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Nations in Transit

Nations in Transit 2018

Kazakhstan

Country Profile

Regime Classification: 
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

Nations in Transit Score

(1=Most Democratic, 7=Least Democratic)

Quick Facts

Capital: 
Astana
Population: 
17.8 million
GNI/capita, PPP: 
$22,910
Democracy Score: 
6.71

NIT Edition

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Electoral Process

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

Civil Society

5.50

5.75

5.75

6.00

6.25

6.5

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.75

Independent Media

6.50

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

National Democratic Governance

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

Local Democratic Governance

6.25

6.25

6.25

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

Judicial Framework and Independence

6.00

6.25

6.25

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.75

Corruption

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.75

6.75

Democracy Score

6.32

6.43

6.43

6.54

6.57

6.61

6.61

6.61

6.64

6.71

 

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

 

Score Changes:

  • Civil Society rating declined from 6.50 to 6.75 due to ongoing routine harassment and persecution of activists, journalists, lawyers, individual users of social networks, and religious communities against the backdrop of increasingly restrictive legislation and administrative pressure on civil society, which manifested itself in fines against two human rights NGOs and the liquidation of the Confederation of Trade Unions in 2017.
  • Judicial Framework and Independence rating declined from 6.50 to 6.75 due to recent changes that create the legal possibility of stripping citizenship for a broadly formulated range of crimes, leaving space for potential arbitrary prosecution of dissent. The right to a nationality is a fundamental human right and deprivation of citizenship should not be available in a judicial system unless double citizenship is recognized.

As a result, Kazakhstan’s Democracy Score declined from 6.64 to 6.71.

Malika Tukmadiyeva
Executive Summary: 

Kazakhstan remained a consolidated authoritarian state in 2017. Following the death of Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov in 2016, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev is the only leader in the former Soviet Union who has been continuously in power since the collapse of the Union. The 77-year-old Nazarbayev, who has the constitutional status of “Founder of independent Kazakhstan, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Yelbasy,”1 enjoys uncontested political authority and seeming popular support on the basis of “prosperity, peace, and stability” that his rule officially provides.2

The year started with a constitutional reform and an associated package of amendments to a number laws that were seen by many as legal preparations for the transition of power.3 The reform introduced a measure of government accountability to the parliament, empowering the parliament to influence the composition of the government and dismiss its members, although the president has retained the power to dismiss the government. The change also limited the president’s lawmaking capacities by removing his right to issue decrees and assume legislative powers of the parliament for up to a year. The amendments also significantly reduced the list of potential presidential candidates by requiring them to be former public or elected officials with party affiliation and in good health. Nazarbayev’s status as “Yelbasy” was also added to the list of constitutional values, which may not be amended.4

In practice, the reform will not affect the current political structure as long as Nazarbayev is in power. But in the context of weak institutions and informal inter-elite decision making, they could be instrumental in ensuring a smooth transition that does not allow for the appearance of outsiders, and envisions greater collegiality of rule, guaranteeing continuity and the “evolutionary” development of the established political model.

In 2017, the remnants of an independent civic sector and press continued to feel the aftershocks of a turbulent 2016, which saw two major violent attacks on law enforcement and a heavy-handed crackdown on Kazakhstan’s largest public protest movement. The government continued to prosecute journalists and activists, as well as individual users of social networks, on charges of “inciting social and ethnic discord,” “libel,” “knowingly false denunciations,” “infringing the procedure for the conduct of assemblies, meetings, street marches and demonstrations,”5 as well as financial crimes. Several amendments to legislation have been adopted or are currently being developed with a view to tightening control over society, often on the grounds of counteracting radicalization and violent extremism. The amendments introduce new or reinforce existing restrictions on freedoms of association, speech, assembly, and religion.

Labor rights were significantly undermined in 2017 by a court ruling to liquidate the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, the largest trade union organization in the country. The decision was protested by about 600 oil workers, who went on hunger strike in January. The authorities reacted by arresting and fining several dozen protesters; the protest organizers and the leader of the Confederation were sentenced to extended terms of imprisonment and restraint of liberty.6

Despite the continuing economic downturn that started in mid-2014, the former capital, Almaty, hosted the 28th Worldwide Winter Universiade in January and Astana hosted the grandiose EXPO 2017 International Specialized Exhibition during the summer months. The events were accompanied by massive “clean-ups” of the cities: homeless people were removed to nearby towns,7 while streets and houses were inspected by the police. Meanwhile, in order to ensure ambitious attendance rates, the regional governors forced public servants en masse, especially schoolteachers, to buy tickets for the EXPO.8

In 2017, Kazakhstan for the first time became a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, crowning the country’s efforts in championing international peacemaking activities, such as a series of Syrian peace talks hosted in Astana over the course of the year.9

Outlook for 2018:

Assuming Nazarbayev stays in good health in 2018, nothing indicates cardinal changes in the political structure or how Kazakhstan is governed. The recent constitutional reforms only reiterate the regime’s intentions to control every aspect of political life and the eventually inevitable transition of power. In the meantime, the regime will remain vulnerable and thus especially sensitive to any manifestation of dissent. In this context, the authorities are likely to continue cracking down on the perceived threat from the surviving political opposition, civil society activists, and journalists, and further tighten control over religion and social networks. These measures will be complemented by a reinforced state propaganda of “stability first” and major spending to create the desired image of Nazarbayev’s legacy.

National Democratic Governance: 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

 

  • President Nursultan Nazarbayev has ruled Kazakhstan since 1989, and a special provision in the constitution allows him to remain in office for an unlimited number of terms. Over the years, Nazarbayev has built a highly centralized and personalized political system that ensures firm presidential control over all major governing institutions, including the parliament, the judiciary, the military, and security structures, all of which are dominated by state officials loyal to the “president’s course.”10

  • On March 10, the president signed into law constitutional reforms that, in his words, were aimed at “serious redistribution of power and democratization of the political system as a whole.”11 The presidential position was reframed as that of a “supreme arbiter,” focusing on the “strategic functions” of foreign policy, national security, and defense.12

  • The government, previously the exclusive domain of the president, acquired a measure accountability to the parliament under the new constitution: the parliament is now consulted on the composition of the government and is empowered to dismiss government members. Moreover, the government is to resign its powers to the Majilis, the lower chamber of parliament, rather than to the president.13 The reforms also require the president to consult with the Majilis prior to appointing and dismissing the cabinet (except for the ministers of defense and foreign affairs).14 Nevertheless, the president preserves considerable influence over the executive branch, having kept the right to terminate the powers of the government, dismiss the prime minister and any other member of the government, as well as to accept or decline the resignation of the government in the event of a parliamentary motion of no confidence.

  • The reform limits the previously omnipotent lawmaking powers of the president, such as the right to issue decrees with the force of law and the possibility to assume legislative powers of the parliament for up to a year. Likewise, the president no longer has the power to instruct the government to prepare and submit draft laws to the parliament, as well as the power to revoke or suspend the acts of the government and the prime minister.15 On the other hand, the president retains the right of legislative initiative, still unavailable to the parliament, whose role is confined to considering the proposals of the government.

  • The constitutional reform further cemented the position of Nazarbayev personally by including “the fundamental principles […] laid down by the Founder of independent Kazakhstan, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Yelbasy, and his status”16 into the list of constitutional values, which cannot be changed even through constitutional amendments.

  • The reforms, rather than enhancing the system of checks and balances over the current regime, look more like half-hearted measures for reducing vulnerabilities of the transition to a post-Nazarbayev era, as well as for distancing Nazarbayev from “unpopular” anti-crisis policies that might tarnish the legacy of the Founder of the Nation. The reforms should provide continuity to the system put in place by Nazarbayev, excluding unexpected elements of the transition by imposing restrictions on who can stand for president and ensuring greater collegiality of the decision-making process.

  • Several high-profile criminal cases were initiated in the short period of weeks in the last days of 2016 and beginning of 2017. The former chairman of the National Security Committee (KNB) Nartai Dutbayev, and two high ranking officials from the President’s Administration—former deputy head Baglan Mailybayev and deputy head of the internal policy department Nikolai Galikhin—were arrested and convicted in closed trials for divulging state secrets and abuse of power.17 The former Minister of National Economy, Kuandyk Bishimbayev, was taken into custody on corruption charges in late 2016 and is currently on trial.18

  • Several high-profile personnel reshuffles were especially notable in 2017. Marat Tazhin, a longtime confidante of Nazarbayev, returned to the Presidential Administration, replacing Baglan Mailybayev as the deputy head. His place as Ambassador to Russia was taken by another political heavyweight, Imangali Tasmagambetov, who left the post of deputy prime minister. Aslan Mussin, a former head of the Presidential Administration once known as one of the most powerful political actors in Kazakhstan, was relieved of his post as the Ambassador to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro “in connection with achievement of retirement age.”19

  • In October, at the height of the Kyrgyz electoral campaign, then president Atambaev of Kyrgyzstan accused Nazarbayev of trying to influence the elections and emotionally criticized the rule of Nazarbayev as corrupt, hinting at the need for a change of leadership in Kazakhstan.20 Consequently, Kazakhstan strengthened phytosanitary controls at border crossings with Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in several weeks long multi-kilometer queues on the border.21 In response, Atambayev canceled six Eurasian Economic Union integration aid agreements with Kazakhstan.22 The political crisis lasted almost two months and was resolved only after the election of the new president of Kyrgyzstan,Sooronbai Jeenbekov.23

  • The economic situation continued to stagnate due to low oil prices and accumulated structural problems. The government continued to use resources of the sovereign wealth fund to support the economy. In 2017, the majority of more than $12.5 billion spent was used to support the country's financial sector, in particular, for the repayment of troubled loans of second-tier banks.24 In December, the president signed a law approving minimum $6.1 billion annually of guaranteed transfers from the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the republican budget for 2018-2020.25

  • In his national address on January 31, the president announced the start of a “third stage of modernization.” Besides the institutional reforms discussed above, the reforms will focus on accelerating technological modernization, improving the business environment, maintaining macroeconomic stability, enhancing the quality of human capital, ensuring security, and fighting corruption.26

  • In November, the government approved the Strategic Development Plan of Kazakhstan until 2025.27 The plan replaces the Development Strategy until 2020, which Minister of National Economy Timur Suleimenov said had already achieved its main tasks.28 The document envisions achievement of “qualitative and sustainable growth of the economy, leading to an improvement in the standard of living of people comparable to OECD countries by 2025” by focusing on increasing the productivity and “complexity” of the economy, developing people's competence, involving private capital, orienting the economy towards exports, and opening up the potential of the regions.29

Electoral Process: 

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

 

  • Although the regime has lavished attention on observing the trappings of elections, such as participation of international observers, high electoral turnout, and participation of multiple candidates/parties, the Soviet-era aphorism “elections without choice”30 remains relevant in today’s Kazakhstan. None of the elections held in Kazakhstan since independence have been considered “free and fair” by credible international observers. In monitoring elections, the OSCE has consistently expressed concern over the country’s restrictive legal framework, lack of genuine political choice, and suppression of freedoms of assembly, association and expression.31

  • In the latest presidential elections in 2015, Nazarbayev won 97.7 percent of votes; the party he leads, Nur Otan, received 82.2 percent of the votes in the 2016 elections to Majilis.32 The distinction between the state and the ruling party is effectively blurred in Kazakhstan. For instance, the akims (heads of a local government) of the regions and large cities, who are appointed by the president, are automatically appointed as leaders of the corresponding regional subdivisions of the party.33

  • Under this year’s amendments to the constitution and the constitutional law “On Elections”, self-nominees are no longer allowed to run for elections to the Majilis34 and the presidency.35 Meanwhile, in recent years it has become practically impossible for opposition parties to register. The only surviving registered party that positions itself as opposition, the Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP), failed to win any seats in the latest parliamentary elections in 2016. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK) was liquidated by court decision in 2015,36 and Alga! was banned as extremist in 2012, following the violent suppression of protests in the western oil town of Zhanaozen.37

  • The constitutional reform assigned more limits to who can run for president. A presidential candidate must have at least five years of experience in the public service or in elected government positions, have a higher education degree, and is required to provide medical examination results.38 This will further narrow the suffrage rights of citizens. According to calculations by the OSDP, out of 9 million citizens with active suffrage, only 350,000 former public servants are now eligible to run for president.39 Moreover, given that the legislation does not define the medical eligibility criteria, and taking into account the medical secrecy principle, this innovation leaves space for the arbitrary, non-transparent disqualification of candidates.40

  • In another change affecting the electoral process, the constitutional reform authorized the legislature to define the procedure for appointing or electing the city, district and rural akims, as well as for dismissing them from office.41Previously, the procedure was regulated by a decree of the president.

  • In 2017, four electoral campaigns were held in Kazakhstan: two by-elections to maslikhats (local representative bodies) were held in March and October, elections to the Senate were conducted in June, and there were indirect elections of akims of rural districts within the framework of the mechanism of local self-government in August.42 All of the campaigns went unnoticed by large parts of the population and lacked genuine competition. In the only four districts that published figures on the elections of rural akims, 70 percent of the winning candidates received 100 percent of votes.43 That is not surprising given that all candidates were nominated by a governor and elected by the local maslikhats.

  • Comparable unanimity was observed during the campaign to the Senate, where each candidate scored an overwhelming majority of the votes. Fourteen out of 16 of the elected candidates were either high-ranking officials in local administrations or in the branches of Nur Otan party.44 Nur Otan also took majority of the seats in the by-elections to the maslikhats. For instance, as a result of the March by-elections in Kostanai region, Nur Otan won six out of seven mandates, with similar results in the rest of the regions.45 Likewise, the October by-elections resulted in 102 seats won by Nur Otan, while two pro-presidential parties, Auyl and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (KNPK),46 won one seat each. Only one elected deputy was not affiliated with any political party.47

Civil Society: 

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

5.50

5.75

5.75

6.00

6.25

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.75


 

  • In recent years, the government has further tightened space for civil society, introducing restrictive legislation on public assembly and associations, advocacy and legal aid, information, religion, and counter-extremism,48 as well as imposing burdensome registration procedures and reporting obligations for NGOs, trade unions, and religious organizations.49 In 2016, a Ministry for Religious and Civil Society Affairs was established to regulate “interaction with religious associations, ensuring the rights of citizens to freedom of religion, as well as interaction between the state and civil society.”50

  • A number of civil rights activists and regime critics remained in detention in 2017. The Open Dialog Foundation lists 37 cases of politically motivated prosecution in Kazakhstan, among them human rights defender Vadim Kuramshin; participants of the 2016 mass peaceful rally against the “land reform” Maks Bokayev and Talgat Ayan; political dissident and poet Aron Atabek; journalists Asset Matayev and Zhanbolat Mamay, and others.51

  • The year started with 2016’s “counter-extremism” legislation coming into effect. The law, which was initiated in reaction to the violent attacks in Aktobe and Almaty in 2016, consisted of amendments to a dozen existing codes and laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The reform affected a wide range of issues, such as national security, housing, citizenship, media and communications, religious association, and more.52

  • In January, more than 600 oil workers in Mangistau region went on hunger strike to protest a court decision that liquidated the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kazakhstan. Trade union leaders Nurbek Kushakbayev and Amin Yeleusinov were sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison for “misappropriating another’s property,” “disobedience,”” “use of violence” against a representative of authorities, and “calling on workers to continue a strike that has been declared illegal by a court.”53 Three dozen other workers were ordered to pay compensation collectively amounting to 3.5 million tenge ($10,000) to the company for the damage inflicted by the hunger strike.54

  • Before its liquidation, the Confederation was the largest trade union in the country, uniting approximately 100,000 workers. It was closed after a number of unsuccessful attempts to register due to its inability to comply with burdensome requirements of the new registration procedure for trade unions.55

  • On January 9, the former chairperson of the Confederation, Larissa Kharkova, was arrested on charges of “abuse of office” and was later sentenced to four years of restraint of liberty with confiscation of property and given a five-year ban on holding senior positions in civil society associations.56 In September, a car belonging to Kharkova’s son was burned, and earlier that month both her son and mother were victims of muggings on the same day, in which their documents and money were stolen.57

  • In January three human rights NGOs—the International Legal Initiative Foundation (ILI), Liberty, and Kadyr Kassiyet—were subjected to an unscheduled tax audit. As a result, the court ordered ILI and Liberty to pay 1.3 million tenge (about $4,000) and 3 million tenge ($9,000) respectively of corporate income tax, in direct contradiction to the Tax Code, which exempts nonprofit organizations from taxes. More than 70 Kazakhstani and international NGOs issued a joint statement declaring those cases to be “essentially a prosecution for human rights activities.”58

  • In February, Оlesya Khalabuzar, a former leader of the unregistered opposition party Spravedlivost (Justice), was detained by the police and, according to the activist, was questioned regarding “her role in organizing a protest against amendments to article 26 of the Constitution on regulation of property rights.”59 In May, Khalabuzar announced that she is leaving “public life” in Kazakhstan. In her statement she said her activities as head of the party had been “erroneous and wrong” and regretted that she used “counterproductive methods” of pressure on the authorities, “blackmailing them, conducting illegal protests, and disseminating [illegal] information.”60 In August, the Almaly district court sentenced Khalabuzar to two years’ restraint of liberty for “inciting ethnic hatred”.61

  • In October, the OSDP sent applications to the akimats (local administrations) of 18 cities in Kazakhstan to hold a series of rallies under the slogan “OSDP Against the Rising Cost of Living!” All administrations but the akimat of the city of Semey refused to authorize the events.62 In Semey, the rally was obstructed by a sudden urgent repair of the bridge - the only way to the Colonel’s Island, where the rally was authorized to be held.63

  • In late November, on the eve of the Independence Day, which marks anniversaries of the violent crackdown on the protests of Zheltoksan (1989) and Zhanaozen (2011), members of an informal Alash discussion club, Almat Zhumagulov and Kenzhebek Abishev, were arrested in Almaty on charges of “propaganda of terrorism or public calls for the commission of an act of terrorism.”64 The defendants’ lawyers and a number of human rights activists questioned the authenticity and coherency of the investigator’s materials.65

  • On December 11, about 700 workers of all eight mines belonging to the mining giant Arcelor Mittal Temirtau in Karaganda region refused to leave their working place in demand for salary increase and reduction of the retirement age for miners. The court ruled the strike illegal.66 The strike ended on December 15 after the company partially agreeing to the workers’ demands and the local procurator signing a letter guaranteeing “exemption from criminal prosecution for participation in the strike.”67 However, in late December, Natalia Tomilova, chairman of the NGO Miners’ Family (Shakhterskaya Semya) and Dmitry Sinyavsky, head of the branch of the Trade Union of Fuel and Energy Sector Employees were summoned for questioning by the police.68

  • As part of the “counter-extremism” legal reforms introduced in 2016, the Ministry for Religious and Civil Society Affairs prepared a draft amending the law on religion. The bill proposes to further tighten the already restrictive 2011 Law on Religion, including more restrictions and punishments for unauthorized religious teaching and missionary activities, participation of children in religious activities, ban of certain types of religious clothing, as well as more censorship of religious literature.69

Independent Media: 

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

6.50

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

6.75

 

  • Conditions for media freedom in Kazakhstan continued to deteriorate in 2017. The government continued to crackdown on dissent under the pretext of fighting terrorism, extremism, and crime. Besides the “traditional” prosecutions for libel,70 “instigation of national, social, religious hatred,”71 and “dissemination of knowingly false information,”72 journalists now increasingly often face criminal charges for financial crimes. The amendments made to the law on information and communications threaten the existence of investigative journalism, restrict Internet freedoms, and introduce vaguely defined notions of “information infringing on legitimate rights and interests” and “propaganda.”73

  • According to the media watchdog foundation Adil Soz, in 2017 there were 61 cases of criminal charges and 76 cases of civil suits against media outlets and journalists, including 16 cases of journalists in Kazakhstan taken under detention or arrest.74 There were an additional 15 cases of closures and termination or suspensions of media sources or licenses including Radiotochka and Tribuna/Sayasi Kalam, and 9 cases of arbitrary blocking and restricting access to online sources, including blocking the petition site Avaaz.org, the online version of Foreign Policy magazine, as well as temporary blockings of WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. Two media outlets, Radiotochka and Tribuna/Sayasi Kalam, were closed in 2017. The report mentions six cases of attacks on journalists in 2017.75

  • As of late 2017, more than 20 social network users were convicted for publications online, and 16 of them sentenced to imprisonment for up to 9 years on charges of “spreading propaganda of violation of the integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” “inciting social and ethnic hatred,” “propaganda of terrorism or calls for terrorist attacks,” and “insult of a government representative.”76

  • In December, President Nazarbayev approved a package of amendments to the legislation on information and communications77 that were criticized by civil society for their potential to increase self-censorship and curtail investigative journalism.78 The new rules complicate access to official records and oblige journalists to verify all published information and to receive consent from the subjects of their reports to disseminate “personal, family and other secrets”. The legislation might further reduce online freedoms through mandatory pre-identification on the portal of “electronic government” or SMS registration for commentators in the Internet.79

  • Following the liquidation of almost all independent media, social media has emerged as an alternative platform for open discussion. Although not fully enforced yet, the 2016 amendments to the law on communications will require all Internet users to install a “national security certificate” on their devices, allowing state control over personal communications and access to information.80

  • In May, Scandinavian telecommunication company Telia expressed concern over new Kazakhstani technical regulations allowing the government to directly access telecommunications systems using the Russian-designed communications monitory system SORM. According to Telia, the new legislation “may have serious consequences for freedom of expression.”81 In July, the government issued a decree that transferred the State Technical Service from the Ministry of Information and Communications to the care of the National Security Committee “for the implementation of centralized management of telecommunications networks, the single Internet access gateway, computer incident response service, and the Information Systems Monitoring Center.”82

  • In April, a court ordered two media outlets, Forbes and Ratel, to compensate former finance minister Zeynulla Kakimzhanov and his son Ilkhalid 50.2 million tenge (approximately $160,000) on charges of “defaming the honor, dignity and business reputation” of the businessmen.83 In 2016, the two outlets reported that the inspecting state bodies have revealed signs of embezzlement in the activities of a construction company affiliated with Kakimzhanovs. The court disregarded official documents submitted by the journalists as evidence, including the protests of the General Prosecutor's Office, expert opinions, and a decision of the National Anticorruption Bureau.84

  • While the space for independent media is shrinking, the government spends about 40 billion tenge ($120 million) yearly to support loyal media outlets that cover official view on the current events, produce patriotic materials and promote the “president’s course”.85 Moreover, Kazakhstan continues the Soviet practice of enforced subscription to progovernment newspapers among public servants to ensure consumption of the progovernment media products.86

  • In 2017, the Ministry of Information and Communications introduced new rules of state budget allocation, replacing a public tender system with a special commission’s examination. In September a prominent media watchdog, the Legal Media Center, announced that it was refused access to information on the amounts and recipients of more than 2 billion tenge ($6.2 million) allocated by the commission for “a cycle of films” about Nazarbayev, economic and political reforms, and the results and indicators of the transport and housing programs Nurly Zhol and Nurly Zher.87 The prosecutor’s office also refused to review the watchdog’s appeal against the Ministry regarding the non-disclosure.88

  • In January, a former editor-in-chief of the Central Asia Monitor and Radiotochka, and president of the Kazakhstani PEN club, Bigeldy Gabdullin, was accused of extortion and sentenced to five years’ restricted liberty. In August, after the General Prosecutor’s appeal to increase the sentence to seven years in prison, Gabdullin stated that he is leaving journalism, adding that “he remains a strong supporter of President Nazarbayev.” On August 29, the General Prosecutor withdrew his appeal.89

  • In February, a former editor-in-chief of an opposition newspaper Tribuna/Sayashi Kalam, Zhanbolat Mamay, was arrested on money laundering charges. In September, he was sentenced to three years of restricted liberty and was banned from engaging in journalistic activities for three years.90

  • In May, a prominent journalist and the chairman of the board of Journalists in Danger, Ramazan Yesergepov, was stabbed by two unknown men on his way to meet with foreign diplomats to discuss the situation of political prisoners in Kazakhstan. Prior to the attack, Yesergepov had been detained after he and 10 other activists walked to the main post office of Almaty to send a letter to international organizations aimed at bringing attention to the case of Zhanbolat Mamay. Ramazan Yesergepov previously served three years in prison after his newspaper published an article revealing corruption schemes in the KNB. The police ruled the walk was a violation of the law on peaceful assembly. Yesergepov left the country in August after facing a threat of a new criminal charge.91

  • In December, former head of the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan, Seytkazy Matayev, was granted early release on parole due to health condition.92 His son Asset, former director of the private KazTAG News Agency, remained in jail on charges of fraud at year’s end.93

Local Democratic Governance: 

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

6.25

6.25

6.25

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

 

  • Kazakhstan is a unitary state with a highly centralized form of government. The akims, as the local executive branch, are directly accountable to the president and the central government. The maslikhats, although elected by the population, can be dismissed by the president and are thus also accountable to him. Since 2012, the government has been implementing decentralization policies, outlined in the Concept of Development of Local Self-Government until 2020.94

  • In 2017, amendments to the constitution introduced minor improvements on the redistribution of powers by enabling the parliament, rather than the president, to appoint akims at the town, rayon (district), and rural levels. The president keeps his powers to appoint akims of regions, cities of republican level, and the capital. The chairpersons of the two chambers of parliament and the prime minister are now to be consulted prior to the preterm termination of powers of maslikhats by the president.95

  • On July 11, the president signed the Law “On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Development of the Local Self-Government”.96 The law envisages the introduction of an independent budget and municipal ownership of the local self-government, and the expansion of local self-governments’ powers regarding the management of budgetary processes and municipal property.97

  • Despite these minor positive changes, experts have expressed concerns regarding the “extremely low participation of citizens in local elections showing as a rule indifferent and even negative attitude of citizens to local policy and local governments”, due to the high level of corruption and public distrust of candidates and local governments.98

Judicial Framework and Independence: 

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

6.00

6.25

6.25

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.75

 

  • Although Kazakhstan’s constitution guarantees the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, de facto, the executive dominates the judicial branch. The president forms a considerable part of the judiciary, namely by appointing chairpersons and judges of local and other courts; with his consent, the Senate elects the supreme body of the judicial branch of power – the Supreme Court. The pervasive corruption of the courts, and the ruling elites’ control over them, results in low public expectations and trust in the justice system.

  • The constitution confers judicial powers on the procuracy and the Constitutional Council, although neither is an entity of state power or a part of the judiciary. The Constitutional Council substitutes a constitutional court and is empowered to review disputes and issues related to the operation and application of constitutional norms and interpretation.99 However, the Council only reviews appeals from the president, the Chairman of the Senate, the Chairman of the Majilis, the prime minister, and at least one-fifth of the total number of deputies of parliament. The citizens of Kazakhstan have no recourse for direct appeals to be heard by the Constitutional Council.100 On the other hand, the procuracy is empowered with the supervisory powers of the judiciary, making the institution inherently vulnerable to corruption.101

  • In 2017, the constitutional reform introduced several minor improvements to the judicial system. The Constitutional Council is now authorized to review all constitutional amendments before their adoption, while the president received the right to appeal directly to the Council on the constitutionality of laws or other legal acts. Importantly, the reform abolished the president’s power to veto the Council’s decisions.102

  • On the other hand, the Venice Commission has voiced its concerns over the amendment transferring the power to define the “common system” of remuneration of public servants (including judges) to the government, arguing that such a provision might potentially obstruct the judiciary’s autonomy from the executive.103

  • The changes introduced under the Article 10 are particularly concerning. These amendments allow courts to deprive Kazakhstani citizens of their citizenship for terrorism offences and “other serious damage to the vital interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan”. The reform raises serious concerns, as it contradicts the inalienable right of every person to citizenship.104 Moreover, given the justice system’s dependence upon political pressure, the potentially broad interpretations of terms like “terrorism” and “vital interests” may arm the state with yet another repressive instrument in its fight against political dissent.

  • Torture is still widespread in Kazakhstan. According to official information, every year there are about 700 new registered complaints of “unlawful methods of investigation and violence against detainees and prisoners.”105 According to Kadyr Kassiyet, a prominent human rights NGO, torture-related complaints often stay unregistered or unreported due to “risks and restrictions on the right to file complaints, […] lack of an independent complaint mechanism, and guarantees of non-repetition of torture,” and only a small number of cases reach the court.106 In 2017, torture allegedly was used during some of the year’s most notorious cases: those of Zhanbolat Mamay,107 Seitkazy Matayev,108Vadim Kuramshin,109 Iskander Yerimbetov,110 and Muratkhan Tokmadi.111 Two of the defendants later publicly withdrew their own complaints, and no investigations of the allegations followed.

  • In 2017, the UN Human Rights Committee concluded that Kazakhstan violated the right to fair trial (Vladislav Chelakh vs. Kazakhstan,112 Dmitry Tyan vs. Kazakhstan113), the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Dmitry Tyan vs. Kazakhstan, 114 Zhaslan Suleimenov vs. Kazakhstan115), adequate detention conditions (Zhaslan Suleimenov vs. Kazakhstan), and the right to freedom of expression (Andrei Sviridov vs. Kazakhstan).116 Kazakhstan has yet to implement the recommendations made by the Committee.117

  • In the last few years, investigatory and trial processes in Kazakhstan have become increasingly non-transparent. According to Evgeny Zhovtis, a prominent human rights defender, “almost all participants in criminal processes sign a pledge of secrecy of investigation. [...] Every other case concerning ‘extremism’ or ‘high-profile’ cases, especially against high-ranking officials, turn into a secret.”118 In September, two lawyers representing Muratkhan Tokmadi – a businessman arrested on extortion and homicide charges, the latter “on instruction of Mukhtar Ablyazov” – were suspended by the prosecutor’s office for refusing to sign a pledge of secrecy of investigation.119

  • In October, more than 500 lawyers signed an appeal to the Prime Minister regarding the draft law on “On Advocacy and Legal Aid”,120 which, if accepted, might jeopardize the principles of the independence and self-governance of bar associations and personal security of lawyers, and will introduce significant restriction for the legal practice. Among other things, the bill allows for questioning of lawyers as witnesses; provisions participation of judges and Ministry of Justice in disciplinary commissions, and abolishes the bar association admission fees, thus depriving the bar of financial independence.121

  • On the other hand, courts in Kazakhstan are embracing online services and electronic documentation, allowing citizens to submit applications to the courts, check their status, or receive electronic copies of judicial acts through the Supreme Court’s united portal, thereby improving the transparency and efficiency of the system. In 2016, video and audio recording of the trials were introduced; according to the Supreme Court, 98 percent of trials conducted in 2017 were recorded and available at the portal.122

Corruption: 

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.50

6.75

6.75

 

  • National strategic documents, such as Kazakhstan-2050, the Strategic Development Plan until 2020, and the Nation's Plan “100 concrete steps”, give the fight against corruption the highest priority. In February, in his annual address to the nation, President Nazarbayev listed “rooting out corruption” as one of the five priorities of the country’s “third modernization” strategy.123 In 2017, Kazakhstan continued to implement the Anticorruption Strategy for 2015-2025, which is designed to facilitate “transition from combating consequences to the systematic prevention of corruption.”124 Despite extensive anticorruption legislation and much government emphasis on the issue, petty corruption, nepotism, patronage, and state capture are endemic.

  • According to Anticorruption Agency’s annual report, out of 520 corruption-related criminal cases initiated against national government employees in 2016, 309 involved officials in the Ministry of Interior, while 58 cases were against Ministry of Finance employees.125 In June, the deputy chair of the agency criticized the public councils under state bodies, calling them a “formality”: “half of the public councils have never even discussed countering corruption.”126

  • Anticorruption criminal legislation was frequently utilized in inter-elite struggles or to crackdown on dissent in 2017. During the year, journalists Zhanbolat Mamay, Bigeldy Gabdullin, Seitkazy and Asset Matayevs, trade union leaders Larissa Kharkova, Аmin Eleusinov and Nurbek Kushakbayev, a housing rights activist Makhambet Abzhan were all convicted of financial crimes.127

  • At the same time, grand corruption in Kazakhstan is often left without proper investigation or considered by courts to be a lesser crime. In September 2016, a former president of the Khorgos International Center for Cross Border Cooperation, Vasily Ni, was caught in the act of receiving a bribe of $1 million for preferentially accepting an investment tender. In April 2017, an Almaty court ruled to release Ni and his co-defendant from criminal liability, as, in the words of the judge, “the defendant repented of his crime, did not cause any damage, and helped to solve the case”.128 According to prominent lawyer Jokhar Utebekov, unprecedented measures were taken to conceal the release of Ni, such as removing the case from the online database of judicial decisions.129

  • In November, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Defense and Aerospace Industry, Beibut Atamkulov, and former energy minister and current head of the state-owned oil and gas company KazMunayGaz, Sauat Mynbayev, were featured in the Paradise Papers, a major leak of offshore financial documents. The Paradise Papers investigations revealed that Sauat Mynbayev, one of the key decision makers in the lucrative Kazakhstani oil and gas industry for more than a decade, was a co-founder and former shareholder of Meridian Capital, a transnational investment company in oil and gas, mining, banking, and other spheres worth at least $3 billion.130 The leak revealed that his fellow Meridian Capital co-founders included top executives of Kazkommertsbank, formerly the largest bank in the country, which provided Meridian with access to easy credit. The bank has been bailed out by the state several times,131 before it was acquired in June by Halyk Bank (owned by President Nazarbayev’s son-in-law) and the National Welfare Fund “Samruk-Kazyna” for a symbolic price of 1 tenge ($0.002).132

  • Since 2007, Kazakhstan has rolled out a system of providing public services through the “E-Government” online portal and through “one-stop-shops”. The system eliminated direct contact between service providers and citizens, thus significantly reducing petty corruption and improving the efficiency and transparency of public service provision processes. In 2017 the government approved the Digital Kazakhstan program that should ensure continuity of those successes by development of digital infrastructure, increasing digital literacy of the population, introduction of digital technologies to improve the competitiveness of various sectors of the economy and of the electronic and mobile government systems.133

Author: Malika Tukmadiyeva is an independent researcher. She holds an MA in Politics and Security in Central Asia from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and an MA in Global and European Security from the Geneva Center for Security Policy/the University of Geneva. Malika has several years of working experience in the civil society and research sectors. She was a research intern for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and a Visiting Research Fellow at the George Washington University.

Notes: 

1 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 91, Par. 2.

2 “Н.Назарбаев: Мир, согласие, стабильность – наше золотое достояние” [N. Nazarbayev: peace, concord, and stability are our golden treasure] 24.kz, 9 December 2016, http://24.kz/ru/news/top-news/item/152844-n-nazarbaev-mir-soglasie-stabi...

3 See for example in Catherine Putz, “Are Political Reforms Afoot in Kazakhstan?”, The Diplomat, 27 January 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/are-political-reforms-afoot-in-kazakhstan/; Arkady Dubnov, “Continuity in Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev’s Curious Appeal for Constitutional Reform”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 6 February 2017, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/67906; George Voloshin, “Kazakhstan Embarks on Constitutional Reform Amid Uncertain Times”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 23, 23 February 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-embarks-constitutional-reform-a...

4 “Закон Республики Казахстан от 10 марта 2017 года № 51-VI ЗРК “О внесении изменений и дополнений в Конституцию Республики Казахстан” [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of March 10, 2017 No. 51-VI LRoK "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan], Tengrinews.kz, 10 March 2017, https://tengrinews.kz/zakon/parlament_respubliki_kazahstan/konstitutsion...

5 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

6 “Kazakhstan: 2 Union Leaders Arrested”, Human Rights Watch, 7 April 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/26/kazakhstan-2-union-leaders-arrested

7 “Партию столичных бомжей перевезли перед ЭКСПО в Кокшетау” [Part of the capital’s homeless people were moved to Kokshetau prior to the EXPO], Informburo, 25 May 2017, https://informburo.kz/novosti/partiyu-stolichnyh-bomzhey-perevezli-pered...

8 Jamilya Maricheva, “ЭКСПО 2017: кто возьмет билетов пачку?” [EXPO 2017: who will buy a pack of tickets?], Ratel.kz, 8 February 2017, http://ratel.kz/raw/ekspo_2017_kto_vozmet_biletov_pachku

9 Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United States, "UN Security Council", https://www.kazakhembus.com/content/un-security-council

10 Nurlan Onzhanov, "Уверенный курс Лидера нации" [Confident course of the Leader of the nation], Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 8 December 2015, www.kazpravda.kz/fresh/view/uverennii-kurs-lidera-natsii/.

11 Catherine Putz, “Are Political Reforms Afoot in Kazakhstan?”, The Diplomat, 27 January 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/are-political-reforms-afoot-in-kazakhstan/.

12 Catherine Putz, “Are Political Reforms Afoot in Kazakhstan?”, The Diplomat, 27 January 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/are-political-reforms-afoot-in-kazakhstan/.

13 Carna Pistan, “2017 Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan: increasing democracy without political pluralism?”, Constitutionnet, 28 March 2017, http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/2017-constitutional-reform-kazakhsta....

14 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), “Kazakhstan. Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution”, 14 March 2017, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)010-e

15 Zarina Akhmatova, “Проект изменений в Конституции. Сравнительная таблица” [Draft amendments to the Constitution. Comparison table.], Vlast.kz, 26 January 2017, https://vlast.kz/politika/21511-proekt-izmenenij-v-konstitucii-sravnitel....

16 The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 91, Par. 2, www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/constitution

17 Kassym Amanzhol, “Арест Майлыбаева и других. Что дальше?” [The arrest of Mailybaev and others. What's next?], Radio Azattyq, 16 January 2017, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/azattyqlive-zaderzhanie-mailybaeva/28235753.html

18 “Дело Куандыка Бишимбаева передали в суд” [The case of Kuandyk Bishimbaev was transferred to court], Tengrinews.kz, 19 October 2017, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/delo-kuandyika-bishimbaeva-peredal...

19 “Аслан Мусин освобождён от должности из-за пенсионного возраста” [Aslan Musin was released from office due to achievement of the retirement age], Forbes.kz, 4 January 2017, https://forbes.kz/process/appointments/aslan_musin_osvobojden_ot_doljnos...

20 “Что сказал Атамбаев про власть Казахстана” [What Atambaev said about the power of Kazakhstan], Sputnik.kg, 7 October 2017, https://ru.sputnik.kg/video/20171007/1035618366/chto-skazal-atambaev-pro...

21 Nurjamal Djanibekova, “Compromise Agreement Resolves Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Gridlock”, Eurasianet.org, https://eurasianet.org/s/compromise-agreement-resolves-kazakhstan-kyrgyz...

22 Madina Zhalil, “Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambaev cancelled six agreement with Kazakhstan”, The Qazaq Times, 20 November 2017, http://qazaqtimes.com/en/article/27748

23 “Conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan resolved”, 24.kg, 30 November 2017, https://24.kg/english/69763_Conflict_between_Kyrgyzstan_and_Kazakhstan_r...

24 “Средств в Нацфонде с начала года стало меньше на 10,6%. За 10 месяцев в Нацфонд поступило 1,6 триллиона тенге, а использовано в 2,6 раза больше” [The National Fund has decreased by 10.6% since the beginning of the year. In 10 months, the National Fund received 1.6 trillion tenge, used 2.6 times more], Finprom.kz, 16 November 2017, http://finprom.kz/ru/article/sredstv-v-nacfonde-s-nachala-goda-stalo-men...

25 “Главой государства подписан Закон Республики Казахстан «О гарантированном трансферте из Национального фонда Республики Казахстан на 2018-2020 годы" [The Head of State signed the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On guaranteed transfers from the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2018-2020], Official site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 4 December 2017, www.akorda.kz/ru/legal_acts/laws/glavoi-gosudarstva-podpisan-zakon-respu...

26 “The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Address to the Nation of Kazakhstan", Official site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 31 January 2017, http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/the-president-o...

27 “Стратегический план развития Казахстана до 2025 года утвердили в правительстве” [The strategic plan of development of Kazakhstan until 2025 was approved by the government], Vlast.kz, 28 November 2017, https://vlast.kz/novosti/25890-strategiceskij-plan-razvitia-kazahstana-d...

28 “Стратегический план-2025 представят на рассмотрение Правительства” [Strategic Plan-2025 will be submitted for consideration by the Government], Khabar Agency, 27 November 2017, http://24.kz/ru/news/top-news/item/208251-strategicheskij-plan-do-2025-g...

29 “2020 достигнуто, впереди - 2025” [2020 is reached, 2025 is ahead], Atameken Business Channel, 27 November 2017, http://abctv.kz/ru/news/2020-dostignuto-vperedi-2025

30 In Russian, “vybory” means both choices and elections, thus “vybory bez vyborov.”

31 “Republic of Kazakhstan Early Presidential Election OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report”, OSCE/ODIHR, 26 April 2015, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/174811?download=true

32 "Центральная избирательная комиссия установила итоги внеочередных выборов депутатов Мажилиса Парламента Республики Казахстан" [The Central Election Commission has established the results of the early elections of deputies of the Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan], The Central Election Commission, Press Release, 22 March 2016, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=3291.

33 Roman Ivanov, “Выборы, которых никто не заметил, или зачем Казахстану партии?” [Elections that no one noticed, or why does Kazakhstan have parties?], 365info.kz, 28 March 2017, https://365info.kz/2017/03/vybory-kotoryh-nikto-ne-zametil-ili-zachem-ka...

34The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of Its Deputies", Art. 4, Par. 4, Zakon.kz, https://online.zakon.kz/m/document/?doc_id=1003961.

35 The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan", Art. 55, Zakon.kz, https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=1004029#pos=0;0.

36 "Суд Алматы постановил ликвидировать Коммунистическую партию Казахстана" [The Almaty court ruled to liquidate the Communist Party of Kazakhstan], Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 4 September 2015, www.kazpravda.kz/news/politika/sud-almati-postanovil-likvidirovat-kommun....

37 Andrey Osavolyuk, et. al., "История оппозиционного движения «Демократический выбор Казахстана»" [The history of the opposition movement "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan"], Open Dialogue Foundation, 29 January 2016, ru.odfoundation.eu/a/7249,istoriya-oppozicionnogo-dvizheniya-demokraticheskiy-vybor-kazahstana.

38 “Главой государства подписан Конституционный закон РК «О внесении изменений и дополнений в некоторые Конституционные законы Республики Казахстан», [The Head of the State signed the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Amendments and Additions to Some Constitutional Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan"], Central Election Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 14 July 2017, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=4014.

39 Askhat Rakhimjanov, “Дискриминация законом” [Discrimination by law], National Social Democratic Party, 3 June 2017, http://www.osdp.info/diskriminacija-zakonom/.

40 Askhat Rakhimjanov, “Дискриминация законом” [Discrimination by law], National Social Democratic Party, 3 June 2017, http://www.osdp.info/diskriminacija-zakonom/.

41 The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 87, Par. 4, www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/constitution

42 “Выборы в Сенат и довыборы в маслихаты пройдут в этом году” [Elections to the Senate and by-elections to maslikhats will be held this year], Kapital.kz, 17 Februray 2017, https://kapital.kz/gosudarstvo/57636/vybory-v-senat-i-dovybory-v-masliha....

43 “Завершились выборы сельских акимов” [The elections of rural akims completed], Public Association "ECHO", 25 August 2017, http://www.echo.kz/35-zavershilis-vybory-selskikh-akimov.html.

44 “Центральная избирательная комиссия подвела итоги выборов депутатов Сената Парламента Республики Казахстан” [The Central Elections Commission summed up the election of deputies of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan], The Central Elections Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 29 June 2017, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=3970.

45 “Казахстан-2017: Выборы в маслихаты показали подавляющее превосходство партии власти” [Kazakhstan-2017: Elections to maslikhats showed overwhelming superiority of the party of power], Sodruzhestvo Press Club, 28 March 2017, http://press-unity.com/stati/9852.html

46 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan", 27 March 2012, https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/27/background-on-communist-people-...

47 “29 октября в 105 округах республики состоялись выборы депутатов маслихатов вместо выбывших” [105 districts of the republic held by-elections to the maslikhats on October 29], The Central Elections Commission, 30 October 2017, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=4135

48 “Закон РК о внесении изменений и дополнений в некоторые законодательные акты Республики Казахстан по вопросам противодействия экстремизму и терроризму” [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on introducing changes and amendments to some legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on countering extremism and terrorism], 27 February 2017, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=34199995

49 “Kazakhstan: Rights Groups Harassed”, Human Rights Watch, 21 February 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/21/kazakhstan-rights-groups-harassed

50 “Kazakhstan established the Ministry for Religious and Civil Society Affairs”, Official website of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, 13 September 2016, https://primeminister.kz/en/news/all/v-kazahstane-obrazovano-ministerstv...

51 “On the anniversary of the Zhanaozen tragedy, the ODF presents the most high-profile cases of politically motivated prosecution in contemporary Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 15 December 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8486,on-the-anniversary-of-the-zhanaozen-tragedy-the-odf-presents-the-most-high-profile-cases-of-politically-motivated-prosecution-in-contemporary-kazakhstan

52 “Закон РК о внесении изменений и дополнений в некоторые законодательные акты Республики Казахстан по вопросам противодействия экстремизму и терроризму” [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on introducing changes and amendments to some legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on countering extremism and terrorism], 27 February 2017, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=34199995

53 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

54 “Kazakhstan: 2 Union Leaders Arrested”, Human Rights Watch, 7 April 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/26/kazakhstan-2-union-leaders-arrested

55 “Kazakhstan. Events of 2016”, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/kazakhstan

56 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

57 “Давление на лидеров РОП Конфедерации независимого профсоюза Республики Казахстан (КНПРК) зашло слишком далеко” [Pressure on the leaders of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions has went too far], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 21 September 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/iz_drugikh_istochnikov/davlenie_na_liderov_knp...

58 “Заявление организаций гражданского общества Республики Казахстан” [Statement of Civil Society Organizations of the Republic of Kazakhstan], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 30 January 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/zayavlenie_organizaci...

59 “Очередная жертва земельной реформы” [Another victim of land reform], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 1 August 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/ocherednaya_jertva_ze...

60 “Олеся Халабузарь покидает «общественную жизнь» в Казахстане” [Olesya Khalabuzar leaves "public life" in Kazakhstan], Center1, 18 May 2017, https://centre1.com/kazakhstan/olesya-halabuzar-pokidaet-obshhestvennuyu...

61 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

https://timeskz.kz/23374-dva-goda-ogranicheniya-svobody-poluchila-olesya...

62 “Заявление в связи с отказом в проведении митинга «ОСДП против удорожания жизни!»” [Statement in connection with the refusal to hold a rally "NSDP Against the Rise in Life!"], National Social Democratic Party, 19 October 2017, http://www.osdp.info/zajavlenie-v-svjazi-s-otkazom-v-provedenii-mitinga-...

63 “Митинг в Семее. Подборка из Facebook” [Rally in Semey. Facebook compilation], National Social Democratic Party, 22 October 2017, http://www.osdp.info/miting-v-semee-podborka-iz-facebook/

64 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Terrorist Plot - or Concocted Conspiracy?”, Eurasianet.org, 2 February 2018, https://eurasianet.org/s/kazakhstan-terrorist-plot-or-concocted-conspiracy

65 “Стать «джихадистом» очень просто” [It’s very easy to become a “jihadist”], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 10 January 2018, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/stat_djikhadistom_och...

66 Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: Coal Miners End Strike After Compromise Reached”, Eurasianet.org, 15 December 2017, https://eurasianet.org/s/kazakhstan-coal-miners-end-strike-after-comprom...

67 “О чем договорились бастующие шахтеры и АрселорМиттал Темиртау” [What the striking miners and ArcelorMittal Temirtau agreed upon], Tengrinews.kz, 15 December 2017, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/chem-dogovorilis-bastuyuschie-shah...

68 “Власти ищут крайних в проведении шахтерской забастовки” [Authorities are looking for a punching bag for the mining strike], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 28 December 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/vlasti_ishut_krainikh...

69 Felix Corley, “Kazakhstan: More restrictions to Parliament in December?”, Forum 18, 10 October 2017, f http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2324

70 The Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 130, https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=31575252&doc_id2=31575252#activ....

71 The Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 174, https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=31575252&doc_id2=31575252#activ....

72 The Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 274, https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=31575252&doc_id2=31575252#activ....

73 "Парламент принял закон в пользу коррупционеров" [Parliament passed a law in favor of corrupt officials], Adil Soz, 21 December 2017, http://www.adilsoz.kz/news/show/id/2535.

74 “Cтатистика нарушений права на свободу выражения в Казахстане за январь-декабрь 2017 года” [Statistics on violations of the right to freedom of expression in Kazakhstan January-December 2017], Adil Soz, 21 January 2018, http://www.adilsoz.kz/politcor/show/id/223.

75 “Cтатистика нарушений права на свободу выражения в Казахстане за январь-декабрь 2017 года” [Statistics on violations of the right to freedom of expression in Kazakhstan January-December 2017], Adil Soz, 21 January 2018, http://www.adilsoz.kz/politcor/show/id/223.

76 “16 казахстанцев сели в тюрьму за высказывания в соцсетях” [16 Kazakhstani were imprisoned for statements in social networks], Forbes.kz, 16 October 2017, http://www.inform.kz/ru/16-kazahstancev-seli-v-tyur-mu-za-vyskazyvaniya-v-socsetyah_a3075320

77 Yelizaveta Tsoy, “Назарбаев подписал поправки в закон по вопросам информации и коммуникаций” [Nazarbayev signed amendments to the law on information and communications], Vlast.kz, 28 December 2017, https://vlast.kz/novosti/26281-nazarbaev-podpisal-popravki-v-zakon-po-voprosam-informacii-i-kommunikacij.html; “О совершенствовании законодательства о средствах массовой информации” [On the improvements of the legislation on the mass media], Adil Soz, 18 January 2017, http://www.adilsoz.kz/news/show/id/2227

78 “Калеева: поправки в закон о СМИ ставят крест на журналистских расследованиях” [Kaleeva: amendments to the law on the media puts an end to investigative jourmalism], Sputniknews.kz, 21 December 2017, https://ru.sputniknews.kz/radio/20171221/4095342/kaleeva-popravki-v-zako...

79 “Парламент принял закон в пользу коррупционеров” [Parliament passed a law in favor of corrupt officials], Adil Soz, 21 December 2017, http://www.adilsoz.kz/news/show/id/2535

80 “Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of Human Rights”, 22 February 2017, http://www.refworld.org/docid/58b033e8a.html and Gaziza Baituova, Vasilina Atoyanz-Larina, "Казахстан ужесточает контроль за интернетом" [Kazakhstan tightens control over the Internet], IWPR Central Asia, 15 February 2016, https://iwpr.net/ru/global-voices/казахстан-ужесточает-контроль-за-интернетом.

81 “TeliaCompany выражает опасения в связи с намерением Казахстана использовать системы «прямого доступа»” [TeliaCompany is concerned about Kazakhstan's intention to use "direct access" systems], Vlast.kz, 11 May 2017, https://vlast.kz/novosti/22932-teliacompany-vyrazaet-opasenia-v-svazi-s-...

82 "В КНБ передали службу, управляющую сетями телекоммуникаций в Казахстане" [The service that manages telecommunications networks in Kazakhstan is transferred to the National Security Committee], Tengrinews.kz, 2 August 2017, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/knb-peredali-slujbu-upravlyayuschu...

83 Svetlana Borisova, “«Дело против СМИ»: станет ли оно уроком для судебной системы?” ["The case against the media": will it be a lesson for the judiciary?], Central Asia Monitor, 28 April 2017, https://camonitor.kz/26686-delo-protiv-smi-stanet-li-ono-urokom-dlya-sud...

84 “США обеспокоены делом «Какимжанов против Ratel.kz и Forbes.kz»” [US is concerned about the case of "Kakimzhanov v. Ratel.kz and Forbes.kz"], Forbes.kz, 10 May 2017, https://forbes.kz/process/ssha_obespokoenyi_delom_kakimjanov_protiv_rate...

85 “Министр не ответил, как израсходовали 156 миллиардов” [The minister did not answer how 156 billion were spent], Radio Azattyq, 11 November 2016, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/almaty-mediaforum-smi-gossredstva/28110165.html

86 Diana Okremova, “Диана Окремова: грызите кактус анонимно” [Diana Okremova: gnaw the cactus anonymously], Legal Media Center, 25 November 2017, http://lmc.kz/item/3070-%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D1%83%D1%81-%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BD%D0%BE.html

87 “​Мининформации и коммуникаций ограничивает доступ к информации о получателях госинформ заказа - НПО” [NGO: The Ministry of Information and Communications restricts access to information about the recipients of the state budgeting], Vlast.kz, 18 September 2017, https://vlast.kz/novosti/24852-mininformacii-i-kommunikacij-ogranicivaet-dostup-k-informacii-o-polucatelah-gosinform-zakaza-npo.html

88 Svetlana Glushkova, “Прокуратура не рассмотрела жалобу на отказ в информации о госзаказе в СМИ” [The prosecutor's office did not consider the complaint about the refusal of information about the state commissioning in the media], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 28 September 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/iz_drugikh_istochnikov/prokuratura_ne_rassmotr...

89 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

90 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

91 “Председатель правления фонда «Журналисты в беде» покинул Казахстан” [Chairman of the Board of the "Journalists in Need" has left Kazakhstan], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 4 August 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/iz_drugikh_istochnikov/predsedatel_pravleniya_...

92 "Сейтказы Матаев вышел на свободу" [Seitkazy Mataev was released], Today.kz, 4 December 2017, today.kz/news/zhizn/2017-12-04/755630-sejtkazyi-mataev-vyishel-na-svobodu/

93 “Суд постановил освободить Матаева условно-досрочно” [The court ruled to release Matayev on parole], Azattyk.org, 16 November 2017, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/mataev-reshenie-uslovno-dosrochno/28857695.html

94 The Concept of Development of Local Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Official website of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 28 November 2012, economy.gov.kz/ru/pages/ob-utverzhdenii-koncepcii-razvitiya-mestnogo-samoupravleniya-v-respublike-kazahstan

95 Carna Pistan, “2017 Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan: increasing democracy without political pluralism?”, Constitutionnet, 28 March 2017, http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/2017-constitutional-reform-kazakhsta....

96 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Development of Local Self-Government", Zakon.kz, July 11 2017, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38280611

97 Jania Urankaeva, “Local government budgets to be introduced in Kazakhstan in 2018”, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 18 January 2017, http://www.kazpravda.kz/en/news/society/local-government-budgets-to-be-i...

98 “Kazakhstan. Country Profile”, Participatry Local Democracy, https://localdemocracy.net/countries/asia-west/kazakhstan/.

99 Saken Shardarov, “Поправки к Конституции РК не устраняют угрозу безопасности государства и ключевые противоречия Конституции” [Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan do not eliminate the threat to state security and key contradictions in the Constitution], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 14 February 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/popravki_k_konstituci...

100 Jörg Pudelka, “Возможности обращения граждан в Конституционный Совет Республики Казахстан: состояние и перспективы” [Possibilities of citizens' appeal to the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan: status and prospects], Zakon.kz, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31061251#pos=7;-13

101 Saken Shardarov, “Поправки к Конституции РК не устраняют угрозу безопасности государства и ключевые противоречия Конституции” [Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan do not eliminate the threat to state security and key contradictions in the Constitution], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 14 February 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/popravki_k_konstituci...

102 Carna Pistan, “2017 Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan: increasing democracy without political pluralism?”, Constitutionnet, 28 March 2017, http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/2017-constitutional-reform-kazakhsta....

103 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), “Kazakhstan. Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution”, 14 March 2017, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)010-e

104 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15, Sec. 2.

105 Prosecutor General’s Office, Press Release, “Состоялся IV-ый Форум тюремной реформы” [The IVth Prison Reform Forum took place], 23 February 2017, http://prokuror.gov.kz/rus/novosti/press-releasy/sostoyalsya-iv-yy-forum...

106 Anara Ibrayeva, "О проекте «Анти-пытки»" [About the Anti-Torture project], "Kazakhstan: Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Istanbul Protocol)", Conference Collection of Speeches and Recommendations, 21 November 2017, https://kkassiyet.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/sbornikvystupleniiconfpytk...

107 “Избиение в камере” [Beating in the cell], The Coalition against Torture, 3 March, 2017, https://www.notorture.kz/izbienie-v-kamere/

108 “Сейтказы Матаев обратился в комитет ООН против пыток” [Seytkazy Matayev appealed to the UN Committee Against Torture], The Coalition against Torture, 11 October 2017, https://www.notorture.kz/seitkazy-matajev-obratilsja-v-komitet-oon-proti...

109 “«Враг» всех режимов” [The "enemy" of all regimes], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 31 January 2018, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/vrag_vsekh_rejimov/

110 “On the anniversary of the Zhanaozen tragedy, the ODF presents the most high-profile cases of politically motivated prosecution in contemporary Kazakhstan”, Open Dialogue Foundation, 15 December 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8486,on-the-anniversary-of-the-zhanaozen-tra...

111 Igor Savchenko, “The Report: The case of Muratkhan Tokmadi”, Open Dialog Foundation, 10 August 2017, http://ru.odfoundation.eu/a/8262,otchet-delo-murathana-tokmadi.

112 ICCPR Case Digest, Vladislav Chelakh v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2645/2015, Submission: 2 February 2015, Center for Civil and Political Rights, ccprcentre.org/decision/16826.

113 ICCPR Case Digest, Dmitry Tyan v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2125/2011, Submission: 1 April 2011, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16731.

114 ICCPR Case Digest, Dmitry Tyan v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2125/2011, Submission: 1 April 2011, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16731.

115 ICCPR Case Digest, Zhaslan Suleimenov v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2146/2012, Submission: 14 January 2011, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16734.

116 ICCPR Case Digest, Andrei Sviridov v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2158/2012, Submission: 23 February 2012, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16764 .

117 “Комитет ООН по правам человека требует от председателя Совбеза ООН соблюсти права несправедливо осужденного” [The UN Human Rights Committee requires the UN Security Council chairman to observe the rights of an unjustly convicted person], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 18 January 2018, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/komitet_oon_po_pravam...

118 Evgeny Zhovtis, “Уголовный процесс в Казахстане: тайна за семью печатями” [Criminal trial in Kazakhstan: a mystery with seven seals], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 15 September 2017, https://bureau.kz/novosti/sobstvennaya_informaciya/taina_za_semyu_pechat...

119 Alfiya Tashimova, "Джохар Утебеков: Генпрокуратура отстранила меня от дела Токмади" [Jokhar Utebekov: The Prosecutor General's Office suspended me from the Tokmadi case], Informburo.kz, 8 September 2017, https://informburo.kz/novosti/dzhohar-utebekov-genprokuratura-otstranila...

120 Svetlana Glushkova, “Более 500 адвокатов в Астане обратились к Сагинтаеву по поводу законопроекта” [More than 500 lawyers in Astana appealed to Sagintayev regarding the bill], Azattyk.org, 14 October 2017, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/28794254.html

121 “UN Special Rapporteur. Lawyers should engage in their professional activities without any interference or restrictions.”, Republican Bar Association, 07 February 2018, http://advokatura.kz/spetsialnyj-dokladchik-oon-advokaty-dolzhny-zanimat...

122 “Заведующий Секретариатом судебной коллегии Департамента Верховного Суда Л.Курмантаева: «Конкурентоспособная и независимая судебная система – важный показатель экономического роста и стабильности»” [L.Kurmantayeva, Head of the Secretariat of the Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court Department: "Competitive and independent judicial system is an important indicator of economic growth and stability"], Zakon.kz, 30 June 2017, http://sud.gov.kz/rus/massmedia/zaveduyushchiy-sekretariatom-sudebnoy-ko...

123 “Нурсултан Назарбаев назвал пять приоритетов модернизации Казахстана” [Nursultan Nazarbayev named five priorities of modernization of Kazakhstan], ABCTV, 13 February 2017, http://www.abctv.kz/ru/news/nursultan-nazarbaev-nazval-pyat-prioritetov-...

124 “Национальный доклад о противодействии коррупции” [National Report on Combating Corruption], page 6, Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Civil Service and Anti-Corruption Affairs, 27 April 2017, http://kyzmet.gov.kz/sites/default/files/pages/nacdoklad_o_protivodeystv...

125 Marat Shibutov, “Борьба с коррупцией в Казахстане: Национальный доклад за 2016 год” [Combating Corruption in Kazakhstan: National Report 2016], Regnum, 26 May 2017, https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2277018.html

126 Anar Bekbassova, “Где больше всего воруют в Казахстане” [Where they steal most in Kazakhstan?], Transparency International Kazakhstan, 14 June 2017, http://tikazakhstan.org/gde-bolshe-vsego-voruyut-v-kazahstane/#more-3047

127 Igor Savchenko, “The list of Kazakhstani political prisoners and persons subjected to politically motivated prosecution by Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog Foundation, 12 October 2017, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/8423,the-list-of-kazakhstani-political-priso...

128 “Суд прокомментировал освобождение экс-главы МЦПС «Хоргос»” [The court commented on the release of the former head of the ICCBC "Khorgos], Forbes.kz, 26 April 2017, https://forbes.kz/process/probing/sud_prokommentiroval_osvobojdenie_eks-...

129 “Освобождению Василия Ни нет разумных и законных объяснений – адвокат Утебеков” [Vasily Ni’s release: there is no reasonable and legitimate explanation - lawyer Utebekov], Caravan.kz, 26 April 2017, https://www.caravan.kz/news/osvobozhdeniyu-vasiliya-ni-net-razumnykh-i-z...

130 Miranda Patrucic, Vlad Lavrov, and Ilya Lozovsky, “Kazakhstan’s secret billionaires”, OCCRP, 5 November 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/paradisepapers/kazakhstans-secret-billionaires

131 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Kazakhstan Country Report August 2017”, page 5, 7 September 2017, http://invest.gov.kz/storage/09/09c208d9e451b356bfce377b0351f1da.pdf

132 “Ракишев продаёт акции Qazkom за 1 тенге” [Rakishev sells Qazkom shares for 1 tenge], Forbes.kz, 15 June 2017, https://forbes.kz/finances/finance/rakishev_prodaet_aktsii_qazkom_za_1_t...

133 Ainagul Elyubaeva, “The government approved the state program Digital Kazakhstan” [Правительство одобрило госпрограмму Цифровой Казахстан], Kapital.kz, 4 december 2017, https://kapital.kz/gosudarstvo/65069/pravitelstvo-odobrilo-gosprogrammu-...