Freedom in the World

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

1985-1986
A FREEDOM HOUSE BOOK


*Strategies for the 1980s: Lessons of Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan* by Philip van Slyk. Studies in Freedom, Number 1

*Escape to Freedom: The Story of the International Rescue Committee* by Aaron Levenstein. Studies in Freedom, Number 2
Freedom in the World

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

1985-1986

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With an Essay by

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GREENWOOD PRESS
New York • Westport, Connecticut • London
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Preface

Americans have many foreign policy interests. For most citizens our economic and security relations are foremost, and our foreign policy is directed primarily to securing these interests. However, in the long run the future of our country will only be secured in a free and democratic world. From this perspective achieving this world is both a vital interest of Americans and a vital interest of all peoples. To help us in understanding where we are in the struggle to achieve this world and to keep the relevance of this issue before the public, Freedom House has supported the Comparative Survey of Freedom since 1972.

This yearbook marks the thirteenth year of the Comparative Survey and is the seventh edition in the Freedom House series of annual publications. Previous yearbooks, in addition to focusing on the Comparative Survey, have emphasized different aspects of freedom and human rights. The first yearbook, the 1978 edition, examined basic theoretical issues of freedom and democracy and assessed the record of the Year of Human Rights. The second yearbook reported extensively on a conference devoted to the possibilities of expanding freedom in the Soviet Union. The 1980 yearbook considered international issues in press freedom, aspects of trade union freedom, the struggle for democracy in Iran, elections in Zimbabwe, and the relationship between human rights policy and morality. The 1981 yearbook contained essays and discussions from a Freedom House conference on the prospects for freedom in Muslim Central Asia. The 1982 yearbook emphasized a variety of approaches to economic freedom and its relation to political and civil freedom. The 1983-84 yearbook addressed the problems of corporatism, and the health of democracy in the third world. It also incorporated the papers and discussions of a conference held at Freedom House on supporting democracy in main-
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land China and Taiwan. The 1984-85 yearbook came back to the themes of the definition of freedom, and the conditions for the development of freedom that were first addressed in the 1978 yearbook. It also looked at the particular problem of developing democracy in Central America.

In addition to the ratings and tables of the Comparative Survey, the extensive discussion of criteria and definitions at the beginning of the 1985-86 yearbook includes a checklist for political rights and civil liberties. This edition also presents a discussion of the continuing controversy over the role and regulations appropriate to the news media, a report on a conference held this summer on supporting liberalization in Eastern Europe, and discussions of policy questions relating to American support for democracy in the world.

We acknowledge, once again, the contribution made by the advisory panel for the Comparative Survey. The panel consists of: Robert J. Alexander, Richard W. Cottam, Herbert J. Ellison, Seymour Martin Lipset, Lucian W. Pye, Leslie Rubin, Giovanni Sartori, Robert Scalapino, and Paul Seabury. We also express our appreciation to those foundations whose grants have made the Survey and the publication of this yearbook possible. We are especially grateful for the continuing primary assistance provided to the Survey by the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust. We thank the Earhart Foundation for its additional support. The Survey and all Freedom House activities are also assisted by the generous support of individual members of the organization as well as trade unions, corporations, and public foundations which contribute to our general budget. No financial support from any government—now or in the past—has been either solicited or accepted.

We also acknowledge the research and editorial assistance of Jeannette C. Gastil in producing this yearbook.
PART I

The Survey in 1985
Freedom in the Comparative Survey: Definitions and Criteria

Freedom, like democracy, is a term with many meanings. Its meanings cover a variety of philosophical and social issues, many of which would carry us far beyond the discussion of political systems with which the Comparative Survey of Freedom has been principally concerned. Unfortunately, linguistic usage is such that the meanings of a word such as freedom infect one another, so that a "free society" may be taken to be a society with no rules at all, or a free man may be taken to be an individual with no obligations to society, or even another individual. It is this global sense of individual freedom that leads many Americans to scoff at the idea that theirs is a free society. Not primarily concerned with politics, most Americans apply the word "free" to their personal relationships, sensing correctly, but for our purposes irrelevantly, the necessity to work at a job, or to drive at a certain speed on the highway. To these individuals, "freedom" sounds like a wonderful goal, but hardly a goal that their society has achieved. Yet freedom, when addressed in a narrow political sense, is the basic value, goal, and, to a remarkable degree, attainment of successful democratic regimes.

Freedom as independence is important to the Survey, but this too is not a primary basis of judgment. When the primary issue for so many countries in the colonial era was to become free from a colonial or occupying power, "freedom" meant that a country had emerged from control by another state, much as the United States had achieved freedom in the 1780s. This sense of freedom was applied to the term "the free world" after World War II because the Soviet Union forced satellization on so many countries of Eastern Europe. By contrast those beyond this sphere were said to be free. In this sense Spain was part of the free world, but at the time only in its relative independence. Still, for a people to be ruled by leaders from among themselves rather than by
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foreign leaders is an aspect of political freedom-self-determination is a democratic right. But the fact, for example, that the dictators of Haiti have been Haitians has done little for the freedom or democratic rights of this oppressed people.

Since democratic freedoms and human rights are often considered together it has often been assumed that the Survey of Freedom is equivalent to a survey of human rights. However, in spite of the considerable overlap of the two, concern for democracy and concern for human rights are distinct. A free people can deny human rights to some of their number, and they can certainly deny human rights to others. Thus, the Japanese tendency to exclude foreigners, and to discriminate against those who come to Japan, is unfortunate but does little to affect its democracy. If people are beaten cruelly in the jails of Arkansas, this too is a violation of human rights, but the ill-treatment may both be passively approved by the people of the state and be of little consequence for those requirements for free speech and nonviolent pluralism necessary for the expression of political democracy.

One concern that many have felt with the human rights movement has been its tendency to proliferate as "rights" an ever-lengthening list of desirabilia, a list that mixes general principles of natural rights with the particular concerns of modern intellectuals. This weakens the proposition that there are basic natural rights that all peoples in all places and times should feel incumbent upon themselves and their societies. It also leads to an increasing opposition between expanding democratic freedoms (that is, the ability of a people to decide its own fate) and expanding human rights.

In the Survey, freedom or democracy is taken to mean "liberal democracy." It is surprising how many well-informed persons believe that since the "German Democratic Republic" also uses the term democracy in its label, we must include regimes of this type within our definition. It would be like saying that since the German fascists called their party "National Socialist," discussions of socialism must use definitions that would include the Nazis. Words can be appropriated to many uses, and no one can stop the appropriation, but when an extension of meaning adds little but confusion, and begins to call black white, then it should be rejected.
In rejecting the Marxist-Leninist or extreme leftist usage of the word democracy, as in "people's democracy," we do not mean to imply that there is not a range of acceptable meanings of "democracy" that must be taken into account in any survey of democratic freedoms. We have explicitly addressed in previous volumes of the Survey the question of how "economic freedom" might be defined. Our conclusion was that a system was free primarily to the extent that the people were actually given a choice in determining the nature of the economic system. Therefore, a system that produces economic equality, if imposed, is much less democratic than a more unequal system, if freely chosen. Of course, questions must always be asked about the extent to which a system is freely chosen by any people. Economic measures such as land reform in a poor peasant economy may play a significant fact in improving the ability of people to take part in the political process fairly, and thereby choose the economic strategies that they desire.

The Comparative Survey was begun in the early 1970s as an attempt to give a more standardized and relativized picture of the situation of freedom in the world than could be provided by essays of individuals from different backgrounds that had formed, and in part still form, Freedom House's annual review of the condition of freedom in the world. My own experience had been that the world media and, therefore, informed opinion often mismeasured the level of freedom in countries with which Westerners had become particularly involved. In many countries oppressions were condemned as more severe than they were in comparative terms. On the other hand, the achievements of the postwar period in expanding freedom were often overlooked. Many small countries had quietly achieved and enjoyed democracy with relatively little media attention. The most oppressive states were those about which there was the least news in the media. Although these imbalances are still present, it is possible that some improvement in the presentation of the state of freedom in the world has resulted from the development of these Surveys.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom was hardly the first survey. There had been a number of other surveys. Bryce had listed the number of democracies in the world in about 1920. An extensive cross-comparison of societies on social and cultural variables was published in the early sixties by Banks and Textor.
the period 1960-62, the authors ranked and categorized polities on
a wide variety of indices. These included economic development,
literacy, and degree of urbanization, as well as political and
civil rights. Since the authors' purpose was ultimately to discov-
er correlations among the variables, their indices were more
specific than those used in the Comparative Survey. They were
interested primarily in presenting detailed information on items
such as the nature of the party system, the presence or absence of
military intervention, the freedom of opposition groups to enter
politics, or the freedom of the press.

The next major effort, by Robert Dahl and colleagues at Yale,
was much closer in intent to the Comparative Survey. In updat-
ing Banks and Textor's work they placed all significant states along a
variety of scales relating to democracy. The resulting scales
were then aggregated into scales representing the two fundamental
dimensions of "polyarchy" according to Dahl: opportunities for
political opposition and degree of popular participation in na-
tional elections. The resulting lists of polyarchies and near-
polyarchies were very similar to our lists of free states. A
similar rating of democratic systems was developed about the same
time by Dankwart Rustow. In both cases, and especially that of
Rustow, there seemed to be an overemphasis on the formal charac-
teristics of participation in elections and too little regard for
the civil liberties that must complement elections if they are to be
meaningful. Nevertheless, the resulting lists were very simi-
lar to those produced a few years later in the first Comparative
Survey of Freedom.

A recent attempt to rank most, if not all, nations on a human
rights scale by Charles Humana achieves similar results to my
own. This is particularly remarkable in that Humana's goals are
quite different. Human rights for Humana covers a broader spec-
trum of issues, and the issues include both those generally ack-
nowledged in international documents and those that Humana is
particularly concerned about (such as military training, amounts
spent on defense, and homosexual rights). His work again suggests
the close connection of human rights and democracy or freedom, yet
it tends to rank down poorer countries by bringing in a number of
basic needs as "rights."

The essential difference between the Comparative Survey and the
other attempts of the last generation has been its annual presen-
tation of the evidence and rankings, as opposed to what are essentially one-shot presentations. The latter often represent much more detailed study, but they suffer from the lack of experience with repeated judgments and changes over a period of years that has served to improve the Comparative Survey.

In many ways more comparable to the Survey are the annual reports on human rights to Congress of the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Presenting detailed information on the state of human rights in every country, the reports consider political and civil liberties as well as other issues. They are, of course, influenced by America's foreign policy concerns, but with this caveat they are remarkably informative. Improving in coverage and comparability are also the annual reports of Amnesty International. Amnesty's concerns in the area are much narrower, but information on Amnesty's issues-execution, political imprisonment, and torture—often has a wider significance. Both of these efforts have now become basic sources of information for the Comparative Survey.

The purpose of the Comparative Survey, then, is to give a general picture of the state of political and civil freedoms in the world. By taking a consistent approach to the definition of freedom, distinctions and issues that are often overlooked are brought out. In particular, its comparative approach brings to the reader's attention the fact that the most publicized denials of political and civil liberties are seldom in the most oppressive states. These states, such as Albania and North Korea, simply do not allow relevant information to reach the world media. There may or may not be hundreds of thousands in jail for their beliefs in North Korea: few care because no one knows.

Besides giving a reference point for considering the performance of nations, by its existence the Survey stands for the importance of democracy and freedom to an often cynical world. Too often, Westerners believe that democracy is impossible outside of a few Western countries, and consign the rest of the world to perpetual despotism. The story of the struggle for democratic freedoms is a much more complicated one, and it needs to be told. In a sketchy manner the Survey records the advances and retreats of democracy, and alerts the world to trends that should be resisted and those that should be supported.
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The Categories of the Survey

The two dimensions of the Survey—political rights and civil liberties—are combined summarily for each country as its "status of freedom." Political rights are rights to participate meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties are rights to free expression, to organize or demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy such as is provided by freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights. The Status of Freedom is used to differentiate those countries that are grouped toward the top, middle, or bottom of the political rights and civil liberties scales.

Political rights and civil liberties are rated on seven-point scales, with (7) the least free or least democratic and (1) the most free. With no exact definition for any point on these scales, they are constructed comparatively: countries are rated in relation to other countries rather than against absolute standards. The purpose of the rating system is to give an idea of how the freedoms of one state compare with those of others. Different persons with different information, or even with the same information, might compare countries differently. But unless the results of such comparisons are wildly different, there should be no concern. For example, if the Survey rates a country a (3) on political rights, and another person, accepting the criteria of the Survey, rates it a (4), this is an acceptable discrepancy. If judgments of two persons should turn out to be more than one point off, however, then either the Survey's methods are faulty, or the information of one of the judges is faulty.

The generalized checklist for the Comparative Survey is outlined in the following table. Detailed discussion follows.
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Checklist for Freedom Ratings

Political Rights

1. Chief authority recently elected by a meaningful process

2. Legislature recently elected by a meaningful process

   Alternatives for 1. and 2.:

   a. no choice and possibility of rejection
   b. no choice but some possibility of rejection
   c. choice possible only among government or single-party
      selected candidates
   d. choice possible only among government-approved candidates
   e. relatively open choices possible only in local elections
   f. open choice possible within a restricted range
   g. relatively open choices possible in all elections

3. Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation

4. Fair reflection of voter preference in distribution of power
   —parliament, for example, has effective power

5. Multiple political parties
   —only dominant party allowed effective opportunity
   —open to rise and fall of competing parties

6. Recent Shifts in power through elections

7. Significant opposition vote

8. Free of military control

9. Free of foreign control

10. Major group or groups denied reasonable self-determination
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11. Decentralized political power
   —including: groups or factions other than the national government having legal regional or local power

12. Informal consensus; de facto opposition power

Civil Liberties

13. Media/literature free of political censorship
   a. Press independent of government
   b. Broadcasting independent of government

14. Open public discussion

15. Freedom of assembly and demonstration

16. Freedom of political or quasi-political organization
17. Nondiscriminatory rule of law in politically relevant cases
   a. independent judiciary
   b. security forces respect individuals

18. Free from unjustified political terror or imprisonment
   a. free from imprisonment or exile for reasons of conscience
   b. free from torture
   c. free from terror by groups not opposed to the system
   d. free from government-organized terror

19. Free trade unions, peasant organizations, or equivalents

20. Free businesses or cooperatives

21. Free professional or other private organizations

22. Free religious institutions
23. Personal social rights: including those to property, internal and external travel, choice of residence, marriage and family

24. Socioeconomic rights: including freedom from dependency on landlords, bosses, union leaders, or bureaucrats

25. Freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality

26. Freedom from gross government indifference or corruption

Discussion of Political Rights.

(1-2) Political systems exhibit a variety of degrees to which they offer voters a chance to participate meaningfully in the process. Let us briefly consider several levels of political participation and choice.

At the antidemocratic extreme are those systems with no process, such as inherited monarchies or purely appointive communist systems. Little different in practice are those societies that hold elections for the legislature or president, but give the voter no alternative other than affirmation. In such elections there is neither a choice nor the possibility—in practice or even sometimes in theory—of rejecting the single candidate that the government proposes for chief executive or representative. In elections at this level the candidate is usually chosen by a secretive process involving only the top elite. More democratic are those systems, such as Zambia’s, that allow the voter no choice, but do suggest that it is possible to reject a suggested candidate. In this case the results may show ten or twenty percent of the voters actually voting against a suggested executive, or even on occasion (rarely) rejecting an individual legislative candidate on a single list. In some societies there is a relatively more open party process for selecting candidates. However the list of preselected candidates is prepared, there is seldom any provision for serious campaigning against the single list.

The political system is more democratic if multiple candidates are offered for each position, even when all candidates are gov-
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government or party selected. Popular voting for alternatives may exist only at the party level—which in some countries is a large proportion of the population—or the choice may be at the general election. Rarely do such systems extend voter options to include choice of the chief authority in the state. Usually that position, like the domination by a single party, is not open to question. But many legislators, even members of the cabinet, may be rejected by the voters in such a system, although they must not go beyond what the party approves. Campaigning occurs at this level of democracy, but the campaigning is restricted to questions of personality, honesty, or ability; for example, in Tanzania campaigning may not involve questions of policy. A further increment of democratic validity is effected if choice is possible among government-approved rather than government-selected candidates. In this case the government's objective is to keep the most undesirable elements (from its viewpoint) out of the election. With government-selected candidates there is reliance on party faithfuls, but self-selection allows persons of local reputation to achieve office. More generally, controlled electoral systems may allow open, self-selection of candidates for some local elections, but not for elections on the national scale. It is also possible for a system, such as that of Iran, to allow an open choice of candidates in elections, but to draw narrow ideological limits around what is an acceptable candidacy.

Beyond this, there is the world of free elections as we know them, in which candidates are both selected by parties and self-selected. It could be argued that parliamentary systems such as are common outside of the United States reduce local choice by imposing party choices on voters. However, independents can and do win in most systems, and new parties, such as the "Greens" in West Germany and elsewhere, test the extent to which the party system in particular countries is responsive to the desires of citizens.

(3) In most of the traditional western democracies there are fair election laws, at least on the surface. This is not true in many aspiring democracies. Senegal, for example, did not allow opposition parties to join together for the last general election, a regulation the government seems determined to maintain. Since effective oppositions often emerge from coalitions, this regula-
tion is a useful device for preventing fragmented opposition groups from mounting a successful challenge. Election laws in Egypt and South Korea have been devised so that the size of the majority of the governing party is artificially inflated after its victory. This is a useful device where there is a danger of excessive fragmentation leading to majorities too weak to govern, but it seems in these cases to be intended to reduce the size of the opposition.

Political scientists dispute whether it is fairer to allow people to contribute to candidates as they like, or whether the government should disburse all campaign funds. Obviously, if the former system is allowed there will be advantages for the more wealthy. However, if the latter is allowed there will be advantages for those who already have power, since governmental disbursement systems must allow funds to be spent in accordance with past patterns (and impoverished campaigns favor incumbents who initially are better known). If outcomes of elections were determined simply by the amounts spent, then depending on government financing would support a quite unchanging vote distribution. One example of this tendency on a restricted scale is the use of the public media for electioneering, usually by giving the parties, or candidates, or at least the major parties and candidates, specified and equal time on television or radio.

Perhaps the most common accusation against the fairness of elections is the extent to which the government takes advantage of the resources of office to defeat its opponents. Incumbents and government officials can often issue statements and make appearances related to the campaign that are not strictly described as campaigning. "News," whatever its origin, is likely to favor incumbents simply because as long as they are incumbents actions are more newsworthy. Other practices that continue in the less-advanced democracies, but were common in all democracies until recently, are various forms of "vote buying," whether this be by actually distributing money, or the promise of large projects, or the promise of future positions to well-placed influential in critical districts. The use of government equipment such as jeeps and helicopters has often been alleged in campaigns in the third world, such as those of Congress (I) in India or of Barletta in Panama in 1984.
Few democracies are now seriously plagued by direct manipulation of votes, except occasionally on the local level. However, new democracies and semidemocracies are plagued both by such manipulations and equally by accusations that they have occurred. Elections recently in El Salvador, Panama, and Mexico have been marred by such accusations, and in the latter two cases, at least, with some justification. One test of a democracy is the extent to which it has effective machinery in place to prevent flagrant cheating. Such methods generally include genuinely neutral election commissions and poll watchers from all major parties to observe the voting and tabulation of results.

Given the advantages of the incumbents, and thereby generally the government and its party, any campaigning rules that restrict the campaign are likely to affect opposition candidates or parties most severely. The very short campaigns prescribed by many democratic systems would seem to Americans to be unfair—yet many countries have a fully competitive system with such limited campaigns (probably because their strong parties are, in effect, continuously campaigning). More serious are restrictions placed on campaigning ostensibly to reduce the chance of violence, such as Malaysia's rule that all rallies must be held indoors, even during campaigns.

(4) Even though a country has a fair electoral process, fair campaigning, and meaningful elections, it will not be a functioning democracy unless those elected have the major power in the state. The most common denial of such power has come through the continued domination of the political system by a monarch or a self-selected leader, as in Morocco or Pakistan. Another common denial of real parliamentary power is occasioned by the continued direct or indirect power of the military—or military and king as in Thailand. In Latin America it is common even in otherwise functioning democracies for the military services not to be effectively under the control of the civilian and elected government. By tradition, ministers of defense in much of Latin America are appointed from the military services rather than being civilians as is the practice in more mature democracies. In countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the problem has gone beyond that of the military not being under civilian control. In such cases, at least until recently, an economic elite has been unwilling to let
elected governments rule. Such an elite may directly and indirectly struggle against its opponents through violent internal warfare outside the control of the system—although elements of the system may be used to implement the desires of these shadowy rulers.

(5) In theory it should be quite possible for democracy to be perfected without political parties. Certainly the founding fathers of the American Republic did not think parties were necessary. The leaders of many countries that have moved from liberal democratic models to single parties argue for the necessity to reduce the adversarial spirit of parties; they claim to be able to preserve democracy by bringing the political struggle within the confines of one party. However, in practice policy is set in single parties by a small clique at the top; those in disfavor with the government are not allowed to compete for office by legal means—indeed, they are often ejected from the single party altogether, as in Kenya.

The conclusion of the Survey is that while parties may not be necessary for democracy in very small countries such as Tuvalu, for most modern states they are necessary to allow alternatives to a ruling group or policy to gain sufficient votes to make a change. Therefore, the existence of multiple parties is important evidence for the existence of democracy, but is not absolutely conclusive. We are waiting for demonstrations of the ability of one-party or nonparty systems to achieve democracy. (Nepal's experiment with a nonparty system is worth watching in this connection.)

"Dominant Party" structures such as those of Malaysia or Mexico allow oppositions to mobilize to the extent that they can publicize alternative positions and effectively criticize government performance, but not to the extent that they represent a realistic threat to the group in power. Controls over campaigning, expression of opinion, patronage, and vote manipulation, as well as "punishment" of areas that vote against the government are methods used in such systems to make sure that the governing party remains in power.

(6-7) An empirical test of democracy is the extent to which there has been a recent shift in power occasioned through the
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operation of the electoral process. While it is true that the people of a country may remain relatively satisfied with the performance of one party for a long period of time, it is also true that a party in power may be able over time to entrench itself in multiple ways to such a degree that it is next to impossible to dislodge it by legitimate means. For a time in the first years of the Survey there was the suspicion that the social democratic party of Sweden had accomplished this. However, in 1976 social democratic domination was ended after forty-four years. The extent of democratic rights can also be empirically suggested by the size of an opposition vote. While on rare occasions a governing party or individual may receive overwhelming support at the polls, any group or leader that regularly receives seventy percent or more of the vote indicates a weak opposition, and the probable existence of undemocratic barriers in the way of its further success. When a government or leader receives over ninety percent of the vote this indicates highly restrictive freedom for those opposing the system: over ninety-eight percent indicate that elections are little more than symbolic.

(8-9) A free, democratic society is one that governs itself through its own official processes. The two most blatant means of denying the control of a society by its elected leaders are military or foreign control. Since control of violent force is a basic requirement of all governments, when those who directly have this power begin to affect the political process, this aspect of government is turned on its head. The traditional democracies have long since been able to remove the military from power; at the opposite extreme are purely military regimes, as in much of Africa. A few countries remain under a degree of foreign control or influence. For example, in Europe, Finland, and to a lesser extent Austria, must remain neutral because of the pressure of the Soviet Union. Mongolia and Afghanistan are under direct Soviet occupation.

There are many vague accusations that one or another country is under military or foreign control. In this spirit the United States is said to be "ruled" by a military-industrial complex or Mexico is said to be under American control. But there is simply too much evidence that these "controllers" are frequently ignored or slighted for such accusations to be taken too seriously. To a
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degree every country in the world is influenced by many others-large and small. (While smaller countries generally have less power of self-determination than larger countries, for most issues the power of the individual voter in the smaller states to control his life through the ballot is likely to be greater than that of people in larger countries.) The Survey's position in regard to both of these kinds of "outside" control is to record only the most flagrant cases, and to not enter the area of more complex interpretations.

(10) A democratic polity is one in which the people as a whole feel that the process is open to them, and that on important issues all individuals can be part of a meaningful majority. If this is not true, then the democratic polity must either divide, or devise methods for those who feel they are not part of the system to have reserved areas, geographical or otherwise, in which they can expect that their interests will be uppermost. In other words, there must be either external or internal self-determination. Most democracies are relatively homogeneous. But even here, without some forms of elected local or regional government, people in some areas will feel crushed under a national majority that is unable to understand their particular problems or accept their values. Other democracies, such as India or the United States, have devised elaborate methods for separate divisions of the country to be in important degrees self-governing. The problems of over-centralization in Europe have recently been addressed by countries such as France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, but in the case of Northern Ireland, current subdivisions or political boundaries continue to make a population feel like foreigners in their own land.

(11) The question of self-determination is closely related to the extent to which political power has been decentralized. Since it would be possible for a country to have an elaborate degree of decentralization and still hand down all the important decisions from above, there must be the empirical test of the extent to which persons or parties not under control of the center actually succeed politically. The fact, for example, that Japanese are able to play a leading role in Hawaiian politics, or that the
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Scots nationalists are able to achieve a significant vote in Scotland suggest an authentic devolution of political power.

(12) Finally, the Survey wants evidence for the extent to which the political decision process depends not only on the support of majorities at the polls, but also on a less adversarial process involving search for consensus among all groups on issues of major public interest. A democracy should be more than simply a society of winners and losers. The most common way for this to be demonstrated is for the opposition to be taken into account in major decisions and appointments, even when it does not have to be consulted in terms of the formal requirements of the system. The recent unwillingness of Malta’s governing party to treat its opposition in this way, in spite of the fact that the governing party received less than a majority of the popular votes in the last election (but a slight majority of the seats), has made that country’s political life into the struggle of two warring camps.\(^1\) Obviously, this test of informal power is particularly important in judging the degree of success of one-party "democracies" that base their claim to legitimacy on their willingness to achieve national consensuses.

Discussion of Civil Liberties.

(13) The checklist for civil liberties is much longer and more diffuse than that for political rights. While many civil liberties are considered in judging the atmosphere of a country, primary attention is given to those liberties that are most directly related to the expression of political rights, with less attention being given to those liberties that are likely to primarily affect individuals in their private capacity.

At the top of the list are questions of freedom for the communications media. We want to know whether the press and broadcasting facilities of the country are independent of government control, and serve the range of opinion that is present in the country. Clearly, if a population does not receive information about alternatives to present leaders and policies, then its ability to use any political process is impaired. In most traditional democracies there is no longer any question of freedom of the press: no longer are people imprisoned for expressing their
rational views on any matter—although secrecy and libel laws do have a slight affect in some countries. As one moves, from this open situation, from ratings of (1) to ratings of (7), a steady decline in freedom to publish is noticed: the tendency increases for people to be punished for criticizing the government, or papers to be closed, or censorship to be imposed, or indeed for the newspapers and journals to be directly owned and supervised by the government.

The methods used by governments to control the print media are highly varied. While pre-publication censorship is often what Westerners think of because of their wartime experience, direct government ownership and control of the media and post-publication censorship through warnings, confiscations, or suspensions are more common. Government licensing of publications and journalists and controls over the distribution of newsprint are other common means of keeping control over what is printed. Even in countries with some considerable degree of democracy, such as Malaysia, press controls of these sorts may be quite extensive, often based on an ostensible legal requirement for "responsible journalism." Control of the press may be further extended by requiring papers to use a government news agency as their source of information, and by restricting the flow of foreign publications.11

Broadcasting—radio or television—are much more frequently owned by the government than the print media, and such ownership may or may not be reflected in government control over what is communicated. It is possible, as in the British case, for a government-owned broadcasting corporation to be so effectively protected from government control that its programs demonstrate genuine impartiality. However, in many well-known democracies, such as France or Greece, changes in the political composition of government affects the nature of what is broadcast to the advantage of incumbents. The government-owned broadcasting services of India make little effort to go beyond presenting the views of their government.

In most countries misuse of the news media to serve government interests is even more flagrant. At this level, we need to distinguish between those societies that require their media, particularly their broadcasting services, to avoid criticism of the political system or its leaders, and those that use them to "mobilize" their peoples in direct support for government poli-
Freedom: Definitions and Criteria

cies. In the first case the societies allow or expect their media, particularly their broadcasting services, to present a more or less favorable picture; in the second, the media are used to motivate their peoples to actively support government policies and to condemn or destroy those who oppose the governing system. In the first, the government's control is largely passive; in the second it is directly determinative of content.

The comparison of active and passive control by government brings us to the most difficult issue in the question of media freedom—self-censorship. It is fairly easy to know if a government censors or suspends publications for content, or punishes journalists and reporters by discharge, imprisonment, or worse; judging the day-to-day influence of subtle pressures on the papers or broadcasting services of a country is much more difficult. Perhaps the most prevalent form of government control of the communications media is achieved through patterns of mutual assistance of government and media that ensure that, at worst, reports are presented in a bland, non-controversial manner—the practice until this last year, at least, of the largest newspapers in Pakistan and the Philippines.

Some critics believe that most communications media in the West, and especially in the United States, practice this kind of censorship, either because of government support, or because this is in the interest of the private owners of the media. In the United States, for example, it is noteworthy that National Public Radio, financed largely by the state, is generally much more critical of the government in its commentaries than are the commercial services. The critics would explain this difference by the greater ability of commercial stations to "police" their broadcasts and broadcasters. The primary explanation, however, lies in the gap between the subculture of broadcasters and audience for public radio and the subculture of broadcasters and especially audience for commercial stations.

(14) Open public discussion is at least as important a civil liberty as free communications media. The ultimate test of a democracy is the degree to which an atmosphere for discussion in public and private exists free of fear of reprisal by either the government or opposition groups. Even in the relatively free communist society of Yugoslavia people are still being imprisoned
for the expression of critical opinions in private. Certainly
Iranians have had to be careful in the early and mid 1980s not to
express too openly opinions that go against the prevailing climate
of opinion in their country.

(15-16) Open discussion expressed by means of political organ-
ization, public demonstration, and assemblies is often threatening
to political incumbents. There are occasions in which such assem-
blies may be dangerous to public order and should be closely
controlled or forbidden. But in many societies this hypothetical
danger is used as a pretense to deny opposition groups the ability
to mobilize in support of alternative policies or leaders. In
Malaysia, for example, the government’s denial of public assembly
to the opposition has been one of the main ways to restrict the
ability of the opposition to effectively challenge the rule of the
government. Obviously, denial of the right to organize freely
for political action is the most generalized form of the attempt
to prevent the effective mobilization of opposition to government
policies. Control over political organization is a distinguishing
characteristic of one-party states, but many multiparty states
place limits on the kinds or numbers of political parties that may
be organized. Controls over extremist parties that deny the
legitimacy of democratic institutions, such as many fascist or
communist parties, are understandable—still, they represent
limits on freedom. (Obviously, political and civil freedoms over-
lap closely on the right to political organization. The distinc-
tion is between the existence of a denial of a right to partici-
pate in elections and the denial of a right to organize to present
alternative policies or arguments for and against change in other
ways.)

(17) A democratic system is not secured unless there is a legal
system that can be relied on for a fair degree of impartiality.
The electoral process, for example, needs to be supervised by
electoral commissions or other administrative systems that ulti-
mately can be checked or overruled by the judicial system. People
accused of actions against the state need to have some hope that
their cases will be tried before the courts of the society and
that the process will be fair. One of the tests that the author
often applies to a country is whether it is possible to win
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against the government in a political case, and under what conditions. A reliable judicial system requires a guarantee of the permanence of judicial tenure, particularly at the highest levels, as well as traditions of executive noninterference developed over a period of years. Of course, in no society are all trials fair or all judges impartial; but in this respect there are vast differences between democracies and nondemocracies.

A significant but less striking difference exists between the ways in which security services treat the public in democracies and nondemocracies. Since the people of a democracy are the sponsors of the system, theory the security services are their hired employees, and these employees should treat them with the utmost respect. However, because of the nature of the task of police and army, and their monopoly over force, in larger societies, at least, this relationship is often forgotten. Even in full-fledged democracies many security services have a reputation, for example in France or certain parts of the United States, of treating people with carelessness and even brutality. But it is clearly true that to the degree that security forces are the employees even in theory of a smaller group than the people as a whole, then their behavior will be even less "democratic."

Certainly democracy requires that people be free from fear of the government, especially in regard to their politically related activities. To this degree, the emphasis of organizations such as Amnesty International on the extent of imprisonment, execution, or torture for reasons of conscience is closely related to any measurement of democracy. Oppressive countries imprison their opponents, or worse, both to silence the particular individuals, and to warn others of the dangers of opposing the system. Recently exile and disappearances have been used as a further deterrent. "Disappearance" is generally a form of extra-judicial execution; often carried out in support of the ruling system: such terrorism may or may not be directly under the orders of government leaders. These practices underscore the fact that a great deal of such internal state terrorism does not involve the normal legal process; frequently opponents are incarcerated through "detentions" that may last for years. In the Soviet Union and some other communist countries, the practice of using psychiatric institutions to incarcerate opponents has been developed on the
theory that opposition to a people's state is itself a form of mental illness.

It is important in this regard to distinguish between the broader category of "political imprisonment" and the narrower "imprisonment for reasons of conscience." The former includes all cases that informed opinion would assume are related to political issues, or issues that can be defined politically in some states (such as religious belief in communist or some Islamic societies). It includes those who have written articles that the regime finds offensive as well as those who have thrown bombs or plotted executions, or even caused riots, to dramatize their cause. Since clearly the latter actions cannot be accepted by any government, all states, at whatever level of freedom, may have some "political prisoners." But if we take the category of political prisoners and separate out those who appear to have not committed or planned, or been involved in supporting, acts of violence, then we have the smaller category of "prisoners of conscience." Their existence must be counted against the democratic rating of any country. This is not to say that the existence of prisoners of conscience who have been involved in violence cannot also be taken in many countries as an indication that a system may not be sufficiently responsive to demands expressed nonviolently—too often there may be no effective means to express opposition without violence. The distinction between prisoners by reason of conscience and political prisoners is in practice often blurred by the outsider's difficulty in deciding whether particular incarcerated individuals have or have not committed or planned acts of violence. Nevertheless, by looking at the pattern of a regime's behavior over a period of years it is possible to estimate the degree to which a regime does or does not have prisoners of conscience.

Anti-dissident terror undertaken by groups that support the general system of a country but are not, or may not be, under government control is often difficult to evaluate in determining a country's rating. In the case where the terrorism is carried out by the security services, or their hired hands, we can either assume that these services are no longer controlled by the civilian administration, and to this extent the system cannot be called free, or that the civilian administration actually approves of the actions. In cases where the terror stems from parties or
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cliques outside of this structure, which to some degree has been the case in El Salvador, then the judgment has to be based on a finer balance of considerations.

(19-21) Democracies require freedom of organization that goes far beyond the right to organize political parties. The right of individuals to organize trade unions, or to organize cooperatives, or business enterprises, are certainly basic rights that may be limited only with great care in a free society. The right of union or peasant organization has been particularly significant because it allows large groups of ordinary people in many societies to balance through numbers the ability of the wealthy to concentrate power. However, in some societies, such as those of western Africa, the ability of medical, bar, and academic associations to mobilize or maintain alternatives to ruling groups has been of equal importance. The primary reason that democracies require freedom of organization is that there have to be organized, countervailing power centers in a society—which is one definition of pluralism—if a society is going to maintain free institutions against the natural tendency of those in government to aggregate power.

(22) It is for this reason that religious freedom, in belief and in organization, has been particularly important for the defense of freedom in a more general sense. Religious institutions have been able to maintain opposition strength in societies as different as those of Poland and Chile. A strong religious institution can build a wall around the individual dissident that a government will be loathe to breach for the sake of imposing its order. In countries such as Argentina or Poland, in recent years the organized church and organized unions have gone a long way toward insuring a society able to resist the encroachments of government. The question is not whether a particular established organization, such as the church, is itself favorable toward democracy. It is rather whether there are organizational structures willing and able to exist independently of government direction. Without such countervailing organizational power it is unlikely that significant civil liberties can be maintained against government pressure.
Civil liberties also include personal and individual social rights, particularly those that are likely to most directly affect the ability of people to withstand the pressures of the state. Especially important are those to property, travel (including emigration), and to an independent family life. The right to property does not necessarily mean the right to productive property, but it does mean the right to property that can provide a cushion against government pressures such as dismissal from a position, that will make possible private publications, or other activity that cannot be financed unless people have more than subsistence incomes. The ability of an individual to travel, particularly to leave the country, is of great importance to dissidents or potential dissidents. It allows them additional sources of support and an additional refuge should the effort to improve conditions in their own country fail. An independent family offers another type of emotional haven that makes possible independent thinking and action. Opposition to Mao during the 1960s in China became almost impossible when individuals could no longer trust even spouses and children not to inform on their activities. The complete isolation of the individual, even in the midst of a crowded life, is the ultimate goal of oppressors.

Civil liberty requires, then, that most people are relatively independent in both their lives and thoughts. It implies socioeconomic rights that include freedom from dependency on landlords, on bosses, on union leaders, or on bureaucrats. The kind of dependencies that the socioeconomic system imposes on individuals will vary from society to society, but widespread dependencies of these kinds are incompatible with democratic freedoms. This implies that there should be freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality. It should be noted that we are not saying that democracy requires that incomes or living standards be equalized. But we are saying that if inequalities are too great, if a small group of very wealthy lives in the midst of a large number of very poor individuals it is likely that relations of dependency will develop that will make impossible the unfettered expression of opinion or a free and uncoerced vote.

Finally, there would seem to be an indirect requirement that the civil liberties of a democracy include freedom from the
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extremes of government indifference and corruption. These conditions make it impossible for the people affected to feel that they are in any important sense the sponsors of their political system. Such indifference and corruption also implies that the mechanisms of democracy in the state are simply not working. If there is a continued record of disregard for the interests of the people, and yet the representatives of the people are not replaced by the electoral or judicial process, the system is not working. Such indirect tests are necessary for a rating system that is based in large part on regular monitoring of press reports from around the world.

Status of Freedom

After countries are rated on seven-point scales for levels of political rights and civil liberties, these ratings are summarized in terms of overall assessments as free, partly free, and not free. This categorization is interpreted to mean that the list of operating democracies in the world is made up of those countries given the summary status of "free." Terms such as "free" and "not free" are only to be understood as relative expressions of the degree of political and civil liberties in a country.

It should be clear that the more important ratings are the basic ones for political rights and civil liberties, and that the Status of Freedom is a summary statement that arbitrarily divides up the other scales for ease of presentation (particularly in the annual "Map of Freedom" derived from the Survey). This lumping together will place in the same category countries that are actually quite far apart in terms of their democratic practices—such as Hungary or South Africa at the lower edge of partly free as compared with Malaysia or Mexico at the upper edge.

Methods and Criticisms of the Survey

The Survey is based on library research, updated by a more or less continuous flow of publications across the author's desk. Once the basic nature of the political system and its respect for civil liberties is established, following the flow of information
Once the basic nature of the political system and its respect for civil liberties is established, following the flow of information either confirms or disconfirms this general picture, as well as recording any changes that may occur. It also has had the effect since the beginning of the Survey in 1972 of refining the author’s sensitivity to those conditions and indicators that go with different levels of democratic rights.

The use of general descriptions and a flow of information is particularly useful because the Survey is based on evidence of democratic or nondemocratic behavior by the governments of countries in regard to their own peoples. Because interest in human rights and democracy is often centered in the legal community, many students or analysts in this area concentrate their attention on changes in laws or legal structures. Even Amnesty International takes the position that the numbers imprisoned or executed in a country is a less important indicator of change than change in the law in regard to these practices.\(^\text{17}\)

The Comparative Survey has received good and bad reviews.\(^\text{18}\) The criticisms have been of two sorts. The most common have been based on the misunderstanding that the Survey is commissioned by Freedom House as a tool in the struggle of capitalism and communism. In spite of the fact that the Survey has always shown some “socialist” countries as relatively democratic and some capitalist countries as relatively tyrannical, and that no economic system criteria are used in measuring political rights or civil liberties, critics often allege that the Survey automatically rates capitalist countries as “free.” In this same vein it may be alleged that the Survey ignores certain “human rights” such as the right to adequate nutrition. This is, of course, a criticism that can be addressed on several levels. Most appropriate is the remark that the Survey is of political and civil freedoms and not of human rights. (In philosophical terms neither freedom nor democracy are properly understood as including all “goods” and only “goods.”)

The criticism is also made that the Survey does not take into account social and economic rights. Clearly, some social and economic rights, such as the right to the freedom of workers or of businessmen to organize, are considered basic rights by the Survey. It is our feeling that some of the other proposed rights, including some of those implied by the Universal Declaration of
Freedom: Definitions and Criteria

order to give people maximum freedom to develop their societies in terms of their needs and desires as they understand them, it is important that the list of rights be reduced to the minimum that allows them to make this determination.

The objection that the Survey should take more seriously "economic rights" in the narrower sense of economic freedom has been addressed in the 1982 and 1983-84 Freedom in the World volumes. As was mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter, the conclusion was that the basic economic right of all democracies was for the people to have an authentic and repeated opportunity to choose the economic system they desired. Their choice might range from libertarian to any one of a number of forms of socialist. To this we added that to be effective this economic freedom of choice must be based on some relative equalities in power; the absence of dependency that is included in the checklist above as a requisite civil liberty in a democracy must be generally present for economic freedom to be meaningful.

Another common criticism has been that the Survey is not sufficiently quantitative and rigorous. It has been pointed out that it would be possible to take the checklist variables, such as we outline above, and assign values to each, such that the results could be cumulated to yield more objective ratings. Aside from making a number of experiments along this line, the author has answered this criticism by pointing to the problems that others have had in applying such schemes to this data. Robert Dahl used such a scheme in developing his list of democracies. Yet he notes that in at least one case he had to adjust the results to obtain the relationships that he intuitively "knew" were correct in spite of the quantitative apparatus.\(^{19}\) In his rating of countries according to human rights variables referred to above, Charles Humana also seems to have had difficulty assigning numerical scores to variables, and in summing these to obtain comparable "scores" for each country.

Two more objections to more quantification may be mentioned. First, we simply do not have adequate information to make possible assigning scores to the wide variety of individual variables that would be involved. Second, all such systems assign definite values to each area of the problem, so that when there is a particularly good or bad showing in an area the scoring system cannot flexibly record this special quality of a country's demo-
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craey or lack of it. Only a very few points could be accorded, for example, to religious freedom, and yet in a particular instance the denial of religious freedom might be the outstanding fact in the judging of a country's civil liberties.

If more resources were available for assistance and on-site investigations, the Surveys could be greatly improved. They began, and have continued to be, a generalized attempt to improve the informed public's picture of the world. In spite of their limitations, some political scientists, economists, and sociologists have used the yearly Surveys as a source of data for correlation analyses of related variables. They are useful simply because they represent the only annual attempt to compare the level of democratic rights in all the countries in the world.

NOTES


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13. For an attempt to suggest the relatively greater importance of subcultural as opposed to class or other interests in determining the opinions of people in our society see R. D. Gastil, "Selling Out' and the Sociology of Knowledge," Policy Sciences, 1971, 2, pages 271-277.


15. See, for example, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 23, 1984.


17. Amnesty Action January 1, 1985. The discussion on page seven suggests that improvement in human rights is-not seen so much in changes in the numbers imprisoned or killed as it is in changes in the laws of a country, such as the outlawing of torture or a change in a judicial policy that permits unjust imprisonment.


Survey Ratings and Tables for 1985

The trend toward democracy of the last few years continued in 1985. Although the news media made the world aware of continuing problems of repression and oppression in many countries, such as South Africa, Poland, Chile, and Nicaragua, more quietly there was movement toward the further institutionalization of democracy or the extension of its acceptance in a number of areas of Latin America and Asia. In examining some of the details of this progress in the following discussion, it is necessary to remember the fragility of many of the advances. In much of the world the story of freedom remains that of the undulation of political rights and civil liberties.

The Tabulated Ratings

The accompanying Table 1 (Independent Nations) and Table 2 (Related Territories) rate each state or territory on seven-point scales for political and civil freedoms, and then provide an overall judgment of each as "free," "partly free," or "not free." In each scale, a rating of (1) is freest and (7) least free. Instead of using absolute standards, standards are comparative. The goal is to have ratings such that, for example, most observers would be likely to judge states rated (1) as freer than those rated (2). No state, of course, is absolutely free or unfree, but the degree of freedom does make a great deal of difference to the quality of life.¹

In political rights, states rated (1) have a fully competitive electoral process, and those elected clearly rule. Most West European democracies belong here. Relatively free states may receive a (2) because, although the electoral process works and

³
Comparative Survey: 1985

Table 1
INDEPENDENT NATIONS: COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF FREEDOM

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<td>7</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>212/100</td>
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Notes to the Table

1. The scales use the numbers 1-7, with 1 comparatively offering the highest level of political or civil rights and 7 the lowest. A plus or minus following a rating indicates an improvement or decline since the last yearbook. A rating marked with a raised period (*) has been reevaluated by the author in this time; there may have been little change in the country.
2. F designates "free," PF "partly free," NF "not free."
4. Also known as Kampuchea. 5. Formerly Upper Volta.
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the elected rule, there are factors that cause us to lower our rating of the effective equality of the process. These factors may include extreme economic inequality, illiteracy, or intimidating violence. They also include the weakening of effective competition that is implied by the absence of periodic shifts in rule from one group or party to another.

Below this level, political ratings of (3) through (5) represent successively less effective implementation of democratic processes. Mexico, for example, has periodic elections and limited opposition, but for many years its governments have been selected outside the public view by the leaders of factions within the one dominant Mexican party. Governments of states rated (5) sometimes have no effective voting processes at all, but strive for consensus among a variety of groups in society in a way weakly analogous to those of the democracies. States at (6) do not allow competitive electoral processes that would give the people a chance to voice their desire for a new ruling party or for a change in policy. The rulers of states at this level assume that one person or a small group has the right to decide what is best for the nation, and that no one should be allowed to challenge that right. Such rulers do respond, however, to popular desire in some areas, or respect (and therefore are constrained by) belief systems (for example, Islam) that are the property of the society as a whole. At (7) the political despot at the top appear by their actions to feel little constraint from either public opinion or popular tradition.

Turning to the scale for civil liberties, in countries rated (1) publications are not closed because of the expression of rational political opinion, especially when the intent of the expression is to affect the legitimate political process. No major media are simply conduits for government propaganda. The courts protect the individual; persons are not imprisoned for their opinions; private rights and desires in education, occupation, religion, and residence are generally respected; and law-abiding persons do not fear for their lives because of their rational political activities. States at this level include most traditional democracies. There are, of course, flaws in the liberties of all of these states, and these flaws are significant when measured against the standards these states set themselves.
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### Notes to the Table

1. See Notes, Table 1.
2. See Notes, Table 1.
3. These states are not listed as independent because all have explicit legal forms of dependence on a particular country (or countries in the case of Andorra) in such areas as foreign affairs, defense, customs, or services.
4. The geography and history of these newly independent "homelands" cause us to consider them dependencies.
5. Now in transition; high degree of self-determination.
### Comparative Survey: 1985

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39
## Comparative Survey: 1985

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<td>Andorra</td>
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Movement down from (2) to (7) represents a steady loss of the civil freedoms we have detailed. Compared to (1), the police and courts of states at (2) have more authoritarian traditions. In some cases they may simply have a less institutionalized or secure set of liberties, such as in Portugal or Greece. Those rated (3) or below may have political prisoners and generally varying forms of censorship. Too often their security services practice torture. States rated (6) almost always have political prisoners; usually the legitimate media are completely under government supervision; there is no right of assembly; and, often, travel, residence, and occupation are narrowly restricted. However, at (6) there still may be relative freedom in private conversation, especially in the home; illegal demonstrations do take place; and underground literature is published. At (7) there is pervading fear, little independent expression takes place even in private, almost no public expressions of opposition emerge in the police-state environment, and imprisonment or execution is often swift and sure.

Political terror is an attempt by a government or private group to get its way through the use of murder, torture, exile, prevention of departure, police controls, or threats against the family. These weapons are usually directed against the expression of civil liberties. To this extent they surely are a part of the civil liberty "score." Unfortunately, because of their dramatic and newsworthy nature, such denials of civil liberties often become identified in the minds of informed persons with the whole of civil liberties.

Political terror is a tool of revolutionary repression of the right or left. When that repression is no longer necessary to achieve the suppression of civil liberties, political terror is replaced by implacable and well-organized but often less general and newsworthy controls. Of course, there is a certain unfathomable terror in the sealed totalitarian state, yet life can be lived with a normality in these states that is impossible in the more dramatically terrorized. It would be a mistake to dismiss this apparent anomaly as an expression of a Survey bias. For there is, with all the blood, a much wider range of organized and personal expression of political opinion and judgment in states such as Lebanon and Guatemala than in more peaceful states such as Czechoslovakia.
Comparative Survey: 1985

In making the distinction between political terror and civil liberties as a whole we do not imply that the United States should not be urgently concerned with all violations of human rights and perhaps most urgently with those of political terror. Again it must be emphasized that the Survey is not a rating of the relative desirability of societies—but of certain explicit freedoms.

A cumulative judgment of "free," "partly free," or "not free" is made on the basis of the foregoing seven-point ratings, and an understanding of how they were derived. Generally, states rated (1) and (2) will be "free"; those at (3), (4), and (5), "partly free"; and those at (6) and (7), "not free." A rating of (2),(3) places an independent country in the "free" category; a rating of (6),(5) places it in the "partly free."

It has long been felt that the Survey has paid too little attention to the material correlates, conditions, or context of freedom or non-freedom. While we have argued elsewhere that there is no one-to-one relation between wealth and freedom, and that history has diffused freedom along with economic wealth more than one has produced the other, the relationship remains an important one to ponder.

We again reprint a measure juxtaposing the infant mortality rate to the per capita GNP. This offers three pieces of knowledge to the reader in a short compass: the health care and nutrition standard of the population as a whole, the wealth of the society, and the extent to which the wealth is shared to provide the most basic necessities. The use of infant mortality statistics to measure the modernization of a society might have been thought to be outmoded by new measures such as the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), which combines infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates. However, the doubtful comparability of literacy rates introduces an element of incomparability that is likely to make a society appear relatively more modernized or "equalized" than it is. For example, in the Overseas Development Council's table (referenced above) Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand have the same GNP/capita and the same infant mortality rates. However, because Mongolia claims 95% literacy its PQLI is given as considerably higher. This suggests either that literacy in Mongolia is incomparable or that literacy in Mongolia is used for purposes of state with little connection to the life of ordinary people. In either case, if we are interested in
levels of modernity or "justice," it would seem best to stay away from literacy rates. Doubtless, infant mortality rates may also be "cooked." China's, for example, appears suspiciously low, and we wonder if reported infanticide is included. Yet overall cases of this kind of error appear to be considerably rarer.

The reporting period covered by this Survey (November 1984 to November 1985) does not correspond with the calendar of short-term events in the countries rated. For this reason the yearly Survey may mask or play down events that occur at the end of the year.

Declines in Freedom in 1985

The condition of freedom in Africa remains as unpromising as ever. The ability of citizens in Burkina Faso to express opposition or to maintain an organized opposition to the government has been greatly reduced in the last few years through the transformation of the media into organs of indoctrination, and increasing pressures on labor unions, including arrest of their leaders. Much the same has also occurred in Zimbabwe. In addition, elections in Zimbabwe have been followed by increasing pressures, including arrests of elected MPs, against the opposition parties. Civilian control has been eroded in Sierra Leone by the nomination and subsequent uncontested election of the head of the army as the new president. He was apparently chosen in part to avoid the danger of a military coup. The autocratic nature of the administration of Comoros has increased over the last few years. Recently this has been augmented by abolishing the position of Prime Minister and changing governorships of the constituent islands from elective to appointive. Coup attempts and rumors of attempts have led to large-scale political imprisonment or detention.

In the Americas three countries have seen some declines in freedom. The most serious was in Panama, where the elected president was forced to step aside by a military leader nervous about the possibility of an investigation of a recent disappearance, as well as the decline in the economy. The vice-president used as a replacement has little popular legitimacy. Mexico failed in its 1985 election to continue the opening to democracy that had begun a few years ago. This year's election was generally believed to be marred by manipulation of registration lists, double voting,
### Comparative Survey: 1985

#### Table 3

**RATING COUNTRIES BY POLITICAL RIGHTS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Free</th>
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Legend:
- **Free Countries**:
  - Countries with full sovereignty and independence.
  - **Related Territories**:
    - Territories with some degree of self-governance but not fully independent.
  - **Partly Free Countries**:
    - Countries with limited freedom and human rights issues.

Countries are listed alphabetically by region: Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Oceania.
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and unsupervised and highly questionable ballot tabulations. There has been a decline in the effective guarantee of civil liberties in Ecuador, both by a dispute between Congress and the executive on who controls appointments to the Supreme Court that for a time produced two Supreme Courts, and, more seriously, by physical attack and imprisonment of journalists, and the cancellation of a controversial television program with the change in government.

In Europe the government of Greece showed a cavalier attitude toward the country's constitution, and thus the interests of the opposition, by the irregular method used to have parliament select a new president. This was followed by an election in which the newspapers under control of the state, as well as the state-owned TV and airlines, were misused to ensure government victory.

Advances in Freedom

Freedom advanced in a number of countries of the New World. An election in Belize (December 1984) brought to power an entirely different party than had ruled the country since independence. The year saw the further consolidation of democracy in Brazil. There are now few if any controls on political party activity at all levels, and the press and academia are fully free. The state is also moving to restore more fully the rule of law by investigating corruption charges in the judiciary and elsewhere in the bureaucracy and military, and to implement the provisions of a long-standing land-reform law that had not been implemented. El Salvador's latest election firmly demonstrated the support of the majority for the incumbent government by destroying the myth of another "silent majority" on either the right or left. The year has also seen a growing expressiveness through demonstrations and strikes of the labor unions of the left. Hesitant but significant steps were taken toward the full establishment of civilian government control and the rule of law outside areas of communist control. Grenada's December 1984 election was judged by observers to be fully free and fair; it resulted in the resumption of full parliamentary order on a better basis than the country had ever enjoyed. Guatemala's election of a new civilian government was completed after a run-off election in December. Given recent
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history, the process seemed to have worked remarkably well, without interference from right or left—up to the time of writing. (The candidates involved a broader spectrum than has competed recently, for example, in El Salvador.) Even before the run-off, and the actual return of civilian rule on January 1, there seemed to have been a shift of power. Suriname remains a military dictatorship, but its rulers have through the institution of an appointed assembly brought a wider range of persons and organizations, including business and labor, into the system. Uruguay fully reestablished civilian democratic government in 1985 after elections in late 1984. The restrictions that had limited the actual election process were lifted on essentially all groups and individuals, political prisoners were let out of the infamous jails, and the press freed of controls.

There were important gains in Asia. After refusing to allow the organization of dissent for a generation, Brunei authorized the establishment of a new political party standing for the establishment of a more limited monarchy. While the fate of democracy in South Korea remained on a roller coaster during the year, the relative success of the opposition in legislative elections, and its subsequent ability to unite into a credible parliamentary bloc, represented a more serious democratic opening than has been seen in many years, if ever. In the Philippines an embattled president had to watch as the country went through the trauma of a complex political trial and faced a growing guerrilla movement. Although government forces, and those identified with the government, justly or not, continued to murder their opponents and critics, including press and broadcast journalists, the openness of discussion, organization, and criticism, even within papers formerly supportive of the system, developed an arena of freedom greater than it had been since the early 1970s.

Pakistan's military ruler finally allowed the long-promised parliamentary elections in February. Although the political parties were not to participate as parties, and as a result the parties urged a boycott of the elections, and the constitution the legislature faced offered it little power in comparison to the executive, the result has been the initiation of a democratic process that may be hard to halt. The election resulted in well-fought campaigns, and the parliament that was formed divided quickly into quasi-parties supporting and opposing the regime. As
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a group the parliament has worked for expansion of its power, and
has to a degree forced its desired changes on the military execu-
tive. Facing a similar need to return to parliamentary forms, but
unwilling to bypass the well-organized political parties and the
pre-martial law constitution, the military ruler of Bangladesh has
been unable to obtain the agreement of the political parties for a
general election satisfactory to both sides. Still, he managed to
develop a series of elected local government institutions, which
were developed further through well-contested subdistrict elec-
tions in 1985. Despite the political parties’ objections to the
1985 elections in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, members of these
parties played an important role in the elections.

Hungary remains a communist state under the control of the
Party hierarchy. However, in 1985 it took another step down the
road to ostensible liberalization “within the system” by holding
parliamentary elections in which competition for most positions
was required. The candidate selection process was public, a
number of independents were elected, and in many races a runoff
election was required to decide the winner. “Real dissidents”
were kept out of the process, but it still marked an important
step. The Turkish sector of Cyprus, labeled in the Survey Cyprus
(T), has not been recognized by any country other than Turkey, the
state to which it owes its creation. Nevertheless, it has emerged
as a working political system with most of the aspects of demo-
cracy, in spite of its dependence. In 1985 it carried out a
series of free elections that further legitimized the system.

In Africa there were two minor advances. In Southwest Africa
(Namibia), a dependency of South Africa, a semblance of home rule
and self-determination was reestablished with a nonelected assem-
bliness that includes most of the parties outside of the Ovambo area.
To the extent that the assembly is granted power, here blacks and
whites work together politically on the basis of ostensible equal-
ity. Liberia’s return to full democracy under its new constitu-
tion was marred by the maneuvering of the President to exclude
major individuals and parties that wished to contest the general
election, and then by the reported manipulation of the vote—and
the subsequent coup attempt that was said to have been sparked by
this outcome. Nevertheless, the new President no doubt received a
large percentage of the votes, and now rules with at least a
limited popular mandate.
Changes in Other Countries

Important political events in support of, or against, democracy occurred in a number of countries, but in such a manner that they did not lead to a change in the Survey's rating.

On the positive side, the ability of Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru to continue the democratic process in the face of massive economic and internal security problems should be noted. In each case the votes of the people showed faith in the process, and their leaders were able to maintain and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of civilian rule—the key issue for the maintenance of democracy in these countries. In India the new leadership showed itself capable of overcoming intense communal feeling and strengthening the reality of its federal institutions.

On the negative side, Poland's communist leadership has been able to recapture some of the authority that had become seriously eroded, and can apparently hold within acceptable limits the public expression of opposition without the use of extremely harsh measures. Poland's parliamentary election this year was perhaps freer than any other in the communist world aside from the process initiated only this year in Hungary. Yet it was not freer than other Polish elections have been, and so represents a stabilization of the situation. Nevertheless, the continuing high level of parallel organizational and publishing activity outside the Party's control causes its rating to remain unchanged.

Much the same can be said in regard to Nicaragua. Here the assembly elected last year has been largely bypassed by the Party structure that actually rules in all Marxist-Leninist states. Recently, in ostensible reaction to the continued guerrilla war, the government has officially suspended many civil liberties that were formerly given lip service. However, the real change over last year seems to have been too slight to make the country equivalent to countries that we rate lower (for example, 6,6). There is still an active church leader that stands against the domination of the Sandinistas; there are still organized groups and individuals within the country that oppose the imposition of the new system, and the embattled newspaper "La Prensa" still publishes, if ever more heavily censored. This is an eroding situation; next year is likely to force a reevaluation down.
Table 5
MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES: 1984-85

BANGLADESH

RATING
2,2
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4,4
5,5
6,6

1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 1985

BRAZIL

RATING
2,2
3,3
4,4
5,5
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1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 1985

ECUADOR

RATING
2,2
3,3
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1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 1985
Comparative Survey: 1985

LIBERIA

MEXICO

PAKISTAN
Comparative Survey: 1985

**PANAMA**

- Rating: 7.7 (1973-1977)
- Rating: 6.6 (1978-1985)

**PHILIPPINES**

- Rating: 6.6 (1973-1985)

**URUGUAY**

- Rating: 6.6 (1973-1985)
The situations in Chile and South Africa present problems of a different kind. Here the opposition elements have been struggling publicly and privately against the system, with the result that government inflicted mortalities, imprisonment, and house arrest or internal exile for political reasons have increased. As so often happens, the heightening of the struggle against repression comes when the government has been making a number of moves to reduce the repression. In South Africa the last two years have seen a number of attempts to ameliorate some aspects of the system, such as the miscegenation laws, the exclusion of all non-whites from the political system, and the denial of South African citizenship to a large proportion of the black population. The apartheid system and its sponsors look vulnerable, and its opponents have heightened that vulnerability by persistent confrontation, and the violence this confrontation is sure to produce. Where civil liberties have declined in South Africa they have declined in those areas that are related to the escalation of violence, such as the restrictions on news media coverage of the confrontation. At the same time as these losses have occurred, major studies have been issued by South African institutions without censure that argue for the abandonment of the apartheid system, and that present evidence that torture is used systematically by South African police, particularly against Blacks.

Chile has seen the massing of the full spectrum of the political parties against the now rather isolated government of President Pinochet. However, Pinochet maintains some legitimization of his rule through the plebiscite that established the process of return to democracy to which he still clings. That plebiscite was not free and fair, but at that time its support of Pinochet's "innovations" represented the judgment of a large section of the Chilean population. Denials of civil liberties in Chile continually rise and fall as new challenges are mounted to the system. But, as in South Africa, the fact that we are so well and consistently informed about these repressions through a variety of human rights, religious, and other organizations suggests the degree of freedom that exists alongside the repression.

Uganda presented a mixed picture. On the one hand, the elected government was removed in a coup. Yet the election had itself been highly questionable and subsequent rule was by murderous repression, engineered either by a tyrannical ruler, or an out-o-
Comparative Survey: 1985

control army. The leaders of the coup were again generals. But they quickly included in their cabinet the leaders of perhaps the most democratic party, and at least the second in size, as well as other segments of the community—and moved to include the powerful guerrilla forces that had helped to bring down the regime. The new, and perhaps temporary, coalition in Kampala allowed for a brief moment of reduction in the prison population, and a freer press.

Another military coup in Nigeria was more hopeful. From one perspective it was little more than the replacement of one group of officers by another. But from another, the new group seemed inclined to respect the rule of law, and to rely more on the development of consensus among the elements of society than had its predecessor. The coup was followed by emptying the jails of political prisoners and momentarily a freer press. But before the rating is changed we need to have more evidence that substantial changes have been made.

The Record of Gains and Losses: 1973-1985

Table 5 relates the most important of this year's changes in country ratings to the recent record of the countries involved. In this regard "important" must be a partly subjective judgment, but it certainly excludes those changes in ratings that resulted from the analyst's judgment or method of rating.

Table 6 allows the reader to roughly trace the course of freedom since the Survey began. It should be noted that changes in information and judgment since 1973 make many ratings not strictly comparable from year to year. Nevertheless, the table reflects the direction of trends in each country.

Since the Survey began, the world has experienced a number of gains and losses of freedom, either immediate or prospective. Most generally there has been an advance of Soviet communism in Southeast Asia after the fall of South Vietnam, and at least its partial institutionalization in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and the former Portuguese colonies of Africa. In the Americas there has arisen an imminent danger of the spread of communism to Nicaragua and an erstwhile danger in Grenada. Perhaps equally significant has been the amelioration of communism in many areas. While
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Notes to the Table

* Indicates year of independence.

1. Ratings are from the Jan/Feb issues of Freedom at Issue through 1982. The ratings for 1983, 1984, and 1985 are based on 1983-84 and subsequent yearbooks. The three lines are political rights, civil liberties, and status of freedom.

2. Ratings for many former dependencies are not available for 1974.

3. Until 1975 Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) were evaluated together as Portugal Colonies (A), while Sao Tome and Cape Verde were Portugal (B). Until 1978 Antigua, Dominica, and St. Lucia were considered together as the West Indies Associated States (and Grenada until 1975). The Comoros and Djibouti (Territory of the Afars and Issas) were considered as "France: Overseas Territories" until 1975. Until 1975 Kiribati and Tuvalu were considered together as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Cyprus was regarded as a unit until 1981.

4. 1973 ratings for South Africa were white: 2,3,F and black: 5,6,NF.

5. Ratings for North Vietnam for 1973-1976 were 7,7,NF; those for South Vietnam were 4,5,PF for 1973-75, 7,7,NF for 1976.
### Table 6 (continued)

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Comparative Survey: 1985

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### Comparative Survey: 1985

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mainland China is still a repressive society, it has increased freedom through the support of private initiative, through more open discussion in some areas, and through the sending of thousands of students overseas. While Poland suggests the immediate limits of change, nearly every country in Eastern Europe is freer today than it was at the beginning of the 1970s. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Soviet Union.

In Western Europe gains for democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece were critical to its continual advancement everywhere. After the setback in Chile, gains have been achieved in many parts of Latin America. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay reestablished democratic institutions. Several countries that the Survey listed as "free" at the beginning may now be more authentically free. Colombia is an example. (El Salvador and Guatemala probably should not have been listed as free in 1973. El Salvador may be as free today.)

African democracy has not fared well during these years. In many areas there has been a noticeable decline, especially in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), and Kenya in which great hopes were placed in the 1970s. In sub-Saharan Africa only Senegal seems to have made progress. Recently we have seen a modest resurgence of free institutions in the Middle East. The destruction of Lebanon will be hard to make up. Further to the east there has been remarkably little advance. The people of Sri Lanka have lost freedoms; those of Thailand and Nepal have made some hopeful progress.

During this period many new democratic states successfully emerged—in the South Pacific from Papua New Guinea to the east, and among the islands of the Caribbean.

Elections and Referendums

Evidence for political freedom is primarily found in the occurrence and nature of elections or referendums. Therefore, as a supplement to our ratings we summarize in the accompanying Table 7 the national elections that we recorded for independent countries since late 1984. A few elections from earlier in 1984 are included because they were overlooked in last year's annual. The reader should assume that the electoral process appeared comparatively
Comparative Survey: 1985

Table 7
NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation and Date</th>
<th>Type of Election</th>
<th>Results and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>non-binding approval of the Beagle Channel Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/25/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>slight loss for government; defeat of old-line Peronistas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/3/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government margin decreased; two constitutional referendums defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>95% said to support president; government claim of 72% participation widely doubted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1/84</td>
<td></td>
<td>coalition government increases majority; popular leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>government decisively defeated; leads to first post-independence change in administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/21/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>front-runners receive 28% and 26% of the vote; congress subsequently selected president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>electoral college overwhelmingly elects person decisively favored in public opinion polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/13/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>new constitution approved by substantial vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>incumbent wins easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/14/84</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>high turnout; government wins plurality; forms coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>government wins easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/14/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>government wins absolute majority nationally and locally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>government wins easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>electoral college overwhelmingly elects person decisively favored in public opinion polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (T)</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>new constitution approved by substantial vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/5/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>incumbent wins easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/9/85</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>high turnout; government wins plurality; forms coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government wins easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>government wins absolute majority nationally and locally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>government wins absolute majority nationally and locally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Comparative Survey: 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation and Date</th>
<th>Type of Election</th>
<th>Results and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gabon 3/3/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>99% approve single list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 6/2/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government wins, but with a decreased majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada 12/3/84</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>high turnout; moderate party wins over both Marxists and their predecessors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala 11/3/85</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>good turnout; well-contested; presidential run-off later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti 7/22/85</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>government claims less than 1% oppose reforms; observers doubt claims of high participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras 11/24/85</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>many candidates; result in doubt because of uninstitutionalized method of determining winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India 12/24-28/84</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government wins by largest percentage in history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 8/16/85</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>incumbent wins easily; but vigorous campaign by opponent; candidacy of liberal denied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 10/24/84</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>all candidates selected by ruling front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 6/14/84</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>approve enfranchisement of resident aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 6/9-10/85</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>automatic wage indexation rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast 10/27/85</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>99% participate; 99% approve the single candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/10/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>choice among party-approved candidates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Comparative Survey: 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation and Date</th>
<th>Type of Election</th>
<th>Results and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea (S) 2/12/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>opposition parties receive 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait 2/20/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>well contested; very limited suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia 11/8/85</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>incumbent president and party win; major parties and candidates excluded; tallies widely doubted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg 7/17/84</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government wins; new coalition results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali 6/9/85</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>99.9% approve president and legislative candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 7/7/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government increases margin; fairness of vote and count generally doubted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 9/9/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government wins: very narrow margin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan 12/19/84</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>97% endorse president's policies (and Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/25/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>nonparty, but effectively competitive and relatively open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 4/14/85</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>high participation in face of guerrilla call for boycott; opposition parties win easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 10/13/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>party controlled, but some non-party candidates and opposition; dispute over number voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 10/6/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>social democrats win plurality; socialists decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania 3/17/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>97% vote for approved candidates, but some choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation and Date</td>
<td>Type of Election</td>
<td>Results and Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone 10/21/85</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>99% vote for single candidate; 90% participation claimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore 12/22/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>traditional government margin cut sharply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia 12/31/84</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>99% approve list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 9/15/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government retains narrow advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland 9/22/85</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>liberal family law passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 2/11/85</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>99.9% approve incumbent; no choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 10/13/85 (Zanzibar)</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>single candidate wins with 61% of vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 10/27/85</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>presidential: no choice; parliamentary: limited choice among party-approved candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo 3/24/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>party-approved candidates; some choice; no discussion of issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 11/25/84</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>well contested and open; returned the country to democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa 2/22/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>well contested; limited suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe 7/4/85</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>government substantially increased its majority in a coercive atmosphere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
open and competitive unless our remarks suggest otherwise; extremely one-sided outcomes also imply an unacceptable electoral process. Voter participation figures have been omitted this year because they are often unattainable, and when attainable open to a great deal of doubt. Many states compel their citizens to vote, in others it is unclear whether voter participation figures refer to a percentage of those registered or of those of voting age.

Although we seldom include non-national elections, they are often much more significant than national elections in many countries. Recent regional elections in India, France, and Italy come to mind. The reader's attention should also be drawn to the number of referendums that occurred during the year. There seems to be a definite tendency toward letting the citizens more directly influence their government through this means.

Political-Economic Systems and Freedom

Table 8 (Political-Economic Systems) fills two needs. It offers the reader additional information about the countries we have rated. For example, readers with libertarian views may wish to raise the relative ratings of capitalist countries, while those who place more value on redistributive systems may wish to raise the ratings of countries toward the socialist end of the spectrum. The table also makes possible an analysis of the relation between political and economic forms and the freedom ratings of the Survey. Perusal of the table will show that freedom is directly related to the existence of multiparty systems: the further a country is from such systems, the less freedom it is likely to have. This could be considered a trivial result, since a publicly competitive political system is one of the criteria of freedom, and political parties are considered evidence for such competition. However, the result is not simply determined by our definitions: we searched for evidence of authentic public competition in countries without competitive parties, and seldom found the search rewarded. Both theoretical and empirical studies indicate the difficulty of effective public political opposition in one-party systems.

The relation between economic systems and freedom is more complicated and, because of our lack of emphasis on economic
Comparative Survey: 1985

systems in devising our ratings of freedom, is not predetermined by our methods. Historically, the table suggests that there are three types of societies competing for acceptance in the world. The first, or traditional type, is marginal and in retreat, but its adherents have borrowed political and economic bits and pieces from both the other types. The second and third, the Euro-American and Sino-Soviet types, are strongest near their points of origin, but have spread by diffusion and active propagation all over the world. The Leninist-socialist style of political organization was exported along with the socialist concept of economic organization, just as constitutional democracy had been exported along with capitalist economic concepts. In this interpretation, the relation of economic systems to freedom found in the table may be an expression of historical chance rather than necessary relationships. Clearly, capitalism does not cause nations to be politically free, nor does socialism cause them to be politically unfree. Still, socialists must be concerned by the empirical relationship between the rating of "not free" and socialism that is found in tables such as this.

The table shows economies roughly grouped in categories from "capitalist" to "socialist." Labeling economies as capitalist or socialist has a fairly clear significance in the developed world, but it may be doubted that it is very useful to label the mostly poor and largely agrarian societies of the third world in this manner. However, third-world states with dual economies, that is, with a modern sector and a preindustrial sector, have economic policies or goals that can be placed along the continuum from socialist to capitalist. A socialist third-world state has usually nationalized all of the modern sector—except possibly some foreign investment—and claims central government jurisdiction over the land and its products, with only temporary assignment of land to individuals or cooperatives. The capitalist third-world state has a capitalist modern sector and a traditionalist agricultural sector, combined in some cases with new agricultural projects either on family farm or agribusiness models. Third-world economies that fall between capitalist and socialist do not have the high taxes of their industrialized equivalents, but they have major nationalized industries (for example, oil) in the modern sector, and their agricultural world may include emphasis on
States with inclusive capitalist forms are generally developed states that rely on the operation of the market and on private provision for industrial welfare. Taxes may be high, but they are not confiscatory, while government interference is generally limited to subsidy and regulation. States classified as noninclusive capitalist, such as Liberia or Thailand, have not over fifty percent of the population included in a capitalist modern economy, with the remainder of the population still living traditionally. In such states the traditional economy may be individual, communal, or feudal, but the direction of change as development proceeds is capitalistic.

Capitalist states grade over into capitalist-statist or capitalist-socialist nations. Capitalist-statist nations are those such as Brazil, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, that have very large government productive enterprises, either because of an elitist development philosophy or major dependence on a key resource such as oil. Government interferes in the economy in a major way in such states, but not primarily because of egalitarian motives. Mixed capitalist systems, such as those in Israel, the Netherlands, or Sweden, provide social services on a large scale through governmental or other nonprofit institutions, with the result that private control over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes. These nations still see capitalism as legitimate, but its legitimacy is accepted grudgingly by many in government. Mixed socialist states, such as Syria or Poland, proclaim themselves to be socialist but in fact allow rather large portions of the economy to remain in the private domain. The terms inclusive and noninclusive are used to distinguish between societies where the economic activities of most people are organized in accordance with the dominant system and those dual societies where fifty percent or more of the population remain largely outside.

Socialist economies, on the other hand, strive programmatically to place an entire national economy under direct or indirect government control. States such as the USSR or Cuba may allow some modest private productive property, but this is only by exception, and rights to such property can be revoked at any time. The leaders of noninclusive socialist states have the same goals as the leaders of inclusive socialist states, but their relatively
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>Multiparty</th>
<th>Dominant-Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC SYSTEM:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitalist inclusive</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barb.</td>
<td>F Iceland F</td>
<td>Australia F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>F Ireland F</td>
<td>Belgium F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>F Japan F</td>
<td>Canada F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>F Korea (S) F</td>
<td>Germany (W) F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>F Luxembourg F</td>
<td>Lebanon PF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>F Mauritius F</td>
<td>Switzerland F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (G)</td>
<td>F New Zealand F</td>
<td>United States F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (T)</td>
<td>FF St. Kitts-Nevis F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>F St. Lucia F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Rep.</td>
<td>F St. Vincent F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador/1/3</td>
<td>FF Spain F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>non-inclusive</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>F Thailand F</td>
<td>Botswana F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>FF Papua New Guinea F</td>
<td>F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>FF Guinea F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>FF Solomon F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras/1/4</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Transkei PF F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitalist-Statist inclusive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>F Sri Lanka F</td>
<td>Brazil 5/4 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>F Turkey 1/4 F</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>F Venezuela F</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>F Panama 1 F</td>
<td>Mexico F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>non-inclusive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>India F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Indonesia 1/4 F</td>
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<td>Pakistan 1/2</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Iran 5/4 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Paraguay 1/4 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda 1/3</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Philippines F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mixed Capitalist inclusive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>F Netherlands F</td>
<td>Egypt 3/4 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>F Norway F</td>
<td>Nicaragua F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>F Portugal F</td>
<td>Senegal 1/4 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>F Sweden F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>F U.K. 3 F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>F Uruguay F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
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<td><strong>mixed Socialist inclusive</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>non-inclusive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes to the Table**

1. Under heavy military influence or domination. (All countries in the Nonparty Military column are military dominated.)
2. Party relationships anomalous.
3. Close decision along capitalist-to-socialist continuum.
4. Close decision on inclusive/noninclusive dimension.
5. Noninclusive.

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## POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Party</th>
<th>military</th>
<th>nationalist</th>
<th>communist</th>
<th>One-Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 3/4</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanna 2/4</td>
<td>PP</td>
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<td>Bhatan 3</td>
<td>PP</td>
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<td>Nepal 3</td>
<td>PP</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>NF</td>
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<td>Nigeria 2/4</td>
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<tr>
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primitive economies or peoples have not yet been effectively included in the socialist system. Such states generally have a small socialized modern economy and a large preindustrial economy in which the organization of production and trade is still largely traditional. It should be understood that the characterizations in the table are impressionistic; the continuum between capitalist and socialist economies is necessarily cut arbitrarily into categories for this presentation.

Political systems range from democratic multiparty to absolutist one-party systems. Theoretically, the most democratic countries should be those with decentralized multiparty systems, for here important powers are held by the people at two or more levels of the political system, and dissent is legitimated and mobilized by opposition parties. More common are centralized multiparty systems, such as France or Japan, in which the central government organizes lower levels of government primarily for reasons of efficiency. Dominant-party systems allow the forms of democracy, but structure the political process so that opposition groups do not have a realistic chance of achieving power. Such limitations may be through vote fraud, imprisonment of opposition leaders, or other devices.

The now classical form of one-party rule is that in states such as the USSR or Vietnam that proclaim themselves to be communist. The slightly larger group of socialist one-party states are ruled by elites that use Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, organize ruling parties very much along communist lines, but either do not have the disciplined organization of communist states or have explicitly rejected one or another aspect of communism. A final group of nationalist one-party states adopts the political form popularized by the communists (and the fascists in the last generation), but the leaders generally reject the revolutionary ideologies of socialist or communist states and fail to develop the totalitarian controls that characterize these states. There are several borderline states that might be switched between socialist and nationalist categories (for example, Libya). "Socialist" is used here to designate a political rather than economic system. A socialist "vanguard party" established along Marxist-Leninist lines will almost surely develop a socialist economy, but a state with a socialist economy need not be ruled by a vanguard party. It
should be pointed out that the totalitarian-libertarian continuum is not directly reflected by the categorization in this table.

Nonparty systems can be democratic, as in the small island of Nauru, but generally they are not. Such systems may be nonmilitary nonparty systems ranging from Tonga to Saudi Arabia. These should be distinguished from the many military nonparty systems, such as those in Chile or Niger.

Conclusion

Although 1985 showed significantly more gains than losses in political rights and civil liberties, this conclusion is tempered by the fact that the major changes actually occurred at the beginning of our reporting period, reflecting the important gains that had taken place, or were prefigured by the events of November and December 1984.

The more important story for 1985 was that of the continuing stabilization of freedom in a number of new or emerging democracies. Against considerable odds the Brazilians, Argentinians, Bolivians, Uruguayans, Peruvians, and Ecuadorians were able to overcome, at least temporarily, the serious problems that beset them both politically and economically. It is no doubt true that a major reason for their success was the mutual support that each of these adjacent societies was able to give its neighbors. In maintaining their freedoms these states also implicitly put additional pressure on Chile and Paraguay, the states in their midst that continue to have oppressive systems.

The record in Central America was more mixed than it was last year. Significant advances continued in El Salvador and Guatemala. In the latter, the degree of success that progress toward more freedom and a rule of law appears to be making is as surprising as President Duarte's victory over the right in El Salvador may have been reassuring. Elsewhere, the democratic institutions and elections in Honduras were once again attended by the uncertainty of constitutional and factional confusion, while rights went down in Nicaragua and Panama. In many of these states a key issue remains the degree to which men under arms are able to remain the arbiter of politics—whether the arms be in the hands of leftists or those who vow their hatred of the left.
The continued strength of democracy in Spain and Portugal, as well as the attempt of the British and Irish to lay a basis for a more normal society in Ulster, were perhaps more significant than recorded changes in countries such as Greece or Cyprus. In Eastern Europe the acceptance of a moderate level of expression and organization outside of official channels was tacitly maintained in several countries.

Indian democracy was strengthened by the ability of the government to reassure minority and regional peoples of the center's commitment to democratic process. Glimmerings of hope that the problems of Sri Lanka may find a solution should also be noted. Neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh both moved toward more democratic and open systems, although there was still a long way to go. Thailand's ability to easily surmount another military coup attempt seemed to suggest a further institutionalization of democracy.

Further east the development of an East and Southeast Asian model of modern, noncommunist autocracy was shaken by the ability of the Korean people to demonstrate a growing commitment to democracy, in spite of the controls that are exerted over the expression of their political and civil freedoms. A similar fighting spirit was demonstrated throughout Philippine society in the struggle to restore the openness that once characterized its political system. The people of one province in Malaysia were able to vote in a regional government uncontrolled by that country's ruling front. They appeared willing to withstand pressure from a central government intent on preserving its monopoly of power.

We must not forget that in spite of certain positive trends, most of the world continues to live in nondemocracies, or what at best might be called semidemocracies. Where armed force determines the outcome, as in so much of Africa or the Middle East today, there is still little room for democratic forms. As more and more people realize, however, that they need not live under repression, maintaining repressive systems in many countries appears to require ever more violence.
NOTES


PART II

Current Issues
No Detente in International Communications

Leonard R. Sussman

Pro-Moscow, pro-Washington, that is the only way you can see the world. All your terms are political, and your politics is the crude fight between your two great blocs. . . . Your news agencies report our events, and from a point of view which is eccentric and sensational.*

In the field of international communication the East-West struggle has been both destructive and illuminating.

The war of words which began in 1917 paused briefly during the Second World War while the Western allies and the Soviet Union fought their common enemy. That detente ended when the Soviets absorbed central Europe and imposed the communications blackout. The Iron Curtain was penetrated only by uncertain Western short-wave broadcasts which the Soviets jammed by expensive triangulation.

The adversarial systems became a communications arena, and mass countercommunications a new form of advocacy or public diplomacy. Communications increasingly, must be reckoned with by totalitarians as well as democrats, by developing as well as industrialized states. For each of these discrete groups, the advantages—and the problems—posed by expanded communications potentialities will

* A criticism of Western journalism by an African delegate to UNESCO in the British stage play, A Map of the World, by David Hare, shown in New York in fall, 1985.
be different. But none, neither the least developed nor the most restrictive, can ignore the pervasive quality of news and information conveyed by new communications media.

The struggle for access to domestic and international communications is, therefore, not only a function of that East-West conflict but of the far larger communications revolution which generates crucial competition among Western powers as well as between North and South, and East and West.

That does not diminish, however, the importance of the East-West theme in all the major theatres in which communications play a role. We shall examine here the most significant actions in 1985 to assist developing countries enter the Information Age, the "depoliticization" of UNESCO's communications programs, one developing country's attempt to rationalize the control of the news media under "guided journalism"—an eloquent effort to limit press freedom under the classic guise of "social responsibility," the belated recognition by the US government that the national interest requires new policies that will share American communications technology and training with developing countries, and the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Accords which, despite having illuminated the hazards to human freedom in East-bloc communications policies, generated demands in the United States to withdraw both from the Accords and UNESCO.

Development Information

The Nonaligned Movement at Bandung in 1955 recognized that economic power was mainly in the hands of former colonial powers of the West and the neocolonial powers of the East. Consequently, a third force—the Third World—was needed to acquire political power by standing unaligned between the two major centers of military power. The movement foresaw that industrial, political, and military power were conjoined. Twenty years later, the movement formally recognized the corollary that information power is intimately linked to all other forms of national influence and development. The movement began emphasizing the need to change the mode of the international and domestic flow of information to benefit the developing countries. Their demand: A New World Information Order!
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The "new order" was ceaselessly discussed in international forums for the next ten years, and nowhere more insistently than in UNESCO. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization devoted no more than five percent of its budget and program to this "new order" (later expanded to include "communications" after "information"—the NWICO). But that five percent inflamed Western journalists and, later, governments. Western fears of NWICO made it easier for an American administration to mount a campaign to withdraw from UNESCO in 1985 as part of larger pressures on the entire United Nations system. The campaign that generated a crisis within UNESCO encompassed far more than NWICO. It included charges of overbudgeting, maladministration, and "politicalization" of programs in human rights and peace as well as communications.

Information—news, data-processing, and scientific and industrial knowledge of all kinds—remained the central issue for the developing countries. They regarded UNESCO as their surrogate to secure further access to the Information Age. Western observers who influenced the withdrawal from UNESCO regarded the NWICO as a thinly disguised plan to replace the free flow of information as the universal standard.

Attempts were made in 1976 to separate the building of communications infrastructure in developing countries from the bitter ideological debates over the content and methods of processing news and information. Too many suspicions had been generated, however, and all discussions of the NWICO were shrouded in biting controversy. UNESCO—the agency committed to many diverse functions in combating illiteracy, preserving heritages, managing the copyright convention, running meteorological, oceanographic, and other science programs—suffered.

The countries for which UNESCO was the information surrogate received little succor from the ideological debates which came to be known as the "reflective" part of UNESCO's communications program. The "action" programs have begun to produce concrete assistance in developing communications infrastructure.

While the United States pledged $100,000 in 1976 and again in 1978 for "action" to fulfill the communications needs of developing countries, not a dollar of these pledges was provided. West Germany, however, has quietly contributed $500 million to help build communications facilities in developing countries.
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regular programs provide $30 million a year for communications programs in developing countries.

The United States suggested the creation of the International Program for the Development of Communications (IPDC), a special fund within UNESCO. The US government refused to contribute to the IPDC during its first three years, but is pledging one million dollars through bilateral aid over several years. This "in trust" arrangement earns a public relations credit at IPDC. Most of the funds are spent in the United States to train Third World journalists. Some 147 projects valued at five million dollars have been funded by IPDC in developing countries of all regions. All but several projects have assisted government-owned communications entities. Privately-owned media must submit appeals for assistance through their governments.

Meanwhile, there has been a flurry of nongovernmental programs to cover more development-oriented news and information, train Third World journalists to serve their own peoples, and share communications technology with developing nations. While these programs are all limited by minimal funding for the purpose, the motivation and dedication are commendable.

The private sector increased its training and other assistance to developing-country journalists. The two US global news services and many newspapers continued to help train foreign journalists. The World Press Freedom Committee supported training and supply projects in many countries. The Al Friendly Press Fellows began bringing developing-country journalists to the United States for five months of on-the-job training. The Center for Foreign Journalists, opened in February 1985 outside Washington, will provide workshops to help sharpen journalistic techniques. The Center does not want to "reform the world's press," says its director, but rather help journalists "produce a fair and responsible product because they are applying the tools." And WorldPaper, published in Boston, regularly carries articles written by leading Asian, African, and Latin American journalists about their concerns and their countries. WorldPaper appears as a regular supplement in newspapers on several continents.

The concept of a new information order includes theory as well as activism. In Mustapha Masmoudi's early efforts to define NWICO (he is regarded as the father of NWICO), the analysis of current communications inadequacies was clearly followed by a theoretical
"new order" that included governmental monitoring of the mass media, adopting government-approved codes of ethics and practices for journalists, licensing of journalists by government, and applying penalties for publishing or broadcasting material deemed objectionable to the government. All of these standards and procedures, incidentally, appear in the draft legislation of the Republic of South Africa. The bill has not yet been passed into law by Pretoria.

Theories can be important. Sometimes they lead to activism, including press controls. Sometimes theory remains that, and nothing more. Theories should be taken seriously not only as an educative force, but as the possible forerunner of active change.

Debates over theory are still another remove from actual change. Debates may disprove a theory, and end it there. Or debates of theory may prepare the basis for change. It must be noted, however, that despite all debates over NWICO theory, UNESCO has never approved a single resolution supporting a journalistic code, or the licensing or censoring of journalists. On the contrary, censorship has been clearly opposed as a governmental device.

The relationship between NWICO theory and practice brings to mind the debate in 1945 at the creation of UNESCO. One model was the predecessor Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). It was concerned with the reconstruction of educational systems in countries subject to wartime domination of the Nazis and Fascists. CAME was an intergovernmental agency that sought to convert educational theory directly into practice. Another model for UNESCO was the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) founded after World War I. This was a nongovernmental forum for objective exchanges among prominent intellectuals from many countries. The IIIC avoided political influences.

The two models were ambiguously merged in UNESCO. The new organization would attract scientists, educators, and other specialists who would speculate on the data and analyses of research. But UNESCO would also seek to produce change in all the fields of its competence. UNESCO, as the NWICO, would engender both reflection and activism.

When countries which created UNESCO still dominated it, activism mainly followed the conclusions of Western theoretical research. The research agenda, however, focused largely on assis-
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tance to citizens of emerging independent states. Nations in the Soviet bloc that approved neither UNESCO theory nor activism remained outside UNESCO. When its membership was swollen by scores of developing countries, the agendas changed. The operation and procedures of global news and information services inevitably seemed suitable subjects for research and analysis. In the ambiguity of UNESCO's early activities, it could be assumed that theoretical analyses could result in Western-style activism and change. But in this new climate the NWICO seemed a direct challenge to the continuing operation in some countries of Western news services, and threatened the application of news-source controls or other forms of censorship. Nothing was done to implement such objectives, yet little was done to allay those fears. Meanwhile, quite apart from UNESCO but adding credence to those fears, journalists were being killed, wounded, arrested, harassed, censored, or otherwise maltreated in dozens of countries.

In 1985, thirty journalists were killed in eleven countries, thirteen held hostage or disappeared in four nations, and seventy-six in twenty countries were beaten, bombed, wounded, or otherwise harassed. There were 109 arrests of journalists, and nine were expelled from eight countries. Efforts to protect journalists from physical attacks by governments, insurgents, or terrorists began with the Geneva Conventions of 1899. "Newspaper correspondents" were to be protected as civilians during wartime. But the conventions, though binding on virtually all states, are routinely violated. An initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in April 1985 will provide a "Hot Line" to assist journalists captured or "disappeared." The families or employers of the journalists may now call a special number at ICRC. It will seek information and inform the inquiring party. The ICRC warns, however, that its work is often impeded by governments violating the accords they have signed.

Apart from fears of censorship and cold statistics of physical assaults on journalists, the fundamental question is whether communication theories—moderate or extremist—can be insulated from practice, without decisions by a true consensus. There should be better ways than UNESCO has so far devised for placing the issues of the communications revolution before thoughtful men and women around the world. These issues deserve broad examination, but not
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in association with hidden action agendas—real or merely suspected after years of political exploitation of the issues. I believe the fundamental objection of Western news media to the communications programs at UNESCO is the fact that these issues are discussed in an intergovernmental forum, implying that improvements in the news flow, however necessary, will be primarily under the control or monitoring of governments.

On that premise I believe it is wiser to take out of UNESCO all of the controversial communications programs, and enable professional organizations to become the forum for discussing such issues. In order to do this, it would be necessary to secure concurrence from the major actors in the field.

The idea seeks to remove governments from the communications discussions (except for those issues concerning governments which already own or control the media). Some new, continuing forum would be needed to which to transfer examination of valid communications issues and potentialities. I suggest that a forum such as that convened for the Red Cross "protection" meeting in April 1985 (this time without the Red Cross) would be an appropriate format. No new organization would be needed beyond enhancing the consortium of existing professional organizations to manage the programs. But there may be a better alternative.

The need for some such concept was underscored at UNESCO's general conference in 1985. Scores of delegates spoke in favor of the IPDC and other communications "action" programs. But the "reflective" programs representing five percent of the communications budget generated ninety-one percent of the discussion subjects. Thirty-two of thirty-five draft resolutions (DRs) were devoted to proposed changes on reflective or ideological programs. Of the DRs, nineteen were submitted by the Soviet bloc, eight by Third World, and eight by Western countries.

The East sought to reverse the consensus set the previous year in the meetings of UNESCO's executive board. In response to American and British objections to concepts regarded as threats to Western communications modes, the board reaffirmed the formal definition of a new world information and communication order as an "evolving, continuous process," not some preordained scheme to be imposed one day. The same consensus assigned lesser priority to reflective programs; for example, studies of press "responsibility" and the "right to communicate."6
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At the later general conference, the top policy-making body, East-bloc delegates repeatedly attacked the consensus as retrogressive and yielding to Western "consumerism." Byelorussia, East Germany, and others sought to kill the consensus on NWICO as an "evolving, continuous process." The Soviet Union wanted to define explicitly a "new information order," and concentrate on "implementing" the mass media declaration of 1978. Western DRs sought to reaffirm the consensus. Third-World delegates were generally silent on the reflective issues. They supported the expanded programming for building infrastructure in communications in poor countries.

After three days of closed-session negotiations, the board's consensus was reaffirmed. Most East-bloc DRs were withdrawn or defined to include Western formulations. Studies of the "watchdog" role of the press—anathema to the Soviet bloc—were retained. But so were studies of the "right to communicate" with the West's protective modifier that this means upholding the broad rights and freedom as already set forth in universally recognized instruments on human rights. If only the Universal Declaration on Human Rights were mentioned, the intent would be clear. But among the instruments is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that propaganda for war, and advocacy of specified "hatreds" or "incitement" shall be prohibited by law. Such exceptions to the free flow of information are not mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Generally, the communications decisions went much farther to support Western than Eastern concepts. Some of the approved East-bloc DRs received low-priority ratings, and will probably not be conducted. The British, who had watched communications programming as a major key to whether they would withdraw from UNESCO on January 1, 1986, said they were satisfied, but still noncommittal. The Canadian External Affairs Minister told the Parliament in late November that the government "is pleased with the results." Moreover, "UNESCO has emerged with a renewed commitment to reform and with the image of an organization that knows what it means to accept responsibility." Strong opposition to Britain's leaving UNESCO was also voiced by the Commonwealth High Commissioners. Nevertheless, according to the headline in the Manchester Guardian, November 22, 1985, "Washington raises pressure on Britain to leave UNESCO." Secretary George Shultz wrote Foreign Secretary
Sir Geoffrey Howe that he should consult privately to hear the American arguments before the British decided whether to withdraw from UNESCO.

That will not eliminate discussions at the United Nations General Assembly. In 1982, I told an American official that these issues, if not resolved in UNESCO, will be taken up at the United Nations. He responded, "Forget about UNESCO, we'll take care of New York." Ironically, since 1983 the NWICO has been consensually described in UNESCO as "an evolving and continuous process." This recognized that the communications revolution was not static or imposed. NWICO thus seemed not as fearsome to Western critics.

Yet the sixty-nine nation Information Committee of the General Assembly in August 1985 reverted to the older concept. Interestingly, the committee acted on roll-call votes that the Western delegates repeatedly lost by forty-one to fourteen or thirteen or twelve. In UNESCO, all communication-program decisions have been by consensus, thereby moderating both tone and context.

The operative paragraph of the draft appears in this single, elongated sentence, prepared by the Group of 77, the developing countries:

Promotion of the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order intended to strengthen peace and international understanding based on the free circulation and wider and better balanced dissemination of information.

3. All countries, the United Nations system as a whole, and all others concerned, should collaborate in the establishment of the new world information and communication order based, inter alia, on the free circulation, and wider and better balanced dissemination of information, guaranteeing the diversity of sources of information and free access to information and, in particular, the urgent need to change the dependent status of the developing countries in the field of information and communication as the principle of sovereign equality among nations extends also to this field, and intended also to strengthen peace and international understanding, enabling all persons to participate effectively in political, economic, social and cultural life, and promoting
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understanding and friendship among all nations and human rights.

A few words of analysis here will demonstrate the continuing problem. There should be no objection by independent journalists of Western governments to the free circulation of better-balanced news coming from diversified sources that provide open access to journalists. All of this the draft supports, and all are Western journalistic concepts. But there are three major objections:

First, the context for all of this is primarily governmental and intergovernmental action. This thereby insinuates governmental monitoring and ultimately regulation in the heart of the information systems.

Second, the "new order" is regarded once again as static—something to be introduced tomorrow that did not exist today. But there will be tomorrows and tomorrows, in an everlasting process. That process increasingly networks telecommunications facilities to send news and information farther, domestically and internationally.

Third, the recommended journalistic procedures, admittedly libertarian, are, in fact, prologue for the political objectives that follow. These objectives are peace, political and economic activities of citizens, and promoting understanding and human rights. Again, these are laudable objectives. But should they be assigned as responsibilities of journalists?

Such exegesis has dominated and embittered UNESCO debates for a decade. It is time to eliminate those communications programs that either the East or the West find objectionable. The vital issues of the communications revolution should be addressed in academic or professional journalistic forums.

"Guided Journalism"

Daily newsreporting, meanwhile, follows essentially the mode of the domestic political system within which journalists must function. A Canadian correspondent working in Asia for a British magazine, for example, carries with him the North American/Western European criteria for gaining access to information—freely—and
reporting it without restriction as accurately as possible. But that reporter when working in a third country must also adhere to the laws and customs of that society. By Freedom House criteria (Table 9) the print media in twenty-five percent of the countries are partly free. All but one (39 of these) are developing countries, and many practice what may be called "guided journalism." They publicly avow that their press is free—up to a point—whether or not the newspapers are owned by the government or independently operated. Journalists are either civil servants or employees of private entrepreneurs, and generally held in low esteem. Either way, the government expects journalists to demonstrate support for fundamental governmental policies and, in most cases, the regime itself.

It is easy to keep domestic journalists in line; more difficult to hold foreign correspondents to such objectives. To influence foreign media is the purpose of many Third World initiatives at UNESCO. They would establish a different universal standard than the traditional free flow of information. The new standard would support "a wider and better balance of information" sent around the world. Such a flow entails changes in the content not encompassed in supporting a free flow. Freeness may result in imbalance, inaccuracy, unfairness. Balance may entail content-control, a short step from censorship if governments do the monitoring. Some enlightened developing countries are reluctant to engage in outright censorship, yet they believe they must "guide" journalists—foreign and domestic.

James Clad, a Canadian correspondent in Malaysia for the British-run Far Eastern Economic Review is a case in point. I met him in September 1985 in Kuala Lumpur where I addressed the Confederation of Asean Journalists. Clad told me that two high-ranking police officers had visited his apartment, and searched his possessions seeking Cabinet papers from which Clad had quoted: the classified document, "A Managed and Controlled Relationship with the People's Republic of China."

Malaysia has a large ethnic Chinese minority. For a decade ending twenty-five years ago, ethnic Chinese communists terrorized the Malay majority. The Cabinet paper discussed the PRC in light of the pending visit to that country in November by Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.
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Table 9

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1. P designates print media; B designates broadcast (radio and TV) media. Print media refers primarily to domestic newspapers and news magazines. Countries with undeveloped media or for which there is insufficient information include: Comoros, Djibouti, Kiribati, Rwanda, Solomons, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa.

2. X designates the presence of a government news agency, with or without the availability of private news services.

3. See Table 1, above.
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Table Summary for Countries

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Governments in three-fourths of the world have a significant or dominant voice in determining what does and what does not appear in the media. This definition of control does not include regulation such as that practiced by the FCC; it means control over newspaper or broadcast content. In some countries particular media (often broadcasting) may be government financed and indirectly government managed like the BBC, but are still largely free of government control of content.

In only one-fourth of the countries are both the print and broadcast media generally free: the press is generally free in one-third. Newspapers tend to be freer than radio or TV.

Nearly a half century ago there were thirty-nine national news services in twenty-eight countries. Seventy percent of these were at least nominally independent of government (Robert Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, Appleton-Century, 1937). Today there are 106. The number of government-operated news services has increased rapidly in the past five years in consequence of recommendations made by UNESCO. Sixty-eight percent of the countries have a government news agency; eighty-one percent of the "not free," sixty-eight percent of the "partly free," and fifty-seven percent of the "free" countries. Of nations with the lowest civil liberties rating (7), ninety-five percent operate government news agencies. National news agencies often use the world news services of the transnational Western media or TASS. They may then decide what world news may be distributed inside the country. Some national news agencies assign themselves the sole right to secure domestic news for distribution inside or outside the country.
Clad was the first arrested under the Official Secrets Act. Soon after he pleaded guilty and was fined $4,150, the police arrested a reporter from the New Straits Times, the leading newspaper. He pleaded not guilty. The law enacted originally by the British in 1950 has been strengthened as recently as 1984 by the Malaysian government. Panlynn Chin in the New Straits Times quoted a legal specialist: "Strictly speaking, you can get in trouble even by asking a government officer, 'When is the next election?'"

I sensed this in speaking privately to Malaysian journalists. One said, "I come to work every day ready to go to prison." Yet the Prime Minister and several members of the Cabinet spent many hours, September 1985, explaining to more than one hundred ASEAN journalists how free journalism is in Malaysia. The Prime Minister's hour-long address solely on press-government relations was, therefore, a classic exposition and defense of guided journalism.

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad began by asserting that "there never was this Individual Man, born free, living completely unfettered in isolated splendor. From the beginning of time man lived in groups—first, the family, the village, then the district, then the state." Thus, "a code had to be developed and imposed by common consent... that could not but restrict individual freedom."

The need then arose for an "enforcement authority" to deal with "those who break the code."

"The media, like the individual or groups of individuals, is an actor within a human community." In many countries, the media have become "a powerful force in society, so powerful in fact that kings and presidents bow and scrape before it." He asked, "what should be its relationship to the rest of society and to the government structure in society?" What is considered "legitimate, proper and moral varies from system to system, country to country and, of course, from time to time."

There are, he said, four basic models regarding the concept of press role and freedom: the authoritarian, communist, libertarian, and social responsibility model. Each system, he said, has its own assumptions and "none are completely without virtue, not even the communist model." He added, "none are without flaws of logic, or relevance or legitimacy, not even the libertarian model that so many in the Third World, unable to break the shackles of
psychological and intellectual neocolonialism, sometimes aspire to with such wide-eyed enthusiasm."

Each country, he said, "must choose for itself what is the proper system to adopt" without "hectoring and lecturing from the pious." The "appropriate system to adopt" must depend on the objective condition of society, its aspirations, and stage of development." He said he had "no negative assessments about the curbing of press freedom in Britain and the United States, through the introduction of censorship during the First and Second World Wars." It should be "plain to the inventors of the doctrine of 'clear and present danger,' that there are many societies today that are under severe stress, that function under a condition of 'clear and present danger' that have no choice but to do what needs to be done. In many of these countries there is no ignorance about what is the ideal in ideal circumstances."

He declared himself "a firm believer in the greatest freedom consonant with the vital interest of society." Therefore, he added, "for most countries most of the time the morally proper choice is the social responsibility model."

The Prime Minister then proceeded to "demolish" the other three forms he had described:

"Both the authoritarian and the communist model believe that the mass media is a servant of the state. Both assert a monopoly of wisdom by those in authority. However, the communist model requires the mass media to be more active, positive tools for the use of government or the party for the achievement of socialist goals. Communist systems demand more than just nonobstruction and noncriticism and a little help now and then from media practitioners. The media must be constantly active propagandists, agitators, and organizers of public opinion—every day of the year and in every column inch. Secondly, the communist model requires state monopoly of all the means of mass communication. Under the communist model, because there can be only one truth—the truth as defined by the Communist Party—the media must work assiduously to mold opinion to ensure a oneness of perception and thought . . . 'the correct view'—is the ideal . . . a variety of views is not only unnecessary but immoral."

He criticized the communist model: "Because it is in the authoritarian and communist state that abuses of authority and power are likely to be greatest, ironically it is essentially in
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the authoritarian and the communist state that morality demands that the media must be a check, that the media be in a confronta-tionist mode. The watchdog role of the media is needed most in communist and authoritarian systems—where, of course, it is tolerated least.

"All wisdom does not spring from a single source, truth from a single mind, even a collective mind made up of a large number of intellectual giants. If nothing is to be published, broadcast or televised unless it has been approved by those in authority, power must always be the determinant of truth."

He turned to the libertarian model which he clearly associated with the dominant Western style of journalism. "Libertarian theory," he said, "states that man is a supremely rational animal with an insatiably desire for truth; the only method by which truth can be grasped is by the free competition of opinion in the open marketplace of ideas.

"To be fair, the libertarian theorists concede that in a free-for-all, much information reaching the people would be false and some deliberately so. People would be telling and spreading lies as well as truths. However, it was up to the people, not the state, to decide what is true and what is false. The people because they are inherently rational must be able to digest and discard, in the final analysis, ending at the destination called Truth."

The PM continued with this eloquent attack on Western-style journalism:

"A most fundamental requirement of the libertarian model is that the media must be completely free from government controls or interference. Another is the idea that it is the duty of the press to prevent government from overstepping its bounds.

"In the words of Jefferson, it must provide a check on government which no other institutions can provide. It must thus be a political institution and a political actor in its own right—but one which must regard government as an adversary, essentially an evil force, which will do evil unless there is a watchdog acting on behalf of the people.

"Unfortunately or otherwise, the libertarians do not say who is to watch the watchdog, beyond saying that it must not be the government."
"The advocacy of the media as an extra-legal check on the government, the call for an adversarial relationship with regard to authority, is understandable on the part of libertarians in an age of authoritarianism. For centuries liberalism had to struggle against authoritarianism. The established government was its greatest enemy. Is it always so today?

"There are many things wrong with the libertarian model. First, it must be quite clear that man is as much an irrational animal as a rational one.

"It may sound patronising but it is true: The discerning of truth from untruth is a most difficult task for the ordinary man.

"Even the wisest of men have often consistently been led up the garden path. The idea that man spends most of his time, much of his time or even some of his time in the relentless search for truth is absolute and silly nonsense. . . ."

"Second, is it right that truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, must always be told, at all times? Every society known to man in every era of man has distinguished the lie and the white lie. History is littered with examples where it was justified not to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

"Third, the libertarian model in its unremitting advocacy of the adversarial role may be justified in the case of an authoritarian or Communist or evil government. Is it as essential in the case of a democratic government, a libertarian government, a good government? The basic assumption that government must always be corrupt and evil is also absolute and silly nonsense.

"Fourth, if it is assumed that power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely, by what magical formula is the media itself, with all its awesome power, exempt from this inexorable tendency? Is power the only cause of corruption? Freedom too can corrupt and absolute freedom can corrupt absolutely.

"Fifth, the libertarian assumption of a free marketplace of ideas where there is a multiplicity of voices, where each individual has a chance to have his say, can exist only in the realm of theory. In practice, say in the West, since when has there been a multiplicity of views on the Arabs for example?

"For decades, the multiplicity of voices have all said the same thing about the Arabs. The picture of the one-way distortion of
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truth is not a pretty one. At no time in history and in no country has the ideal been actualised.

"Some men have a greater ability to express their views than others. How many newspapers have given space to the views of the idiot and the imbecile? How many communists or exploitative capitalists are today on the staff of the major newspapers of the world? By comparison how many members of the public have access to the means of mass communication? Indeed even Presidents and Prime Ministers are denied the right to defend themselves from insinuations by mass circulation publications.

"The question has to be asked: Is freedom of the Press often no more than the right of one man, the editor, and several men, the sub-editors and journalists, to express his or their views and prejudices? Since when has the American editor of a mid-Western weekly magazine had a say equal to the American editor of a national magazine? How many American cities can today boast of more than one newspaper?

"The concentration of media even in the United States, the haven of the libertarian model, have concentrated power in the hands of a select few.

"It is quite clear that the libertarian theorists have never faced squarely the problem of financial wealth and economic support of the mass media and the fact of the silent majority.

"For those whose voice will never be heard, freedom of the Press does not exist. They are denied the same right of expression as is denied by a government-controlled Press.

"Sixth, the libertarian model is based on the childlike assumption that the media will generally, if not always, adhere to ethical practices and aspire to the public good.

"William Peter Hamilton, once publisher of the powerful Wall Street Journal, is on record as saying 'A newspaper is a private enterprise owing nothing whatsoever to the public, which grants it no franchise. It is therefore affected with no public interest. It is emphatically the property of the owner, who is selling a manufactured product at his own risk.'"

"Not many respected publishers today will openly say this or mean it. But there are hordes of media owners and practitioners whose sense of responsibility to the public good is, to say the least, somewhat limited. How else can we explain the libertarian film industry of the West? How many socially contributing films
are made in the West today in comparison with the number feasting on pornography and violence?

"How many truth-seeking newspapers and television stations will go into print or on the air with scattered bits of information in the knowledge that they are not in possession of the facts, still less all the facts, simply to beat their competitors? And for what? For the good of the individual, man and society?

"The Press is not an institution created in heaven, naturally bestowed with virtue. It is not the unique kingdom of the virtuous. It is made up of and run by men who are moved, like other men, not only by high ideals, but also by base needs and feelings.

"The ability of the journalist to influence the course of events is out of all proportion to his individual right as a citizen of a democratic society. He is neither especially chosen for his moral superiority nor elected to his post.

"A Free Press is as prone to corruption as are the other institutions of democracy. Is this then to be the only institution of democracy to be completely unfettered?"

The PM made this unusual revelation of instability as part of his argument:

"For a society precariously balanced on the razor's edge, where one false or even true word can lead to calamity, it is criminal irresponsibility to allow for that one word to be uttered.

"It can be no surprise that it was in the United States itself that the doctrine of 'clear and present danger' was formulated.

"Comparatively few countries in today's world are ultra-stable states where full, free and utter licence can be allowed to run riot. Even in these ultra-stable states such licence has not been allowed. There is and has never been such a thing as absolute freedom. It is my view that regardless of circumstance or time, the best model is the social responsibility model.

"Its basic assertions are simple. The individual has rights. So too does society.

"Whereas the authoritarian and the Communist will boldly say that the rights of society must take precedence over the rights of the individual, and the libertarian will take the equally rigid view that the rights of the individual must override that of society. I believe that it is a question of qualitatively and quantitatively balancing the two rights."
Then, the key question: "Who is to decide on the balancing of the two rights? In a democratic state with a democratically elected government, it is the task of the democratically elected government." He continued, "Under the social responsibility system, the media does have an important role to play and must be allowed much leeway to play this role, including to criticise authority. I am reminded of an article I wrote in July 1981. Please allow me to quote. 'By and large, the role of the Press in ensuring good democratic practices and hence sustaining democracy itself is not only right but also truly indispensable. It is indeed a means of communication between a democratic government and the people. Through it not only will the people be kept informed of all that the government and its leaders are doing, but the leaders too will learn of the attitudes, needs and problems of the people. A responsible democratic government must accordingly regard a free Press as an asset which facilitates good government.'"

There would be no question of where ultimate power lay: "There are no two-ways about it. The media must be given freedom. But this freedom must be exercised with responsibility. "It must be given the freedom to express opinion freely, even the right to be wrong; but it must do so without prejudice and without malice. Just as in a democratic society no person or institution has a right to destroy society or to destroy democracy, the media too has no such right. "An irresponsible Press is a negation of the right of the people in a democratic society. "If the Press fails to understand this, then it should be made to do so by the people through their elected representatives. To put it in another way, so long as the Press is conscious of itself being a potential threat to democracy and conscientiously limits the exercise of its rights, it should be allowed to function without government interference. "But when the Press obviously abuses its rights, then democratic governments have a duty to put it to right. "In representing the inevitably selected views of various groups of people and in pressing its own views, in pursuit of its perceptions of the public good, on those occasions when it is involved in the pursuit of the public good, the media must act with the humility that it demands of those in power.
"Just as it is right in saying that a government has no monopoly on constructiveness and wisdom, the media must recognise that it too has no monopoly on constructiveness and wisdom.

"Just as the public servant must be prepared to accept criticism, so too must the media be prepared to accept criticism. Just as Government is not above the law, the media too is not above the law. It simply will not do if a public servant is subject to the laws on state secrets but in the name of freedom others are not. Just as the media is not to be made subservient to the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, in the same way and to the same extent, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are not to be made subservient to the media. Just as the Government cannot be allowed to have the freedom to do exactly as it pleases in society, so too the media cannot be allowed to do exactly as it pleases in society.

"The media must be allowed to compete in the economic marketplace and curry the favour of its target customers, but it must do so within the bounds of decency and responsibility.

"Contrary to what is thought in many of even the best journalistic institutions, the deadline is not sacred. The public good is sacred. In my view, and I state it without any reservation or apology, the public good is always sacred."

He concluded that modern man has forgotten the "dangers of individual isolation" and therefore "tends to see the restraint on his individual freedom as irksome and he rebels against it." The PM said:

"There is a need to be educated on the structure and obligations of society, especially now, when the growth of human societies is so rapid, and complex. The media needs to educate and itself to be educated with the rest of society, especially since its reach is so vast and its power so great."

Almost slyly, the Prime Minister ended: "Now let us see how this little speech of mine is treated by the media."

The press treatment of this pronouncement was itself instructive. The major daily, which has significant financial support from individuals in the ruling party, carried four-inch high, front-page headlines over a report that began: "Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad said today the media must be given freedom but stressed that this freedom must be exercised with responsi-
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bility." The headline read: "Media must act without prejudice and malice—Freedom with responsibility."

The less party-dominated paper under a five-inch banner headline—"Limits of Press Freedom"—began the story, "Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad assured the press today that it will be allowed to function freely if it conscientiously limits the exercise of its rights and is conscious that it is a potential threat to democracy."

The subtle differences in the headlines and reporting were themselves an indication of the partial freedom under which the Malaysian press operates. Both reports were accurate summaries of the Prime Minister's talk. One report stressed press freedom, the other press responsibility. The full text was published in the New Straits Times, which is strongly influenced by the party.

But there was no editorial comment on the speech—and I was told there would be none.

I took the liberty the next day of responding to the Prime Minister. My remarks were not published in the Times but did appear in the Star, the less government-dominated paper. I welcomed the Prime Minister's discussion of the classic Four Models of the Press and said that, "I have long favored the social responsibility model—but with a difference: Social responsibility, by definition, invokes the responsibility of the journalist to society, not the government. The government is no less in need of watching than other organs of society. The watchers over the press, to answer the Prime Minister, is a more diversified press and an informed citizenry—both of which will monitor press infractions. To expect government to monitor the press—any government, even the most democratic—is to tip the scale inevitably in favor of government overpowering the press. For only government—not the press—has the power of the police, and the threat of a call in the night.

“The openness of a free society promises not everlasting truth, but the freedom to pursue it; not absolute freedom, but a balancing of power, particularly brain power. The canons of professional press conduct—based on a social contract with all of society, not just government—is the surest way to strengthen both democratic government and social stability."

The following month James Clad was convicted, a month later a Malaysian reporter was arrested for gaining access to unpublished
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government reports, and several weeks later Singapore\textsuperscript{10} and Indonesia—two other ASEAN partners—took similar action against foreign correspondents and publishers. Governments were demonstrating a firmer grip in guiding journalists. As Ms. Chin recalled after James Clad was fined, a justice of the High Court in his 1978 ruling on the Official Secrets Act stated that "All information belongs to the government and all information is secret, and wrong classification on the part of the government does not render information any less secret."\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, the government is entitled to classify any information as secret. Such guidance produces a highly developed system of self-censorship. It is based on the ability to perceive possible dangers in even the simplest situations. Even an automobile accident must be carefully reported lest racial implications are inferred.

In 1947, the private Commission on Freedom of the Press\textsuperscript{12} set out to discover whether freedom of the press was in danger in the United States. Its answer: "Yes."

The Commission, headed by Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, included Harold D. Lasswell, public opinion analyst, Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, Reinhold Niebuhr, distinguished Protestant minister, Beardsley Ruml, economist, Arthur M. Schlesinger, scholar, and George N. Shuster, college president.

The Commission concluded that "those who direct the machinery of the press have engaged from time to time in practices which the society condemns, and which, if continued, it will inevitably undertake to regulate or control." The Commission chided the press, as did the Malaysian Prime Minister, for failure to "recognize the needs of a modern nation and to estimate and accept the responsibilities which those needs impose upon them." Yet the group recognized that government intervention might "cure the ills of freedom of the press but only at the risk of killing the freedom in the process."

It acknowledged that breaking up news conglomerates is not the same as an oil monopoly—a necessary journalistic service may be destroyed by that process.

The Hutchins Commission addressed the crucial question raised repeatedly by critics of the Western news media: If you believe in the free flow of information, how do you assure the right of everyone or every group to be heard? Assurance of access requires
some form of regulation; if not by government, by whom? The Commission said:

"Not every citizen has a moral or legal right to own a press or be an editor or have access, or a right, to the audience of any given medium of communication. But it does belong to the intention of the freedom of the press that an idea shall have its chance even if it is not shared by those who own or manage the press." And, too,

"The press must be accountable ... to society for meeting the public's need and for maintaining the rights of citizens and the almost forgotten rights of speakers who have no press."

How is this to be managed? Not by more laws or government action, the Commission said. The communications industry is private but "affected with a public interest." It was the Commission's hope that the press, unlike the railroads, would regulate itself. For the faults and errors of the press "have ceased to be private vagaries and have become public dangers. Its inadequacies menace the balance of public opinions."

Specifically, the Commission urged that the members of the press engage in vigorous mutual criticism. It recommended the creation of a new and independent agency to appraise and report annually upon the performance of the press. Nearly forty years later there are several periodicals that critique press performance. But the National News Council died after failing to receive major press support. And while there are regular reviews in the press of television news and entertainment, several TV critiques of the print press have foundered, and there is no regular TV analysis of television programming.

The Hutchins Commission came to several crucial conclusions:

"An overall social responsibility for the quality of press service to the public cannot be escaped; the community cannot wholly delegate to any other agency the ultimate responsibility for a function in which its own existence as a free society may be at stake.

"This means that the press must now take on the community's press objectives as its own objectives . . . (italics in original).

"The important thing is that the press accept the public standard and try for it. The legal right will stand if the moral right is realized or tolerably approximated. There is a point
beyond which failure to realize the moral right will entail encroachment by the state upon the existing legal right."

Those who regard the Malaysian formula for government-guided journalism as merely a rationalization for control of the news content should consider more carefully the lack of credibility with which the US news media are regarded today by Americans, and recall the warnings of the Hutchins Commission. The journalist's responsibility to society—not government—can be defined only after analyses of omissions and commissions by the press. Who or what has not been covered, or reported inadequately or in balance? Who or what has been favored or disfavored? What should the public know that it may not realize it should know as a matter of national or international need or interest? How to balance older traditions with new trends? How can economic or political balance be assured in the news reports? These and other professional questions raise moral issues, for they are "invested with the public interest."

Such issues deserve public attention in the mass media, and not only in the all-too-few, and limited-circulation professional journals.

**Licensing of Journalists**

Independent journalism, particularly in Latin America, received unusual juridical support on November 14, 1985, when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights unanimously found compulsory licensing of journalists to be incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. Twelve countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean license journalists.

This was the first time an international court explicitly declared that licensing denied journalists access to the "full use of the mass media as a means of expressing themselves or imparting information." One judge also held that requiring membership in a colegio as prerequisite to practicing journalism was a violation of the guarantee of free assembly, as well as a restriction of the freedom of expression.

The court has no enforcement power, but it expresses legal authority in clarifying obligations which states have assumed by treaty. The government of Costa Rica had sought an advisory opinion in the case of Stephen Schmidt, a US newsman who had
worked for years on a Costa Rican newspaper without being able to join the colegio. Although a graduate of another Central American journalism school he could not secure a license without membership in the colegio.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) heard the Schmidt case earlier in 1985 and ruled five to one in favor of Costa Rica. The only dissenting brief was written by R. Bruce McColm, the US delegate, who is director of the Center for Caribbean/Central American Studies of Freedom House. Mr. McColm later testified before the Inter-American Court that the colegio was a "select body" that determines who may practice journalism in Costa Rica. In reply to the assertion that licensing provides responsibility in journalism, McColm stated that Costa Rica's libel laws already protect the public from journalistic abuses.

Journalists were licensed in thirteen countries of Latin America since the first colegio was organized in Costa Rica in 1969. Chile has discontinued the practice. The Costa Rican constitution guarantees freedom of expression, and the government seldom interferes in the operation of the news media. Elsewhere, the colegio system or licensing per se strongly influences the content of publications, as well as who is and will remain a journalist.

While the Inter-American Court's decision may have no immediate effect on any of these countries (except perhaps when the legislature next meets in Costa Rica), the broad range of partly-free countries has received the clear declaration that signers of several international covenants on human rights are in violation over their press-licensing laws. And when next a case protesting licensing arises in any country that is a signatory to a human rights convention, the Schmidt case will serve as precedent.

Press Credibility

The freer the country and its news media, the greater the clamor for better journalism. Conversely, authoritarian societies permit neither pluralistic journalism nor public criticism of the information channels. Citizens in unfree states read the day's news in boredom, and often believe far less than they are told. Western broadcasts have large audiences in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Underground writing flourishes in Poland. In America,
"alternative" journals have a cachet that attracts substantial advertisers.

Crude action was taken in 1985 in South Africa and Nicaragua to control domestic and foreign journalists. Pretoria forbade radio or television coverage of black unrest, and required the permission of the police for reporters to enter troubled areas. Managua imposed severe restrictions on public assembly as well as public expression, and censored still more extensively the only opposition newspaper.

The very freeness of American society has led to journalistic practices and public perceptions that suggest all is not well in American journalism. It suffers a distinct loss of credibility. To assess this phenomenon, the American Society of Newspaper Editors released in April 1985 its national study of 1,002 adults who responded to 284 questions put to them in writing and by phone. The study revealed that "one-fifth of all adults deeply distrust their news media." Three-fourths question the credibility of the media. Liberals more than moderates or conservatives gave low credibility scores to newspapers. Conservatives were more likely to assign low credibility scores to television. Young people were less likely to believe the print press. Only 51% of adults polled said newspapers can be trusted, and still fewer—36%—believe newspapers to be unbiased. Only 23% of readers said newspapers were reliable in reporting national and international news. Sixty-five percent found television reliable. This is particularly significant. TV implies that "seeing is believing." But we know that is not necessarily so. A nation with little historic memory is getting still less chance in nightly television to understand the meaning of the present.

The survey underscored an already established fact: preferred sources for national and international news are TV, 72%; newspapers, 18%; radio, 5%; magazines, 5%.

ASNE's study is sobering because diminished credibility directly affects press freedom. Credibility is the public's way of judging whether the press is responsible. Forty-two percent of the national sample said the press has too much freedom, and only 58% recognized that press freedom permits—if it doesn't encourage—irresponsibility. Still more clearly, 39% stated categorically that the media abuse their constitutional guarantee of a
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free press. This is a serious erosion, particularly when 46% rate newspaper credibility low. They link press credibility (or responsibility) and press freedom.

Not all the signs are negative. Seventy-six percent said the press helps keep public officials honest, and 69% supported the protection of journalistic sources. The sampling demonstrated a certain balanced public perception. Some 64% said although there is some bias in the news media, the average person has enough sources of news to be able to sort out the facts.

And that, all else considered, may be the most important finding—if only the public and officials would realize it.

Diversity in news and entertainment—in print, on the cable, in the fibres, on the dish—diversity is second only to the First Amendment as a guarantee of freedom. And the First Amendment is only as strong as we, the people’s support. Support is eroded when credibility diminishes. Less than responsible journalism reduces credibility and, ultimately, freedom for all; not journalists’ alone.

Responsible journalism is vital business, and the tension between state and press is not only inevitable but healthy—the stuff of a free press, and a government of free men and women. Adversary journalism, therefore, is essential. When the press/state relationship deteriorates, and either regards the other as enemy, the entire society is in jeopardy.

The journalist, then, moves each day on an unchartered course. The journalist, as every citizen, has no absolute freedom. The journalist does have great latitude to report, and in proper ways, comment. How he or she does both is governed by an increasingly higher standard of professional ethics. Only a free society can have an ethical code that frees the journalist to make crucial choices, and act with integrity. But blended with integrity should be a high social consciousness—a sense of responsibility, if you will, that weighs the social implications of a story as well as its newsworthiness. Social consciousness, correction of error, access for differing viewpoints, and diversity—always diversity—are the hallmarks, then, not only of responsible journalism, but human freedom.
Finally: A US Worldview

Up to now, America has been the world's foremost communicator. That is why Third World critics especially challenge US public and private communicators—makers of hardware and software, suppliers of data and news channels, and purveyors of news and information—challenge them to share infrastructure, training, and information. Both the private and public US communications services have generally resisted such pleas. They also reject criticism that American films, news reports, music, and other cultural forms dominate the views and creativity of most other countries. Increasingly, however, competitive systems employing satellites, radio, computers, and other facilities are challenging US dominance. American public policy became increasingly defensive and isolationist. Private communications systems maintained an arms-length relationship to the US government, and continued business-as-usual. There was no US communications policy, except perhaps laissez-faire.

The Administration in 1985 spectacularly enlarged the ability to communicate worldwide by sending two-way telecasts around the world on a daily basis. Charles Z. Wick, director of the United States Information Agency, said the program called Worldnet has "changed the standard by which international broadcasting is measured and public diplomacy is carried out." Worldnet enables journalists in Europe to question President Reagan in the White House, while millions watch in many countries. One telecast included the President speaking to an American spacecraft in orbit, with the West German Chancellor participating in Bonn, and seventy European journalists in five countries taking part.

In the quieter sanctums of the National Security Council, however, it was clear that the basic challenges to continued American dominance in communications were increasing. The NSC asked the State Department's Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy to recommend a policy for America in the development of communications abroad. At the very moment when the United States was withdrawing from UNESCO, in part because of pressures for a "new information order," a sweeping recommendation for developing a US communication policy was being formulated by the coordinator's Senior Interagency Working Group for Communications Development Assistance (SIG).
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The SIG report discussed the private sector's as well as the government's role in communications. For the first time an American administration sought to establish policies with regard to (1) development communications (the application of communications to the promotion of development objectives abroad) and (2) communications development (the expansion of Third World news and information resources including infrastructure, programs, and training for all aspects of communications).

This first serious attempt to examine communications development in terms of US national interest placed Third World communications development on the NSC policy agenda. In effect, the Administration is committing itself to consider an American response to the challenges posed by developing countries to the news, telecommunications, and other media.

The SIG report recognized that a serious imbalance exists in the North/South communications linkage, and recommended practical steps to meet the problem. SIG did not suggest imposing US views on other peoples, but providing substantial communications assistance to enable developing nations to make choices that could favor the pluralistic, free flow of news and information. The report also examined the continuing distribution abroad of American telecommunications hardware and software.

Most significant, the SIG report found communications to be a development priority, and essential to fulfilling basic human needs. Until recently, Congress restricted foreign aid mainly to providing food, housing, and clothing. A decision at the highest level will now be needed to assure that communications will henceforth be regarded as a major US priority. It may be difficult to believe that the most communications-minded nation on earth had to be prodded to accept the vital role of communications in international relationships, and in the social and economic development of much of the rest of the world. The UNESCO controversy has helped stimulate official awareness that American communications practices were under challenge, and there was no apparent policy for response.

The SIG report clearly acknowledged "an ideological commitment in which the issue of Third World communications development plays an increasingly important role." It stated the obvious: "Information is a basic resource without which full participation in today's world is impossible." It added what was not so obvious
until now to American policy-makers: "It is highly destabilizing to allow the world to remain separated into two groups of countries: a small group that is information-rich, and a large group that is information-poor." It acknowledged further: "The United States has resisted LDC demands for large-scale direct transfer of funds and technology. However, it is in our political and economic interests to recognize the seriousness of the North/South communications imbalance and the need to take practical steps to meet the problem." Finally, an official study came to grips with reality: "Unless the United States and its allies give sympathetic attention to the communications concerns of developing countries and make some positive effort to rectify admitted inadequacies in the present global communications system, there will be an increasing disposition on the part of LDCs, pushed by a major Soviet effort, to close off sources of news and information." The conclusion: "Without a countervailing effort by the United States, the result will be the development of institutions and mind-sets antithetical to Western values and interests." On the other hand, concluded SIG, "if provided with a significant impact of Western and especially US thinking, the developing nations will be able to make an informed choice that is likely to favor our views."

The sizeable report and extensive annexes discuss US strategic interests in development communications, the American commitment to the free flow tied to communications development, strengthening US export competitiveness in telecommunications equipment and other goods and services, private-sector efforts, current but limited US government efforts, and, finally, SIG recommendations. The first was said to be the need for a National Security Council policy statement designating international communications development to be "explicitly recognized as a strategic priority on the foreign-affairs agenda."

A Permanent Presidential Council on International Communication and Information Policy has been recommended by Dante Fascell, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Council would advise the President, Congress, and the private sector on international communications.

All of that is a far cry from resisting out of hand, or stonewalling for years, the appeals for communications-development aid made in UNESCO and other forums.
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Illumination: The Helsinki Accords

We said earlier that the East-West struggle over the power of communications is destructive and illuminating. Many of the developments described above demonstrate both qualities. The celebration in 1985 of the tenth anniversary of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided several opportunities to illuminate the fundamental—the civilizational—differences between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries. That has become increasingly clear through the continuing reviews of the Helsinki Accords, as the Final Act is known.

The reviews have taken on a name, the Helsinki Process; and a style, the blunt exposition of violations of the accords. The human rights "basket," including the freeing of informational exchange within and between countries, is particularly stressed. The Helsinki Process has become a unique channel through which to report and assess the protestations by the Soviets that their system (and their satellites') is simply another and perhaps higher form of democratic governance. Such claims not only distort social and political reality, but threaten to drain language of its meaning. The Helsinki Process, therefore, is a persistent reminder that words and pledges mean what was intended when the reviewing countries signed the Final Act. The need for the review is apparent.

Proof of the ironclad control over communication are the courageous dissenters who write and circulate samizdat in the Soviet Union, the Charter 77 people in Czechoslovakia, the prolific Solidarity movement in Poland, and others. These inspired exceptions prove the rule. Authorized contacts—cultural, scientific, and journalist exchanges—are carefully controlled. East-bloc travelers are highly indoctrinated, mainly trustworthy carriers of governmental ideology. Occasionally, a defector appears but the rarity underscores the effectiveness of the authoritarian and totalitarian indoctrination in the homelands. That is not said to denigrate cultural and other exchanges. They should continue, and be expanded. One may assume that Westerners, for their part, can make a certain positive impact on the East-bloc citizens they meet inside Soviet-dominated countries.
The fact that cultural and other exchanges have limited effect suggests, however, that additional channels such as the Helsinki Process are necessary. That process must not be examined in isolation, as simply a discussion of thirty-five delegates behind closed doors, or even as a conference producing a single, concluding statement that is bound to be consensual and mainly innocuous. The Helsinki Process should be seen as ideological ammunition to be fed continuously into established Western communication channels that reach regularly into East-bloc homelands. We do ourselves a disservice if we regard the Helsinki Process from our viewpoint rather than from the Soviets' perspective. There must be some reason why they dread facing, in public, human rights reviews in the Helsinki Process. They fought long and hard before the Belgrade, Madrid, and Ottawa conferences to restrict press and NGO observation of the compliance discussions.

The reason is obvious: the Soviets don't want the world outside, particularly the 110 developing countries, to see the USSR repeatedly stigmatized as a modern tyranny, and not the Marxist Utopia that was promised. One cannot fully estimate the impact of the Helsinki Process without factoring in the continuous use of the discussions by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and other Western radios. The stepped-up jamming of American broadcasts by the Soviet Union is further proof that the radios are effective.

For more than six decades, Western efforts to help liberalize the Soviet Union from outside largely failed. Cold War, detente or a blend of the two were tried with little success. These were largely approaches devised by, or in response to, the Marxist-Leninist system itself. The Helsinki Process is different. It is a Western concept. It was, to be sure, almost an afterthought when Western Europeans finally agreed to hold a postwar conference that the Soviet Union had long demanded. The West Europeans, and reluctantly the United States, agreed provided human rights were as thoroughly examined as security and economic matters. It was to be understood that every word in the entire Final Act would be approved by all thirty-five signatories, and every word—human rights included—would carry equal weight. The Soviets thus committed themselves to standards of human rights that were not theirs in practice or in promise; standards that would, if complied with, transform their country and all East-bloc countries
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into far freer societies. The Soviets were apparently willing to take that risk in order to achieve Europe-wide approval of existing borders.

The accords, however, did not affirm as inviolable the existing territorial boundaries. On the contrary, the declaration speaks clearly on this point: "Frontiers can be changed," it states, "in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement." That is given in the first principle. The third principle governing the document says that states "will refrain now and in the future from assaulting" another's frontiers. When read with the first principle the document opposes changes in borders by force but upholds changes resulting from peaceful agreement. Moreover, President Ford stipulated clearly as he signed the accords: "The United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and is not doing so now." Indeed, a crucial territorial division, the Oder-Neisse line between the GDR and Poland, was settled in 1970, five years before the Helsinki Final Act.

The principal American negotiator (Harold S. Russell) writes that he and "all the Western negotiators" believe the "USSR failed in large part to achieve the kind of language it originally sought." The document, he says, "does not depart materially from previous international agreements on frontiers and does nothing to recognize existing frontiers in Europe." The two sentences in the accords "comprising the inviolability principle occupied four months" of negotiation, and eliminated "virtually all" of the essential elements in the Soviet's initial draft.

However, what the Soviets failed to achieve in the CSCE negotiations they "almost totally recouped at Helsinki through the American press"—that, too, from the American negotiator. The US press continues to support the Soviet line that Helsinki gave the East bloc its present borders. It did not.

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher put it properly in the Bundestag: "The Conference has not finalized the status quo in Europe," he said. "And what the Conference did not do by text we should not do by words."

President Ford stated explicitly as he signed the Helsinki Accords that he did not accept the interpretation that the CSCE "will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe."
If he believed that it would, he said, he would not have come to Helsinki.

Without achieving the territorial commitment they sought, the Soviets found themselves accepting in Basket Three a human rights commitment they did not want. Had they pulled out of the conference over Basket Three, they would have failed to get even a bland territorial statement that might later be used propagandistically to convert their failure into success. Sadly, Americans are helping make that conversion after the fact. Instead of wringing our hands over a bad bargain, we should repeatedly proclaim the truth: Helsinki, far from providing territorial commitments, created an important set of human rights standards and pledges.

The Helsinki Process is not a legally binding commitment, as today’s critics point out. For two years of negotiations before 1975 the Americans insisted that the Final Act would not be legally binding. And probably for good reason. Without resort to the military, it would be difficult to enforce commitments to internal relations. Realities would probably be no different in the Gulags today if the Act had been legally binding, but the fragile rule of law would have been further weakened.

Critics also suggest that the Helsinki Process is an elaborate pretense, that we and the Soviets are seemingly in accord about the values and the violations of free expression, free trade unions, freedom to travel, and other matters. That criticism entirely misses the value of the process. The framing of the standards, important though they are, is only the beginning. The key is holding the Soviet bloc to our interpretations of those standards. We have devised the most effective mechanism so far to bring Soviet spokesmen to the dock at Helsinki and charge them—citing names, cases, and institutional procedures—with violations of the approved code of human practice.

Of course the Soviets counterattack, and of course they charge interference in their internal affairs. But that, on their part, is purely damage control. It is the business of the free press to carry around the world the charges of violations of the accords. To the extent that the press does not convey this information, people everywhere—including the mass media themselves—suffer. For violators of humane standards are let off too easily. But that is not the fault of the Helsinki Process; rather it is a sign of misunderstanding or indifference.
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We should also credit the Helsinki Process with the diverse activities of the American CSCE—the joint Executive-Legislative Commission. The Commission carefully monitors lists of human rights violations. A substantial number of the 1,800 family-reunion cases submitted to the Rumanian government, for example, have been successfully resolved, and the last outstanding Hungarian-US family reunification case was concluded. The Commission has held hearings, widely reported in the press, on the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union, psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union, forced labor in the USSR, and the status of Andrei Sakharov and the unofficial peace groups in Eastern Europe. All of these public manifestations were possible because the Helsinki Process created both framework and newsworthiness.

Given the nature of Western journalism, in the absence of such organized activities in defense of human rights, it is highly unlikely the press would cover individual appeals. Isolated, ad hoc complaints generally go unreported.

Human rights is one of three general concerns of the CSCE. The Madrid review conference, for example, helped spotlight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the repression of Poland, and the shooting down of the Korean airliner. The meeting had the unusual effect of unifying the Western nations, including the neutrals and nonaligned, in the face of East-bloc opposition. Not often publicized, the Madrid review also served as an open channel for East-West communication during the time when other contacts were shut down. The Madrid conference also mandated the Stockholm meeting on confidence-building measures in the security field. While no rapid results may be anticipated there, the effort to avoid destabilizing military surprises can be useful.

"The Madrid meeting," in the words of Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, was "the appropriate forum at which to insert political and moral pressure into the process." The message to the Soviet Union was clear, he added, "Conform to the promises made in 1975 if you wish to be recognized as a responsible member of the international community."

In a militarized, adversarial world the application of moral and political pressure is the essential alternative, and free men and women should support it to the fullest. It is a vital employment of international communications.
NOTES


5. For listings of countries see Freedom at Issue, Jan/Feb, 1986.

6. For a balanced view of the issue and four options for further study or ending work on this subject see "The Right to Communicate: Report by the Director-General," 23/C13, Sept. 12, 1985, item 4.1 of the provisional agenda (Paris: UNESCO, 1985).


10. The editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal apologized to Singapore's High Court, November 19, 1985, for committing contempt of court in an editorial dated October 17.

11. Chin, in New Straits Times.


13. See the forthcoming book on the Schmidt case in the series, Perspectives on Freedom, including the McColm brief, other testimony, and the court's finding.
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15. U.S. Development Communications Assistance Program (final draft), Senior Interagency Working Group for Communications Development Assistance; for Office of the Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy, U.S. Department of State.

PART III

Strengthening American Support for Liberalization in Eastern Europe
Foreword

On June 15, 1985 Freedom House held a conference at the Wye Plantation in Maryland on supporting liberalization in Eastern Europe. This conference was the fourth in a series. Previous conferences have been held on supporting freedom and liberalization in the Soviet Union, Muslim Central Asia, and the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Reports of these conferences have been included in previous editions of this yearbook. In this section we have included an edited version of the discussion. No written papers were presented, although we did begin with prepared statements by three authorities on the area. The section is concluded by a statement drafted after the conference, reviewed by the participants, and transmitted to the government.

Conference participants were:

Morris Bornstein, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan.

Robert R. Bowie, Dillon Professor of International Affairs (Emeritus), Harvard University; author and consultant.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University and a Senior Adviser at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Lawrence Eagleburger,* President, Kissinger Associates, Inc.

Herbert J. Ellison, Secretary, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.

Raymond D. Gastil, Director, Comparative Survey of Freedom, Freedom House.

Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
Conference: Eastern Europe

Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy.

Colonel George Kolt, USAF, National Intelligence Officer for Europe, National Intelligence Council.

F. Stephen Larrabee, Vice-President and Director of Studies, Institute for East-West Security Studies.

Lt. General William E. Odom, Director, National Security Agency.

Spencer Oliver, Chief Counsel, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, United States Department of State.

Richard E. Pipes, Baird Professor of History, Harvard University.

Walter Raymond, Jr., Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Communications and Information, National Security Council.

Henry S. Rowen, Professor of Public Management, Graduate School of Business, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, the Brookings Institution.

Rapporteur: Bradford P. Johnson, Program Associate, Kennan Institute for Advanced Studies.

* Lawrence Eagleburger participated in the planning of the conference and the discussion of the concluding statement, although he was unable to attend the discussion.
Introductory Remarks on Recent Trends in Eastern Europe

The initial presentation to the conference characterized Eastern Europe as a region of increasing ferment and change.* This movement away from unquestioned Soviet domination posed serious problems for the Soviet Union, and both opportunities and dangers for the West. The speaker saw the well-known struggle of the Polish people as symbolic of a much broader trend.

The irreversibility of this trend is suggested by the fundamental changes that have occurred in Poland. Despite efforts at consolidation by the Jaruzelski government, the Party remains in disarray, and, in the view of many, its existence is largely a facade for military rule. The economy presents enormous problems. The people are apathetic and hostile. The intellectuals work almost entirely in terms of a thriving underground counterculture. There is a high probability that failure by the government to overcome its problems and reassert its authority will result in a violent eruption. How to respond to this danger and to this outcome, if it occurs, will remain a critical problem for both the USSR and the United States in the decades to come.

Poland is but a part of the broader problem in Eastern Europe. Since the mid-1970s the Soviet Union has witnessed an erosion of its authority in the area and an increase in domestic ferment. The challenge is both systemic and country-specific. Indeed, it is the interaction of these two challenges that heightens the dilemma and makes it acute.

* The following discussion is based on, but not limited to, the presentation by F. Stephen Larrabee.
Several factors have contributed to the dilemma. One is economic decline. The era of consumerism that characterized the early 1970s is over. Eastern Europe is in a period of austerity and stagnation that is likely to last for many years. Growth rates throughout the area have declined precipitously, except for East Germany (also referred to as the DDR or GDR). This is likely to continue at least into the late 1980s and perhaps 1990s. According to some Western estimates, the growth rates may be roughly one-third of those recorded in 1976-80, perhaps as much as one-fifth of those achieved in 1970-75. At the same time the terms of trade with the Soviet Union have significantly deteriorated as a result of the sudden change in international oil prices, as well as the overall increase in prices for raw materials.

This poses significant problems for all Eastern European countries. On the one hand, they have to find ways of convincing the Soviet Union to increase the exports of energy and raw materials; on the other, they have to find ways to pay for increasingly expensive supplies. One statistic in this regard highlights the problem. In 1974 Hungary had to sell 800 buses to obtain one million tons of oil; in 1980 it had to sell 2,000 buses to get the same oil, in 1981 it had to sell 2,300 buses, and in 1984 it had to sell 4,000 buses to obtain one million tons of oil.

To compound the problem for Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is demanding higher and higher quality goods. At the same time, Western banks are unlikely to engage in the same kind of lending they did in the 1970s. This may be less true for a country like the GDR, but for the rest of Eastern Europe it is likely to be true. The interaction of these trends is expected to lead eventually to a stagnation in living standards, a situation that may have already been reached by some countries in the region. In the long run, such stagnation could lead to greater instability. Certainly popular pressures for economic relief can fuel political discontent.

This is not to argue that there is an imminent danger—or hope—that the whole of Eastern Europe will go the way of Poland. The circumstances in Poland that produced Solidarity were unique, and related to the specific situation of Poland at the end of the 1970s. But the same type of pressures are likely to be felt in many other countries in Eastern Europe.
Romania is perhaps the country most likely to experience these pressures in the near future. There has been a sharp economic decline, due in large part to faulty investment and a failure to institute reform. There is rising discontent, as evidenced by the miners' strike in 1977 and religious protest. Perhaps the most important discontent from the regime's viewpoint comes from the Hungarian minority, for their problems with this group have led to a deterioration of relations with Hungary. For the first time, at a Hungarian Party congress in March, 1985, the Hungarians raised this issue in a public document, as well as in a speech from the floor. As an illustration of how bad relations are, Ceausescu has not made an official visit to Hungary since the early 1960s.

But President and Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu is still firmly in control. Where a successful move to replace him might come from is hard to know, but given his strong hold on the Party it is most likely to come from the military and security forces. Reports of an abortive coup in January 1983, together with increasing defections from within the security apparatus in Western Europe, suggest that there might be rising discontent within these institutions and organizations. The trend bears watching. In some ways it is not unlike the situation in Iran in the sense of how quickly the control apparatus could disintegrate.

The economic decline of Eastern Europe also has obvious military implications. It could constrain Moscow's plans to carry out a military modernization within the pact. It will accentuate, and to some degree has already accentuated, the debate within the Warsaw Pact over guns versus butter and burden sharing. Romania told the Soviet Union several years ago that it would not raise its defensive outlays above the 1983 levels. There is already quite a bit of evidence of debate on, and resistance to, increases in defense spending, particularly by Hungary and Poland. An exception is the GDR (East Germany), which has maintained high levels of defense spending.

Succession problems also face many Eastern European countries. In Hungary, Kadar is nearly 74, in Czechoslovakia Husak is over 70, Zhukov in Bulgaria is over 70, Honecker of the GDR is over 70; all of these countries will face succession crises in the near future. The departure of these leaders simultaneously could have an impact on the area.
Much will, of course, depend on what happens in the Soviet Union and on Gorbachev’s moves internally and externally. Since the last part of the Brezhnev era, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has been characterized by drift and immobilism. This has been shown by the vacillation that the Soviets showed in Poland in 1980-81, and the postponement of the long-awaited COMECON summit, which was finally held in June 1984. When the summit convened, little progress was made toward what had been the main goal. The Soviets seemed to have retreated to the far less ambitious goal of simply coordinating five-year plans. Even here, they have met resistance on the part of the Hungarians, and to some degree the Bulgarians.

In the last years under Brezhnev the Soviet Union really had no policy toward Eastern Europe. Andropov showed signs of developing one, but his tenure was too short. Chernenko essentially carried out the policies of the Brezhnev years. Many East European countries sought to exploit this drift to expand their economies and to challenge the Soviet Union. An example was the effort of the GDR and Hungary in the last few years to expand their room for maneuvering in foreign policy. Such moves were, of course, within narrow limits.

The question is, what can we really expect from Gorbachev? He is likely to be a more dynamic and assertive leader than Russia has had in the recent past. The emphasis on limited and partial reform may accentuate efforts at reform at home, or at least encourage them. His emphasis on discipline may presage tighter controls at home; such controls may have an echo in Eastern Europe. This should remind us that reform is not necessarily liberalization: a more flexible attitude toward reform can go hand-in-hand with more discipline. Such a trend would make it harder for some East European countries to move toward more autonomous policies.

We can also expect that the example and diplomacy of Communist China will begin to play a more important role in Eastern Europe. For a long time China played a negligible part. More recently China has begun to take a more active role, particularly in the economic area. In the Spring of 1984 the Chinese General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, made official visits to Bucharest and Belgrade. A number of other high-ranking officials have been increasingly active in making visits to Eastern Europe. If it proves success-
ful, recent Chinese liberalization could have an impact in Eastern Europe, directly and through intensifying pressures for liberalization in the Soviet Union. None of this suggests that the Chinese are apt to pose a major challenge to the Soviet Union in the region. But if the Chinese follow a more assertive policy in the area, this will complicate further the Soviet problem.

These are only some of the reasons for the increasing ferment and change in Eastern Europe that are likely to progressively challenge Moscow's ability to control events in the region.

Responses to the Introductory Remarks

This view of recent trends was challenged on a number of grounds. The case was presented that in contrast to the picture that had been drawn, in fact little change had occurred, or was likely to occur in the region. It was argued that the region has become economically more dependent on the Soviet Union than previously. In large part this was due to a combination of increasing energy requirements and the increasing dependency of the region on energy supplies from the Soviet Union. The oil shortages of the 1970s played a hand in this, as did the special terms on which the Soviet Union supplied the region. The building of gas pipelines increased its dependency. Electric grids have been developed along the borders of the region that further tie their economies to the Soviet Union. The result is that, with the exception of the GDR, the East European states are more dependent on the Soviet Union than they were five, ten, or fifteen years ago.

Another aspect of East European dependency is the continued reliance of all its economies on central planning. The result is that no country in the region can effectively compete with the West, either in Europe or the third world. Hungary may be a partial exception, but even there it is unclear that it will be able to become really competitive. The experience of the seventies seemed to suggest that the East Europeans just could not break into the Western markets on a large scale. It is certainly true that the Soviet Union is confined to the export of raw materials.

From the military viewpoint, the Warsaw Pact structure means that for the six satellites there are, with the partial exception
of Romania, no national armies. The command structure has been increasingly centralized under Soviet control.

These factors would seem to give the Soviet Union a good deal of leverage. This may be why, in spite of all the turmoil of the years from the 1950s to the 1980s, all the countries of Eastern Europe continue to be ruled by Parties on the Soviet model. There have been challenges, attempts to change the pattern of Party rule, possibly to create a multiparty system in 1956, 1968, and 1980-81, but these attempts failed. In this light it is important to remember that the aspect of the Polish crisis that the Soviets must look on with a good deal of satisfaction is that it became unnecessary for them to intervene directly to reestablish the Party position. Although a military leader, General Jaruzelski is a lifelong Party member, a Party apparatchik first and foremost.

It is true that a few countries in Eastern Europe have shown some modest independence in foreign policy, and have developed some minor economic variations. But the Party and Soviet control remains. From this viewpoint there appears to be little evidence for the positive trends that so many find.

This argument was bolstered by the proposition that the Soviets appear to have developed a form of control in Eastern Europe that relies more on leverage than direct intervention. Instead of relinquishing control, they have found a way to maintain control while decreasing their costs. It can also be argued that much of what we see as anti-Soviet innovation in Eastern Europe is really Soviet controlled and manipulated experimentation. Hungary is, in this view, to be seen as an “experimental station” for the Soviet world; in this guise Hungary is allowed to try innovations that may later be used more widely. Romania’s apparent foreign policy independence can also be interpreted as stage-managed, or at least closely controlled by the Soviets, with effects that help keep the Romanian Communist Party in power, while doing little or no harm to critical Soviet world interests.

In assessing prospects for change in Eastern Europe it is also important to note that ethnic barriers may severely limit change in most of the region. It is significant that the most successful change has been in Poland and Hungary, two essentially homogeneous states without ethnic problems. East Germany has a particular problem of self-definition in regard to West Germany. More serious are the fissures in a country such as Czechoslovakia. Since
1968 there has been a large-scale economic development at the expense of the Czechs, and in favor of the slightly smaller Slovak community. There is little more than a token presence of Czechs in the government—nearly all the key posts are held by the Slovaks. So potential for dissidence has been defused for the Slovaks. In Romania there is not only a split between the people and the regime but between both and the Hungarians of Transylvania. It is possible that in Bulgaria the ethnic split between Slavs and Turks is used to defuse opposition to the government. Liberalization in Yugoslavia is also probably limited by its many ethnic problems.

While accepting some aspects of this case, a majority of the conferees refused to accept the position that Soviet control in the region had not eroded significantly in the last generation. The most general point would be that the continuing Soviet economic and military leverage did not seem to translate on the ground into an equal ability to control events. This is a relationship that the United States has also come to experience on many occasions. Whatever levers a great power may have, they often do not work.

The idea of unshaken Party control in Eastern Europe was particularly contested in the case of Poland. Many saw General Jaruzelski as more of a military than a Party figure, and felt that this was equally true of those around him. In their view the Polish Party hardly functions in the present climate; certainly the concept of civilian Party control over the military that has been traditional in communist societies has been breached. They felt that this was unlikely to change in the near future. Hungary was seen as having diverged much further from the Soviet model with its "creeping incrementalism" than this argument would allow. In Hungary controls characteristic of communist societies, such as control over movement, no longer exist in a recognizable fashion.

The independence of the Hungarians in foreign policy is certainly real. They have supported the Romanians a number of times in the Warsaw Pact discussions. They openly supported the desire of the East Germans to have Honecker visit Bonn. On the other hand, the Hungarians opposed any kind of invasion of Poland in its crisis; the East Germans, on the other hand, pushed for more direct action. Hungarian journals have an increasing number of
articles on the role of small and medium size powers in international relations.

The argument that there was growing dependence of the East European countries on the Soviet Union in terms of trade and energy was also challenged. There has been a growing attempt to look for outside power sources. The Bulgarians are building a large capacity in nuclear power. The gas lines certainly do tend to give the Soviets leverage, however. It was argued that there was an attempt by some East European countries to reorient their trade in the 1970s toward the West, a tendency that was thwarted by the oil problems of the 1970s. The result is that much of the increase in trade with the West that occurred in the 1970s has now been lost. Because of the decline in the Western economies and the higher prices of raw materials, the East Europeans have not yet been able to make up the loss. Since the early 1980s, however, there has been some catching up, and exports to the West have gone up substantially. Although small, Romanian trade with the United States doubled last year. Most East European states have actively resisted being integrated into the East European version of the Common Market—COMECON. (Although analogous to the EEC in many ways, Comecon or CMEA is, of course, dominated by one overwhelming state, the Soviet Union.

More generally, it was suggested that we should look at the global prospects as they appear to the East Europeans. The Chinese experiments are important to the East Europeans. The peoples of the area, the Hungarians, Romanians, and Bulgarians, for instance, feel that so often they have come out on the wrong side of history. Many of their leaders do not want to be on the losing side again. Coupled to this is the rising perception of most people in the area that they are Europeans, that Europe is again a world leader, and that the centers of Europe lie to the West.

The INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force) and Soviet-fabricated war crisis that was generated over American plans to introduce new weapons into Europe in response to the Soviet SS-20 buildup has had a backlash that has further hurt the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. While many people in Eastern Europe had been aware for many years of Soviet military deployments, the Soviet propaganda campaign led them for the first time to explicitly discuss their own nuclear deployments. In East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, at least, this produced significant public reactions. Apparently, the concerns of these regimes over the effect on public morale were transmitted to the Soviets. There was evidently some Soviet effort to placate the concerns of their allies. The evidence is uneven, but it appears as though at the COMECON summit in 1984 two and possibly even three of the East European regimes refused to sign the communique until the Soviets had committed themselves to toning down their propaganda and returning to the Geneva talks. If so, this may be the first time since World War II that the Soviets have had their foreign policy significantly influenced by East European popular reactions. This experience may act as a future brake on the Soviets, at least on efforts to manipulate perceptions of the danger of nuclear war.

There is growing evidence that many people in the governments of Eastern Europe are no longer content to leave the nuclear debate entirely to the Soviets. They are uninformed and they know it, and search for more adequate information, even from the United States. They welcome American arms control briefings. We know of papers East European officials have prepared that reflect more Western than Soviet positions. Although such papers are not made public, they are used internally to buttress their government's attempts to affect the discussion. In Hungary there may be many officials who do not accept the Warsaw Pact line. They were not consulted on the invasion of Afghanistan, and they resent it. They have made it clear publicly that they do not support the Soviets there.

The discussion emphasized certain fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Russia, and now the Soviet Union, has traditionally been characterized by a large relatively uneducated and inward-looking general population ruled over by a small, relatively highly educated elite. Our attempts to influence opinion in the Soviet Union rarely gets beyond this elite. The great majority of Russians remain hostile to outside criticism and fundamentally patriotic, seeing themselves not so much a part of Europe as equal to Europe. Even if anticommunist, they resent outside criticism. Although we do not know the percentages, in the minds of many Russians communism and patriotism are mutually supportive ideas.

In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, there is much more of a tendency to look to the outside, to see both danger and hope as
coming from the outside. Here, communism and patriotism are more often in conflict, because communism came as a result of Soviet conquest. With historically more educated general populations there has been, and is, less of a gap between the opinions of the general public and the elites. Many East Europeans reject the concept "East European" as an American concept. They see themselves as simply "Europeans" and culturally may see their main task as overcoming the "artificial" division of Europe.

Although the Hungarians are still required to have a passport to leave, it is symbolic of this attitude that Hungary and Austria have abandoned visas for travel between the two states. In a recent informal survey of theaters in Budapest, most of the films being shown were from the West; there were many more American than Soviet films. Hungarian television is beginning to show American serials. They look to the West for fashion. Very few in Hungary outside of the Party elite speak Russian.

Most participants believed that the Soviet Union had had substantial problems in controlling the Polish situation, and in dealing with the present government. The Soviets see two main problems in Poland: its ties to the West and the role of the Church. But they do not know what to do about it. When the signing of the Warsaw Pact treaty took place recently in Warsaw, Gorbachev's coming was not announced until the day before the meeting. Such visits are usually announced well in advance, but in this case he had to practically sneak into town. He requested a meeting with the entire Polish politburo, which would have been unprecedented. Jaruzelski refused.

The argument that the Soviet Union saw East European countries such as Hungary as laboratories, and they only allowed that experimentation that they desired was generally denied. Most felt that the Hungarians were acting in ways the Soviets would never have chosen for them to act. Of course, the Soviet Union may look on Hungary as an experiment. It is true that Soviet economists study what is happening in Hungary and try to profit from it. This does not mean that they intended it to be a laboratory, but that they have decided to make the best of an uncomfortable situation. The Hungarians have progressed by small steps for which Moscow has simply not found adequate responses. The Soviets are reluctant, but they have gone along because they trust Kadar, and his approach seems to have promoted stability. This does not mean
that Soviet leaders are not also afraid of a general infection by such change. The Soviets are certainly not pushing East Europeans to experiment.

But in another sense important to the West, Hungary is a laboratory. For the Soviets will not be willing to merely observe what happens. If change in Eastern Europe gets too far ahead of change in the Soviet Union, the USSR will have to either change itself or step in to slow down change in the region. In this sense we must regard Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as connected, and must not attempt artificially to separate change in one from the other.

Assuming there has been an increasing divergence of Eastern Europe from the USSR, the reasons for this trend were considered further. Perhaps most fundamental is the European cultural affiliation of the peoples of the area and their common resentment of Soviet control. It is often harder to know what the motivations of the communist governments of the area are. At first they were established by, and directly dependent upon the Soviets in most cases. But as time passes, and they increasingly have to legitimate their rule in the eyes of their own populations, this distinction between the attitudes of the people toward Soviet rule and the attitude of their leaders can be expected to have faded. Initially, some Soviet leaders encouraged East European leaders to develop their separate nationalisms, as a way of securing communist rule. But the eventual outcome of this identification of Party or government with nationality may not always be to their liking. But often we do not know; even in the case of such a figure as General Jaruzelski, we are not sure of whether he likes or resents the Soviet presence. Probably both.

On one level the Soviets have the same problem in dealing with the East European governments that we do. They want to allow them to express their nationalisms to achieve legitimacy, but they are unable to control what this leads to. The United States, on the other hand, grants aid or trade to East European governments in order to allow them to increase their independence. Yet at the same time we are granting legitimacy to governments that are otherwise resented by the people; through our aid we are helping communist leaders remain in power. Both superpowers gamble on policies that may have a result opposite to what was intended.
In addition to the naturally operating factors of a differing identity and resistance to outside direction, most felt that one cause of change was the continuing effort of the West to provide an information alternative, and through this at least a form of indirect support. It was argued that to understand the events in Poland in the 1970s we have to go back to the 1950s and the role of the Western radios, such as Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. They prevented the monopoly over all forms of education and communication that is characteristic of totalitarian societies. Even some East European leaders have confided how as children they would listen to the radios and share what they had learned with their friends at school. In addition, since at least the 1960s hundreds of Poles in official positions have come to the United States, many to take educational courses. This was bound to give them a different kind of exposure. One cannot also forget the selection of a Polish Pope in the 1970s. The visits of the Pope and American political leaders, as well as the expression of the American human rights policy in Eastern Europe, also made the Polish people think that there was outside support and sympathy for their cause. Poland was, and still is, the target of a bipartisan American policy of support. It was also pointed out that the West Europeans had in this case played a major role. For example, for a long time Polish writers and composers could get published in France when they couldn’t in Poland.

Two related questions about causation were: Was change more likely to occur in a period of relatively good US-USSR relations, a period of detente, or in one of confrontation? and, Was change more likely to occur through the occurrence of crises or the maintenance of stability? Although these questions are often confused they should be kept separate.

Whether or not one thinks that detente is likely to lead to liberalization in Eastern Europe depends on how you perceive the East European regimes and the Soviet Union. If one sees them as fundamentally pragmatic, then detente should help, because it is more likely to allow for step by step accommodations. But if one sees them as fundamentally rigid, ideological regimes that will exploit detente for their own purposes, then detente is not a good policy. In this case, while detente gives you a little more access to the population, the West pays for it through legitimizing the governing elites.
It was suggested that the events of 1956 were the product of a period of detente that encompassed the signing of the Austrian Treaty and a momentary blossoming of summitry. Hungary's attempt to escape from Soviet control in 1956 would never have occurred if the Soviets had not withdrawn their troops from Austria.

But we have to be very careful not to overestimate the effects or opportunities offered by detente. It offers more opportunity for influence from the outside. But the Polish situation has not been notably influenced by the downturn in American-Soviet relations in the last few years. It is very difficult to generalize about the relationship between an overall American or Western policy and the likelihood of change in Eastern Europe. Essentially, in addition to the slight degree of detente, what laid the basis for the 1956 crisis in Hungary was de-Stalinization and the succession crisis in the Soviet Union. They allowed the situation to get out of hand. First, they allowed Rakosi to be replaced. In the result both sides learned new limits that each would allow. Although repression followed the Soviet crushing of Hungarian resistance, they could never go back to the previous situation. Thus, while Nagy and his faction had to be eliminated on the right, the Rakosi forces on the left also remained totally discredited. Kadar had no choice but to try to move to the center and reestablish links to the population.

After crushing the Nagy forces, and in another period of loosening East-West relations, especially after 1968, the Kadar regime embarked on reform. While detente contributed to the reform, it could not have occurred unless Kadar had been trusted by the Soviets as the leader who crushed the revolution of 1956.

Turning to the question of the role of crisis in change in Eastern Europe, it was argued that the change that we find in Hungary and Poland ultimately would have been impossible without the history of crisis. Perhaps we should reevaluate the events of 1956, and see them as the beginning of a necessary process. Crisis is likely to bring improvement, but not immediately. Poland appears to be a much freer, more interesting country today than it was before the 1979 crisis connected with the rise of the Solidarity movement. We should see such events more as part of a process of change, and not something to be overly concerned about. Of course, crises will be followed by repressions, but they will leave a residue on the basis of which more progress can be made in
the future. It can be argued, however, that in these cases it was not so much the crisis that was productive, but the process of mutual learning of limits within which the reformers and the bureaucracy could live. Such lessons might well be learned with or without the trauma of violence.

As an aside, the importance and significance of polling in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was discussed. There has been an increasing willingness of governments and Parties, and now even opposition groups such as Solidarity, to conduct relatively honest public opinion polls. Examples were given of the use of polling even within communist Party meetings. Professional pollsters have been developed that can hold their own with their American colleagues in the profession. Although the results are often kept secret by administrations, there is a growing tendency to discuss public policy in terms of its relation to public opinion, and to establish in the public's mind the relative safety of answering polls honestly—as long as they do not touch on sensitive issues, such as which individuals should be ruling a country. They can touch on surprisingly sensitive topics. Polls in Poland, for example, are known to have shown that the Pope and President Reagan were the two most popular people in the country. Polls have been held in East Germany on the degree to which the citizens of the GDR see themselves as Germans or as East Germans.

There are several implications to this development. In the first place, the use of polls may increasingly come to cast doubt on the right of governments to govern regardless of what the people think. While one purpose of polling may be to guide the government's propagandists as to the subjects that need more drill, the unforeseen consequence can be the acceptance of the right of a people to an opinion, and a diminishment of the absolute right of a vanguard party to lead. A second consequence could be the gradual development of a kind of plebiscitary democracy such as many have advocated in the West, in which elected representatives come gradually to be replaced by periodic and well supervised testing of what people want.
The Economic Situation.*

The presentation on the economic situation covered the subject from three angles: its internal or domestic aspects, its external or international aspects, and finally its near-term prospects to 1990. This introduction considers only the six East European centrally planned economies, those of the countries that belong to COMECON and the Warsaw Pact (analogous to EEC and NATO respectively).

As far as the internal situation is concerned, there are three subjects of primary interest: growth, consumption, and economic security as seen from the household. In regard to economic growth, the growth of the six countries has declined noticeably over the last fifteen years. Just a few illustrative figures: In 1971-75 the average annual rate of growth of GNP in real terms for the six East European countries as a group was 4.9%. Romania was running 6.7%, Hungary 3.3%. In 1976-80 the average for the group was 1.9%—with Romania at 4%, Poland at 0.7%. In 1980-83 the average growth rate for the group was zero, ranging from 2% for Bulgaria to -0.7% for Poland. For 1984 we have only preliminary estimates: growth was probably about 2% for the region, with about 3% for Romania and 0.5% for Hungary.

Observers must be very careful about these rates. In many ways Hungary, for example, appears to be relatively well off, while Romania appears to be having an increasingly hard time. For example, heat and light were reported to be in very short supply in Bucharest in the winter of 1984-85. But the impressions of outsiders, based largely on consumption and retail trade, also may be misleading.

There are four sets of factors that account for the decline in growth rates. One set we might describe as long-term or secular factors over the fifteen year period. They include the slowdown in the growth of labor inputs for demographic reasons, and also the slowdown in the growth of productivity of labor and capital. There are at least two kinds of reasons for the slowdown: shortages of materials and fuels, which affect what labor and capital

* The following discussion is derived in large part from the presentation of Professor Morris Bornstein.
can produce, and the difficulties that these countries have encountered in trying to administer a growing and more complex economy.

The second set of factors involve developments in the world economy that have affected Eastern Europe. These include recessions in West European countries that are potential markets for East European exports, as well as inflation in those West European countries that supply imports for Eastern Europe.

The third set of factors involves harvest fluctuations in countries where agriculture still plays a large part in the economy. Agriculture accounts for one-fourth of GNP by sector of origin in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

Finally there are special factors such as martial law in Poland. The relative importance of these different factors clearly varies by the time period, and by the particular country.

Next is the question of consumption and living standards within GNP. Initially, say in late 1970s, the East European regimes put the burden of the slowdown on investment rather than consumption. Their investment programs grew more slowly than in the past, or were even cut back absolutely. But consumption growth rates were largely maintained. In the early 1980s the regimes found it necessary to curtail the modest improvement in consumption. Per capita consumption grew more slowly in some countries like Bulgaria, but it was reduced absolutely in Poland and Romania. It is common now in East Europe to find shortages, queues, black markets, grey markets, and involuntary saving. Households cannot find goods and services they would like and for which they have money.

Traditionally, there have been two bases of security for the household in Eastern Europe: job security and negligible inflation. Job security was understood as the combination of two elements. The first was the "right to work"; jobs for all—the commitment of the government to a full employment policy, or even a more-than-full employment policy in which there were more job openings than there were available workers. The second element was the duty to work. Every able bodied adult was expected to work. These policies generally continue, but the regimes in some East European countries are considering changes in the conception of job security. First, the promise of tenure in a specific job is no longer absolute. In the past when you got a job you could
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not be fired except for egregious reasons such as insubordination, drunkenness, or absenteeism. You could not be released even when it was desirable to cut the work force in a particular enterprise. Job security was the right to your present job. The proposal now is to guarantee a suitable job in the same geographical area, but allow for a person being released from one enterprise and placed in another, perhaps with retraining.

Another element of economic security is inflation. Traditionally, East European regimes promised the population, in contrast to what was observed in Yugoslavia and the West, a negligible rate of inflation. This had two components. First, the overall state retail price level would not increase. Some individual prices might be raised, but this would be balanced by reductions in other prices. The second component was that the prices of "basic" individual goods and services should not be changed at all. Thus, the prices of bread, meat, rents, and urban transit fares remained unchanged, not just for years, but for decades. In the last decade this promise of no inflation has been effectively revoked. There have been some sharp increases in prices, including the prices of goods and services that were previously untouchable. Moreover, when these price increases have outstripped the increase in money incomes, people's real incomes have been reduced for certain parts of the population, if not all.

To turn to the external side, let us look at some aspects of East Europe's relations with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and with the West on the other. In East European relations with the Soviet Union over the last decade, the East European countries have run large trade deficits. The explanation starts first from the commodity composition. Generally, the Soviet Union exports to Eastern Europe chiefly raw materials and fuels, and the Soviet Union imports from Eastern Europe chiefly manufactured producer and consumer goods. A related element is the increase in world oil prices after 1973, which, as was mentioned in the introductory remarks, led to a significant change in the terms of trade with the Soviet Union. The prices of East European imports from the Soviet Union went up much faster than the prices of East Europe exports to the Soviet Union. These developments have been moderated by certain aspects of pricing in intrabloc trade. The general principle in this trade is that COMECON "contract" prices should be based on a moving five-year average of the world market
prices for the particular goods. When world oil prices rise, then, the Soviet Union sells oil to Eastern Europe at a price below the current world market price. The higher world market prices are reflected in the prices used in East Europe-USSR trade with a lag, and in an attenuated way, because the earlier lower prices are averaged in.

We also have some evidence that the Soviet Union buys East European manufactured goods at prices above the corresponding world market prices, or a moving average of them. Sometimes this combination of what has been interpreted as Soviet undercharging for Soviet exports and Soviet overpayment for imports from Eastern Europe has been called "implicit trade subsidies." Some estimates have placed the amounts of these trade subsidies at significant figures. For example, it is claimed that in the mid-1970s for the East European states together, the Soviet Union granted implicit trade subsidies in an amount equal to seven billion dollars a year. Corresponding estimates are sixteen billion dollars in 1981 and eleven billion dollars in 1984.

It is important to stress that there is serious, critical, technical discussion among specialists about the reliability and nature of these numbers. The reason is basically a lack of data. Therefore, the results depend on the analyst's assumptions about prices and quantities of Soviet exports of fuels and raw materials to Eastern Europe and also about the quantities and prices and qualities of East European manufactured goods that are exported to the Soviet Union. A figure like sixteen billion dollars for the Soviet trade subsidy should be read with caution.

Specialists encounter a number of other problems in assessing East European-Soviet trade. These arise from inadequate information about three very important questions. One is the extent to which this trade involves valuations and settlements in the hypothetical unit of account called the "transferable ruble," which is not transferable, versus trade in a convertible currency. So Soviet-East European trade is being conducted in two quite different ways with very different implications. Second, we do not know as much as we would like about Soviet deliveries of oil above a certain quota. These are tied to East European deliveries of "hard goods," which are defined as something that is scarce—for example, meat from Hungary is a hard good. Third, it is uncertain how East European trade deficits with the Soviet Union are
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financed. For example, to what extent do East European surpluses on other categories of the balance of payments, like services, offset the trade deficit? To what extent is the difference made up by credits from the Soviet Union, and on what terms? There may even be grants from the Soviet Union.

In all of these aspects of Soviet-East European relations the Soviet Union can and does differentiate in its treatment of individual East European countries. Indeed, this differentiation is an important reason for the secrecy that surrounds economic relations and the areas of ignorance of outside analysts.

The last point in connection with Soviet-East European relations is that Soviet economic pressure on Eastern Europe is increasing. The Soviet Union is pressing the East European countries to reduce their trade deficits. In 1984, for example, in two important CMEA (Comecon) meetings, the USSR announced that future Soviet deliveries of fuels and raw materials would depend on two sets of factors. On the Soviet side they would depend on Soviet production, domestic use, and the need to export to the rest of the world for hard currency. So the East Europeans were warned that there would not be so much left for them. Second, Soviet deliveries would depend on what the East Europeans delivered in return, namely, more food, more manufactured consumer goods, and more machinery and equipment that would meet world market technological standards—in contrast to what was currently being supplied. The East Europeans were also called on to participate in Soviet natural resource projects—for example, Soviet oil and natural gas development, a new gas pipeline from Yamal in Siberia to Eastern Europe and an iron ore combine.

These demands on Eastern Europe will certainly strain the East European economies in 1986-90, because to increase exports to the Soviet Union will divert goods from internal use inside Eastern Europe and also reduce what the region can export to the world market for convertible currency. Finally, it is hard to see how Eastern Europe could increase the technological level of its machinery and equipment to meet world market standards.

In relations with the West, Eastern Europe incurred significant trade deficits in the 1970s. These deficits were financed by private and official credit. This led to the rapid growth of East European net convertible currency debt to the West. Western creditors reacted to this buildup of East European debt chiefly at
the beginning of the 1980s. This occurred first with the Polish hard currency payments crisis in 1980, then with the Romanian debt-servicing problems in 1981. The reaction of Western banks and firms that were supplying imports to Eastern Europe was, in banker's terminology, to "reduce their exposure." They curtailed credit to Eastern Europe in order to pull down their holdings of East European debt. The East European countries responded to this by reducing their deficits, or in some cases by turning deficits into surpluses.

They were unable to accomplish this by increasing exports to the West because of the weak demand for East European products. So their adjustment was primarily by reducing East European imports from the West. This process was pursued vigorously. If we look at the five East European countries, excluding Poland (whose accomplishment was to stretch out the existing debt), the net debt went down rather sharply. At the end of 1980 these countries had a net convertible currency debt of about $32 billion. By the end of 1983 they reduced it to $25 billion, and it seems they have cut it to about $20 billion in 1984.

The challenge they face now is how to increase exports to the West. They face three constraints. First, slow internal economic growth. Second, the requirements for exports to the Soviet Union mentioned above. Third, the situation in the markets of Western Europe where East European manufactured goods are usually in a weak competitive position in comparison with their rivals in the newly industrializing countries of the third world. East European countries are competing, for example, with Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea in many areas. East European exports are also limited by the trade restrictions of some Western countries.

Some participants contrasted one aspect of the experience of the more open Yugoslav economy with that of the rest of Eastern Europe. For the last generation a major source of income for Yugoslavia has been the export of labor. With the recent recession in Western Europe this has seriously hurt the Yugoslav economy. Still, this opportunity has given the Yugoslavs chances that the rest of Eastern Europe has not had. As Europe recovers it may be possible for East European countries to begin to follow to some degree the Yugoslav example. Hungary is obviously the best positioned to take advantage of this opportunity. Two years ago they passed a law that allows Hungarians to work in other
countries. Hungarian experts have regularly been sent out to special projects, as in the third world, but there are now technical people going to work in western factories. It is not yet the free export of workers from all classes as in Yugoslavia, but Hungary is the only Soviet bloc country that has gone this far. Hungary does not have the unemployment that propelled Yugoslavia into this course, but this may be an opening that will gradually make their workers more competitive, and provide their workers with new ideas of worker-management relations.

Turning more generally to the future of East European economies, what are the prospects for future economic performance? The consensus of specialists is that economic growth in Eastern Europe through 1990 is likely to be slow, perhaps for the six countries about two percent. These countries will be under pressure during this period. First they must try to curtail domestic absorption (the domestic production plus imports minus exports) in order to increase net exports both to the Soviet Union and the West. Second, they wish to increase the share of investment in GNP.

In regard to the economic policy of the East European countries for the rest of the decade, there is little evidence of planning for significant changes in the allocation of investment; labor force, wage or price policies; or the direction and composition of trade. We may be able to learn more from the new five-year plans for 1986-1990, which should be issued later this year. These may not, however, provide the answers. First, the planning documents may be too skimpy to answer our questions, and, second, the five-year plans are often not fulfilled.

Another subject of considerable interest is possible changes in the economic system. These include changes in planning methods, pricing principles, enterprise performance indicators, compensation schemes for workers and managers, or the role of the private sector. In Eastern Europe, these are often referred to by the catch phrase "changes in the economic mechanism"; more ambitiously, especially in the West, they are called "economic reform."

Hungary is the only striking case of real changes in the economic mechanism, or economic reform, in Eastern Europe. The Hungarians have, in fits and starts, over the last seventeen years, made changes in how they decide questions of what to produce, resource allocation, and income distribution. They have
increased the role of domestic and foreign market forces. Despite this, the central guidance of the economy, both formally and informally, remains very strong in Hungary. It is not yet anywhere near a genuine market economy. It would best be characterized as having elements of a market economy combined with a strong central hand.

The other five East European countries have had no comparably significant, lasting economic reform. In some, such as Bulgaria and the GDR, there have been some relatively minor changes that redistribute authority among different tiers in the administrative hierarchy. Specialists that study these changes often conclude both that the actual content of the new provisions does not involve very much change, and that the changes are often not fully implemented. It turns out that the more one is acquainted with this kind of economic reform, the more skeptical one becomes about it.

The reason for this conservatism is that economic reform in Eastern Europe (and it is also true of the Soviet Union) faces strong opposition on three main grounds. The first is ideological: many important people think that socialism always must include central planning. Second, current government and Party officials with vested interests think that economic reform diluting centralized control would mean a loss in their power. Third, there are some pragmatic and not ill-founded fears that marketizing reforms would involve more inflation and unemployment than has occurred under the present system. The combination of these factors presents a serious barrier to any genuine economic reform.

The Situation in Specific Countries

Poland

There was general agreement that the situation in Poland was of an importance and intensity that was not to be found in the rest of the region. The basis for this situation was, of course, laid down over a period of years. Of the Soviet satellites, only Poland was able to maintain the primacy of independent agriculture, and only Poland was able to maintain the power of a relatively independent Church. Through the period of communist rule the Church remained powerful; often its publications and ministers
retained an independence of expression remarkable in Eastern Europe. Then in the 1970s there was promise of a reformist regime that turned out to be more corrupt than reformist. But in the course of the 1970s money poured into the country, and the standard of living rose on a false and mismanaged spending spree that ended in massive debt and widespread shortages, even of necessities. The Solidarity movement of the last few years developed on this broad basis of relative pluralism and independence of thought. Its specific cause was the careless raising and then disappointing of cultural and economic expectations in the 1970s.

While there are dissidents in all or nearly all of Eastern Europe, only in Poland has the dissidence come to involve the bulk of the population. Today Poland is a "dissident society" rather than a society with dissidents. It is also an articulate society. By mid-1984 there were about 400 underground newspapers. By June 1985 there may have been 950. These papers are issued on a wide variety of topics, often representing a particular union or profession in a particular place. They may list the people who subscribe, and carry articles on how to organize social resistance. In 1984 there were 240 books published by the underground press, some in runs of 35,000 to 40,000, which are very significant runs. There are twelve independent radio stations operating sporadically within the country. This year there have been twelve instances of television overrides at prime time on weekends. This means that on a national television program the official program is interrupted for six to eight minutes while a Solidarity flag appears on the screen and the Solidarity message is presented. Generally the government discovers the override equipment later, but new equipment is acquired. There remains a general boycott of television and theater by the intellectual community. Actors perform instead in churches, freely or with donations.

At least until June 1985, years after the imposition of martial law, an underground committee of Solidarity was still in existence, with two of its original members, hiding successfully for five years, meeting regularly, publishing declarations, and directing a network of underground workers. There are several hundred full-time and perhaps 10,000 part-time workers in the organization. Much of the printing of the organization is done in official government printing houses. There is also another kind of leadership in Lech Walesa and his associates that is able to
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confer with foreign representatives—and even discuss with the Americans whether they should or should not impose sanctions in Poland.

There is, in addition, an external Solidarity network. From its headquarters in Brussels it coordinates activity in a number of leading cities of Europe and North America. It puts out double publications, appearing in Poland and abroad simultaneously, or else smuggled into Poland in large numbers, where they are again reproduced. These magazines present the debates of the opposition community, between socialists and conservatives, believers and nonbelievers; they argue whether Poles should concern themselves with the question of Ukrainian independence or confine their attention less provocatively to Poland itself. They argue about what internal order should be established in Poland.

In short, the social consciousness of the society has been altered. This is the most enduring achievement of Solidarity. In many ways the organization has been crushed, but the social consciousness of the country has thrown off forty years of communism. In private homes underground newspapers are on coffee tables, in the schools history is taught in a manner totally different than it was ten or fifteen years ago.

The reaction that has been setting in now is serious, but has a long way to go before it overcomes what has been accomplished. The first serious sentences for political crimes since the 1984 amnesty have been accompanied by changes in the laws relating to the independence of the universities, a threatened change in the law regarding union pluralism, the mistreatment of priests, the throwing of the wife of a solidarity leader off a moving train, the mistreatment and subsequent expulsion of an American colonel and his wife. On the other hand the trial of the murderers of Father Popieluzko was unprecedented in the communist world—in spite of the attempt to use it to attack the dissident movement rather than those ruling groups who hired the murderers. Still, the reaction is a long way from the viciousness characterizing the repression that Kadar carried out in Hungary after 1956, and is likely to remain so.

It was agreed that we can expect more provocations, if not from the government itself, at least from some of the factions within it, or perhaps the Soviets. The surprise is the degree to which the opposition has maintained its nonviolence. Adam Michnik, the
Solidarity leader, has said, in rough translation, "There are things in life for which it is worthwhile to suffer and die; there are no things in life for which one can inflict suffering and kill." This has been their motto. But, of course, under provocation it could break down.

The participants did not come to a firm conclusion on the position of the Party in Poland; most participants believed the Party had been weakened, if not fatally. They saw Jaruzelski as both a military leader and Party leader. To speak of a "military takeover" or a "military regime" in this circumstance seemed foolish to those who saw the military as simply be the last reservoir of relatively uncorrupted Party cadres. Others believed that Jaruzelski only trusted military men, and that both he and the society saw him primarily as a general. It was pointed out that in the typical communist regime the Party apparatus is dominant, and it is supported by the secret police and reinforced by the army. In Poland the government is dominated by the army, and supported by the secret police and the Party. From this viewpoint Poland now has a military-police regime. Proponents of the continuity of Party rule admitted that the Party was up against the wall. Whether this meant that it was not possible to reconstitute traditional civilian Party control or not remained to be seen.

Hungary

There is little doubt that Hungary offers the least controversial example of positive change in Eastern Europe. It has liberalized in many ways unparalleled by its Soviet-dominated neighbors. It has introduced economic reforms far more meaningful than those in other satellites—although in agriculture Poland has retained more aspects of the pre-communist system. However, the degree to which Hungary's liberalizing trends are, or will become, fundamental remains unclear. Some emphasized the fact that the Hungarians do a very good job of advertising their successes, and in the West have "sold" their changes as being more successful and thorough than they have actually been.

The Hungarians have made significant strides in increasing the private enterprise economy, in increasing the private sector, in relating domestic prices to the world market, in relating prices to the cost of production, and in bringing Hungarian values into
closer alignment with real world values. While prices for producer goods are still set administratively, for goods that are traded internationally the Hungarians set the prices in relation to prices on the world market. This is a real change, yet it is a mistake to say that Hungary has achieved "market socialism." Since competitive pricing in the producer's market does not exist internally, prices cannot lead to a rational allocation of resources.

In a broader sense, one can speak of a different "climate" having been achieved in Hungary. In a way there is a nation-wide conspiracy to make as many changes as possible while keeping the Soviets quiet. The elites are clearly trying to take every advantage of the limits they perceive. The leaders move incrementally forward. At each step they tell the Soviets what they are doing, nothing is done behind their back; progress is achieved so naturally that there is never an obvious point at which the Soviets will step in and say that this is enough, or that the process must stop.

There have also been negative aspects to the Hungarian process. This has led to muted struggles within the regime and between the regime and the people. One issue is that the economic reforms have led to considerable economic inequality. Incentives have led to new wage differentials, as well as the beginning of a wealthy class. Even the communist-controlled union leaders have tended to dissent on this issue, leading to a "conservative communist" reaction among part of the work force. An important union leader was recently replaced as a result. A second issue is the desire of the cultural elite to move faster than the government wishes. They want to write more on current problems and to reconsider the recent past, a past that includes the earlier actions of Kadar. The regime has tended to react strongly to this latter attempt.

Hungarian political leaders agree that the economic opening has led to more inequality. But they feel that this is the price they have to pay for attempting to integrate their economy into the world market. Given the fact that a large percentage of the country's income comes from foreign trade, they feel they have no choice. In their eyes the solution is to find ways to retrain and retool people that they have to let go from enterprises that are no longer profitable or competitive in the world market. Although there is a social cost, from a policy viewpoint they are correct.
The multiple candidate elections in summer 1985 offered just a glimmer of democracy, yet symbolically they were very significant. Perhaps at this point it was just an attempt to let people work off steam rather harmlessly. The candidates are still tightly controlled and have to support the Party program. But what has already been done is unprecedented in Eastern Europe, and the future may see pressures for continued expansion of the process.

Hungary has fairly open access to foreign media and scholarly publications. There is also a surprising openness and willingness to criticize within the society. Still, there are at least short-term political arrests for the expression of opinion that the government feels goes too far; the real dissidents are a carefully monitored and tiny group of intellectuals. Hungary is, on the other hand, perhaps the only East European country that has not been accused of putting dissidents in mental hospitals as a form of punishment.

Such openings and problems suggest that transition to a new regime after the retirement of Kadar could lead to a severe crisis. If the Soviets have allowed change in Hungary largely because of the trust they have in Kadar, then it may be very hard for a successor regime to move forward in the same way without more overt Soviet interference.

East Germany (DDR or GDR)

The German Democratic Republic is by far the most powerful communist state in Eastern Europe. It receives the most modern arms from the Soviet Union, and it is the one country that has been willing to maintain the high rate of defense spending that the Soviet Union wishes. The reliability of its military is considered very high. Economically it is a junior partner of the Soviet Union. East Germany is especially important as a funnel for high technology to the Soviet Union. The Polish problems have tended to increase its importance. The large-scale modernization of the East German navy has gone largely unnoticed. It has had to take over responsibilities in the Baltic Sea.

In essence the GDR has sought to fill the vacuum created by Poland's weakness since 1980. It has sought at the same time to use its increased importance as a means of increasing its independence. It has become much more assertive vis-a-vis Moscow. In
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particularly, it has sought to expand its trade contacts with the Federal Republic (West Germany). Its motives are economic, but this should also be seen as part of a general policy to expand contacts with the West. Economically, support from West Germany has tended to make the GDR a closer partner of the EEC than the other countries of the region, and at the same time to give it a higher standard of living.

The cancellation under Soviet pressure of the visit by Honecker in September 1984, underscored the limits of this policy. But this will not mark the end of the GDR's attempts to increase its ties with Bonn. It needs the credits that it can get from the Federal Republic, and it would risk serious political repercussions at home if it attempted to reduce contacts with West Germany. Over the past decade the increasing number of visits between the two Germanies have become a fact of life; it is unlikely that they will be cut back.

Because of Soviet pressure, at present relations between the two Germanies are on hold. But after a decent interval, they are likely to warm again. When and how will depend in part on the relations of East and West, and particularly on the state of relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union. If these improve, it will be hard for the Soviets to stand in the way of an improvement in relations between the two Germanies. But we do not know the latitude or leeway that Gorbachev will grant the DDR.

Overall, there has been relatively little liberalization in the GDR. However, the East German churches have managed to maintain a good deal of independence. With the help of their West German colleagues, they have developed a large and impressive independent peace movement.

There has been some separation of the two Germans culturally and linguistically as a result of the wall. But culturally, the East Germans certainly regard themselves as Europeans, and most continue to regard themselves as Germans rather than East Germans. Although the East German government has tried to develop a separate East German consciousness, its greater effort goes into its attempt to acquire the mantle of German nationalism. Their recent celebration of Luther was only one aspect of a general effort to revive the past, as both Prussians and Germans. The new army uniforms are Prussian uniforms. But this is a two-edged sword for the East Germans. Because in one sense they have never accepted
their connection with the German past: They have never seen themselves as a successor government to the Reich. They have never paid reparations, even to other East Europeans. They want to cut themselves off from any identity with the Kaiser or the Nazis.

East Germans have become increasingly attached to West German television, which offers a greater diversity. It uses the same language and without special efforts covers most of East Germany. Where it does not, cable is being introduced to give the benefits of Western television to all East Germans.

One participant argued that the changes in East Germany when taken together add up to more than is usually realized. Since 1978 the assertive Protestant Church has been echoed to a degree by the Catholic Church. The population has begun to assert itself. There is large-scale alienation of youth. Without the burden of the past they have a good deal more self-confidence.

Certainly, East Germany is the key to our strategic interest in Eastern Europe. The main Soviet army in the region is located there, and any major attack on the West would originate in East Germany.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia remains a politically inactive, morose country. Yet there is interest in the government in developing more contacts with the West. Among the dissidents the Charter 77 movement still lives. Small numbers have demonstrated in spite of the controls. Last year a group of the Greens tried to demonstrate at the Soviet army base.

Romania

Romania is one of the most repressive societies in Eastern Europe domestically, and yet one of the most independent in its foreign policy. The government is often referred to as Stalinist, but it has diverged from that model in the direction of that of North Korean familial rule. The leader's wife, Elena Ceausescu, serves beside him on the politburo and is often addressed in almost identical terms. His son and other relatives also have high government positions. The obsequiousness of the Party about the Ceausescus should not obscure the fact that they are probably
some of the least loved leaders in Eastern Europe. The result is a presumption that their fall might seriously endanger the Party's rule; they have by their efforts to accumulate power undermined its morality and vitality. In addition to the repression, the economy is in shambles.

Internationally, the regime is assertive, and has opposed the Soviet Union both within the Warsaw Pact and publicly outside. There is some doubt as to the reality of this opposition. At international meetings the Romanians seem ultimately to be under the control of their Soviet colleagues. However, the Romanian military have been particularly open in their attempts to develop contacts with the West. They have been glad to demonstrate the special abilities of their mountain troops. They appear to cause the Soviets problems in meetings of the Warsaw Pact. Romania's reduction of its role in the Warsaw Pact is marked by its refusal to participate in major Soviet maneuvers or to let major Soviet units transit the country. Its independence from Soviet international positions was perhaps best symbolized by its active participation in the 1984 Olympics. Romania is trying to increase exports to the West and thus reduce dependence on the Eastern bloc.

Romania's role in human rights meetings, such as those connected with the Helsinki process, is both independent and duplicitous. While its representatives criticize the Soviets for their actions against human rights, none of this reflects back on changing the actual situation in their own country, where many are imprisoned for political reasons. Expression is closely controlled, even typewriters must be registered with the government. Knowing that Congress looks critically on their performance, at the time of the Most Favored Nation reviews they tend to loosen control slightly, only to increase the repression after the review is over.

Nevertheless, the Romanian human rights record is not all black. Fundamentalist groups such as the Baptist Pentacostals represent perhaps the fastest growing religious group in Europe, and their activities have had little interference from the regime. There are twelve different denominations involved in the movement. New churches are permitted. It is also true that Romania has recently allowed more emigration than any other country in Eastern
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Europe. Sometimes it is even more than we are prepared to accept; many of them have been dissidents.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria has been characterized by modest economic reform, with new interest in exports to the West, and in Western aid in developing high technology. There has been increasing trade and even the introduction of multinationals. Although traditionally seen as the only real friend of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria today seems somewhat more independent. It has recently joined with Hungarians or Romanians in resisting Soviet initiatives at the COMECON meetings. The issue of the Pope's assassination has been said to have led to recriminations between Sofia and Moscow.

Albania

Albania has been the most repressed and inaccessible country in Eastern Europe. However, like Romania, its Stalinism has gone along with independence in foreign policy. In this case the independence has meant opposition to most of the world, including the United States, China, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. With the death of Hoxha, however, the situation may be changing. Tirana receives and even rebroadcasts Italian television. Some trade has developed with Western Europe.

Nevertheless, at home Albania maintains a Stalinist repression. Not a single church or monastery is left open. The idea of change in the structure or level of repression in the society remains a hope.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia has managed the first phase of its succession crisis fairly well. The Party remains in control, but to some minds the Party is little more than a grouping of the several Parties of the different Republics (and within each of these there are feuding groups). Ethnic cleavages and disparities between the standard of living and culture in different parts of the country threaten to blow it apart. The Albanian-speaking people in the Kosovo area
have been particularly restive, with some demanding a separate republic or accession to Albania. However, there does not seem to be a cleavage between the government and the military, nor does there seem to be a dissident movement on a large scale that could affect the system nationally. Ethnic dissidence is just below the surface, but the national army, dominated by the most numerous people, the Serbs, would stand against any serious attempt to split up the country. Although there is a deliberate policy of mixing people from the different nationalities in military units, the development of the territorial forces may have reduced the ability of the army to serve as a unifying force. Yugoslavia is also faced with a thirty percent decline in the standard of living—based in part on the return of workers from Western Europe as the result of its recession. Yugoslavia's national debt is close to twenty billion dollars.

Yugoslavia remains independent in foreign policy, although perhaps not as assertive and outward looking as under Tito. Domestically it is more schizoid. Often playing to a Western audience, and deeply embued with Western ideas, year in and year out the regime still chooses to imprison for political reasons perhaps as many people as any country in Eastern Europe. Harsh sentences are given sometimes for trivial verbal and private expressions of opposition. This repression seriously embarrasses the regime and its intellectual supporters, and yet it has continued with relatively little change for the last generation. The most notorious trials have been those of the Belgrade Six and those in Croatia. The Party is still ruled by harsh elements. The woman who has been governing the country in recent years, Mrs. Planinc, developed her reputation in part because of her role in suppressing Croats in 1971.

In spite of this it can be argued that the sociology of Yugoslavia has become Western. One out of every five workers has had experience in noncommunist Europe. Every year more Yugoslavs go to Greece and Italy for vacations than Germans and Northern Europeans go to Yugoslavia.
Policy Toward Eastern Europe: General Considerations

American political objectives in Eastern Europe are determined by several considerations. Eastern Europe is, in the first instance, an area of danger for the United States and its allies. Any war in Europe would be launched from Eastern Europe, employing initially the Soviet troops stationed in the region. Therefore, our first concern is the presence of Soviet troops in these countries, their only significant presence outside of the homeland before Afghanistan. Secondly, we are concerned with the human rights situation in Eastern Europe. The denial of freedom is particularly glaring in the face of the universal democratization of Western Europe since World War II. Human rights in the region take on a considerable political importance internally because of the many East European nationality groups in the United States that retain sentimental or familial ties to their oppressed homelands. Eastern Europe is also important to the extent that the Soviet Union is able to use it as a base or conduit for the support of many of the third world propaganda or revolutionary activities that Moscow directly or indirectly supports. Finally, we are concerned with the region because of its intimate association with the Soviet Union. Change or immobility in either area is likely to be reflected in the other. Ideologically and culturally Eastern Europe is a transition zone between East and West. Such an area is useful for the transmission of ideas and values. Immediately after World War II this capability was seen as a danger to Western Europe. It is now seen primarily as an avenue for the eventual liberalization of the Soviet Union. However, in regard to the third world and certain activities such as international terrorism the Soviet Union is still able to use Eastern Europe as an additional avenue for spreading its ideas and supporting its causes.

American political interests in the region have been defined in terms of achieving the twin goals of improvement in human rights and increasing the independence of East European regimes from the Soviet Union. We might speak of our goals as the neutralization and liberalization of Eastern Europe. In some cases the one objective and in others the other will stand out. American leaders have no illusions that there can be a rapid change of position for most East European governments—in fact, too rapid a
change would present dangers of destabilization. But many believe that there is a good prospect of being able in the long run to foster the twin goals of neutralization and liberalization.

The goals and emphases of the participants varied widely under the umbrella of agreement on the most general goals. To those who see Eastern Europe primarily in relation to the Soviet Union and its security threats to Europe, the objective of neutralization is one of reducing the ability of the Soviets to act freely in the area, to give them problems closer to home that will reduce their tendency to operate throughout the world, and to take away those bases or facilities for such operations that they have developed in the region. From this perspective many attempts to aid Eastern Europe economically are doubly costly, in that they reduce the burden of empire that the Soviet Union must now carry. On the other hand, if a country can be detached politically from the Soviet empire, if that empire can be physically reduced, then we should assist that country.

Recent studies of scenarios involving different levels of participation of East European armed forces in Soviet offensives in Central Europe have shown that a high degree of satellite cooperation is very important for Soviet success. The extent to which satellite cooperation is essential to Soviet success in the region in a nonnuclear military encounter has not been generally realized. This cooperation is already doubtful on a salient from Albania through Yugoslavia into Romania. The Polish crisis of 1980-81 cast doubt on the reliability of this key to the Soviet military posture. Clearly, if the Soviets were to become progressively less sure of the cooperation of East European armed forces in Soviet military initiatives in and through the region, then the problem of the conventional defense of Western Europe would be significantly alleviated.

The rise of peace movements in Eastern Europe has also reduced the freedom of the Soviet Union in regard to nuclear initiatives. Participants noted evidence that the satellites had been instrumental in returning the Soviet Union to the arms control negotiating table. In this regard it was interesting that most participants considered that arms control negotiations were less important for the peace of Europe than for the success of an attempt to achieve the neutralization of Eastern Europe.
Since the Carter administration the key to American policy has been differentiation. This means that the American government strives to differentiate in its policy both positively and negatively between those countries in Eastern Europe that have to a degree separated themselves from the Soviet Union in foreign policy or have shown an increased respect for human rights. It also means that the American government should differentiate between its treatment of an oppressed East European country and its treatment of the Soviet Union, a country with more complete responsibility for its actions.

While simple to enunciate, the policy has been hard to put into practice; directly or indirectly how this might be done was the basis of much of the discussion at the conference. The first problem is that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are of primary importance regardless of what is happening in Eastern Europe. The primacy of relations with the Soviet Union is even clearer in the policies of our West European allies. The result is that it is difficult to follow a policy that consistently differentiates in favor of the Eastern Europeans—especially when for other reasons there is pressure to improve relations with the Soviet Union. For example, Poland is clearly a more liberal country than the Soviet Union, and a country much closer to us even on the governmental level. Yet because of its recent suppressions of dissidents we treat it far worse than we do the USSR. We speak, for example, of being anxious to meet with the Soviets, Secretary Shultz saw Gromyko at least six times in 1984-85, and there were plans for a meeting on the presidential level. Yet during this period there was a ban on anyone of even Assistant Secretary level going to Poland or seeing the Charge in Washington. At first the Reagan administration had a policy of blaming everything that went on in Poland directly on the Soviet Union. But this policy could not be maintained. The East Europeans and the Polish-American community are said to consider this imbalance between the way we treat Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as outrageous.

Secondly, there is a good deal of difference between those who see progress in human rights as the primary criterion—or at least a necessary criterion—for improved American relations with an East European state, and those who view separation from the Soviet Union as the more critical objective of policy.
A subsidiary issue in this regard was the significance to the United States of demonstrations of foreign policy independence. Many were reluctant to give much importance to the demonstrations, particularly of the Romanians, of policy independence. It was argued that just irritating the Soviets by actions such as refusal to participate in the Olympic boycott, or taking an independent position in regard to the third world does not count for much. If an East European country actually keeps out Soviet troops, or puts pressure on the Soviets in regard to their missile bases, then this makes a real difference to our national interests, and should be rewarded in terms of the policy of differentiation.

Another position was that the activities of the separate communist countries of Eastern Europe are representative of possibilities for change that are learned by all the others. The importance of Romanian independence is not so much in how much this hurts the Soviets, but in the possibility for independence that Romania demonstrates. There is no doubt but what the Yugoslav example has had meaning to other East Europeans in terms of both foreign and domestic policy. Yugoslavia is not an ideal, but it has shown some possibilities. In foreign policy, even Albania has had a lesson to teach. On the other hand, the degree of liberalization attained in Hungary, or the strength of the union movement and the Church in Poland give examples of other possibilities of change that can be read by neighbors. The Polish Church, for example, has surely been an example to a slightly more independent Czechoslovak Catholic Church, as well as to the Protestants in East Germany. From this perspective it is less important to test every example of change in an East European country from the viewpoint of its immediate return to American interests, but rather to see its value as a possible building block for other steps that may be taken in that country, or in other communist countries.

There was general agreement that the key aspect of American strategy in Eastern Europe is to develop policy that supports trends in the area that are already developing irrespective of what we do. Such "organic," "indigenous," or internally generated trends are much more likely to be reliable than any gains that we might achieve in the short-run through the application of leverage of any kind. Similarly, if we were to attempt too early to support trends that have not yet developed much steam in the country
affected, then we might cause embarrassment to ourselves and set back the very development we wish to promote. Thus, for example, in the absence of a strong dissident movement in a country, we should concentrate on raising the level of communication and education about the West, without actively trying to promote revolutionary forces.

Another participant saw an additional aspect of US-USSR relations developing that would have serious consequences for Eastern Europe. In his estimation the Soviet Union faces a period of continuing stagnation, with growth hovering between zero and two percent per year. Feasible reforms under Gorbachev are unlikely to change this forecast very much. This suggests that in a few years there will be an initiative by the Soviet Union to improve relations with the United States so that they might obtain Western aid. If Moscow decides that this help is really important to give them relief on the military or economic front, then this is bound to affect the overall climate. Although the Soviets may look more particularly at the West Europeans for aid, they will be unable to avoid turning to us as well. If so, then this leads us to the question of what the Soviets might be prepared to give up to attain the aid, or, conversely, what we should ask for in return. These questions will then frame other questions in regard to Eastern Europe. In particular, we might decide to make relaxing Soviet control over Eastern Europe a precondition for better relations and more aid.

The Soviets supply most of the raw materials and the energy for Eastern Europe. Eighty to eighty-five percent of their exports to the West are in the form of energy. Energy prices are going down. If as expected the Soviets end up with less hard currency they will face a dilemma. On the one hand, they will wish to reduce their current subsidies and extract as much as they can from the East European economies. On the other hand, the East Europeans will be under enormous economic strain, and the more they tax them, the worse their problems will be.

It was objected that while this forecast might be correct, one could expect to reap much less advantage from the situation politically than was implied. Historically, the Soviets have since 1917 never made political concessions, even under the most strained economic conditions. But on questioning this position it
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was agreed that the Soviets might make some concessions to reality, such as on arms control or weaponry.

The alternative, more hard-line, suggestion was that while the Soviets would never concede anything politically to get assistance, we might, through withholding aid, force them to make concessions out of internal necessity. When they have no choice, then they will give ground. But one can never offer aid in the hope of concessions. The discussion seemed to revolve around a question of emphasis, but still one with important policy implications.

Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Strategy and Tactics

The most general conclusion for American policy was that the United States should put renewed emphasis on Eastern Europe, both for its own sake, and as an important factor in our relationship to the USSR. It was felt that American attention given in the past, particularly through the services of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America, had played an important part in making possible current trends in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. Conceptually the keystone of American policy toward Eastern Europe should remain the policy of differentiation, which has in fact been American policy for a number of years.

Our objectives in regard to the specific countries of Eastern Europe should vary with their situation and level of opposition. For most of Eastern Europe the United States has three major policy questions: How do we support liberalization? How do we react to retrogression? and How do we relate our policy toward the USSR to our policies or reactions in Eastern Europe? For Hungary our goal should be to consolidate the liberalization that has taken place. There are dangers stemming from the economic slowdown and the succession crisis that may follow Kadar. As long as the development of the country remains on the track of recent years, our goal must be to help the country overcome such crises. It is important to emphasize that we are speaking of supporting trends, not supporting stability for its own sake. Hungary has many problems; it still has a long way to go before it reaches real freedom.
For Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Bulgaria our goal should be the promotion of liberalization. These are far from liberal societies. If in these cases we move too early, if we begin to support printing presses, and take other actions such as we have taken in Poland, then this may actually result in a setback for liberalization. The reason our efforts succeed in Poland is the nationwide support they receive. The degree of collaboration, even of government officials at many levels is phenomenal. But if we tried to give open support to dissident movements in Czechoslovakia, or even Hungary, inevitable failures would lead to the loss of whole programs, and a retrogression in freedom. The stage is just not set for an active program of support for an underground.

Romania and Poland present, however, more complex problems for American policy.

Our policy interests in Poland must involve active support for the opposition, support that carries considerably beyond the generalized support for liberalization that should characterize our policy in the rest of Eastern Europe. Here the problem becomes devising means for assisting the process of transformation. In the current geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, it is very difficult to develop a satisfactory policy. The situation is explosive because if we prevail on Jaruzelski to achieve what we euphemistically call "reconciliation," we are, in effect, calling upon him to share power with the opposition.

It is equally hard to decide what American policy objectives should be in Romania. We want to support the country's independence from the Soviet Union, while at the same time pressing the government to improve its human rights record. But we do not know if the two goals are compatible in the present geopolitical situation. Ceausescu has achieved the independence he has in part because he has maintained the repression. Were he to liberalize he might both lose control personally, and invite Soviet interference. Successor regimes would be likely to face the same dangers.

Some participants felt that Yugoslavia should be included as a part of Eastern Europe. It was still communist, and shared many other cultural features with its neighbors. If the lesson that we wanted to teach in Eastern Europe was what could be done in a communist country in the region, then Yugoslavia stood as a good example. On the other hand, if we wish to demonstrate that we
stand for something more than simply cold war opposition to the Soviet Union, then we should bring pressure against Yugoslavia for its denials of human rights, just as we do against denials in Romania, or another East European country.

However, most participants did not think that Yugoslavia should figure prominently in a discussion of American support for liberalization in Eastern Europe. They felt that Yugoslav leaders had done a creditable job in dealing with very difficult problems both internally and in relation to the USSR. They felt that the conference should be devoted to consideration of American policy toward that set of countries that are involved intimately with the USSR, and that American policy should be seen in terms of the interplay of three main actors: the United States, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. This did not mean that human rights groups such as Freedom House should not continue to work for a freer Yugoslav society. This can be effective. Recently the German "Greens" came to protest at the trial of the Six. The Yugoslav authorities did not know how to handle them when they held press conferences and public meetings with the dissidents in their hotel rooms.

It was felt appropriate, however, to consider Albania in the context of the conference, because it was not yet attached to either world—it was still "up for grabs" geopolitically. Therefore, it was felt that at least indirectly a version of the liberalization approach used with the Warsaw Pact states should be supported.

More generally it was felt that our policy in Eastern Europe should encourage the peoples of the region to be aware that they enjoy the support of the outside world. We want them to know that we do not accept the interpretation of Yalta that says that we have agreed to a permanent division of Europe. We want them to know that we distinguish the people from their governments, and, where it is warranted, that we distinguish their governments from the government of the Soviet Union. Even in the case of a country such as Hungary, in which the government and the people are relatively close together, some felt that we should pursue a policy of support for the interests of the people as people distinct from their government. Without continuing government-to-government pressure for human rights, the desirable trends that do exist may dry up.
In pursuing this policy it was felt desirable to maintain people-to-people contact at all levels in a variety of fields, and to maintain these if at all possible even in crisis situations where there is a temptation to break off contacts. Thus, the group stood in this case for a modification of at least the policy tendencies of recent administrations in response to crisis.

Distinguishing between governments and peoples in the application of sanctions admittedly has practical problems. Economic moves, for example, generally hurt both the people and government. Similarly difficult was "punishing" the Soviet Union for its action in Eastern Europe, when in fact our relations with the Soviet Union involve so much else. It was suggested that one approach might be reductions in the size of the Soviet purchasing mission, or the expulsion of KGB agents, where these actions could be made explicit responses to oppressions in a East European country.

Depending on local conditions we should assist the local opposition, the trade unions, the Church, or even, as appropriate, the military, on the assumption that the Communist Party is the principle enemy, and that the transfer of power to any other group is advantageous and progressive. This proposition was, of course, questioned by those who would deemphasize support for actual opposition groups in countries such as Hungary where progress was occurring without them, or in Czechoslovakia, where they had not yet reached a high enough level to warrant an effort that might do more harm than good.

In the case of Hungary, it was pointed out that the opposition was in some cases the more conservative group, the ones who wanted to roll back some of the economic changes that have occurred. In such cases our task would be to support the right of the opposition to oppose, rather than to support the opposition cause. This would appear to be another reason why in most of Eastern Europe we should be careful to support primarily liberalization, rather than dissident groups.

Many ideas for increasing people-to-people contact were mentioned; there appeared to be a great deal of room for more innovation. The establishment of the Chair of American Studies at the University of Budapest was one example. American universities could do much more of this. The Catholic Church's support for agriculture in Poland gave other opportunities.
The idea that military groups should be aided was related to the suggestion that we should be in favor of military governments as transitions away from Communist Party rule. As discussed above, whether this had actually occurred in Poland was argued. There was also disagreement over whether military rule in the East European context would be likely to evolve further into a more liberal regime, as had happened in other parts of the world—or become merely another form of repressive society. Most seemed to feel that the evolution through military rule would be possible, or more possible than continued Party rule allowed.

However, it was also pointed out that there appeared to be some important evolutions in states that remained under Party rule. Yugoslavia and Hungary had certainly changed, and Romania had a familial form of communism that was different than the model from which it had evolved. Thus, the question of the desirability of military rule has raised the most basic question of all—What kind of evolution is really possible under communism? Especially when reinforced by a neighboring Soviet Union?

The only state for which this was seen as a likely possibility in the near future, aside from the possible case of Poland, was Romania. In this case the government could hardly be more repressive than it already was, and the Party had been greatly weakened by the familial system established by Ceausescu. The military might in this case be the last resort. If they did take over, it was argued that we should welcome this outcome. The possibility of a military takeover in Yugoslavia was also mentioned, but it was felt to be unlikely, except perhaps as a response to the threat of the dissolution of the union. In this case the Serbian-dominated officer corps would step in to prevent disintegration.

In general the group wished to stress the desirability of supporting internally generated change rather than artificially imposed change. Some felt that the American government had been inclined to think that leverage and sanctions would of their own accord bring about permanent change. We cannot support what is not there. Our goal must instead be to assist trends and developments in the region that we find desirable.

The group agreed that it should not be American policy to talk about borders or possible changes in borders. Thus, we should strive to stay away from disputes such as that between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania, or that between Yugoslavia and Albania.
over the Kosovo (Albanian-speaking) area of Yugoslavia. It could only be in the Soviet interest to have such disputes inflamed. However, in the case of East Germany we should avoid speaking as though we accept the reality of two Germanies, or of the separation of East Berlin from West Berlin.

Another overall approach for American policy in Eastern Europe was the promotion of human rights through manipulating the general level of warmth in diplomatic and associated relations. Persistent criticisms of communist denials of human rights in the meetings of what has come to be called the "Helsinki process" have been one aspect of this. (The most important meetings have been held in Belgrade and Madrid, and most recently Ottawa.) The arguments over renewing most-favored-nation status that the United States has granted to Romania is another aspect of this process. Here the criticism comes directly from Congress, but is of vital importance to the Romanians. It forces the Romanians to listen to us throughout the year. The use of such forums is a means of exposure. It has certainly been welcomed by dissident groups in Eastern Europe. Yet the concrete accomplishments of the human rights approach are sparse; and it seemed difficult to conceive of ways to use this approach more fully.

Perhaps more useful is exploitation of the fact that the governments of East European countries seem increasingly interested in being "well thought of" by Americans. They resent the attitude Americans have had toward them as both puppets and oppressors. Yet they strive to improve their images, and this affects their actions to some extent. This desire to maintain or improve their image in the West, and thus to increase positive contact with Americans on all levels, affects chiefly the Hungarians, and, some thought, the Bulgarians. But one can see its effects in most of Eastern Europe. It may lie behind the relative freedom with which the Charter 77 group has maintained its existence in Czechoslovakia, or the relative freedom of the East German Protestant churches.
Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Specific Countries

In addition to the general discussion of policies, and the categorization of countries according to general criteria, the discussion considered specific policy questions in regard to a number of individual countries.

Poland

Poland was thought to lie outside the normal considerations for other countries for a number of reasons. As pointed out, it was a country in a process of transformation, a dissident society. At the same time, it was a society with a large ethnic population in the United States that was directly concerned. Thus, although it is actually quite liberal, there is an emotional tendency to treat every sign of repression in Poland much more seriously than if it had occurred in another East European state.

Many felt that when a new repression, a new trial for example, occurs we should do something. But as pointed out above, if this means broad sanctions against the society, then the temptation should be resisted. Walesa is now surrounded by a number of very competent economic advisors. He warns that the Polish people are tired of the economic struggle, and cutting trade or credits might in fact hurt the opposition as much as the government.

Poland has gone through and is expected to go through a series of crises, stimulated by economics, as well as raised hopes during periods of liberalization. While the opposition has remained remarkably nonviolent, a series of crises followed by nasty repressions may eventually produce an explosion. There is a danger that some segments of the opposition may radicalize. The KGB or its Polish equivalent may try to provoke this process.

The first problem for policy is how to support the dissent and the pluralism, while at the same time preventing the explosion. The second is to devise strategies for dealing with the explosion if it occurs. The commonsense solution is to say that we will do nothing in a real crisis, but for a number of internal and external reasons we might not be able to take this approach even if it were desirable.

Right now the four policy questions are: How do we help the opposition? How do we support the liberal transformation? How do we react to retrogression? and, How do we link our policy with the
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Soviet Union to the situation in Poland? On the second question we should expand exchanges, continue the IMF negotiations, and aid the church-supported agricultural programs. In reacting to retrogression, we must avoid giving economic body blows. The vitality of the society is being drained, and this saps the resistance. Even those who felt that we should put increased economic pressure on Eastern Europe felt that Poland was an exception.

Actions must be found that hurt primarily the regime, that affect its prestige, or its relations with the Soviet Union. The size of the Warsaw Treaty trade mission in this country might be cut down. Perhaps the Polish UN mission is too large; its life could be made miserable. We could increase substantially the budget for broadcasts to Poland, and the number of hours that are being broadcast, especially since the radio is being jammed. Most difficult is linkage of the Polish situation to our policy to the Soviet Union.

The danger is that we will be pressured, both by the Russians and some elements in Poland, into severing most of those ties that developed after 1956, and gave us some influence on events in Poland. It is the object of some people, perhaps including General Jaruzelski, to create circumstances in which these ties are disrupted mutually.

Tactically it was felt to have been a mistake over the last few years to have put so much emphasis on whether we had an ambassador in Warsaw. We should look at this as something the Poles should request because of their needs, rather than something we should insist on.

It was pointed out that we have more leverage with the Soviets than we may be aware of. They do not want to bail Poland out. They know that if Poland becomes a total basket case, it will cost them tens of millions of rubles. Thus, since they actually want help in Poland this means that we can set conditions. At some point a Polish government leader will have to conclude that he needs to talk to the opposition and work out a joint program that will carry the country through a prolonged period of austerity. They will need such a program and it will not be easy. To bring this about, we will have to keep up the strength of the opposition, especially since it may be weakened by arrests. We must not let it shrink, or appear to be crushed. It should remain relatively organized. We should discuss our policy in regard to
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Poland with them. We want the people to know that we consult with the leaders of the opposition in regard to subjects such as the IMF. We should not decide in isolation what level and type of sustenance we provide: our decisions should develop out of mutual discussion with the opposition leaders.

Hungary

Leaving Poland and Yugoslavia aside, the differentiation policy places Hungary in the most-favored position from the American viewpoint. The policy recommended for Hungary was support for the continued liberalization effort, particularly as it seemed to involve both the government and the people. While there was a difference of opinion as to why the Soviets allowed the relative liberalization in Hungary, there was a feeling that the United States and the Soviet Union have more common interests in Hungary than in any other East European country. Both countries want to see continued stability—although, no doubt, wish for different end points for the current trends.

There are two problems for American policy. First, how to maintain current trends, given economic problems and the coming retirement of Kadar, and secondly, how to fine tune our support for a liberalizing government with our support for the right of opposition elements to express their points of view more freely, or to take a more active part in the political process. The general feeling was that we should not be too active in support for dissidents, although there should be continued pressure for liberalization.

East Germany (DDR) (GDR)

Policy toward East Germany should differ from that toward the rest of Eastern Europe for two reasons. First, the West Germans have a special interest that has led them to become involved in relatively intense trade and cultural relationships. Secondly, we should not act in any way that legitimizes the permanent division of Germany. We should not treat it as a fully sovereign state, nor accept Berlin as its capital. We should continue, for example, to protest when East German forces parade in East Berlin. We should make it clear that we retain responsibility for Germany as a whole, and should maintain our declaratory policy that the Germans have a right to decide on the political arrangements for
all of Germany. We should conduct business with East Germany, but should refrain from ceremonial visits. This does not mean that we should isolate East Germany or the East Germans.

Although the West Germans have a major interest in East Germany, and should in many cases take the lead, we should not allow the West Germans to be the dominant actor in the relationship. First, this kind of relationship scares the rest of Western Europe. Secondly, the relationship so fascinates some West Germans that it may make problems for NATO. There are already some West Germans who have reservations about the degree of solidarity they can afford to demonstrate in NATO, or even the EEC (Common Market), without foreclosing certain options that they think they have with East Germany. This problem would be compounded if they became the sole, or even frequently the single, actor in the relationship. So we should try to coordinate our policies in this regard with a number of West European governments so that the West Germans are not left alone too often in their relationships with the East Germans.

The suggestion that as a confidence-building measure the East and West Europeans agree to sabotage the lines of communication if their allies started a war could perhaps be taken more seriously in regard to the two Germanies. It was felt that if the two Germanies could get together and agree not to participate in a war that the superpowers started, this might be to our advantage. Such a nonaggression treaty would seem to make sense. It was pointed out that without the language about supporting allies, the two Germanies did have a general treaty that was essentially equivalent. If the suggested treaty of the Germanies were to be signed, there is the danger that it could lead to demands for troop removal from both East and West Germany, and thus to the ultimate dissolution of NATO.

Romania

The problem for US policy in Romania is one of condemning the government for its human rights policy while supporting it for its demonstrations of independence from the Soviet Union. Although some doubts were raised about the sincerity of American efforts on behalf of human rights, as recently as the Ottawa experts meeting of the CSCE (Helsinki process) the Americans roundly condemned the human rights record of Romania. Radio Free Europe regularly
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condemns the Romanians on this account; attacks that Bucharest has reacted to violently. Doubts were also raised as to the usefulness of the Romanian demonstrations of independence. But the general feeling was that there was enough reality here for our support, and it was in the interest of the United States to maintain its two-track policy.

Some believed that the primary lever in our relationship was the Most-Favored-Nation status that Congress continually threatens to withdraw. This does give us some control, and there has been a marked response to our efforts in regard to freeing up emigration. It was felt that this was a lever that we should continue to manipulate, although it might be preferable to actually withdraw the status, and then discuss giving it back as a reward for improved performance.

The danger for American policy was that the apparently unpopular Ceausescus will be replaced by unknown forces, and forces not necessarily more liberal or acceptable to the Soviets. Although some support was given to the idea of military rule as a preferable replacement for Party rule, there was little consensus on how we might respond to more general instability or renewed Soviet interference.

Bulgaria

While there was disagreement about the degree of economic or foreign policy independence that Bulgaria had achieved, there was agreement that aside from the general support for liberalization and independence that characterized our policies toward Eastern Europe, no special efforts should be made in regard to Bulgaria pending the outcome of the trials in Rome of suspects in the attempt on the life of the Pope. If the case collapses, or the general consensus is that the Bulgarians were not involved, we can develop relations further. If not, it will be impossible to do a great deal in the near future.

Albania

With the recent change in leadership, there was a feeling that more of a policy should be developed toward Albania. This meant support primarily for the efforts of the West Europeans, led by the Italians. There will be no change without more outside engagement, and it is occurring. The Europeans are reluctant, but
need to be pushed. The Americans should not take too active a role because to do so would give the Russians justification for coming back in. Potentially they are still far ahead of us. There is a generation of Albanians trained in Moscow. The Russians still have a large group that devotes its attention to the country, even though they have no relations. We have almost no one who knows Albania or follows it. So our main interest will remain trying to prevent the reestablishment of the Soviet-Albanian relationship, rather than the development of our own.

In regard to the possibility of establishing a RFE (Radio Free Europe) Albanian program, several possible objections were mentioned. First, an Albanian program might have negative repercussions in Belgrade because of the difficulties the Yugoslavs have with their own Albanians. Part of the American Albanian community that would be involved in such broadcasts has mixed feelings as to where Kosovo belongs. The second argument is that at the very time that some windows may be opening in Tirana, would starting such a program send a tough, hard-nosed signal to those with which we would otherwise want to be developing a relationship? The consensus was that the programming would have to be tightly controlled, but within that constraint it would be a good idea. It would not be likely to undermine our diplomatic efforts, in particular since the main effort here would be by West Europeans.

Albania represented a security threat to NATO, since a renewed Soviet presence could lead to a Soviet naval base that would threaten the Mediterranean fleet. The opportunities that Albania might present, if a noncommunist group asked for American support after achieving power, seemed not to interest the participants. There was a general feeling that the Yugoslavs were poised to intervene in that case, so that the chance of an appeal to the West to forestall a possible Soviet intervention was not judged realistic.

Yugoslavia

Although most did not want to treat Yugoslavia as a part of the East European problem, they did think that it should remain a focus of American attention. There were dangers of a breakup and severe internal problems. But the relationship of the Yugoslavs to the West dictated that on the government-to-government level we remain primarily supportive. Both the United States and West
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Germany are properly considering ways in which they might be able to help financially. Yugoslavia can serve as a model for the region. We want to do everything possible to preserve its independence from the Soviet Union, improve its civil liberties, and help it become economically viable.

Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Specific Tools

A number of more specific policy "tools" were suggested and discussed. "Tool" was used here in a highly generalized sense: often it seemed to be little more than an agenda item, in other cases it covered a broad area of tactical policy. "Ideas for action" might have been a preferable term.

First, there has been a development lately of American initiatives to discuss arms control issues with East Europeans. This has been welcomed by the East Europeans, and seems to have been helpful to both sides. It was felt that these contacts should be increased. East European leaders on all levels are simply uninformed, and kept uninformed by their Soviet colleagues, about nuclear and conventional force levels, deployments, and arms control proposals and their implications. Tours by our officials, and subsequent briefings have been so successful that the Soviets have felt compelled to follow them with equivalent efforts. This subject is particularly important for East European leaders, because they have a faith, perhaps naive, that arms control is one way to solve their security problem. They do not feel the Soviets are telling them the whole truth.

This effort supplements the effort of the radios to provide military and arms control information to the region. It might also be helpful to have people outside of government become more involved in disseminating information of this kind in Eastern Europe. This is one of the focuses of the new Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York.

Another tool is the development of military-to-military relationships with Eastern Europe. This development seems well received on both sides. There have been high level meetings with the Romanian military, including inspection of their mountain troops. Military relationships with the Yugoslavs are long standing. Other countries may be interested; we should explore
the possibility. It might also be valuable to encourage the West Europeans to expand such contacts. The French have contacts of this kind at least with the Soviets. We have a proposal on the table at Stockholm on expanding military contacts and exchanges between the two sides. This should be pursued if possible.

We should consider the more general question of increasing the number of official visits between the United States and the countries of the region. There has recently been a very successful visit by a high-ranking Hungarian official. Such visits are not nonsense; on occasion they make a real impact. High-level visits to Poland have in the past diminished the sense of isolation of the Polish people. The opposition seems to welcome visits to the country by West Europeans or Americans, in so far as they include visits to the Church leaders and the opposition, as well as the government. Such visits strengthen the legitimacy of the dissidents.

In other situations, there is a serious danger of legitimizing East European regimes by high-level American visits. This should be avoided particularly in regard to East Germany. Hungary probably is the best candidate for such visits in both directions at this time. Prime Minister Thatcher was well received in Hungary. It might also be possible for Kadar to be received in Washington. Yugoslavia is another possibility, in so far as we include it in Eastern Europe. We have had many high-level visits with the Romanians over past years, with some probable affect on their independence. In any case, the problem of the human rights past of East European leaders remains. Even Kadar has had his repressive and bloody past. To what extent do we accept such past actions by our visits or invitations?

Another policy proposal is to try to reduce the involvement of Eastern Europeans in supporting international terrorism. We have made attempts in this area, but so far with little success. One country formerly giving asylum to the famous terrorist "Carlos" has recently refused to take him in. We can certainly make action on reducing support of terrorism a critical part in improving a government's image in the United States. Possibly we could induce some states to exchange intelligence information with us.

In this discussion "political action" or political support referred to the growing American programs of support for books, journals, newspapers, even video cassettes in the languages of
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Eastern Europe. This is the kind of project that the National Endowment for Democracy would seem to be set up for. In Poland political action takes on a more active coloration. It can include legal defense for political prisoners, and humanitarian assistance for dissidents who find themselves cut off from economic resources because of their dissent. But all these programs suffer from the fact that the National Endowment is underfunded. Perhaps it should be possible to persuade business interests involved in providing private money to supplement what is available, but so far this has not been done.

For the long term, we should concentrate on institution building in most of Eastern Europe. There are institutions not completely controlled by the government in almost every country that could be supported. In East Germany it is the churches. We should think more in terms of such functional groups, of unions, and professional associations, groups of farmers and others that have common interests. Our goal is strengthening pluralism, which is the eventual foundation of more democratic systems.

The "engines of change" can be seen as the functional groups. In Poland three elements made the present situation possible: the Church, private agriculture, and the nongovernmental organization of labor. When looking at how to affect change, we must look at such sectors. Small shopkeepers might be another important group to look at, for example, in East Germany. We might have special programs to reach professional managers, or even fledgling political parties.

To most of Eastern Europe the idea of an independent union or an independent church is exciting. We should look at what we can do to strengthen contacts with these particular groups. The difficulty with labor, however, is that the leaders of the official unions may not be the ones to talk to. However, in the case of Polish journalists we have found that people who spent the better part of their professional lives retailing the government version of reality can, in a transitional situation, come to be accepted engines of change in these same professional roles.

Some believe that increasing the availability of personal computers would help break the monopoly on information and communication characteristic of communist states. Computers could aid in the security of files for organizations that are not part of the government structure.
This brought the discussion back to the larger "tool" of communication. For a long while services such as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America have been the primary means of trying to affect the populations of Eastern Europe. This remains the keystone of the effort at liberalization, and most agreed that it should continue to be, and should be strengthened. For example, the idea of a service on Radio Free Europe to Albania was discussed. The strength of the transmitters and quality of the staffs could also be improved.

Television, and the accompanying technology of the VCR recorders, has become the latest means for transmitting the message. So far this opportunity has not been developed explicitly. West German television is regularly received in most of East Germany, and it has a direct impact on attitudes there, even though it is not produced for this audience. West European television is increasingly moving to the use of satellite transmitters. These will cover nearly all of Eastern Europe, but not the Soviet Union. This will increase exposure, although without a special effort few programs will be in the languages of Eastern Europe, except for German. It might be desirable to develop a new service along the line of Radio Free Europe—a Television Free Europe.

The use of large backyard receivers to bring in television from around the world, or from cable services closer to home, has spread in the United States, especially in rural areas. The Soviet Union is now inviting people to its embassy to watch programs from Moscow. This implies that we should take the Soviet initiative and press the idea of the free exchange of television signals across borders as a natural expectation. We should also look forward to the time when new technologies—or new laws—will allow many people in Eastern Europe, and possibly the USSR, to receive the full spectrum of available worldwide television services. We would have much to gain and little to lose from such a general opening up.

The content of the programs and publications should, of course, be supportive of the approaches that we are making in other ways. For example, while we do broadcast information on arms control issues, we might contribute to the peace movement in Eastern Europe more directly by broadcasting updated information on the nuclear and chemical weapon sites. We could also distribute maps of these sites.
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On a related issue, it has been discovered that Soviet representatives receive quite a bit of exposure on Western television programs. If we exchanged such opportunities with East European countries, we would open a new avenue of contact. Some countries have already allowed American representatives on their television; others would be likely to.

The final tool that was discussed was trade, perhaps to the East Europeans the key to their relationship with the West. This is generally at the top of their list of questions. For example, a country such as Czechoslovakia, without MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) status, wants to know how and when they can get. But the question of trade also involves what we trade and what we do not. The desirability of pushing personal computers in Eastern Europe was mentioned. But might we not in the process be giving the Soviet communist world advantages that we do not want to give? Bulgaria, for example, has set itself the goal of becoming the "Japan of the Balkans." This means they want high technology, and they would like to get it from the United States. But what should we be prepared to give them? Would trade in high technology add to their independence, or would we be establishing another funnel to the USSR?

The question was also raised as to the amount of financial support for trade that we should be willing to give. There seems to be less money to go around; we certainly have no reason to want to reduce the financial burden on the Soviet Union. This suggests that we should single out for aid the "best opportunity cases," which would seem to be Poland, Yugoslavia, and possibly Hungary. If these three countries can be influenced through the maintenance of trade contacts, then we will have achieved about as much as could be hoped for from this policy.

In the case of Poland the IMF (International Monetary Fund) negotiations were seen as a key means of leverage on the present government. It was felt that fear of continued exclusion from the IMF offered critical Western leverage on the situation. Some felt that the negotiations should be allowed to drag on, so that we might maintain this fear. They saw the American veto over Polish access to the fund as essential. Others pointed to the fact that the United States would still have a lever if Poland were readmitted. For once in, to get loans it would have to satisfactorily answer a number of questions, such as "What is your recovery
program?" "What is your labor policy?" or, "What is your agricultural policy?" This could potentially give us more control over the Polish situation than we now have at the present stage in the negotiations.

It was objected that while this might be true, accepting the Poles into the International Monetary Fund would mean a form of legitimation for Jaruzelski. While it is true that there are many countries in the IMF that have governments we do not approve of, to let them in now would send the wrong signal. Nevertheless, most participants seemed to approve the thesis that we did not want to cut off the negotiating process by a flat rejection.

In this discussion, the purposes of trade policy were conceived as the maintenance of leverage over East European governments and the opening or intensification of contact. It was pointed out that trade or economic assistance could not be expected in themselves to lead to political change. East Germany had perhaps received more economic assistance than any other country in the bloc. Yet it had hardly become free as a result.

It was also pointed out that the American government had relatively little control over the volume of trade or aid, particularly from the West Europeans. Our government cannot control the loans that banks will make or not make, nor can it force businessmen to invest in losing propositions. But up to a point the United States can encourage or discourage economic activity. Some would favor using administration awards of trade quotas to punish or reward East European regimes in terms, for example, of their human rights performance. Quota shares for items such as shoes, textiles, or steel could be flexibly manipulated.

The suggestion was made that it might be desirable to develop a code for business dealings with Eastern Europe similar to the Sullivan Code for American businesses operating in South Africa. Of course, there could not be a direct translation of the Sullivan Code, but some of the same ideas might be useful. The point would be to make American businessmen aware that in dealing with oppressive societies they should not do anything contributing to the oppression. They should not, for example, follow host government guidelines in limiting the expression of their workers, or in stopping the development of unions. It is becoming a legal principle in the United States that such rules have to be followed in dealing with South Africa. If this could become a worldwide set
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of principles for multinationals, then it might be more acceptable to those who deal with South Africa, the Middle East, or other areas. The group reacted coldly to the suggestion. It was felt that the West Europeans do the most trade in Eastern Europe, and it would not work without their participation. It was also felt that support for such principles being applied in Eastern Europe does not exist in the United States.

It was pointed out that as a part of the National Endowment for Democracy there is a Chamber of Commerce organization called the Center for International Private Enterprise. One of their projects is to make businessmen more aware of the advantages to them in the third world of working in democratic states. The effort to get American business more involved in industrial cooperation or joint ventures in Eastern Europe should have some spin-off for the support of democracy there as well.

Although the conference directed its attention primarily to American policy, major agreement was achieved on the importance of the West Europeans in the process. The conference was, after all, inspired to a considerable extent by an article in Foreign Affairs* that pointed to the importance for the devolution of power from the Soviet Union to the East European states of separating this issue from the US-USSR confrontation. To achieve this there has to be more of a sense of one Europe, or of Europe as an alternative for peoples on both sides of the wall. Therefore, as we consider American policy, we must remember that in the long run it will be the ability of Western Europe to carry the symbolic role as an alternative center of power and culture that is likely to play the major role in the transformation of Eastern Europe.

This did not mean that we should attempt at this point to influence this process by involving the West Europeans directly in our activities. Their interests are often different, and, in a way, that is the point. Their actions will complement ours at times, and be at cross-purposes at other times. Separately we will do more: if we try too hard to work together, we may end up with only the lowest common denominator. There are, in particular, certain things that the Europeans can uniquely do, such as the West Germans in East Germany, or the Italians in Albania. But

more than that, most East Europeans see themselves as Europeans, and we must avoid inserting ourselves in a way that obscures this identification.

Politically and economically, we cannot allow our policy to be tied up by West European desires. Right now, virtually all West Europeans want to give new credits to Poland, to get their money out by putting more in. We are having a struggle to keep these countries out. At the same time, politically the West Europeans tend to want to ignore most of Eastern Europe. Here our task must be to persuade the West Europeans to see the importance of Eastern Europe in East-West relations. Their tendency has been to be so concerned with relations with the Soviet Union that they ignore the interests or existence of the East European states. On the other hand, the European actions on recent official visits to Poland have been very helpful, and have tended to strengthen the hand of Solidarity.

In the cultural sphere the central idea that must be developed is the idea of one European culture, or of a broader European culture, the idea that the line dividing Europe is an artificial one, and that it has become increasingly artificial with the growth of communication and contact between the two halves of Europe. There is the sense of cultural unity that characterizes the work of the Czech author, Milan Kundera. Americans often find that, if they are to have effective programs in Eastern Europe, the best contacts for developing these programs will be found in Western Europe, around the emigre communities of London, Paris, or elsewhere. It was suggested that it might be useful to make a study on the use of modern technology to maintain or to break the monopoly control over communication in a totalitarian state. It would seem that both American and East European purposes are assisted by the process of modernization. For it is modernization that breaks down the walls between the different parts of Europe, and between the communist and noncommunist worlds. The new communication technologies rely on change at the elite, technical level, but even more on the diffusion of new technologies throughout the societies in which we are interested. The Albanians, for example, now have free access to Italian television. But until every Albanian has a television in his home the impact of this
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window on the West will be less than the impact of West German TV in wealthier and more modern East Germany where everyone has a private TV.

Funding a study on the nature and rate of cultural evolution in communist societies might also be useful. If we could know what has happened over the last fifty years under a variety of internal and external pressures, then we might be better able to determine how to intervene in, or aid the process of cultural evolution in the future. This carries back, of course, to the idea that we must be concerned primarily with the support of indigenous or internally generated change. Perhaps better, we should be concerned primarily with assisting that positive change in Eastern Europe that has been occurring with or without our aid.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Eastern Europe offers a significant opportunity for the achievement of American political objectives. This opportunity stems from: a) the relatively more rapid economic, technological, and social progress in the Western democracies, b) the increasing availability of information in Eastern Europe about the values and achievements of the Western democracies, as well as alternative forms of socialism, c) the historical identification of the region's peoples with European Civilization, d) the prospect of increasing dependence of the region and its Soviet sponsor on the West for further economic and technological progress, and e) natural resistance to continued foreign domination. As a result, the states and peoples of Eastern Europe are developing in ways that increasingly diverge from the Soviet model and the interests of the Soviet Union. Within the next generation some East European regimes may come to see their stability best assured by redefining their national interests in ways characteristic of neutrals such as Finland or Austria rather than Soviet satellites.

The advantages to the United States and its allies of this trend are manifold. Chief among these must be the steady erosion of Soviet confidence that they could operate militarily in Central Europe with the full cooperation of the Warsaw Pact states, cooperation that would be essential were they to try to rapidly achieve conventional victories in the West. Equally important is the opening that this trend provides for the extension of Western assumptions and standards toward the East, and eventually to the Soviet Union itself. To the extent that an Eastern European nation transforms itself into an independent state, and one more
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respectful of international standards of human rights, it will serve as a model for transformation for any communist society.

Specific Countries

Poland, the largest country in the region, and geographically central to our political and security interests, has achieved a level of popular self-consciousness and assertiveness that places it outside the post-war experience of the remainder of the region. In effect, its communist government shares power with a powerful Church and the highly variegated but powerful opposition identified with the Solidarity movement. The deep roots of Westernization and the politicization of its people suggest that the communist leadership will be unable to return to the unchallenged rule characteristic of communist societies. Nonetheless, under Soviet prodding, in the short run a more repressive domestic policy is to be expected.

The Hungarian people and the Hungarian state have developed a reform consciousness that allows for the gradual transformation of that society in a more liberal direction without the sharp struggle and dangers that characterize Poland. While it is easy to overestimate what has been achieved, there is no doubt that Western influence is deep and growing, and that some of the controls over communication, personal movement, economic independence, and even political pluralism of the past have been significantly reduced.

In the rest of Eastern Europe change is more limited. In Czechoslovakia a small group of dissidents has developed an independent intellectual and cultural life. The statements and analyses of Charter 77 have helped to develop a critical European consciousness. In East Germany the Protestant church has managed to develop an independent peace program that has reached both believers and nonbelievers in large numbers. The government has exhibited growing self-confidence. While the Romanian government has not softened its harsh rule in most respects, it has made some notable efforts to express an independent foreign policy, a foreign policy that to some degree is modeled on the earlier achievement of policy independence by communist Yugoslavia and Albania.
Assisting Change

Basic change in Eastern Europe will come about through the internally generated, self-development of its societies. We cannot with any conceivable or reasonable effort compel the transformation of these societies. In this light our task becomes assisting through the tools available to us the process of self-development that we see occurring. With the exception of Poland, this primarily means emphasizing the level of contact through direct personal exchange, the provision of literature, and the maintenance or expansion of the radios. Television offers an opportunity to develop a new generation of tools for the enhancement of political, economic, and cultural pluralism in Eastern Europe. These efforts will be more effective to the degree that Western Europeans are involved, for it is in the strengthening of a European consciousness in the region that our long-term hope must lie.

Since for the foreseeable future the Soviets will retain a preponderant influence in most of Eastern Europe through their military and Party control, the rate of progress will to a considerable extent depend on the rate of change in the Soviet Union itself. In addition, support for change in Eastern Europe will not be effective unless it is carefully calibrated in such a fashion that it does not elicit massive Soviet interference, and consequent retrogression.

Differentiation

The assertion of freedom from Soviet control and the rejection of the repressive policies of Marxism-Leninism are goals of American policy in Eastern Europe that should continue to be pursued through the policy of differentiation. This policy requires that we improve relations with those in Eastern Europe who foster the growing autonomy and divergence of their societies and downgrade relations with those who oppose these trends. Change must be pursued on the state to state level and through the support of the aspirations of repressed peoples. It can be fostered by both institutional and personal relations, private as well as governmental.

Often the assertion of independence will be supported through enhanced contact with the government bureaucracies of Eastern Europe, including even those of the Party and military. Where
possible, such contacts should be encouraged. Equally we must be
supportive of the efforts of the suppressed peoples of Eastern
Europe to achieve modern economic and political standards, while
being careful to avoid the transfer of sensitive, militarily
relevant technology. This will mean a continued effort to support
their intellectual and cultural life wherever possible, and to
bring denials of elementary human rights to the attention of their
governments and the international community. Where the objective
of maintaining positive interstate relations conflicts with the
necessity to support an oppressed population, the methods chosen
to express our displeasure with the Eastern European government or
the Soviet Union, as appropriate, must involve economic or poli-
tical sanctions that do not limit the growing intensity of com-
munication and support on popular levels and do not unduly punish
East European populations for the errors of their oppressors.

Policies for Specific Countries

The American task in Poland becomes the difficult one of
devising means to assist in the process of institutionalization of
the gains of the recent past so that they will lay a basis for the
further liberalization of the society, while at the same time
striving to prevent a cycle of repression and violence that might
undo the gains that have been made. We must be prepared to aid
the opposition, promote the transformation of the society, and
increase the costs of repression for both the government and the
Soviet Union. We must react to efforts to reestablish earlier
levels of Party control with measures that negatively affect the
regime rather than the people. Soviet leaders should not be
allowed to feel that they have a free hand in Poland, or that
their encouragement of repressive policies will not have a nega-
tive impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. For this reason, the
sanctions against the Soviet Union adopted after the imposition of
martial law in Poland should not be lifted in toto, and, when
appropriate, should be reimposed in response to particularly
repressive actions.

In Hungary our goals should be more broadly supportive. As
long as current trends continue in both the area of foreign policy
and domestic liberalization we should maintain positive contact at
all levels. This does not mean that we should abandon the general
human rights and communication policies common to our approach to all countries in the region.

The particular situation in East Germany requires, in addition to the common elements of our approach, an American policy that a) maintains bilateral relations that support the enhanced autonomy of the government or popular institutions, b) recognizes the special nature of ties between the two Germanies, and c) maintains the American view of the DDR as a temporary expedient rather than a separate nation state comparable to its neighbors in Eastern Europe.

The opportunities that may be provided by the change of leadership in Albania suggest that we should make a new effort to expand our communications to this country, and to encourage our allies to similar action. This is particularly important as long as Albania's geopolitical situation remains undefined.

Supporting Our National Goals

The foreign policy goals of this administration are the achievement of a safer and more democratic world. Since World War II Central Europe has offered the greatest chance for direct and deadly conflict between the superpowers. It has also been evident that Soviet communism was the only serious rival to Western democracy, and thus a primary obstacle to the achievement of the ideals expressed in international charters of human rights. The growing self-assertion of the countries of Eastern Europe, and the increasing determination of their peoples to bring an end to the unnatural division of Europe, offers a serious opportunity to neutralize this nexus of potential conflict, expand the area of freedom, and further weaken the appeal of Soviet communism.
PART IV

Aspects of the Struggle for Democracy
Aspects of an American Campaign for Democracy

From the beginning of the republic, Americans have believed that their model of governance was the natural, rational solution for every country, and that all societies would eventually copy us. There was good reason for this belief. Unlike other societies at the time, the United States was founded on a popular document that also incorporated some of the most advanced political thinking of its age. Constitutionally, in the nineteenth century the American model was widely emulated, particularly in Latin America, and honored more indirectly by the progressive liberalization of Europe. This emulation of the American idea of democracy and of American political forms has continued down to today. Countries of all ideological and national colors have in recent years incorporated into their laws our Bill of Rights, our presidential system, our division of powers, or our federal structure—at least on paper. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is to a significant extent a product of America and an attempt to universalize American ideals (as of the 1940s).

Yet the simplistic identification of the American political system with political progress had been complicated almost immediately by the experience of the French Revolution. The eighteenth century "Age of Enlightenment" passed, to be succeeded by the romantic, nationalist nineteenth, and the economic, technological, and elitist twentieth. The precursor for both these new currents was Rousseau, and implicit in both was the Platonic assumption that the few should decide for the many. Romantics, materialists, philosophers, and technocrats agreed that only the few could discern the true interests of the "masses." While the few that ruled in past centuries had had only the claims of victory or history and often arrogantly ruled in their own interest,
the few who would rule in the future would have "scientific" claims, and ostensibly rule in the interest of all.

For many years the seriousness of the challenge of these alternative visions of the future was obscured for most Americans by the continued progress of democracy at home and abroad and the lack of response to elitist theories in America. However, as the world modernized and old forms fell away, belief in a scientific or intuitive "right to govern" by the few grew among political groups and the intelligentsia, particularly in Europe. Finally, with the massive breakdown of old political and social forms and structures during and after World War I, America lost both its isolation and its easy confidence. The political and military challenge of the 1930s was from highly organized, rigid societies under absolute leaders (or small elites) that had nothing but scorn for democracy. Perhaps only the fortunate fact that one absolutist regime (the USSR) was attacked by another enabled us to overcome the challenge of World War II. The fate of democracy was at issue. If we had lost, America would have become an isolated nation and eventually succumbed. Democracy in this era would have been over.

After World War II there was a resurgence of democracy and of confidence in the American mission. We had destroyed the racist, parochial elitism of the fascists, and imposed democratic regimes on their peoples (outside of Eastern Europe). Communism emerged from the war as the only legitimate absolutist alternative to democracy. But it was weakened almost everywhere. Unless its adherents or agents were directly supported by a contiguous USSR they failed repeatedly. In those days of optimism, as new states emerged from colonialism they were initially democracies, modeled on regimes already established by their democratic "home countries."

The United States became for the first time in history a truly international power. The great empires of the nineteenth century were vanishing, leaving most of the world fragmented, unstable, and militarily helpless. A temporarily united international communist movement was poised to exploit this instability. To counter this danger Americans suddenly found themselves everywhere helping everyone outside the Soviet orbit. In this process our support for democracy was theoretically as automatic as our opposition to communism or concern for poverty. The international
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The communist movement was seen as a limited military and organizational challenge. Evolution to democracy outside its orbit was regarded as a natural process that needed only protection against Soviet influence.

A central purpose of US foreign aid was political development; for most Americans political development was identified with progress toward democracy. American support for political development was based on three related doctrines. The first assumed that economic development led ultimately to political development. The second assumed that security assistance would bring security and that security was an essential requirement for political development. The third doctrine was a characteristically American theory that supporting the emergence of democracies would bring security and economic development. The first two were the most salient, but all three were significant. All doctrines assumed optimistically that what the world needed was US "know-how," money, and ideals, and that it was in our capacity to transfer these effectively.¹

Years later we are wiser, or at least more careful. The struggle has not gone smoothly; the early promise of a democratized world has not been achieved. Even the partial victory of a secure stalemate within a stable balance of power has eluded us. While we must remember, reconsider, and not undervalue our successes in the postwar years, we still must recognize that gradually communism has spread and never retreated. China, Indochina, and Cuba have been added to the hard core: Afghanistan may be in the process of incorporation. Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, South Yemen, and other states form an expanding "soft periphery of communism" that may include Nicaragua and Guyana in our hemisphere. Beyond this achievement of political control, communist-inspired ideas dominate intellectual thought, education, and often the media, in much of the noncommunist world. Pro-communist rhetoric and assumptions dominate debate in the United Nations and its agencies.

The communist world is no longer unified, but this gives us little cause for cheer. The Soviet Union is militarily stronger vis-a-vis the rest of the world—communist and noncommunist—than it has ever been, and most communist expansion remains Soviet inspired and Soviet controlled.
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At the same time as communism alternately grows or husbands its strength, much of the noncommunist world has been wracked by enervating violence, tyranny, and brutality. Most of the larger European colonies that emerged as independent states after World War II failed to maintain democratic forms or practices; they lapsed eventually into modified or unqualified despotisms of the left or right. Of course, the picture has many shades of gray. In many third-world despotisms the struggle goes on; in most there are still democrats eager to reestablish the rule of law. Recently Latin America has seen a recrudescence of democracy. It was in this context that President Reagan's call for a "crusade for democracy" was made. Yet withal, the frontiers of democracy are not where we envisaged in the 1950s that we would find them in the 1980s.

In part, the failure of democracy in many third-world states has been due to the difficulty of achieving stable political forms without tyranny in uneducated, disunited, and impoverished societies. But this is as poor an analysis as it would have been in the twenties and thirties to explain the repeated failure of the new democracies of that period. In our time Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina did not have relatively poor or uneducated populations. Cuba was one of the materially best-off and most homogeneous Latin American states before Castro. It appears that democracy failed to maintain its post World War II promise primarily because of the renewed currency of theories of political legitimacy that deny ordinary human beings their basic right to say how they are governed. The assumed rights of small elites are buttressed in some societies by a revival of religious fanaticism, in others by modern technocrats who believe only they can manage development. Democratic forms are denigrated by many leaders as symbols of cultural imperialism, as inimical to authentic national traditions, such as Confucianism in East Asia or "African Humanism" in Africa. Anti-democratic talk of harmony and community, of group versus individual values, or cooperation versus conflict has a wide and obvious appeal, especially among the educated youth. It takes a while to realize that the harmony and community are generally imposed by brutality, and that the group values they express are either those of a few at the top or idiosyncratically chosen on the basis of ideology.

The military challenge posed by the increase in the armed
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strength of the USSR compounds the crisis of the democracies in two ways. On the one hand, it forces the United States to spend large amounts for unpopular purposes. The imbalances in the defense efforts of the United States and its allies weakens our alliances by leading to recurrent recrimination. On the other hand, the democracies naturally have developed an increasingly pacifistic culture, opposed bitterly (and reasonably) to nuclear war, but also to all war, to the idea of war, and to the sacrifice of life and blood war requires. Pacifism is a triumph for democratic individualism and humanism. But it also threatens to disarm democracy when it must compete with a despotic society growing ever more powerful militarily, and in which pacifistic tendencies are not allowed to develop.

Strategic Principles and Options

If taken seriously a campaign for democracy must strive to achieve three goals: the preservation of democracies from internal subversion of either right or left; the establishment of new democracies where feasible; and keeping open the democratic alternative for all nondemocracies. The basic tools of the campaign for democracy are economic, military, political, and ideological.

In regard to the more generally accepted economic and military means of supporting or defending democracy, a critical issue in cold war debate has been the relative efficacy of the economic alternatives of incorporation or isolation. Do we, in other words, guide a country more effectively toward democracy by punishing its tyranny through isolation or through increasing trade links and thus contacts until the country becomes inextricably a part of our world? This case can be argued as well in regard to South Africa and Haiti as the USSR or China. Much evidence can be adduced on both sides. Generally, the most isolated states are the most tyrannical, but this does not prove which came first. Certainly Iran imposed its recent isolation on itself as an adjunct of its growing tyranny. On the other hand, trade and aid and superficial openness has not had a decisive impact on the level of oppression in a society as well situated for change as Yugoslavia.
The use and disposition of the military also must be the constant background, and occasional foreground, of the effort. Psychologically the use of force can be costly, and defeat even more so. But we are dealing with ever-expanding forces and force capabilities in communist states and with a perception of these as a growing threat in much of the noncommunist world.

Where and how do we make a stand? Here we need consider only three aspects of this question. First, what is the total impact on the strategy for democracy of stationing or increasing regional forces such as the Indian Ocean force (with bases at Diego Garcia, Oman, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and elsewhere), or Pacific forces with bases in the Philippines, Japan, and other sensitive areas, or permanent forces in South Korea and Germany? What is the affect on the political strategic climate as well as the military balance? The second question involves seeking for a new definition of the rules under which we intervene with military equipment, training, or manpower to assist a government we feel is threatened by internal terrorists and guerrillas. What kind of aid do we give or not give countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala, and what is the full scope of the reasoning? Finally, under what conditions and in what ways do we aid guerrillas or any political movement seeking to overthrow a tyrannical government? Do we ignore the partisans of Afghanistan, the hundreds of thousands of Iranians, Vietnamese, or Cuban exiles who have been oppressed or are oppressed and are struggling in "our cause" as well as their own?

The answers are not at all evident. For many reasons a nonviolent strategy is preferable both at home and abroad. It locks us in less, results in a better press, and results in fewer casualties for the peoples involved. Yet to always choose this course would be to give away the game, and even in the short run to condemn millions more to unnecessary oppression. The problem is exacerbated by the asymmetry of reporting on interventions by an open society and a closed society, by a society primed to publicly doubt the word of its own government and a society that dare not on pain of prison or worse. In a perceptive paper Maurice Tugwell argues that the essential arms in our current military struggle must be political and ideological. Cognizant of the degree to which we have disarmed ourselves through humanism and individualism, and of the inescapable invalidation of war and the military
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occasioned by nuclear weapons and television's realism, he proposes that we must in this generation move from reliance on political warfare or we will lose the game. To win, and thus to defeat communism and the spread of communist ideas, Tugwell believes that we must surpass the communists practically and propagandistically in three fields: in providing for the world's needs, in the advocacy of peace, and in the promotion of self-determination for all the world's peoples. Since the United States and most democracies can practically demonstrate their superiority to the communists in these three areas—higher production, superior technology, and either lower military budgets or fewer men under arms relative to GNP and population—the solution is to explicitly adopt these principles as the core of our international strategy, and then communicate our intentions and accomplishments insistently, and on all levels.

Tugwell does not believe that we should advocate Western democracy or our concepts of rights, as these depart too much from the training and experience of two-thirds of the world. He is wrong. There is much too much evidence from recent events in countries such as Poland, China, India, and Grenada that people everywhere instinctively want, and feel they have a right to, the same political and civil liberties we cherish. Recent elections in third-world countries such as El Salvador and Panama demonstrate the thirst of third-world peoples for democracy. Of course, there may be differences of detail, and economic systems and priorities will vary, but we cannot oppose the communist vision without a coherent vision of our own as to the nature of man and how we think societies should be organized. We cannot show up elitism as the dehumanization of the individual, which it is, unless we make explicit our commitment to political equality.

The approach Tugwell advocates, coupled with the promotion of the essentials of democratic freedom, could play a critical part in the preservation of democratic societies and the extension of democracy. On this basis the United States becomes not the defender of the status quo but the creator of the future.

Tentatively, then, let us consider the following five strategic principles that America and its allies should adopt for winning the struggle for democracy. In each case it will be important not
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only to do it, but to inform domestic and foreign publics we are doing it.

1. Increase our efforts to provide for the basic needs of all peoples.

2. Increase our efforts to preserve and secure the peace, particularly in the nuclear area.

3. Promote the rights of self-determination of all peoples, large and small.

4. Promote the adoption and increasing effectiveness of the political institutions of democracy.

5. Promote the guarantee of civil liberties as rights, with respect for human individuality and the maximum economic and social self-reliance of individuals.

Each of these principles should be discussed briefly in order that misunderstanding be avoided.

1. For the United States to increase its efforts to provide for basic needs does not necessarily mean larger giveaway programs, although it could in some circumstances lead to such programs on an emergency basis. Areas of public health, agricultural technology (particularly for the small farmer through extension services), medicine, and emergency relief are traditional areas of concern, but we could do more. The extent and conditions of providing aid to Soviet-supported or other unfriendly despotisms must be worked out with care, but we should certainly work toward a posture of being willing and able to help any people (as distinct from government) anywhere.

2. Emphasizing peace does not mean we have to immediately disarm, but we should be a leader in peace programs and disarmament, and decisively shift the burden of blocking such moves, onto the USSR or other tyrannies. We should come out resolutely against nuclear war in any form, and point out that in spite of protestations only the Soviets have protected their population against nuclear war (our mistake, but we must make capital of our civil defense weakness). We should let the world know that commu-
nist countries form the only bloc of states in which a compulsory military draft is the general practice. The communist states and other tyrannies should also be identified as the states that do not allow free movement of people and ideas—and thus foster paranoia born of ignorance.

3. Promoting self-determination does not necessarily mean breaking up all states in which territorial minorities have a grievance. It does mean listening to their grievances and supporting some degree of autonomy. We should point to the efforts of the Swiss, Spanish, and other European states, to the federalism of Nigeria and the Sudan, and to the moves of the United States, Canada, and Australia to increase the self-determination of their native peoples. We should popularize the thesis that the only great empire today is the USSR, and speak regularly of it as colonial or imperialist in regard to both incorporated peoples and satellites. Certainly our approach will not be well received by the present Indonesian regime and a few other quasi-allies. However, it can be modulated, and states such as India should be praised regularly for their democratic federalism in spite of their continuing problems. An effort in the Middle East that would give a modicum of satisfaction to the Palestinians would be of inestimable value for this strategic item.

4. We should identify competitive elections as the primary means of legitimizing political rule in the modern world. We should remember that the history of all democracies shows an increasing comprehensiveness of elections until they incorporate effectively all parts of the population. Initial imperfections in new democracies should be expected and admitted as long as movement is in the right direction. We should not unthinkingly promote elections for their own sake, particularly when their likely result is the initiation of a new despotism. But the goal should be to make continuous and credible efforts to extend political rights.

5. The development of free media and effective and fair judicial systems is a necessary buttress for democracy, and a process we can aid. This is especially true for those small, poor countries in which the media remain severely underdeveloped and largely governmental.

Governments have traditionally not respected the rights and interests of individuals, especially those of poor people or
minorities. Democracy forces these interests to be progressively recognized. This point must be stressed in any American program, as well as the corollary that group interests are essentially the interests of individuals in groups over time.

America believes that economic systems are properly the choice of the peoples concerned, whether through political institutions, private decisions, or voluntary cooperative organizations. Self-reliant peoples, deciding on their own futures, live more fully human lives—and incidentally often produce more as well. It will be noted that this discussion does not mention capitalism or socialism: in most countries either would be an imposed, arbitrary system. In pressing this point we will be changing the coin of the discussion—and adopting a historically and practically more defensible stance.

In striving to preserve democratic societies we must remember the distinction between stable, traditional democracies, and newer, more tenuous democracies. For the former, preservation of economic health is the key for preventing the kind of subversion that appeared threatening in the inter-war years. For less stable democracies, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, or India, the economic effort must be supplemented by a continuing struggle for the minds of the opinion-forming classes. This will involve for each country specially-tuned versions of the overall Western strategy outlined above. In addition to ideology and information, assistance to these countries will require appropriate aid for unions, parties, news media, courts, and even parliaments. We and our allies must find ways to help institutions of this kind function with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of injustice. To help effectively in the prevailing climate of distrust and nationalism will, of course, hardly be easy. It will take patience and restraint, and a realization that sometimes inaction will in the short run be the best choice.

Classifying Nations for Political and Ideological Attention

When we consider how we might launch the campaign for democracy in the two-thirds of the world that lies on or beyond the frontiers of democracy, the approaches we should consider become more com-
plex. It will help us to comprehend the problem if we break it down in terms of a classification such as the following:

1. Communist states
   a. USSR and its closest dependencies—for example, USSR, Mongolia
   b. Soviet-supported, but fundamentally anti-Soviet, contiguous—for example, Poland, Hungary
   c. Soviet-supported, noncontiguous—for example, Cuba, Angola, Vietnam
   d. Anti-Soviet, liberalizing—for example, China, Yugoslavia
   e. Anti-Soviet, conservative—for example, Albania

2. One-party leftist tyrannies—for example, Libya, Tanzania

3. Muslim tyrannies—for example, Saudi Arabia, Iran

4. Non-Muslim rightist tyrannies—for example, Haiti, Malawi

5. Partly-free authoritarian states—for example, Singapore, Taiwan

6. Pro-democratic transitional states—for example, Thailand, Bangladesh, Turkey

7. Democracies with insecure democratic institutions—for example, Argentina, Honduras.

Each of these groups requires a particular strategy, and, within that, one for each particular country. Obviously the promotion of democracy in some countries will be easier than in others. For most countries outside of Groups (6) and (7) the immediate goal will not be the adoption of democracy but rather opening up the country to democracy, the building or developing of a pluralism in ideas and institutions that will keep options open and lay the basis for democracy.

We should consider in broad outline what each of these areas requires.
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The heart of the military problem is the Soviet Union, and therefore the blunting of this threat becomes a critical part of any realistic strategy for supporting democracy.

We assume at the outset that:

a) the people of the Soviet Union do not want war, and want to reduce the proportion of the national income (and the military time of young men) devoted to military affairs and adventures such as Cuba or Afghanistan;

b) they are generally disappointed in communism, especially the form that has been forced on them, and do not really believe in Marxist "science";

c) the non-Russian peoples of the USSR desire much more self-determination, to get out from under the Soviet yoke; and

d) there is no hope that citizens can individually or collectively change the Soviet system.

We also assume that, except for a few with special educational opportunities or skepticism, most Soviets believe:

e) the United States (or Germany) is war minded and aggressive;

f) that Western capitalism is unjust and oppressive at home and abroad; and

g) that democracy in the West is both false and anarchical.

Most Russians and many non-Russian Soviets are also assumed to be highly nationalistic and anxious to defend their country both militarily and symbolically against the threats of others. The Soviet people are, nevertheless, low morale in regard to their own lives and the national future.\(^6\)
It is within these parameters that we must work to democratize the Soviet system.

Our strategic task in regard to contiguous Soviet dependencies, such as Czechoslovakia, is to weaken the paralyzing assumption that the Soviets will be willing and able to intervene against any significant liberalization. At the same time we must strive to use such societies as conduits for new ideas and new hopes into the USSR.

The peoples of central Europe under communist control are fundamentally anti-Soviet. Beyond nationalistic reasons common to all occupied peoples, these peoples feel a traditional historical association with the rest of Europe and tend to look down on Soviet peoples as backward. This feeling of distinction and superiority is reenforced by the fact they continue to have a great deal more contact with the West than the Soviets through radio, television, literature, church associations, and travel.

The percentage of people in Sovietized Central Europe immediately attracted by the democratic concepts of political rights and guaranteed civil liberties is certainly much higher than in the USSR (in this regard, the former Baltic States are closer to Central Europe). The level of liberalization allowed in Poland and Hungary in recent years has been much greater than in most of the Soviet Empire. Interest in these values was evident in the communist leadership of Czechoslovakia that produced the "Prague Spring" of 1968. We should welcome and treasure such partial liberalizations in the area, in spite of their limitations and fragility. Clearly the liberalized Hungarian society of the 1980s is better for its people and less of a militant threat to the West than a more Stalinist Hungary would be.

The limits of abrupt change seem to have been set by Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981. Significant movement away from Soviet domination on both governmental and citizen levels has occurred throughout the area. Most of Eastern Europe is now much more liberal than a generation ago. This movement both weakens the ability of the USSR to project power elsewhere in the world and sends important information into the Soviet Union. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would attempt to invade Western Europe as long as its "internal front" in Central Europe is not secured. The Polish people are our first line of defense—and of ideological offense.
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This does not imply that we have the right to use Central Europeans as cannon fodder. The implication is rather that we have a strong common interest in the success or maintenance of opposition in the area. We must carefully consider the best means to support the growing independence and civil liberties of East Europeans without providing an excuse for renewed repression. We must at a minimum conceive and communicate a credible theory of success to those opposing repression. This requires the Soviet Union to be progressively weaned from direct intervention. When General Jaruzelski stepped in to reestablish communist order, this may have served to preempt a Soviet move and, thus, to preserve alternatives for a more liberal Polish future while weakening the exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Noncontiguous communist states offer a different kind of opportunity. If revolution should occur in such states the physical ability of the Soviets to control the situation is of a different order of magnitude than on the Soviet periphery. In Cuba there is a small Soviet contingent and in Angola there are Cuban forces, but for containing serious revolts these contingents might be more irritants than positive factors. In Vietnam the situation for the Soviets is particularly fragile. Here there are even fewer foreign soldiers to defend the ruling elite, and there is a powerful Chinese Communist force opposed to the government (and sponsoring guerrillas within the country) poised on the border.

It is characteristic of countries in this grouping that the economic situation is desperate. We think of Cuba’s economic problems, but in fact Cuba is far and away in the best shape of the group. Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and Vietnam face desperate economic problems; and in each case there are guerrilla forces in the field. Vietnam also has to contend with guerrilla forces in an unpopular war in Cambodia.

A program to support democracy should consider means of achieving the displacement of current leaders in one or more of these Soviet-supported, noncontiguous communist states. Such revolts would enhance their national self-determination, and with US support might lead to progressive improvement in political and civil rights. The ideological and institutional preconditions are much more favorable for the early achievement of a working democracy in Cuba, less so in Vietnam, least in the African cases. Liberalization would politically make more feasible American and allied aid
in the restoration of the affected nation's economy and enhance the supply of basic necessities. A single success in displacement of such a government, particularly an undeniably communist system such as Cuba or Vietnam, would do much to destroy the myth of communist invincibility, of communism as the wave of the future, and give renewed hope to peoples under communist control everywhere. Although on a small scale, the reversal of communist rule in Grenada certainly serves this purpose—if it can be kept on track.

For success in a particular country the first requirement would be a communications program aimed directly at this result. In order to overcome the sense of isolation of potential opponents of communist regimes our communications to their peoples should emphasize information on the activities and intentions of those opposed to the regime. We should also facilitate such groups obtaining the supplies they need outside the country. Massive military aid is not what is required. Even if the struggle is an armed one, as in Angola, the arms for the movement can be obtained within the country. Primarily, the question is not one of sponsoring guerrilla wars or coups from outside, but rather the encouragement of rapid change through the increase of information, organization, and confidence in the population, and the decrease of confidence in the ruling elite.

Recent events suggest two models of change: the Dubcek model of a communist elite deciding to radically change the nature of its system due to popular pressure and its own changing values, or the Walesa model of popular discontent coalescing into a movement so strong that the official communist leadership shows signs of withering away (until stiffened by Soviet pressure). Obviously, the police and military are critical in either event; they must be ideologically undermined to such an extent that they will no longer use effective, organized force against those who are pressing for change. Reports of demoralization among security forces in communist states are frequent—including recently all communist forces in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique.

Anti-Soviet communist states pose quite different problems. Here the problem for democratic supporters is analogous to that in the noncommunist despotisms considered below. Nations in both groupings are led by political, economic, and media leaders seriously infected with Western values such as the legitimacy of
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democracy. However, the ruling elites do not know how to liberalize without losing their positions and being swept away in a democratizing tide. As analogously with many noncommunist regimes, the strategic tactic might be to work with the system and its critics in such a way that progressive change can be realized and a modern, relativized "Eurocommunism" achieved. This strategy fits most smoothly with our other goals, but it must not lead to American justification of the continued suppression of nonviolent dissidents. While we adapt our approach to different contexts and interests, consistency must also be a part of the American message.

One-party leftist tyrannies lack the well worked-out ideologies, the disciplined parties, and the automatic Soviet guarantees that characterize most communist parties. Nevertheless, the control mechanisms in countries of this class, such as Algeria, Libya, Syria, or Tanzania, have been quite successful; this is a stable and even growing class. In foreign policy, states in this class are generally supportive of the USSR and supported by it, but there is flexibility and there are important exceptions. Somalia was forced by events to become anti-Soviet, and Guinea under Toure was able to twist and turn in any direction.

Hanging on to the coat tails of communism and the worldwide tendency to forgive the errors and omissions on the left, these states generally have ineffective external and internal enemies. At least in part this is because their internationally acceptable ideology makes it possible for them to suppress their opponents as ruthlessly as their communist models without incurring international criticism. Their additional strength is that they offend the nationalistic feelings of their citizens less than more orthodox communist states.

An effective strategy for democratizing this class of states must be worked out. Perhaps initially the goal should be to isolate the virus of one-party leftism by pointing out insistently to the peoples of these states and their neighbors the true nature of these regimes. Most are economic failures—unless they have a special resource such as Libyan oil. For a nation to become dependent on the aid of nations such as Libya or the USSR should come to be viewed as increasingly undesirable by the world community, and should be punished in appropriate ways by the United States and its allies.
Muslim tyrannies are closer to communist one-party states than to other authoritarian states on the right. Islam at its most rigid claims to regulate by heavenly decree all aspects of life, and unlike most religious traditions explicitly claims the right to control the political process. Theoretically, the stance of the democratic strategist toward these states must be the same as toward left-wing tyrannies.

However, practical objections will be raised to this stance because states in this group can be bitterly anticommunist, and thus form backfires for controlling the communist advance. They may control important resources, and elites (as in Saudi Arabia) may be pro-American. To undermine the government of such a state in pursuit of a more thoroughgoing pro-democratic strategy would seem self-defeating. (This is the same argument used against the Carter administration's condemnations of authoritarian "friends" of the United States.)

A compromise is to treat pro-American states in this group with relative passivity. At best their progress toward democracy will be halting. Groups pressing for change in these societies should receive American encouragement as long as these groups are at least intentionally democratic (so often opposition groups are clearly antidemocratic). We should communicate general news, and the rationalistic, scientific, egalitarian (but not libertarian) viewpoint that has become nearly universal in the West. We can condemn the most egregious human rights violations. But, in the short run, we need not explicitly attack the governments for their basic assumptions.

Other authoritarian rightist tyrannies, such as Haiti or Guatemala are under increasing pressure from the international community. Few people take states in this category as models, sometimes not even their own ruling elites. Some are traditional societies, but many fewer than is claimed. Most are temporary solutions to the personal power needs of their rulers. In such states the United States can use its considerable leverage to achieve some liberalization, as President Carter did with the Shah and Somoza. But the Carter administration did not solve the problem of achieving substantial liberalization without initiating violent movement toward yet another despotism of right or left. It is insufficient to rely on persistent messages to both incumbents and opponents (or potential opponents) that we desire funda-
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mental change, and that we will support any democratic or even potentially democratic alternative that appears.

At this level another part of the American strategy starts to emerge, that of institution building. This is the first group of countries for which it becomes conceivable that public American support for business and labor organizations, or even political party organization would help. For only at this level can the foreign policy interests of a target country be such that the United States can act as a shield for that institutionalization that may eventually support democracy.

Partly-free authoritarian states offer more scope for American influence. Their governments, elites, and general publics often know what a functioning democracy is like and yearn for it. There is a steady flow of outside information and a great deal of travel both to and from these states and Western democracies.

It is true that these states often have more institutionalized and stable social and political systems than the one-party tyrannies. They nevertheless accept in theory the idea of democracy as we know it. The goal of communications and leverage would be to get the process of democratization started again. Often this will mean working out interim power-sharing agreements between present rulers and opposition leaders, similar to that worked out between the conservative and liberal parties in Colombia.

The last two groups—pro-democratic transitional states and insecure democracies—may be treated together. Countries such as Brazil, Thailand, or Honduras have in common a strong affinity for democracy and repeated experience with its workings. In these countries there is no powerful antidemocratic ideology, although institutions such as the armed forces may have a record of repeated interventions.

The job of political elites in these countries is to build gradually more unshakeable democratic institutions among party structures, unions, farmers, professional organizations, courts, the media, schools, and churches. Eventually the military forces must become so integrated with the rest of society that they become the guardians rather than the usurpers of democracy.

The United State's role in these societies is perhaps more critical than at any other point on the spectrum. While being sufficiently sensitive to the nationalistic feelings of societies in this group, we should at the same time make clear our realiza-
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tion of, and respect for, the dedication their elites have to democratic values, and grade our aid efforts in direct proportion as the society seems to be moving toward or away from democracy. We should endeavor to provide private as well as public assistance in the many practical affairs that make democracy work.

Organizing the Effort

The campaign for democracy would ideally involve a substantial bureaucracy dedicated to its purposes and able to represent its interests vis-a-vis competing foreign and domestic interests. We could hope that the greater attractiveness of democracy will allow the campaign to perform satisfactorily with hundreds of employees instead of the thousands routinely assigned to the task of promoting Soviet communism internationally. American electoral experience suggests that good candidates and good causes defeat with modest campaign efforts undesirable candidates or causes that spend lavishly. But good causes do not win without a carefully organized and directed effort and a reasonable level of funding.

Since we do not have a tightly organized, internationally involved political party in any way analogous to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and since we cannot therefore organize what amounts to party branches throughout the world, the structure of our effort can never be directly comparable to this central aspect of the Soviet effort.

Parts of the campaign for democracy are already in place, particularly in functional areas such as the information services of USIA. These programs should be expanded. More time needs to be devoted to both planning and broadcasting, and more languages employed. A massive translation and book distribution service should be developed to at least begin to compete with the Soviet effort. Much is also being done in other functional areas such as union organization, generally by the American labor unions themselves. The Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Bureau performs an important service in direct support of many of the goals of the campaign. Institutes for the study of democracy may be developed on a continental basis to help train cadres of leaders familiar with democracy and to study the problems of developing and maintaining modern civil societies and democratic
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institutions. Certainly the State Department, Foreign Service, and CIA perform supporting functions in other areas.

It is within the context of the overall commitment of the United States to the promotion of democracy that we should consider the mission of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The "strategic principle" in the campaign for democracy that it addresses is the fourth, "Promote the adoption and increasing effectiveness of the political institutions of democracy" (See above). To a lesser degree the Endowment will also promote self-determination and human rights. It cannot be the principal operating arm in carrying out strategies in these areas; but it can over a period of years provide an institutional reference point for American support for democracy that will stand apart from the varying emphases and interests of successive administrations. It can represent commitment to the longer-term goal of democratic change when other more pressing concerns direct immediate and day-to-day policy.

Paralleling such functional efforts and perhaps under a general supervisory office there should ideally also be developed individual programs for every country, with coordinators specifically responsible for the promotion of democracy in or through that country.

The goals for country programs will vary widely. In stabilized democracies, goals will include developing or increasing both private and governmental efforts in support of democracy in third countries and reducing or eliminating counterproductive support for nondemocratic regimes. Every democracy has certain other countries in which it takes a particular interest, and we may be able to shape this interest more positively (for example, Sweden in Tanzania and Ethiopia; Italy in Somalia and Ethiopia). We must struggle in every country against an interpretation of the world that understands most nonindustrialized countries in essentially marxist and anti-imperialist terms. This is important, in addition, because of the influence of the climate of opinion in developed countries on exiles or other third-world nationals that reside in them.

In pro-democratic transitional states and fragile democracies, the ideological and foreign policy struggle will occupy less of the coordinator's time. His main task will be discovering ways to improve the functioning of democratic institutions and sounding
alerts when economic or other trauma threaten to overwhelm these institutions. Here it will be particularly important to have someone specifically responsible for democracy and thoroughly knowledgeable about what works and does not in the particular country.

Democratic campaign coordinators for nondemocracies will be faced with another set of problems, yet the solutions will be no less country specific. They must be prepared to work along at least three tracks: 1) assisting in the provision of information to the people of the country on democracy, the state of the world, oppression in the country and opposition to it, and democratic alternatives, where such information is not otherwise obtainable; 2) influencing the policies of government elites so that they move the country in a more democratic direction; and 3) improving the effectiveness or democratic promise of ostensibly democratic groups actively working for a change of government. Multiple track approaches of this kind are commonly pursued by both Soviet and anti-Soviet communists, and with care can be emulated.

Special coordinators might be appointed to represent and coordinate the interests of particular nationality groups, working in close relationship with the coordinators for the countries affected. For example, South African Blacks, Kurds, Tibetans, several of the Soviet nationalities, and the Indonesian, Burmese, and Indian dissident minorities might have such specialists. It is important that all peoples see the democratic campaign as potentially meaningful for them and that they not be left by inadvertence to see communism as their only hope.

The message, the vision, we offer each country must be modulated in relation to its situation and possibilities. For example, in a recent discussion of liberalization in the USSR, the discussants generally agreed on the "principle of proximate criticism," that is, the ideas most likely to promote democratic change in the minds of Soviets are those not too far from the assumptions of the socialist world they know (although this would vary with class and region). This implies that our ideological offensive should begin with emphasis on the many historical and contemporary Marxist critiques of the USSR and descriptions of successful socialist aspects of the West. It was also recommended that we emphasize relatively objective information services to a society thirsty for real news, and that we expand support of religious
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dissidents. (Most would also emphasize nationality dissidence, but some see this as leading to greater repression.) Emphasis on religious dissidence was seen as especially important because a constituency for this effort already existed in the United States—a critical consideration for the longevity and thus eventual effectiveness of any policy.9

Supporting democratic directions in a country such as Iran poses an entirely different set of problems. Does "proximate criticism" make sense here, or should we instead campaign for the secularization of society, as in Ataturk's Turkey? Are Islam and democracy fundamentally antithetical? Is it possible for modernized Islam to lay the basis for democracy? Does it make sense to support the dissidence movements of an essentially westernized elite when it seems so thoroughly rejected and its leaders are in exile? Should democracy mean increased autonomy for the Baluch, Kurds, Turkomen, and others when their movements offend many Persian nationalists? For Iran, before we consider democracy should we promote the evolution of a modern civil society, and if so, for what period of time and in what manner?10

A primary task of the country coordinators in nondemocracies will be to open an informed dialogue with opposition or resistance groups so as to assess their strengths and weaknesses, and to gauge the depth of their commitment to democracy. On the one hand, country programs should be developed on the basis of these contacts; on the other, the contacts will help coordinators discover what can be done to strengthen the effectiveness or democratic fiber of such groups. It may be that in some countries these groups will be found to be so weak and disassociated or so weakly dedicated to democracy that coordinators will plan to restrict the campaign initially to work with incumbent elites and the upgrading of US informational services. Where groups or individuals with democratic leadership potential are discovered either within or without a country, it should be a major goal to develop attitudes of conciliation, compromise, and moderation. Not only are these essential to any democratic, and therefore pluralist, society that emerges, they are also absolutely necessary for the incorporation of those many leaders, even among ruling elites, that will be necessary for change to occur. It is also important to realize that the more a democratic system comes to power through relatively peaceful and incorporative means, the
more magnanimous it is in power to its previous opponents, the more likely it will be able to achieve a modern and stable pluralism.

The example of Iran also suggests the necessity for country coordinators to develop among themselves regional programs. Democratic elements of nondemocracies must necessarily exist internationally. They must work with similar groups across borders, and they must hear approximately the same message from the United States and its allies in whatever country they are. Moreover, groups of countries generally evolve together; democracies exist only with difficulty in isolation, or when surrounded by states moving in a different direction.

The campaign for democracy will not be only a governmental effort. Many organizations, such as Freedom House, are already in the field. The National Endowment for Democracy is a semi-private, federally funded attempt to achieve many of the purposes of the campaign. Its efforts have already made an important contribution. However, NED suffers from the push and pull of the political forces that brought it into being, the continuing political fragility of its position, and inadequate funds for the development of a coherent program. This is particularly so since its funds are largely allocated to groups outside its direct control. If it achieves some organizational stability, there are signs it may be able to effectively overcome these obstacles.

Expanding the Democratic Community of Nations

An aspect of a national policy to support democracy is the further development and exploitation of alliance relationships. Clearly it is past time for the United States to extend or reformulate its alliance structure. The spectacle of allied disinterest in, or even sabotage of, US policy in regard to Israel, Vietnam, Poland, Afghanistan, Central America, and elsewhere weakens both defense and deterrence, gives aid and comfort to our detractors, and ultimately lays the basis for the dissolution of our military alliances. The pipeline controversy of the early 1980s proved again, if proof were needed, that our international obligations and special relationships should be reexamined.
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If we are to maintain our alliances, we will need to take our traditional allies more fully into partnership, ask their advice earlier and more consistently, and accept their judgment more often for the sake of preserving unity. We may also find it advisable to reach out globally for new alliance relationships.

The importance of this approach may be seen when we look beyond immediate goals to the construction of an ever-widening community of democracies. Ultimately what the campaign for democracy should envisage is a new internationalism, and the growth of truly democratic international institutions. The UN, the OAU (Organization for African Unity), and other ideologically mixed internationalisms are failing, either to handle the problems for which they were designed, or to advance the interests of the peoples they were purportedly established to help. Meanwhile, more uniformly democratic organizations like the Council of Europe are able to play more positive roles in extending and incorporating a sense of international and democratic law within their spheres.

The sense of an institutionally unified, democratic Europe played an important role in extending and defending its "frontier of democracy" in the last decade. This role was an important one in returning Greece to democracy, and in the creation of democratic, noncommunist Spain and Portugal; it will be critical in holding these countries to the democratic tradition. If, as planned, Turkey reestablishes its democratic institutions, it will be in large part because it wishes to maintain its identification with democratic Europe.

Neighboring democracies support and help to maintain one another, as in North America, Australia-New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the island worlds of the South Pacific, most of the Caribbean, and recently most of the South American states. The British Commonwealth offers a model of a similar set of democracy-reinforcing relationships that is not based on geography. It should be American policy to encourage these groupings, and at the same time to encourage an international community of democracies with an increasingly overlapping and dense set of relationships. The nonaligned movement satisfies certain ideological needs, but it has come to be used primarily as a means of spreading the anti-American virus. New sets of relationships can be developed to supplement and perhaps replace those based on ignoring the difference between oppressive and free societies, tyrants who rule
through fear and leaders who rule only at the pleasure of their people.

In light of these considerations, it has recently been proposed that an Association of Democracies be established on the model of the Council of Europe. The organization would be devoted primarily to the development of democratic institutions and the expansion of human rights. Initially it is not assumed that the Association would campaign actively for the establishment of democracy in nondemocratic states. However, it would actively support democracy where it exists and wherever it comes to exist. By working together on issues of common concern in this limited arena, there might come to be a sense of mutual interest that would allow for later cooperation on economic and development issues and questions of self-determination. Since the world's most modern and wealthy states would form half of its membership, the Association of Democracies would symbolize the relation of democracy to progress. It is hoped that many countries now on the democratic periphery would eventually see their future best secured by identifying with the Association and its ideals. Since this would require the institutionalization or preservation of full democratic rights, the Association should by its very existence operate to steadily increase the number of democracies in the world.

The Need for Research and Analysis

In support of the democracy campaign, a center for the study of democracy should be developed, perhaps as a major project of the National Endowment for Democracy. It is certainly necessary for any democracy campaign to make a concerted effort to benefit from the histories of the democracies and their opponents. This is not a call for original research, but a call for the collection and analysis of what is already known. We need to study what the efforts of the communists have been, their successes and failures, and what we can learn from this record. This should help in creating our own approach and identify the particularly effective aspects of the Soviet effort that need to be explicitly counter-balanced by our activities.
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In order to improve the efficiency of our efforts to support democracy we should make a supplementary effort to record and consider the history of the efforts the United States or other democracies have made to support or even impose democracy. Sometimes these efforts have been rewarded, as in the Axis powers after World War II, in Costa Rica, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. We have also used our leverage with remarkable consistency in Bolivia—with mixed but not entirely negative results. The continued and positive struggle for democracy in Thailand may owe much to US efforts. Vietnam offers a rich fund of experience. Even when ultimately unsuccessful, our past efforts should be reconsidered.

Inconsistency must be remembered as the plague of much of US policy. One of the most searing and egregious examples was Afghanistan. The king established a constitutional democracy with US political help in 1963, and persisted with the new system, imperfect but the best the country had ever had, for ten years. Yet in spite of Afghanistan's extreme poverty, US economic aid steadily declined during these years, and was greatly outdistanced by the Soviets.

In assessing our role in the world, it is particularly important to note how important the United States is in the consciousness of peoples everywhere, and especially in Latin America. The possibilities and problems this gives us have never been adequately assessed, but those who develop a strategy for extending and institutionalizing democracy must understand and exploit this factor. Sometimes it will mean shifting the responsibility for the campaign to other more local actors or other Western allies. At other times we might conclude that an effort directly by the United States would be particularly effective.

Regional loyalties and anti-Western attitudes loom large in some societies. In Asia it might be particularly desirable to increase interest in, and knowledge of, Japanese democracy. Japan is widely accepted as the economic model for Asia, and there may be a rapid transition from grudging admiration to enthusiastic emulation. If this relationship could be transferred to political systems, it would constitute a critical breakthrough. How to encourage the Japanese to view themselves as potential exporters of democracy, and others so to view them, is a major challenge.
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Overcoming Educational and Ideological Barriers

The struggle for democracy begins at home, and specifically on US campuses and in the cultural media. In American higher education the United States is often viewed by the politically aware as the enemy of democracy in the third world, as well as the exploiter of its resources, and the deliberate opponent of its development. These views spread beyond Marxist circles to generally affect the intellectual environment. America itself is widely, though less commonly, viewed as repressive in intellectual-academic American and West European communities. Unfortunately, these are the communities that write the books and teach the courses directly or indirectly consumed by the noncommunist world. American information programs and other forms of intellectual warfare outside of the United States can perhaps no more than offset part of this larger and unintended effect of education and other forms of cultural communication within Western states.15

This burden on the campaign for democracy can never be entirely lifted, but it will help to recognize it and try to work around it. One approach would be to publicize, for example, through refugee speakers, the extent of oppression in the world that can clearly not be ascribed to American machinations. Another is to develop educational programs for foreign students on US campuses that foster understanding of American political and party systems, our different levels of government, the meaning of consensus and compromise in the American context, and other values. Most foreign students do not take political science or government courses, and leave with only a "street knowledge" of what goes on here. Similar programs could be developed on campuses in other democracies.

It is equally important to modify those actions of the US government that affect perceptions of our role and purposes. For example, we must more fully consider the ideological losses incurred throughout the West, as well as the regions affected, whenever we appear to befriend a repressive regime such as Haiti, South Africa, or Chile. We may have good reasons, even reasons that benefit the people directly affected, but we must also fully realize the losses we must accept in the struggle of images and ideologies.
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The American war for the minds of men will face many obstacles. Intellectually two of the more important of these are the arguments that the campaign is either an example of cultural imperialism or cultural naivete. We must be prepared in our own minds and in public to overcome these interpretations with an understanding of the justice in these accusations that will allow us to avoid the pitfalls they point to, and with an understanding of the changing world that allows us to show their relative triviality.

Obviously we must understand differences among cultures, the difficulty of cultural change, and the pain that enforced change inflicts when it forces people to abandon values and practices with which they identify their lives. Our trivial fads and fashions are not the only true ways: we must be sure not to foist them on others when they do not want them. On the other hand, all our culturally determined actions, technologically and morally, are not trivial; we have good reason to believe that selected aspects of our culture should become part of universal civilization.

We approach other cultures with the understanding that the world is changing rapidly, that many people are not satisfied with their pasts, and wish to change both the structure and details of their lives. For good or ill, attaining one wish inevitably generates others. For example, everyone wants people to have good health, and babies to survive, but as this wish becomes realized the old wish for large families is progressively set aside.

Specifically, in politics and economics old ways are changing and people everywhere are adopting new models, or radical revisions of old models. In this situation we would be unfair to ourselves and others not to promote what we have found, or reason to be, the best models. Of course, for any model to work it must be adapted to the local situation to which it is applied.

We must remember that nearly all systems of belief or organization in the world today were imposed on, or copied by, the peoples with which they are now identified. Arab imperialism imposed Islam on Khomeini's Iranian ancestors just as surely as Spanish imperialism imposed Catholicism on Latin America. After World War II we imposed democracy on Germany, Italy, and Japan. They had no reason to complain or we to feel guilt. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an imperialist document—primarily, a liberal, Western, Christian document. Although, for example, the Africans
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had little to do with its formulation, this does not make it any less applicable to Africa today. Every powerful contending leader in the world—from Khomeini to Qadhafi, or Reagan to Gorbachev—is imperialist in the sense of actively trying to have their ideas adopted by other leaders. This is the responsibility of anyone who thinks that he has something others should also have.

In both development and Marxist literature America's advocacy of democracy has often been criticized as superficial. For example, Owens and Shaw write:

In a number of countries the democratic system has served merely to confirm and legitimize the precolonial power structure. Elections reflect the influence of ruling groups rather than the wishes of the people. Parliaments have been established, but have little power. ... In these countries the democratic system lacks one of its crucial characteristics—choice.

In some countries, however, there has been an illusion of choice—much of Latin America and Asian countries such as Ceylon and the Philippines. There is more than one party, and governments have been changed peacefully in accordance with election results. However, these parties represent a division among ruling groups rather than alternative choices for the nation at large. In addition, the competition among immature parties has often led to grossly unrealistic promises to the electorate, pledges that could not be redeemed by any party in power.

In both situations—no choice or an illusion of choice—there is a lack of effective participation by the people. And in both situations, the failure of the transplant to become a viable political system has led to a series of military coups, dictatorships, and one-party states.16

In some degree these accusations might be made (and often are made) against any democratic system. To a greater degree they are simply overstated—poor people do participate meaningfully in many third world democracies. The fact that their interests and votes remain too conservative in the eyes of Western critics does not invalidate their participation.
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The final remark of Owens and Shaw that coups and dictatorships result from the "failure" of democracies should alert us to a common misunderstanding of system failure, in that it falsely suggests the greater desirability or at least viability of the successor regimes that replace "failed" democracies. It is well to remember that the developing democracies of the 1920s in Germany and Japan did not so much "fail" as fall before the superior force of their opponents. It is likely that in most third-world countries the reason for the periodic collapse of democracy is not that the majority turns its back on democracy but rather than an armed minority (often a section of the military or the army as an institution) is more interested in power than in democracy. It grasps the opportunity to achieve power in a period of societal malaise. The inculcation of democratic values in the armed services is a major distinction between stable and unstable democracies.¹⁷

Nevertheless, there is an air of unreality in many new democracies. A major goal of any campaign for democracy must be to increase the perceived reality of the choices offered the electorate and to make it possible for all significant groups to use the system. A first step is to openly recognize the impediments to true democracy in formalistic democracies, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Mexico, or Paraguay, that make it next to impossible for opponents to threaten the power of incumbents. Such states should not publicly be called democracies by American officials. The campaign for democracy should realize the inadequacy of such states and work within the limits of our knowledge of nationalistic sensitivities to achieve true democracy in these cases.

While we may be justified in our cultural imperialism we may still be wrong in our optimism. But here we need only be clear that we have no fixed timetable for all states. We realize that the basis for stable democracy, or even the possibility of adequate group self-determination without anarchy, is simply lacking in many states. The fact that India, Botswana, and Papua New Guinea are democracies and Chile and Taiwan are not suggests this is not a matter of levels of modernism and development. The political systems in oil exporting countries suggest it is not a matter of money alone. Many factors are involved, and we must work with these without forgiving leaders who unreasonably deny elementary rights, and expecting repeated setbacks in many coun-
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tries. We must work in the faith that the firm association of democracy with modern life will eventually bring political rights to all peoples.

NOTES


5. This categorization is based in large part on the categories and experience of the Comparative Survey of Freedom. See R. D. Gastil, Freedom in the World 1984-1985, and previous editions of this annual.


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15. The pervasiveness of the leftist interpretation of the US-Third World relationship can be found in the works of otherwise quite conservative authors. See, for example, General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War: The Untold Story (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 234-249.


17. For this and other problems in achieving stable democracies see also the section on developing democracy in last year's yearbook (R. D. Gastil, Freedom in the World 1984-85, pages 193-269).
Reflections Inspired by the June 15 Conference

It has long been the fashion to refer to the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe as the satellites of the Soviet Union. Immediately after World War II, this was appropriate since the regimes were to a large extent the creations of the Soviet Union and its Communist Party apparatus. Soviet troops were stationed in many of the states and Soviet forces were used directly or indirectly to keep them in power. To a large extent this is still the situation. Yet over the years experiences and assumptions have built up a new view that recognizes a new reality in Eastern Europe. It is to this reality that we must respond, for it is in this reality that the opportunities lie for major change in the prospects for democracy, and thus eventually for the security and freedom of all peoples.

Our understanding of East European reality will be influenced by the degree to which we consider Yugoslavia to be an integral part of the region. The issue is not geography. Most observers are quite willing to consider Bulgaria a part of Eastern Europe, even though it is even farther into what geographically is the Balkans, or what historians used to refer to as the Near East. Focusing on US-USSR relations causes many to see Yugoslavia as irrelevant to our concerns in Eastern Europe. However, if we consider Europe as divided between those countries that became communist under Soviet tutelage at the end of World War II and those that became associated with the revival of democracy under American tutelage, then Yugoslavia clearly belongs with the rest of Eastern Europe. It is not a "neutral" such as Austria and Finland. Neither of these states ever chose a communist system, with the Marxist-Leninist political system that goes along with
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it. In this sense, Finland and Austria have remained steadfast members of the West, in spite of the necessity to opt out of security arrangements with the West.

It is important to remind both communists and noncommunists through the medium of the Yugoslav example of the possibility to develop foreign and domestic policies in Eastern Europe that diverge quite strongly from those of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is necessary for those in the West who would denounce the human rights violations of the communist states to remember that many of these violations also characterize Yugoslavia. While in many respects Yugoslavia has been a leader in the liberalization of Eastern Europe, it is losing this position, and so offers less guidance to those who are looking for a way out. It is our responsibility, both for the sake of consistency and for the sake of all East Europeans, to condemn the denials of human rights in Yugoslavia in the same terms that we condemn those in the other countries of the region.

The societies of Eastern Europe are still formally all Marxist-Leninist states. Yet the characteristics of these states diverge further and further from the Soviet model and the assumptions on which the Soviet world system was originally built. At one extreme, states such as Albania, and to a lesser extent Romania, retain the repressive totalitarian apparatus of Stalinism. Quite different are societies such as Poland, in which under communism collectivization was reversed and eventually the power of the church was allowed to increase, and Hungary where an informal social pact between the government and people has allowed progressive liberalization of policies in a wide variety of areas. Access to foreign publications, as well as movement in and out of the country, has become increasingly liberalized. Compared to the Soviet Union, the people in all but the first two countries listed above are freer in a wide variety of ways than those in the Soviet Union itself. There has been an often interrupted but definite slide of most of these states toward more liberalism, a slide that to a much greater extent has been slowed and sometimes even reversed in the USSR itself. Eastern Europe has also been the scene, of far more extensive experimentation with the imposed Soviet economic system than has been possible in the Soviet Union itself.

Equally important for our notion of how to deal with the region has been the development of increasingly authentic, government-
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sponsored, nationalism. Yugoslavia was the first to challenge the Soviet claim to a right to intervene anywhere in the region, a presumption later codified in the media as the "Brezhnev Doctrine." Since then the Soviets have been forced to intervene on a number of occasions, but still the slide away from their immediate and direct control continues. Most notable have been the defections of Albania and Romania. Neither has given any pretext for Soviet intervention to defend the communist order. Without a common border with Albania its claim to independence was especially difficult for Moscow to deny. While Romania remains formally in the Warsaw alliance, it has challenged the Soviet conception of their right to lead the socialist world in many ways. It does not allow maneuvers on its territory, and generally does not cooperate in Warsaw pact maneuvers. It plays a role in the Warsaw Pact analogous to that of France within NATO (although France is, of course, relatively more important to its alliance).

Aside from such flagrant cases, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany have on several occasions played less than totally subservient roles in relation to Soviet purposes. This is particularly true within Soviet alliances, such as Comecon, where the USSR has been unable to dictate its version of what should be done, with the result that there has been surprisingly little success in constructing a true economic federation in Eastern Europe. In fact, economic contacts with the West have become increasingly important, particularly for Hungary.

The diffusion of West European standards and ways of life into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has been irresistible. The Yugoslavs have long gone out in large numbers to work in, and absorb the standards of, the West. This has become increasingly easy for the Hungarians. East Germany has been bombarded daily by the outpourings of West German television, until the East German government had to install cable television beaming West German programs into Dresden, the only area until then beyond the reach of the West. Even the Albanians receive Italian television without jamming—although that from Yugoslavia is jammed. The Albanians rebroadcast some Italian programs.

Recent events in Poland have tended to obscure the extent to which Poland had long been an "exception" in Eastern Europe. The existence of a dissident population in Poland today is possible only because of the continuing structure of alternative institu-
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tions in Poland throughout the greater part of the post-World War II period. Most critical was the continuing domination of private agriculture in Poland since at least 1956. Equally important was the preservation of the dominance of the Catholic Church in Polish spiritual, and increasingly, national life. Church publications were censored, but they remained under the control of an independent Church. After 1956 under the leadership of Gomulka, a de facto opposition was allowed to exist, and mild dissent was regularly voiced in the media. Under Gierek in the 1970s intellectual publications with considerable independence were protected by top officials from the too-heavy hand of the censor. While parliament was hardly independent, it contained individuals, often belonging to the coopted minority parties, whose behavior contrasted with the total subservience of legislators elsewhere in the Soviet bloc.

Czechoslovakia has been regarded since the 1960s as a spent society, cringing under Soviet repression. Yet within the intellectual and cultural life of the country it has managed to develop a complex world of free expression such as is unknown, for example, in the Soviet Union. Admittedly the goal is not now revolution or change, but survival. Within this limited objective the Charter 77 movement has developed. This group issues a steady stream of publications and analyses in a wide variety of fields. Between 1972 and 1984 at least 600 books and several journals have been published. Since 1981 the Critical Review has appeared four times a year, with eighty to one hundred pages per issue. It contains articles by well-known writers and scholars. Since typewriters are the main duplicating device, the number of copies is limited. Perhaps the best-known representative of this effort is the writer Vaclav Havel who has continued to attack publicly the presuppositions of communist oppression, and to express the Charter 77 position that true peace can only be achieved when respect for human rights is achieved.

In Czechoslovakia part of the struggle for an autonomous life has centered around music, particularly jazz and rock. For years the Jazz Section of the Union of Musicians kept its affiliation with the International Jazz Federation in spite of the government’s opposition. Finally in 1984 the government dissolved the entire Union of Musicians because it refused to expel the Section. The largest bibliography of rock music in the world has been
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published recently by this semi-underground world. The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia has taken courage from the Polish Church and from the East German peace movement to carve out its own area of dissent.

The situation in Hungary was considered by the conference participants to be the most liberal in Eastern Europe. But perhaps equally important, the intellectual atmosphere, even within the top layers of the ruling elite, has veered further from Moscow's line. Most recently the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party has advanced the thesis that it is in the national interest of Hungary to establish a middle ground between East and West. Reprinted in East Germany's Neues Deutschland, it has been sharply attacked in Prague and Moscow. The thesis was a Party version of the position developed by the well-known Hungarian writer George Konrad in his book Antipolitics. But significantly Konrad is not speaking so much of Hungary as he is of Europe as a third force rising above the power politics of the two blocs. In the course of this consideration Konrad points out the degree to which Hungary has already culturally and intellectually become that third force. He points out that Hungarian television has good documentaries, and the journals have useful articles. A few subjects cannot be addressed: membership in the Warsaw Pact, the desirability of multiparty candidates, and worker rights to choose their bosses. (There appears to have been movement on at least the second issue since he wrote.) He identifies democracy as more important than socialism, because democracies can choose socialism, but it does not appear possible to move the other way around. Democracy, Konrad asserts, is the "high road of European history." "The rejection of terror, the rejection of atomic war, democracy within and among all social units, contractual relations according to the rules of the game—it is up to us to declare that this is the meaning and goal of history." Published in Hungarian, but not in Hungary, Konrad's book was perhaps yet too much for the system to swallow. But its utopianism is an encouraging alternative alongside the Central European pessimism of Havel.

East Germany is often thought of as a harsh and repressive state. Certainly experience with the Berlin Wall supports this image. However, within the constraints of its society the Evangelical Church has managed to show increasing independence, espe-
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cially since it achieved a form of concordat with the government in 1978. Pressed by its constituent churches and councils the evangelical federation has repeatedly and publicly opposed the state's concept of the Church's role. It has supported the workers and Church in Poland in its crisis, and developed a peace movement directed against military training and hate literature in the schools. It has pressed for peace education and alternative service and condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its 1983 synod unanimously passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on all missiles in Europe, and calling for the Soviets to dismantle some of their SS-20s. It urged the authorities to declare the possession or use of nuclear weapons to be a crime, to support a nuclear freeze, and to ban short-range nuclear weapons from the GDR.9

Recent studies of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe emphasize the extent to which the Soviet Union, in spite of its overwhelming power, is thwarted in its attempt to use mechanisms such as the Warsaw Pact and Comecon to achieve its objectives.10 Clearly the Russians often do not get what they want. They have been as unable as the United States to get their allies to keep up the percent of their budgets devoted to defense. Comecon has not become the integrated economic system the Soviets had hoped for. In the 1970s Comecon's "Comprehensive Program" was simply not carried out. It provided for a collective currency, the convertibility of all Comecon currencies, and the use of a single rate of exchange for each country's currency. But its most far-reaching proposals were not carried out.

Different Approaches to the Soviet World and Eastern Europe

The situations in Eastern Europe and those in the Soviet Union should be carefully distinguished. In many respects there is a smooth gradation in the degree of exposure to the outside world as one moves west to east. Gradation with distance should be expected for the diffusion of any cultural items, material or spiritual. In other respects the Soviet border is a sharp boundary that must be appreciated in policy by devising quite different strategies for societies on either side.
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The situations are the same in that all communist countries are open to the steady and positive diffusion of Western ideas. In this generalized attraction to the West there is no fundamental discontinuity. The extent of exposure varies with the historical background of the peoples, their channels of contact, the policies of their governments, and recent history. Historically, the most exposed areas or countries are Hungary, Slovenia in Yugoslavia, the Czech portions of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia), Poland, and East Germany. Because of the extensive export of labor by Yugoslavia to Western Europe in the last few years, other areas of Yugoslavia should perhaps be included with Slovenia. The next degree of exposure includes Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Armenia. On the next level are most of the Soviet Republics, including the Russian, Romania, and perhaps Bulgaria. In the least culturally exposed category are Albania and the Central Asian Republics of the USSR.

Crosscutting this categorization is one in terms of nationalism and the affinities of nationalities. Three levels may be distinguished. The first is that of the USSR's Russian population. While many Russians dislike communism, the majority appear to identify positively with the idea of a powerful Soviet state, and thus with communism as the ideology of that state. They are very "touchy" about criticism by outsiders of Russia or the accomplishments of Russia. This attachment leads them to accept the broad lines of Moscow's view of the international situation, and to be less than convinced of Soviet inferiority in any sphere—moral or material. The strong nationalism of the Russian people is reinforced by the fact that Russia has long been characterized, and continues to be characterized, by a broad gap between the great majority of the people and a small, highly educated, and relatively cosmopolitan ruling elite. Except for items of material and popular culture, diffusion from the West is almost entirely limited to the elite stratum.

On the third level are those peoples that in large part see Soviets or Russians as those who occupy or oppress their lands. They take no pride in Russian accomplishments, confining their concern within the Soviet orbit to preserving or developing their own culture or nation state. These include all the peoples of
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Eastern Europe and the communist Balkans, except for Bulgaria. To a lesser extent this position may categorize many of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

A second, or intermediate, level on the nationalities dimension includes peoples that do not identify with Russian success or power, but who, nevertheless, may not reject communist leaders beholden to the USSR. They may also support communist advances worldwide, and feel themselves to have a part in "Soviet" successes. On this level are Bulgaria and some non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Over time, majorities may move between levels two and three. (Minorities among all peoples would find themselves on a different level than the majority of their fellows.)

Experience and time have fundamentally altered the totalitarian models that previously were assumed to roughly reflect the reality of life in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Critics of the current Polish regime are beginning to speak of a a "post-totalitarian regime." Nationality has achieved, or been allowed to achieve, increasing recognition. Authoritarianism has increasingly replaced totalitarianism.

Within the USSR the extent of self-determination achieved by the non-Russian nationalities has been slight, but in Eastern Europe it has weakened both the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. At the same time Western ideas have flooded in everywhere. Increasingly, young Russians see themselves as part of an international youth culture.\(^1\) This is more so in Eastern Europe where there is rapid diffusion of European civilization—often under the label of world or international civilization. This social and cultural diffusion is affecting every sphere of life. Although its influence has been least noticeable in the political arena, there has been more and more talk in Eastern Europe of a "social contract" in which peoples grant loyalty (of a sort) to their government in exchange for a reasonable rate of growth in consumer goods and consumer satisfaction.\(^12\) The widespread acceptance by both government and opposition of polling as a standard against which to debate policy is fundamentally modern—but as used it is also democratic.\(^13\)
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Implications for American Policy

This analysis suggests that our policy toward Eastern Europe should differentiate in certain key respects between the messages we send to the Russian people and those we transmit to the other peoples of the region. In communicating with Russians we must emphasize the development of a partnership in progress, of moving forward together to help all peoples overcome the remnants of the past. In communicating with non-Russians we should emphasize the need to join the international community as free peoples, communist or not, the need of every people to move out from under the control of any other people. We should also emphasize the need of all peoples to accept a modern ideology of science and progress. Emphasizing human rights violations has a positive role, in Eastern Europe, especially when such violations can be presented as an expression of the generalized backwardness of communist culture.

Within this approach, emphasis on national cultures and religion must be developed with care. On the one hand, appeals to these questions support anti-Sovietism and freedom. But on the other, it may make anti-communism itself seem backward-looking, and thus contradict the message that we should all go forward together toward a freer and more humanistic future. To reduce this conflict we must present religion primarily in its institutional, symbolic, and ethical aspects. We should not promote or approve Christianity or Islam in contrast to "atheistic communism." The modern world is irremediably secular and scientific. Many of those who have flocked into the Christian churches of Poland or East Germany in recent years are not believing Christians (much as many of those who support Israel are not believing Jews). Our messages to the peoples of Eastern Europe should encourage symbolic religiosity without diminishing the identification of the West with the future.

Because of the traditional support of the Russian Church for the government of the day, and the tendency of most orthodox priests to continue in this tradition, there is less reason for our efforts in regard to the Russian people to even touch on the subject of religion, except in a purely cultural sense, or when it involves the human rights of minorities.

Similarly, when we support the right of dissidents to express their opinions freely and openly, we must be careful to distin-
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guish between support for the right of dissidence and support for the ideas of the dissidents. Much of the dissent against the government in Hungary today is based on opposition to reforms that lead to greater economic freedom. Even authentic voices of labor may not be, in this case, on the side of freedom. Elsewhere conservative religious opinion may be outraged by communist governments on issues with which we are not concerned. Our message is that all groups have the right to be heard, irrespective of what we may think of what they say, but this distinction is often overlooked.

Our effort to communicate with Eastern Europe has been largely successful. However, the most enduring messages are perhaps the least direct. From whatever source, the messages that are most significant are those that expand the realization of the possibilities of freedom, both political and social, and of growth, modernization—of a new world that all can join.

What makes this message particularly significant is the growing realization both within and without Eastern Europe that change can be attained under communism. This became clear with the achievement of national freedom by Yugoslavia, and more recently through the growing self-determination of the constituent Republics of Yugoslavia. It grew with the evident ability of Romania to pursue a foreign policy of its own. It grew with the growing freedom of movement and information in Hungary and Yugoslavia, as long as it does not threaten the system. This has led to a surprising freedom of discussion in Hungary, even in the official media.

The freedom achieved by the Catholic Church in Poland has been reflected to some extent in Czechoslovakia, and to a greater extent by the Protestant Church in East Germany. In both cases genuine peace movements offer an opening for expanding freedom within systems that have traditionally emphasized peace in a purely ideological and tendentious manner. The unofficial labor organization and many widely distributed unregistered periodicals in Poland also symbolize the possibilities within communism. The ability of Charter 77 and other groups in Czechoslovakia to develop an independent and extensive scholarly and investigative output has demonstrated that dedicated people can hollow out totalitarian controls even in generally repressive situations.
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The Causes of Change and Their Longer-Term Implications

From a broader perspective what is occurring in Eastern Europe is what should have been anticipated forty years ago. At the end of World War II Europe was divided between the two major powers. Each conducted itself in its own sphere in terms of its national traditions and internal needs. At first the Soviet Union cruelly crushed opposition wherever it was found, and imposed communism on the entire region. In its own way, with its peculiar mixture of paternalism, pragmatism, and humanitarianism, the United States supported, and, to a degree, imposed liberal democracy in the remainder of Europe.

Institutionally, both halves of Europe might have been incorporated into the "empires" of the superpowers. In its system of ethnic republics the Soviet Union already had a ready-made formula for such incorporation; its leaders may for a time have considered the possibility of extending the "union" to the satellites. However, no serious effort was made to effect such an incorporation. Institutionally, the two halves of Europe came to be symbolized by rather less formidable incorporations such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Common Market and Comecon. The looseness of the American hegemony in the West is suggested by the fact we encouraged but did not take part in the Common Market. Although our policy was often inconsistent, when we were at our best our goal was to create an independent, strong, Western Europe that could stand on its own. The Soviet goal was to create a group of communist-controlled, subservient states that would form a buffer between itself and American-backed Western Europe. Perhaps most critical in the thinking of Soviet leaders was maintaining through the satellite structure a basis on which to prevent the reunification of Germany. In this sense the creation of East Germany and the presence of a large Soviet army there is the key to the Soviet structure in Eastern Europe. It is certainly a major reason for its creation.

Soviet policy had an additional goal in Eastern Europe—expansion of communism. At least at the beginning, Soviet leaders had reason to hope that with the retirement of Americans after the war, and the disastrous conditions left behind in Europe, communism could be spread over the rest of the continent. In so far as this hope includes Western Europe, it is now reminiscent of the
hopes of the leaders on Taiwan to reclaim mainland China. But it is important to realize that one factor that constrained the Soviet Union in their relations with their satellites, as well as with Europe as a whole, was the hope that they might retain a favorable image in the rest of Europe. Since East European states served as models of what all European states could be like in a Marxist-Leninist future, the USSR had to modify its behavior with this in mind.

In the ensuing years Western Europe has reclaimed its position as one of the most civilized and wealthy parts of the world. The leading "countries" of the world in economics and technology have become Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. Eastern Europe has remained behind, becoming more a model of what not to become than what to become. This is not to say that there has not been a great deal of progress in the East. There has. But the USSR and its satellites are grey societies, marked by continuing shortages, and an unwillingness and inability to respond to consumer demands, or to grant the "little freedoms" that to the West make life more open and enjoyable.

Since 1945 both halves of Europe have tended to increasingly reject domination by their superpower. England and then France developed independent nuclear deterrents. Problems with France eventuated in France's semi-withdrawal from NATO. The withdrawal may be more symbolic than real, and yet it certainly complicates NATO plans. For a time Greece rejected the democratic forms of Western Europe; more recently it has abandoned many of its geopolitical assumptions—yet it has not actually left NATO. Turkey is faced with the dilemma of wanting to be a part of Western Europe, and yet not being able to accept either its standards of human rights or its position on Greece and Cyprus. Although not formally a part of a military pact, nevertheless the open courting of the communist bloc by the island state of Malta is a strategic irritation. Norway and Denmark do not allow nuclear weapons on their territory, in spite of their adherence to NATO.

To the east, the first country to escape Soviet hegemony was Yugoslavia in the 1940s. When Soviet threats and attempts to subvert the Yugoslav Party failed, it was accepted tangentially back into the communist fold as an associate of Comecon, although not a member. Albania was the next to leave, first in the company of China, and against the revisionism of the post-Stalin USSR.
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Blocked from direct action by Yugoslavia, the Soviets were not able to maintain Albania's satellite status. Attempts by other states to leave were blocked by direct imposition of force in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. But by the time of the "Prague Spring," Romania was already disaffected enough that it refused to cooperate in combined military action to restore old-line communism in Czechoslovakia. Since then Romania has maintained oppressive communist rule alongside repeated expressions of foreign policy independence. These have included what amounts to a French-style semi-withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

In Hungary the Soviet position began to erode when the Austrian peace treaty led to Soviet withdrawal from Austria in the 1950s. Although the close-following Hungarian insurrection was put down by Soviet troops and bloody repressions, by the 1970s Hungary and Austria were developing increasingly harmonious contacts, leading eventually to an opening of borders unheard of elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Today, Hungary appears psychologically to have turned almost entirely to the West. While maintaining communist forms, its theaters prefer to show western films, its shops to sell western goods, its students to study English rather than Russian. Even its political journals discuss Hungary's future as a small or medium power in the world, thereby raising implicitly the chance of disassociation from any bloc.

It is easy to look at individual countries of Eastern Europe and point out the wide variations in rates of change, in the relation of ruling parties to the people they rule, and in the spirit of the people. It is also easy to point out that small changes are often overevaluated. We must not forget that a Communist Party rules in every East European state. But what is equally important is how far these states and peoples have come, how many models of change they can profit from within their own region, and the continuing and growing inability of the Soviet Union to make any fundamental change in the underlying erosion of its influence.

Each event, each opening, should be seen as an example to the rest of the region's governments and peoples, and in most cases we should support it as such. East Europeans quickly learned and cherished the fact that the Yugoslav Party had managed to get out from under the CPSU, and it had made some interesting innovations in the way work was managed, and later was also willing to accept
the inevitable "infection" that sending hundreds of thousands of workers to the West was bound to bring. Yugoslavia is not a liberal state, but there is a flow of information in and out that until recently was unmatched. The Polish Church maintained its independence. Today the Czech Church, and the Protestant churches of East Germany take inspiration from the Poles. Romania allows more breathing room to the independent Protestant sects than the rest of the area. The Charter 77 group has become an intellectual focus in the area, and peace movements thrive and support one another in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

All of this could be crushed by the Soviet Union, or by the local communist governments, but for one reason or another it is not. In part, this is because communist leaders have learned to wait, to slowly apply pressures, and eventually to stamp out dissent and opposition entirely. With small isolated groups this seems effective, as it has been in the Soviet Union. But it is not working very well in Eastern Europe. The oppression seems to need to be more vigorous and brutal.

It is simply not true that communist regimes cannot be more oppressive than they are. They have been very effective oppressors in the past, no matter how dedicated and vital their opposition. Brutal oppression was used to centralize power in the Soviet Union. The widespread killing and torture that brought "peace" to Pol Pot's Cambodia before the Vietnamese invasion was only an extreme version of what they had learned to be a legitimate part of the communist past. But aside from the open war situation of Afghanistan, this is not the way the Soviet communists and their satellites enforce their rule any longer.

Suppression of unwanted tendencies in Eastern Europe is milder today because the governments and Parties, and even the Soviet Union, are more concerned than in the past with their image, by how their actions "look" to the world community, to other communists—to their own families and ultimately themselves. The wives of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze want to be able to meet Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Shultz on equal terms: they are no longer content to live in the narrow world of communist reticence. It is perhaps too much to assume, but it appears as though Soviet and satellite elites are becoming gradually civilized, gradually a part of the modern world and its assumptions, in spite of themselves. They are in a pre-revolutionary situation much like that
which characterized the French aristocracy at the end of the eighteenth century, or the Shah at the end of the twentieth, or indeed the tsars in World War I. Such rulers no longer had the "guts" to do what was necessary. This is not to disparage them, but to explain them.

The outcome in Eastern Europe is not going to be that which faced the Shah. For the people of these countries and their leaders are also post-revolutionary. They are tired of violence, and unconvinced that they can win through violence. Dissidents in almost every country of this region have adopted explicitly non-violent approaches.15

Inevitably the dissident commitment to nonviolence will slow down change, just as it may make it more probable. Nonviolent rhetoric will not arouse to the same degree the general public to engage in those sharp, quick, explosions of frustration, stored up for years, that characterize analogous revolutionay situations. The people have learned to live with searing frustrations. While most peoples of Eastern Europe passively accept their rulers, with the possible exceptions of Bulgaria and certain parts of Yugoslavia, they are all deeply disaffected either with their national governments or with the right of the Soviet Union to oversee their governments. In Poland the majority has moved into active dissidence; in Hungary both the people and the government coopt the dissidence of one another. But whatever the level of opposition, in Eastern Europe relatively civilized oppressors face relatively civilized revolutionary peoples. If this situation can be maintained and fostered, then a slow-burning revolution will take place—is taking place—and it will be a revolution much more likely to have lasting success than more bloody ones that have marked the past. In the opinion of some serious policy analysts preserving the peacefulness of the process may be the primary American policy goal in Eastern Europe for the next decade.

One can argue over the influence of detente or the lack of detente on the evolution of Eastern Europe. But the primary obstacle to the successful conclusion of the East European revolution is the fear that Soviet and East European communist leaders are bound to have that this slow revolution we have identified could be turned against them. Most of these leaders need to be able to develop a theory of their own survival through the revolutionary process, and for this purpose they need to be faced by the
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least frightening prospects that the agents of change can manage. At the same time, East European dissidents and their Western friends need to avoid giving communist leaders good arguments for violent repressions, arguments that are easier to come by in a harsh atmosphere of confrontation, especially when it includes military threats.

Everything we do can be threatening. But let our actions be those of increasing contacts at all levels, of maintaining or improving the quality and quantity of communication with these societies, of continuing to point out the extent to which they fall below human rights standards. We need to stand for a better world, and a world that has not forgotten Eastern Europe, in order to support the revolutionary process. As we continue to represent the alternative, we should in every way possible reduce the sense of military confrontation, and the fear that this inspires.

The conference described in the foregoing section was inspired by Brzezinski's paper in Foreign Affairs on reconsideration of the Yalta agreement forty years after. His central point was to give the East Europeans and the West Europeans a reaffirmation of the fact that we have, in spite of Yalta, never accepted the artificial division of Europe. He suggests that this might be done by: officially challenging the division of Europe into two spheres by both denying the right of the Soviet Union to impose its system and renouncing any intention to extend the American sphere of influence to Soviet frontiers; reconfirming the West's commitment to the Helsinki Final Act by again renouncing any intention to change borders in Eastern Europe, including specifically that of the two Germanies, and by affirming the right of Western countries to comment on violations of human rights in Eastern Europe; increasing the number of institutions in which East Europeans can participate alongside the West Europeans, and expanding efforts to develop linkages between East European countries and those of the Common Market; by emphasizing European rather than American support for dissidence and human rights in Eastern Europe, (including perhaps the deliberate use of the expanding "footprints" of West European television through the use of satellites to carry an all-Europe message to the East); and by reducing the American role in the defense of Western Europe, perhaps ultimately through an agreement to withdraw both American and Soviet forces to their respective homelands.
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If we follow such prescriptions, the world we will be helping to create will be one in which there is a new and more self-assertive Europe, but yet a neutralized Europe in a sense suggested by Konrad or the East German evangelicals. It may require that eventually both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be dismantled, the American troops brought home, and the two Germanies form a loose, but essentially disarmed, federation. In every respect this Europe would be a safer one for the Soviet Union than the one they face today. All of Eastern Europe would be neutralized, accepting a status similar to that of Finland and Austria today. There would thus be no hostile military forces on the Soviet border, not even as close as they are today—and there would be no American forces in Europe. From this Europe we can imagine the Soviets moving their troops back to their homeland.

This may be the road to the liberalization of Eastern Europe, and ultimately to that of the Soviet Union itself.

NOTES


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13. See Tökö, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives."

14. Poland Watch, Number 7, pages 59-60. This was also confirmed in the conference discussions.


18. This is a point developed by Konrad in Antipolitics.


20. Brzezinski, pages 295-300. I have added my own interpretation of some points.
PART V

Country Summaries
Introduction

The following country descriptions summarize the evidence that lies behind our ratings for each country. They first bring together for each country most of the tabular material of Part I. Then, political rights are considered in terms of the extent to which a country is ruled by a government elected by the majority at the national level, the division of power among levels of government, and the possible denial of self-determination to major subnationalities, if any. While decentralization and the denial of group rights are deemphasized in our rating system, these questions should not be ignored. The summaries also contain consideration of civil liberties, especially as these include freedom of the media and other forms of political expression, freedom from political imprisonment, torture, and other forms of government reprisal, and freedom from interference in nonpublic group or personal life. Equality of access to politically relevant expression is also considered, as well as economic conditions and organization in their relation to freedom. In some cases the summaries will touch on the relative degree of freedom from oppression outside of the government arena, for example, through slavery, labor bosses, capitalist exploitation, or private terrorism: this area of analysis is little developed at present.

At the beginning of each summary statement the country is characterized by the forms of its economy and polity. The meanings of the terms used in this classification may be found in Part I, "The Relation of Political-Economic Systems to Freedom," and its accompanying Table 8. The classification is highly simplified, but it serves our concern with the developmental forms and biases that affect political controls. As in Table 8 the terms inclusive and noninclusive are used to distinguish between societies in which the economic activities of most people are
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organized in accordance with the dominant system and those dual societies in which they remain largely outside. The system should be assumed to be inclusive unless otherwise indicated.

Each state is categorized according to the political positions of the national or ethnic groups it contains. Since the modern political form is the "nation-state," it is not surprising that many states have a relatively homogeneous population. The overwhelming majority in these states belong to roughly the same ethnic group; people from this group naturally form the dominant group in the state. In relatively homogeneous states there is no large subnationality (that is, with more than one million people or twenty percent of the population) residing in a defined territory within the country: Austria, Costa Rica, Somalia, and West Germany are good examples. States in this category may be ethnically diverse (for example, Cuba or Colombia), but there are no sharp ethnic lines between major groups. These states should be distinguished from ethnically complex states, such as Guyana or Singapore, that have several ethnic groups, but no major group that has its historic homeland in a particular part of the country. Complex states may have large minorities that have suffered social, political, or economic discrimination in the recent past, but today the governments of such states treat all peoples as equals as a matter of policy. In this regard complex states are distinguishable from ethnic states with major nonterritorial subnationalities, for the governments of such states have a deliberate policy of giving preference to the dominant ethnic group at the expense of other major groups. Examples are Burundi or China (Taiwan).

Another large category of states is labeled ethnic states with (a) major territorial subnationalities(y). As in the homogeneous states there is a definite ruling people (or Staatsvolk) residing on its historic national territory within the state. But the state also incorporates other territories with other historic peoples that are now either without a state, or the state dominated by their people lies beyond the new border. As explained in Freedom in the World 1978 (pp. 180-218), to be considered a subnationality a territorial minority must have enough cohesion and publicity that their right to nationhood is acknowledged in some quarters. Often recent events have forged a quasi-unity among quite distinct groups—as among the peoples of Southern Sudan.

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Typical countries in this category are Burma and the USSR. Ethnic states with major potential territorial subnationalities fall into a closely related category. In such states—for example, Ecuador or Bolivia—many individuals in pre-national ethnic groups have merged, with little overt hostility, with the dominant ethnic strain. The assimilation process has gone on for centuries. Yet in these countries the new consciousness that accompanies the diffusion of nationalistic ideas through education may reverse the process of assimilation in the future, especially where the potential subnationality has preserved a more or less definable territorial base.

There are a few truly multinational states in which ethnic groups with territorial bases coexist in one state without an established ruling people of Staatsvolk. In such states the several "nations" normally have autonomous political rights, although these do not in law generally include the right to secession. India and Nigeria (when under civilian rule) are examples. One trinational and a few binational states complete the categories of those states in which several "nations" coexist.

The distinction between truly multinational states and ethnic states with territorial subnationalities may be made by comparing two major states that lie close to the margin between the categories—the ethnic Russian USSR and multinational India. In the USSR, Russian is in every way the dominant language. By contrast, in India Hindi speakers have not achieved dominance. English remains a unifying lingua franca, the languages of the several states have not been forced to change their script to accord with Hindi forms, and Hindi itself is not the distinctive language of a "ruling people"—it is a nationalized version of the popular language of a portion of the population of northern India. (The pre-British ruling class used a closely related language with Arabic, Persian, and Turkish infusions; it was generally written in Persian-Arabic script.) Unlike Russians in the non-Russian Soviet Republics, Hindi speakers from northern India do not have a special standing in their own eyes or those of other Indians. Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras are non-Hindi speaking cities, and their pride in their identities and cultures is an important aspect of Indian culture. By contrast, many Soviet Republics are dominated by Russian speakers, a situation developing even in Kiev, the largest non-Russian city.
Finally, transethnic heterogeneous states, primarily in Africa, are those in which independence found a large number of ethnically distinct peoples grouped more or less artificially within one political framework. The usual solution was for those taking over the reins of government to adopt the colonial approach of formally treating all local peoples as equal, but with the new objective of integrating all equally into a new national framework (and new national identity) as and when this would be possible. Rulers of states such as Senegal or Zaire may come from relatively small tribes, and it is in their interest to deemphasize tribalism. In some cases the tribes are so scattered and localistic that there is no short-term likelihood of secession resulting from tribalism. However, in other cases portions of the country have histories of separate nationhood making the transethnic solution hard to implement. In a few countries recent events have placed certain ethnic groups in opposition to one another or to ruling circles in such a way that the transethnic state remains only the formal principle of rule, replaced in practice by an ethnic hierarchy, as in Congo, Sierra Leone, or Ghana.

The descriptive paragraphs for political and civil rights are largely self-explanatory. Subnationalities are generally discussed under a subheading for political rights, although the subject has obvious civil liberties aspects. Discussion of the existence or nonexistence of political parties may be arbitrarily placed in one or the other section. These paragraphs only touch on a few relevant issues, especially in the civil liberties discussion. An issue may be omitted for lack of information, because it does not seem important for the country addressed, or because a particular condition can be inferred from the general statement of a pattern. It should be noted that we have tried where possible to incorporate the distinction between a broad definition of political prisoners (including those detained for violent political crimes) and a narrow definition that includes those arrested only for nonviolent actions—often labeled "prisoners of conscience." Obviously we are primarily concerned with the latter.

Under civil liberties there is often a sentence or two on the economy. However, this is primarily a survey of politically relevant freedoms and not economic freedoms. In addition our view of economic freedom depends less on the economic system than the way in which it is adopted and maintained. (See Lindsay M.
At the end of each country summary we have included an overall comparative statement that places the country’s ratings in relation to those of others. Countries chosen for comparison are often neighboring or similar ones, but juxtaposing very different countries is also necessary for tying together the system.

Human rights, in so far as they are not directly connected with political and civil liberties, are given little attention in the following summaries. Capital punishment, torture, denial of refugee status, or food and medical care are issues that are less emphasized in this treatment than they would be in a human rights report. The summaries take little account of the oppressions that occur within the social units of a society, such as family and religious groups, or that reflect variations in the nonpolitical aspects of culture. The reader will note few references in the following summaries to the relative freedom of women. Democracies today have almost universally opened political and civic participation to women on at least a formal basis of equality, while most nondemocratic societies that deny these equal rights to women also deny effective participation to most men. In such societies granting equal rights has limited meaning. There is little gain for political and most civil rights when women are granted equal participation in a totalitarian society.
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AFGHANISTAN

Economy: noninclusive socialist  Political Rights:  7
Polity:  communist one-party  Civil Liberties:  7
Population:  14,700,000*  Status:  not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights.  Afghanistan is ruled by a communist party under the tutelage and direct control of the Soviet Union.  The rule of this very small party has no electoral or traditional legitimization.  Soviet forces control the major cities but their control is contested by a variety of resistance movements throughout the country.  In many areas local administration is in the hands of traditional or ad hoc resistance leaders.  Subnationalities: The largest minority is the Tajik (thirty percent), the dominant people of the cities and the western part of the country.  Essentially lowland Persians, their language remains the lingua franca of the country.  The Persian speaking Hazaras constitute five to ten percent of the population.  Another ten percent belong to Uzbek and other Turkish groups in the north.

Civil Liberties.  The media are primarily government owned and under rigid control.  Antigovernment organization or expression is forbidden.  Conversation is guarded and travel is restricted.  In a condition of civil war and foreign occupation, political imprisonment, torture and execution are common, in addition to war deaths and massacres.  Resources have been diverted to the Soviet Union as payment for its military "assistance."  Economic, educational, and cultural programs may be laying the basis for incorporation into the USSR.  The modern sectors of the economy are controlled; much of the agricultural economy has been destroyed. The objectives of the state are totalitarian; their achievement is limited by the continuing struggle for control.

Comparatively:  Afghanistan is as free as Mongolia, less free than Iran.

* Population estimates for countries are generally derived from the 1985 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC.
A L B A N I A

Economy: socialist  Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party  Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 3,000,000  Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Albania has been a communist dictatorship under essentially one-man rule since 1944. While there are a number of elected bodies, including an assembly, the parallel government of the communist party (4.5 percent of the people) is decisive at all levels; elections offer only one list of candidates. Candidates are officially designated by the Democratic Front, to which all Albanians are supposed to belong. In recent years extensive purges within the party have maintained the power of the top leaders.

Civil Liberties. Press, radio, and television are completely under government or party control, and communication with the outside world is minimal. Media are characterized by incessant propaganda, and open expression of opinion in private conversation may lead to long prison sentences. There is an explicit denial of the right to freedom of thought for those who disagree with the government. Imprisonment for reasons of conscience is common; torture is frequently reported, and execution is invoked for many reasons. All religious institutions were abolished in 1967; religion is outlawed; priests are regularly imprisoned. Apparently there are no private organizations independent of government or party. Economic disparities are minimal: all people must work one month of each year in factories or on farms, and there are no private cars. Attempting to leave the state is a major crime. Private economic choice is minimal.

Comparatively: Albania is as free as Cambodia, less free than Yugoslavia.

A L G E R I A

Economy: socialist  Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party  Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 22,200,000  Status: not free
Country Summaries

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Algeria has combined military dictatorship with one-party socialist rule. Elections at both local and national levels are managed by the party; they allow little opposition to the system, although individual representatives and specific policies may be criticized. However, the pragmatic, puritanical military rulers may be supported by a fairly broad consensus. Subnationalities: Fifteen to twenty percent of the people are Berbers, who have demonstrated a desire for enhanced self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are governmental means for active indoctrination; opposition expression is controlled and foreign publications are closely watched. Private conversation appears relatively open. Although not fully independent, the regular judiciary has established a rule of law in some areas. Prisoners of conscience are detained for short periods, but how many political prisoners are held only for reasons of conscience is unclear. In 1985 the leaders of a new human rights organization were almost immediately detained. Appeals from the decisions of special courts for state security and economic crimes are not allowed. Land reform has transformed former French plantations into collectives. Although government goals are clearly socialist, small farms and businesses have been encouraged recently. Travel is generally free. Eighty percent of the people are illiterate; many are still very poor, but extremes of wealth have been reduced. Unions have slight freedom. Islam’s continued strength provides a counterweight to governmental absolutism. There is freedom of religious worship.

Comparatively: Algeria is as free as Tanzania, freer than Iraq, less free than Morocco.

ANGOLA

Economy: noninclusive socialist  Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party  Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 7,900,000  Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities
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Political Rights. Angola is ruled by a very small communist-style socialist party in which military commanders may wield considerable power. The ruling party has relied heavily on Soviet equipment and Cuban troops to dominate the civil war and to stay in power. There is an elected parliament but essentially no choice in the elections. Subnationalities: The party is not tribalist, but is opposed by groups relying on particular tribes or regions—especially in Cabinda, the northeast, and the south-central areas. The UNITA movement, strongest among the Ovimbundu people, actively controls much of the south and east of the country.

Civil Liberties. The nation remains in a state of war, with power arbitrarily exercised, particularly in the countryside. The media in controlled areas are government owned and do not deviate from its line. Political imprisonment and execution are common; repression of religious activity is reported. Travel is tightly restricted. Private medical care has been abolished, as has much private property—especially in the modern sectors. Strikes are prohibited and unions tightly controlled. Agricultural production is held down by peasant opposition to socialization and lack of markets.

Comparatively: Angola is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Zambia.

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Economy: capitalist Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 79,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Antigua is a parliamentary democracy with an elected house and appointed senate. The secessionist island of Barbuda has achieved special rights to limited self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are published by opposing political parties, but an opposition paper has been repeatedly harassed, especially by libel cases. Radio is government and private and reports fairly. There is freedom of organization and demonstra-
Country Summaries

Unions are free and have the right to strike. The rule of law is guaranteed in the British manner.

Comparatively: Antigua and Barbuda is as free as Jamaica, freer than Malta, less free than Dominica.

**ARGENTINA**

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A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Argentina has a functioning constitutional democracy under a strong president. The president is elected by electors, but it is essentially a process of direct election. Two successful elections and the well-publicized trials of the country's previous military junta leaders for murder and torture have exemplified democratic rule. Potentially, the military remains a threat to democracy.

Civil Liberties. Private newspapers and both private and government broadcasting stations operate. The media freely express varying opinions. Political parties organize dissent, and public demonstrations are frequent. Courts are independent. The church and trade unions play a strong political role. Human rights organizations are active. The economy includes a large government sector.

Comparatively: Argentina is as free as Finland, freer than Bolivia, less free than Venezuela.

**AUSTRALIA**

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A relatively homogeneous population with small aboriginal groups
Political Rights. Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with strong powers retained by its component states. With equal representation from each state, the Senate provides a counterbalance to the nationally representative House of Representatives. The British appointed Governor-General retains some power in constitutional deadlocks. Constitutional referendums add to the power of the voters. Trade unions (separately and through the Labour Party) and foreign investors have great economic weight. The states have separate parliaments and premiers, but appointed governors. The self-determination rights of the aborigines have been recognized through necessary self-administration and return of property.

Civil Liberties. All newspapers and most radio and television stations are privately owned. The Australian Broadcasting Commission operates government radio and television stations on a basis similar to BBC. Although Australia lacks many formal guarantees of civil liberties, the degree of protection of these liberties in the common law is similar to that in Britain and Canada. Freedom of assembly is generally respected, although it varies by region. Freedom of choice in education, travel, occupation, property, and private association are perhaps as complete as anywhere in the world. Relatively low taxes enhance this freedom.

Comparatively: Australia is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than India.

**A U S T R I A**

Economy: mixed capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 7,263,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Austria's parliamentary system has a directly elected lower house and an upper (and less powerful) house elected by the provincial assemblies. The president is directly elected, but the chancellor (representing the majority party in parliament) is the center of political power. The two major parties have alternated control since the 1950s but the government
Country Summaries

often seeks broad consensus. The referendum is used on rare occasions. Provincial legislatures and governors are elective. Subnationalities: Fifty thousand Slovenes in the southern part of the country have rights to their own schools.

Civil Liberties. The press in Austria is free and varied, although foreign pressures have exceptionally led to interference. Radio and television are under a state-owned corporation that by law is supposed to be free of political control. Its geographical position and constitutionally defined neutral status places its media and government in a position analogous to Finland, but the Soviets have put less pressure on Austria to conform to Soviet wishes than on Finland. The rule of law is secure, and there are no political prisoners. Banks and heavy industry are largely nationalized.

Comparatively: Austria is as free as Belgium, freer than Greece.

BAHAMAS

Economy: capitalist-statist Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 200,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Bahamas have a parliamentary system with a largely ceremonial British Governor-General. The House is elective and the senate appointed. The ruling party has a large majority, but there is an opposition in parliament. Government power is maintained in part by discrimination in favor of supporters and control over the broadcast media. There has not been a change in government since independence. Most islands are administered by centrally appointed commissioners. There is no army.

Civil Liberties. There are independent newspapers and no censorship. Radio and television are government owned and not free of government influence. Labor and business organization are free; there is a right to strike. A program of Bahamianization is being promoted in several sectors of the economy. Rights of travel, occupation, education, and religion are secure. Corrup-
tion is widely alleged, and may reach the highest governmental levels.

Comparatively: Bahamas is as free as Fiji, freer than Honduras, less free than Barbados.

**BAHRAIN**

| Economy: capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 5 |
| Polity: traditional nonparty | Civil Liberties: 5 |
| Population: 400,000 | Status: partly free |

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous

**Political Rights.** Bahrain is a traditional shaikhdom with a modernized administration. Direct access to the ruler is encouraged. The legislature is dissolved, but powerful merchant and religious families place a check on royal power. There are local councils. Subnationalities: The primary ethnic problem has been the struggle between the Iranians who once ruled and the Arabs who now rule; in part this is reflected in the opposition of the Sunni and majority Shi'a Muslim sects.

**Civil Liberties.** The largely private press seldom criticizes government policy. Radio and television are government owned. There is considerable freedom of expression in private, but informers are feared. Rights to assembly and demonstration are limited. The legal and educational systems are a mixture of traditional Islamic and British. Short-term arrest is used to discourage dissent, and there are long-term political prisoners. In security cases involving violence, fair and quick trials are delayed and torture occurs. Rights to travel, property, and religious choice are secured. There is a record of disturbances by worker groups, and union organization is restricted. Many free social services are provided. Citizenship is very hard to obtain; there is antipathy to foreign workers (but unlike neighboring shaikhdoms most people in the country are citizens).

Comparatively: Bahrain is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than India.
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**BANGLADESH**

| Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 5 |
| Polity: military nonparty | Civil Liberties: 5 |
| Population: 101,500,000 | Status: partly free |

An ethnically and religiously complex state

Political Rights. Bangladesh alternates between military and parliamentary rule. In 1982 military rule was reintroduced; local elective institutions are functioning, and have been expanded by well-contested subdistrict level elections in 1985. Political parties are active, but intransigence on both sides has thwarted an expected return to parliamentary rule. Participation in an earlier referendum was greatly inflated—effective opposition was not allowed. Subnationalities: Non-Muslim hill tribes have been driven from their lands, tortured, and killed.

Civil Liberties. The press is largely private and party. The papers are intermittently censored, and there is pervasive self-censorship through both government support and pressure. Radio and television are government controlled, but are not actively used for mobilization. In a violent context there have been recurrent executions and imprisonments, and considerable brutality. Political imprisonment continues to occur, but there are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience. Political parties organize and mobilize the expression of opposition, and large rallies are frequently held—yet all political activity is periodically banned. Many trials have been before military courts. The civilian courts can decide against the government. In spite of considerable communal antipathy, religious freedom exists. Travel is generally unrestricted. Although they do not have the right to strike, labor unions are active and strikes occur. Over half of the rural population are laborers or tenant farmers; some illegal land confiscation by local groups has been reported. Corruption remains a major problem.

Comparatively: Bangladesh is as free as Jordan, freer than Burma, less free than Malaysia.
BARBADOS

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 300,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Barbados is governed by a parliamentary system, with a ceremonial British Governor-General. Elections have been fair and well administered. Power alternates between the two major parties. Public opinion has a direct and powerful effect on policy. Local governments are also elected.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and free of censorship. The government has, however, revoked the work permit of the editor of a leftist publication because of his criticism of the US intervention in Grenada. Both the private and government radio stations are largely free; the only television station is organized on the BBC model. There is an independent judiciary, and general freedom from arbitrary government action. Travel, residence, and religion are free. Although both major parties rely on the support of labor, private property is fully accepted.

Comparatively: Barbados is as free as France, freer than Jamaica, less free than Costa Rica.

BELGIUM

Economy: capitalist
Polity: decentralized multiparty
Population: 9,900,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A binational state

Political Rights. Belgium is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Elections lead to coalition governments, generally of the center. Linguistic divisions have produced considerable instability. Subnationalities: The rise of nationalism among the two major peoples—Flemish and Walloon—has led to increasing transfer of control over cultural affairs to the eommu-
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nal groups. However, provincial governors are appointed by the national government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are free and uncensored. Radio and television are government owned, but independent boards are responsible for programming. The full spectrum of private rights is respected; voting is compulsory. Property rights, worker rights, and religious freedom are guaranteed.

Comparatively: Belgium is as free as Switzerland, freer than France.

BELIZE

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 1,600,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Belize is a parliamentary democracy with an elected house and indirectly elected senate. The governor-general retains considerable power. Elections are competitive and fair; a recent election transferred power to the opposition. Competitive local elections are also a part of the system. A small British military force remains because of non-recognition by Guatemala.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and varied. Radio is government controlled but presents opposition viewpoints. Organization and assembly are guaranteed, as is the rule of law. The opposition is well organized. Private cooperatives have been formed in several agricultural industries. Unions are independent; strikes have been used to gain benefits.

Comparatively: Belize is as free as Costa Rica, freer than Honduras.

BENIN

Economy: noninclusive socialist
Polity: socialist one-party
(military dominated)
Population: 4,000,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free
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A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Benin is a military dictatorship buttressed by a one-party organization. Regional and tribal loyalties may be stronger than national. Elections are single list, with no opposition. Local assemblies are closely controlled.

Civil Liberties. All media are rigidly censored; most are owned by the government. Opposition is not tolerated; criticism of the government often leads to a few days of reeducation in military camps. There are few long-term political prisoners, but the rule of law is very weak. Detainees are mistreated. Private schools have been closed. Although there is general freedom of religion, some sects have been forbidden. Independent labor unions are banned. Permission to leave the country is closely controlled. Economically, the government's interventions have been in cash crops and external trade, and industries have been nationalized; control over the largely subsistence and small entrepreneur economy remains incomplete. Widespread corruption aggravates already large income disparities.

Comparatively: Benin is as free as Iraq, less free than Burkina Faso.

BHUTAN

Economy: preindustrial Political Rights: 5
Polity: traditional nonparty Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 1,400,000 Status: partly free

An ethnic state with a significant subnationality

Political Rights. Bhutan is a hereditary monarchy in which the king rules with the aid of a council and an indirectly elected National Assembly. There are no legal political parties, and the Assembly does little more than approve government actions. Villages are traditionally ruled by their own headmen, but districts are directly ruled from the center. The Buddhist hierarchy is still very important in the affairs of the country. In foreign policy Bhutan's dependence on India has been partially renounced;
Country Summaries

it is still dependent for defense. Subnationalities: The main political party operates outside the country, agitating in favor of the Nepalese and democracy. Although they may now be a majority, the Nepalese are restricted to one part of the country.

Civil Liberties. The only paper is the government weekly. There are many small broadcasting stations. Outside media are freely available. There are few if any prisoners of conscience. No organized opposition exists within the country. The legal structure exhibits a mixture of traditional and British forms. There is religious freedom and freedom to travel. Traditional agriculture, crafts, and trade dominate the economy.

Comparatively: Bhutan is as free as Bahrain, freer than Swaziland, less free than Nepal.

BOLIVIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 6,200,000

An ethnic state with major potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Bolivia is a parliamentary democracy with a directly elected president. The traditional power of the military and security services has been curtailed, but not eliminated. Union power expressed through massive strikes has become a major challenge. Provincial and local government is controlled from the center. Subnationalities: Over sixty percent of the people are Indians speaking Aymara or Quechua; these languages have been given official status alongside Spanish. The Indian peoples remain, however, more potential than actual subnationalities. The Spanish-speaking minority still controls the political process.

Civil Liberties. The press and most radio stations are private and are now largely free. But fear remains in the presence of private security forces and mob action; torture has occurred. The Catholic Church retains a powerful and critical role. The people are overwhelmingly post-land-reform, subsistence agriculturists.
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The major mines and much of industry are nationalized; the workers have a generous social welfare program, given the country's poverty.

Comparatively: Bolivia is as free as India, freer than Guyana, less free than Venezuela.

**BOTSWANA**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 1,100,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The republican system of Botswana combines traditional and modern principles. The assembly is elected for a fixed term and appoints the president who rules. There is also an advisory House of Chiefs. Nine district councils, led either by chiefs or elected leaders, have independent power of taxation, as well as traditional control over land and agriculture. Elections continue to be won overwhelmingly by the ruling party as they were before independence, yet there are opposition members in parliament and the opposition controls town councils. There is economic and political pressure from both black African and white neighbors. Subnationalities: The country is divided among several major tribes belonging to the Batswana people, as well as minor peoples on the margins. The latter include a few hundred relatively wealthy white farmers.

Civil Liberties. The radio and the main daily paper are government owned; a private newspaper began in 1982. There is no censorship, and opposition party and foreign publications offer alternative views. Courts appear independent. Rights of assembly, religion, and travel are respected but regulated. Passport controls may be restrictive, and have been applied in the past to the opposition. Prisoners of conscience are not held. Unions are independent, but under pressure. In the modern society civil liberties appear to be guaranteed, but most people continue to live under traditional rules. (Government support is firmest in rural areas of great inequality.)
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Comparatively: Botswana is as free as India, freer than Gambia, less free than Barbados.

BRAZIL

Economy: capitalist-statist Political Rights: 3
Polity: decentralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 138,400,000 Status: free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population with many very small, territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Although still in a transitional stage, in which the president has not been directly elected, the fully open process by which he came to power was effectively democratic. The legislature is popularly elected. The military remains independently powerful. Political party activity is free but remains chaotic. There are independently organized elected governments at both state and local levels. Subnationalities: The many small Indian groups of the interior are under both private and governmental pressure on their lands, culture, and even lives.

Civil Liberties. The media are private, except for a few broadcasting stations. The powerful and critical press is free of censorship, however, government control of most industry, and thus advertising, limits freedom to criticize government. Radio and television are generally free. There is a right of assembly and organization, and no prisoners of conscience. Massive opposition demonstrations have become a recent feature of political life. Private violence against criminals, suspected communists, peasants, and Indians continues outside the law. The courts are beginning to move actively against officers and others accused of killing or corruption. Union organization is powerful and strikes are widespread, though sometimes repressed. There is considerable large-scale government industry, but rights to property, religious freedom, travel, and education of one’s choice are respected. Although recent policy has favored modern and relatively wealthy sectors, the current government is pressing for more land reform.

Comparatively: Brazil is as free as Bolivia, freer than Morocco, less free than Uruguay.
BRUNEI

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights:  6
Polity: monarchy  Civil Liberties:  5
Population:  200,000  Status: partly free

An ethnic state with a major nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Brunei is ruled in the traditional manner as an absolute monarchy with little delegation of authority. Considerable reliance on the military forces and advice of the United Kingdom and Singapore continues. Civil Liberties. Little or no dissent is allowed in the nation's media. Radio and television and a major paper are government owned. However, many students attend schools overseas, and foreign media of all kinds are widely available. A new political party calling for constitutional monarchy was officially registered in 1985. A few dissidents remain in jail. Formally the judicial system is patterned on the English model. The position of the Chinese non-citizens (many long-term residents) has declined since independence. All land is government owned, as is most of the oil wealth.

Comparatively: Brunei is as free as Chile, freer than Burma, less free than Singapore.

BULGARIA

Economy: socialist  Political Rights:  7
Polity: communist one-party  Civil Liberties:  7
Population:  8,900,000  Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Bulgaria is governed by its Communist Party, although the facade of a parallel government and two-party system is maintained. The same man has essentially ruled over the system since 1954; elections at both national and local levels have
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little meaning. Soviet influence in the security services is decisive. Subnationalities: Muslim minorities numbering about one million have been forced to adopt non-Muslim names.

Civil Liberties. All media are under absolute control by the government or its Party branches. Citizens have few if any rights against the state. There are hundreds or thousands of prisoners of conscience, many living under severe conditions. Brutality and torture are common. Those accused of opposition to the system may also be banished to villages, denied their occupations, or confined in psychiatric hospitals. Believers are subject to discrimination. Hundreds have been killed in enforcing name changes. Citizens have little choice of occupation or residence. Political loyalty is required to secure many social benefits. The most common political crimes are illegally trying to leave the country, criticism of the government, and illegal contacts with foreigners. However, there have been openings through a new spirit of independence and attempts at deconcentration in the economic sphere.

Comparatively: Bulgaria is as free as Mongolia, less free than Hungary.

BURKINA FASO
(UPPER VOLTA)

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 6,900,000 Status: not free

A transetnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. The government is directed by a radical and increasingly dictatorial military leader. Burkina Faso has suffered a succession of relatively nonviolent military coups; the latest has been followed by executions and the reduction of regional chiefly power.

Civil Liberties. Media are government-controlled means of indoctrination. Censorship is the rule. Private criticism is common. There are prisoners of conscience; freedom of assembly or
of political organization is denied. Trade unions are under strong government pressure, and many leaders have been arrested for expressing their opposition. External travel is restricted; internal movement is free. The economy remains dependent on subsistence agriculture, with the government playing the role of regulator and promoter of development.

Comparatively: Burkina Faso is as free as Mali, freer than Chad, less free than Sierra Leone.

**BURMA**

| Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist | Political Rights: 7 |
| Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated) | Civil Liberties: 7 |
| Population: 36,900,000 | Status: not free |

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

**Political Rights.** Burma is governed by a small military elite as a one-party socialist state. The government's dependence on the army makes its strengths and weaknesses more those of a military dictatorship than those of a communist regime. Elections are held at both national and local levels: the Party chooses the slate of candidates. Subnationalities: The government represents essentially the Burmese people that live in the heartland of the country. The Burmese are surrounded by millions of non-Burmese living in continuing disaffection or active revolt. Among the minorities on the periphery are the Karens, Shan, Kachins, Mon, and Chin. Many Muslims have been expelled, encouraged to leave, or imprisoned indefinitely.

**Civil Liberties.** All media are government owned, with alternative opinions expressed obliquely if at all; both domestic and foreign publications are censored. The media are expected to actively promote government policy. Organized dissent is forbidden; even private expression is dangerous. Prisoners of conscience have been common, and torture reported. However, few ethnic Burmans now seem to be detained for reasons of conscience. The regular court structure has been replaced by "people's
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courts." Racial discrimination has been incorporated in government policy. Emigration or even travel outside the country is very difficult. Although the eventual goal of the government is complete socialization, areas of private enterprise remain, subject to control by government marketing monopolies.

Comparatively: Burma is as free as Cambodia, less free than Bangladesh.

BURUNDI

Economy: noninclusive mixed capitalist
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Population: 4,600,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free

An ethnic state with a major, nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Burundi is ruled by a self-appointed military president with the assistance of a Party Central Committee and Politburo. The assembly elections allow only the narrowest choice of pre-selected candidates from the one party; presidential elections allow no choice. Subnationalities: The rulers continue to be from the Tutsi ethnic group (fifteen percent) that has traditionally ruled; their dominance was reinforced by a massacre of Hutus (eighty-five percent) after an attempted revolt in the early 1970s.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled and closely censored, as are often the foreign media. Missionaries were expelled for distributing a pamphlet. Lack of freedom of political speech or assembly is accompanied by political imprisonment and reports of brutality. Under current conditions there is little guarantee of individual rights, particularly for the Hutu majority. However, in recent years the exclusion of the Hutu from public services, the Party, and other advantages has been relaxed. There are no independent unions, but short wildcat strikes have been reported. Religion is closely regulated, especially in the areas of education and missionary activity; religious services are illegal on weekdays. Traditional group and
individual rights persist on the village level: Burundi is not a highly structured modern society. Travel is relatively unrestricted. Although officially socialist, private or traditional economic forms predominate.

Comparatively: Burundi is as free as Cameroon, freer than Somalia, less free than Kenya.

CAMBODIA

Economy: noninclusive socialist  Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party  Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 6,100,000  Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cambodia is divided between the remnants of the Pol Pot tyranny and the less tyrannical, imposed Vietnamese regime. The people have little part in either regime. Other more democratic rebel groups are increasing in strength.

Civil Liberties. The media continue to be completely controlled in both areas; outside publications are rigorously controlled. Political execution has been a common function of government. Reeducation for war captives is again practiced by the new government. There is no rule of law; private freedoms are not guaranteed. Cambodians continue to be one of the world's most tyrannized peoples. At least temporarily much of economic life has been decollectivized.

Comparatively: Cambodia is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Indonesia.

CAMEROON

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party  Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 9,700,000  Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with a major subnationality
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Political Rights. Cameroon is a one-party state ruled by the same party since independence in 1960. The government has steadily centralized power. Referendums and other elections have little meaning; voters are given no alternatives, although a legislative candidate is occasionally rejected. Provincial governors are appointed by the central government. An attempt has been made to incorporate all elements in a government of broad consensus. Subnationalities: The most significant opposition has come from those opposing centralization. Politics is largely a struggle of regional and tribal factions.

Civil Liberties. The largely government-owned media are closely controlled; censorship and self-censorship are common; works of critical authors are prohibited, even university lectures are subject to censorship. A number of papers have been closed, and journalists arrested. Freedom of speech, assembly, and union organization are limited, while freedom of occupation, education, and property are respected. Prisoners of conscience are detained without trial and may be ill-treated. Over one hundred suspects may have been executed after secret trials following a bloody coup attempt. Allegations have been made of torture and village massacres. Internal travel and religious choice are relatively free; foreign travel may be difficult. Labor and business organizations are closely controlled. Although still relatively short on capital, private enterprise is encouraged wherever possible.

Comparatively: Cameroon is as free as Syria, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Nigeria.

C A N A D A

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 25,400,000  Status: free

A binational state

Political Rights. Canada is a parliamentary democracy with alternation of rule between leading parties. A great effort is made to register all eligible voters. The provinces have their own democratic institutions with a higher degree of autonomy than
the American states. Subnationalities: French has linguistic
equality, and French is the official language in Quebec. In
addition, Quebec has been allowed to opt out of some national
programs and maintains its own representatives abroad. Greater
self-determination is being granted to Indian and Eskimo groups.

Civil Liberties. The media are free, although there is a
government-related radio and television network. The full range
of civil liberties is generally respected. The new Charter of
Rights and Freedoms includes the right of judicial review. In
Quebec rights to choose English education and language have been
infringed. There has been evidence of the invasion of privacy by
Canadian security forces in recent years, much as in the United
States. Many judicial and legal structures have been borrowed
from the United Kingdom or the United States, with consequent
advantages and disadvantages. Some provinces limit employment
opportunities for nonresidents.

Comparatively: Canada is as free as the United States of
America, freer than France.

CAPE VERDE

Economy: noninclusive socialist  Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party   Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 300,000  Status: not free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. The ruling party is small and tightly orga-
nized. Elections allow no choice, but abstention and negative
votes are allowed.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned; all are
closely controlled to serve party purposes. Prisoners of con-
science are frequently detained for short periods; rights to
organize opposition, assembly, or political expression are not
respected. The judiciary is weak. Drought and endemic unemploy-
ment continue to lead to emigration. Most professions, fishing,
farming, and small enterprises are private. Land reform has
emphasized land-to-the-tiller programs. Religion is relatively
free, although under political pressure; labor unions are government controlled. Travel is relatively free.

Comparatively: Cape Verde is as free as Ghana, freer than Equatorial Guinea, less free than Ivory Coast.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: military nonparty
Population: 2,700,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. The Central African Republic is a military dictatorship without representative institutions. Prefects are appointed by the central government in the French style. Heavily dependent on French economic and military aid, France has influenced or determined recent changes of government, and French forces are still present.

Civil Liberties. All media are government owned or closely controlled. There are prisoners of conscience. Former ministers have been sentenced to internal exile. Religious freedom is generally respected. Union activity was suspended following the September 1981 coup. The judiciary is not independent. Movement is occasionally hampered by highway security checks. Most economic activity is private with limited government involvement. Corruption is particularly widespread.

Comparatively: Central African Republic is as free as Mali, freer than Somalia, less free than Kenya.

CHAD

Economy: noninclusive capitalist
Polity: military decentralized
Population: 5,200,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A transitional collection of semi-autonomous ethnic groups
Political Rights. The central government is under control of a military-factional leader. Much of the country remains governed by reprisals and counter-reprisals of warring groups. Massacres and pillaging are uncontrollable by government or opponent leaders. France's participation in the defense of the present government has seriously reduced its independence in inter-state relations. Subnationalities: Ethnic struggle pits the southern negroes (principally the Christian and animist Sara tribe) against a variety of northern Muslim groups (principally nomadic Arabs). Political factionalism is only partly ethnic.

Civil Liberties. Media are government owned and controlled. There is little chance for free expression. In recent years many have been killed or imprisoned without due process; mass killings continue to be reported. Labor and business organizations exist with some independence. Religion is relatively free. Not an ideological area, traditional law is still influential. The economy is predominantly subsistence agriculture with little protection of property rights.

Comparatively: Chad is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Tanzania.

**CHILE**

Economy: capitalist  
Polity: military nonparty  
Population: 12,000,000

Political Rights: 6  
Civil Liberties: 5  
Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The government of Chile is lead by a self-appointed military dictator assisted by a junta of military officers. Although a 1980 plebiscite confirming government policy allowed an opposition vote of thirty percent, all power is concentrated at the center; there are no elective positions. Popular support for the system has declined.

Civil Liberties. All media have both public and private outlets; newspapers are primarily private. The media, although censored and often threatened with closure, express a considerable range of opinion, occasionally including direct criticism of gov-
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ernment policy. Limited party activity is tacitly allowed, and human rights organizations operate under pressure. Students, church leaders, and former political leaders regularly express dissent, sometimes massively and in the face of violent government repression. While one can win against the government, the courts are under government pressure. Prisoners of conscience are still commonly taken for short periods, torture occurs; political expulsions and internal exile continue. Violent confrontations lead repeatedly to repressions, only to be followed by new periods of relaxation. Unions are restricted but have some rights, including a limited right to strike and organize at plant levels. Many nationalized enterprises have been resold to private investors, with government intervention in the economy now being limited to copper and petroleum.

Comparatively: Chile is as free as Kenya, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Peru.

C H I N A  (Mainland)

Economy: socialist  Political Rights:  6
Polity: communist one-party  Civil Liberties:  6
Population:  1,042,000,000  Status:  not free

An ethnic state with peripheral subnationalities

Political Rights. China is a one-party communist state under the collective leadership of the Politburo. A National People's Congress is indirectly elected within party guidelines, but does not function as a competitive parliament. National policy struggles are obscured by secrecy; choices are sharply limited. Some local elections have had limited competition. Party administration is decentralized. Subnationalities: There are several subordinated peripheral peoples such as the Tibetans, Uygurs, Mongols, and the much acculturated Zhuang. These are granted a limited degree of separate cultural life. Amounting to not more than six percent of the population, non-Chinese ethnic groups have tended to be diluted and obscured by Chinese settlement or sinification. However, minority peoples have been given a special dispensation to have more than the single child allowed Chinese.
Civil Liberties. The mass media remain closely controlled tools for mobilizing the population. While the underground and wall-poster literature of 1978-79 has been suppressed, there is limited non-political cultural freedom. Many local papers not entirely under government control have recently developed. Although there is movement toward "socialist legality" on the Soviet model, court cases are often decided in political terms. There are unknown thousands of political prisoners, including those in labor-reform camps; the government has forced millions to live indefinitely in undesirable areas. Political executions are still reported. Millions of Chinese have been systematically discriminated against because of "bad class background," but such discrimination has recently been curtailed. Political-social controls at work are pervasive.

Compared to other communist states popular opinions and pressures play a considerable role. Occasional poster campaigns, demonstrations, and evidence of private conversation shows that pervasive factionalism has allowed elements of freedom and consensus into the system; recurrent repression, including imprisonment, equally shows the government's determination to keep dissent from becoming a threat to the system or its current leaders. Rights to travel and emigration are limited, as are religious freedoms. Rights to marry and have children are perhaps more closely controlled than in any other country in the world. Economic pressures have forced some, not wholly successful, rationalization of economic policy, including renunciation of guaranteed employment for youth. Introduction of private sector incentives has increased economic freedom, especially for small entrepreneurs and farmers. Small local strikes and slow downs have been reported concerning wage increases and worker demands for greater control over choice of employment. Inequality derives from differences in political position and location rather than direct income.

Comparatively. China (Mainland) is as free as Algeria, freer than Mongolia, less free than China (Taiwan).
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**CHINA (Taiwan)**

**Economy:** capitalist-statist  
**Polity:** centralized  
**Political Rights:** 5  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Population:** 19,200,000  
**Status:** partly free

A quasi-ethnic state with a majority nonterritorial subnationality

**Political Rights.** Taiwan is ruled by a single party organized according to a communist model (although anticommunist ideologically). There is a parliament which includes some representatives from Taiwan; a few members oppose the regime but no effective opposition party is tolerated. The campaigns of non-government candidates are highly limited, particularly because the media are nearly uniformly pro-government. Most parliamentarians are still persons elected in 1947 as representatives of districts in China where elections could not be held subsequently because of communist control. The indirect presidential election is pro forma. Some local and regional positions are elective, including those in the provincial assembly that are held by Taiwanese. Subnationalities: The people are eighty-six percent native Taiwanese (speaking two Chinese dialects); opposition movements in favor of transferring control from the mainland immigrants to the Taiwanese are repressed. The vice-president is Taiwanese. A small pre-Chinese ethnic group is discriminated against.

**Civil Liberties.** The media include government or party organs, but are mostly in private hands. Newspapers and magazines are subject to censorship or suspension, and most practice strict self-censorship. A group of independent editors and publishers regularly publish dissenting journals. Although the more they publish the more they are suspended, this effort maintains a semblance of an opposition press. Government thought police and their agents also operate overseas. Television is one sided. Rights to assembly are limited, but are sporadically granted. There are several hundred political prisoners, including prominent leaders of the moderate opposition. Union activity is restricted; strikes are forbidden. Private rights to property, education, and religion are generally respected; there is no recognized right to travel overseas, and travel to mainland China is criminal.
Comparatively: China (Taiwan) is as free as Hungary, freer than Burma, less free than South Korea.

**C O L O M B I A**

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights:  2  
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties:  3  
Population: 29,400,000  Status: free  

A relatively homogeneous population with scattered minorities

Political Rights. Colombia is a constitutional democracy. The president is directly elected, as are both houses of the legislature. The opposition won the 1982 presidential election in which participation rose to over fifty percent. Members of the two principal parties are included in the government and the list of departmental governors. Both of the leading parties have well-defined factions; among the minor parties several are involved in revolutionary activity. The provinces are directly administered by the national government. The military has recently been put more firmly under government control.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, with most papers under party control, and quite free. Radio includes both government and private stations; television is a government monopoly. All media have been limited in their freedom to report subversive activity. Personal rights are generally respected; courts are relatively strong and independent. Riots and guerrilla activity have led to periodic states of siege in which these rights are limited, and violence is endemic. Assemblies are often banned for fear of riots. In these conditions the security forces have infringed personal rights violently, especially those of leftist unions, peasants, and Amerindians in rural areas. Many persons are rounded up in antiguerrilla or antiterrorist campaigns, and may be tortured or killed. However, opponents are not given prison sentences simply for the nonviolent expression of political opinion, and the government and courts have attempted to control abuses. Human rights organizations are active. The government encourages private enterprise where possible; union activity and strikes for economic goals are legal.
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Comparatively: Colombia is as free as India, freer than Guyana, less free than Venezuela.

COMOROS

Economy: noninclusive capitalist
Polity: centralized one-party
Population: 500,000

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The present Comoran leader returned to power with the aid of mercenaries in 1978, and they continue to protect him. His later election was an uncontested 99% event. The position of Prime Minister was subsequently abolished and autocratic rule enhanced. Coups have been attempted. Assembly elections have allowed choice within the one-party framework, but the Assembly has little power. Independents contest some elections. Elections may be manipulated. Each island has an appointed governor and council. (The island of Mayotte is formally a part of the Comoros, but it has chosen to be a French dependency.)

Civil Liberties. Radio is government owned and controlled. There is no independent press, but some outside publications are available. There is detainment for reasons of conscience. Pressure is reported against the opposition, but private criticism is allowed. There is a new emphasis on Islamic customs. The largely plantation economy has led to severe landlessness and concentrated wealth; emigration to the mainland for employment is very common. The concentration of wealth in a few hands closely connected to the government reduces choice.

Comparatively: Comoros is as free as Tanzania, freer than Mozambique, less free than Zambia.
C O N G O

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Population: 1,700,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Congo is an increasingly arbitrary military dictatorship with a very small ruling party. One-party elections allow no opposition, but criticism is aired in parliament.

Civil Liberties. The press and all publications are heavily censored. Radio is government owned. Criticism may lead to imprisonment, yet there is some private discussion and limited dissent. Executions and imprisonment of political opponents have occurred, but conditions have improved. The only union is state sponsored; strikes are illegal. Religious groups are limited but generally free. There is little judicial protection; passports are difficult to obtain. At the local and small entrepreneur level private property is generally respected; most large-scale commerce and industry are either nationalized or controlled by expatriates. Literacy is high for the region.

Comparatively: Congo is as free as Syria, freer than Iraq, less free than Kenya.

C O S T A   R I C A

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 2,600,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A parliamentary democracy, Costa Rica has a directly elected president and several important parties. No parties are prohibited. This structure is supplemented by an independent tribunal for overseeing elections. Elections are
Country Summaries

fair; rule alternates between parties. Provinces are under the direction of the central government.

Civil Liberties. The media are notably free, private, and varied; they serve a society ninety percent literate. The courts are fair, and private rights, such as those to movement, occupation, education, religion, and union organization, are respected.

Comparatively: Costa Rica is as free as Ireland, freer than Colombia.

CUBA

Economy: socialist Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 10,100,000 Status: not free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cuba is a one-party communist state on the Soviet model. Real power lies, however, more in the person of Fidel Castro and in the Russian leaders upon whom he depends than is the case in other noncontiguous states adopting this model. Popular election at the municipal level is closely supervised. Provincial and national assemblies are elected by municipalities but can be recalled by popular vote. The whole system is largely a show: political opponents are excluded from nomination by law, many others are simply disqualified by Party fiat; no debate is allowed on major issues; once elected the assemblies do not oppose Party decisions.

Civil Liberties. All media are state controlled and express only what the government wishes. Cuba may have the longest serving prisoners of conscience in the world. Torture has been reported in the past; hundreds who have refused to recant their opposition to the system continue to be held in difficult conditions, and new arrests are frequent. There are hundreds of thousands of others who are formally discriminated against as opponents of the system. There is freedom to criticize policy administration through the press and the institutions of "popular democracy," but writing or speaking against the system, even in private is severely repressed. There are reports of psychiatric
institutions also being used for incarceration. Freedom to choose work, education, or residence is greatly restricted; new laws force people to work harder. It is generally illegal to leave Cuba, but some have been forced to leave. Denial of rights to religious freedom and private property seem to be easing.

Comparatively: Cuba is as free as Guinea-Bissau, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Guyana.

C Y P R U S (G)

Economy: capitalist
Polity: multiparty
Population: 500,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: free

An ethnic state

Political Rights. The "Greek" portion of Cyprus is a fully functioning parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model. Elections have been fair and highly competitive. However, the community continues to be under considerable political influence from mainland Greece. The atmosphere of confrontation with the Turkish side of the island may restrict freedoms, especially for the small number of remaining citizens of Turkish background.

Civil Liberties. The newspapers are free and varied in both sectors, but overwhelmingly support the governments of their sectors. Radio and television are under the control of governmental or semigovernmental bodies. The usual rights of free peoples are respected, including occupation, labor organization, and religion. Because of communal strife and invasion, property has often been taken from members of one group by force (or abandoned from fear of force) and given to the other. Under these conditions rights to choose one's sector of residence or to travel between sectors have been greatly restricted.

Comparatively: Cyprus (G) is as free as France, freer than Greece, not as free as Denmark.
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CYPRUS (T)

Economy: capitalist
Polity: multiparty
Population: 150,000
Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 3
Status: partly free

An ethnic state

Political Rights. "Turkish" Cyprus was created after Turkish troops intervened to prevent a feared Greek takeover. A large section of the island, including much territory formerly in Greek hands, is protected by Turkish military power from the larger Greek portion of the island, as well as the much larger Greek population. In spite of this limitation, parliamentary forms are functioning in the Turkish sector: 1985 witnessed three elections that fully confirmed the popularity of the present government. However, the continuing confrontation restricts choice for some, particularly the few remaining Greek Cypriots in the Turkish sector.

Civil Liberties. Publications are are free and varied. Radio and television are under government or semigovernmental control. The usual rights of free peoples are respected, including occupation, labor, organization, and religion. However, travel between the sectors and the removal of property is restricted. Many people formerly resident in the Turkish part of the island have lost their property.

Comparatively: Cyprus (T) is as free as Vanuatu, freer than Turkey, not as free as Greece.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economy: socialist
Polity: communist one-party
Population: 15,500,000
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free

A binational state

Political Rights. Czechoslovakia is a Soviet style, one-party communist state, reinforced by the presence of Soviet troops.
Elections are noncompetitive and there is essentially no legislative debate. Subnationalities: The division of the state into separate Czech and Slovak socialist republics has only slight meaning since the Czechoslovak Communist Party continues to rule the country (under the guidance of the Soviet Communist Party). Although less numerous and poorer than the Czech people, the Slovaks are granted at least their rightful share of power within this framework.

Civil Liberties. Media are government or Party owned and rigidly censored. However, some relatively free private and literary expression, as well as serious underground publications, occurs. Freedoms of assembly, organization, and association are denied. Heavy pressures are placed on religious activities, especially through holding ministerial incomes at a very low level and curtailing religious education. There are a number of prisoners of conscience; exclusion of individuals from their chosen occupations and short detentions are more common sanctions. The beating of political suspects is common, and psychiatric detention is employed. Successful defense in political cases is possible, but lawyers may be arrested for overzealous defense. Human rights groups are persecuted. Travel to the West and emigration are restricted. Independent trade unions and strikes are forbidden. Rights to choice of occupation and to private property are restricted.

Comparatively: Czechoslovakia is as free as East Germany, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Poland.

D E N M A R K

Economy: mixed capitalist Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 5,100,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliament. Elections are fair. Since a wide variety of parties achieve success, resulting governments are based on coalitions. Districts have governors appointed from the center
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and elected councils; local officials are under local control.

Civil Liberties. The press is free (and more conservative politically than the electorate). Radio and television are government owned but relatively free. Labor unions are powerful both socially and politically. All other rights are guaranteed. The very high tax level constitutes more than usual constraint on private property in a capitalist state, but has provided a fairly equitable distribution of social benefits. Religion is free but state supported.

Comparatively: Denmark is as free as Norway, freer than Finland.

DJIBOUTI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 300,000 Status: not free

A binational state with subordination

Political Rights. Djibouti is formally a parliamentary democracy under French protection. Only one party is allowed, and in recent elections there has been little if any choice. Although all ethnic groups are carefully included in the single-party lists, one group is clearly dominant. A large French garrison continues to play a role.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and controlled and there is no right of assembly. There have recently been prisoners of conscience and torture. Unions are under a degree of government control, but there is a right to strike. An extremely poor country, its market economy is still dominated by French interests.

Comparatively: Djibouti is as free as Guinea-Bissau, freer than Somalia, less free than North Yemen.
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DOMINICA

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 100,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population with a minority enclave

Political Rights. Dominica is a parliamentary democracy with competing political parties. An opposition party came to power in highly competitive 1980 elections. There have been several violent attempts to overthrow the government, and the military has subsequently been disbanded. The rights of the native Caribs may not be fully respected.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and the radio public. The press is generally free and critical, and the radio presents alternative views. Rights of assembly and organization are guaranteed. There is rule of law and no prisoners of conscience. States of emergency have recurrently limited rights to a small extent. Personal rights to travel, residence, and property are secured, as are the union rights of workers.

Comparatively: Dominica is as free as Nauru, freer than Guyana, less free than Barbados.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 6,200,000  Status: free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Dominican Republic is a presidential democracy on the American model. Elections are free and competitive. Military influence is greatly reduced. Provinces are under national control, municipalities under local.

Civil Liberties. The media are generally privately owned, free, and diverse, but advertising may be denied unfavored papers, and stations may be closed for defamation. Communist materials
Country Summaries

are restricted. Broadcasting is highly varied, but subject to government review. Public expression is generally free; the spokesmen of a wide range of parties quite openly express their opinions. There are no prisoners of conscience. The courts appear relatively independent and human rights groups are active. Labor unions operate under moderate constraints. Travel overseas is sometimes restricted. State-owned lands are slowly being redistributed.

Comparatively: Dominican Republic is as free as Uruguay, freer than Colombia, less free than Barbados.

**ECUADOR**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights:  2
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties:  3
Population: 8,900,000  Status: free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

   Political Rights. Ecuador is governed by an elected president and parliament. 1984 witnessed a change of government by electoral process, an event rare in the country's history. There have been minor restrictions on party activity and nominations. Provinces and municipalities are directly administered, but there are elected local and provincial councils. Struggle between congress and president over appointments to the Supreme Court led to a serious confrontation in 1985. Subnationalities: Forty percent of the population is Indian, most of whom speak Quechua. This population at present does not form a conscious subnationality in a distinct homeland.

   Civil Liberties. Newspapers are under private or party control and quite outspoken. Radio and television are mostly under private control. However, programs have been cancelled, reporters fired, or advertising cancelled for falling out of government favor. There are no long-term prisoners of conscience, but persons are detained for criticizing government officials. Human rights organizations are active. The court system is not strongly independent, and imprisonment for belief may occur. Land reform has been hampered by resistance from landed elites. Although

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there are state firms, particularly in major industries, Ecuador is essentially a capitalist and traditional state.

Comparatively: Ecuador is as free as India, freer than Panama, less free than Venezuela.

EGYPT

Economy: mixed socialist Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized Civil Liberties: 4
dominant-party
Population: 48,300,000 Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population with a communal religious minority

Political Rights. Egypt is a controlled democracy. Within limits political parties may organize: communist and religious extremist parties are forbidden. The ruling party won about seventy-five percent of the vote in 1984 parliamentary elections, but opposition parties achieved increased representation. Participation rates were very low; electoral laws favored the government. Subnationalities: Several million Coptic Christians live a distinct communal life.

Civil Liberties. The Egyptian press is mostly government owned, but weekly party papers are relatively free and increasingly influential. Radio and television are under governmental control. A fairly broad range of literary publications has recently developed. There is limited freedom of assembly. Severe riot laws and a variety of laws restricting dissent have led to large-scale imprisonment or banning from political or other organizational activity. Many prisoners of conscience have been held in the last few years, but very seldom for long periods. Women's rights have improved. In both agriculture and industry considerable diversity and choice exists within a mixed socialist framework. Unions have developed some independence from the government, but there is no right to strike. The predominance of state corporations contributes to the acquiescence of unions in official policy. Travel and other private rights are generally free.
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Comparatively. Egypt is as free as Malaysia, freer than Algeria, less free than Brazil.

**EL SALVADOR**

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 5,100,000  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. El Salvador is ruled by an elected president and parliament. The 1984 election was fair, but the armed opposition did not participate. In the countryside a bloody struggle between government and guerrilla forces continues. On the government side armed killers have prevented the establishment of normal political or civil relationships. Recent elections have legitimized the power of the civil, elected government and confirmed the political weakness of the guerrillas. The possibility of military intervention continues to threaten the system.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and radio are largely in private hands. Under strong pressure from all sides the media have been self-censored, but are showing more independence. Legal and illegal opposition papers and broadcasts appear, but no major critical voice has developed comparable to the La Prensas of Nicaragua and Panama. The rule of law is weak, assassination common, but improvement has occurred. Conscription by both sides has been a major rights problem. Atrocities have been committed by both sides in the conflict, probably frequently without the authorization of leaders. On the government side, these atrocities are beginning to be investigated. Human rights organizations are active. The Catholic Church remains a force. The university has been reopened. Union activities are common, and strikes, legal and illegal, have become a major means of political expression for groups on the left. Although still a heavily agricultural country, rural people are to a large extent involved in the wage and market economy. Banking and foreign trade of export
crops have been nationalized; land reform has had limited but
significant success.

Comparatively: El Salvador is as free as Vanuatu, freer than
Guatemala, less free than Dominican Republic.

**EQUATORIAL GUINEA**

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<th>Population:</th>
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<tr>
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An ethnic state with a territorial minority

**Political Rights.** Equatorial Guinea is a military dictatorship. The coup that replaced the former dictator was popular, but the population as a whole played and plays little part. The partially elected assembly seems irrelevant. A several-hundred-man Moroccan bodyguard protects the incumbent at Spanish expense.

**Civil Liberties.** The media are very limited, government owned, and do not report opposition viewpoints. The rule of law is tenuous; there are political prisoners, but perhaps none of conscience. Police brutality is common. Compulsory recruitment for plantation and other work occurs. Opposition parties are not tolerated, and there are no unions. Religious freedom was reestablished in 1979, and private property is recognized. Plantation and subsistence farming is still recovering from near destruction under the previous government.

Comparatively: Equatorial Guinea is as free as Zaire, less free than Tanzania.

**ETHIOPIA**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>noninclusive socialist (military dominated)</td>
<td>communist one-party</td>
<td>36,000,000</td>
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Status: not free
Country Summaries

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Ethiopia is ruled by a military committee that has successively slaughtered the leaders of the ancien regime and many of its own leaders. A spectrum of mass organizations has been established on the model of a one-party socialist state. Establishing locally elected village councils has been the primary effort to mobilize the people. In late 1984 a national communist (workers) party was established. Subnationalities: The heartland of Ethiopia is occupied by the traditionally dominant Amhara and acculturated subgroups of the diffuse Galla people. In the late nineteenth century Ethiopian rulers united what had been warring fragments of a former empire in this heartland, and proceeded to incorporate some entirely new areas. At that time the Somali of the south came under Ethiopian rule; Eritrea was incorporated as the result of a UN decision in 1952. Today Ethiopia is crosscut by linguistic and religious conflicts: most important is separatism due to historic allegiances to ancient provinces (especially Tigre), to different experiences (Eritrea), and to the population of a foreign nation (Somalia).

Civil Liberties. The media are controlled, serving the mobilization needs of the government. Individual rights are unprotected under conditions of despotism and anarchy. Political imprisonment, forced confession, execution, disappearance, and torture are common. There are no rights to assembly. Many thousands have been killed aside from those that died in civil war. Education is totally controlled. What freedom there was under the Ethiopian monarchy has been largely lost, but land reform has benefited many. Choice of residence and workplace is often made by the government; there have been reports of forced transport to state farms, and of the forced movement of ethnic groups. Religious groups have been persecuted, and religious freedom is limited. Peasant and worker organizations are closely controlled. Travel outside the country is strictly controlled; hostages or guarantors are often required before exit. The words and actions of the regime indicate little respect for private rights in property. The economy is under increasing government control through nationalizations, state-sponsored peasant cooperatives, and the regulation of business licenses. Starvation has been a recurrent theme, with government ineffectiveness playing a part both before and
after the accession of the radicals.

Comparatively: Ethiopia is as free as Cambodia, less free than Sudan.

FIJI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist       Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty         Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 700,000                     Status: free

A binational state

Political Rights. Fiji has a complex political structure designed to protect the interests of both the original Fiji people and the Indian people, who now form a slight majority. The Lower House is directly elected on the basis of both communal and national rolls. The Upper House is indirectly elected by a variety of electors (including the council of chiefs, the prime minister, and the opposition leader). Local government is organized both by the central government and by a Fijian administration headed by the council of chiefs. Although the opposition has ruled only briefly since independence, the 1982 general election illustrated the vitality of the election process, albeit with some unfair practices.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private (but government positions must sometimes be published); government radio is under a separate and independent commission. Libel laws can restrict the media's political discussion. Freedom to assemble is not impeded. The full protection of the rule of law is supplemented by an ombudsman to investigate complaints against the government. Some rights to property may have been sacrificed to guarantee special rights of inalienability of land granted the Fijians. Strong unions have full rights. Religion, travel, and other personal rights are secured. The nation may be about evenly divided between a subsistence economy, based on agriculture and fishing, and a modern market economy.

Comparatively: Fiji is as free as Papua New Guinea, freer than Tonga, less free than New Zealand.
Country Summaries

FINLAND

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 4,900,000
Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: free

An ethnic state with a small territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Finland has a parliamentary system with a strong, directly elected president. Since there are many relatively strong parties, government is almost always by coalition. Elections have resulted in shifts in coalition membership. By treaty foreign policy cannot be anti-Soviet, but the 1982 presidential election indicated a weakening of a more general Soviet veto on the political process. The provinces have centrally appointed governors. Subnationalities: The rural Swedish minority (seven percent) has its own political party and strong cultural ties to Sweden. The Swedish-speaking Aland Islands have local autonomy and other special rights.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, diverse, and uncensored. Government-press relations can be so hostile as to restrict communications. Most of the radio service is government controlled, but there is an important commercial television station. The government network has been manipulated at times. Discussion in the media is controlled by a political consensus that criticism of the Soviet Union should be circumspect. There is a complete rule of law; private rights are secured, as is freedom of religion, business, and labor.

Comparatively: Finland is as free as Mauritius, freer than Malta, less free than Sweden.

FRANCE

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 55,000,000
Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities
Political Rights. France is a parliamentary democracy with many features of the American system, such as a strong presidency and a check and balance of several centers of power. Either the Senate or the more powerful Assembly can check the power of government. They also have a constitutional council that oversees elections and passes on the constitutionality of assembly or executive actions on the model of the United States Supreme Court. Regional and local power has recently been greatly increased. Subnationalities: Territorial subnationalities continue to have limited rights as ethnic units, but the ethnic and self-determination rights of such groups as the Bretons, Corsicans, and Basques are increasingly observed.

Civil Liberties. The French press is generally free. There is government involvement in financing and registration of journalists; press laws restrict freedom more than in other Western states. Criticism of the president and top officials may be muted by government threats and court actions. Books may be burned or banned. The news agency is private. Radio is now free and plural; the government monopoly of television has generally been pro-administration, but new systems are being added. In spite of recent changes there is still an authoritarian attitude in government-citizen relations, publications may be banned at the behest of foreign governments, and arrest without explanation still occurs, particularly of members of subnationalities. Police brutality is commonly alleged. Information and organization about conscientious objection is restricted. France is, of course, under the rule of law, and rights to occupation, residence, religion, and property are secured. Both through extensive social programs and the creation of state enterprises France is quite far from a pure capitalist form.

Comparatively: France is as free as West Germany, freer than India, less free than the United Kingdom.

G A B O N

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights:  6
Polity: nationalist one-party  Civil Liberties:  6
Population: 1,000,000  Status: not free
Country Summaries

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Gabon is a moderate dictatorship operating in the guise of a one-party state, with controlled elections characteristic of this form. Candidates must be party approved but there may be limited competition. Major cities have elected local governments; provinces are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. All media are government owned and controlled; few legitimate opposition voices are raised; journalists may be arrested for expression. Some critical items appear in local or available foreign media. There are prisoners of conscience and mistreatment. There is no right of political assembly; only one labor union is sanctioned. The authoritarian government generally does not care to interfere in private lives, and respects religious freedom, private property, and the right to travel. The government is taking a more active role in the economy and is gradually replacing foreign managers with Gabonese.

Comparatively: Gabon is as free as Sudan, freer than Angola, less free than Tunisia.

GAMBIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 3
Polity: dominant party  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 800,000  Status: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. This is a parliamentary democracy in which the same party and leader have been in power since independence in 1965; they always win with substantial electoral margins. In a recent election the opposition candidate campaigned from prison. There is local, mostly traditional autonomy, but not regional self-rule. The state is now in confederation with Senegal, and the system is protected by Senegalese troops.

Civil Liberties. The private and public newspapers and radio stations are generally free, but are subject to self-censorship. Arrests for antigovernment pamphlets occur. Although opposition leaders have been jailed following a major insurrection, the
independent judiciary maintains the rule of law. The state of emergency was again extended in 1984. Labor unions operate within limits. The agricultural economy remains traditionally organized and is largely dependent on peanuts, the export of which is a state monopoly. Internal travel is limited by document checkpoints.

Comparatively: Gambia is as free as Nepal, freer than Sierra Leone, less free than Botswana.

**GERMANY, EAST**

Economy: socialist  
Polity: communist one-party  
Population: 16,700,000  
Political Rights: 7  
Civil Liberties: 6  
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. East Germany is in practice a one-party communist dictatorship. No electoral competition is allowed that involves policy questions; all citizens are compelled to vote for a government-selected list of candidates. In addition, the presence of Soviet troops and direction from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union significantly reduces the sovereignty (or group freedom) of the East Germans.

Civil Liberties. Media are government-owned means of indoctrination. Dissidents are repressed by imprisonment and exclusion; the publication or importation of materials with opposing views is forbidden. One may be arrested for private criticism of the system, but complaints about policy implementation occur in all the media; a few favored dissidents have managed to exist and publish outside the country. Among the thousands of prisoners of conscience, the most common offense is trying to leave the country illegally (or in some cases even seeking permission to leave), or propaganda against the state. Prisoners of conscience may be severely beaten or otherwise harmed. Political reeducation may be a condition of release. The average person is not allowed freedom of occupation or residence. Once defined as an enemy of the state, a person may be barred from his occupation and his children denied higher education. Particularly revealing has been the use
Country Summaries

of the "buying out scheme" by which West Germany has been able intermittently to obtain the release of prisoners in the East through cash payments and delivering goods such as bananas and coffee. There is considerable religious freedom, with the Catholic and Protestant hierarchies possessing some independence, as does the peace movement at times. Freedom exists within the family, although there is no right to privacy or the inviolability of the home, mail, or telephone. Agriculture is highly collectivized and virtually all industry is state controlled. Membership in unions, production cooperatives, and other associations is compulsory.

Comparatively: East Germany is as free as Cameroon, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Poland.

GERMANY, WEST

Economy: capitalist Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 61,000,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. West Germany is a parliamentary democracy with an indirectly elected and largely ceremonial president. Both major parties have ruled since the war. The weak Senate is elected by the assemblies of the constituent states and loyally defends states' rights. Successive national governments have been based on changing party balances in the powerful lower house. The success of the "Greens" at all levels suggests the openness of the system to change. The states have their own elected assemblies; they control education, internal security, and culture.

Civil Liberties. The papers are independent and free, with little governmental interference. Radio and television are organized in public corporations under the usually neutral direction of the state governments. Generally the rule of law has been carefully observed, and the full spectrum of private freedoms is available. Terrorist activities have led to tighter security regulations, invasions of privacy, and less acceptance of nonconformity. Arrests have been made for handling or producing inflam-
Country Summaries

matory literature, for neo-Nazi propaganda, or for calling in question the courts or electoral system. Government participation in the economy is largely regulatory; in addition, complex social programs and mandated worker participation in management have limited certain private freedoms while possibly expanding others.

Comparatively: West Germany is as free as France, freer than Finland, less free than the United States of America.

Ghana

Economy: mixed socialist Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 14,300,000 Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. A small military faction rules with the support of radical organizations. On the local level traditional sources of power are minimal. Local councils are elected, but under close government supervision. Subnationalities: The country is composed of a variety of peoples, with those in the South most self-conscious. The latter are the descendants of a number of traditional kingdoms, of which the Ashanti are the most important. A north-south, Muslim-Christian opposition exists but is weakly developed, because of the numerical and economic weakness and incomplete hold of Islam in the north. In the south and center of the country a sense of Akan identity is developing among the Ashanti, Fanti, and others; since they include forty-five percent of the people, this amounts to strengthening the ethnic core of the nation. The one million Ewe in the southeast (a people divided between Ghana and Togo) play a major role in the new revolutionary government.

Civil Liberties. Radio and television and most of the press are government owned. All are under close government scrutiny. Private opinion is restrained. There have been hundreds of political arrests and political trials; many professionals have been murdered, apparently for "revolutionary" reasons. Soldiers are reported out of control. Papers and universities have been closed. Peoples' courts have been used to counter the previous
judicial system. There has been a great deal of government control in some areas of the economy—especially in cocoa production, on which the economy depends, and in modern capital intensive industry. The assets of many businesses have been frozen. Some groups, including the strong women’s marketing associations, have resisted government attempts to impose price ceilings on all goods. Labor unions are controlled. Like Senegal, Ghana has a relatively highly developed industry and its agriculture is dependent on world markets. There is religious freedom; travel is controlled.

Comparatively: Ghana is as free as Niger, freer than Romania, less free than Ivory Coast.

G R E E C E

Economy: capitalist-statist political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty civil Liberties: 2
Population: 10,100,000 status: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Greece is a parliamentary democracy with an indirectly elected president. The stabilization of free institutions is proceeding rapidly; recent elections have been competitive and open to the full spectrum of parties, but recent moves have suggested contempt-for the letter of the law if not the spirit; the government has tended to misuse its authority in elections. Provincial administration is centrally controlled; there is local self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and the judiciary is independent. Broadcast media are government owned and controlled; TV favors the government viewpoint. Government interference in journalism, broadcasting, and universities has recently been reported. There are no known prisoners of conscience. Because of the recent revolutionary situation all views are not freely expressed (a situation similar to that in post-fascist Portugal). One can be imprisoned for insulting the authorities or religion. The courts are not entirely independent. Pressures have been reported against the Turkish population in Western Thrace, partic-
ularly in regard to education, property, and free movement. Union activity is under government influence, particularly in the dominant public sector. Private rights are respected.

Comparatively: Greece is as free as Finland, freer than Malta, less free than France.

GRENADA

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized  Civil Liberties: 3
dominant-party
Population: 118,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Parliamentary rule has been effectively reestablished. The 1984 elections were free and fair, and included all major political forces. The legislature governs. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The newspapers are independent and largely free. Radio and television are government and private. While generally free the government has been accused of restricting the development of private radio. There are a number of political prisoners at least most of whom are accused of violent crimes. The economy is largely private.

Comparatively: Grenada is as free as Colombia, freer than Panama, less free than Barbados.

GUATEMALA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 4
Polity: military nonparty  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 8,000,000  Status: partly free

An ethnic state with a major potential territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Guatemala is in transition from military to civilian rule. A credible election in November 1985 should be
Country Summaries

followed by a run-off in December, and formal civilian rule in January. However, whether the military will actually allow civilian rule is in doubt. The provinces are centrally administered; local government under elected officials is important in some areas. Military and other security forces maintain extra-constitutional power at all levels. Subnationalities: Various groups of Mayan and other Indians make up half the population; they do not yet have a subnationalist sense of unity, but are involved both forcibly and voluntarily in guerrilla and antiguerilla activity.

Civil Liberties. The press and a large portion of radio and television are privately controlled. Until recently self-censorship has been common because of the threat of torture and murder by political opponents. Expression is relatively free, although many killings continue to occur. The struggle against rural guerrillas has led to frequent attacks on recalcitrant peasants or Indians by security forces. Tens of thousands have been killed in the last few years, primarily by the security forces. Thousands have sought refuge internally and in border areas. Torture and kidnapping are practiced by both sides in the conflict. The judiciary is under both leftist and governmental pressure in political or subversive cases and has become relatively ineffective in these areas. Recent improvements in security have increased rights in many areas. Political parties are active, and unions are regaining part of their losses.

Comparatively: Guatemala is as free as Mexico, freer than Nicaragua, less free than El Salvador.

G U I N E A

Economy: noninclusive Political Rights: 7
mixed socialist
Polity: military nonparty Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 6,100,000 Status: not free

A formally tranethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea is under military rule.

Civil Liberties. The press has limited freedom. Unions are
under government direction. Political prisoners have been freed, but all members of the former government and the leaders of its political party are in prison. Industry is heavily nationalized.

Comparatively: Guinea is as free as Nigeria, freer than Ghana, less free than Senegal.

**Guinea-Bissau**

Economy: noninclusive socialist
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Population: 900,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea-Bissau is administered by one party; all other parties have been illegal. Regional council elections lay the basis for indirect election of the assembly; party guidance is emphasized at all levels. Public pressure has caused the replacement of some local officials.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled; criticism of the system is forbidden. Although human rights are not protected by an adequate rule of law, there are few, if any, long-term prisoners of conscience. Union activity is government directed. Land ownership is public or communal. The small industrial sector remains mixed, but the continuing economic crisis has virtually halted all private sector activity. An additional block to further decollectivization is the Soviet and Cuban presence. Religion is relatively free, as are travel and other aspects of private life.

Comparatively: Guinea-Bissau is as free as Libya, freer than Mali, less free than Senegal.

**Guyana**

Economy: mixed socialist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 800,000

Comparatively: Guyana is as free as Nigeria, less free than Senegal.
Country Summaries

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Guyana is a parliamentary democracy with a strong executive and an increasingly dominant ruling party. In recent elections the government has been responsibly charged with irregularities that resulted in its victory. December 1985 elections could improve the legitimacy of the process. Opposition parties are denied equal access to the media, and their supporters are discriminated against in employment. Administration is generally centralized but there are some elected local officials.

Civil Liberties. Radio is now government owned. Several opposition newspapers have been nationalized; the opposition press has been nearly forced out of existence. However, a variety of foreign news media are still available. There is a right of assembly, but harassment occurs. Opposition parties remain well organized. There is an operating human rights organization. All private schools have been nationalized, and the government has interfered with university appointments. It is possible to win against the government in court; there are no prisoners of conscience, though torture of convicts may be practiced. Art and music are under considerable government control. The independence of unions has been greatly abridged. The private sector is stagnating under official intimidation and extensive state control of productive property, although a black market thrives. The opposition is terrorized by armed gangs and the police; the general public suffers under arbitrary and severe controls. Political patronage is extensive and some social benefits are allocated on a preferential basis. Internal exile has been used against political opponents.

Comparatively: Guyana is as free as North Yemen, freer than Guatemala, less free than Colombia.

**HAITI**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist
Polity: dominant quasi-one-party
Population: 5,800,000
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free
Country Summaries

A relatively homogeneous population

**Political Rights.** Haiti is a dictatorship with an ephemeral ruling party. Elections allow little if any opposition. Small parties have been organized, but are repeatedly harassed or eliminated. The latest goal seems to be a one-party state. Non-voters are beaten by government toughs, and supporters vote repeatedly.

**Civil Liberties.** The media are both private and public. Censorship is legal for all media, including films and theatre; attempts at independence in journalism are frequently repressed; although under government pressure, a Catholic station maintains a critical voice. Rights of assembly and organization are restricted, but a private human rights organization has been active. A government-sponsored militia has suppressed opposition; political murders, imprisonment without trial, exile, and torture characterize the system. An acceptable rule of law has been in abeyance during a prolonged "state of siege"; property has been seized indiscriminately by security forces. Many people attempt to flee the country illegally every year; several dozen opponents have been forcibly expelled. The church has been increasingly critical of the system. Union activity is restricted. Corruption and extreme poverty seriously infringe rights to political equality.

Comparatively: Haiti is as free as Burundi, freer than Mongolia, less free than Nicaragua.

**HONDURAS**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  
Polarity: centralized multiparty  
Population: 4,400,000  
Political Rights: 2  
Civil Liberties: 3  
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

**Political Rights.** The government is a parliamentary democracy with an elected president. The relationships between the president, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the military are still in question. Military leaders have retained influence, but civilian government has been able to assert its dominance. Provincial government is centrally administered; local government is elected.
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Civil Liberties. The media are largely private and free of prior censorship. Human rights organizations are active. Militant peasant organizations are quite active, and the struggle of peasants for land often leads to violence. The spreading of guerrilla war from neighboring countries has led to repressions of refugees and others. Most private rights are respected—in so far as government power reaches. Private killings, especially of leftists and with the involvement of security forces, have often been reported. Labor unions have suffered oppression, but are relatively strong, especially in plantation areas. There is freedom of religion and movement.

Comparatively: Honduras is as free as Colombia, freer than Panama, less free than Venezuela.

**HUNGARY**

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<td>Civil Liberties:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>10,700,000</td>
<td>Status:</td>
<td>partly free</td>
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A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Hungary is ruled as a one-party communist dictatorship. Although there is an elective national assembly as well as local assemblies, all candidates must be approved by the party, and the decisions of the politburo are decisive. Within this framework recent elections have allowed choice among candidates. Independents have been elected and in many cases run-offs have been required. The group rights of the Hungarian people are diminished by the government's official acceptance of the right of the Soviet government to interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary by force. A council to represent the special interests of the large gypsy community has been established.

Civil Liberties. Media are under government or party control. Basic criticism of top leaders, communism, human rights performance, or the Soviet presence is inadmissible, but some criticism is allowed; this is expressed through papers, plays, books, the importation of foreign publications, or listening to foreign broadcasts. Radio and television give relatively balanced pres-
entations, even of news. Informally organized dissident groups are allowed to exist. Individuals are regularly detained for reasons of conscience, though usually for short periods. Control over religious affairs is more relaxed than in most communist states. Although private rights are not guaranteed, in practice there is considerable private property, and permission to travel into and out of the country is easier to obtain than in most of Eastern Europe. The border with Austria is essentially open. Unions are party directed and have no right to strike; however, workers have gained some control over enterprise management and operations.

Comparatively: Hungary is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Egypt.

Iceland

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 230,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Iceland is governed by a parliamentary democracy. Recent years have seen important shifts in voter sentiment, resulting successively in right- and left-wing coalitions. Although a small country, Iceland pursues an independent foreign policy. Provinces are ruled by central government appointees.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party and free of censorship. Radio and television are state owned but supervised by a state board representing major parties and interests. There are no political prisoners and the judiciary is independent. Private rights are respected; few are poor or illiterate.

Comparatively: Iceland is as free as Norway, freer than Portugal.
Country Summaries

INDIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized multiparty
Population: 762,200,000

A multinational and complex state

Political Rights. India is a parliamentary democracy in which the opposition has an opportunity to rule. The strong powers retained by the component states have been compromised in recent years by the central government's frequent imposition of direct rule, but 1985 saw an attempt to reestablish state autonomy. Use of criminal elements in politics in some local areas is a threat to fair participation. A 1985 law to prohibit change of party affiliation after election should strengthen voter rights.

Subnationalities. India contains a diverse collection of mostly territorially distinct peoples united by historical experience and the predominance of Hinduism. India's dominant peoples are those of the north central area that speak as a first language either the official language, Hindi (Hindustani), or a very closely related dialect of Sanskrit origin. The other major subnational peoples of India may be divided into several groups: (1) peoples with separate states that are linguistically and historically only marginally distinct from the dominant Hindi speakers (for example, the Marathi, Gujerati, or Oriya); (2) peoples with separate states that are of Sanskrit background linguistically, but have a relatively strong sense of separate identity (for example, Bengalis or Kashmiris); (3) peoples with separate states that are linguistically and to some extent racially quite distinct (for example, Telegu or Malayalam); and (4) peoples that were not originally granted states of their own, and often still do not have them. These peoples, such as the Santali, Bhuti-Lepcha, or Mizo, may be survivors of India's pre-Aryan peoples. With the partial exception of the last group, the Indian federal system accords a fair amount of democratic rights to all peoples. Several peoples from groups (2), (3), and (4) have shown through legal (especially votes) and illegal means a strong desire by a significant part of the population for independence or greater
autonomy (notably Kashmiris, Nagas, and Mizo). This accounting leaves out many nonterritorial religious and caste minorities, although here again the system has granted relatively broad rights to such groups to reasonable self-determination. In 1985 government attempts to deal with a serious problem of Sikh unrest in the Punjab led to the successful reestablishment of elected state government. The Northeast is inflamed by hatred of encroaching Bengalis from both Indian Bengal and Bangladesh.

Civil Liberties. The Indian press is diversified, independent, but often not strongly critical or investigative. Radio and television are government controlled in this largely illiterate country, and they serve government interests. There is freedom of organization and assembly, but there have been illegal arrests, questionable killings, and reports of torture by the police, which have often been out of control. Journalism can be dangerous. There is a remarkable extent of private political organization at many social levels and for a variety of causes. The judiciary is generally responsive, fair, and independent. The problem of extreme trial delay has recently been addressed. The frequent approach to anarchy in Indian society offers many examples of both freedom and repression. There are few if any prisoners of conscience, but there are hundreds imprisoned for real or "proposed" political violence; demonstrations often lead to fatalities and large-scale jailings. Due to the centralized political structure, operation of the security laws varies from region to region. Kashmir has especially repressive security policies in relation to the press and political detention; Sikkim is treated as an Indian colony; the same might be said for some other border areas. Assam is necessarily under stricter supervision. Indians enjoy freedom to travel, to worship as they please, and to organize for mutual benefit, especially in unions and cooperatives. Lack of education, extreme poverty, and surviving traditional controls reduce the meaning of such liberties for large numbers.

Comparatively: India is as free as Colombia, freer than Malaysia, less free than Japan.
Country Summaries

**INDONESIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy:</th>
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A transethnic complex state with active and potential subnationalities

**Political Rights.** Indonesia is a controlled parliamentary democracy under military direction. Recent parliamentary elections allowed some competition but severely restricted opposition campaigning and organization. The number and character of opposition parties are carefully controlled, parties must refrain from criticizing one another, candidates of both government and opposition require government approval, and the opposition is not allowed to organize in rural areas. All parties must accept the broad outline of state policy and the state ideology. All civil servants are expected to vote for the government. In any event parliament does not have a great deal of power. Regional and local government is under central control. Local and regional assemblies are elected. Military officers are included in most legislatures and play a major part in the economy as managers of both public and army corporations.

**Subnationalities.** Indonesia includes a variety of ethnic groups and is divided by crosscutting island identities. Although the island of Java is numerically dominant, the national language is not Javanese, and most groups or islands do not appear to have strong subnational identifications. There is discrimination against Chinese culture. Both civilian and military elites generally attempt to maintain religious, ethnic, and regional balance, but government-sponsored settlement of Javanese on outer islands results in the destruction of minority cultures and the denial of self-determination. Groups demanding independence exist in Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Timor, West Irian, and northern Sumatra, and continue to mount revolts against the government.

**Civil Liberties.** Most newspapers are private. All are subject to fairly close government supervision; there is heavy self-
censorship and censorship in some areas. Criticism of the system is muted by periodic suppressions. Radio and television are government controlled, whether or not private. Freedom of assembly is restricted, but citizens are not compelled to attend meetings. All organizations must now conform to the official ideology. There continue to be prisoners of conscience, but most are now detained only for short periods. Thousands of released prisoners remain in second-class status, especially in regard to residence and employment. In this area the army rather than the civilian judiciary is dominant. The army has been responsible for many thousands of unnecessary deaths in its suppression of revolt in, or conquest of, East Timor. Recently there have been many murders of nonpolitical criminals, apparently at the hands of "hit squads" allied to the security services. Union activity is closely regulated, but labor organization is widespread and strikes occur. Many people are not allowed to travel outside the country for political reasons. Movement, especially to the cities, is restricted; other private rights are generally respected. The Indonesian bureaucracy has an unenviable reputation for arbitrariness and corruption—practices that reduce the effective expression of human rights. The judiciary is not independent. There are many active human rights organizations. Much of industry and commercial agriculture is government owned; sharecropping and tenant farming are relatively common, particularly on Java.

Comparatively: Indonesia is as free as South Africa, freer than Burma, less free than Singapore.

**IRAN**

| Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 5 |
| Polity: quasi-dominant party | Civil Liberties: 6 |
| Population: 45,100,000 | Status: partly free |

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Iran has competitive elections, but the direction of the nonelective, theocratic leadership narrowly defines who may compete in the elections. Those who oppose the overall
Country Summaries

A system on fundamentals are silenced or eliminated. Political parties are poorly defined. Subnationalities: Among the most important non-Persian peoples are the Kurds, the Azerbaijani Turks, the Baluch, and a variety of other (primarily Turkish) tribes. Many of these have striven for independence in the recent past when the opportunity arose. The Kurds are in active revolt.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are semi-private or factional, and all are closely controlled. The other media are largely government-owned propaganda organs. The right of assembly is denied to those who do not approve of the new system. There are many prisoners of conscience, and executions for political offenses, often nonviolent, have been frequent. Unions have been suppressed. Vigilante groups compete with the official security system; many private rights have become highly insecure, as the goal of the Islamic system is control over most aspects of life. This is especially so for the Bahais and other religious minorities. Legal emigration is quite difficult. Education is subject to religious restrictions; the freedom and equality of women is radically curtailed. However, privacy has recently been reemphasized and there appears to be a good deal of freedom in the home. Diversity and choice still characterize economic activity.

Comparatively: Iran is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Iraq, less free than Egypt.

Iraq

Economy: noninclusive socialist Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party Civil Liberties: 7
(military dominated)
Population: 15,500,000 Status: not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Iraq is a one-party state under military leadership, with control in the hands of a small minority faction. Elections allow some choice of individuals, but all candidates are carefully selected, and no policy choices are involved in the process. Resulting parliaments have little if any power. Provinces are governed from the center. Subnationalities: Many
Country Summaries

Kurds remain in open war with the regime, in spite of institutions ostensibly developed for them.

Civil Rights. Newspapers are public or party and are closely controlled by the government; foreign and domestic books and movies are censored. Radio and television are government monopolies. The strident media are emphasized as governmental means for active indoctrination. Political imprisonment, brutality, and torture are common, and execution frequent. Poisoning on release from prison is reported. The families of suspects are often imprisoned. Rights are largely de facto or those deriving from traditional religious law. Religious freedom or freedom to organize for any purpose is very limited. Education is intended to serve the party’s purposes. Iraq has a dual economy with a large traditional sector. The government has taken over much of the modern petroleum-based economy; land reform is, however, now expanding private choice.

Comparatively: Iraq is as free as Bulgaria, less free than Lebanon.

IRELAND

Economy: capitalist Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 3,600,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Ireland is a parliamentary democracy that successively shifts national power among parties. The bicameral legislature has an appointive upper house with powers only of delay. Local government is not powerful, but is elective rather than appointive. Referendums are also used for national decisions.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private, and radio and television are under an autonomous corporation. Strong censorship has always been exercised over both publishers and the press, but since this is for social rather than political content, it lies within that sphere of control permitted a majority in a free
Country Summaries

democracy. The rule of law is firmly established and private rights are guaranteed.
Comparatively: Ireland is as free as Canada, freer than France.

ISRAEL

Economy: mixed capitalist Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 4,200,000 Status: free

An ethnic state with microterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Israel is governed under a parliamentary system. Recent elections have resulted in increasingly uneasy or unstable coalitions. Provinces are ruled from the center, although there are important local elective offices in the cities. Subnationalities: National elections do not involve the Arabs in the occupied territories, but Arabs in Israel proper participate in Israeli elections as a minority grouping. Arabs both in Israel and the occupied territories must live in their homeland under the cultural and political domination of twentieth century immigrants.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and free of censorship except for restrictions relating to the always precarious national security. Radio and television are governmentally owned. In general the rule of law is observed, although Arabs in Israel are not accorded the full rights of citizens, and the orthodox Jewish faith holds a special position in the country's religious, customary, and legal life. Detentions, house arrest, and brutality have been reported against Arabs opposing Israel's Palestine policy. Because of the war, the socialist-cooperative ideology of its founders, and dependence on outside support, the role of private enterprise in the economy has been less than in most of Euro-America. Arabs are, in effect, not allowed to buy land from Jews, while Arab land has been expropriated for Jewish settlement. Unions are economically and politically powerful and control over twenty-five percent of industry. The Survey's rating of Israel is based on its judgment of the situation in Israel proper and not that in the occupied territories.
Comparatively: Israel is as free as Uruguay, freer than India, less free than France.

ITALY

Economy: capitalist-statist Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 57,400,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population with small territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Italy is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. Elections are free. Since the 1940s governments have been dominated by the Christian Democrats, with coalitions shifting between dependence on minor parties of the left or right. Recently premiers have often been from these smaller parties. The fascist party is banned. Referendums are used to supplement parliamentary rule. Opposition parties gain local political power. Regional institutions are developing, and the judiciary's moves against mob influence at this level should improve the legitimacy of the system.

Civil Liberties. Italian newspapers are free and cover a broad spectrum. Radio and television are both public and private and provide unusually diverse programming. Laws against defamation of the government and foreign and ecclesiastical officials exert a slight limiting effect on the media. Freedom of speech is inhibited in some areas and for many individuals by the violence of extremist groups or criminal organizations. Since the bureaucracy does not respond promptly to citizen desires, it represents, as in many countries, an additional impediment to full expression of the rule of law. The judiciary has recently shown strong independence and determination. Detention may last for years without trial. Unions are strong and independent. Catholicism is no longer a state religion but remains a favored religion. Major industries are managed by the government, and the government has undertaken extensive reallocations of land.

Comparatively: Italy is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than Greece.
Country Summaries

**IVORY COAST**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 6  
Polity: nationalist one-party  Civil Liberties: 5  
Population: 10,100,000  Status: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

**Political Rights.** Ivory Coast is ruled by a one-party, capitalist dictatorship in which a variety of political elements have been integrated. Assembly elections have recently allowed choice of individuals, including nonparty, but not policies. Provinces are ruled directly from the center. Contested mayoralty elections occur.

**Civil Liberties.** Although the legal press is party or government controlled, it presents a limited spectrum of opinion. Foreign publications are widely available. While opposition is discouraged, there is no ideological conformity. Radio and television are government controlled. Short-term imprisonment and conscription are used to control opposition. Travel and religion are generally free. Rights to strike or organize unions are quite limited. All wage earners must contribute to the ruling party. Economically the country depends on small, private or traditional farms; in the modern sector private enterprise is encouraged.

**Comparatively:** Ivory Coast is as free as Transkei, freer than Guinea, less free than Senegal.

**JAMAICA**

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 2  
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 3  
Population: 2,400,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

**Political Rights.** Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy in which power changes from one party to another. However, political life is violent; previous elections have been accompanied by hundreds of deaths in the pre-election period. The general
neutrality of the civil service, police, and army preserves the system. Responses by both parties to the anomalous one-party parliament has been excellent (more open debate in parliament and a mock opposition parliament taking its arguments to the people). Public opinion polls are becoming an increasingly important part of the political process. Regional or local administrations have little independent power, although there are elected parish councils.

Civil Liberties. The press is largely private; the broadcasting media largely public. The only major daily supports the party that currently forms the government. Critical media are widely available to the public. Freedom of assembly and organization are generally respected. The judiciary and much of the bureaucracy retain independence, although the police and legal system have been accused of countenancing brutality and severe punishments. Some foreign companies have been nationalized, but the economy remains largely in private hands. Labor is both politically and economically powerful.

Comparatively: Jamaica is as free as Colombia, freer than Panama, less free than Dominica.

**J A P A N**

Economy: capitalist  
Polity: centralized multiparty  
Population: 120,800,000

Political Rights: 1  
Civil Liberties: 1  
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Japan is a bicameral, constitutional monarchy with a relatively weak upper house. The conservative-to-centrist Liberal Democratic Party ruled with solid majorities from independence in the early 1950s until the mid-1970s. Although the Liberal Democrats have lost considerable support in recent elections, through coalitions with independents they have maintained control at the national level and have recently showed increased strength at the local level. Concentrated business interests have played a strong role in maintaining Liberal Party hegemony through the use of their money, influence, and prestige. In addition,
weighting of representation in favor of rural areas tends to maintain the Liberal Party position. Opposition parties are fragmented. They have local control in some areas, but the power of local and regional assemblies and officials is limited. Democracy within the Liberal Party is increasing. The Supreme Court has the power of judicial review, but its voice is not yet powerful.

Civil Liberties. News media are generally private and free, although many radio and television stations are served by a public broadcasting corporation. Television is excellent and quite free. Courts of law are not as important in Japanese society as in Europe and America; both the courts and police appear to be relatively fair. Travel and change of residence are unrestricted. By tradition public expression and action are more restricted than in most modern democracies. Japanese style collectivism leads to strong social pressures, especially psychological pressures, in many spheres (unions, corporations, or religious-political groups, such as Soka Gakkai). The distinction between union leaders and management is blurring. Human rights organizations are very active. Discrimination against Koreans and other minority groups remains a problem.

Comparatively: Japan is as free as Australia, freer than France.

J O R D A N

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights:  5
Polity: limited monarchy  Civil Liberties:  5
Population: 2,600,000  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Although formally a constitutional monarchy, Jordan has had few elections and a very weak parliament. Provinces are ruled from the center; elected local governments have limited autonomy. The king and his ministers are regularly petitioned by citizens.

Civil Liberties. Papers are mostly private but self-censored and occasionally suspended. Television and radio are government controlled. Free private conversation and mild public criticism
Country Summaries

are allowed. Under a continuing state of martial law normal legal guarantees for political suspects are suspended, and organized opposition is not permitted. There are prisoners of conscience and instances of torture. Labor has a limited right to organize and strike. Private rights such as those of property, travel, or religion appear to be respected. The government has partial control over many large corporations.

Comparatively: Jordan is as free as Bangladesh, freer than South Yemen, less free than Egypt.

KENYA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Polity: nationalist one-party Population: 20,200,000

Political Rights: 6 Civil Liberties: 5 Status: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Kenya is a one-party nationalist state. Only members of the party can run for office, and political opponents are excluded or expelled. All civil servants have been ordered to join the party, which includes a large part of the population. Election results can express popular dissatisfaction, but candidates avoid discussion of basic policy or the president. Selection of top party and national leaders is by consensus or acclamation. The administration is centralized, but elements of tribal and communal government continue at the periphery. Subnationalities: Comprising twenty percent of the population, the Kikuyu are the largest tribal group. In a very heterogeneous society, the Luo are the second most important subnationality.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but essentially no criticism of major policies is allowed. Radio and television are under government control. Rights of assembly, organization, and demonstration are severely limited, particularly for students and faculty. The courts have considerable independence. Prisoners of conscience detained intermittently include university lecturers and writers. Defending them in court has now become itself dangerous. Unions are active but strikes are de facto illegal.
Country Summaries

Private rights are generally respected. Land is gradually coming under private rather than tribal control.

Comparatively: Kenya is as free as Ivory Coast, freer than Tanzania, less free than Gambia.

KIRIBATI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized nonparty
Population: 58,000

A relatively homogeneous population with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Kiribati has a functioning parliamentary system. Although there are no formal parties, both the legislature and president are elected in a fully competitive system. Local government is significant.

Civil Liberties. The press is private; radio government owned. Public expression appears to be free and the rule of law guaranteed. The modern economy is dominated by investments from the now virtually depleted government-run phosphate industry. A free union operates, and most agriculture is small, private subsistence; land cannot be alienated to non-natives.

Comparatively: Kiribati is as free as France, freer than Western Samoa, less free than Australia.

KOREA, NORTH

Economy: socialist
Polity: communist one-party
Population: 20,100,000

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. North Korea is a hard-line communist dictatorship in which the organs and assemblies of government are only a facade for party or individual rule. National elections allow
no choice. The politburo is under one-man rule; the dictator's son is the dictator's officially anointed successor. Military officers are very strong in top positions.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled, with glorification of the leader a major responsibility. External publications are rigidly excluded and those who listen to foreign broadcasts severely punished. No individual thoughts are advanced publicly or privately. Individual rights are minimal. Everyone is given a security rating that determines future success. Opponents are even kidnapped overseas. Rights to travel internally and externally are perhaps the most restricted in the world: tourism is unknown—even to communist countries. Social classes are politically defined in a rigidly controlled society; and differences between the standard of living of the elite and the general public are extreme. There are thousands of long-term prisoners of conscience; torture is reportedly common. There are also reeducation centers and internal exile. There is no private business or agriculture.

Comparatively: North Korea is as free as Albania, less free than South Korea.

KOREA, SOUTH

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 42,700,000

Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. South Korea is under a military regime with the support of a partly free legislature. Recent elections of both president and assembly have given the opposition a restricted right to compete. The opposition now controls a substantial bloc of legislatures, but the legislature is relatively weak. The method of allocating seats greatly favors the government party. Public campaigns can significantly affect government. There is no independent local government.

Civil Liberties. Although most newspapers are private, as well as many radio stations and one television station, they have been
reorganized by government fiat. Freedom to express differing opinion has been repeatedly restricted only to reemerge, and the mobilization of public opinion by the opposition directly affects government policy. Because of government pressure, self-censorship is the rule, and censorship affects all media. Special laws against criticizing the constitution, the government, or its policies results in many prisoners of conscience; torture is used. The courts have not been able to effectively protect the rights of political suspects or prisoners. Many political opponents have been denied travel permits, but freedom of internal and external travel is otherwise unabridged. There is religious freedom (but not freedom of religious groups to criticize the government). Human rights organizations are active, but have been under heavy pressure. Outside this arena, private rights have been generally respected. Rapid capitalistic economic growth has been combined with a relatively egalitarian income distribution. Government controls most heavy industry; other sectors are private. Union activity remains severely curtailed under the 1980 labor law.

Comparatively: South Korea is as free as Pakistan, freer than China (Mainland), less free than Thailand.

**K U W A I T**

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 4
Polity: traditional nonparty  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 1,900,000  Status: partly free

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous

Political Rights. Kuwait is a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy with a limited franchise and concentration of power in the monarch. Women cannot vote. Citizens have access to the monarch. More than half the population are immigrants: their political, economic, and social rights are inferior to those of natives, and they very seldom achieve citizenship for themselves or their children.

Civil Liberties. Although the private press presents diverse opinions and ideological viewpoints, papers are subject to suspension for "spreading dissension," or for criticism of the monarch,
Islam, or friendly foreign states. Radio and television are government controlled. Imported media are censored. Freedom of assembly is curtailed. Public critics may be detained, expelled, or have their passports confiscated. Formal political parties are not allowed. Private discussion is open, and few, if any, political prisoners are held. Private freedoms are respected, and independent unions operate. There is a wide variety of enabling government activity in fields such as education, housing, and medicine that is not based on reducing choice through taxation.

Comparatively: Kuwait is as free as Egypt, freer than Qatar, less free than Nepal.

LAOS

Economy: noninclusive socialist  Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party  Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 3,800,000  Status: not free

An ethnic state with active or potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Laos has established a traditional communist party dictatorship in which the party is superior to the external government at all levels. The government is subservient to the desires of the Vietnamese communist party, upon which the present leaders must depend. Vietnam continues to maintain five divisions in the country. There is continued resistance in rural areas, where many groups have been violently suppressed. Subnationalities: Pressure on the Hmong people has caused the majority of them to flee the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled. There are prisoners of conscience; thousands remained in reeducation camps at least until 1984. There are few accepted private rights, but there is relaxed opposition to traditional ways, particularly Buddhism. Collectivization has been halted since 1979 because of peasant resistance; most farmers continue to be small, individual owners. The limited industry is nationalized. Travel within and exit from the country is highly restricted.

Comparatively: Laos is as free as Mongolia, less free than China (Mainland).
Country Summaries

**LEBANON**

**Economy:** capitalist  
**Political Rights:** 5  
**Polity:** decentralized multiparty  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Population:** 2,600,000  
**Status:** partly free

A complex, multinational, microterritorial state

**Political Rights.** In theory Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a strong but indirectly elected president. In spite of the calamities of the last few years the constitutional system still functions to varying degrees in some parts of the country. The parliament is elected, although the last general election was in 1972. Palestinians, local militias, Syrian, and Israeli forces have all but erased national sovereignty in much of the country. Subnationalities: Leading administrative and parliamentary officials are allocated among the several religious or communal groups by complicated formulas. These groups have for years existed semi-autonomously within the state, although their territories are often intermixed.

**Civil Liberties.** Renowned for its independence, the press still offers a highly diverse selection to an attentive audience. Most censorship is now self-imposed, reflecting the views of locally dominant military forces. Radio is government and party; television is part government and now officially uncensored. Widespread killing in recent years has inhibited the nationwide expression of most freedoms and tightened communal controls on individuals. In many areas the courts cannot function effectively, but within its power the government secures most private rights. Few if any prisoners of conscience are detained by the government. Unions are government-supervised and subsidized and generally avoid political activity. There is little government intervention in the predominantly service-oriented economy. There is an active human rights organization.

**Comparatively:** Lebanon is as free as Morocco, freer than Syria, less free than Cyprus.
Country Summaries

LESOTHO

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 5
Polity: partially centralized  Civil Liberties: 5
dominant party
Population: 1,500,000  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy essentially under the one-man rule of the leader of the ruling political party. Opposition parties as well as the king have been repressed, although several members of opposition parties are in the parliament. A planned 1985 election was nullified by the refusal of all opposition groups to participate. Guerrilla activity continues. There is some local government, and the chiefs retain limited power at this level. Although there are frequent expressions of national independence, Lesotho remains under considerable South African economic and political pressure. Lesotho is populated almost exclusively by Basotho people, and the land has never been alienated. A large percentage of the male citizenry works in South Africa.

Civil Liberties. The media are government and church; criticism is muted. Opposition political activity or assembly is repressed, but not eliminated. Opponents are periodically detained. Paramilitary forces apparently are responsible for the deaths of several political opponents. The judiciary preserves considerable independence vis-a-vis the government: one can win against the government in political cases. Limited union activity is permitted; some strikes have occurred. Most private rights are respected, but political opponents may be denied foreign travel.

Comparatively: Lesotho is as free as North Yemen, freer than South Africa, less free than Botswana.

LIBERIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 5
Polity: military nonparty  Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 2,200,000  Status: partly free
Country Summaries

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Liberia's election of president and assembly in 1985 was marred by the exclusion of important candidates and parties from the process. Credible accusation of falsification led to a coup in the aftermath and the detention of opposition leaders. There is some traditional local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, exercises self-censorship, but represents a variety of positions. Papers may be suspended or closed. Radio and television are largely government controlled. Lack of legal protection continues to characterize the country. Executions have been common—rebellion and coups and accusations of coups are frequent. Disappearances are reported. Prisoners of conscience are detained. Travel and other private rights are generally respected. Only blacks can become citizens. Religion is free. Union organization is partly free; illegal strikes have occurred, often without government interference. Most industry is government or foreign owned.

Comparatively: Liberia is as free as Sierra Leone, freer than Togo, less free than Senegal.

LIBYA

Economy: mixed socialist
Polity: socialist quasi one-party (military dominated)
Population: 4,000,000

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Libya is a military dictatorship effectively under the control of one person. Although officially there is no party, the effort to mobilize and organize the entire population for state purposes follows the socialist one-party model. The place of a legislature is taken by the direct democracy of large congresses, but elections held at local levels reflect local interests and are relatively fair. Whatever the form, no opposition is allowed on the larger questions of society. Institutional self-management has been widely introduced in the schools, hosp
Country Summaries

tals, and factories. Sometimes the system works well enough to provide a meaningful degree of decentralized self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are government-controlled means for active indoctrination. Political discussion at the local level is relatively open. There are many political prisoners; the use of military and people's courts for political cases suggests little respect for the rule of law, yet acquittals in political cases occur. All lawyers must work for the state. Torture and mistreatment are frequent; executions for crimes of conscience occur—even in foreign countries through assassination. Although ideologically socialist some of the press remains in private hands. Oil and oil-related industries are the major areas of government enterprise. Socialization tends to be announced at the top and imposed rather anarchically and sporadically at the bottom. Most private associations and trade organizations are being integrated into or replaced by state organizations. Employment is increasingly dependent on political loyalty. Respect for Islam provides some check on arbitrary government.

Comparatively: Libya is as free as Algeria, freer than Afghanistan, less free than Tunisia.

**LUXEMBOURG**

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<tr>
<td>Population: 365,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
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A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy on the Belgian model, in which the monarchy is somewhat more powerful than in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia. The legislature is bicameral with the appointive upper house having only a delaying function. Recent votes have resulted in important shifts in the nature of the dominant coalition.

Civil Liberties. The media are private and free. The rule of law is thoroughly accepted in both public and private realms. Rights of assembly, organization, travel, property, and religion are protected.
Country Summaries

Comparatively. Luxembourg is as free as Iceland, freer than France.

M A D A G A S C A R

Economy: noninclusive mixed political rights: 5 socialist
Polity: dominant party civil liberties: 6 (military dominated)
Population: 10,000,000 status: partly free

A transetnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Madagascar is essentially a military dictatorship with a very weak legislature. Legislative elections have been restricted to candidates selected by the former political parties on the left grouped in a "national front"; resulting parliaments appear to play a very small part in government. The presidential election in late 1982 allowed vigorous opposition. Although the opposition candidate was later arrested, he subsequently won a seat in the 1983 parliamentary elections. Emphasis has been put on developing the autonomy of local Malagasy governmental institutions. The restriction of local elections to approved front candidates belies this emphasis, but contests are genuine. Although tribal rivalries are very important, all groups speak the same language.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, but papers are carefully censored and may be suspended. Broadcasting is government controlled. Movie theaters have been nationalized. There is no right of assembly; still, election processes allow periods of intense criticism, and vocal, organized opposition persists. There are few long-term prisoners of conscience; short-term political detentions are common, often combined with ill-treatment. The rule of law is weak, but political prisoners may be acquitted. Labor unions are not strong and most are party-affiliated. Religion is free, and most private rights are respected. Public security is very weak. Overseas travel is restricted. While still encouraging private investment, most businesses and large farms are nationalized. Corruption is widespread.
Country Summaries

Comparatively: Madagascar is as free as Poland, freer than Mozambique, less free than Morocco.

MALAWI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist
Polity: nationalist one-party
Population: 7,000,000

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Malawi is a one-man dictatorship with party and parliamentary forms. Elections allow some choice among individuals. Administration is centralized, but there are both traditional and modern local governments.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or religious but under strict government control, as is the government-owned radio service. Even private criticism of the administration remains dangerous. Foreign publications are carefully screened. The country has been notable for the persecution of political opponents, including execution and torture. There are prisoners of conscience, and even slight criticism can lead to severe penalties. Asians suffer discrimination. Corruption and economic inequality are characteristic. The comparatively limited interests of the government offer considerable scope for individual rights. There is some protection by law in the modernized sector. Small-scale subsistence farming is dominant, with much of the labor force employed in South Africa.

Comparatively: Malawi is as free as South Yemen, freer than Somalia, less free than Zambia.

MALAYSIA

Economy: capitalist
Polity: decentralized dominant-party
Population: 15,700,000

Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: partly free
Country Summaries

An ethnic state with major nonterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy with a weak, indirectly elected and appointed senate and a powerful lower house. The relatively powerless head of state is a monarch; the position rotates among the traditional monarchs of the constituent states. A multinational front has dominated electoral and parliamentary politics. By such devices as imprisonment or the banning of demonstrations, the opposition is not given an equal opportunity to compete in elections. The states of Malaysia have their own rulers, parliaments, and institutions, but it is doubtful if any state has the power to leave the federation. Elected local governments have limited power. Subnationalities: Political, economic, linguistic, and educational policies have favored the Malays (forty-four percent) over the Chinese (thirty-six percent), Indians (ten percent) and others. Malays dominate the army. Traditionally the Chinese had been the wealthier and better educated people. Although there are Chinese in the ruling front, they are not allowed to question the policy of communal preference.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and highly varied. However, nothing that might affect communal relations negatively can be printed, and editors are constrained by the need to renew their publishing licenses annually to follow government advice on many issues. "Undesirable" publications, defined in the broadest terms, may not be printed or distributed. Foreign journalists are closely controlled. Radio is mostly government owned, television entirely so: both present primarily the government's viewpoint. Academics are restrained from discussing sensitive issues. There have been reports of an atmosphere of fear in both academic and opposition political circles, as well as widespread discrimination against non-Malays. An attempt to establish a private university for Chinese-language students was blocked. About three hundred political suspects are detained, generally on suspicion of communist activity. Some are clearly prisoners of conscience; several have held responsible political positions. Confessions are often forcibly extracted. Nevertheless, significant criticism appears in the media and in parliament. Unions are permitted to strike and have successfully opposed restrictive legislation. Although the government has begun to assume control of strategic
sectors of the economy, economic activity is generally free, except for government favoritism to the Malays.

Comparatively: Malaysia is as free as Egypt, freer than Indonesia, less free than India.

MALDIVES

Economy: noninclusive capitalist
Polity: traditional nonparty
Population: 200,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Maldives have a parliamentary government in which a president (elected by parliament and confirmed by the people) is predominant. The elected parliament has gained some freedom of discussion. Regional leaders are presidentially appointed, but there are elected councils. Both economic and political power are concentrated in the hands of a very small, wealthy elite. Islam places a check on absolutism.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers present some diversity of views but are under pressure to conform; the radio station is owned by the government. Foreign publications are received; political discussion is limited. Several persons have been arrested for their political associations since a coup attempt. The legal system is based on traditional Islamic law. No unions have been formed. Most of the people rely on a subsistence economy; the small elite has developed commercial fishing and tourism.

Comparatively: Maldives is as free as Qatar, freer than Seychelles, less free than Mauritius.

MALI

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)
Population: 7,700,000

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Country Summaries

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mali is a military dictatorship with a recently constructed political party to lend support. The regime appears to function without broad popular consensus. Assembly and presidential elections allow no choice, though there is some at the local level. Military officers have a direct role in the assembly. Subnationalities: Although the government is ostensibly transethnic, repression of northern peoples has been reported.

Civil Liberties. The media are nearly all government owned and closely controlled. Antigovernment demonstrations are forbidden. Private conversation is relatively free. There are prisoners of conscience, and reeducation centers are brutal. Student protests are controlled by conscription and detention. Religion is free; unions are controlled; travelers must submit to frequent police checks. There have been reports of slavery and forced labor. Private economic rights in the modern sector are minimal, but collectivization has recently been deemphasized for subsistence agriculturists—the majority of the people. Corruption, particularly in the state enterprises, is widespread and costly.

Comparatively: Mali is as free as Ghana, freer than Somalia, less free than Liberia.

M A L T A

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 400,000 Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Malta is a parliamentary democracy in which the governing party has become increasingly antidemocratic. The most recent election resulted in a government victory in spite of an opposition majority in the popular vote. There is little local government.

Civil Liberties: The press is free, but foreign and domestic journalists are under government pressure. Radio and television
are government controlled and partial. The government has tried to prevent the opposition use of Italian stations and to forbid criticism of the system to foreigners. The rule of law is shaky: judges who cross the government are removed or demoted, and court orders are repeatedly ignored. The government foments gang violence against its opponents. The government has concentrated a great deal of the economy in its hands in a manner that reduces freedom by reducing pluralism. The most recent attack has been against the independence of church schools. The governing party and major union have been amalgamated; one union confederation remains independent but subdued.

Comparatively: Malta is as free as Vanuatu, freer than Turkey, less free than Cyprus(G).

Mauritania

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty
Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,900,000
Status: not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Mauritania has been ruled by a succession of military leaders without formal popular or traditional legitimation. Subnationalities: There is a subnational movement, in the non-Arab, southern part of the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and censored, but foreign publications and broadcasts are freely available. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience. Conversation is free; no ideology is imposed, but no opposition organizations or assemblies are allowed. Travel may be restricted for political reasons. Internal exile has been imposed on some former officials. Union activity is government controlled. There is religious freedom within the limits of an Islamic country. The government controls much of industry and mining, as well as wholesale trade, but there have been recent moves to reduce government involvement. The large rural sector remains under tribal or family control. Only in 1980 was there a move to abolish slavery.
Country Summaries

Comparatively: Mauritania is as free as Mali, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Algeria.

**MAURITIUS**

Economy: capitalist  
Polity: centralized multiparty  
Population: 1,000,000  
Political Rights: 2  
Civil Liberties: 2  
Status: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy. Recent elections have shifted control from one party to another. A variety of different racial and religious communities are active in politics. There are guarantees in the electoral system to make sure no major group is unrepresented in parliament. There are elected local governing bodies.

Civil Liberties The press is private or party and without censorship. Nevertheless, there has been a struggle between journalists and the government over proposed restrictions, and rights of reply on television. Broadcasting is government owned, but opposition views are aired. Opposition parties campaign freely and rights are guaranteed under a rule of law. The labor union movement is quite strong, as are a variety of communal organizations. Strikes are common. There is religious and economic freedom; social services are financed through relatively high taxes.

Comparatively: Mauritius is as free as Papua New Guinea, freer than India, less free than France.

**MEXICO**

Economy: capitalist-statist  
Polity: decentralized dominant-party  
Population: 79,700,000  
Political Rights: 4  
Civil Liberties: 4  
Status: partly free

An ethnic state with potential subnationalities
Country Summaries

Political Rights. Mexico is ruled by a governmental system formally modeled on that of the United States; in practice the president is much stronger and the legislative and judicial branches much weaker. The states have independent governors and legislatures, as do local municipalities. The ruling party has had a near monopoly of power on all levels since the 1920s. Political competition has been largely confined to factional struggles within the ruling party. Party conventions are controlled from the top down. Progress in opening the system to other parties has been reflected in recent elections, but the 1985 elections were marred by irregularities. Plausible accusations include adding fictitious names, stuffing the ballot boxes, excluding opposition observers, and fraudulent counting. Government pressure on the bureaucracy and media for support is overwhelming. The clergy are not allowed to participate in the political process. Subnationalities: There is a large Mayan area in Yucatan that has formerly been restive; there are also other smaller Indian areas.

Civil Liberties. The media are mostly private, but operate under a variety of direct and indirect government controls (including subsidies and take-overs). Free of overt censorship, papers are subject to government "guidance." Literature and the arts are free. The judicial system is not strong. However, decisions can go against the government; it is possible to win a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional in a particular application. Religion is free. Widespread bribery and lack of control over the behavior of security forces greatly limits freedom, especially in rural areas. Disappearances occur, detention is prolonged, torture and brutality have been common. Private economic rights are respected; government ownership predominates in major industries, graft is legendary. Access to land continues to be a problem despite reform efforts. Nearly all labor unions are associated with the ruling party. There is a right to strike. Some union and student activity has been repressed. Critical human rights organizations exist.

Comparatively: Mexico is as free as Egypt, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.
Country Summaries

**MONGOLIA**

| Economy: socialist | Political Rights: 7 |
| Polity: communist one-party | Civil Liberties: 7 |
| Population: 1,900,000 | Status: not free |

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A one-party communist dictatorship, Mongolia has recently experienced a change of leader through a mysterious politburo shift of power. Power is organized at all levels through the party apparatus. Those who oppose the government cannot run for office. Parliamentary elections offer no choice and result in 99.9% victories. Mongolia has a subordinate relationship to the Soviet Union; 25,000 Soviet troops are maintained in the country. It must use the USSR as an outlet for nearly all of its trade, and its finances are under close Soviet supervision.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled. Religion is restricted; Lamaism is nearly wiped out. Freedom of travel, residence, and other civil liberties are denied. As in many communist countries all typewriting and duplicating machines must be registered annually. Employment is assigned; workers committees are extensions of the party.

Comparatively. Mongolia is as free as Bulgaria, less free than China (Mainland).

**MOROCCO**

| Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 4 |
| Polity: centralized multiparty | Civil Liberties: 5 |
| Population: 24,300,000 | Status: partly free |

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the king has retained major executive powers. Referendums have been used to support the king's policies. Recent elections at both local and national levels have been well contested. Many
parties participated; the moderate center was the chief victor. The autonomy of local and regional elected governments is limited.

Subnationalities: Although people in the newly acquired land of the Western Sahara participate in the electoral process, it has an important resistance movement. In the rest of the country the large Berber minority is a subnationality whose self-expression is restricted.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and quite diverse. Recently there has been no formal censorship, but government guidance is common, and backed up with the confiscation of particular issues and the closing of publications. Monarchical power must not be criticized. Broadcasting stations are under government control, although they have recently been opened to the parties for campaign statements. In the past the use of torture has been quite common and may continue; the rule of law has also been weakened by the frequent use of prolonged detention without trial. There are many political prisoners; some are prisoners of conscience. Private organizational activity is vigorous and includes student, party, business, farmer, and human rights groups. There are strong independent labor unions in all sectors; religious and other private rights are respected. State intervention in the economy is increasing, particularly in agriculture and foreign trade.

Comparatively: Morocco is as free as South Korea, freer than Algeria, less free than Spain.

**MOZAMBIQUE**

Economy: noninclusive socialist
Polity: socialist one-party
Population: 13,900,000

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A tranethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mozambique is a one-party communist dictatorship in which all power resides in the "vanguard party." All candidates are selected by the party at all levels, but there is some popular control of selection at local levels. Discussion in party congresses and other meetings can be quite critical.
Regional administration is controlled from the center. Southerners and non-Africans dominate the government.

Civil Liberties. All media are rigidly controlled. Rights of assembly and foreign travel do not exist. There are no private lawyers. Secret police are powerful; thousands are in reeducation camps, and executions occur. Police brutality is common. Unions are prohibited. Pressure has been put on several religions, especially the Catholic clergy and Jehovah's Witnesses. Villagers are being forced into communes, leading to revolts in some areas. However, the socialization of private entrepreneurs has been partially reversed. The emigration of citizens is restricted, although seasonal movement of workers across borders is unrecorded. Pressure on religion has been relaxed recently.

Comparatively: Mozambique is as free as Malawi, freer than Somalia, less free than Tanzania.

**NAURU**

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist
Polity: traditional nonparty
Population: 9,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Nauru is a parliamentary democracy in which governments change by elective and parliamentary means. All MPs are elected as independents, although there are informal alignments. The cabinet currently represents a coalition of factions. The country is under Australian influence.

Civil Liberties. The media are free of censorship but little developed. The island's major industry is controlled by the government under a complex system of royalties and profit-sharing. No taxes are levied; phosphate revenues finance a wide range of social services. The major cooperative and union are independent.

Comparatively: Nauru is as free as Fiji, freer than Maldives, less free than New Zealand.
NEPAL

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 3
Polity: traditional nonparty  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 17,000,000  Status: partly free

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Nepal is a constitutional monarchy in which the king is dominant. A relatively free referendum held in 1980 rejected a move toward party government, but the new constitution opened the system to direct parliamentary elections. However, candidates must belong to certain "class" organizations, the king continues to appoint many members and has essentially unchecked power to intervene. Parliament acts independently, and is able to change governments. Subnationalities: There are a variety of different peoples, with only fifty percent of the people speaking Nepali as their first language. Hinduism is a unifying force for the majority. Historically powerful Hindu castes continue to dominate.

Civil Liberties. Principal newspapers are public and print only what the government wishes; private journals carry criticism of the government but not the king. Some offending publications have been suspended in the recent past. Radio is government owned. Private contacts are relatively open. Political detention is common, sometimes probably for little more than expression of opinion. Parties are banned as the result of the referendum, but human rights organizations function. Union organization is under government control. The judiciary is not independent. Religious proselytizing and conversion is prohibited, and the emigration of those with valuable skills or education is restricted. The population is nearly all engaged in traditional occupations; sharecropping and tenant farming is common. Illiteracy levels are very high.

Comparatively: Nepal is as free as Thailand, freer than Bhutan, less free than Mauritius.
Country Summaries

NETHERLANDS

Economy: mixed capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 14,500,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy in which nearly all the power is vested in a directly elected legislature. The results of elections have periodically transferred power to coalitions of the left and right. There is some diffusion of political power below this level, but not a great deal. The monarch retains more power than in the United Kingdom both through the activity of appointing governments in frequently stalemated situations, and through the advisory Council of State.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private. Radio and television are provided by private associations under state ownership. Commercial services have been introduced. A wide range of views is broadcast. The courts are independent, and the full spectrum of private rights guaranteed. The burden of exceptionally heavy taxes limits some economic choice, but benefits offer the chance to choose not to work.

Comparatively: The Netherlands is as free as Belgium, freer than Portugal.

NEW ZEALAND

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 3,300,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous state with a native subnationality

Political Liberties. New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between the two major parties. There is elected local government, but it is not independently powerful. Subnationalities: About ten percent of the population are Maori, the original inhabitants. Their rights are now a growing concern.
Civil Liberties. The press is private and free. Television and most radio stations are government owned, but without reducing their independence significantly. The rule of law and private rights are thoroughly respected. Since taxes (a direct restriction on choice) are not exceptionally high, and industry is not government owned, we label New Zealand capitalist. Others, emphasizing the government’s highly developed social programs and penchant for controlling prices, wages, and credit, might place New Zealand further toward the socialist end of the economic spectrum.

Comparatively: New Zealand is as free as the United States, freer than France.

Nicaragua

Economy: noninclusive mixed
Political Rights: 5
socialist
Polity: dominant-party
Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 3,000,000
Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Government is in the hands of the Sandinista political-military movement. Major opposition parties chose not to participate in the November 1984 elections because of Sandinista controls on the media and harassment of the opposition campaigns. Detailed Sandinista controls over livelihood makes a free vote impossible. Still, there is now a small, legal, elected opposition in the legislature. However, in the Marxist-Leninist style the government is controlled by the Party rather than the legislature. Subnationalities: Several thousand Miskito Indians have been forcibly settled and resettled with many killed in the process.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and radio stations are mostly under government control; private television is not allowed. There is pressure on dissident or radical journalists. A radio station and a paper have been closed. Basic rights to expression have been suspended, and censorship is heavy. However, papers and private persons still oppose the new system. Government gangs regularly break up opposition rallies. Political activity by
Country Summaries

parties outside the Sandinista movement is restricted. There are thousands of political prisoners; most are former national guardsmen; many detainees including labor leaders are clearly prisoners of conscience. Neighborhood watch committees have been established. Killing and intimidation occur, especially in rural areas. Thousand of disappearances have been reported. The independence of the judiciary is not well developed, although the government does not always win in court. A parallel judiciary has constricted the rule of law. Foreign travel is restricted for some political opponents. Internal travel is restricted in much of the country. Unions are under pressure to join a new government-sponsored federation; strikes have been banned. A private human rights organization is active, but it has been intermittently harassed and oppressed. Some enterprises and farms have been nationalized; much of the economy remains formally private, though supplies must generally be bought from and products sold to the government.

Comparatively: Nicaragua is as free as Tunisia, freer than Cuba, less free than El Salvador.

NIGER

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 6,500,000 Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Niger is a military dictatorship with no elected assembly or legal parties. A civilian "development assembly" has recently been appointed. All districts are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. Niger's very limited media are government owned and operated, and are used to mobilize the population. Dissent is seldom tolerated, although ideological conformity is not demanded. There is little overt censorship, but also no barrier to censorship. A military court has taken the place of a suspended Supreme Court; a few political prisoners are held under severe conditions. Unions and religious organizations are rela-
tively independent but nonpolitical. Foreign travel is relatively open; outside of politics the government does not regulate individual behavior. The economy is largely subsistence farming based on communal tenure; direct taxes on the poor have been abolished; agriculture has been honestly supported.

Comparatively: Niger is as free as Mali, freer than North Korea, less free than Liberia.

NIGERIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: military nonparty
Population: 91,200,000

A multinational state

Political Rights. Nigeria is under the direct rule of the military as defined by successive coups. The full spectrum of political positions has been replaced by the military command. Subnationalities: Nigeria is made up of a number of powerful subnational groupings. Speaking mainly Hausa, the people of the north are Muslim. The highly urbanized southwest is dominated by the Yoruba; and the east by the Ibo. Within each of these areas and along their borders there are other peoples, some of which are conscious of their identity and number more than one million persons. Strong loyalties to traditional political units—lineages or kingdoms—throughout the country further complicate the regional picture.

Civil Liberties. The status of civil liberties remains in flux. Television and radio are now wholly federal or state owned, as are all but two of the major papers, in part as the result of a Nigerianization program. The media have limited editorial independence; journalists have been arrested. Political organization, assembly, and publication are largely eliminated. The universities, secondary schools, and trade unions are under close government control or reorganization in the last few years. The national student association has been banned. Many members of the previous government are imprisoned; their trials for corruption
Country Summaries

have generally been held in secret. Harsh punishments have been decreed for many crimes. Police are often brutal, and military riot control has led to many deaths. There is freedom of religion and travel, but rights of married women are quite restricted. The country is in the process of moving from a subsistence to industrial economy—largely on the basis of government-controlled oil and oil-related industry. Government intervention elsewhere in agriculture (cooperatives and plantations) and industry has been considerable. Since private business and industry are also encouraged, this is still far from a program of massive redistribution. General corruption in political and economic life has frequently diminished the rule of law. Freedom is respected in most other areas of life.

Comparatively: Nigeria is as free as Tanzania, freer than Benin, less free than Senegal.

N OR W A Y

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 4,200,000
Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population with a small Lapp minority

Political Rights. Norway is a centralized, constitutional monarchy. Labor remains the strongest party, but other parties have formed several governments since the mid-1960s. There is relatively little separation of powers. Regional governments have appointed governors, and cities and towns their own elected officials.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are privately or party owned; radio and television are state monopolies, but are not used for propaganda. This is a pluralistic state with independent power in the churches and labor unions. Relatively strong family structures have also been preserved. Norway is capitalistic, yet the government's control over the new oil resource and general reliance on centralized economic plans reduce the freedom of economic activity.
Comparatively: Norway is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than West Germany.

OMAN

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 6
Polity: centralized nonparty
Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,200,000
Status: not free

An ethnic state with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Oman is an absolute monarchy with no political parties or elected assemblies. There is an appointed consultative assembly. Regional rule is by centrally appointed governors, but the remaining tribal structure at the local and regional level gives a measure of local autonomy. British influence remains strong. Subnationalities: The people of Dhofar constitute a small subnationality in periodic revolt.

Civil Liberties. Broadcasting is government owned; the daily papers are government owned, weeklies are subsidized. There is little or no criticism. Foreign publications are censored regularly. Although the preservation of traditional institutions provides a check on arbitrary action, the right to a fair trial is not guaranteed in political cases. Freedom of assembly is curtailed, and there are no independent unions. With all this, there are few if any prisoners of conscience. Travel is not restricted; private property is respected. Proselytizing for non-Muslim faiths is illegal. The population is largely involved in subsistence agriculture.

Comparatively: Oman is as free as Algeria, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than the United Arab Emirates.

PAKISTAN

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 4
Polity: quasi-multiparty (military dominated)
Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 99,200,000
Status: partly free
Country Summaries

A multinational state

Political Rights. Pakistan is under mixed military and civilian rule. A December 1984 referendum on the President’s rule and Islam was a farce—it was almost impossible to vote against it. However, in 1985 nonparty assembly elections created a parliament that has increasingly shown its independence. Although the established political parties did not compete, many of their individual members did. Campaigning for a boycott was illegal. Local elections of limited significance have been held. Military officers have positions throughout the bureaucracy and private industry. Subnationalities: Millions of Pathans, Baluch, and Sindis have a long record of struggle for greater regional autonomy or independence. Provincial organization has sporadically offered a measure of self-determination, but at least the Baluch and Sindis continue to feel oppressed.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are censored; the frequent detention of journalists and closing of papers lead to strict self-censorship. Radio and television are government controlled. If parliamentary power continues to grow, civil liberties should expand rapidly. For ordinary crimes punishments are often severe; torture is alleged, and executions have been common. Thousands of members of the opposition have been imprisoned or flogged in the violent political climate. The officially dissolved parties retain considerable de facto organization, but the parties are not to be mentioned in the media. Rights of assembly are limited, as well as travel for political persons. Courts preserve some independence. Union activity is restricted but strikes and demonstrations occur; student unions are banned. Emphasis on Islamic conservatism curtails private rights, especially freedom of religion and women’s rights: religious minorities suffer discrimination. Prayer wardens attempt to ensure general observance of five prayers a day. Teaching must conform to Islam. Private property is respected; some basic industries have been nationalized. Over half the rural population consists of sharecroppers and tenant farmers.

Comparatively: Pakistan is as free as South Korea, freer than Bangladesh, less free than India.
### Panama

**Economy:** capitalist-statist  
**Political Rights:** 6  
**Polity:** centralized multiparty  
(military dominated)  
**Civil Liberties:** 3  
**Population:** 2,000,000  
**Status:** partly free  

A relatively homogeneous population with small subnationalities.

**Political Rights.** Panama is formally organized as a democracy on the American model. The 1984 election that was to return power to a civilian government was influenced by the military. In 1985 the military forced the resignation of the president they had chosen, replacing him with the relatively unknown vice-president. The provinces are administered by presidential appointees, with elected councils; there is considerable local power in Indian areas.

**Civil Liberties.** There are opposition papers, and critical opposition positions are reported in the news media. Through regulation, sanctions, threats, and special arrangements, the government ensures a preponderance of pro-government reporting in all media. Political parties maintain their opposition role, and rights to organization and assembly are generally respected. The judiciary is not independent; the rule of law is weak in both political and nonpolitical areas. There are few if any prisoners of conscience, but individuals dangerous to the military's interests may be eliminated. Labor unions are under some restrictions. There is freedom of religion, although foreign priests are not allowed. In general travel is free and private property respected. Major firms are state owned; land reform has been largely ineffective in reducing inequities in land ownership.

**Comparatively:** Panama is as free as Singapore, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.

### Papua New Guinea

**Economy:** noninclusive capitalist  
**Political Rights:** 2  
**Polity:** decentralized multiparty  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Population:** 3,300,000  
**Status:** free
Country Summaries

A transethnic heterogeneous state with many subnationalities

Political Rights. Papua New Guinea is an independent parliamentary democracy, although it remains partially dependent on Australia economically, technically, and militarily. Elections are fair and seats are divided among a number of major and minor parties. Since party allegiances are still fluid, there is considerable party-switching after elections. Parties are weakened by the overwhelming desire of politicians for government positions and their perquisites. Because of its dispersed and tribal nature, local government is in some ways quite decentralized. Elected provincial governments with extensive powers have been established, but only a few have firm public support. Subnationalities: The nation is being created from an amalgam of small tribal peoples with similar racial and cultural backgrounds. Development of provincial governments seems to have lessened secessionist sentiments in Bougainville, Papua, and elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is not highly developed but apparently free. Radio is government controlled but presents critical views; Australian stations are also received. There are no political prisoners. Rights to travel, organize, demonstrate, and practice religion are legally secured. The legal system adapted from Australia is operational, but a large proportion of the population lives in a preindustrial world with traditional controls, including violence, that limit freedom of speech, travel, occupation, and other private rights. In the cities ordinary crime is the major social issue; in the country, continued tribal warfare. Land ownership is widely distributed.

Comparatively: Papua New Guinea is as free as St. Vincent, freer than Vanuatu, less free than Australia.

PARAGUAY

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: centralized dominant-party (military dominated)
Population: 3,600,000

Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: partly free

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A relatively homogeneous state with small Indian groups

Political Rights. Paraguay has been ruled as a modified dictatorship since 1954. In addition to an elected president there is a parliament that includes members of opposition parties. Presidential election results determine parliamentary representation. Elections are regularly held, but they have limited meaning: the ruling party receives about ninety percent of the vote, a result guaranteed by direct and indirect pressures on the media, massive government pressure on voters, especially in the countryside, interference with opposition party organization, and perhaps electoral fraud. The most important regional and local officials are appointed by the president. Subnationalities: The population represents a mixture of Indian (Guarani) and Spanish peoples; ninety percent continue to speak Guarani as well as Spanish—a bilingualism the government has promoted. Several small tribes of primitive forest people are under heavy pressure from both the government and the public.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, and a combination of private, government, and church radio and television. In spite of censorship and suppression of publications, dissenting opinion is expressed, especially by the church hierarchy. Opposition political organization continues, as do human rights organizations, but there is open discrimination in favor of members of the ruling party in education, government, business, and other areas. A limited right of assembly and demonstration is exercised. Imprisonment, torture, and execution of political opponents, particularly peasants, have been and to a limited extent still are an important part of a sociopolitical situation that includes general corruption and anarchy. Political opponents or dissident writers may also be refused passports or exiled. There are now few if any long-term prisoners of conscience, but the rule of law is very weak. Most unions are dominated by the ruling party. Beyond the subsistence sector, private economic rights are restricted by government intervention, control, and favoritism. A large proportion of peasants work their own land, partly as a result of government land reform.

Comparatively: Paraguay is as free as Nicaragua, freer than Cuba, less free than Guatemala.
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PERU

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty
Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 19,500,000
Status: free

An ethnic state with a major potential territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Peru is ruled by an elected multiparty parliamentary system. Won by the opposition, 1985 elections led to a stronger assertion of civilian control over the military. Provincial administration is not independent, but local elections are significant. Subnationalities: Several million people speak Quechua in the highlands, and it is now an official language. There are other important Indian groups.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely private. Censorship has been abolished. Essentially all positions are freely expressed, but there is still the shadow of the military and the recent past. There is little if any imprisonment for conscience, but many are killed or imprisoned in the course of antiguerrilla and antiterrorist campaigns; torture occurs. However, thousands of members of the security forces have been censored or arrested for excesses, including generals held responsible. Periodic states of emergency reduce freedoms, especially in certain areas. Travel is not restrained, and rights to religion and occupation are generally respected. Labor is independent and politically active; strikes are common. The public sector remains dominant, but private property has regained governmental acceptance.

Comparatively: Peru is as free as Brazil, freer than Mexico, less free than Venezuela.

PHILIPPINES

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 4
Polity: dominant party
Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 56,800,000
Status: partly free
A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. The Philippines is ruled as a plebiscitary family dictatorship with the aid of a relatively powerless assembly. The present ruler was elected in a fair election in the early 1970s, but more recent referendums and elections affirming his rule and his constitutional changes have not been conducted with acceptable voting procedures. The 1984 assembly elections were not fairly conducted. Yet they led to massive opposition gains and a real advance for democracy. There is some decentralization of power to local assemblies. Many provincial and local officials are centrally appointed, but elected local officers are often quite independent. Subnationalities: The Philippines includes a variety of different peoples of which the Tagalog speaking are the most important (although a minority). A portion of the Muslim (Moro) subnationality is in active revolt along the front of Christian-Muslim opposition. There are several major potential subnationalities that may request autonomy in the future on the basis of both territorial and linguistic identity.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and broadcasting are largely private but the larger outlets are under indirect government influence. Many newspapers and publications express dissident viewpoints. Diverse foreign publications are available. A multitude of radio stations display surprising independence, especially in the provinces. Most television is quite controlled. There is large-scale opposition political organization, and opposition leaders regularly hold public meetings. Demonstrations have been massive. A private electoral monitoring organization has operated extensively and effectively. The courts have retained some independence, although it is much reduced. Hundreds of prisoners of conscience have been held; torture is used, but it is also sporadically condemned by the top levels of government and torturers have been punished. Unions have only limited independence, but strikes occur. Military actions against insurgents have led to many unnecessary arrests, killings, and destruction. Disappearances occur, as do private, progovernment killings. The Catholic Church maintains its independence. The private economy is marginally capitalist, but rapid growth in government intervention, favoritism, and direct ownership of industries by government and
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government favorites brings the economy closer to capitalist-statist.

Comparatively: The Philippines is as free as Sri Lanka, freer than Singapore, less free than Peru.

**POLAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: mixed socialist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Polity: communist one-party</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(military dominated)</td>
<td>Status: partly free</td>
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Population: 37,300,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Poland is a one-party communist and military dictatorship. Assembly elections in 1985 allowed some competition. All candidates must support the system. More generally, in recent years a few nonparty persons have gained election to the assembly and some sessions have evidenced more than pro forma debate. There are elected councils at provincial levels. Although party and military hierarchies operating from the top down are the loci of power, the Catholic Church, academics, peasants, and workers must be considered by any government. The Soviet Union's claim to a right of interference and continual pressure diminishes Poland's independence.

Civil Liberties. The Polish newspapers are both private and government; broadcasting is government owned. Censorship is pervasive, but underground publication on a massive scale exists in a variety of fields. Private expression is relatively free. There are no formal rights of assembly or organization, nor concept of an independent judiciary. The church remains a major independent voice as do the leaders of the formally disallowed Solidarity. Detention, beating, and harassment are common means of restricting opposition. Illegal attempts to leave Poland have frequently led to arrest; while others have been forced into exile. For most people passports are now relatively easy to obtain. Most agriculture and considerable commerce remain in private hands; industry is fully nationalized.
Comparatively: Poland is as free as South Africa, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Mexico.

PORTUGAL

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 9,750,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Portugal is a parliamentary democracy. Although the president was a general, the separate power of the military is now minimal. There is vigorous party competition over most of the spectrum (except the far right), and fair elections. Party relationships remain unstable, but the overwhelming majority of voters are centrist. Elections are competitive and power is shared by several groups. Provincial government is centrally directed.

Civil Liberties. In spite of government or party ownership of most major papers, journalism is now quite free. Radio and television are government owned, except for one Catholic station. They are both relatively free editorially. The government has restored the rule of law. There are few if any prisoners of conscience, yet one can be imprisoned for insult to the military or government. Long periods of detention without trial occur in isolated instances. Imprisonment for "fascist" organization or discussion was promulgated in 1978. The Catholic Church, unions, peasant organizations, and military services remain alternative institutions of power. Although there is a large nationalized sector, capitalism is the accepted form for much of the economy.

Comparatively: Portugal is as free as France, freer than Jamaica, less free than United Kingdom.

QATAR

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist
Polity: traditional nonparty
Population: 300,000
A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. Qatar is a traditional monarchy. The majority of the residents are recently arrived foreigners; of the native population perhaps one-fourth are members of the ruling family. Open receptions are regularly held for the public to present grievances. Consensus plays an important role in the system.

Civil Liberties. The media are public or subsidized private, and loyalist. Discussion is fairly open; foreign publications are controlled. Political parties are forbidden. This is a traditional state still responsive to Islamic and tribal laws that moderate the absolutism of government. The family government controls the nation's wealth through control over oil, but there are also independently powerful merchant and religious classes. There are no income taxes and many public services are free. There are no organized unions or strikes. The rights of women and religious minorities are quite limited: only native Muslim males have the full rights of citizens.

Comparatively: Qatar is as free as the United Arab Emirates, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Lebanon.

ROMANIA

Economy: socialist Polity: communist one-party
Population: 22,800,000 Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7 Status: not free

An ethnic state with territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Romania is a now-traditional communist state. Assemblies at national and regional levels are subservient to the party hierarchy. Although the party is not large, all decisions are made by a small elite and especially the dictator. Elections involve only candidates chosen by the party; for some assembly positions the party may propose several candidates. Soviet influence is relatively slight. Subnationalities: The Magyar and German minorities are territorially based. If offered
Country Summaries

A self-determination one Magyar area would surely opt for rejoining neighboring Hungary; many of the Germans evidently wish to migrate to Germany, and many have. In Romania the cultural rights of both groups are narrowly limited.

Civil Liberties. The media include only government or party organs; self-censorship committees replace centralized censorship. Private discussion is guarded; police are omnipresent. Dissenters are frequently imprisoned. Forced confessions, false charges, and psychiatric incarceration are characteristic. Treatment may be brutal; physical threats are common. Many arrests have been made for attempting to leave the country or importing foreign literature (especially bribes and material in minority languages). Contacts with foreigners must be reported if not given prior approval. Religious and other personal freedoms, such as the right not to have children, are quite restricted. Outside travel and emigration are not considered rights; potential emigrants may suffer economic discrimination. Private museums have been closed. Independent labor and management rights are essentially nonexistent. Attempts to form a trade union in 1979 were crushed, as was a major coal strike in 1981. Pressure on workers and consumers to provide a greater surplus is heavy. Central planning is pervasive throughout the highly nationalized economy.

Comparatively: Romania is as free as the USSR, less free than Hungary.

RWANDA

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)
Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 6,300,000 Status: not free

An ethnic state with a minor nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Rwanda is a military dictatorship with an auxiliary party organization. Elections are not free and candidates are pre-selected, but voters have some choice. Districts are administered by the central government. However, everyone
Country Summaries

belongs to the party, and party elections and deliberations have some competitive and critical aspects. There are elected local councils and officials. Subnationalities: The former ruling people, the Tutsi, have been persecuted and heavily discriminated against, but the situation has improved.

Civil Liberties. The weak press is religious or governmental; radio is government owned. Only the mildest criticism is voiced. Political prisoners are held, and beating of prisoners and suspects may be common. The courts have some independence. Considerable religious freedom exists. Travel is restricted both within the country and across its borders. Labor unions are very weak. There are no great extremes of wealth. The government is socialist in intent, but missionary cooperatives dominate trade, and private business is active in the small nonsubsistence sector. Traditional ways of life rather than government orders regulate the lives of most.

Comparatively: Rwanda is as free as Tanzania, freer than Burundi, less free than Zambia.

ST. KITTS — NEVIS
(ST. CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS)

Economy: capitalist Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 42,000 Status: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. St. Kitts-Nevis has a fully functioning parliamentary system in which the smaller Nevis has a relatively large share of power and internal self-government, and has a continuing option to secede.

Civil Liberties. The media are free; there is a constitutional rule of law.

Comparatively: St. Kitts-Nevis is as free as Costa Rica, freer than Jamaica.
ST. LUCIA

Economy: capitalist  Polity: centralized multiparty  Population: 115,000
Political Rights: 1  Civil Liberties: 2  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. This is a functioning parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between parties, most recently in 1982. There are elected local governments.

Civil Liberties. The papers are largely private or party controlled, and uncensored. Broadcasting is government and private. Organization and assembly are free, but harassment and violence accompany their expression. There are strong business, labor, and religious organizations. Massive strikes in part forced the resignation of the prime minister in early 1982. Personal rights are secured.

Comparatively: St. Lucia is as free as Barbados, freer than Jamaica, less free than the United States.

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Economy: capitalist  Polity: centralized multiparty  Population: 123,000
Political Rights: 2  Civil Liberties: 2  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. St. Vincent is an operating multiparty state. In a 1984 election the ruling party was defeated.

Civil Liberties. Weekly papers present a variety of uncensored opinion, although there may be some government favoritism. Radio is government owned and has been accused of bias. Foreign media are readily available. There is a full right to assembly and organization; effective opposition to government policies is easily organized and often successful. There is a rule of law, but accusations of police brutality. Much of economic activity is based on agriculture.
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Comparatively: St. Vincent is as free as Finland, freer than Colombia, less free than Barbados.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Economy: socialist
Polity: socialist one-party
Population: 85,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sao Tome and Principe are governed under strongman leadership by the revolutionary party that led the country to independence. There is an indirectly elected assembly. Popular dissatisfaction and factional struggles occasionally appear, but no public opposition is allowed. There are local elections. Angolan and other foreign troops have been used to maintain the regime.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and controlled; opposition voices are not heard; there is no effective right of political assembly. Labor unions are not independent. The rule of law does not extend to political questions; there are few known political prisoners, but many opponents are in exile. There is little evidence of brutality or torture. The largely plantation agriculture has been socialized, as has most of the economy. Illiteracy is particularly high.

Comparatively: Sao Tome and Principe appear to be as free as Angola, less free than Comoros.

SAUDI ARABIA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: traditional nonparty
Population: 11,200,000

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population
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Political Rights. Saudi Arabia is a traditional family monarchy ruling without representative assemblies. Political parties are prohibited. The right of petition is guaranteed, and religious leaders provide a check on arbitrary government. Regional government is by appointive officers; there are some local elective assemblies.

Civil Liberties. The press is both private and governmental; strict self-censorship is expected. Radio and television are mostly government owned, although ARAMCO also has stations. Private conversation is relatively free; there is no right of political assembly or political organization. Islamic law limits arbitrary government, but the rule of law is not fully institutionalized. There are political prisoners, and torture is reported; there may be prisoners of conscience. Citizens have no freedom of religion—all must be Muslims, and must observe Muslim rites. Strikes and unions are forbidden. Private rights in areas such as occupation or residence are generally respected, but marriage to a non-Muslim or non-Saudi is closely controlled. Women may not marry non-Muslims, and suffer other special disabilities, particularly in the right to travel. The economy is overwhelmingly dominated by petroleum or petroleum-related industry that is directly or indirectly under government control. The commercial and agricultural sectors are private, but connection to the royal family may be critical for success. Extreme economic inequality is maintained by the political system.

Comparatively: Saudi Arabia is as free as Mauritania, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Bahrain.

SENEGAL

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized
Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: partly free
Population: 6,700,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Although elections are fairly open and parties represent a variety of positions, one party continues to
Country Summaries

donate elections, and not without help from the government. Opposition parties are not allowed to form coalitions, and election regulations do not provide for adequate supervision. Contested elections occur on the local level. Subnationalities: Ethnically eighty percent are Muslims; the Wolof people represent thirty-six percent of the population, including most of the elite, the urban population, and the more prosperous farmers. However, regional loyalties, both within and outside of this linguistic grouping, seem to be at least as important as communal groupings in defining potential subnationalities. Rapid assimilation of rural migrants in the cities to Wolof culture has reduced the tendency toward ethnic cleavage, but a separatist movement in the far south has shown increasing activity.

Civil Liberties. The press is predominantly public; the independence of private publications is somewhat constrained, although opposition papers and journals appear. Radio and television are under an autonomous government body, but not fully impartial. Rights of assembly and demonstration are often denied. There are at least some separatist prisoners of conscience. Unions have gained increasing independence. Religion, travel, occupation, and other private rights are respected. The government sometimes loses in the courts. Although much of the land remains tribally owned, government-organized cooperatives, a strong internal private market, and dependence on external markets have transformed the preindustrial society. Many inefficient and corrupt state and quasi-public enterprises are now being dismantled.

Comparatively: Senegal is as free as Gambia, freer than Ivory Coast, less free than Botswana.

SEYCHELLES

Economy: mixed capitalist Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 65,000 Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Seychelles is a one-party state allowing little political competition for parliament and none for presi-
dent. The former ruling party is said to have "simply disappeared." Tanzanian military support has largely been replaced by North Korean. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. Aside from an occasionally mildly critical Catholic publication, there is no independent opinion press; radio is government owned. No opposition in publication or even conversation is legal. Individuals have little judicial protection. There is no right of political assembly, and the security services have broad powers of arrest. Opposition party activities are banned; people have frequently been arrested on political charges. Critics are often urged to leave, exiled, or refused permission to leave. Labor and government are interconnected. Private rights, including private property, are generally respected. Religious institutions maintain some independence. Quasi-government enterprises are being established; state monopolies control the marketing of all export crops. Government services in this largely impoverished country are extensive.

Comparatively: Seychelles is as free as Tanzania, freer than Somalia, less free than Maldives.

**SIERRA LEONE**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 5
Polity: socialist one-party  Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 3,600,000  Status: partly free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Sierra Leone's one-party system has coopted many members of the previous opposition. The 1985 presidential election allowed no choices; participation was suspiciously high. Military influence in government is critical. There are some elected and traditional local governments.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and governmental. Radio is government controlled. There is occasional independence in the press, but it is under heavy pressure; still there is considerable freedom of private speech. The courts do not appear to be very powerful or independent. Special emergency powers have sporadically given the government untrammeled powers of detention, cen-
Country Summaries

sorship, restriction of assembly, and search. There may now be no prisoners of conscience. Identity cards have recently been required of all citizens. Labor unions are relatively independent, and travel is freely permitted. The largely subsistence economy has an essentially capitalist modern sector. Corruption is pervasive and costly.

Comparatively: Sierra Leone is as free as Zimbabwe, freer than Gabon, less free than Senegal.

S I N G A P O R E

Economy: mixed capitalist  Political Rights:  4
Polity: centralized  Civil Liberties:  5
dominant-party
Population: 2,600,000  Status: partly free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Singapore is a parliamentary democracy in which the ruling party traditionally won all legislative seats. Economic and other pressures against all opposition groups (exerted in part through control of the media) make elections very unfair. Opposition leaders have been sentenced and bankrupted for such crimes as defaming the prime minister during the campaign. The opposition still obtains thirty percent of the vote. In December 1984 the opposition won two seats and greatly improved its vote. Alarmed, the government spoke of changing the electoral system. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is nominally free, but owners of shares with policy-making power must be officially approved—in some cases the government owns the shares. Government argues that the press has a duty to support government positions. Letters to the editors do express opposition opinion. Broadcasting is largely a government monopoly and completely controlled. By closing papers and imprisoning editors and reporters, the press is kept under close control. University faculties are under pressure to conform. Rights of assembly are restricted. Most opposition is treated as a communist threat and, therefore, treasonable. Prisoners of conscience are held; in internal security cases the
Country Summaries

Protection of the law is weak—prosecution's main task appears to be obtaining forced confessions of communist activity. Torture is alleged. Trade union freedom is inhibited by the close association of government and union. Private rights of religion, occupation, or property are generally observed, although a large and increasing percentage of manufacturing and service companies are government owned. Natalist policy favors better educated. Many youths have reportedly been forcibly drafted into construction brigades.

Comparatively: Singapore is as free as Uganda, freer than Indonesia, less free than Malaysia.

**SOLOMON ISLANDS**

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 300,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous state with subnational strains

Political Rights. The Solomon Islands are a parliamentary democracy under the British monarch. Elections are intensely contested; party discipline is weak. There is some decentralization of power at the local level; further decentralization to the provincial level is planned.

Civil Liberties. Radio is government controlled; the very limited press is both government and private. There is no censorship, but a number of pressures against journalists have been reported. The rule of law is maintained in the British manner alongside traditional ideas of justice. Published incitement to inter-island conflict has led to banishment for several persons. Union activity is free. The government is involved in major businesses. Most land is held communally but farmed individually.

Comparatively: The Solomon Islands are as free as Jamaica, freer than Vanuatu, less free than New Zealand.
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SOMALIA

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Population: 6,500,000
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. The Somali Republic is under one-man military rule combining glorification of the ruler with one-party socialist legitimization. Elections in 1985 with ninety-nine percent approval allowed no choice. Ethnically the state is homogeneous, although until the military coup in 1969 the six main clan groupings and their subdivisions were the major means of organizing loyalty and power. While politics is still understood in lineage terms, in its centralizing drive the government has tried to eliminate both tribal and religious power.

Civil Liberties. The media are under strict government control, private conversation is controlled, and those who do not follow the government are considered to be against it. There are many political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience. There have been jailings for strikes and executions for reasons of conscience. Travel is restricted. Some state farms and industries have been established beyond the dominant subsistence economy. A large black market circumvents official distribution channels; corruption is widespread in government and business.

Comparatively: Somalia is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Kenya.

SOUTH AFRICA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 26,000,000
Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: partly free

An ethnic state with major territorial and nonterritorial subnationalities
Political Rights. South Africa is a parliamentary democracy in which the black majority is excluded from participation in the national political process because of race. Recent constitutional changes add over ten percent more to the politically accepted population although the great majority black population remains excluded. For the nonblack population elections appear fair and open. There is a limited scope for blacks to influence affairs within their own communities. Subnationalities: Most of the black majority is ascribed to a variety of "homelands" that they may or may not live in, although increasingly they have been forced to move to these limited areas. Several of these have become independent states in the eyes of South Africa but they have not received such recognition elsewhere. Except for Transkei we see these as dependent territories. Because of their close integration into South Africa politically and economically we treat these states as part of South Africa for most purposes. The dependent governments of these states are generally unpopular and tyrannical, although this seems not to be the case in Bophuthatswana. (We feel that geographically and historically Transkei does have a reasonable claim to statehood, in spite of the reasons that may have brought it into being. It is in many ways comparable to Lesotho, Swaziland, or, further afield, states such as Bhutan or Mongolia.) In the several homelands that have not yet separated from the country officially, black leaders have some power and support from their people. Most black political parties are banned, but operating political parties among Indians and people of mixed blood represent the interests of their peoples. Regionally, government within the white community includes both central government officials and elected councils.

Civil Liberties. The white South African press is private and quite outspoken, although pressures have been increasing, especially on reporters. Freedom for the nonwhite press is closely restricted. Broadcasting is under government control. The courts are independent on many issues, including apartheid, but have not effectively controlled the security forces. There are political prisoners and torture—especially for black activists, who live in an atmosphere of terror. Nevertheless, black organizations regularly denounce the government's racial and economic policies, hold conferences, and issue statements. Academic groups publish highly critical well-publicized studies of the system. Private rights
Country Summaries

are generally respected for whites. Rights to labor organization have improved for blacks recently. Legal separation of the races remains, but has been relaxed in a number of ways. Rights to choice of residence and occupation are legally circumscribed for nonwhites. Hundreds of thousands are arrested or forcibly moved every year as a result of discriminatory laws and the government homelands policy. This includes large-scale deportations from one rural area to another. Human rights organizations are quite active in both white and black communities. Church organizations have become centers of opposition to apartheid. Several aspects of apartheid were improved in 1985, including family laws, residence, and multirace parties. Escalating violence and counterviolence during the year, and the emergency powers that accompanied the violence, obscured these gains. But given the nature of the society, the crisis of government did not lower the level of civil liberties.

Comparatively: South Africa is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Tanzania, less free than Morocco.

**SPAIN**

Economy: capitalist  
Polity: centralized multiparty  
Population: 37,000,000  
Political Rights: 1  
Civil Liberties: 2  
Status: free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Spain is a constitutional monarchy with a fully functioning democratic system. In the last few years it has managed to largely overcome or pacify military, far right, and Basque dissidence. Elected regional and local governments are of increasing importance. Subnationalities: The Basque and Catalan territorial subnationalities have had their rights greatly expanded in recent years.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and is now largely free. The television network and some radio stations are government owned. National television is controlled by an all-party committee, but there are autonomous regional channels. There are few prisoners of conscience; imprisonment still threatens those who
insult the security services, the courts, the state, or the flag. Short detention periods are often used with little legal redress. Police brutality and torture are still alleged, but offenders are punished. Criticism of the government and of suspected human rights violators are quite freely expressed both publicly and privately. Private freedoms are respected. Continued terrorism and reactions to terrorism affect some areas. Union organization is free and independent.

Comparatively: Spain is as free as France, freer than Argentina, less free than Norway.

**SRI LANKA**

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist  
Polity: centralized multiparty  
Population: 16,400,000  
Political Rights: 3  
Civil Liberties: 4  
Status: partly free

An ethnic state with a major subnationality

Political Rights. Sri Lanka is a parliamentary democracy in which opposition groups have been under increasing pressure. A number of individuals have been barred from government for breach of trust, and the main opposition party is close to being ruled illegal. In late 1982 the government used its then current popularity to guarantee a six-year extension of its rule. The referendum on this issue was held under a state of emergency restricting opposition campaigning. Regional government is centrally controlled, but local government is by elected councils. Subnationalities: Receiving a large vote in the most recent election, the Tamil minority movement constitutes a serious secessionist tendency. Private violence against the Tamils has been increasing, and the government has been unable to protect them or even remain neutral.

Civil Liberties. The press has been strong, both private and governmental. However, all journalists seem to be under increasing governmental pressure. Broadcasting is under government control and presents a relatively narrow range of views. Censorship is used particularly in regard to the guerrilla war. The rule of law has been threatened by this communal violence, as
Country Summaries

well as by the use and misuse of states-of-emergency powers to
detain political opponents. Courts remain independent of the
government; an important human rights movement supports their
independence. However, their decisions can be overruled by par-
liament. A few prisoners of conscience have been arrested, at
least for advocating Tamil independence; torture and brutality is
alleged. There is freedom of assembly but not demonstration.
Private rights to movement, residence, religion, and occupation
are respected in theory, but gangs and the army have been guilty
of widespread looting, destruction, and killing in Tamil areas.
Strikes in public services are restricted, but unions are well
developed and politically influential. There has been extensive
land reform; the state has nationalized a number of enterprises in
this largely plantation economy. The system has done an excellent
job in providing for basic nutrition, health, and educational
needs within a democratic framework.

Comparatively: Sri Lanka is as free as Thailand, freer than
Indonesia, less free than India.

S U D A N

Economy: noninclusive mixed
socialist
Polity: nationalist one-party
(military dominated)
Population: 21,800,000
Status: not free

An ethnic state with major but highly diverse subnationalities

Political Rights. Sudan is under military control, with the
partial support of civilian political parties. Much of the
country may no longer be under the government's control.
Subnationalities: The people of the South are ethnically and
religiously distinct. The national government remains overwhelm-
ingly northern. A war for southern independence is again under-
way. There are also major ethnic groups in the north that seem to
be assisting the southerners.

Civil Liberties. The press is weak and nationalized. Radio
and television are government controlled. The media have been
used for active indoctrination, but the 1985 coup led to a considerable opening. All civil liberties are in a state of flux in late 1985. Some force has been used to reduce urban migration. Sudan is socialist theoretically, but in business and agriculture the private sector has recently been supported by denationalizations. Bureaucratic corruption is costly.

Comparatively: Sudan is as free as Algeria, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Egypt.

**SURINAME**

| Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist | Political Rights: 6 |
| Polity: military nonparty | Civil Liberties: 6 |
| Population: 375,000 | Status: not free |

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Suriname is ruled by a military leader and council without legitimization by elections. An appointed assembly and alliances with some business and labor groups have broadened the base of power marginally.

Civil Liberties. The press is under strong pressure. Political organization or assembly is forbidden. The leaders of all major opposition groups (of former political parties, unions, journalists, and academia) were executed without trial in late 1982. Prisoners of conscience have been detained and treated brutally. Courts and unions retain some independence. Houses are searched at will.

Comparatively: Suriname is as free as Tanzania, freer than Albania, less free than Guyana.

**SWAZILAND**

| Economy: noninclusive capitalist | Political Rights: 4 |
| Polity: traditional nonparty | Civil Liberties: 3 |
| Population: 600,000 | Status: partly free |
Country Summaries

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Swaziland is ruled by a king (or regent and council of nobles). Indirect elections for part of an advisory legislature are held, but only one party is allowed. Local councils invite popular participation. South African political and economic influence is pervasive.

Civil Liberties. Private media exist alongside the dominant government media; little criticism is allowed; South African and other foreign media provide an alternative. Opposition leaders have been repeatedly detained, and partisan activity is forbidden. Criticism is common in parliament and other councils, but public assemblies are restricted, unions limited, emigration difficult. The rule of law is very insecure. Religious, economic, and other private rights are maintained. The traditional way of life is continued, especially on the local level. Several thousand whites in the country and in neighboring Transvaal own the most productive land and business.

Comparatively: Swaziland is as free as South Africa, freer than Mozambique, less free than Botswana.

Sweden

Economy: mixed capitalist   Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty   Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 8,300,000   Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sweden is a parliamentary democracy in which no party monopolizes power, and the king's power has been all but extinguished. Referendums are held. Although there are some representative institutions at regional and local levels, the system is relatively centralized. Resident aliens have a right to vote in local elections. The tendency of modern bureaucracies to regard issues as technical rather than political has progressed further in Sweden than elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party; broadcasting is by state-licensed monopolies. Although free of censorship; the
media are accused of presenting a narrow range of views, but this may be changing as politics become polarized. There is the rule of law. The defense of those accused by the government may not be as spirited as elsewhere, but, on the other hand, the ombudsman office gives special means of redress against administrative arbitrariness. Most private rights are respected. State interference in family life is unusually strong, with many children unjustly taken from their parents. The national church has a special position. In many areas, such as housing, individual choice is restricted more than in other capitalist states—as it is of course by the very high tax load. Unions are a powerful part of the system. The state intervenes in the economy mainly through extensive business regulation rather than direct ownership.

Comparatively: Sweden is as free as Denmark, freer than West Germany.

SWITZERLAND

Economy: capitalist
Polity: decentralized multiparty
Population: 6,500,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A trinational state

Political Rights. Switzerland is a parliamentary democracy in which all major parties are given a role in government determined by the size of the vote of each party. Parties that increase their vote above a certain level are invited to join the government, although such changes in party strength rarely occur. The lack of a decisive shift in power from one party to another in the last fifty years is a major limitation on the democratic effectiveness of the Swiss system. However, its dependence on the grand coalition style of government is a partial substitute, and the Swiss grant political rights in other ways that compensate for the lack of a transfer of power. Many issues are decided by the citizenry through national referendums or popular initiatives. After referendums, in keeping with the Swiss attitude even the losing side is given part of what it wants if its vote is sufficiently large. Subnationalities: The three major linguistic
Country Summaries

groups have separate areas under their partial control. Their regional and local elected governments have autonomous rights and determine directly much of the country’s business. National governments try to balance the representatives of the primary religious and linguistic groups; this is accomplished in another way by the upper house that directly represents the cantons (regions) on an equal basis.

Civil Liberties. The high-quality press is private and independent. Broadcasting is government operated, although with the considerable independence of comparable West European systems. Unions are free but there are few strikes. The rule of law is strongly upheld; as in Germany it is against the law to question the intentions of judges. 1985 saw a major extension of women’s rights. Private rights are thoroughly respected.

Comparatively: Switzerland is as free as the United States, freer than West Germany.

SYRIA

Economy: mixed socialist  Political Rights: 6
Polity: centralized dominant-party  Civil Liberties: 7
(military dominated)
Population: 10,600,000  Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Syria is a military dictatorship assisted by an elected parliament. The election of the military president is largely pro forma; in assembly elections a variety of parties compete within the National Front, organized under the leadership of the governing party. The independence of these groups has progressively eroded, yet many independents serve in the cabinet. Because of its position in the army the Alawite minority (ten percent) has a very unequal share of national power. Provinces have little separate power, but local elections are contested.

Civil Liberties. The media are in the hands of government or party. Broadcasting services are government owned. The media are used as governmental means for active indoctrination. Medical, bar, and engineering associations have been dissolved. Thousands
have been arrested and many executed. Other thousands have been killed in punitive expeditions. The courts are neither strongly independent nor effective in political cases where long-term detention without trial occurs. Political prisoners are often arrested following violence, but there are also prisoners of conscience. Political opponents may even be killed overseas. Torture has frequently been employed in interrogation. Religious freedom is restricted. Rights to choice of occupation or residence are generally respected; foreign travel and emigration are closely controlled for certain groups. Much of industry has been nationalized; the commercial sector remains private. Land reform has successfully expanded private ownership. There is no independent labor movement.

Comparatively: Syria is as free as Cameroon, freer than Somalia, less free than Kuwait.

**TANZANIA**

Economy: noninclusive socialist  
Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party  
Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 21,700,000  
Status: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous nation in union with Zanzibar

Political Rights. Tanzania is an unequal union of two states. The single parties of each state have joined to form one all-Tanzanian party. Elections offer choice between individuals, but no issues are to be discussed in campaigns; all decisions come down from above, including the choice of candidates. Over half of the MP's are appointed. The resulting parliament is not, however, simply a rubber stamp. Local government is an extension of party government. Subnationalities: Ethnically, the country is divided into a large number of peoples (none larger than thirteen percent); most are not yet at the subnational level. The use of English and Swahili as national languages enhances national unity. Recent resistance by some Zanzibar leaders to continued association with the mainland has been defused by the appointment of a Zanzibari as president.
Country Summaries

Civil Liberties. Civil liberties are subordinated to the goals of the socialist leadership. No contradiction of official policy is allowed to appear in the media, nearly all of which is government owned, or in educational institutions; private and limited criticism of implementation appears. The people learn only of those events the government wishes them to know. There is no right of assembly or organization. Millions of people have been forced into communal villages; people from the cities have been abruptly transported to the countryside; forced labor on the farms is still a problem. Thousands have been detained for political crimes. There are prisoners of conscience. Lack of respect for the independence of the judiciary and individual rights is especially apparent in Zanzibar. Union activity is government controlled. Neither labor nor capital have legally recognized rights—strikes are illegal. Most business and trade and much of agriculture are nationalized. Religion is free, at least on the mainland; overseas travel is restricted.

Comparatively: Tanzania is as free as Algeria, freer than Malawi, less free than Zambia.

THAILAND

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 4
(military dominated)
Population: 52,700,000 Status: partly free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with continuing military influence. Both parties and parliament are, however, significant. The politics are those of consensus. Provincial government is under national control; there are elected and traditional institutions at the local level. Subnationalities: There is a Muslim Malay community in the far south, and other small ethnic enclaves in the north.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but periodic suppressions and warnings lead to limited self-censorship. Casting doubt on the monarchy is illegal. Most broadcasting is government or
Country Summaries

Military controlled. Some books are banned as subversive. There are few long-term prisoners of conscience, but many are periodically detained for communist activity. In rural areas arrest may be on vague charges and treatment brutal. Human rights and other public interest organizations are active. Labor activity is relatively free; a ban on strikes was lifted in early 1981. Private rights to property, choice of religion, or residence are secure; foreign travel or emigration is not restricted. However, corruption limits the expression of all rights. Government enterprise is quite important in the basically capitalist modern economy.

Comparatively: Thailand is as free as Senegal, freer than Malaysia, less free than India.

TOGO

Economy: noninclusive mixed  Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party Civil Liberties: 6
(military dominated) Status: not free
Population: 3,000,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Togo is a military dictatorship ruled in the name of a one-party state. In this spirit there is a deliberate denial of the rights of separate branches of government, including a separate judiciary, or even of private groups. National elections allow choice among party-approved candidates. Campaigns allow no policy discussion. But essentially everyone can join the party and there is some discussion in parliament and party organs. Below the national level only the cities have a semblance of self-government. Subnationalities: The southern Ewe are culturally dominant and the largest group (twenty percent), but militant northerners now rule.

Civil Liberties. No criticism of the government is allowed in the government or church media, and foreign publications may be confiscated. There are long-term prisoners of conscience. Jehovah's Witnesses are banned. There is occasional restriction of foreign travel. Union organization is closely regulated. In this largely subsistence economy the government is heavily involved in

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trade, production, and the provision of services. All wage earners must contribute to the ruling party.

Comparatively: Togo is as free as Gabon, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Zambia.

TONGA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Political Rights: 5
Polity: traditional nonparty Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 100,000 Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy in which the king and nobles retain power. Only a minority of the members of the legislative assembly are elected directly by the people; but the veto power of the assembly can be effectively expressed. Regional administration is centralized; there are some elected local officials.

Civil Liberties. The main paper is a government weekly; radio is under government control. Other foreign and local media are available. There is a rule of law, but the king's decision is still a very important part of the system. Private rights within the traditional Tonga context seem guaranteed.

Comparatively: Tonga is as free as Kuwait, freer than Seychelles, less free than Western Samoa.

TRANSKEI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized Civil Liberties: 6
dominant-party
Population: 2,500,000 Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. In form Transkei is a multiparty parliamentary democracy; in fact it is under the strongman rule of a
Country Summaries

paramount chief supported by his party's majority. The meaning of recent elections has been largely nullified by governmental interference, including the jailing of opposition leaders. Chiefs form half of the assembly by appointment. The balancing of tribal interests remain very important in the system, but beyond that there is little decentralization of power. South Africa has a great deal of de facto power over the state, particularly because of the large number of nationals that work in South Africa. However, Transkei is at least as independent as several Soviet satellites; it has had continuing public disputes with South Africa.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but under strong government pressure. Broadcasting is government controlled. Many members of the opposition have been imprisoned; new retroactive laws render it illegal to criticize Transkei or its rulers. Freedom of organization is very limited, although an opposition party still exists. Private rights are respected within the limits of South African and Transkei custom. Capitalist and traditional economic rights are diminished by the necessity of a large portion of the labor force to work in South Africa.

Comparatively: Transkei is as free as Swaziland, freer than Mozambique, less free than Zimbabwe.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized multiparty
Population: 1,200,000
Status: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Trinidad and Tobago is a parliamentary democracy in which one party has managed to retain power since 1956 (in part because of the division of the electorate among ethnic groups). However, there has been a decentralization of power, and elections have been vigorously contested by a variety of parties. There is elected local government. Tobago's elected regional government is controlled by an opposition party.
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Civil Liberties. The private or party press is generally free of restriction; broadcasting is under both government and private control. Opposition is regularly voiced, although the government-owned television is said to favor the government. There is a full spectrum of private rights. Violence and communal feeling reduce the effectiveness of such rights for many, as does police violence. Many sectors of the economy are government owned. Human rights organizations are active. Labor is powerful and strikes frequent.

Comparatively: Trinidad and Tobago is as free as Venezuela, freer than Guyana, less free than Belgium.

**TUNISIA**

Economy: mixed capitalist  Political Rights: 5
Polity: dominant party  Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 7,200,000  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tunisia has a dominant party system but is essentially under one-man rule. Elections to the assembly are contested primarily within the one-party framework, but opposition parties have played, or theoretically been allowed, a minor role in recent elections. Regional government is centrally directed; there is elected local government.

Civil Liberties. The private, party, and government press is under government pressure. Although frequently banned or fined, opposition papers are published. Broadcasting is government controlled. Distribution of cassettes and video tapes gives an extra dimension of freedom. Private conversation is relatively free, but there is no right of assembly. Organizational activity is generally free, including that of the Tunisian Human Rights League. The courts demonstrate only a limited independence, but it is possible to win against the government. Unions have been relatively independent despite periods of repression. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience, but arrests for unauthorized political activity or expression occur. The unemployed young are drafted for government work. Overseas travel is
occasionally blocked. Most private rights seem to be respected, including economic freedoms since doctrinaire socialism was abandoned and much of agriculture returned to private hands.

Comparatively: Tunisia is as free as Jordan, freer than Algeria, less free than Egypt.

T U R K E Y

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: multiparty (military dominated)
Population: 52,100,000
Status: partly free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Power is divided between a military president and a civilian prime minister. The current president was confirmed in power on a questionable adjunct to a constitutional referendum in late 1982. Opposition campaigning was restricted and the vote not entirely secret. Although controls on party formation and candidature greatly reduced the significance of the legislative election in November 1983, subsequent events have, in effect, restored the old parties and shown the ruling party to represent an authentic democratic force. Power is centralized, but local and provincial elections are significant. Subnationalities: Several million Kurds are denied self-determination; it is illegal to teach or publish in Kurdish.

Civil Liberties. The press is private; the government controls the broadcasting system directly or indirectly. Suspensions and arrests by the government have produced general self-censorship in all media. Kurds and Armenians are prohibited topics, even in books. There remain many prisoners of conscience under martial law, and petitioners to expand rights have been detained. Religious expression is free only if religion is not related to law and way of life. Torture has been common, but the government has made arrests of some accused torturers. Independent union activity has been curtailed; but strikes are now permitted. Nearly fifty percent of the people are subsistence agriculturists. State enterprises make up more than half of Turkey's industry.
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Comparatively: Turkey is as free as Malaysia, freer than Yugoslavia, less free than Spain.

**TUVALU**

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<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Polity: traditional nonparty</td>
<td>(military dominated)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population: 8,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
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A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Tuvalu is a parliamentary democracy under the British monarch. Each island is represented; seats are contested individually. Opposition blocs have been formed in the assembly and have been able to achieve power. There are local councils for each island. Continued dependence on the United Kingdom is self-chosen and economically unavoidable.

Civil Liberties. Media are government owned but little developed. The rule of law is maintained in the British manner, alongside traditional ideals of justice. The economy is largely subsistence farming; much of the labor force is employed overseas.

Comparatively: Tuvalu is as free as Portugal, freer than Mauritius, less free than New Zealand.

**UGANDA**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>capitalist-statist</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity: multiparty (military dominated)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population: 14,700,000</td>
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A tranethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Military leaders displaced the authoritarian president in 1985 in the name of political rights and civil liberties. Rule is temporarily in the hands of several military and political factions attempting to end the civil strife.
Subnationalities: The population is divided among a wide variety of peoples, some of which are subnationalities based on kingdoms that preceded the present state. The most important of these was Buganda. Its Ganda people suffer from recurrent repression.

Civil Liberties. The largest circulation newspaper and radio and television are government owned. Political violence and an incomplete rule of law inhibit all expression. Critical newspapers have suffered recurrent pressure, but free discussion has again emerged. Assembly and travel are restricted within the country. Unions are weak and government influenced. The murder of opposition politicians has declined, and over 1,000 political prisoners have been released. Massacres accompany anti-guerrilla campaigns. Torture is widely reported. The courts have some independence. Religious freedom has been partially reestablished, and the churches play a balancing role to a limited extent. The economy has suffered severe dislocation: property is not secure, corruption is pervasive and costly, a black market flourishes.

Comparatively: Uganda is as free as Lebanon, freer than Tanzania, less free than Brazil.

UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Economy: socialist
Polity: communist one-party
Population: 278,000,000
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: not free

A complex ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The Soviet Union is ruled by parallel party and governmental systems: the party system is dominant. Elections are held for both systems, but in neither is it possible for the rank and file to determine policy. Candidacy and voting are closely controlled, and the resulting assemblies do not seriously question the policies developed by party leaders (varying by time or issue from one individual to twenty-five). The Soviet Union is in theory elaborately divided into subnational units, but in fact the all-embracing party structure renders local power minimal.
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Subnationalities. Russians account for half the Soviet population. The rest belong to a variety of subnational groupings ranging down in size from the forty million Ukrainians. Most groups are territorial, with a developed sense of subnational identity. The political rights of all of these to self-determination, either within the USSR or through secession, is effectively denied. In many cases Russians or other non-native peoples have been settled in subnational territories in such numbers as to make the native people a minority in their own land (for example, Kazakhstan). Expression of opinion in favor of increased self-determination is repressed at least as much as anticommunist opinion. Most of these peoples have had independence movements or movements for enhanced self-determination in the years since the founding of the USSR. Several movements have been quite strong since World War II (for example, in the Ukraine or Lithuania); the blockage of communication by the Soviet government makes it very difficult to estimate either the overt or latent support such movements might have. In 1978 popular movements in Georgia and Armenia led to the retention of the official status of local languages in the Republics of the Caucasus; freedoms, such as that to move in and out of the country, are notable in Armenia.

Civil Liberties. The media are totally owned by the government or party and are, in addition, regularly censored. Elite publications occasionally present variations from the official line, but significant deviations are found only in underground publications, which have been very rare recently. Recent cases of arrests and exile have silenced nearly all criticism. Crimes against the state, including insanity (demonstrated by perverse willingness to oppose the state), are broadly defined; as a result political prisoners are present in large numbers both in jails and insane asylums. Nearly all imprisonment and mistreatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union are now carried out in accordance with Soviet security laws—even though these laws conflict with other Soviet laws written to accord with international standards. Since the Bolshevik Revolution there has never been an acquittal in a political trial, at least in areas such as Moscow about which there is public information. Insofar as private rights, such as those to religion, education, or choice of occupation, exist, they are de facto rights that may be denied at any time. Travel within and outside of the USSR is highly controlled; many areas of the
country are still off-limits to foreigners—especially those used as areal prisons for dissidents. Nearly all private entrepreneurial activity is outside the law; there are rights to nonproductive personal property. Other rights such as those to organize an independent labor union are strictly denied. Literacy is high, few starve, and private oppression is no more.

Comparatively: The USSR is as free as Romania, less free than Hungary.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized nonparty
Population: 1,300,000

Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. The UAE is a confederation of seven sheikhdoms in which the larger are given the greater power both in the appointed assembly and the administrative hierarchy. There is a great deal of consultation in the traditional pattern. Below the confederation level there are no electoral procedures or parties. Each shaikhdom is relatively autonomous in its internal affairs. The majority of the people are recent immigrants and noncitizens.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or governmental. There is self-censorship, but some criticism is expressed. Broadcasting is under federal or shaikhdom control. There are no political assemblies, but there are also few, if any, prisoners of conscience. The courts dispense a combination of British, tribal, and Islamic law. Labor unions are prohibited, but illegal strikes have occurred. Private rights are generally respected; there is freedom of travel. As in most Muslim countries there is freedom of worship for established religions, but only the favored Muslims may proselytize. Many persons may still accept the feudal privileges and restraints of their tribal position. The rights of the alien majority are less secure: "troublemakers" are deported. Private economic activity exists alongside the dominance of government petroleum and petroleum-related activities.
Country Summaries

Comparatively: United Arab Emirates are as free as Bahrain, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Kuwait.

UNITED KINGDOM

Economy: mixed capitalist Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 56,400,000 Status: free

An ethnic state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy with a symbolic monarch. Plurality elections from single member districts on the basis of party affiliation rather than personal record makes for strong parties and political stability. Fair elections are open to all parties, including those advocating secession. Unchecked by a written constitution or judicial review, parliament is restrained only by tradition. Between elections this means potentially great powers for the prime minister. There are elected local and regional governments, and their limited powers are gradually being increased. Subnationalities: Scots, Welsh, Ulster Scots, and Ulster Irish are significant and highly self-conscious territorial minorities. In 1978 parliament approved home rule for Scotland and Wales, but the Welsh and (more ambiguously) the Scots voters rejected this opportunity in 1979. Northern Ireland’s home rule has been in abeyance because of an ethnic impasse, but is being reestablished. Ulster Scot and Irish live in intermixed territories in Northern Ireland. Both want more self-determination—the majority Ulster Scots as an autonomous part of the United Kingdom, the minority Ulster Irish as an area within Ireland.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and powerful; broadcasting has statutory independence although it is indirectly under government control. British media are comparatively restrained because of strict libel and national security laws, and a tradition of accepting government suggestions for the handling of sensitive news. In Northern Ireland a severe security situation has led to the curtailment of private rights, to imprisonment, and on occasion to torture and brutality. However, these conditions
have been relatively limited, have been thoroughly investigated by
the government, and improved as a result. Elsewhere the rule of
law is entrenched, and private rights generally respected. Unions
are independent and powerful. In certain areas, such as medicine,
housing, inheritance, and general disposability of income, socia-
list government policies have limited choice for some while
expanding the access of others.

Comparatively: The United Kingdom is as free as the United
States, freer than West Germany.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 238,900,000  Status: free

An ethnically complex state with minor territorial subnation-
alities

Political Rights. The United States is a constitutional democ-
racy with three strong but separate centers of power: president,
congress, and judiciary. Elections are fair and competitive.
Parties are remarkably weak: in some areas they are little more
than temporary means of organizing primary elections. States, and
to a less extent cities, have powers in their own rights; they
often successfully oppose the desires of national administrations.
Each state has equal representation in the upper house, which in
the USA is the more powerful half of parliament.

Subnationalities. There are many significant ethnic groups,
but the only clearly territorial subnationalities are the native
peoples. The largest Indian tribes, the Navaho and Sioux, number
100,000 or more each. About 150,000 Hawaiians still reside on
their native islands, intermingled with a much larger white and
oriental population. Spanish-speaking Americans number in the
millions; except for a few thousand residing in an area of
northern New Mexico, they are mostly twentieth-century immigrants
living among English-speaking Americans, particularly in the large
cities. Black Americans make up over one-tenth of the U.S.
population; residing primarily in large cities, they have no major
Country Summaries

territorial base. Black and Spanish-speaking Americans are of special concern because of their relative poverty; their ethnic status is quite comparable to that of many other groups in America, including Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Italians, or Jews.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; both private and public radio and television are government regulated. There are virtually no government controls on the content of the printed media (except in nonpolitical areas such as pornography) and few on broadcasting. There are no prisoners of conscience or sanctioned uses of torture; some regional miscarriages of justice and police brutality have political and social overtones. Widespread use of surveillance techniques and clandestine interference with radical groups or groups thought to be radical have occurred; as a reduction of liberties the threat has remained largely potential; in recent years these security excesses have been greatly attenuated if not eliminated. A new threat is control over the expression of former government employees. Wherever and whenever publicity penetrates, the rule of law is generally secure, even against the most powerful. The government often loses in the courts. Private rights in most spheres are respected, but rights to travel to particular places, such as Cuba, are circumscribed. Unions are independent and politically influential. Although a relatively capitalistic country, the combination of tax loads and the decisive government role in agriculture, energy, defense, and other industries restricts individual choice as it increases majority power.

Comparatively: The United States is as free as Australia, freer than West Germany.

**U R U G U A Y**

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<th>Economy: mixed capitalist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: centralized multiparty</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 3,000,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A relatively homogeneous population
Country Summaries

Political Rights. Uruguay reestablished democracy in 1985 under a directly elected president and parliament. All parties have been legalized.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, and broadcasting private and public. Both are now free, as are books and journals. Foreign media are widely available. Rights of assembly and organization as well as the independence of the judiciary and the civil service have been reestablished. All prisoners of conscience have been released. Private rights are generally respected. The tax load of an overbuilt bureaucracy and emphasis on private and government monopolies in major sectors still restrict choice in this now impoverished welfare state.

Comparatively: Uruguay is as free as Mauritius, freer than Paraguay, less free than Venezuela.

VANUATU

Economy: noninclusive Political Rights: 2
capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized mutiparty Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 120,000 Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous society with geographical subnationalities

Political Rights. Vanuatu has a parliamentary system with an indirectly elected president. Elections have been freely contested by multiple parties. Opposition exists between islands and between the French and English educated. Local government is elected; a decentralized federal system of regional government is being developed.

Civil Liberties. News media are limited and largely government owned; the only critical paper was closed by government order in 1983; radio is not wholly free. The full spectrum of civil freedoms is observed, but in the aftermath of the suppression of a secessionist (largely French supported) movement at independence, many political arrests and trials occurred; mistreatment was reported. The judiciary is independent. Rights to political
Country Summaries

economic, and union organization are observed. There is a general right to travel.
Comparatively: Vanuatu is as free as Malta, freer than Maldives, less free than Belize.

VENEZUELA
Economy: capitalist-statist        Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty    Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 17,300,000            Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Venezuela is a constitutional democracy in which power has alternated between major parties in recent years. Campaigns and voting are fair and open. Regional and local assemblies are relatively powerful, but governors are centrally appointed. Each state has equal representation in the upper house.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and generally free; most broadcasting is also in private hands. Censorship occurs only in emergencies, but television scripts on certain subjects must be approved in advance, and there are recurrent attempts at government control. The rule of law is generally secured, except apparently in areas of guerrilla actions. On rare occasions members of parliament have been arrested. However, there are no prisoners of conscience, and the government has taken steps to prevent torture. The court can rule against the government and charges are brought against the security forces. Most private rights are respected; government involvement in the petroleum industry has given it a predominant economic role. Human rights organizations are very active. Unions are well organized and powerful.

Comparatively: Venezuela is as free as France, freer than Ecuador, less free than Costa Rica.

VIETNAM
Economy: socialist                   Political Rights: 4
Polity: communist one-party         Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 60,500,000              Status: partly free
An ethnic state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Vietnam is a traditional communist dictatorship with the forms of parliamentary democracy. Actual power is in the hands of the communist party; this is in turn dominated by a small group at the top. Officially there is a ruling national front as in several other communist states, but the noncommunist parties are facades. Administration is highly centralized, with provincial boundaries arbitrarily determined by the central government. The flow of refugees and other evidence suggest that the present regime is very unpopular, especially in the South which is treated as an occupied country. Subnationalities: Continued fighting has been reported in the Montagnard areas in the South. Combined with new resettlement schemes non-Vietnamese peoples are under pressure in both North and South Vietnam. Many Chinese have been driven out of the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are under direct government, party, or army control; only the approved line is presented. While the people have essentially no rights against the state, there is occasional public criticism and passive resistance, especially in the South. Arbitrary arrest is frequent. Repression of religious groups has eased, at least in the South. Perhaps one-half million persons have been put through reeducation camps, hundreds of thousands have been forced to move into new areas, or to change occupations; thousands are prisoners of conscience or in internal exile. Former anticommunist and other groups are regularly discriminated against in employment, health care, and travel. There are no independent labor union rights, rights to travel, or choice of education; many have been forced into collectives.

Comparatively: Vietnam is as free as USSR, less free than China (Mainland).

WESTERN SAMOA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 160,000

Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 3
Status: partly free
Country Summaries

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Western Samoa is a constitutional monarchy in which the assembly is elected by 16,000 "family heads." There have been important shifts of power among parties in the assembly as the result of elections, or the shift of allegiance of factions without elections. A recent election was voided in the courts on a corruption issue. Campaigning by lavish distribution of gifts is common. Village government has preserved traditional forms and considerable autonomy; it is also based on rule by "family heads."

Civil Liberties. The press is private and government; radio is government owned; television is received only from outside. Government media have limited independence. There is general freedom of expression, organization, and assembly. The judiciary is independent and the rule of law and private rights are respected within the limits set by the traditional system. Most arable land is held in customary tenure. Health and literacy standards are very high for a poor country.

Comparatively: Western Samoa is as free as Senegal, freer than Indonesia, less free than Nauru.

YEMEN, NORTH

Economy: noninclusive capitalist   Political Rights: 5
Polity: military nonparty   Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 6,100,000   Status: partly free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. North Yemen is a military dictatorship supplemented by an appointive and elected advisory assembly. Leaders are frequently assassinated. The tribal and religious structures still retain considerable authority, and the government must rely on a wide variety of different groups in an essentially nonideological consensual regime. Recent local elections have allowed some competition. Political parties are forbidden. The country is divided between city and country, a variety of tribes, and two major religious groupings, and faces a major revolutionary challenge.
Civil Liberties. The weak media are largely government owned; the papers have occasional criticisms—the broadcast media have none. Foreign publications are routinely censored. Yet proponents of both royalist and far left persuasions are openly accepted in a society with few known prisoners of conscience. There is no right of assembly. Politically active opponents may be encouraged to go into exile. The traditional Islamic courts give some protection; many private rights are respected. There is no right to strike or to engage in religious proselytizing. Unions and professional associations are government sponsored. Economically the government has concentrated on improving the infrastructure of Yemen's still overwhelmingly traditional economy. Most farmers are tenants; half the labor force is employed abroad.

Comparatively: North Yemen is as free as Bhutan, freer than South Yemen, less free than Egypt.

**Yemen, South**

<table>
<thead>
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A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. South Yemen considers itself a communist country governed according to the communist one-party model. It is doubtful that the party retains the tight party discipline of its exemplars; it is government by coup and violence. Parliamentary elections follow the one-party model; they allow some choice among individuals. Soviet influence in internal and external affairs is powerful.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned or controlled, and employed actively as means of indoctrination. Even conversation with foreigners is highly restricted. In the political and security areas the rule of law hardly applies. Political imprisonments, torture, and "disappearances" have instilled a pervasive fear in those who would speak up. Death sentences against protesting farmers have been handed down by people's courts. Independent private rights are few, although some tradi-
Country Summaries

tional law and institutions remain. Unions are under government control. Industry and commerce have been nationalized, some of the land collectivized.

Comparatively: South Yemen is as free as Malawi, freer than Somalia, less free than Oman.

YUGOSLAVIA

Economy: mixed socialist
Polity: communist one-party
Population: 23,100,000

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: partly free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Yugoslavia is governed on the model of the USSR, but with the addition of unique elements. These include: the greater role given the governments of the constituent republics; and the greater power given the assemblies of the self-managed communities and industrial enterprises. The Federal Assembly is elected indirectly by those successful in lower level elections. The country has been directed by a small elite of the communist party, but measures to increase in-party democracy seem genuine. No opposition member is elected to state or national position, nor is there public opposition in the assemblies to government policy on the national or regional level.

Subnationalities. The several peoples of Yugoslavia live largely in their historical homelands. The population consists of forty percent Serbs, twenty-two percent Croats, eight percent Slovenes, eight percent Bosnian Muslims, six percent Macedonians, six percent Albanians, two percent Montenegrins, and many others. The Croats have an especially active independence movement; Albanians have agitated for more self-determination. Yet there is a degree of authentic defense of cultural differences.

Civil Liberties. The media in Yugoslavia are controlled directly or indirectly by the government, although there is ostensible worker control. The range of ideas and criticism of government policy in domestic and available foreign publications is greater than in most communist states: there is no prepublication censorship. There is no right of assembly, but some assemblies are
allowed outside of government direction. Hundreds have been imprisoned for ideas expressed verbally or in print that deviated from the official line (primarily through subnationalist enthusiasm, anticommunism, or communist deviationism). Dissidents are even pursued overseas. Torture and brutality occur; psychiatric hospitals are also used to confine prisoners of conscience. As long as the issue is not political, however, the courts have some independence; there is a realm of de facto individual freedom that includes the right to seek employment outside the country. Travel outside Yugoslavia is often denied to dissidents; religious proselytizing is forbidden, but sanctioned religious activity is increasing. Labor is not independent, but has rights through the working of the "self-management" system; local strikes are common. Although the economy is socialist or communalist in most respects, agriculture in this most agricultural of European countries remains overwhelmingly private.

Comparatively: Yugoslavia is as free as Poland, freer than Romania, less free than Morocco.

**Z A I R E**

| Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 7 |
| Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated) | Civil Liberties: 7 |
| Population: 33,100,000 | Status: not free |

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Zaire is under one-man military rule, with the ruling party essentially an extension of the ruler's personality. Presidential elections are farces. Elections at both local and parliamentary levels are restricted to one party, but allow for extensive choice among individuals. Parliament has little if any power. Regions are deliberately organized to avoid ethnic identity: regional officers all are appointed from the center, generally from outside of the area, as are officers of the ruling party. The president's personal exploitation of the system delegitimizes it.
Country Summaries

Subnationalities. There are such a variety of tribes or linguistic groups in Zaire that no one group has as much as twenty percent of the population. The fact that French remains the dominant language reflects the degree of this dispersion. Until recently most of the Zaire people have seen themselves only in local terms without broader ethnic identification. The revolts and wars of the early 1960s saw continually shifting patterns of affiliation, with the European provincial but not ethnic realities of Katanga and South Kasai being most important. The most self-conscious ethnic groups are the Kongo people living in the west (and Congo and Angola) and the Luba in the center of the country. In both cases ethnicity goes back to important ancient kingdoms. There is continuing disaffection among the Lunda and other ethnic groups.

Civil Liberties. Private newspaper ownership remains only in name. Broadcasting is government owned and directed. Censorship and self-censorship are pervasive. There is no right of assembly, and union organization is controlled. Government has been arbitrary and capricious. The judiciary is not independent; prisoners of conscience are numerous, and execution and torture occurs. Ethnic organizations are closely restricted. Arrested conspirators have been forbidden their own lawyers. There is relative religious freedom; the Catholic church retains some power. Through the misuse of government power, the extravagance and business dealings of those in high places reduces economic freedom. Nationalization of land has often been a prelude to private development by powerful bureaucrats. Pervasive corruption and anarchy reduce human rights. There is also considerable government enterprise.

Comparatively: Zaire is as free as Vietnam, less free than Zambia.

ZAMBI A

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Polity: socialist one-party
Population: 6,800,000
Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: partly free
A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Zambia is ruled as a one-party dictatorship, although there have been elements of freedom within that party. Party organs are constitutionally more important than governmental. Although elections have some meaning within this framework, the government has suppressed opposition movements within the party. Perhaps uniquely, parliament managed to block a government bill in 1985. Expression of dissent is possible through abstention or negative votes. There are some town councils with elected members.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled. A considerable variety of opinion is expressed, but it is a crime to criticize the president, the parliament, or the ideology. Foreign publications are censored. There is a rule of law and the courts have some independence; cases have been won against the government. Political opponents are often detained, and occasionally tortured, yet most people talk without fear. Traditional life continues. The government does not fully accept private or traditional rights in property or religion; important parts of the economy, especially copper mining, have been nationalized. Union, business, and professional organizations are under government pressure but retain significant independence.

Comparatively: Zambia is as free as Guyana, freer than Angola, less free than Morocco.

ZIMBABWE

Economy: noninclusive
Capitalist-statist
Polity: centralized
Dominant party
Population: 8,600,000
Status: partly free

An ethnically complex state with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Zimbabwe is a parliamentary democracy. The ruling party has achieved power through elections marked by coercion of the electorate both before and after the actual
Country Summaries

process. The whites retain special minority political rights in a transitional phase. All military forces are still not controlled. Pressure to form a one-party state is growing with the increasing repression of the main opposition party. Subnationalities: The formerly dominant white, Indian, and colored populations (five percent altogether) are largely urban. The emerging dominant people are the majority Shona-speaking groups (seventy-four percent). The Ndebele (eighteen percent) are territorially distinct and politically self-conscious. Their allegiance to a minority party is being violently reduced.

Civil Liberties. The press is indirectly government owned and follows the government line except occasionally in the letters columns. The government-owned broadcast media are active organs of government propaganda. The rule of law is increasingly threatened; opposition politicians have been forced into exile or imprisoned. Acquittals are regularly followed by rearrests. Racial discrimination is officially outlawed, especially in residence, occupation, and conscription. Many citizens live in fear of the nationalist parties and their former guerrilla forces. Many have been killed or beaten in an attempt to force change of party allegiance. Unions and private associations retain some independence, but are increasingly being unified under government direction. The economy has capitalist, socialist, and statist aspects. The white population still wields disproportionate economic power.

Comparatively: Zimbabwe is as free as Tunisia, freer than South Africa, less free than Senegal.
PART VI

Related Territory Summaries
Related Territory Summaries

Using the same format as the Country Summaries, the dependent territories of each superordinate country are discussed below as a group. Exceptions to the general pattern are pointed out. It is often unclear whether a political unit should be regarded as a territory or an integral unit of its ruling state. For example, only the history of the Survey explains why the "independent" homelands of South Africa are considered dependent territories while the Republics of the USSR are not. Depending on the historical background, geographical separation, as by water and distance, often leads to consideration as a related territory. Many additional separated islands, such as those of India or Indonesia, could well be defined as dependent territories rather than as an integral part of the state. In general, if a unit is considered a full equal of the units of the superordinate state, it is not a territory.

A U S T R A L I A

CHRISTMAS ISLAND

| Economy: capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 4 |
| Polity: agent               | Civil Liberties: 2  |
| Population: 3,300           | Status: partly free |

An ethnically complex territory

COCOS ISLANDS

| Economy: capitalist-statist | Political Rights: 4 |
| Polity: agent and council   | Civil Liberties: 2  |
| Population: 600             | Status: partly free |

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)
Territory Summaries

NORFOLK ISLAND

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 4
Polity: council & administrator  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 2,200  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Australia apparently follows democratic practices in so far as possible. Christmas Island is essentially a state-run phosphate mine, which is soon to be depleted. The population is Chinese and Malay. Formerly a personal fiefdom, Cocos Islands has been placed under Australian administration, with the assistance of a local council. In 1984 the people voted in a UN supervised referendum to be integrated with Australia. Yet distance, the Malay population, and the plantation economy may make this difficult in more than theory. There appears to be free expression and a rule of law, but in neither are communications media developed.

Norfolk Island has a freely elected legislative assembly. It is in large measure self-governing; the wish of some residents for more independence is currently under consideration. An Australian "administrator" remains appointed. At least one lively free newspaper is published—in spite of threats and arson against the editor—and other rights of organization and law appear to be guaranteed.

CHILE

EASTER ISLAND

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 6
Polity: governor  Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 2,000  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

The Island is granted a limited autonomy within the generally repressive Chilean context. In 1984 the appointed governor was for the first time a native of the island. Discussion at least of
local problems seems to be quite open, and organized political activity is beginning.

DENMARK

FAROE ISLANDS

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: multiparty
Population: 44,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

GREENLAND

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: multiparty
Population: 51,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

An ethnically complex population (nonwhite majority)

Both territories have elected parliamentary governments responsible for internal administration, and free to discuss their relationship to Denmark. In addition they elect representatives to the Danish parliament. They also have considerable freedom in international affairs—such as Greenland’s ability to opt out of the European Economic Community in 1985. On major issues referendums are also held. Full freedoms of expression and organization are recognized. The local languages are dominant in both territories. The majority Inuit population is now politically in charge of Greenland.
Territory Summaries

FRANCE

FRENCH GUIANA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)
Population: 73,000

An ethnically complex state (nonwhite majority)

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: dependent multiparty
Population: 170,000

A relatively homogeneous population (few French)

GUADELOUPE

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)
Population: 324,000

Relatively homogeneous with a small, dominant French minority

MARTINIQUE

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)
Population: 342,000

Relatively homogeneous with a small, dominant French minority
MAHORE (formerly MAYOTE)

Economy: noninclusive capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 47,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (non-French)

MONACO

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 4
Polity: dependent constitutional monarchy (limited)  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 26,000  Status: partly free

An ethnically heterogeneous population

NEW CALEDONIA

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 3
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 150,000  Status: free

An ethnically complex territory (large French component)

REUNION

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 3
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 495,000  Status: partly free

An ethnically complex territory (few French)
Territory Summaries

ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: dependent multiparty  Civil Liberties: 2
(limited)
Population: 6,260  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous territory (French)

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 4
Polity: dependent assembly  Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 12,300  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (non-French)

The territories of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, and St. Pierre and Miquelon are considered overseas departments of France. They have elected representatives in the French parliament and local councils. However, French law applies; a French administrator is the chief executive. Open advocacy of independence in such integral parts of France has led to arrest in the past. Nevertheless, small independence movements exist in at least Guadeloupe and Martinique. St. Pierre and Miquelon chose department status by referendum. Local elected governments have little power. The governance of Mahore (Mayotte) is similar. However, two recent referendums have confirmed the desire of the people for their island to remain a part of France (because the Christian population would otherwise be ruled by the Muslim Comoros). Women are especially active in the anti-Comoros movement. Beyond the special colonial position, French law and its civil guarantees are maintained in the group.

The overseas territories of French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna in the South Pacific are more traditional colonies in theory. In practice, the administrative structure is similar to that of the overseas departments. Assemblies have limited powers, although in the large territories perhaps as great as those in the overseas departments since there is not the
automatic application of French law. Independence appears here to be a lively and accepted issue, especially in New Caledonia. France seems willing to go toward independence even though a 1985 election shows the majority to be against independence. The native people, the Kanaks, about forty percent, are highly organized and pro-independence with a system guaranteeing their control. However, French reluctance to grant full freedom led to New Caledonia threatening an election boycott and an alternative government in 1984. Wallis and Futuna chose territorial status by referendum in 1959.

Monaco is not normally considered a dependent territory. However, by treaty with France, Monacan policy must conform to French security, political, and economic interests; the head minister must be acceptable to the French government, and France controls foreign relations. The hereditary ruler appoints the government, but shares legislative power with an elected council. There is also elected local government. Foreign publications are freely available. Civil freedoms approximate those in France. The government owns the casino and major hotels.

Of the traditional colonial powers only France retains a grip on its colonies that seems to be resented by important segments of their populations. For example, independence movements in Guadeloupe and New Caledonia have not had the opportunity for fair electoral tests of their desires that those in American and British colonies have had. France does not allow such electoral tests of independence sentiment in its overseas departments, and seldom elsewhere.

**ISRAEL**

**OCCUPIED AREAS**

Economy: capitalist

Polity: external administration; local government

Population: 1,150,000

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 5

Status: partly free

A complex population with a dominant minority
Territory Summaries

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank both have elected local governments, although the decisive power is in the hands of the occupying force. Opposition to the occupation is expressed in local elections and the media, but heavy pressure against any organized opposition is applied in an atmosphere of violence on both sides. There is censorship as well as other controls on the media and on movement. Settlement by the occupying people has steadily infringed upon the rights of the Arab majority.

ITALY

SAN MARINO

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights:  1
Polity: dependent multiparty  Civil Liberties:  1
Population: 19,380  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous state

VATICAN

Economy: statist  Political Rights:  6
Polity: elected monarchy  Civil Liberties:  4
Population: 860  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

San Marino is ruled by a multiparty parliamentary government with active elected local governments (a leftist coalition generally controls the ancient forms). The media are independent; in addition, Italian media are available. Although often considered independent, the influence of Italy is overwhelming. Defense and many foreign-relations areas are handled by the Italian government; major court cases are tried in Italian courts; the political parties are essentially branches of the respective Italian parties. Citizenship was recently extended to long-term residents for the first time.
The political situation of the Vatican is anomalous. On the one hand, the Vatican is ostensibly an independent state under absolutist rule, with the ruler chosen for life by a small international elite, which also has advisory functions. On the other hand, the international relations of the state are actually based on its ruler's status as head of a church rather than as head of a state. The people of the Vatican live more as Italian citizens than as citizens of the Vatican, regardless of their formal status. Vatican media represent the views of the church, yet Italian media and avenues of expression are fully available, and the dissatisfied can leave the context of the Vatican with minimal effort.

NETHERLANDS

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Economy: mixed capitalist  Political Rights:  2
Polity: multiparty internal  Civil Liberties:  1
Population: 300,000  Status: free

An ethnically complex territory (few Dutch)

The Antilles consist of two groups of islands in the Caribbean. Although the governor is appointed the islands are largely self-governing at both the territory and island levels. The parliament is freely elected. The Netherlands has been urging the islands to accept independence, but the smaller islands have resisted independence in federation with the dominant island, Curacao. Aruba will achieve special powers in a new federal system in 1986, and may move on to full independence. Full freedom of party organization, expression, and abstention are fully recognized.
## Territory Summaries

### NEW ZEALAND

**COOK ISLANDS**

- **Economy:** capitalist-statist
- **Polity:** multiparty internal
- **Population:** 18,000
- **Political Rights:** 2
- **Civil Liberties:** 2
- **Status:** free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

**NIUE**

- **Economy:** capitalist-statist
- **Polity:** internal parliamentary
- **Population:** 3,000
- **Political Rights:** 2
- **Civil Liberties:** 2
- **Status:** free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

**TOKELAU ISLANDS**

- **Economy:** capitalist-statist
- **Polity:** limited assembly
- **Population:** 1,600
- **Political Rights:** 4
- **Civil Liberties:** 2
- **Status:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

The Cook Islands and Niue are largely self-governing territories with elected parliaments. There is, however, some continuing oversight by New Zealand, particularly in defense, foreign affairs, and justice. Tokelau is administered by appointed officials with the help of an elected assembly. Political life, particularly in the Cook Islands, has been vigorous and free. Niue has been unable to arrest a steady decline.
Territory Summaries

PORTUGAL

AZORES

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: internal multiparty  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 292,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population

MACAO

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 3
Polity: limited internal assembly  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 300,000  Status: partly free

An ethnically complex population (majority Chinese)

MADEIRA

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: internal multiparty  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 266,000  Status: free

An ethnically complex but relatively homogeneous population

The Azores and Madeira are considered "autonomous regions," whose parliamentary, multiparty governments have a large degree of internal self-rule, including the right to issue their own stamps. The islands also have elected representatives in the Portuguese parliament. They have the same civil freedoms as on the mainland. Both regions have independence movements. Land holding has traditionally been very concentrated on Madeira. With populations made up largely of Portuguese settlers of past centuries, neither island group has been seen as a colony. Macao is administered by a Lisbon-appointed governor with the help of an elected local assembly. Peking and its supporters affect all levels of government and constrain the news media, as well as rights of assembly.
and organization. However, democratic institutions are much more developed here than in Hong Kong.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**BOPHUTHATSWANA**

Economy: capitalist-statist  
Polity: dependent dominant party  
Population: 1,400,000  
Political Rights: 6  
Civil Liberties: 5  
Status: partly free

An ethnically complex population

**CISKEI**

Economy: capitalist-statist  
Polity: dependent dominant party  
Population: 740,000  
Political Rights: 6  
Civil Liberties: 6  
Status: not free

An ethnically homogeneous territory

**SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)**

Economy: capitalist-traditional  
Polity: appointed multiparty-traditional  
Population: 1,100,000  
Political Rights: 6  
Civil Liberties: 5  
Status: partly free

An ethnically heterogeneous territory

**VENDA**

Economy: capitalist-statist  
Polity: dependent multiparty  
Population: 550,000  
Political Rights: 6  
Civil Liberties: 6  
Status: not free

A relatively homogeneous territory
South West Africa, or Namibia, is ruled as a colony of South Africa, with the help of a multiparty government appointed in 1985. There is considerable freedom of the press, of discussion, and organization—although with occasional interventions. The judiciary is relatively free. Native chiefs and councils play political and judicial roles in their home areas. The northern or Ovambo half of the country is under police rule in a guerrilla war setting.

The other territories are homelands that have accepted formal independence—except for Transkei, which the Survey accepts as independent. Characteristically, most wage earners ascribed to these states work in South Africa proper; the states receive extensive South African aid, and they are not viable units geographically. South Africa exerts considerable control over their foreign affairs and security. Although formally governed by parliamentary systems, the control of political organization and expression, the large number of appointed parliamentarians, and the violent atmosphere makes them more dictatorial than democratic. Expression of opinion in regard to the existence of the state is especially perilous. There are arrests for reasons of conscience and reports of torture. Nevertheless, these territories do protect their peoples from many of the worst insults of apartheid, and, in Bophuthatswana, a much closer approximation to justice exists for blacks than in South Africa itself.

S P A I N

CANARY ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,500,000 Status: free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population
Territory Summaries

CEUTA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: dependent, unrecognized
Population: 78,000 (including 12,000 soldiers)

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 3
Status: free

An ethnically homogeneous population

MELILLA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: dependent, unrecognized
Population: 63,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 3
Status: free

An ethnically complex population

Spain has no official colonies. Its outposts in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, ruled as parts of the Spanish provinces across from them, remain anomalies. Melilla is partly Moroccan ethnically. Both have been Spanish for centuries.

The Canary Islands are governed as two provinces. Although the people are of diverse origins and preserve many pre-Spanish customs, the culture today is largely Hispanic. There is an independence movement, but the development of internal self-determination on a regional basis may help to reduce the desire for separation. Spanish law guarantees rights as in Spain itself.

SWITZERLAND

LIECHTENSTEIN

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: constitutional monarchy
Population: 124,000

Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population
Foreign affairs, defense, and some economic regulations are controlled by Switzerland. Swiss money is used, as is the Swiss postal service. The government is responsible both to the hereditary monarch and an elected parliament. There is local government. Women have recently attained the right to vote; the media are mostly Swiss, although there are local papers.

UNITED KINGDOM

ANGUILLA

- Economy: mixed capitalist
- Polity: dependent limited assembly
- Population: 6,500

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

BERMUDA

- Economy: mixed capitalist
- Polity: multiparty
- Population: 55,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

An ethnically complex state (largely nonwhite)

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

- Economy: mixed socialist
- Polity: limited internal assembly
- Population: 11,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)
Territory Summaries

CAYMAN ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: limited internal assembly  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 17,000  Status: free

An ethnically mixed population (largely white)

CHANNEL ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: traditional parliamentary  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 132,000  Status: free

An ethnically mixed population (white)

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: limited representative  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,800  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)

GIBRALTAR

Economy: capitalist-statist  Political Rights: 1
Polity: internal parliamentary  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 30,000  Status: free

An ethnically complex population
Territory Summaries

HONG KONG

Economy: capitalist  |  Political Rights:  4
Polity: colonial    |  Civil Liberties:  2
Population: 5,500,000 |  Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (Chinese)

ISLE OF MAN

Economy: capitalist  |  Political Rights:  1
Polity: parliamentary |  Civil Liberties:  1
Population: 65,000    |  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)

MONTSERRAT

Economy: capitalist  |  Political Rights:  2
Polity: colonial legislative |  Civil Liberties:  2
Population: 12,000    |  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

ST. HELENA

Economy: capitalist-statist |  Political Rights:  2
Polity: colonial legislative |  Civil Liberties:  2
Population: 5,200        |  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)
Territory Summaries

TURKS AND CAICOS

Economy: capitalist  Political Rights: 2
Polity: colonial legislative  Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 7,400  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

The dependencies of the United Kingdom all have the civil rights common to the homeland. Nearly all have expressed, through elections, elected representatives, or simply lack of controversy in a free atmosphere, a desire to stay a dependency of the United Kingdom under present arrangements. For example, the party winning decisively in 1984 in Turks and Caicos ran on an anti-independence stand. The people of Gibraltar have often affirmed their desire to remain a colony. For the other colonies, there is little evidence of a significant denial of political or civil liberties.

Constitutionally the dependencies may be divided into three groups. The first consists of those units with essentially full internal autonomy, expressed through freely elected parliaments. The second group is administered by a strong appointed governor and a largely elected assembly or council. The third group consists of colonies with little if any power in elected assemblies or officials. The first group includes the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and possibly Bermuda. Midway between the first and second groups are the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and possibly Montserrat. In the second group are Anguilla, Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and Turks and Caicos. The last group consists only of Hong Kong, whose political development, and to some extent even civil liberties have been arrested by the presence of communist China. However, in preparation for the turning back of sovereignty to China in 1997 legislative institutions are being developed. To date the suffrage is very limited. At the same time the self-censorship of the press is increasing.
**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**AMERICAN SAMOA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist-communal</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: parliamentary self-governing</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population: 32,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

**BELAU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist-communal</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: parliamentary self-governing</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population: 12,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

**FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist-communal</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: parliamentary self-governing</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
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Population: 74,000  Status: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

**GUAM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist-statist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: parliamentary self-governing</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population: 106,000  Status: partly free

An ethnically complex population (mostly nonwhite)
## Territory Summaries

### MARSHALL ISLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist-statist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: parliamentary self-governing</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 31,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

### NORTHERN MARIANAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: parliamentary self-governing</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 17,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

### PUERTO RICO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: self-governing quasi-state</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 3,300,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A relatively homogeneous population (Spanish speaking)

### VIRGIN ISLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy: capitalist</th>
<th>Political Rights: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity: appointed governorship</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 97,000</td>
<td>Status: free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A complex population (mostly nonwhite)
Puerto Rico is an internally self-governing commonwealth with a political system modeled on that of the states of the United States. Both directly and indirectly the Puerto Ricans have voted to remain related to the United States. (Independence parties have never received more than a fraction of the vote.) There is full freedom of discussion and organization. There are political prisoners, but no good evidence of imprisonment for reasons of conscience.

The rest of America's dependent territories are now either internally self-governing or have accepted in free referenda their present status. The territories have elective institutions including in most cases an elected governor or chief administrator. There have been a number of recent referendums approving free association with the United States in the Micronesian territories. However, the agreements are not yet fully approved by the American Congress. Full independence was not discussed extensively by either the United States or the islanders. The heavy American military presence in Guam is thought to reduce its independence. Traditional chiefs have special powers in most other Pacific territories. The island groupings, such as the Marshalls or the Federated States have strong local governments on the separate islands, and are really loose federations. Overdependence on American largesse is arguably the greatest hindrance to complete freedom in the Pacific territories. Freedom of expression, assembly, and organization are recognized in all territories.

**FRANCE-SPAIN CONDOMINIUM**

**ANDORRA**

Economy: capitalist  
Polity: limited multiparty  
Population: 31,000  

Political Rights: 3  
Civil Liberties: 3  
Status: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (Catalan)

Andorra has a parliamentary government overseen by the representatives of the French President and the Bishop of Urgel. There has been agitation for more self-determination. External
relations are handled primarily by France, a responsibility France has insisted on in recent discussions with the EEC. Papers freely circulate from both sides; an independent weekly is published. Only recently has the Andorra Council been able to regulate its own radio stations.
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See also Country and Related Territory Summaries and Tables 1-9.

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