December 1, 2016, https://bit.ly/2gOzR46.

30 TRA, “Revocation of telecommunication licenses granted by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority,” February 25, 2016, http://goo.gl/ZRgbnY.

31 TRA, “Article 35 Order No.2 of 2016 2Connect’s breach of Article 24(b), 53 and 78 of the Telecommunications Law,” February 4, 2016, http://bit.ly/2bldqnG.

32 TRA, “Lawful Access Regulation,” accessed August 10, 2018, http://bit.ly/2b5Xyb3.

33 TRA, “Revocation of Telecommunication Licenses granted by the TRA to Bahrain Broadband Co. W.L.L,” December 27, 2017, https://bit.ly/2L8tXJU.

34 TRA, “Article 35, Order No.1 of 2017,” August 24, 2017, https://bit.ly/2MBwuRI.

35 “Bahrain Follows Suit after UAE and Saudi Arabia, Blocks Qatari Media Outlets,” Bahrain Mirror, May 25, 2017, https://bit.ly/2BAxyB4.

36 Maryam AlKhawaja, Twitter post, “#Bahrain regime is so petty they've blocked @qatarairways website and shut down their office,” June 6, 2018, https://bit.ly/2MlBmuR

37 Karen DeYoung and Ellen Nakashima, “UAE orchestrated hacking of Qatari government sites, sparking regional upheaval, according to U.S. intelligence officials,” Washington Post, July 16, 2017, http://wapo.st/2yRxjiX.

38 Bahrain Watch, “Leading Bahraini ISPs are Blocking Telegram Traffic,” June 28, 2016, http://bit.ly/2qpuw8l.

39 LuaLuaTV, Twitter post [in Arabic], “The Bahraini authorities blocks LuaLuaTV website for the fourth time in a week,” June 30, 2016, https://twitter.com/LuaLuaTV/status/748646223972827141

40 Editor of Political Affairs, “Blocking the website of Alwefaq Society,” [in Arabic] Alayam newspaper, June 14, 2016, https://bit.ly/21jZnPA

41 Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), “Bahrain: Authorities Escalate Crackdown on Shia Clerics and Freedom of Religion,” June 17, 2016, http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7914

42 These sites include bambuser.com, ustream.tv, and other websites that stream directly to Twitter like twitcasting.tv, see, Bahrain Freedom Index (blog), http://bit.ly/2b8aYNJ.

43Reporters Without Borders, “Crackdown continues in Bahrain, Bloggers go on trial in Emirates,” June 16, 2011, http://bit.ly/1OUSoae.

44 BCHR, “Bahrain: The Cyber Safety Directorate Monitors Internet Activity In Style Similar to Big Brother,” November 25, 2013, http://bit.ly/1FleBho.

45 “At a Glance: Bahrain,” Herdict, accessed on August 13, 2018, http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth?fc=BH.

46 Ben Birnbaum, “Bahrain continues crackdown on Shi’ite opposition,” The Washington Times, September 14, 2010, http://bit.ly/1JQCXLs.

“WebStatsDomian - Mail.bahrainonline.org,” WebStatsDomain, accessed March 19, 2013, http://bit.ly/1L7Fyla.

47 Bahrain Center for Human Rights, “ANHRI condemns blocking Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper website,” May 24, 2011, http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/4126

48 Ahmed AlDosari, “Bahraini websites migrate from their homeland ... Will they come back one day?,” [in Arabic] (blog), November 21, 2015, http://bit.ly/2bSztUN.

49 Decree—by—Law No. 47 Regarding organizing the press, printing and publishing [in Arabic], October 23, 2002, https://bit.ly/2welijt.

50 Reporters Without Borders, “Authorities Step Up Offensive Against Journalists and Websites,” May 14, 2009, https://bit.ly/2L9XhPX.

51 Reporters Without Borders, “Authorities Step Up Offensive Against Journalists and Websites.”

52 TRA, Resolution No. (12) of 2016 Promulgating the Internet Safety Regulation, accessed May 25, 2017 http://bit.ly/2r6vqbf.

53 Bahrain Tender Board, “Awarded Tenders Monthly Report From 1/1/2016 to 1/31/2016,” page 5, [in Arabic] https://bit.ly/2L93Ouk.

54 Citizen Lab, “Tender Confirmed, Rights At Risk: Verifying Netsweeper in Bahrain,” September 21, 2016, http://bit.ly/2cCUQVO.

55 “Interior Ministry: Group Admin in Bahrain, is responsible to the authorities for everything published,” [in Arabic] Lualua TV, February 19, 2016, http://lualuatv.com/?p=33529.

57 Bahrain Wach, “Bahrain’s Monarchy Cries Sectarianism to Hoard Public Wealth,” June 12, 2017, https://bit.ly/2MyTDEj.

58 Yousif AlJamri, Twitter post, “Bahrain Gulf News deleted an article requesting the return of [people’s] properties, lands and coasts through a campaign on #corruption,” [in Arabic], November 28, 2017 https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/935506839566999554.

59 Twitter, “Transparency Report,” https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/bh.html.

60 BCHR, “Bahrain: After destruction of the actual protesting site at “the Pearl,” the government shifts to eliminate virtual protests,” May 17, 2011, http://bit.ly/1LmOd7Y.

61 Bahrain Gateway farewell tweet, accessed August 14, 2016, https://twitter.com/b4bhcom/status/622400160346341376.

62 Mona Kareem, “Bahrain: Twitter User Jailed for 66 Days for Tweeting,“ Global Voices, December 5, 2011 http://bit.ly/1JXimWe.

63 Moderator of the AlDair Forum talks about his detention, saying he was forced to show the interrogation officer how to close the website: “Ahmed al-Dairi Moderator of AlDair Forums in the first episode of his testimony: thus eased voice of Zakaria AlAsheeri forever,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, January 4, 2012, http://bahrainmirror.com/news/2678.html.

64 iProtestbh, Twitter post, May 26, 2017, 04:49AM https://twitter.com/iprotestbh/status/868071510661095424

65 Ebrahim Sarhan, Twitter page, https://twitter.com/ebrahim_sarhan

66 LuaLua TV, Twitter post, “15 accounts received repeated attacks on social networking sites,” February 25, 2018, https://bit.ly/2wk6OyS.

67 “Information Minister issues edict 68/2016,” Bahrain News Agency, July 16, 2016, http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/736106

68 Human Rights Watch, “Bahrain: Only Independent Newspaper Shut Down,” June 18, 2017, https://bit.ly/2sTqnic.

69 “The Ministry of Information Affairs decided to stop the circulation and use of Al-Wasat newspaper for electronic media immediately..,” [in Arabic] Bahrain News Agency, January 16, 2017, http://bna.bh/portal/news/766017

71 Bahrain Watch, “PR Watch – keeping an eye on the Kingdom’s PR,” http://bahrainwatch.org/pr/.

72 “Trippi & Associates Manipulate Internet Content on Behalf of Bahrain Government,” Bahrain Freedom Index (blog), July 20, 2011, http://bit.ly/1L7nCqT.

73 Marcus Baram, “Lobbyists Jump Ship in Wake of Mideast Unrest,” Huffington Post, March 25, 2011, http://huff.to/1ePbiwQ.

74 Ed Caesar, “The Reputation-Laundering Firm that Ruined its own Reputation,” The New Yorker, June 25, 2018, https://bit.ly/2K4wUih.

75 James Dorsey, "Bahrain rattled by UK court's opening of door to investigation of torture allegations," The World Post, October 21, 2014, http://huff.to/10vInwO.

76 Citizens for Bahrain website, accessed May 26, 2017, https://www.citizensforbahrain.com

77 “Bahrain’s Interior Minister Launched Hate Campaign..Sectarian Takfiri Discourse Returned Under Hashtag #No_to_Iranian_Intervention,” Bahrain Mirror, August 22, 2015, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/25858.html.

78 “HRH Premier calls for the need to use social networks to defend the nation,” Bahrain News Agency, January 14, 2014, http://bit.ly/1L7p6S3.

80 Bob Hooker, “Bahrain’s Troll Army,” Web 3.0 Lab (blog), February 17, 2011, http://bit.ly/1W8HJN3.

81 See Brian Dooley, “No Stamp Required: All Too Easy for #Bahrain Twitter Trolls,” Huffington Post, September 25, 2015 http://huff.to/1WmSueM, and Brian Dooley, “‘Troll’ Attacks on #Bahrain Tweets Show Depth of Government Attempts to Silence Dissent,” The World Post, November 17, 2011, http://huff.to/1iVmxf9.

82 J. David Goodman, “‘Twitter Trolls’ Haunt Discussions of Bahrain Online,” The Lede (blog), The New York Times, October 11, 2011, http://nyti.ms/1NBl3Sv.

83 iManamaa, Twitter post, May 13, 2011, 7:39am, http://bit.ly/1iCuvtJ; Sultan al-Qassemi, “Pioneer Bloggers in the Gulf Arab States,” Jadaliyya, December 20, 2011,http://bit.ly/1k4jzR5; Bob Hooker, “Disturbing Drop in Tweeting in Bahrain,” Web 3.0 Lab (blog), March 22, 2011, http://bit.ly/1OcDDik.

84 “Twitter Trolling as Propaganda Tactic: Bahrain and Syria,” Jillian C. York (blog), December 10, 2011, http://bit.ly/1hXiMFN.

85 David Wheeler, “In the Arab Spring’s Wake, Twitter Trolls and Facebook Spies,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (blog), November 29, 2011, http://bit.ly/1Kx8zdJ.

86 Bahrain Doctor, Twitter post, October 4, 2017, https://twitter.com/BAHRAINDOCTOR/status/915673017669300225.

87 Marc Owen Jones, “The Automation of Sectarianism: Are Twitter Bots Spreading Sectarianism in the Gulf?,” June 21, 2016, http://bit.ly/28TOtwt, and Marc Owen Jones, “Around 51% of Tweets on #Bahrain Hashtag Created by Automated Sectarian Bots,” June 22, 2016, http://bit.ly/2s0Jcfm.

88 Marc Owen Jones, “New Sectarian Bots Still Flooding Twitter with Anti-Shia Hate Speech,” June 28, 2016, http://bit.ly/2qYtiUs and Video by Erin Kilbride, Twitter post, July 4, 2016, 14:20PM https://twitter.com/neo_chlo/status/750076928846159872

89 Bill Marczak, “Is Bahrain’s Government running extremist accounts?” Bahrain Watch, August 5, 2013, http://bit.ly/1UpiYil.

90 Bill Marczak, “Bahrain Govt using fake Twitter accounts to track online critics,” Bahrain Watch, July 31, 2013, http://bit.ly/1hXjfrJ.

91 “MOI: legal action against anyone who abuses the use of social media and raises sectarian strife,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, June 27, 2015, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1003344.html.

92 “Those siding with Qatar or objecting to Bahrain action to be punished,” June 8, 2017, Bahrain News Agency, https://bit.ly/2ORWHcd.

93 “Media warned not to condone with Qatari policies,” June 8, 2017, Bahrain News Agency, http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/789448.

94 “Ministry of Interior (MOI): legal actions against any misuse or abuse on the implementation of the Saudi judicial rulings,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, January 3, 2016, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1063913.html.

95 “Two million and 200K accounts in the social networks in Bahrain in 2015,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, December 15, 2015 http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1057013.html.

96 Simeon Kerr, “Manama fights back in cyberspace,” Financial Times, May 23, 2011, http://on.ft.com/maUYxm.

97 Nancy Messieh, “Online anonymity: A gateway to freedom or abuse?” The Next Web, August 14, 2011, http://bit.ly/1PNCI8x.

98 Editor of Local News, “Activists announce their retirement from political and human rights activism as well quitting Twitter,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, May 29, 2018, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1245294.html

99 “Access Denied,” a project of the independent research and advocacy organization Bahrain Watch, chronicles the many journalists, researchers, academics, and NGO workers that were expelled from or denied access to Bahrain from the 2011 uprising until now. See, http://bahrainwatch.org/access/; Amira al Hussaini, “Bahrain: Tweeting Appalling Conditions at Jaw Prison,” Global Voices, July 19, 2012, http://bit.ly/1ikgVuE.

100 “Tweeter Asks Bahrain King Protection from National Security Service,” Bahrain Mirror, August 4, 2018, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/40771.html

101 Coalition 14 Feb, Twitter Account, https://twitter.com/COALITION14.

102 Toby C. Jones and Ala’a Shehabi, “Bahrain’s revolutionaries,” Foreign Policy, January 2, 2012, http://atfp.co/1JBnf7R; U.S. Embassy Bahrain, “Demonstration Notice 3 – January 17, 2013,“ news release, January 17, 2013, http://1.usa.gov/1JDUPMH.

103 BCHR, “Blocking the Documentary ‘Systematic Torture in Bahrain’ on YouTube,” February 8, 2011, http://bit.ly/1NBlaO4.

104 BahrainDetainees, Twitter Account, https://twitter.com/FreedomPrayers/lists/bahraindetainees.

105 Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, art. 23, http://www.shura.bh/en/LegislativeResource/Constitution/Pages/default.aspx.

106 Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, art. 26.

107 IREX, “Bahrain,” Media Sustainability Index, 2009, https://bit.ly/2L9eKIg .

108 “HRH Premier chairs Cabinet session,” Bahrain News Agency, February 19, 2018, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/826723

109 “Shura Council approves bill to impose 20,000 dinars for defamation on social media,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, May 12, 2018, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/47036.html.

110 “Bahrain King approves military trials for civilians,” The Hindu, April 3, 2017, http://bit.ly/2r8qggR.

111 “MOI: arrest of number of those who abused social media,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, January 4, 2016, http://bit.ly/2b9ULdQ.

112 For cases where the authorities have used the 2002 press law to censor online websites, see BCHR, “Website accused of violating press code, BCHR concerned that move is aimed at silencing critical voices,” October 1, 2008, http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/2446;

“Closing a blow to freedom of opinion and expression,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, April 25, 2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA; “Blocking users ‘Twitter’ caused by a violation of the Copyright Act,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, January 3, 2010, http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA.

113 Press and Publications Law of 2002 of the Kingdom of Bahrain (No.47 of 2002).

114 The Telecommunications Law Of The Kingdom Of Bahrain, Legislative Decree 48.

115 “Alhammadi: No dereliction in dealing with the complaints of the misuse of social media,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, August 4, 2015, http://bit.ly/2bqEFfV.

117 “Electronic Crimes: 449 offenses were referred to the Public Prosecution in 2017,” [in Arabic] Alayam, March 19, 2018, https://bit.ly/2PiEm9h.

118 Rajab was ranked the “most connected” Twitter user in Bahrain according to a survey, with over 260,000 followers as of May 2015. See: Wamda, How the Middle East Tweets: Bahrain’s Most Connected Report December 3, 2012, http://bit.ly/1Jf8vdo.

119 BIRD, “BREAKING: Nabeel Rajab Sentenced to Five Years in Prison for Critical Comments on Twitter,” February 21, 2018, https://bit.ly/2OQMf4r.

120 Adam Rajab, Twitter post, “Photos from the case file of sample tweets over which my father Nabeel Rajab is being tried, which may make him spend five years in prison,” June 4, 2018, https://bit.ly/2nKxYLl.

121 BCHR, "Nabeel Rajab's case update," May 6, 2015, http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7517.

122 BCHR, “Wikipedia and Guessing: Basis of Charges Against Human Rights Defender Nabeel Rajab, December 16, 2016, https://bit.ly/2BsKBnL.

123 Joe Stork, “Bahraini Rights Critic Imprisoned for Yemen Tweets,” Human Rights Watch, September 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/2yJADsS.

124 Nabeel Rajab was first arrested on May 5, 2012 and held for over three weeks for “insulting a statutory body” in relation to criticism directed at the Ministry of Interior over Twitter. On June 9, 2012, he was arrested again after tweeting about the unpopularity of the Prime Minister (also a member of the royal family) in the city of Al-Muharraq, following the sheikh’s visit there. A group of citizens from the city promptly sued Rajab for libel in a show of obedience to the royal family. On June 28, 2012, he was convicted of charges related to his first arrest and ordered to pay a fine of BHD 300 (US$800). Shortly after he was released on bail, he was re-arrested on July 9, 2012 after a court sentenced him to three months of imprisonment for the Al-Muharraq incident. The court of appeals later acquitted Rajab, although he had already served most of his sentence. He was kept in prison until May 2014 to serve a two-year sentence for “calling for illegal gatherings over social networks.” He was then arrested and imprisoned from April 2, 2015 to July 13, 2015 as part of a six-month sentence on charges of insulting public institutions under article 216 of the penal code for a tweet in which he questioned whether Bahraini security institutions are "ideological incubators" for the so-called “Islamic State” terrorist group. He was released that July for health reasons but placed on a travel ban.

125 BIRD, “Nabeel Rajab Faces Absurd New Charges In Latest Attempt to Silence Jailed Critic,” September 18, 2017, https://bit.ly/2Pn3yLH.

126 BCHR, “About BCHR,” http://bahrainrights.org/en/about-us.;

127 Bahrain Press Association, “The Semi-annual Press Freedom Report 2018,” August 3, 2018, http://www.bahrainpa.org/wp/?p=478; Bahrain Press Association, Twitter post, February 21, 2018, https://twitter.com/BahrainPA/status/966353079657431047

128 “Prosecutors releases Ebrahim Sharif after being accused of insulting the Ministry of Information,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, October 23, 2017, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/42472.html and for the tweet in question see Ebrahim Sharif, Twitter post [in Arabic], August 29, 2017https://twitter.com/ebrahimsharif/status/902562477132705792

129 Bahrain Mirror, Twitter post, January 15, 2017, 09:36AM https://twitter.com/BahrainmirrorEN/status/820686137807306752 and original tweet, Ebrahim Sharif, Twitter post [in Arabic], January 14, 2017, 07:45AM https://twitter.com/ebrahimsharif/status/820295702878134272

130 BCHR, “BAHRAIN: Political Opposition Leader Ebrahim Sharif Charged With Inciting Hatred,” March 20, 2017, https://bit.ly/2BubbNs

131 “Authorities release Ebrahim Sharif after questioning him about his tweets on martyr Abdullah Al-Ajouz,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, March 20, 2017, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/37311.html.

132 Yousif alJamri, Twitter post [in Arabic], July 26, 2017, https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/890158397185830912

133 “Three-years prison sentence for a man who posted 27 tweets threatening to kill a judge,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, January 18, 2018, http:// bahrainmirror.org/news/44249.html

134 “An Under-Secretary at the Cabinet describes Ahmed Attiyah as a dog and insult the Speaker of the House of Representatives,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Mirror, February 4, 2018, http://bahrainmirror.org/news/44559.html and “The account of (Repentant Deputy) reveals the hidden conflict between the grandson of the prime minister and the minister of the royal court,” [in Arabic] Manama Post, March 23, 2018, https://bit.ly/2vVXQbI

135 Yousif AlJamri, Twitter port [in Arabic], March 30, 2018, https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/979713480591802368 and Repentant Deputy, Twitter post [in Arabic], March 30, 2018, https://twitter.com/Emp_Bahrain/status/979725223766368256

136 “Arrest of the media professional and the owner of the account "Repentant Deputy" on charges of defamation through Twitter,” [in Arabic] Manama Voice, February 23, 2018, http://manamavoice.com/news/14699; Yousif AlJamri, Twitter post [in Arabic], March 2, 2018,https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/969660902428545024

137 Yousif AlJamri, Twitter post [in Arabic], March 12, 2018, https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/973242633467453441

138 “Prime Minister: What happened on the social networking sites hurts us because it is from government employees,” [in Arabic] Manama Voice, March 20, 2018, http://manamavoice.com/news/17580

139 Ministry of Interior, “His Excellency the Minister of the Interior confirms the adoption of strict measures to address the unprecedented electronic chaos, caused by some abusive social media accounts,” [in Arabic], March 25, 2018, http://www.policemc.gov.bh/news/ministry/80623

140 Manama Voice, Twitter post [in Arabic], March 25, 2018, https://twitter.com/manamavoice1/status/977906157510692864

141 “The arrest of five people suspected of involvement in the establishment of malicious accounts and posting tweets abusive to some people and incitement to sedition,” [in Arabic] Akhbar Alkhaleej, March 30, 2018, http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1116483#.Wr6nThHaaiw.twitter

142 Bahrain Gateway, Twitter post [in Arabic], April 13, 2018, https://twitter.com/b4bhcom/status/984782494229782529 and “Bahrain: Interior ministry announces the arrest of Ayman, the son of Mohammed Khalid, while trying to leave the country and his abuse of social networking sites,” [in Arabic] Manama Voice, April 13, 2018, http://manamavoice.com/news/20316

143 Repentant Deputy, Twitter post [in Arabic], July 25, 2018, https://twitter.com/Emp_Bahrain/status/1022181234376691712

144 For further details refer to FOTN 2016 Report.

145 “3 years instead of 5 for twitter account owner of «Haji Ahmed»,” [in Arabic] Alayam, November 12, 2016 http://bit.ly/2s1fnvd.

146 Reporters Without Borders, “Detained blogger Abduljalil Al-Singace on hunger strike,” September 6, 2011, http://bit.ly/1N5BjuP.

147 Reporters Without Borders, “Detained blogger Abduljalil Al-Singace on hunger strike.”

148 Khalid Abdulaal, Twitter post [in Arabic], November 27, 2017, https://twitter.com/MPKabdulaal/status/935289101946949633

149 “More arrests and jail sentences in Bahrain over social media posts,” BCHR, June 20, 2016, http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919

150 Bahrain Watch, “How The Government of Bahrain Acquired Hacking Team’s Spyware,” November 13, 2015, http://bit.ly/2bVNSQ5.

151 Bahrain Watch, “The IP Spy Files: How Bahrain's Government Silences Anonymous Online Dissent”, May 15, 2013, accessed March 31, 2014, https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/viewreport.php.

152 Bahrain Watch, Twitter Post, March 13, 2015, 12:28 PM, https://twitter.com/BHWatch/status/576464787422339072.

153 Bahrain Watch, “Urgent Security Alert for Bahraini Activists,” October 18, 2015, http://bit.ly/2ba422J.

154 Geoffrey Bew, “Technology Bill Rapped,” Gulf Daily News, July 20, 2006, http://bit.ly/1UduN5E.

155 TRA, “TRA issues SIM-Card Enabled Telecommunications Services Registration Regulation,” February 7, 2016, http://bit.ly/1Q1eK8l.

and TRA, “Resolution No. (13) of 2015, Promulgating the SIM-Card Enabled Telecommunications Services Registration Regulation,” accessed August 14, 2016, http://bit.ly/2bv8bmV.

156 “Adoption of the use of fingerprint to record phone chip,” [in Arabic] Alayam, July 28, 2016, http://goo.gl/ytz8Zu.

157 “Telecommunications regulation": the footprint of mobile phone users is a precautionary security measure,” [in Arabic] Manama Voice, January 28, 2018, http://manamavoice.com/news/11568

158 “The TRA urges consumers to register SIM cards,” [in Arabic] Akhbar Alkhaleej, February 19, 2018, https://bit.ly/2PqsbHd.

159 “Law No. (2) of 2017 on the ratification of the Arab Convention to combat technical crimes of information,” [in Arabic] Official Gazette, January 26, 2017, http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K0217.pdf.

160 Geoffrey Bew, “Big Brother’ Move Rapped,” Gulf Daily News, March 25, 2009, http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/Print.aspx?storyid=246587.

161 Reporters Without Borders, “Countries Under Surveillance: Bahrain.”

162 “Shaikh Fawaz praises Cyber Safety Directorate”, Bahrain News Agency, November 18, 2013 http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/588716.

163 Andy Sambridge, “Bahrain sets up new units to monitor media output,” Arabian Business, May 18, 2011, http://bit.ly/1JmHKqP.

164 General Directorate of Anti-Corruption & Economic & Electronic Security, Law No. (60) for the year 2014 on information technology crimes, [in Arabic] accessed July 31, 2015, http://bit.ly/1QMpBFD.

165 Google, “Google Transparency Report,” accessed August 10, 2018, http://bit.ly/2OQgetc

166 Twitter, “Twitter Transparency Report,” accessed August 10, 2018, https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/bh.html

167 Facebook, “Facebook Transparency Report,” accessed August 10, 2018, https://transparency.facebook.com/country/Bahrain/2017-H1/

168 “People & Power – Bahrain: Fighting for change,” YouTube video, 24:30, posted by Al Jazeera English, March 9, 2011, http://bit.ly/1Flun6y.

169 GCHR, “Bahrain: Photographer Sayed Baqer Al-Kamel and online blogger Sayed Ali Al-Durazi sentenced to prison, while Nabeel Rajab awaits appeal verdict,” May 25, 2018, https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/1871

170 Yousif AlJamri, Twitter post [in Arabic], August 3, 2017, https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/893115913507147776

171 BIRD, “NSA Summons Online Activist Who Exposed Torture in Plea to King,” August 04, 2017, http://bit.ly/2OODxUo

172 Yousif AlJamri, Twitter post [in Arabic], November 13, 2017, https://twitter.com/YusufAlJamri/status/930064406221901824

173 “Prosecution renews detention of prisoner of conscience Rawan Sanqour for 30 days,” [in Arabic] Manama Post, October 19, 2017, http://www.manamapost.com/news.php?name=2017023345

174 “Arab Network for Human Rights Information condemns the arbitrary measures against the activist Rawan Sanqour and her brother,” [in Arabic] Manama Post, October 15, 2017, http://www.manamapost.com/news.php?name=2017073237

175 Peter Beaumont, “Activist who accused Bahraini security services of sexual assault is rearrested,” Guardian, July 6, 2017, http://bit.ly/2weOrel ; “Ebtisam al-Saegh tortured and sexually assaulted,” Frontline Defenders, June 1, 2017, http://bit.ly/2w0KZVr, and please see PDF download here:https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde11/6392/2017/en/.

176 “Bahrain: Woman human rights defender at high risk of torture, including sexual assault,” Amnesty International, July 4, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/bahrain-woman-human-rights-defender-at-high-risk-of-torture-including-sexual-assault/.

177 “Bahrain temporarily frees female activist,” Middle East Online, October 23, 2017, http://middle-east-online.com/english/?id=85545.

178 BCHR, “Return of Electronic Witch Hunt in Bahrain Leads to Arrest of Ali Abdulraheem,” July 14, 2016, http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/8008.

179 AFP, “Bahrain minister briefly hacked after Qatar cyber attack,” Daily Mail, June 3, 2017, https://dailym.ai/2nRUhi1

180 Bahrain Mirror, Twitter post, August 12, 2016, https://twitter.com/BahrainmirrorEN/status/764125566329126916.

181 “Website of (Bahrain Today) is subject to a failed hacking attempt originated from the UAE,” [in Arabic] Bahrain Alyoum, January 24, 2017, https://www.bahrainalyoum.co.uk/?p=79059.

182 “The electronic attacks on WAAD's website are being renewed for the second time in a week,” [in Arabic] LualuaTV, April 9, 2017, http://lualuatv.com/?p=52867 and “WAAD: Our website was hacked and unknown are now in control,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, April 2, 2017, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1226155.html.

183 “Mohammed al-Qaed: 50% of cyber attacks on Bahrain come from Iran,” [in Arabic] Akhbar AlKhaleej, December 9, 2017, http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1100593.

184 “Video: Palestinian hacker penetrates the site of the FIFA to protest Bahrain hosting of the Israeli delegation in the FIFA Congress,” [in Arabic] Alwasat, May 12, 2017, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1227500.html.