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<th>causes or necessary conditions of mobilization</th>
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<td>#mobilization_mechanisms</td>
<td>processes that lead to mobilization emergence and growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>#mobilization_outcomes</td>
<td>possible results of mobilization, including political concessions, removal of the ruler, or a democratic transition</td>
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<tr>
<td>#repression</td>
<td>impact of state repression on mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>#violent_vs_nonviolent_mobilization</td>
<td>comparison of causes, mechanisms, and outcomes of violent and non-violent mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#contextual_factors</td>
<td>external factors that impact mobilization, such as political regime type, level of economic development, or geographic proximity to democratic countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#international_support</td>
<td>impact of direct or indirect support of political players outside the country on mobilization</td>
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### Country Labels

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<th>#Burma</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>#Taiwan</td>
</tr>
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<td>#Iran</td>
<td>#Philippines</td>
<td>#Thailand</td>
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Introduction

by Natalia Forrat

This bibliography includes select academic sources published in the last two decades that shed light on civic mobilization in authoritarian contexts. The included studies focus on mobilization episodes that took place after World War II. Their primary interest is the mobilization from below rather than the politics at the elite-level or mobilization that is driven by the elite-level politics.

The bibliography is structured according to the type of research, e.g. studies using datasets with dozens of countries, more detailed comparisons of several countries, or in-depth studies of single countries. Topic labels point to specific themes covered; country labels show from which countries the empirical evidence came. Topic and country labels and the table of contents are all hyperlinked within this document to make navigation easier.

Support for compiling this bibliography came from the U.S. Department of State award # SLMAQM20CA2259, “Assessing the Precursors to Success,” which supports research on the precursors to civic mobilization in authoritarian contexts. For more information, please contact Laura Adams at adams@freedomhouse.org.
GENERAL OVERVIEWS


#mobilization_mechanisms  #contextual_factors  #international_support  #repression

An overview of the recent literature related to studying social movements in authoritarian regimes. Challenges the view of authoritarian systems as monolithic, uniformly violent and closed, cohesive in their responses and insular of their repressive dynamics.

Main ideas:

1. There are a variety of non-democratic regime types
   a. Different classifications and labels: totalitarian, personalistic, authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, hybrid.
   b. As they evolve over time and often adopt quasi-democratic institutions, they may open opportunities for social movements to capitalize on their discursive commitments to reform and democracy.

2. Autocracies vary in how likely they are to repress and in what repressive tactics they use.
   a. Some autocracies encourage popular participation in lower-level decision making and tolerate localized and economically-driven protests.
   b. Repression has costs: it can fuel growth and radicalization of the social movement and damage the regime legitimacy domestically and abroad.
   c. There are many “softer” alternatives to repression: surveillance, censorship, legal persecution, resource deprivation, or even neglect.
   d. Repression can be subcontracted to other actors to avoid some of the costs.

3. Activists’ access to regime officials and their opportunities for bargaining vary across autocracies.
   a. Some regimes have institutionalized feedback mechanisms (complaints and consultations) and may exhibit a relatively high degree of responsiveness.
   b. Citizens use these institutionalized opportunities along with non-routine forms of political dissent.
   c. Autocrats also sponsor their own “civic” organizations and social movements, which help strengthen the regime.

4. Regimes are comprised of varying levels of powerholders and elites who mobilize protests during periods of intra-regime competition.
   a. Cleavages between elites can create opportunities for mobilization.
   b. Even controlled elections present opportunities to contest the terms and outcomes of power-sharing.
c. Elites may incite movements and protests as bargaining mechanisms to resolve intra-elite disputes. Central and local authorities may encourage protests as a means to gain leverage against each other.

5. Authoritarian repression is often transnational in scope and effect.

a. Social movements often rely on outside allies to “name and shame” regime practices and lobby the international players to intervene. Transnational advocacy networks may mitigate repression, but only when autocrats are sensitive to criticism or seek to avoid sanctions.

b. The hope to attract attention and support of international allies may make activists take heightened risks and make themselves vulnerable to repression that international actors cannot prevent.

c. Mobilization now easily crosses state borders as activists use communication technologies to connect and disseminate information and form émigré activist networks. The international character of social movements makes it difficult for regimes to counteract them.

d. However, autocrats also learn from each other and work together against transnational movements. Technologies provide greater opportunities for them as well as they make it easier to identify, surveil, and punish dissenters.
Main questions:

- What kind of rights are more difficult to fight for;
- The environmental factors that enable human rights movements;
- The structure and tactics of social movements, including framing strategies;
- The causes for movement failure; and
- The effectiveness of remedy measures.

Two crucial contextual factors:

1. **Regime type:**
   
   “autocracy is a major contextual factor undermining the effectiveness of domestic civic actors” (p. 1);

2. **Poverty:**
   
   a. governments presiding over poor countries tend to be more abusive of human rights;
   b. poverty hinders mobilization efforts.

Factors associated with success or failure:

“Success tends to be associated with domestic civic actors who...

1) maintain a dense network of horizontal, vertical, and transnational relationships;
2) are conscious of the resonance of rhetorical frames; and
3) pursue careful concerted strategies to frame their struggles in locally appropriate ways.” (p. 1)

Rights are more difficult to fight for if:

- a human right is contested, such as LGBTQ rights
- granting the right threatens the existing economic or political system

Recommendations for USAID work:

1. Target groups or movements that adopt a human rights frame in advocating for change;
2. Guide and inform assistance by realities on the ground;
3. Help human rights defenders to harness and maintain diverse ties to other activists at home and abroad (e.g. through workshops and focus groups encouraging activists to learn from the experiences of human rights defenders in other contexts).
Main questions:

1. Why does nonviolent resistance often succeed relative to violent resistance?
2. Under what conditions nonviolent resistance succeeds or fails?

Data:

1. NAVCO (Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes) data set containing 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006. Sources of data:
   
   o Literature review
     a. Nonviolent conflict and social movements literature
     b. Encyclopedias, case studies, bibliographies
   
   o Expert knowledge
   
   o Datasets on intrastate wars, insurgencies, and counterinsurgency operations

2. Four case studies:

   o Iran
   o the Palestinian Territories
   o Burma
   o the Philippines

Campaign success = two conditions must be met:

1. full achievement of the campaign’s stated goal within a year of the peak of activities
2. the outcome was a direct result of the campaign activities

Descriptive empirical findings:

1. 75% of nonviolent campaigns have achieved full or partial success.

2. Nonviolent campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as violent ones.

3. The frequency of nonviolent campaigns has increased over time.

4. The success rate of nonviolent campaigns has increased over time while the success rate of violent campaigns has declined.
   
   a. This is true for antiregime and antioccupation campaigns.
   b. Secession campaigns are an exception: no nonviolent secession campaigns and four out of forty violent ones succeeded.

5. Successful nonviolent campaigns create more durable and internally peaceful democracies.
The argument:

High mass participation is important for campaign success. Nonviolent campaigns have lower moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers for participation and are more likely to attract broad and diverse membership. Mass participation increases the probability of success through the following mechanisms:

- Enhanced resilience and expanded civic disruption raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo
- Higher probability of tactical innovation
- Loyalty shifts among the regime's supporters, including members of the security apparatus

Policy implications:

1. Sanctions and state support works best when they are coordinated with the support of local opposition groups; they are not substitutes.

2. Sanctions, diplomatic support, and allies in international civil society are most helpful if they can strengthen and diversify the membership base that is critical to success.


Based on the quantitative analysis of regime transitions, the authors argue that “nonviolent protests substantially increase the likelihood of transitions to democracy, especially under favorable international environments, while violent direct action is less effective in undermining autocracies overall and makes transitions to new autocracies relatively more likely.”

**Main findings:**

The odds of transitioning to democracy are significantly higher after a nonviolent campaign and if the neighboring countries are also democracies.

The authors also suggest but do not test empirically the following *mechanisms* of how nonviolent direct action...

1. **Undermines dictatorship (increases the odds of regime collapse):**
   a. nonviolent action can mobilize a larger number of people due to lower participation barriers;
   b. nonviolent action expands the space for tactical innovation;
   c. it also reduced the probability of repression since nonviolent action does not tend to deepen societal divisions to the same degree as violent conflict and makes it difficult for the regime to justify repression for the public;
   d. it increases the probability of elite defection as it highlights divisions within a regime over how to respond to the political crisis.

2. **Increases the odds of transition to a democracy rather than another autocracy:**
   a. nonviolent action disperses power by producing less centralized and hierarchical structures than violent conflict; → decentralized, loose coalitions of diverse actors, in which individual actors are not likely to dominate, will tend to develop some form of power sharing, i.e. a more democratic political arrangement;
   b. nonviolent action also produces less polarization in society; it can be perceived as less threatening to regime supporters, thus encouraging defection and support for democratic reform.

**Data:**

- country-year level dataset of all countries in 1900-2004, which were autocracies the year before;
- autocracy-democracy transitions were coded using Polity data;
- autocracy-autocracy transitions were defined as a change of a leader who left involuntarily;
- violent and nonviolent campaigns were defined using NAVCO dataset;
- the final dataset contained
  - 199 country-years with ongoing nonviolent campaigns and
  - 786 country-years with violent campaigns.

The authors argue that the activities of human rights INGOs can increase both nonviolent and violent domestic protest.

**Main findings:**

1. Remote shaming and blaming have no significant impact on domestic protest activities; in another study the author found that they may help decrease repression under certain conditions.

2. Human rights INGOs’ activities with local presence (local membership and permanent locations) lead to greater numbers of nonviolent and violent protests. The effect of having permanent locations is similar in size but more robust across different measures and models than the effect of only local membership.

The authors argue that information, training, and financial resources provided by human rights INGOs are best distributed through permanent offices; these offices are also best equipped to provide network contacts and organizational help to domestic groups that benefit both domestic violent and nonviolent protest activities.

The authors use Polity democracy score as control variable, which turns out to be positively associated with protest: all else equal, the more democratic the country, the more protests occur there. The authors do not test whether the effect of human rights INGOs on protest differs in democracies and autocracies.

**Data (timeframe – 1990-2004):**

1. Data from the Integrated Data for Event nalysis (IDEA) – a dataset of all daily events in Reuters Global News Service:

   a. a country-year count of violent or nonviolent protests of domestic actors against a state agent or a state physical office;

   b. a country-year count of remote shaming and blaming activities of 432 human rights organizations;

2. Data from the *Yearbook of International Organizations*:

   a. the list of 432 human rights INGOs, which included the organizations that have mainly a human rights focus and were active during any time between 1990 and 2004;

   b. a country-year count of the number of human rights INGOs that report volunteers or members in a country in a given year;

   c. a country-year count of permanent offices of the human rights INGOs in a country in a given year;

3. Several statistical controls from the World Development Indicators, Physical Integrity Rights Index, Polity democracy score, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Databank.

Primarily quantitative study of “democracy protests” based on a dataset of 180 countries from 1989 to 2011. The total number of protests coded in the dataset is 310.

Democracy protests = “mass public demonstrations in which the participants demand countries adopt or uphold democratic elections,” do not include:

- protests regarding human rights or political and civil rights;
- anti-government protests motivated by economic and policy reforms, corruption charges, human rights concerns, etc., which do not contain democracy as the protest’s primary demand.

The data was collected using primary and secondary news sources:

- The International Federation for Human Rights’ *Steadfast in Protest* reports (2006-2011)
- Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* reports (2003-2012)
- The International Crisis Group’s *Crisis Watch Database* (2003-2012)
- Keesing’s Record of World Events
- News accounts from English and foreign language sources
- Documentary films, blogs, videos, etc.

Main findings – Probability of democracy protests:

Factors that increase the probability of democracy protests:

- economic crisis
  - low rates of growth
  - high rates of corruption
  - high unemployment
- lower levels of economic development strengthen the effect of economic crises on the probability of democracy protests, especially during election years

Factors that do not impact the probability of democracy protests:

- Inflation
- GDP per capita
- Education
- Urbanization
- Internet
- Telephones
- Cell phones

Main findings: Probability of political concessions

Only about 25% of democracy protests received political concessions, usually after a repression attempt.

The likelihood of political concessions strongly depends on the size of the protest; economic crisis is associated with larger
Main findings: Probability of political concessions

Only about 25% of democracy protests received political concessions, usually after a repression attempt.

The likelihood of political concessions strongly depends on the size of the protest; economic crisis is associated with larger protests and, thus, higher likelihood of concessions.

Factors that do not impact the probability of political concessions:

- Geography of protests (urban/rural)
- Type of political regime
- Regime’s coercive capacity
- Economic inequality
- Capital mobility

Notes from the author of this bibliography:

There are several reasons why the findings of this study should be taken with a grain of salt.

1. Brancati defines democracy protests very narrowly: the participants’ main demand must be about changing the political system rather than, say, removing the current ruler, for the protest to be coded as “democracy protest.” For this reason, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution or ousting Mubarak in Egypt during the Arab Spring are not democracy protests according to her coding. Some other coding principles are also concerning, e.g. the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is not coded as the protest that resulted in chief executive removal because “the incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych did not step down from power but was defeated in a rerun of the second round of the presidential elections” (p. 137).

2. Brancati claims that she found a negative effect of economic development on the probability of democracy protests (see, for example, p. 82):

“In contrast to modernization theories, the analysis also demonstrates that more economic development is associated with a lower likelihood of democracy protests to occur, as well as a lower likelihood of these protests to arise in the midst of economic crises.”

I was unable to find empirical evidence in the book for this claim. There is evidence that the level of economic development interacts with the effect of economic crisis, i.e. the probability of democracy protests is lower if economic crisis happens in a more developed country compared to the situation if the same crisis would happened in a less developed country. Outside of the interaction with the economic crisis variable, the variables she uses to measure the level of economic development (education – primary completion rate, number of phone lines and internet users per 100 people) do not show a statistically significant relationship to the probability of democracy protests. Introduction of these variables reduces the number of observations by half, thus, the absence of statistically significant coefficient in this analysis is not a particularly strong evidence of the absence of relationship between economic development and democratic protests in reality.
STRUCTURED COMPARISONS OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES


Based on six case studies of non-democracies, the author studies the characteristics of nonviolent movement that led to political change.

**Conditions of a political transformation in a non-democracy as a result of a nonviolent movement:**

1. the movement must be able to withstand repression;
2. the movement must undermine state power.

**Factors that increase the ability to withstand repression and undermine state power:**

1. Network-oriented rather than hierarchical organization of the movement.

   Compared to hierarchically organized challenges, network organized challenges are more flexible, are more adept at expanding horizontal channels of communication, are more likely to increase the participation and commitment of members and the accountability of leaders, are more likely to innovate tactically, and are more likely to weather repression. (p. 50)

   To aid the coordination side, temporary umbrella organizations or federative structures are helpful both in terms of coordinating action and in terms of framing that common goal that can temporarily unite an opposition.

2. Using all three classes of methods of non-violent actions (protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and non-violent intervention)

3. Quick adaptation and tactical innovations, e.g., ability to shift from methods of concentration to methods of dispersion (network structures and a wide array of methods increase adaptation and innovation, so it is more of a mechanism than an independent factor)

**Strategies of undermining state power (p. 52):**

   a. undermining state resources and legitimacy;
   b. creating or exacerbating elite divisions; and
   c. invoking third-party support.

**Empirical cases in the book:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>South Africa, the Philippines, Nepal, Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>Burma, China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using a comparative-historical analysis of seven Southeast Asian countries, the author argues that:

a. Emotive appeals to nationalist and religious sentiments and solidarities are key for understanding democratic protests in authoritarian regimes, i.e. we need to look beyond economic grievances and class;

b. Democratic mobilization is more likely both to occur and to succeed in societies with politically autonomous communal elites, i.e. a society’s primary possessors of nationalist and religious authority; and

c. Communal elites can act as democratizing agents only in settings in which they have gained political salience and retained political autonomy through long-term processes of political development.

### Case Outcomes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic mobilization</th>
<th>No democratic mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, 1973</td>
<td>Malaysia, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, 1998</td>
<td>Indonesia, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Important:** the symbolic power of communal elites can both support authoritarianism if those elites become the founders of the authoritarian regime and empower democratic protest if those elites find themselves in the opposition.

### Political Positioning of Communal Elites:

- **Dynastic Rulers**
  - Avoided Colonial Emanaculation?
    - Yes: Thailand, Malaysia
    - No: Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Burmese, Singapore
- **Religious Notables**
  - Hegemonic National Religion?
    - Yes: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Singapore
    - No: Vietnam
- **Nationalist Leaders**
  - Contentious Struggle for Independence?
    - Yes: Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma, Philippines
    - No: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore

* Muslims are a growing demographic enjoying increasing political dominance, but urban areas remain deeply divided.
* Some religious and aristocratic actors retain a measure of autonomy, yet the regime’s advantage among communal elites is significant.
* Although the United States voluntarily surrendered sovereignty, the earlier anti-Spanish struggle left nationalism somewhat salient.
* Nationalism has relatively low salience, but provides a minor source of advantage to the authoritarian regime.
Based on comparison of Burma under Ne Win's dictatorship, Indonesia under Suharto, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, the author argues that the patterns of state repression shape subsequent political contention through three mechanisms (institutional/material, tactical/political, and cultural).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repression logic</th>
<th>Burma</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>the Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control of protest activities in cities</td>
<td>Elimination of the opposition organization regardless of geographic area; tolerance of sporadic protest activities in cities</td>
<td>Lower level of repression against both organization and actions than in Burma and Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppositional organizations move underground and to rural areas; protest becomes a relatively rare but cataclysmic phenomenon</td>
<td>Protest is less rare, less violent and more localized than in Burma; dissidents avoid the starkest repression but remain unorganized; contention is atomized and sporadic</td>
<td>Opposition organizations are active in many areas, including elections and anti-state insurgency; opposition is always in substantial control of when or where protest would rise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Natalia Forrat

Nepstad examines why some nonviolent revolutions succeed while others fail. She compares three pairs of cases: socialist regimes, military regimes, and personal dictators (see below).

**Main Findings:**

1. Four structural factors necessary for mobilization, i.e. present in all six cases:
   a. economic decline,
   b. new political opportunities or moral shocks,
   c. divided elites, and
   d. the availability of free spaces (mostly in religious institutions).

2. One strategic factor—undermining states’ sanctioning power, i.e. provoking defections within the coercive apparatus—that distinguished successful cases from unsuccessful ones.
   a. Other resistance techniques considered by the author (refusal to acknowledge regime authority, refusal to cooperate or comply with laws, challenging mentalities of obedience, withholding skills, and withholding material resources) did not have a similarly strong connection to the revolutions’ success.

3. Factors that facilitated troops’ defections:
   a. non-violent discipline of the protesters;
   b. shared collective identity with civil resisters;
   c. framing loyalty to the regime as a moral issue;
   d. collective rather than solitary defections;
   e. lack of direct benefits from the regime.

4. Three factors that can derail nonviolent uprisings:
   a. divided leadership or internal factions;
   b. inability to remain nonviolent; and
   c. external sanctions that backfired, i.e. well-meant international support that happened to have the opposite effect.

**Nonviolent revolutions against...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Unsuccessful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>socialist regimes</td>
<td>East Germany 1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Implications for practitioners:**

1. The most influential revolutionary technique is undermining a regime’s sanctioning power, i.e. persuading troops to defect or refuse orders, although other strategies may contribute to this outcome as well.

2. Not all international support helps the revolutionary success as it may:
   a. generate new allies for the regime;
   b. hurt citizens more than the regime if the latter has alternative sources of revenue;
   c. nullify the achievements of the revolution if the international actors end the sanctions too quickly.

Informal international action (e.g. refusal to intervene) may be no less effective than formal sanctions.

3. Dictators also adjust and learn, so anticipation of their next move is key for revolutionary success.

The article examines two protest waves in El Salvador between 1962 and 1981, the first of which happened during the liberalization period and the second one – during the reactionary period. The author argues that civic organizations and associations that formed during the first period continued to influence politics after the political opportunities closed. As the state became more exclusive and repressive, these organizations radicalized and adopted more coercive protest strategies. The next protest wave they launched was more disruptive and violent and led to the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s.


The article analyzes the process of the organizational development of the democracy movement in South Korea, which led to the June 1987 uprising. It uses the concept of mesomobilization and focuses on the organizations that integrated individual social movement organizations into a coordinated campaign with a common political and symbolic claim.

In South Korea in the 1980s, there were three types of social movement organizations:

1. the civil movement,
2. the Christian movement, and
3. the student movement.

Mesomobilization actors emerged from the civil movement rather than from the other two types because these people were (1) more experienced than students and (2) more moderate and realistic in their tactics than either the students or Christians who avoided forming an alliance as they saw their values as incompatible.

Two important differences of the civil movement of the 1980s compared to its earlier versions, which helped its success:

1. The civil movement organizations included many mid-level activists with their own organizational bases. When the leaders of the coalition organization were jailed during one of the cycles of state repression, these mid-level activists kept the movement alive.

2. These organizations focused on “popular (Minjung) movements” rather than on human rights and political freedom. [NF: I am not sure what exactly was meant here; my best guess is that they used the issues and messages that were popular with the public rather than the ones they derived from their own political and ideological stances.]

There were several civil movement organizations that had an explicit goal of building a coalition network and several attempts in the 1980s to do that. Between 1985 and 1987, several coalition organizations were formed, which manifested the process of negotiations that was happening between the leaders of different organizations.

The organizations succeeded in putting together a unified coalition once they found a common denominator to which they were able to connect their individual causes and grievances—the constitutional revision. The informal networks between the activists that emerged during the negotiation processes in the previous years helped to craft this common political claim.

The National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC) was formed in May 1987. This umbrella organization had 67 representatives under 8 advisors with 22 branches in the provinces and cities. This organization had an account to accumulate financial resources. It coordinated nationwide protests by sending detailed instructions to its branches across the nation.
In the author’s opinion, the emergence of the mesoactor that coordinated various social movement organizations

1. increased the ability to organize a massive uprising,
2. facilitated the dialog of the movement actors with the regime, and
3. decreased the probability of violence on both sides.


Based on three case studies of civil society organizations / social movements in Russia, the author examines the following question: in which circumstances Russians, who appear to be so patient in their relationships with the state, tend to lose their patience?

Main argument:

Political resistance in Russia is interactive in nature. The main factor that triggers formation of a social movement is a concerted and sustained state’s intrusion into people’s individual lives which makes them see the problem as a collective rather than an individual one.

In the post-Soviet Russia, the state has largely disengaged from the life and the needs of its citizens and focused on serving the narrow circle of the elites. It favored atomized, unstructured relationships between citizens and the state, which presented problems as primarily individual in nature and discouraged the search for collective solutions.

If, however, the state exercises a coherent and concerted intrusion into the lives of its citizens, those citizens will form injustice frames and movement identities. If the state subsequently reverts back to disengagement and ad hoc policy making, it will likely undermine the social movement.

Case studies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State intrusion</th>
<th>A traditional human rights NGO</th>
<th>Housing-rights “movements”</th>
<th>A protest movement of motorists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization (a “proto-social movement”)?</td>
<td>incoherent</td>
<td>coherent</td>
<td>coherent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State reaction to mobilization</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td>incoherent</td>
<td>coherent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• successful at defending rights in individual cases; • unsuccessful at addressing more systemic issues</td>
<td>• able to generate “heat”; • not able to sustain the movement</td>
<td>• grew into a grassroots organization exerting consistent policy pressure on the state</td>
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Based on 200 interviews with Syrian refugees conducted in Jordan and Turkey in 2012-2013, the author investigates what motivates people to join the first protesters, which creates a cascade protest dynamic.

Main findings:

The first participants inspire followers by increasing the followers’ awareness of values that are central to their sense of self and their need to express those values.

Three mechanisms:

1. Activating normative ideals and the urge to earn self-respect: not participating would mean lack of moral worth.

   (“Is he a man and I’m not a man? No! I’m a man too. So I’ll also join!”; “Those women are not afraid. Why should I be afraid?”).

   Important: no evidence that this was about reputation and how other people see someone; this was about self-respect and moral worth.

2. Demonstrating the joy of agency and inspire to experience the same gratification: expressing political voice after denying it for years meant to fulfil a sense of self:

   (“I feel that I truly own myself and my freedom.”)

3. Absorbing punishments and activating the sense of moral obligation to contribute to collective efforts: what right do I have to enjoy safety and comfort while others made grave sacrifices?

   (“...the people in my society and my village have decided to fight and may end up dying. Is it fair for them to die and for me to stay alive?”)

This mechanism did not rely on pre-existing personal relations; people were equally moved by the killings of those they did not know. Also, many interviewees said they could not have predicted how the punishment of early risers would affect them until they witnessed those punishments.
CONCEPTUAL ALTERNATIVES


The authors suggest a different theoretical concept—that of *rightful resistance*—to think about protest in China as well as in other countries, including authoritarian ones.

Unlike a typical social movement, rightful resistance *does not protest the existing policies but rather uses the regime’s rhetorical commitments and central policies to hold the local officials accountable*. Rightful resisters act as if they take the values and programs of political and economic elites to heart, while demonstrating that some local authorities do not.

By engaging in in deliberately disruptive but not quite unlawful collective action, rightful resisters attract the attention of local officials and threaten to take their case up the hierarchy, where they believe they can find allies, if their problem is not resolved. Rightful resisters use rather than challenge the symbolic and material capital made available by modern states.

“They launch attacks that are legitimate by definition in a rhetoric that even unresponsive authorities must recognize, lest they risk being charged with hypocrisy and disloyalty to the system of power they represent.”

Other differences of rightful resistance from a typical social movement:

- it is often episodic rather than sustained;
- it is often within-system as much as extra-institutional, and
- it is often local or regional rather than national or even transnational.

Condition of emergence of rightful resistance:

Discontented community members must learn that they have certain protections. It is a relatively recent phenomenon that discontented villagers cite laws, regulations, and other authoritative communications when challenging local officials.

Conditions of effectiveness of rightful resistance:

- Crafting effective tactics, mobilizing followers, and winning a measure of sufferance, even support, for their contention

Possible effects of rightful resistance in China (*not tested yet; there are forces that work against it too)*:

- It is a practice of citizenship based on a contractual understanding of their relationship with the powerful; it may be the first step from an identity of subjects to an identity of citizens;
- It may alter routine politics and generate new loci of decision making by empowering the rural population and affecting the Center’s priorities.
This is an edited volume on civil society in Asia with chapters covering Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Pakistan, Burma, and China.

In the conclusion, the editor of the volume addresses the question of connection between civil society and democracy. Below are the main ideas related to this nexus.

1. There is no necessary connection between civil society and democratic change or between the density of civil society and the vigor of democracy.

   In countries like South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, civil society organizations both prepared the ground for democratic transition and contributed to closing of democratic space. In India and Japan, the democratic effects of civil society are controversial. In Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, and China, some civil society organizations supported authoritarian regimes in one way or the other. Whether civil society organizations helped or hindered democracy depended on their collective interests, adherence to totalizing missions (e.g. religious ones), and, in some cases, resort to violence to achieve political ends.

2. Civil society is supportive of democracy when two conditions are met:

   a. Civil society is not dominated by organizations with totalizing goals;
   b. The dominant discourse in civil society is rooted in democratic ideals.
Annex 01: #mobilization_precursors


Annex 02: #mobilization_mechanisms


Annex 03: #mobilization_outcomes


Annex 04: #repression


Annex 05: #violent_vs_nonviolent_mobilization


Annex 06: #contextual_factors


Annex 07: #international_support


Annex 08: #Burma


Annex 09: #Chile

Annex 10: #China


Annex 11: #East_Germany


Annex 12: #El_Salvador


Annex 13: #India


Annex 14: #Indonesia


Annex 15: #Iran


Annex 15: #Japan


Annex 16: #Kenya


Annex 17: #Malaysia


Annex 18: #Nepal


Annex 19: #Pakistan

Annex 20: #Palestinian_Territories


Annex 21: #Panama


Annex 22: #Philippines


Annex 23: #Russia


Annex 24: #Singapore


Annex 25: #South_Africa


Annex 26: #South_Korea


Annex 27: #Sri_Lanka


Annex 28: #Taiwan


Annex 29: #Syria

Annex 30: #Thailand


Annex 31: #Vietnam

Freedom House is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that supports democratic change, monitors freedom, and advocates for democracy and human rights.