FREEDOM ON THE NET 2022

Countering an Authoritarian Overhaul of the Internet
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This booklet is a summary of findings for the 2022 edition of Freedom on the Net. Narrative reports on the 70 countries assessed in this study can be found on our website at freedomonthenet.org.
Global internet freedom declined for the 12th consecutive year. The sharpest downgrades were documented in Russia, Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya. Following the Russian military's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin dramatically intensified its ongoing efforts to suppress domestic dissent and accelerated the closure or exile of the country's remaining independent media outlets. In at least 53 countries, users faced legal repercussions for expressing themselves online, often leading to draconian prison terms.

Governments are breaking apart the global internet to create more controllable online spaces. A record number of national governments blocked websites with nonviolent political, social, or religious content, undermining the rights to free expression and access to information. A majority of these blocks targeted sources located outside of the country. New national laws posed an additional threat to the free flow of information by centralizing technical infrastructure and applying flawed regulations to social media platforms and user data.

China was the world’s worst environment for internet freedom for the eighth consecutive year. Censorship intensified during the 2022 Beijing Olympics and after tennis star Peng Shuai accused a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official of sexual assault. The government continued to tighten its control over the country’s booming technology sector, including through new rules that require platforms to use their algorithmic systems to promote CCP ideology.

Internet freedom in the United States improved marginally for the first time in six years. There were fewer reported cases of targeted surveillance and online harassment during protests compared with the previous year, and the country now ranks ninth globally, tied with Australia and France. The United States still lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law, and policymakers made little progress on the passage of other legislation related to internet freedom. Ahead of the November 2022 midterm elections, the online environment was riddled with political disinformation, conspiracy theories, and online harassment aimed at election workers and officials.

Human rights hang in the balance amid a competition to control the web. Authoritarian states are vying to propagate their model of digital control around the world. In response, a coalition of democratic governments has increased the promotion of online human rights at multilateral forums, outlining a positive vision for the internet. However, their progress remains hampered by problematic internet freedom practices in their own countries.
Introduction

By Adrian Shahbaz, Allie Funk, and Kian Vesteinsson

At home and on the international stage, authoritarians are on a campaign to divide the open internet into a patchwork of repressive enclaves. More governments than ever are exerting control over what people can access and share online by blocking foreign websites, hoarding personal data, and centralizing their countries’ technical infrastructure. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom has declined for a 12th consecutive year.

Rising digital repression in many countries mirrored broader crackdowns on human rights over the past year. Nowhere was this clearer than in Russia, Myanmar, Libya, and Sudan, which experienced the world’s steepest declines in internet freedom. Online censorship reached an all-time high, with a record number of governments blocking political, social, or religious content, often targeting information sources based outside of their borders. More than two-thirds of the world’s internet users now live in countries where authorities punish people for exercising their right to free expression online.

Alarmingly, these antidemocratic abuses are not the only factor behind the splintering of the internet into national segments. Some governments are clearly cultivating a domestic digital space where state-endorsed narratives dominate and independent media, civil society, and already marginalized voices are more easily suppressed. But others are inadvertently contributing to country-based barriers through their efforts to tackle disinformation, protect user data, and deter genuine cybercrimes. Whatever the intention, however, the growing fragmentation of the internet comes with serious consequences for fundamental rights including freedom of expression, access to information, and privacy, particularly for people living under authoritarian regimes or in backsliding democracies.

A more fragmented internet

The internet has always been subject to some degree of fracturing along national borders, but increased state intervention in the last year has dramatically accelerated the process. This report identifies three main causes of fragmentation, all of which contributed to declining respect for human rights online: restrictions on the flow of news and information, centralized state control over internet infrastructure, and barriers to cross-border transfers of user data.

While the physical network of the global internet remains intact, a growing number of users only have access to an online space that mirrors the views of their government and its interests. Authorities in 47 of the 70 countries covered by Freedom on the Net have limited users’ access to information sources located outside of their borders. Virtually all of these restrictions constitute clear infringements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which codifies the right “to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” In most cases, entrenched and aspiring authoritarian leaders sought to contain online dissent by preventing residents from reaching information sources based in countries with a greater level of media freedom.

This increasing fragmentation is part of a global, multifaceted competition for control over the digital sphere. For most of the period since the internet’s inception, representatives of the private sector, civil society, and the technical community have participated in a consensus-driven process to harmonize security standards and technical protocols. This has resulted in a decentralized infrastructure that speaks a common language, enabling users to communicate with one another and access information regardless of location. Authoritarian powers...
FENCED IN: HOW INTERNET FRAGMENTATION HARMs HUMAN RIGHTS

The internet is more siloed than ever, preventing billions of people from exercising their human rights online.

have long sought to displace this multistakeholder model of internet governance with one that promotes cyber sovereignty, or greater control by states. Diplomats from China and Russia have made inroads at institutions like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), seeking to transform the United Nations agency into a global internet regulator that advances authoritarian interests. Doing so would fundamentally alter the open internet, preventing billions of people from communicating with one another and accessing life-changing resources without explicit permission from their governments.

A cohort of democracies are pushing back. Having previously focused on a narrower set of economic and security interests linked to countering Beijing, the United States has more recently shown promising signs of reengagement in cyber diplomacy with the aim of promoting a positive vision of democracy in the digital age. The European Union (EU) has also moved forward with innovative and rights-respecting regulatory approaches to address harms that have been exacerbated by the internet. But many democracies have yet to significantly improve respect for online rights within their own borders. Of the 35 countries covered by this report that participated in the US-hosted Summit for Democracy, 13 experienced an internet freedom decline over the past year, as did 10 of the 18 Freedom on the Net countries that signed the US-led Declaration for the Future of the Internet. By adopting flawed policies at home, democracies risk undermining the very values they seek to defend abroad, while potentially cutting off residents of authoritarian countries from a freer and more open internet.
Protecting human rights online through democratic resilience

The technologies associated with the global internet have fostered connections and common interests among different people and communities, facilitated more transparent and participatory governance, and brought tremendous direct and indirect economic benefits. However, the rapid digitization of media and communication has also generated new opportunities for manipulation, extremism, and repression. Policymakers have been too slow in addressing the hazards that accompany technological change, and their emphasis on state-level digital threats—grouped under terms such as information war, cyberwar, and trade war—has often elevated national security and economic considerations over the fundamental rights of individuals. The reality is that economic and security interests are directly linked to respect for individual rights.

Lasting solutions to disinformation, online harassment, and other harms presented by digital tools are unlikely to be achieved through a fragmentation of the internet. Simply imposing strict national laws onto a global information system is bound to be ineffective. Beijing’s efforts to build and maintain a Great Firewall, for example, have done little to address societal concerns about privacy, cybersecurity, corporate malfeasance, false content, and abusive online behavior. It may be difficult to prevent Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran from persisting in their efforts to isolate their populations, but there remains an opportunity to convince many less repressive states that an open internet is in their best interest.

Greater focus should be placed on developing political and societal resilience in the face of these harms. Already, journalists, human rights defenders, and advocacy organizations have been at the forefront of many recent successes that strengthened democratic resilience in the digital sphere. Broad coalitions have bolstered international norms against internet shutdowns, which occurred in fewer countries over the past year. Collaborative investigations into the purveyors of surveillance software have resulted in growing awareness of an underregulated industry that continues to target state officials, journalists, activists, and members of diaspora communities. Whistleblowers have done the public a great service by exposing the inadequacies and failures of influential technology companies.

Democratic leaders should recommit to preserving the benefits of a free and open internet. True resilience requires new regulations that enshrine protections for human rights in the digital age, stronger multilateral coordination on cybercrime and corporate accountability, and deeper investment in civil society, which so often drives collective action to defend internet freedom and resist digital authoritarianism.
Global internet freedom has declined for the 12th consecutive year. The environment for human rights online deteriorated in 28 countries, though 26 countries registered net gains—the largest number of improvements since the inception of the project. The sharpest decline occurred in Russia, followed by Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya, while The Gambia and Zimbabwe experienced major improvements. The United States ranked ninth overall, and Iceland was once again the top performer. For the eighth consecutive year, China was found to have the worst conditions for internet freedom.

Freedom on the Net is an annual study of human rights in the digital sphere. The project assesses internet freedom in 70 countries, accounting for 89 percent of the world’s internet users. This report, the 12th in its series, covered developments between June 2021 and May 2022. More than 80 analysts and advisers contributed to this year’s edition, using a standard methodology to determine each country’s internet freedom score on a 100-point scale, with 21 separate indicators pertaining to obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. The Freedom on the Net website features in-depth reports and data on each country’s conditions.

The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine puts internet freedom under threat

Internet freedom in Russia declined by seven points in the period surrounding the government’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, reaching an all-time low and representing this year’s largest national decline in Freedom on the Net. Within weeks of the invasion, the Kremlin blocked Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, depriving Russians of access to reliable information about the war and limiting their ability to connect with users in other countries. The government also blocked more than 5,000 websites, compelled media outlets to refer to the invasion as a “special military operation,” and introduced a law prescribing up to 15 years in prison for those who spread “false information” about the conflict. The regime’s increasing restrictions, both before and after the invasion was launched, significantly raised the risks associated with online activism and hastened the closure or exile of the country’s remaining independent media outlets.

The Russian military’s actions in Ukraine also undermined that country’s internet freedom. In the southern city of Kherson, Russian troops forced service providers to reroute internet traffic through Russian networks during the spring and summer of 2022, leaving Ukrainian users without access to major social media platforms and a plethora of Ukrainian and international news sites. Though online media outlets have bravely continued to cover the invasion, their reporters faced great danger while carrying out their work. Several journalists affiliated with such websites were killed by Russian forces.
The Ukrainian government and people have shown astonishing resilience during the invasion. Government officials and telecommunications companies worked together to repair internet infrastructure and ensure access to online resources and information, which can be life-saving in the midst of an armed conflict. Some 11,000 Starlink stations were deployed to provide satellite-based internet service as part of a collaboration involving the government, the US technology firm SpaceX, and other partners. Ukrainian telecom operators also enabled users to switch between carriers when their primary carrier’s signal was unavailable, and they undertook major efforts to deliver Wi-Fi access to bomb shelters. Immediately after Russian forces invaded the country, the Ukrainian company Ajax Systems collaborated with the government to launch a mobile application—downloaded more than four million times as of March—that alerts users about incoming air raids.

### Coups and elections drive major declines and improvements

Internet freedom declined by five points in Myanmar, contributing to a precipitous 19-point decline over the past two years. The country now hosts the second worst environment for human rights online, outperforming only China. Since the military junta seized power from an elected civilian government in February 2021, it has cemented its censorship regime, blocking all but 1,200 websites, restricting access to major social media platforms, and imposing local internet shutdowns. The few online resources that remained accessible during the year were dominated by pro-military voices, and activists, journalists, and ordinary users continued to be forcibly disappeared, detained, and tortured. The junta compelled the Norwegian service provider Telenor to sell its operations in the country to a military-aligned company, fully consolidating its control over the telecommunications sector.
Sudan’s score fell by four points after military leaders staged a coup and dissolved the country’s transitional government in October 2021, marking a devastating setback for Sudanese democracy. The military voided articles of the interim constitution that protected fundamental rights and declared a state of emergency that lasted until May 2022. As Sudanese civilians mobilized mass protests in response, authorities restricted internet connectivity, blocked social media platforms, and assaulted and arrested journalists.

Internet freedom in Nicaragua dropped by three points amid an election in November 2021 that featured a harsh clampdown on opposition leaders, dissidents, and independent journalists. Repressive legislation such as the Cybercrime Law paved the way for increased self-censorship and lengthy prison sentences against critical users.

In Hungary, the status of internet freedom declined from Free to Partly Free, mirroring the country’s broader democratic decline under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. During opposition primary elections in September and October 2021, in which voters chose candidates to challenge Orbán and his ruling party, cyberattacks from unknown sources plagued electronic voting systems and independent news outlets in the country.

Election organizers were forced to suspend voting after their computer system suffered an attack, and independent news sites were taken offline before the announcement of electoral results. Months earlier in July, an investigation revealed that at least three journalists had been targeted with Pegasus, an infamous spyware tool developed by the Israeli firm NSO Group.

In The Gambia, internet freedom improved by three points, contributing to a 23-point improvement since the end of former president Yahya Jammeh’s repressive regime in 2017. Gambians mobilized online without restriction during the December 2021 presidential election, in which incumbent Adama Barrow secured a second term. The Barrow administration also passed a landmark law guaranteeing the right to public information, an important step for transparency and accountability.
New and persistent threats to free expression worldwide

*Freedom on the Net* found that officials in at least 53 countries charged, arrested, or imprisoned internet users in retaliation for posts about political or social causes. In Libya, which suffered this year’s third-largest score decline alongside Sudan, users who shared criminal commentary or reporting online have been forcibly disappeared before reemerging in detention. Rwandan authorities sentenced a YouTube commentator whose videos criticized the government to 15 years in prison in September 2021.

Authorities in at least 40 countries blocked social, political, or religious content online, an all-time high in *Freedom on the Net*. Internet users in Jordan reported that the website of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists was briefly blocked in October 2021, after the organization published leaked financial documents that exposed the secret wealth of the country’s king and other world leaders. In Belarus, authorities blocked the websites of civil society organizations throughout the coverage period, part of a wholesale assault on the groups that included raids, arrests, and forced closures.

In at least 22 countries, government officials blocked access to social media or communications platforms. Some blocks were imposed to coerce the companies into compliance with requirements that they open in-country offices, store data within the country, or otherwise change their operations in ways that facilitate enforcement of government censorship or data requests. In Uzbekistan, authorities blocked a range of international social media and messaging apps in July and November 2021 on the grounds that they failed to comply with localization requirements in a data protection law; access to most platforms was restored by August 2022. In March 2022, a judge on Brazil’s Supreme Court reversed an order that would have banned Telegram, after the app agreed to remove content that was flagged as disinformation and announced that it would appoint a local representative. Nigerian officials rescinded a seven-month block on Twitter in January 2022, claiming that the company had agreed to establish a physical presence in the country.

The future of internet freedom in “swing states”

Countries including Brazil and Nigeria are often referred to as swing states due to their potential regional or global influence over the future of internet governance. They have oscillated between protecting and undermining human rights online, with many ranked Partly Free by *Freedom on the Net*. Progress in these countries could ensure the survival of a free and open internet, or they could join authoritarian powers in promoting the more closed model of cyber sovereignty.

Democratic institutions in some swing states intervened to protect human rights online during the coverage period. The Indian Supreme Court ordered the government to reevaluate the country’s colonial-era sedition law, which has increasingly been used to charge online dissidents, in May 2022—even as political leaders sought to extend control over online content through problematic new legislation. Brazilian lawmakers enshrined the protection of personal data in the constitution in February 2022, a landmark action that elevated privacy rights above the whims of any government or simple legislative majority. But the decision came amid a contentious election year, in which President Jair Bolsonaro and his allies have bombarded the online space with false claims about electoral fraud. In October 2021, Kenya’s highest court paused the implementation of an expansive biometric identity-card system until it could meet appropriate standards for data protection. President Guillermo Lasso of Ecuador vetoed provisions of a law that criminalized the disclosure of secrets online in June 2021, protecting digital media outlets from a serious legal threat.

Other countries in this group pursued practices that increased digital repression and undermined the diversity of the information space. In Tunisia, President Kais Saïed suspended parts of the constitution, imposed overly broad rules barring what the state deems to be “false” information, and oversaw the arrest of his online critics—an alarming turn for the country with the Arab world’s highest internet freedom score. Indonesian authorities briefly blocked several websites after the coverage period, including Yahoo and PayPal, to force compliance with a repressive law that
requires companies to register with the government, appoint a local liaison, and remove content under tighter timelines.

For the eighth consecutive year, China remained the world’s worst environment for internet freedom.

The world’s most repressive online environment
For the eighth consecutive year, China remained the world’s worst environment for internet freedom. Content related to the 2022 Beijing Olympics and the COVID-19 pandemic remained heavily censored during the coverage period, particularly as Shanghai residents shared their experiences amid a disastrous two-month lockdown that began in April 2022. The government also intensified censorship of online content related to women’s rights and suppressed social media campaigns against sexual assault and harassment, including through the detention of tennis star Peng Shuai after she alleged on the social media platform Weibo that she was sexually assaulted by senior CCP official Zhang Gaoli. Separately, journalists, human rights activists, members of religious and ethnic minority groups, and ordinary users were detained for sharing online content, with some facing harsh prison sentences.

Government officials instituted new policies to tighten their control over Chinese technology companies. The main internet regulator issued guidance requiring platforms to align their content moderation and recommendation systems with “Xi Jinping Thought”—the official ideology of the current CCP leader. Another set of draft rules would impose heavy penalties on companies that enable Chinese internet users to bypass the Great Firewall. Meanwhile, the country’s data protection framework, which took effect in November 2021, established baseline safeguards for personal data held by Chinese companies—though it failed to apply the same standards to data held or requested by the government.

For the United States, progress abroad and stalemate at home
The administration of US president Joseph Biden made the promotion of internet freedom a top priority of its foreign
The lack of a comprehensive privacy law and incomplete reforms to surveillance rules have allowed government agencies to simply purchase Americans’ data from shadowy brokers with little oversight or safeguards. The Supreme Court decision that overturned 
Roe v. Wade and denied a constitutional right to abortion also prompted renewed concerns about law enforcement access to location information, browsing histories, and other forms of data that could be used for criminal and civil investigations in US jurisdictions where legal access to reproductive health care is restricted.

During the coverage period, mass denial of the outcome of the 2020 presidential election by former president Donald Trump and his supporters, driven in part by online conspiracy theories and disinformation, polluted the information environment and seeped into the broader American political system. Election deniers have leveraged online support to mount viable candidacies for public office ahead of the November 2022 midterm balloting. Disinformation about stolen elections and supposed vulnerability to fraud has fueled calls for citizens to “protect” the vote by force if necessary. Election workers and administrators have reported receiving a barrage of online threats and harassment, leading large numbers of them to resign out of fear for their own safety. In effect, such disinformation and intimidation have undermined the basic security of US electoral mechanisms, provided Republican Party leaders in many states with a false justification for new antifraud measures that could restrict access to voting or distort the counting and certification processes, and set the stage for future unrest by eroding public trust in any unfavorable results.
The Shattering of the Global Internet

The internet is more fragmented than ever, preventing billions of people from exercising their human rights online. Authorities in over two-thirds of the countries surveyed in this report have used their legal and regulatory powers to limit access to foreign information sources, leaving residents in a domestic information space that is effectively shaped by the state. More governments are also passing legislation that places guardrails around the flow of user data across borders, with mixed consequences for the global internet and human rights. The most perilous laws purport to protect privacy even as they delegate oversight to regulators beholden to the political leadership or force data to be stored in less secure settings.

Few if any countries have taken the extreme step of disconnecting entirely from the global internet on a technical level. But a small number of authoritarian leaders are following the CCP in reengineering their domestic networks to allow greater control over technical infrastructure. Their success remains constrained by the daunting economic and

A GLOBAL INTERNET SPLINTERED INTO PIECES

More governments are creating barriers to the flow of information across national borders.

BELARUS
The government blocks the websites of civil society and independent media operating in exile. New laws also restrict online media and limit the transfer of data abroad.

IRAN
The National Information Network centralizes infrastructure under the state, allowing for the blocking of nearly all major international platforms and shutting off of domestic networks.

RUSSIA
Since the adoption of the Sovereign Internet Law in 2019, the Kremlin has consolidated its control over infrastructure and intensified its blocking of foreign platforms, VPNs, and international websites.

SINGAPORE
The Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act provides officials with the power to block websites and remove content if they suspect foreign influence.

CUBA
The government has long-standing blocks on foreign news websites. During protests in July 2021, several social media and communications platforms were also restricted.

RWANDA
The 2021 Data Protection Law forces companies to store user data locally, limiting cross-border data flows and increasing the likelihood of state surveillance.

INDIA
More than 100 platforms owned by China-based companies, including TikTok and WeChat, are blocked, and a new regulation has pushed VPN providers out of the country.

47 Governments cut residents off from online content published by foreign sources
22 Governments proposed or passed laws that limit where and how personal data can transfer
7 Governments sought to centralize their control over domestic infrastructure and physically isolate networks
societal costs of such measures, as well as the endurance of international norms supporting an open global internet.

The myriad of national regulations and practices that contribute to fragmentation—intentionally or not—are being imposed by governments across the democratic spectrum, but there are crucial distinctions. Authoritarian regimes in countries such as China, Iran, and Russia are seeking to wall their people off from the rest of the world. More democratic measures typically seek to enforce rights-protecting legislation that addresses abusive company behavior or genuine online harms. Though accomplished through state intervention, these policies are often paired with safeguards that allow for the continued flow of information and services across borders, so long as partners ensure a similar level of protection for users’ rights.

**Isolating users from outside information**

In response to both real and purported threats online, authorities in at least 47 countries cut residents off from the flow of news and information across borders. Some governments alleged foreign meddling to justify new censorial regulations, while others imposed localized shutdowns of internet service, plunging users into digital darkness in a bid to suppress information about human rights abuses. In tandem with this censorship, many political leaders bolstered support for state-aligned social media platforms that are more receptive to their demands.

The restrictions were largely imposed in countries that are designated as Not Free or Partly Free by Freedom in the World, demonstrating the extent to which both entrenched and aspiring authoritarian leaders rely on information controls to retain power. It is during perilous moments of political transition and possible transformation—such as protests, elections, and conflicts—that censorship of foreign information tends to intensify.

**Blocking access to international websites, social media platforms, or the internet as a whole**

 Authorities increasingly cut off domestic users from websites and social media platforms that serve international audiences. These national restrictions have a global impact, limiting connections to family members in other countries and the diaspora communities that use digital technologies to stay in touch with their countries of origin.

Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has cultivated a domestic intranet to help silence opposition to its takeover and consolidate its power. Residents can only access an estimated 1,200 websites and platforms through mobile connections. Facebook and Twitter—both popular with anticoup protesters and key tools for communicating with allies abroad—remain inaccessible. The junta has also imposed shutdowns of internet service in towns across the country, often coinciding with military offensives against ethnic militias, armed prodemocracy groups, or communities that are suspected of supporting them. In practice, these restrictions have limited the sharing of evidence of human rights abuses with external audiences, forced residents to rely on military-dominated information sources, and helped to contain civic mobilization and dissent.

In Ethiopia, internet access has been restricted in the Tigray Region since November 2020, when armed conflict broke out between the federal government and forces associated with the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front. The shutdown has prevented people in Tigray from sharing their stories and reporting on actions by combatants that human rights groups have described as mass atrocity crimes, limiting opportunities for accountability and global solidarity. Similarly in July 2021, as Cubans mobilized the largest antigovernment demonstrations in the country since the 1959 revolution, the authorities briefly restricted internet access and blocked WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal. These steps prevented protesters from effectively using digital tools to coordinate protests, and they separated the movement from independent news outlets and Cubans based abroad, who had rallied support for the demonstrations on international social media platforms.

While the vast majority of governments that limited access to foreign content did so to maintain their own power or thwart accountability, a notable exception came from the EU. Brussels ordered each member state's telecommunications providers to block the websites of the Russian state media services RT and Sputnik. These sites certainly promote incendiary and false content, and international human rights standards permit limits on free expression under specific circumstances including armed conflict. However, the EU's broad ban restricted all content from these sites rather than more narrow information related to the war. It also lacked clear sunset provisions and was imposed without adequate oversight, transparency, and consultation with civil society and telecommunications companies. The EU's insufficient clarity and specificity left companies scrambling to determine how to comply, leading to uneven blocking among member...
Targeting circumvention technology

Journalists, activists, and ordinary users in many countries have flocked to circumvention tools like virtual private networks (VPNs), which allow them to use the internet safely and anonymously while bypassing some forms of state censorship. In response, governments are increasingly blocking, criminalizing, or imposing regulatory requirements on the circumvention tools themselves.

Blocks on circumvention technology escalated in moments of political tension during the coverage period, when access to the uncensored international internet would have boosted those seeking to change the balance of power. During Venezuela’s November 2021 regional elections, in which opposition parties sought to challenge the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, service providers blocked VPNs and the anonymous web browser Tor, presumably on government orders, in addition to widespread blocking of international and independent Venezuelan media sites. Venezuelan internet users were cut off from critical information, particularly the reports of foreign media and election-monitoring groups.

In India, new regulatory requirements for VPN providers were introduced amid government censorship demands targeting US-based technology companies as well as a two-year block on communications platforms owned by China-based companies, including TikTok and WeChat. The VPN services will be required to maintain subscriber records, such as names and IP (internet protocol) addresses, for five years and furnish them to the government on request, with steep fines for noncompliance. International providers TunnelBear and Norton have since made their services unavailable to users in India. In nearby Myanmar, security officials have reportedly employed cruder tactics to deter people from using the technology: they have arbitrarily searched civilians’ phones for evidence of VPNs, detaining individuals who are found to have downloaded them.
In over two-thirds of countries covered by Freedom on the Net, authorities limited access to foreign information sources using at least one form of censorship.

Exploiting fears of foreign interference to inhibit independent media

Authorities also invoked the specter of foreign interference to expand censorship of websites based abroad or those that receive foreign funding. Website owners or journalists living outside a given country often have more leeway to resist government pressure and produce unfettered reporting. By requiring websites and related companies to be based domestically or to accept only domestic funding, a state can enhance its capacity to control the local information space.

In October 2021, Singapore’s government added the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to its formidable arsenal of censorship powers. In the name of preventing foreign meddling in domestic politics, FICA authorizes officials to block websites and order social media companies and other sites to remove speech if they suspect that the content in question was influenced by a foreign actor. A regulatory body suspended the license of the citizen news site The Online Citizen within a day of the bill’s introduction in Parliament, citing concerns about foreign funding.

A restrictive Azerbaijani media law that was adopted in February 2022 limits the foreign funding that media—defined broadly to include both news outlets and individuals—can accept and requires media operators to be based in the country. The law further clamped down on what was already a tightly controlled online media environment, with many Azerbaijani journalists forced to operate from abroad to avoid state persecution.
Propping up state-aligned and state-owned alternatives to international platforms

Even as they increased pressure on foreign platforms over the past year, many repressive governments promoted pliant domestic alternatives as part of a strategy to create a siloed and politically tamed information environment. If users migrate to state-aligned platforms, the domestic political costs of blocking international services would be reduced, facilitating further fragmentation.

In China, the government has been fairly successful in pairing systematic censorship of foreign services with robust investment in domestic platforms that are beholden to the ruling party. A more diverse social media market, including the development of smaller and more local platforms that meet the needs of a particular community, is sorely needed around the world. But companies owned by or with close ties to authoritarian governments are more likely to censor unfavorable content and become vehicles for state disinformation than their counterparts based in more democratic contexts. These so-called parallel platforms are often less transparent in their operations and policies, and they may be better shielded from civil society advocacy, media investigations, and other forms of public scrutiny.

Moscow’s strategy to reduce reliance on foreign social media companies includes a requirement that mobile phones carry preloaded domestic apps. Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, blocks on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram drove users to VK and Odnoklassniki, both run by a parent company that is partly owned by Kremlin allies. Yandex, a popular Russian search engine and rival of Google, reportedly prioritized disinformation narratives and downgraded the search results for sites that criticized the invasion. In 2022, in a bid to win larger user bases for Russian platforms, authorities reportedly offered influencers monthly payments if they switched to RuTube and Yappy, in lieu of YouTube and TikTok, and toed the government’s editorial line.

The push toward domestic platforms often followed explicit or implicit attacks on the credibility of international platforms, further undermining trust in the global information space. In Turkey, many state agencies flocked to the WhatsApp alternative BiP in 2021, after the Meta-owned app introduced a problematic privacy policy update. BiP is owned by the mobile operator Turkcell, which the state’s sovereign wealth fund controls. The platform has a growing user base in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bahrain.

Increasing barriers to the cross-border flow of user data

In at least 22 countries covered by Freedom the Net, laws that limit where and how personal data can flow were proposed or passed during the coverage period. The affected countries span the democratic spectrum, including examples that are ranked Free, Partly Free, and Not Free by Freedom in the World. The transfer of data across jurisdictions is central to the functioning of the global internet and benefits ordinary users, including by improving internet speeds, enabling companies to provide critical services worldwide, and allowing the storage of records in the most secure data centers available.

As policymakers impose necessary privacy laws that safeguard sensitive information from commercial abuse, they may unintentionally drive fragmentation by creating a barrier between their own countries and those without similar standards. The ensuing patchwork of regulations could incentivize companies, particularly newer or smaller services, to concentrate their growth in certain countries, resulting in less diverse online ecosystems for users elsewhere.

The EU’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) permits the transfer of personal data only to jurisdictions with a sufficient level of protection in place. As more governments pursue laws that appear to align with GDPR standards, some have buried problematic obligations that either mandate domestic data storage, feature blanket exceptions for national security or state actors without safeguards, or delegate increased decision-making power to politicized regulators—all of which renders users vulnerable to government abuse despite improvements pertaining to the use of personal data for commercial purposes. Such contradictory “data washing” measures ultimately fail to strengthen privacy and further fragment the internet.

In August 2021, the Chinese government passed a data protection law that regulates the commercial use of personal data, creating an important set of guarantees for the country’s billion internet users. But the law does not restrict the government’s misuse of data, and it mandates domestic data storage for some companies, opening the door to further state intrusion and exploitation and imposing additional onerous barriers on the flow of personal data.

In Rwanda, a data protection law passed in October 2021 requires companies to store data in the country unless
otherwise authorized by the country’s cybersecurity regulator, rather than an independent data protection agency that is more insulated from law enforcement bodies. This localization clause leaves personal data vulnerable to abuse, particularly given that authorities have embedded agents in telecommunications companies for surveillance purposes and prosecuted dissidents based on their private messages.

Though modeled on the GDPR, the United Arab Emirates’ new data protection law, in effect since January 2022, exempts government entities tasked with processing personal data from complying with baseline safeguards. While its constraints on commercial data access are welcome, the law leaves the privacy of residents at risk: authorities in the country still have sweeping powers to monitor communications and seize data from service providers.

**Breaking away from global infrastructure**

Governments in at least seven countries, all of which are ranked Not Free in *Freedom in the World*, sought to centralize state control over domestic infrastructure and physically isolate their networks from the global internet during the coverage period. This form of fragmentation may be the least prevalent due to the exceptionally advanced technical and administrative capacities that it requires. It also entails considerable political will: infrastructural isolation presents economic costs to businesses operating domestically, can significantly slow down connection speeds, and deepens the risk to human rights. These challenges help explain why political leaders in countries with robust civic spaces, thriving technology sectors, and more pluralistic governance systems are less likely to impose such barriers.

The CCP and state-linked companies have cultivated the most sophisticated model of cyber isolation. Internet traffic from outside the country passes through centralized, state-controlled chokepoints, facilitating mass blocking, filtering, and surveillance. Following Beijing’s path, the Iranian government has imposed state barriers between the local infrastructure and global traffic. In July 2021, authorities introduced the User Protection Bill to bolster the country’s National Information Network, which has facilitated the restriction of access to international platforms and connections while directing users to domestic alternatives. The law would place the country’s internet gateways under the authority of a working group that includes military and intelligence agencies.

The Russian government hastened its own progress toward infrastructural isolation over the past year. During a series of tests in June and July 2021, authorities claimed to have successfully separated the so-called RuNet from global connections, though technical experts remain skeptical. In April 2022, following his invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin appointed an interagency commission to pursue his goal of technical isolation.

The Cambodian government planned to route all international and domestic internet traffic through a single portal, dubbed the National Internet Gateway (NIG). This centralized chokepoint would allow authorities to censor content from around the world and surveil residents more easily. Cambodian officials unexpectedly delayed the NIG’s implementation in February 2022, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and issues related to licensing and equipment installation. The decision came after extensive opposition to the NIG from the private sector, civil society, and experts at the United Nations.

**The competition to control the web**

Fragmentation at the national level is part of a global battle for control over the internet. Led by Beijing and Moscow, diplomats from authoritarian countries have promoted their model of cyber sovereignty at multilateral institutions. As secretary general of the ITU, China’s Houlin Zhao encouraged a shift of control over the setting of technical standards away from multistakeholder bodies, where civil society and other nongovernmental experts have more sway, and toward the ITU itself, where only governments have input.

During Zhao’s tenure, in 2019 and 2020, the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei introduced the New IP proposal, a plan to fundamentally alter the interoperability of the global internet’s infrastructure by redesigning common protocols to facilitate greater state control over domestic networks. While initially voted down by ITU members, rebranded elements of the proposal have since reemerged
in standards-setting bodies. Chinese officials also launched in July 2022 the World Internet Conference International Organization in Beijing, intended to serve as a “shared” global community that would determine technical standards and governance. The organization, stemming from an annual meeting of the same name that was first held in 2014, could create a new forum in which the Chinese government can promote and incentivize other governments to adopt its authoritarian model of digital control.

The Russian government has similarly leveraged international institutions to influence internet governance. At the United Nations in February 2022, negotiations began for a new cybercrime treaty, which was initially proposed by Russian diplomats and cosponsored by representatives from Belarus, Cambodia, China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all ranked Not Free by Freedom in the World. Civil society has resoundingly condemned the proposed treaty as a new vector for digital repression. Moscow also joined Beijing in June 2021 to call for a more powerful ITU and endorse the right of each state to control its own “national segment of the internet.” One Russian official explained the need for a more forceful version of the agency by claiming that the multistakeholder model of governance was “ineffective.”

**Democratic states step up globally**

Some democratic leaders have revived efforts to shape global digital standards that uphold fundamental freedoms, creating a much-needed counterweight to authoritarian efforts. After allowing ITU secretary general Zhao to run unopposed in 2014 and 2018, Washington nominated Doreen Bogdan-Martin to seek the post, and she defeated a candidate backed by Moscow in a September 2022 vote by member states. Two US-led initiatives, the Summit for Democracy and the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, have sought to solidify common norms as a basis for further action. Moreover, the United States has pledged to strengthen and expand the Freedom Online Coalition in its upcoming role as chair in 2023.
Across the Atlantic, the EU and its member states have taken similar action. The Copenhagen Pledge on Tech and Democracy, led by the Danish government, uses a multistakeholder format by inviting governments, multilateral bodies, civil society, and the private sector together to protect human rights in the digital age. Separately, the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) is a promising alternative to more censorial regulatory approaches and could serve as a global model. It strengthens transparency, limits advertising systems, and requires large platforms to provide data to independent researchers and organizations, which can then lead to more innovative and effective responses to online harms. The DSA also institutes a more inclusive coregulatory form of oversight and enforcement, including by using independent third-party auditors to review compliance, which can limit the risk of abuse.

However, the DSA framework features a problematic “notice-and-action” provision for companies to remove speech that is deemed illegal by EU authorities or member states, which could be abused to silence political, social, and religious speech. To limit this risk, Brussels and member states should clearly define and harmonize their definitions of what constitutes “illegal” speech in keeping with international law, and ensure that independent judicial authorities oversee any removal of content.
**Greater policy coordination among democracies is vital to the protection of a free and open internet.**

In a promising sign from April 2022, the governments of Canada, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States established the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Forum to bridge regulatory discrepancies and promote the free flow of data under what it determines as “best practices” for data protection. The EU and the United States also made progress during the coverage period following the European Court of Justice’s invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield framework in 2020, a ruling that limited transatlantic data flows due to concerns about US national security surveillance programs. In March 2022, the transatlantic partners announced an agreement on Privacy Shield 2.0, set to be formalized in late 2022, that includes a redress mechanism for EU residents who are concerned about privacy violations as well as new privacy commitments by US intelligence agencies.

Governments also proposed, passed, or began enforcement of data protection laws that are compatible with rights-respecting provisions from existing international frameworks, a practice that can minimize the effects of fragmentation. South Africa’s data protection law, which entered into full force in July 2021, was drafted to harmonize with parts of the GDPR, as was Sri Lanka’s, which passed in March 2022. Both laws put limits on the transfer of personal data across borders except in certain cases, including transfers to a country with adequate safeguards. Protecting privacy does not necessarily require limiting the physical location of data storage. For instance, the proposed American Data Privacy and Protection Act in the United States avoids focusing on where data can be transferred and instead adopts a data minimization approach that limits what can be collected, how it can be stored, and with whom it can be shared.

**Resisting internet fragmentation while protecting human rights**

The values of human rights and open societies are mutually reinforcing. When implementing rights-protecting laws, governments should seek to reduce friction by coordinating their efforts across borders and aligning them with international frameworks whenever possible. Ultimately, democratic officials, technology companies, and global civil society groups should aim to empower individuals to play a greater role in making online spaces more free, secure, and inclusive. This is the best way to ensure that human rights are upheld in the digital age.
A Resilient Internet for a More Democratic Future

Twenty-six countries experienced net improvements in internet freedom over the past year, the highest such figure since the inception of Freedom on the Net. Though digital repression is undoubtedly becoming more sophisticated and entrenched into everyday life, responses from governments, civil society, and the private sector are beginning to yield results.

Freedom on the Net has identified proven strategies that marshal the structures, tools, and expertise necessary to prevent or address illiberal uses of technology by both domestic and foreign actors, as well as the broader societal harms that the internet often exacerbates. Some strategies provide short-term responses to instances of repression, while others build long-term mechanisms for accountability, governance, and oversight that can stave off the advance of authoritarianism over time. These approaches vary in effectiveness depending on a country’s political context: building digital resilience in a backsliding democracy and doing so under an entrenched authoritarian regime involve different sets of challenges. Collectively, however, such efforts have the potential to reverse the global decline of internet freedom.

While success requires the participation of a range of actors, civil society has always been at the forefront. Nonprofit organizations, media groups, and human rights defenders with roots in a given country or region have played a leading role in first identifying and raising awareness of a problem, often tirelessly over years, and then creating a strategy to address it, with assistance from others who can organize the requisite financial and political resources. Governments, philanthropic foundations, private companies, and others with an interest in cultivating a free and open internet that works for all of its users should do their utmost to meaningfully engage with civil society groups that are involved in the fight against digital repression and internet fragmentation, providing funding, technical expertise, capacity building, and other support to advance their work.

Working with the judiciary

In at least 28 countries covered by this report, courts protected internet freedom. In many cases, problematic laws were struck down, creating precedents to guide future state actions. Court intervention appears to be the most effective at fighting censorship and surveillance in countries ranked Free or Partly Free by Freedom in the World, where judicial authorities remain independent from or somewhat resistant to political control. Efforts to protect internet freedom should prioritize strengthening the independence of courts and building their capacity to parse the legal and technical concepts that arise in cases involving human rights online.

In one positive example, the Zambian human rights organization Chapter One Foundation sued the country’s communications regulator after it blocked social media platforms during the August 2021 presidential election. As a result of the legal action, the regulator signed a consent agreement, pledging not to act outside its legal authority and making a commitment to strengthen transparency regarding any future restrictions on telecommunications platforms.

In India, multiple civil society and media groups engaged in strategic litigation in response to the government’s censorial Information Technology Rules, and in August 2021 a court halted the enforcement of problematic provisions in the regulations as part of a suit filed by an organization representing broadcasters. In a more recent case, Mexico’s Supreme Court invalidated a biometric mobile-phone registry in April 2022, strengthening people’s ability to communicate.
anonymously online. The decision came after civil society activists argued that the registry facilitated widespread surveillance, made personal data less secure, and contributed to social inequalities.

**Pushing the private sector into action**

In at least 30 countries over the past year, the private sector moved to protect internet freedom. In many cases, technology companies acted in response to civil society pressure, whistleblower testimony, and media scrutiny. Such cajoling can be necessary, as private-sector efforts to protect internet freedom have been inconsistent and affected by competing demands—including the mass collection of user data that forms the core business model of international social media platforms.

Following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, tech companies scrambled to protect vulnerable users and avoid inadvertent support for a war of aggression. Google, Twitter, and Meta all limited the ability of Russian state media to monetize content across their platforms. They also rolled out new safety features to reduce online risks, such as Meta’s expansion of end-to-end encryption for Instagram users in Russia and Ukraine and

**A MULTIPRONGED APPROACH TO SAFEGUARDING HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE**

Collectively, these strategies can help reverse the global decline of internet freedom.
its introduction of ephemeral messages on the Messenger application for those in Ukraine. Twitter launched a Tor Onion service, allowing users in Russia to access the platform safely and anonymously after it was blocked by the government.

Under public pressure, social media companies have pushed back on the Indian government’s efforts to increase control over online speech. After broad condemnation from civil society about its compliance with state censorship, Twitter resisted government orders to restrict content, including posts from Freedom House, before finally acquiescing in June 2022 after a company employee was threatened with criminal charges. Twitter then took the case to the judiciary, filing a lawsuit in July 2022 that could rein in the government’s broad assertion of censorship powers.

The private sector has sometimes partnered with civil society, government actors, and academia to design innovative responses to online harms. In Taiwan, which faces a barrage of disinformation that can be traced to China, the popular Japan-based messaging application Line worked with civil society groups to develop a tool for users to report false information when it trends on the platform. The Taiwanese government launched a similar coordination effort following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, aiming to track war-related disinformation emanating from China.

Driving government policy changes to restore internet freedom

Policymakers, regulatory bodies, and other government agencies in at least 26 countries took steps to protect human rights online during the coverage period. These measures strengthened institutional safeguards for free expression, access to information, and privacy, and defended internet users from manipulative corporate practices. In some cases, government officials were reacting to targeted advocacy campaigns by civil society organizations; in others, their actions were an indirect outcome of long-term civil society efforts to shape the public discourse about policy and regulatory responses to disinformation, harassment, corporate malfeasance, and other harms online.

The Gambian government enacted legislation in July 2021 that affirmed a right to access public information, empowering journalists, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens to hold the government accountable for its performance. The law was drafted using a multistakeholder model, with Gambian and international civil society and the private sector providing input.

In Armenia, domestic and international civil society groups combined public condemnation with private advocacy to persuade the government to repeal a criminal defamation clause that was originally passed in July 2021. The legislation, which criminalized serious insults of government officials and public figures, was invoked throughout the year to prosecute users who shared critical commentary, especially about Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Civil society activists aired their concerns in private meetings with diplomats and in Armenian news outlets, and their objections were then cited in a formal appeal to the Constitutional Court. Government officials agreed to exclude the provision from a new criminal code that took effect in July 2022, and committed to broad consultation with nongovernmental groups when developing media-related laws in the future.

Civil society called on democratic policymakers to ensure that the sanctions they imposed in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine did not impede critical internet access. In a March 2022 letter, more than 35 internet freedom groups and experts, including Freedom House, alerted President Biden to the dangers and unintended consequences of restricting internet services for users in Russia and Belarus. Weeks later, the Treasury Department exempted telecommunications services from US sanctions related to the invasion.

Independent regulators sought guidance from civil society and other experts on how best to prevent companies from undermining the rights of internet users. In August 2022, after the coverage period, the US Federal Trade Commission announced that it was accepting advice from the public about whether new rules were needed to protect US residents

A multipronged effort including strategic litigation, evidence-based research, multilateral and bilateral engagement, and targeted advocacy has changed the behavior of governments imposing shutdowns.
from corporate data collection. Such rules could allow the regulator to mitigate harms in the absence of comprehensive privacy protections under federal law.

**Progress on internet shutdowns**

Internet shutdowns have long been a core tactic of digital repression. But this may be changing: the Freedom on the Net subscore pertaining to government restrictions on internet connectivity improved in 13 countries, the largest number of gains for a single indicator across the 21-question methodology this year. During the coverage period, governments in 14 of the 70 countries assessed shut off or throttled fixed or mobile internet services, compared with 20 countries in the report’s 2021 edition and 22 in the 2020 edition. In countries where shutdowns continue to occur, they appear to be more localized and temporary, affecting fewer people for less time than past restrictions.

The trend suggests that a multipronged effort including strategic litigation, evidence-based research, multilateral and bilateral engagement, and targeted advocacy has helped to change the behavior of governments imposing shutdowns. For instance, researchers have illustrated that shutdowns take a toll on local economies, and they have been shown to correlate with higher levels of violence, undermining the argument that they are necessary to maintain peace and security. Lawsuits filed by civil society groups, journalists, and others have led to judicial interventions against connectivity restrictions, most recently in India in 2022 and Sudan in 2021.

Proactive advocacy aimed at both governments and internet service providers has succeeded in preventing possible shutdowns ahead of major events. For instance, members of the #KeepItOn coalition—comprising more than 280 civil society groups, including Freedom House, and led by the digital rights group Access Now—mobilized ahead of Kenya’s general elections in August 2022 and Iraq’s parliamentary elections in October 2021 to urge officials to maintain connectivity. Kenyan officials fulfilled their public commitments to refrain from restricting internet access, and no disruptions to internet access were reported in Iraq, unlike during the 2018 elections.

Kenyans track results from the presidential election in August 2022. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) chairman declared Deputy President William Ruto the winner after a tight race. (Photo by Boniface Muthoni, SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
Disproportionate surveillance remains one of the most obvious problems affecting democracies’ internet freedom performance.

This sustained advocacy has contributed to a consensus at the multilateral level that shutdowns are unjustifiable and disproportionate. A UN report, commissioned by the Human Rights Council and released in 2022 to the General Assembly, incorporated civil society and private-sector input to outline recommendations on how to limit such censorship. The Freedom Online Coalition called for the immediate end of shutdowns in July 2021, launching an internet shutdown task force to design best practices for advocacy. The Group of Seven governments also publicly agreed in 2021 to cooperate in opposition to shutdowns when they are “politically motivated,” although they reportedly softened their language after objections from the Indian government, a global leader in connectivity restrictions.

The path to stronger rights protections and a more resilient internet

The success of the collective effort against service shutdowns offers a model for tackling other critical problems that are driving digital repression and the fragmentation of the open internet. Strategies that build on the work of civil society to mobilize change in the courts, among governments, and at tech firms can yield better protections for human rights online on both a national and a global scale, particularly when they enlist multilateral and multistakeholder institutions. Without such campaigns, however, the internet is likely to grow more splintered, obstructing the exchange of diverse views and innovative ideas, constraining people’s ability to organize for political and social causes, and severing cross-border connections between communities.

One advocacy effort has already identified its target: governments’ purchase and deployment of intrusive commercial surveillance tools that violate the rights of internet users around the world. Technical researchers, human rights experts, and media investigations have recently documented the reach and abuses of the shadowy spyware industry, and governments have started to explore legal and regulatory restrictions on the sale of such products. These are welcome first steps, but more is needed.

Disproportionate surveillance remains one of the most obvious problems affecting democracies’ internet freedom performance. Too often, rights considerations are disregarded in favor of the misguided belief that more intrusive tools and greater state access to data will necessarily contribute to a safer society. In addition to addressing the proliferation of spyware, democracies should impose robust controls on other forms of surveillance and protect end-to-end encryption, which limits the impact of such excessive monitoring. The coalition model for achieving digital resilience could be employed to focus much-needed public scrutiny on the question of which surveillance tools and practices are compatible with human rights. Such action would lay the groundwork for democracies to adopt rights-based regulations at home, clear the way for more coordinated and effective restrictions on the private surveillance market, and remove powerful and ever-evolving monitoring tools from the hands of abusive government actors, ultimately fostering a more democratic future.
# Key Internet Controls by Country

Freedom House documented how governments censor and control the digital sphere. Each colored cell represents at least one occurrence of the cited control during the report’s coverage period of June 2021 to May 2022. The Key Internet Controls reflect restrictions on content of political, social, or religious nature.

## No Key Internet Controls Observed

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## Types of Key Internet Controls

- Social media prohibition
- Political social media prohibition
- Restrictions on messaging platforms
- Domestic internet restriction
- External internet restriction
- Censorship or control
- Policy enforcement

## Key Internet Controls by Country

| Country          | Angola | Argentina | Armenia | Australia | Azerbaijan | Bahrain | Bangladesh | Belarus | Brazil | Cambodia | China | Colombia | Cuba | Ecuador | Egypt | Estonia | Ethiopia | France | Georgia | Germany | Ghana | Hungary | India | Indonesia | Iran | Iraq | Italy | Jordan | Kazakhstan | Kenya | Kyrgyzstan | Lebanon | Libya | Malawi | Malaysia | Mexico | Morocco | Myanmar | Nicaragua | Nigeria | Pakistan | Philippines | Russia | Rwanda | Saudi Arabia | Serbia | Singapore | South Africa | Sudan | Taiwan | Thailand | The Gambia | Tunisia | Turkey | Uganda | Ukraine | United Arab Emirates | United Kingdom | United States | Uzbekistan | Venezuela | Vietnam | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
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| Country          | 61     | 71        | 74      | 76        | 38         | 29      | 43         | 28      | 65     | 43       | 10    | 64       | 20   | 64       | 27    | 93      | 27       | 76      | 78      | 77      | 64      | 69      | 51      | 49      | 16      | 42      | 75      | 47      | 32      | 68      | 53      | 51      | 44      | 57      | 59      | 61      | 51      | 12      | 45      | 57      | 26      | 65      | 23      | 37      | 24      | 72      | 54      | 73      | 67      | 48      | 29      | 79      | 59      | 59      | 28      | 79      | 76      | 27      | 30      | 22      | 58      | 49      |

June 2021 - May 2022 coverage period

@freedomhouse freedomhouse.org
FREEDOM ON THE NET 2022

Status Countries
FREE 17
PARTLY FREE 32
NOT FREE 21
Total 70

For more information about the report’s geographical coverage, visit freedomonthenet.org.
GLOBAL RANKINGS

100 = Most Free  0 = Least Free

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2022
Countering an Authoritarian Overhaul of the Internet

#FreedomOnTheNet
Freedom on the Net 2022 covers 70 countries in 6 regions around the world. The countries were chosen to illustrate internet freedom improvements and declines in a variety of political systems. Each country receives a numerical score from 100 (the most free) to 0 (the least free), which serves as the basis for an internet freedom status designation of FREE (100-70 points), PARTLY FREE (69-40 points), or NOT FREE (39-0 points).

Ratings are determined through an examination of three broad categories:

A. OBSTACLES TO ACCESS: Assesses infrastructural, economic, and political barriers to access; government decisions to shut off connectivity or block specific applications or technologies; legal, regulatory, and ownership control over internet service providers; and independence of regulatory bodies.

B. LIMITS ON CONTENT: Examines legal regulations on content; technical filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy and diversity of the online environment; and the use of digital tools for civic mobilization.

C. VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS: Details legal protections and restrictions on free expression; surveillance and privacy; and legal and extralegal repercussions for online activities, such as prosecution, extralegal harassment and physical attacks, or cyberattacks.
REGIONAL RANKINGS

Freedom on the Net 2022 covers 70 countries in 6 regions around the world. The countries were chosen to illustrate internet freedom improvements and declines in a variety of political systems.

A. Obstacles to Access
B. Limits on Content
C. Violations of User Rights

Asia-Pacific

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Americas

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<td>Cuba</td>
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Recommendations

FOR POLICYMAKERS

Protect privacy and security

Strictly regulate the use of surveillance tools and personal-data collection by government and law enforcement agencies. Government surveillance programs should adhere to the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, a framework agreed upon by a broad consortium of civil society groups, industry leaders, and scholars for protecting users’ rights. The principles, which state that all communications surveillance must be legal, necessary, and proportionate, should also be applied to biometric surveillance technologies and open-source intelligence methods such as social media monitoring. In the United States, lawmakers should reform or repeal existing surveillance laws and practices to better align with these standards, including those under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order 12333, and pass the bipartisan Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, which would require government agencies to obtain a court order before purchasing data from data brokers. Policymakers in the United States should also investigate the extent to which commercial surveillance tools, such as spyware and extraction technology, have been used against Americans and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place.

Protect encryption. Robust encryption is fundamental to cybersecurity, commerce, and the protection of human rights. Weakening encryption endangers the lives of activists, journalists, members of marginalized communities, and ordinary users around the world. Governments should refrain from mandating the introduction of “back doors,” requiring traceability of messages, or reducing intermediary liability protections for providers of end-to-end encryption services. In the United States, any reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act should not undermine the ability of intermediaries and service providers to offer robust encryption.

Strengthen data-privacy protections by promulgating stronger regulations and enacting comprehensive legislation.

Democracies should collaborate to create interoperable privacy regimes that comprehensively safeguard user information, while also allowing data to flow across borders to jurisdictions with similar levels of protection. Individuals should have control over their information, including the right to access it, delete it, and easily transfer it to the providers of their choosing. Companies should be required to limit the collection of consumer data, particularly intimate information such as health, biometric, and location data, disclose in plain language how they use data they do collect, and limit how third parties can access and use this data. Updated data-privacy protections should include provisions that provide independent regulators and oversight mechanisms with the ability, resources, and expertise needed to enforce and ensure foreign and domestic companies comply with privacy, nondiscrimination, and consumer-protection laws. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has initiated important action to strengthen privacy enforcement under existing authorities by issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore whether stronger protections are needed regarding commercial surveillance and data security. In the current absence of a federal data privacy law, the FTC should issue a final rule that provides robust protections and facilitates enforcement. Comprehensive data-privacy legislation is also needed in the United States. The proposed American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA), which would institute a comprehensive framework that limits what data can be collected by companies, would be a positive step. The ADPPA would be made stronger by making it clear that states are free to pass their own, more robust privacy protection laws.

Restrict the export of censorship and surveillance technology. A booming commercial market for surveillance and censorship technologies has given governments even greater capacity to flout the rule of law, monitor private communications, and restrict access to essential resources. Democracies should place strict limits on the sale of technologies that enable monitoring, surveillance, interception, or collection of information and communications—including technologies that collect and analyze biometric information (including gait, facial measurements, voice, and DNA, among others), spyware,
data-extraction technology, and general-purpose products that provide the advanced computing power, machine learning, natural-language processing, and artificial intelligence capabilities that can be used to enhance these technologies. In a first, the Costa Rican government called for a global moratorium on the use of spyware technology in 2022. The United States, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, supported by Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have recently announced the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, intended to “help stem the tide of authoritarian government misuse of technology and promote a positive vision for technologies anchored by democratic values.” The United States additionally updated its licensing policy to restrict the export of items if there is “a risk that the items will be used to violate or abuse human rights,” and the European Union (EU) tightened export controls for dual-use products and cybersurveillance technologies. When implementing such new policies, government officials should give extra scrutiny to the suitability of exports intended for countries rated as Not Free or Partly Free by Freedom House, where the most frequent censorship and surveillance abuses occur. Government export guidance should urge businesses to adhere to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Businesses exporting surveillance and censorship technologies that could be used to commit human rights abuses should be required to report annually to the public on the impacts of their exports. Reports should include a list of countries to which they have exported such technologies, potential human rights concerns in each of those countries, a summary of preexport due diligence undertaken to ensure that their products are not misused, human rights violations that have occurred as a result of the use or potential use of their technologies, and efforts to mitigate the harm done and prevent future abuses. In the United States, Congress should pass the Foreign Advanced Technology Surveillance Accountability Act, which requires the Department of State to include information on the status of surveillance and use of advanced technology in its annual report on global human rights practices.

Safeguard free expression, access to information, and a diverse online environment

Maintain access to internet services, digital platforms, and circumvention technology, particularly during elections, protests, and periods of conflict. Intentional disruptions to internet access and online services impact individuals’ economic, social, political, and civil rights. Governments should avoid blocking or imposing onerous regulatory requirements on circumvention tools, and imposing outright or arbitrary bans on social media and messaging platforms. While some services may present genuine societal and national security concerns, bans unduly restrict user expression. Governments should instead address any legitimate risks posed by social media and messaging platforms through existing democratic mechanisms including regulatory action, security audits, parliamentary scrutiny, and legislation passed in consultation with civil society and affected stakeholders. Any restrictions to online content should adhere to international human rights standards of legality, necessity, and proportionality, and include robust oversight, transparency, and consultation with civil society and the private sector. When sanctions are imposed, it should be made clear that internet communications services are exempt so as not to limit essential online tools for users in authoritarian countries.

Enshrine human rights principles, transparency, and democratic oversight in laws that regulate online content.

Legal frameworks addressing online content should establish special type- and size-oriented obligations on companies, incentivize platforms to improve their own standards, and require human rights due diligence and reporting. Such requirements should prioritize transparency across core products and practices, including content moderation, recommendation and algorithmic systems, collection and use of data, and political and targeted advertising practices. Laws should also provide opportunities for vetted researchers to access platform data—information that can provide insights for policy development and civil society’s research and advocacy. Intermediaries should continue to benefit from safe-harbor protections for most user-generated and third-party content appearing on their platforms, so as not to encourage restrictions that could inhibit free expression. Laws should also protect “good Samaritan” rules and reserve decisions on the legality of content for the judiciary rather than companies or executive agencies. Internet users whose account or content is limited or removed should have access to systems for notice, explanation, redress, and appeal. Independent, multistakeholder bodies and independent regulators with sufficient resources and expertise should be empowered to oversee the implementation of laws, conduct audits, and ensure compliance. Provisions within the EU’s Digital Services Act, notably its transparency provisions, data accessibility for researchers, and a coregulatory form of enforcement, offer a promising model for content-related laws.
Support online media and foster a resilient information space. Combating disinformation and propaganda begins with public access to reliable information and local, on-the-ground reporting. Democracies should scale up efforts to support independent online media in their own countries and abroad through financial assistance and innovative financing models, technical support, and professional development support. They should pair those efforts with broader civic education initiatives and digital literacy training that help people navigate complex media environments. They should also expand protections for journalists who face physical attacks, legal reprisals, and harassment for their work online, including by supporting the creation of emergency visas for those at risk. Laws should protect the free flow of information, grant journalists access to those in power, allow the public to place freedom of information requests, and guard against state monopolization of media outlets.

Fully integrate human rights principles in competition policy enforcement. Diversifying the market for online services—particularly through the creation of smaller platforms that can be tailored toward the needs of a particular community or audience—is a key step toward a more resilient information environment. Competition in the digital market can also encourage companies to create innovative products that protect fundamental rights and tackle online harms such as harassment. When enforcing competition policy, regulators should consider the implications of market dominance on free expression, privacy, nondiscrimination, and other rights. Governments should also ensure antitrust frameworks can effectively be applied in the digital age, and create legal regimes that incentivize such diversity, such as by introducing interoperability and data-portability provisions like those in the EU’s Digital Markets Act.

Address the digital divide. Unequal access to the internet contributes to economic and social inequality and undermines the benefits of a free and open internet. In the short term, governments should work with service providers to lift data caps and waive late-payment fees; they should also support community-based initiatives to provide secure public-access points and lend electronic devices to individuals who need them. Longer-term efforts should include expanding access and building internet infrastructure for underserved areas and populations, ensuring that connectivity is affordable, and enacting strong legal protections for user privacy and net neutrality.

Strengthen global internet freedom

Ensure that cyber diplomacy is both coordinated among democracies and grounded in human rights. Democracies should facilitate dialogue among national policymakers and regulators to coordinate on best practices for tech policy, and strengthen engagement at international standards-setting bodies. Diplomats should develop common approaches to countering authoritarian influence within the UN General Assembly, International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and other multilateral bodies. Multilateral decision-making should support and complement, not replace, specific internet-governance and standards-setting activities by multistakeholder bodies like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). In the United States, there is an opportunity to institutionalize and sustain new initiatives and funding streams focused on global technology policy and internet freedom, especially those announced at the inaugural Summit for Democracy. The State Department’s new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy should make human rights a central component of its mandate, including by ensuring that staff have relevant expertise and coordinating closely with other internet-focused departments within and across agencies. These efforts should also formalize regular, ongoing engagement with civil society and the private sector.

Strengthen the Freedom Online Coalition’s capacity to protect internet freedom. As the upcoming 2023 chair, the United States should focus on strengthening the FOC’s name recognition and its ability to drive diplomatic coordination and global action. This includes by more proactively articulating the benefits of a free and open internet to governments, being more publicly and privately vocal on threats and opportunities for human rights online, mainstreaming FOC activity in other multilateral initiatives like the ITU and Group of 7 (G7), and creating more avenues to engage with civil society and the private sector, including through diversifying and expanding the coalition’s advisory network. The FOC should consider increasing internal staffing to achieve these goals, and creating an internal mechanism by which member states’ activities can be evaluated to ensure they align with FOC principles. A new funding mechanism, supported by member states, for programs and activities
led by nonstate stakeholders could also advance FOC priorities. Any expansion of the coalition’s membership should be carried out in consultation with the advisory network, and new members should be selected based on their capacity to bolster the FOC’s work and contribute to greater geographic diversity within the body.

**Defend and expand internet freedom programming as a vital component of democracy assistance.** Democracy assistance targeting internet freedom activities should prioritize digital security and digital activism trainings, as well as provision of software that can protect or assist users. Policymakers should support programs that seek to strengthen judicial independence, enhance technical literacy among judges and others within the legal system, and provide other financial and administrative resources for strategic litigation. Governments should increase support for technologies that help individuals in closed environments circumvent government censorship, protect themselves against surveillance, and overcome restrictions on connectivity. Such tools should be open-source, user-friendly, and locally responsive in order to ensure high levels of security and use. Finally, programming should support efforts aimed at strengthening the independence and expertise of regulators, which can serve as politically neutral bodies that protect internet freedom across changes in political leadership.

**Advocate for the immediate, unconditional release of those imprisoned for online expression protected under international standards.** Governments should incorporate these cases, in addition to broader internet-freedom concerns, into bilateral and multilateral engagement with perpetrator countries. It should be made standard practice to raise the names of those detained for their online content, to request information or specific action related to their treatment, and to call for their release and the repeal of laws that criminalize online expression.

**FOR COMPANIES**

**Ensure fair and transparent content moderation.** To ensure content-moderation policies that are respectful of users, private companies should:

- Prioritize users’ free expression and access to information, particularly for journalism; discussion of human rights; educational materials; and political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression.

- Clearly and completely explain in guidelines and terms of service what speech is not permissible, what aims restrictions serve, and how content is assessed for violations. An essential step is ensuring that terms of service, as well as mechanisms for reporting harmful content and appealing content decisions, are translated into all languages where the company’s products are used.

- When appropriate, consider less-invasive alternatives to content removal, such as demotion of content, labeling, fact-checking, promoting more authoritative sources, and implementing design changes that improve civic discussions.

- Publish detailed transparency reports on content takedowns, both for those initiated by governments and for those undertaken by companies. Transparency reports should also address how machine learning is used to train automated systems that classify, recommend, and prioritize content for human review.

- Provide an efficient and timely avenue of appeal for users who believe that their rights were unduly restricted, including through censorship, banning, assignment of labels, or demonetization of posts.

- Refrain from relying on automated systems for removing content without opportunity for meaningful human review.

- Expand the capacity, geographic, and linguistic diversity of content moderation teams, and ensure they are sensitive to nuances in a language that is spoken across multiple countries or regions. Conduct human rights due diligence assessments to ensure that implementation of moderation does not lead to unintended consequences, such as disproportionately affecting marginalized communities.
Resist government orders to shut down internet connectivity, ban digital services, and unduly turn over data or restrict user accounts and content. Service providers should use all available legal channels to challenge such requests from state agencies, whether they are official or informal, especially those that relate to human rights defenders, activists, civil society, journalists, or other at-risk accounts. If companies cannot resist demands in full, they should ensure that any restrictions or disruptions are as limited as possible in duration, geographic scope, and type of content affected. Companies should thoroughly document government demands internally and notify users as to why connectivity or their content may be restricted, especially in countries where government actions lack transparency. When faced with a choice between a ban of their services and complying with undue data requests and censorship orders, companies should bring strategic legal cases that challenge government overreach, in consultation or partnership with civil society.

Adhere to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, adopt the Global Network Initiative Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, and conduct human rights impact assessments. Companies should commit to respecting the rights of their users and addressing any adverse impact that their products might have on human rights. The Global Network Initiative’s Principles provide concrete guidance on how to do so. Companies should invest in and expand programs and tools that allow users, especially human rights defenders, journalists, and those from at-risk populations, to easily protect themselves from online and offline harms, particularly during crisis events. Companies should also minimize the amount of data they collect, sell, and use, and clearly communicate to users what data are collected and for what purpose. Where companies do operate, they should conduct and publish periodic assessments to fully understand how their products and actions might affect rights including freedom of expression, nondiscrimination, and privacy.

Enshrine human rights principles in product design and development. Protecting rights online begins with responsible product design and development. Technologists and engineers should be trained on the human rights implications of the products they build and on international best practices for preventing their abuse. Companies should conduct research and consult with impacted communities to understand the ways their products can be used to perpetrate online and offline harms and respond with strong guardrails that prioritize safety. When a product is found to have been used for human rights violations, companies should suspend sales to the perpetrating party and develop an immediate action plan to mitigate harm and prevent further abuse. Companies should also support the accessibility of circumvention technology, mainstream end-to-end encryption in their products, and ensure other robust security protocols, including by resisting government requests to provide special decryption access.

Engage in continuous dialogue with civil society to understand the effects of company policies and products. Companies should seek out local expertise on the political and cultural context in markets where they have a presence or where their products are widely used, especially in repressive contexts due to unique sets of human rights challenges that require context-specific solutions. Consultations with civil society groups should inform whether companies choose to operate in a particular country, the companies’ approach to content moderation, the development of products and policies, especially during elections or crisis events, when managing government requests, and when working to counter online harms.
Methodology

WHAT WE MEASURE

The Freedom on the Net index measures each country’s level of internet freedom based on a set of methodology questions. The methodology is developed in consultation with international experts to capture the vast array of relevant issues to human rights online (see “Checklist of Questions”).

Freedom on the Net’s core values are grounded in international human rights standards, particularly Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The project particularly focuses on the free flow of information, the protection of free expression, access to information, and privacy rights, and freedom from both legal and extralegal repercussions arising from online activities. The project also evaluates to what extent a rights-enabling online environment is fostered in a particular country.

The index acknowledges that certain rights may be legitimately restricted. The standard of such restrictions within the methodology and scoring aligns with international human rights principles of necessity and proportionality, the rule of law, and other democratic safeguards. Censorship and surveillance policies and procedures should be transparent, minimal, and include avenues for appeal available to those affected, among other safeguards.

The project rates the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals within each country. While internet freedom may be primarily affected by state behavior, actions by nonstate actors, including technology companies, are also considered. Thus, the index ratings generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental. Over the years, Freedom on the Net has been continuously adapted to capture technological advances, shifting tactics of repression, and emerging threats to internet freedom.

THE RESEARCH AND SCORING PROCESS

The methodology includes 21 questions and nearly 100 subquestions, divided into three categories:

1. **Obstacles to Access** details infrastructural, economic, and political barriers to access; government decisions to shut off connectivity or block specific applications or technologies; legal, regulatory, and ownership control over internet service providers; and the independence of regulatory bodies;

2. **Limits on Content** analyzes legal regulations on content; technical filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy and diversity of online information space; and the use of digital tools for civic mobilization;

3. **Violations of User Rights** tackles legal protections and restrictions on free expression; surveillance and privacy; and legal and extralegal repercussions for online speech and activities, such as imprisonment, cyberattacks, or extralegal harassment and physical violence.

Each question is scored on a varying range of points. The subquestions guide researchers regarding factors they should consider while evaluating and assigning points, though not all apply to every country. Under each question, a higher number of points is allotted for a freer situation, while a lower number of points is allotted for a less free environment. Points add up to produce a score for each of the subcategories, and a country’s total points for all three represent its final score (0-100). Based on the score, Freedom House assigns the following internet freedom ratings:
Checklist of Questions

- Each country is rated on a scale of 100 to 0, with 100 representing the most free conditions and 0 the least free.
- A combined score of 100-70 = Free, 69-40 = Partly Free, and 39-0 = Not Free.

**A. OBSTACLES TO ACCESS**

(child score: 0–25 POINTS)

1. **Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections?** (0–6 points)
   - Do individuals have access to high-speed internet services at their home, place of work, internet cafés, libraries, schools, and other venues, as well as on mobile devices?
   - Does poor infrastructure (including unreliable electricity) or catastrophic damage to infrastructure (caused by events such as natural disasters or armed conflicts) limit residents’ ability to access the internet?

2. **Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons?** (0–3 points)
   - Do financial constraints—such as high prices for internet services, excessive taxes imposed on such services, or state manipulation of the relevant markets—make internet access prohibitively expensive for large segments of the population?
   - Are there significant differences in internet penetration and access based on geographical area, or for certain ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?
   - Do pricing practices, such as zero-rating plans, by service providers and digital platforms contribute to a digital divide in terms of what types of content individuals with different financial means can access?
3. **Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity?** (0–6 points)
   - Does the government restrict, or compel service providers to restrict, internet connectivity by slowing or shutting down internet connections during specific events (such as protests or elections), either locally or nationally?
   - Does the government centralize internet infrastructure in a manner that could facilitate restrictions on connectivity?
   - Does the government block, or compel service providers to block, social media platforms and communication apps that serve in practice as major conduits for online information?
   - Does the government block, or compel service providers to block, certain protocols, ports, and functionalities within such platforms and apps (e.g., Voice-over-Internet-Protocol or VoIP, video streaming, multimedia messaging, Secure Sockets Layer or SSL), either permanently or during specific events?
   - Do restrictions on connectivity disproportionately affect marginalized communities, such as inhabitants of certain regions or those belonging to different ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?

4. **Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers?** (0–6 points)
   - Is there a legal or de facto monopoly on the provision of fixed-line, mobile, and public internet access?
   - Does the state place extensive legal, regulatory, or economic requirements on the establishment or operation of service providers?
   - Do licensing requirements, such as retaining customer data or preventing access to certain content, place an onerous financial burden on service providers?

5. **Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner?** (0–4 points)
   - Are there explicit legal guarantees that protect the independence and autonomy of any regulatory body overseeing the internet (exclusively or as part of a broader mandate) from political or commercial interference?
   - Is the process for appointing members of regulatory bodies transparent and representative of different stakeholders’ legitimate interests?
   - Are decisions taken by regulatory bodies seen to be fair and to take meaningful notice of comments from stakeholders in society?
   - Are decisions taken by regulatory bodies seen to be apolitical and independent from changes in government?
   - Are decisions taken by regulatory bodies seen to be protecting internet freedom, including by ensuring service providers, digital platforms, and other content hosts behave fairly?

**B. LIMITS ON CONTENT**

(0–35 POINTS)

1. **Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?** (0–6 points)
   - Does the state use, or compel service providers to use, technical means to restrict freedom of opinion and expression, for example by blocking or filtering websites and online content featuring journalism, discussion of human rights, educational materials, or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression?
   - Does the state use, or compel service providers to use, technical means to block or filter access to websites that may be socially or legally problematic (e.g., those related to gambling, pornography, copyright violations, illegal drugs) in lieu of more effective remedies, or in a manner that inflicts collateral damage on content and activities that are protected under international human rights standards?
   - Does the state block or order the blocking of entire social media platforms, communication apps, blog-hosting platforms, discussion forums, and other web domains for the purpose of censoring the content that appears on them?
   - Is there blocking of tools that enable users to bypass censorship?
   - Does the state procure, or compel services providers to procure, advanced technology to automate censorship or increase its scope?
2. **Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?** (0–4 points)
   - Are administrative, judicial, or extralegal measures used to order the deletion of content from the internet, particularly journalism, discussion of human rights, educational materials, or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression, either prior to or after its publication?
   - Do digital platforms and content hosts arbitrarily remove such content due to informal or formal pressure from government officials or other powerful political actors?
   - Are access providers, content hosts, and third parties free from excessive or improper legal responsibility for opinions expressed by third parties transmitted via the technology they supply?

3. **Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process?** (0–4 points)
   - Are there national laws, independent oversight bodies, and other democratically accountable procedures in place to ensure that decisions to restrict access to certain content are proportional to their stated aim?
   - Are those that restrict content—including state authorities, ISPs, content hosts, digital platforms, and other intermediaries—transparent about what content is blocked or deleted, including to the public and directly to the impacted user?
   - Do efficient and timely avenues of appeal exist for those who find content they produced to have been subjected to censorship?
   - Are self-regulatory mechanisms and oversight bodies effective at ensuring content protected under international human rights standards is not removed?

4. **Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship?** (0–4 points)
   - Do internet users in the country engage in self-censorship on important political, social, or religious issues, including on public forums and in private communications?
   - Does fear of retribution, censorship, state surveillance, or data collection practices have a chilling effect on online speech or cause users to avoid certain online activities of a civic nature?
   - Where widespread self-censorship exists, do some journalists, commentators, or ordinary users continue to test the boundaries, despite the potential repercussions?

5. **Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest?** (0–4 points)
   - Do political leaders, government agencies, political parties, or other powerful actors directly manipulate information via state-owned news outlets, official social media accounts/groups, or other formal channels?
   - Do government officials or other actors surreptitiously employ or encourage individuals or automated systems to artificially amplify political narratives or smear campaigns on social media?
   - Do government officials or other powerful actors pressure or coerce online news outlets, journalists, or bloggers to follow a particular editorial direction in their reporting and commentary?
   - Do authorities issue official guidelines or directives on coverage to online media outlets, including instructions to downplay or amplify certain comments or topics for discussion?
   - Do government officials or other actors bribe or use close economic ties with online journalists, bloggers, or website owners in order to influence the content they produce or host?
   - Does disinformation, coordinated by foreign or domestic actors for political purposes, have a significant impact on public debate?
6. Are there economic, regulatory, or other constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? (0–3 points)
   - Are favorable informal connections with government officials necessary for online media outlets, content hosts, or digital platforms (e.g., search engines, email applications, blog-hosting platforms) to be economically viable?
   - Does the state limit the ability of online media to accept advertising or investment, particularly from foreign sources, or does it discourage advertisers from conducting business with disfavored online media or service providers?
   - Do onerous taxes, regulations, or licensing fees present an obstacle to participation in, establishment of, or management of digital platforms, news outlets, blogs, or social media groups/channels?
   - Do ISPs manage network traffic and bandwidth availability in a manner that is transparent, is evenly applied, and does not discriminate against users or producers of content based on the nature or source of the content itself (i.e., do they respect “net neutrality” with regard to content)?

7. Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? (0–4 points)
   - Are people able to access a range of local, regional, and international news sources that convey independent, balanced views in the main languages spoken in the country?
   - Do online media outlets, social media pages, blogs, and websites represent diverse interests, experiences, and languages within society, for example by providing content produced by different ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?
   - Does a lack of competition among content hosts and digital platforms limit users’ ability to publish content online?
   - Does the presence of misinformation undermine users’ ability to access independent, credible, and diverse sources of information?
   - Does false or misleading content online significantly contribute to offline harms, such as harassment, property destruction, physical violence, or death?
   - If there is extensive censorship, do users employ virtual private networks (VPNs) and other circumvention tools to access a broader array of information sources?

8. Do conditions impede users’ ability to form communities, mobilize, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? (0–6 points)
   - Can people freely join online communities based around their political, social, or cultural identities, including without fear of retribution?
   - Do civil society organizations, activists, and online communities organize online on political, social, cultural, and economic issues, including during electoral campaigns and nonviolent protests, including without fear of retribution?
   - Do state or other actors limit access to online tools and websites (e.g., social media platforms, messaging groups, petition websites) for the purpose of restricting free assembly and association online?
   - Does the state place legal or other restrictions (e.g., criminal provisions, detentions, surveillance) for the purpose of restricting free assembly and association online?

C. VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS
(0–40 POINTS)

1. Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? (0–6 points)
   - Does the constitution contain language that provides for freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom generally?
   - Are there laws or binding legal decisions that specifically protect online modes of expression?
   - Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with these legal decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced?
   - Are online journalists and bloggers accorded strong rights and protections to perform their work?
   - Is the judiciary independent, and do senior judicial bodies and officials support free expression, access to information, and press freedom online?
2. Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? (0–4 points)
   - Do specific laws—including penal codes and those related to the media, defamation, cybercrime, cybersecurity, and terrorism—criminalize online expression and activities that are protected under international human rights standards (e.g., journalism, discussion of human rights, educational materials, or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression)?
   - Are restrictions on internet freedom defined by law, narrowly circumscribed, and both necessary and proportionate to address a legitimate aim?

3. Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? (0–6 points)
   - Are writers, commentators, bloggers, or social media users subject to civil liability, imprisonment, arbitrary detention, police raids, or other legal sanction for publishing, sharing, or accessing material on the internet in contravention of international human rights standards?
   - Are penalties for defamation; spreading false information or “fake news”; cybersecurity, national security, terrorism, and extremism; blasphemy; insulting state institutions and officials; or harming foreign relations applied unnecessarily and disproportionately?

4. Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? (0–4 points)
   - Are website owners, bloggers, or users in general required to register with the government?
   - Does the government require that individuals use their real names or register with the authorities when posting comments or purchasing electronic devices, such as mobile phones?
   - Are users prohibited from using encryption services to protect their communications?
   - Are there laws requiring that users or providers of encryption services turn over decryption keys to the government?

5. Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? (0–6 points)
   - Does the constitution, specific laws, or binding legal decisions protect against government intrusion into private lives?
   - Do state authorities engage in the blanket collection of communications metadata and/or content transmitted within the country?
   - Are there legal guidelines and independent oversight on the collection, retention, and inspection of surveillance data by state security agencies, and if so, do those guidelines adhere to international human rights standards regarding transparency, necessity, and proportionality?
   - Do state authorities monitor publicly available information posted online (including on websites, blogs, social media, and other digital platforms), particularly for the purpose of deterring independent journalism or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression?
   - Do authorities have the technical capacity to regularly monitor or intercept the content of private communications, such as email and other private messages, including through spyware and extraction technology?
   - Do local authorities such as police departments surveil residents (including through International Mobile Subscriber Identity-Catchers or IMSI catcher technology), and if so, are such practices subject to rigorous guidelines and judicial oversight?
   - Do state actors use artificial intelligence and other advanced technology for the purposes of online surveillance without appropriate oversight?
   - Do government surveillance measures target or disproportionately affect dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, or certain ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?
6. **Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy?** (0–6 points)
   - Do specific laws or binding legal decisions enshrine the rights of users over personal data, including biometric information, generated, collected, or processed by public or private entities?
   - Do regulatory bodies, such as a data protection agency, effectively protect user privacy, including through investigating companies’ mismanagement of data and enforcing relevant laws or legal decisions?
   - Can the government obtain user information from companies (e.g., service providers, providers of public access, internet cafés, social media platforms, email providers, device manufacturers) without a legal process?
   - Are these companies required to collect and retain data about their users?
   - Are these companies required to store users’ data on servers located in the country, particularly data related to online activities and expression that are protected under international human rights standards (i.e., are there “data localization” requirements)?
   - Do these companies monitor users and supply information about their digital activities to the government or other powerful actors (either through technical interception, data sharing, or other means)?
   - Does the state attempt to impose similar requirements on these companies through less formal methods, such as codes of conduct, threats of censorship, or other economic or political consequences?
   - Are government requests for user data from these companies transparent, and do companies have a realistic avenue for appeal, for example via independent courts?

7. **Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities?** (0–5 points)
   - Are individuals subject to physical violence—such as murder, assault, torture, sexual violence, or enforced disappearance—in relation to their online activities, including membership in certain online communities?
   - Are individuals subject to other intimidation and harassment—such as verbal threats, travel restrictions, nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, doxing, or property destruction or confiscation—in relation to their online activities?
   - Are individuals subject to online intimidation and harassment specifically because they belong to a certain ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant or other relevant group?
   - Have online journalists, bloggers, or others fled the country or gone into hiding to avoid such consequences?
   - Have the online activities of dissidents, journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, or other users based outside the country led to repercussions for their family members or associates based in the country?

8. **Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack?** (0–3 points)
   - Have websites belonging to opposition, news outlets, or civil society groups in the country been temporarily or permanently disabled due to cyberattacks, particularly at politically sensitive times?
   - Are websites or blogs subject to targeted technical attacks as retribution for posting certain content, for example on political and social topics?
   - Are financial, commercial, and governmental entities subject to significant and targeted cyberattacks meant to steal data or disable normal operations, including attacks that originate outside the country?
   - Are laws and policies in place to prevent and protect against cyberattacks (including systematic attacks by domestic nonstate actors), and are they enforced?
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