FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1980-1991 Political Rights & Civil Liberties
Freedom in the World
The findings of the *Comparative Survey of Freedom* and the *Map of Freedom*, include events up to 1 January 1991.
Freedom in the World
Political Rights & Civil Liberties
1990-1991

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Foreword

Freedom House is a nonprofit organization based in New York that monitors political rights and civil liberties around the world. Established in 1941, Freedom House believes the effective advocacy of civil rights at home and human rights abroad must be grounded in fundamental democratic values and principles.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom is an institutional effort to monitor the political rights and civil liberties in 165 nations and 62 related territories on an annual basis. Freedom House began earlier efforts to record the progress and decline in freedoms during the 1950s in reaction to racial violence in the United States. The first year-end review of freedom was sparked in 1955 by the kidnapping and murder of Emmett Till, a fourteen-year old black in Mississippi. An all-white jury subsequently acquitted the two white men indicted for the crime.

During those early years, the project was called the Balance Sheet of Freedom, and later the Annual Survey of the Progress of Freedom. By the late 1960s, the Freedom House Board of Trustees felt there was a need to create a single standard by which to measure and record the development of freedom around the world.

When Freedom House’s Comparative Survey of Freedom was finally established in the early 1960s, democracy was in a perilous state both at home and abroad: Spain, Portugal and Greece were under military rule; the world’s largest democracy, India, would soon declare martial law; an American president faced the possibility of impeachment; and the prospects for liberalization—not to say democratization—in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia, were dim. The past decade has seen unprecedented gains in freedom over much of the world.

Today, the Comparative Survey of Freedom has become a year-long project produced by our regional experts, foreign consultants and human rights specialists and derives its information from a wide-range of sources. During the past year, Freedom House conducted numerous fact-finding missions around the world. Freedom House personnel visited Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Poland, South Africa and the Soviet Union. During these on-site visits, we made an effort to meet a cross-section of political parties and associations, human rights monitors, representatives of both the private sector and independent trade unions, academics, foreign and local journalists, security forces and insurgent movements where they existed.

Throughout the year, we consult a vast array of published source materials, ranging from reports of other human rights organizations to regional publications and newspapers. Most valued to us are the many human rights activists, journalists, editors and political figures around the world who keep us informed on a regular basis of their nations’ situations, sometimes at great risk to themselves and their families. As always, the Survey is dedicated to them and their struggle for freedom.

The 1990-1991 Survey was conducted by a Freedom House project team: R. Bruce McColm, the coordinator who also serves as the executive director of Freedom House; Dr. Joseph Ryan, a comparative political scientist; James Finn, general editor; Douglas W. Payne; George Zarycky; Eric Singer; Dale Bricker; Perry Bechky; and Maria Vitagliano. Leonard Sussman and research assistant Jessie Miller compile the Survey of Press Freedom. The Survey team is especially grateful to the extraordinary talents of the editorial team of James Finn, Mark Wolkenfeld and editorial assistant Pei C. Koay without whom this book would not have docked safely. The Survey team also appreciates the dedicated work of this year’s research assistants: Carla Copeland, Paul Danzinger, Sharon Gross, John Gutierrez, Mykola Hryckowian, Alexa Peery, Christina Pendzola, Thomas Ragsdale and Elizabeth Stern.

The findings of the Survey are accompanied by independent, regional essays written by acknowledged experts in their field: William J. Barnds, Asia; J. Leo Cefkin, Africa; James Finn, United States; Douglas W. Payne, Latin America; Don Peretz, Middle East; Arch Puddington, Soviet Union; Wayne C. Thompson, Western Europe.

As always, Freedom House welcomes criticism and comments on our findings. Throughout the year, these exchange of views make us constantly review and improve our findings.

Freedom House receives funding from private individuals, corporations, labor unions and foundations for all its activities. We especially want to express our appreciation to the Pew Charitable Trusts, which has provided the main support for the Comparative Survey of Freedom over the last decade and a half. We also want to thank the Lynde and Hairy Bradley Foundation for its continued support and assistance in this endeavor.
The year of 1990 was a year of great transition for the United States. To adapt a familiar saying, it found itself between two worldviews, one dying and the other struggling to be born. The worldview that is dying is, of course, that which was informed by all that is encompassed in the term Cold War. That war etched sharply on the political scene the freedoms the U.S. upholds and the aggressive forces that threatened them. Suddenly, the perspective this provided for the policies of the United States during the decades since the end of World War II is no longer relevant. The United States is now groping toward a new worldview that will guide its domestic and foreign policies through the last years of this decade and into the new century. In this process the polity of the U.S. will necessarily redefine itself. The present moment is one of uncertainty and deep ambivalence.

In an attempt to select a single memorable event that best symbolizes the surprising and historically unprecedented political shift that has taken place, many commentators have fixed on the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. It may do as well as any to mark the end of the division between Western and Eastern Europe, but it fails to indicate the underlying cause: the publicly acknowledged weakness of the Soviet economy and the consequent decline of Soviet power and influence. With the collapse of the threat posed by Soviet power, the United States has the urgent necessity to review its own interests and options.

The domestic barometer
President Lyndon Johnson frequently said to those who questioned him that if they wanted to know the direction of U.S. foreign policy they should look at its domestic policies. Applied to the administration of President Bush at the beginning of 1990 this sounded a promising note. At the end of the year, that note had been rendered flat and possibly sour. The approval rating of the president’s performance provides a political barometer of the shift. Well after the first half of the year, President Bush’s rating was remarkably high; at the end of the year it had plummeted. Several contested issues, both domestic and foreign, had intervened between the two sets of ratings.

With the end of the Cold War in sight at the beginning of the year, many Americans anticipated a peace dividend, a swift reduction in U.S. armed forces, a reduction of the budget deficit, tax cuts, an infusion of capital into needed enterprises. They were not pleased to hear that peace itself, not financial respite, was to be the dividend. In fact, as the external threat was decreasing, the domestic problems of the country seemed to grow. The projected budget deficit for the year, far from falling, steadily mounted from approximately $95 billion to a late-year projection of near $300 billion. The massive losses from failed Savings and Loan institutions continued to soar, and blame for the debacle spread like the proverbial oil stain, soiling the reputations of many people and agencies at different levels of responsibility. The S & L failures weakened further a soft real-estate market in many parts of the country as the government auctioned off properties that came into its possession from the bankrupted institutions. Charges of unethical and possibly illegal involvement brought against a number of senators added to the growing cynicism sparked among the electorate by earlier charges of corruption that had driven high government officials from office.

The domestic issue that touched U.S. citizens most viscerally, however, was taxes, and the performance of the executive and legislative bodies at federal, state and local levels induced confusion and hostility among many voters.
At the federal level, the Republican administration jousted with the predominantly Democratic Congress to shunt off responsibility for tax increases. The president disconcerted both his supporters and the average American citizen when he broke his no-tax pledge and, after negotiating additional taxes with the Democratic legislators, attempted to renew that pledge. The long drawn out skirmishes brought the U.S. government to a near shut down when the legislators failed to reach a definitive agreement as an automatic deadline approached. A budget compromise that included tax increases and spending cuts was finally agreed on.

The November midterm elections revealed deep ambivalences in the country. The voters were volubly angry about higher taxes, both those imposed by Congress as well as those set by their own states. There was high conjecture among political commentators and deep fear among incumbent politicians that the election would mean sweeping changes.

Although a number of state governor seats did change occupants, what the media described as an alienated and abrasive citizenship returned most Congressional incumbents to office. It was as if the electorate had said, "Throw the bums out, but not my bum." This process raised, in turn, increasingly familiar charges that the incumbents' ability to raise large campaign chests through political action committees (PACS) and other contributors gives them an unfair advantage over the challengers.

For their part the legislators charged, with some reason, that the voters sent them mixed signals, rejecting tax increases but protesting corresponding spending cuts, except in defense and foreign aid. They also pointed to the electorate's criticism of new taxes and a simultaneous rejection of a number of proposals to cut or freeze taxes. Meanwhile a sagging economy and growing unemployment led President Bush to concede that a recession was indeed possible, but to predict that it would be neither severe nor long-lasting. The resulting money crunch—increasing taxes, a shrinking revenue base and federally mandated services—promises future tax revolts in communities across the country.

The international scene, meanwhile, held out the promise of a relatively unstressful period in which the United States could reformulate its policies. That promise was snapped when President Saddam Hussein of Iraq suddenly invaded the small, oil-rich, neighboring country of Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. President Bush's initiative in swiftly countering Saddam's action—an initiative that involved personal persuasion, negotiation, diplomacy, and acceptable pressure to gain international agreement—as well as the promise to send U.S. armed forces to the area, won him immediate and warm support at home. The president's action revealed a number of truths about the international scene and America's emerging role on that scene.

First, it was strikingly evident that if the United States had not provided such leadership, no other country would have. No other country could have. Most commentators agreed that Kuwait and at least a portion of Saudi Arabia would have been swallowed and Saddam would have remained in place to present an ever increasing military threat to regional stability. Such concerns were intensified by reports that Iraq was working on the development of nuclear weapons.

Second, by intervening as it did, by seeking international support for its actions, the United States sharply posed, first to itself and then to other countries, a question it would inevitably have come to: What role will the United States play in the post-Cold War world? It returned the country to the first principle of foreign policy: What is our national interest?

Some of the major responses, which were developing even before the Iraqi invasion, can be only roughly blocked out in brief compass. Whatever their differences, which are profound, they all attempt to answer the same question: to what purpose, to what degree, and by which means should the United States extend its power and influence beyond its own shores?

The future U.S. role

Isolationism and Fortress America as potent elements of U.S. foreign policy were abandoned fifty years ago, but the impulse to return to them still lives in variant forms. They emerged in 1990 with the assertion that, with the end of the cold war and the threat of Communist expansionism, the basis for U.S. interest in many regions of the world had consequently declined. We now have, it was argued, the luxury of concentrating on the defense of our country, of putting our own house in shape, of tending to our own myriad disorders. Our withdrawal cannot, of course, be total. But, these isolationists say, we need not be concerned with the internal affairs of other countries—whatever the plight of their citizens—if they do not affect our own interests.

Other analysts asserted that the option of even relative isolationism is no longer ours. The events of fifty years have thrust the United States into a position of international power and influence that it would be a political and moral failure to abrogate. It is this responsibility, rather than a desire to extend an
American Empire, that should lead the United States to support, for example, both morally and materially the newly freed countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, modern means of communication preclude the possibility of cutting Americans off from the affairs of other countries, or of limiting the spread of American culture, with all the consequences that entails. The United States must acknowledge, they concede, the limits of what this country can do, but within those limits it should do what it can. It should play not the role of the world's policeman, but that of a benign guardian with quite limited warrants.

Another group of critic-analysts stressed the importance of maintaining an always precarious world stability. Within the framework suggested by this responsibility, they emphasized the need—as they see it—of working with an emerging new international order in which collective strength and collective security would be principal goals. This approach would entail a greater recourse to international law and to the mechanisms provided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The foreign policy would be marked by liberal interventionism.

Into the ongoing discussion of what should be the future worldview of the United States, the Iraqi invasion intruded as a rude but quickening shock. Those who had recommended the most stringent cuts in U.S. armed forces and a turning inward were reminded that there were still forces inimical to the international order, regional stability, and U.S. interests, forces that could be effectively challenged only by military might. As the military developed and continued into the closing month of 1990, a number of anomalies emerged.

**The bullied pulpit**

President Bush initially won widespread and bipartisan praise not only for the experience and foreign policy expertise he exhibited in confronting Saddam, but for the decisiveness of his action. In the months following that decision, however, this support began to unravel. People who had called for political leadership (and publicly wondered if the president could provide it) became uncertain they wanted the consequences of such leadership. When the administration attempted to project power without the active engagement of military forces, it found Saddam unyielding. It then increased U.S. forces in the Gulf, giving them an offensive capability. The ensuing threats intended to bear on Saddam and persuade him to retreat increased the concern of U.S. allies, congressional leaders and the American people. In its attempt to lay out a rationale for both the ongoing policy and the possibility of the active engagement of U.S. forces, the administration offered a number of reasons: the need to deter aggression, the danger of regional instability in the Persian Gulf, the severe reduction of needed oil supplies, the loss of American jobs. The American people received the proliferation of reasons as a set of mixed signals. Their uncertainty and anxiety increased when open disputes broke out in Congress, some members siding with the policy, some not, and some being content to ask probing questions.

The electorate, in turn, gave out some mixed signals of its own, the formal statements of organized religious bodies providing a paradigm of the nation's response. Predictably, on the basis of its past condemnations of military actions in Panama and Grenada, the National Council of Churches, composed of delegates of major Protestant denominations, unanimously rejected the administration's response to the Iraqi invasion. Labelling the president's rhetoric "reckless" and his behavior "imprudent," the Council called for the immediate withdrawal of all but token American forces from the Persian Gulf, and a global conference to resolve the Israeli-Arab issue. Less radically, leaders of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops sent letters to the U.S. secretary of state and to the president expressing concern that the present Gulf policy might violate canons of a justifiable war, letters that drew reasoned responses from a variety of past and present officials. Subsequently, 700 delegates of American Jewish organizations unanimously approved the administration's policy in the Gulf.

Occupying a position distinct from each of these three were those who supported the president's policy but who also urged caution. They advocated an extension of time to allow the sanctions to work, to allow the international pressure exerted over time to erode Saddam's resolution to hang on to his military conquests. Part of that pressure was the resolution voted by the United Nations Security Council to authorize the United States and its allies to expel Iraq from Kuwait by force if Saddam had not withdrawn by mid-January 1991. The resolution, passed on 29 November by a vote of twelve to two, with permanent member China abstaining, was widely regarded as a high political accomplishment of President Bush. He was also praised for his offer to send the secretary of state to negotiate with Saddam. His decision not to call a special session of Congress to consider his actions in the Gulf was, however, an indication of his lack of confidence that he would gain from the Congress the support that he wanted.
As the year drew to a close, the events in the Persian Gulf gave weight to the contention that the new foreign policies of the United States would be determined less by the think tankers and great designers of policies than they would by a pattern gradually formed by the outcome of many different challenges the country will face—the unsettled challenge of Saddam being one of the thorniest.

Even as much of the nation was concentrating its attention on the possibility of a hot war in the Gulf, responsible political leaders were directing attention to other areas. They agreed that the U.S. should be concerned with the promised buildup of Iraq's nuclear forces. But should it not also be concerned with Pakistan's nuclear program, and have a clear policy for dealing with it? How should the U.S. weigh the electoral fraud and human abuses in Mexico with the desire for free trade agreements between the two countries? Having worked through several reactions to the massacre in China's Tiananmen Square, how should the U.S. now deal with the interests that the two countries share—or could be brought to share? What investment should the country make in the thirty-four nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which is vying with other international organizations as it considers the new configuration of Europe. The questions themselves were reminders that the United States, as a global power, could not be entirely preoccupied with a single region or single issue, important as it might be.

Americans as decadent puritans

The division and confusion that characterize much of the nation's debate on economic and political issues were also present in arguments on moral/social issues: abortion, drugs, the homeless, the rising crime rate, affirmative action and quotas, censorship and free speech, sex education in the schools, public support of the arts, education and free choice of schools, and so forth. A few examples of some anomalies must suffice.

- Item: The respected Roper poll indicates, that whites have grown more tolerant and that blacks are more satisfied with the quality of their lives. Nevertheless, the media report an "alarming rise" of racism, particularly on campus.
- Item: The sleazy, misogynist lyrics of rap groups are defended, but leading universities are increasingly restricting campus speech that is judged racist or sexist.
- Item: An entire generation of American yuppies is regularly described as narcissistic and greedy, but that same group contributes more, in proportion to their numbers, to charitable and philanthropic causes than other comparable groups.
- Item: In the name of diversity and pluralism, universities across the country are establishing curricula requirements based on multicultural and "politically correct" views that establish a new orthodoxy on minority groups, environmentalism, gays and lesbians, and affirmative action.
- Item: Often described as adventurous individualists, Americans seem intent on creating a risk-free environment, free of the dangers of cholesterol, pesticides, and smoking and, in the attempt, willing to impose legal and societal restrictions on others.

In commenting on the American way of life in the year 1990, the Economist (London) has shrewdly captured the essence of many such issues under the rubric "decadent puritans." It is, the journal asserts, an odd combination of telling everyone else what to do while ducking personal responsibility. How the polity of the United States copes with and possibly resolves these issues is important to its own domestic order, of course. But just as the related domestic and foreign policies of the United States are important to other countries so, in different ways are these. For good or ill, the culture of the United States is lively and vibrant and radiates its influence to countries around the world.

James Finn is editor of Freedom Review and editorial director of Freedom House.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Precarious Democracy

Douglas W. Payne

The last ten years in Latin America have been described as the decade of democratization, and as the lost decade. The fact that both characterizations are appropriate underscores the sharp contrast in today’s Latin America between new-found political freedom and deepening economic crisis. For democracy to survive in the coming decade, Latin America will have to find a way, for the first time in its history, to couple democratic design with economic growth. But anti-democratic traditions remain strong, misery is widespread, and little direct assistance can be expected from the developed world.

Most people of the region now can choose their governments in regularly scheduled elections. For many Latin Americans, however, periodic trips to the ballot box have become brief distractions in an unrelieved struggle for survival amid increasing poverty and continuing political and drug-related violence. Specific conditions vary from country to country, but the experience in general is that democracy has yet to deliver.

Those who are optimistic about Latin America point to the apparent consensus among most of the recently elected governments in favor of a thorough overhaul of sclerotic, statist economies. One Latin leader after another has finally acknowledged that the days of bloated governments, import substitution, subsidies and protected markets are over. But while it is true that debt-strapped economies cannot rebound without serious structural reform based on market principles, it is also true that Latin America remains disfigured by the world’s most unequal income distribution, and the discontent of the majority is growing faster than the rate of economic reform.

Economic reform & austerity measures

In Latin America, economic activity traditionally has been directed by the state. Corporatist, oligarchical systems, headed by military or one-party governments, emphasized vertical authority, patronage and dependence, not individual initiative, fairness or accountability. The business and labor sectors were organized as appendages of the state and rewarded for submitting to its bureaucratic dictates. These entrenched interests, including still powerful military institutions, continue to drain national treasuries, and balk at the deep restructuring that is necessary for attracting domestic and foreign investment and generating economic growth.

The result has been that economic reform in most countries has not passed beyond drastic austerity measures like wage freezes and currency devaluations, which hit ordinary Latin Americans the hardest. Much of the middle class that seemed to be emerging in earlier decades is being driven back into poverty. Many professionals and young entrepreneurs have fled to developed countries. Peasants who were just beginning to move out of a subsistence existence are disappearing from the economic map altogether. The overall economic desperation can be seen in the seething squatter cities that ring Latin America’s urban centers, and in the burgeoning informal or black-market economies that now account for more than a third of all economic activity in the region.

Wall Street, international financial institutions, and the governments of developed nations encourage new Latin leaders to stay the course on economic reform. But Latin voters, with few channels of input to their governments in between elections, wonder if the harsh policies imposed from the top by their elected leaders are not just another scheme by traditional elites to preserve economic power and privilege. The return of an independent, probing media in the last decade has reinforced this view by exposing the depth of corruption and lack of accountability that
continue to plague Latin American political and military institutions. It’s no wonder that citizens increasingly are voting for political outsiders, media personalities and other mavericks.

**The basis of rule: power not law**

The underlying problem is that, despite the emergence of electoral democracy, the basis of rule remains power, not law. Since independence, Latin American countries have promulgated hundreds of constitutions, most of them with democratic features. But the rules of the game continue to be defined by bargaining among powerful elites and special interests, rather than by democracy.

As a result, the legal structures of Latin society are weak, riddled with corruption, and serve more to ensure the prerogatives of the powerful than to provide judicial recourse for the rest of society. But without an institutional framework that guarantees personal liberties and property rights for the majority, Latin American governments, whether elected or not, will remain without legitimacy in the eyes of most citizens.

Latin Americans have traditionally harbored a deep distrust of government, obviously with good reason. Those who learned to fear the power of the state retreated into a kind of stoic fatalism. Others, fueled by a variety of imported, anti-democratic ideologies, resorted to violent rebellion, helping to bring on the military takeovers in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1980s, the militaries stepped back from government, in effect handing a severe economic crisis and a huge foreign debt over to civilian politicians. But in the initial euphoria of democratization, as competing candidates made impossible promises, popular expectations ran high that elected governments would soon make a real difference in people’s lives. The fact that conditions have become worse for most Latin Americans not only reinforces the traditional distrust of authority, but also threatens to undermine the idea of democratic rule itself.

The disillusionment is evident in the sudden rise in voter abstention during the dozens of national and local elections held around the region in the last two years, in the continuing retreat into informal economic activity, and in the unceasing migration to North America. The reality is that large sectors of society are either unable or unwilling to participate in Latin American democracy. Regular elections have not resulted in a more inclusive political culture; rather they have meant that politics-as-usual takes place within a different formal setting.

A central concern is that disaffection appears to be greatest among Latin American youth, the coming generation that will ultimately determine whether Latin democracy survives or not. Much more than half of the Latin American population is under thirty, and nearly half is under fifteen. Nearly all lack a memory of prosperity or democracy, and there are few civic or educational institutions in Latin society that provide younger people with an appreciation of democratic values. At the same time, a majority of the region's children is born into poverty, leaving them with few choices other than a life of crime and drugs, or joining any number of violent extremist groups—nationalists, millennials, dogmatists of the left and right—that continue to seek democracy's demise.

The conditions recounted above prevail in one degree or another in most of the region. Costa Rica and the island nations of the English-speaking Caribbean are the exceptions, although even in those countries sturdy democratic institutions are being tested by recession, rising popular discontent and drug-related corruption. In the rest of the region, however, the fate of democracy is in the balance.

**Chile: where the prospects are good**

Chile is one of the few countries where the prospects are good. Examining the reasons why helps brings into sharper focus the quandary most other Latin countries are in. Prior to the 1973 military coup, Chile had a 150-year history of democracy and respect for human rights that put it in a class just below Costa Rica. And despite seventeen years of dictatorship, Chileans clung to their democratic traditions. During the transition back to civilian rule that culminated in free elections in 1989, political parties and independent civic institutions came quickly back to life. As a result, the newly elected government of President Patricio Aylwin is broadly representative and responsive to a wide social base.

The second reason to be optimistic about Chile is that the task of overhauling a statist economy had already been accomplished when the Aylwin government took office in March 1990. Under Gen. Pinochet, market economists were given a free hand to restructure the state, privatize money-losing state enterprises, and open the country to foreign investment. The Chilean economy has grown by 5 percent or better annually since 1985, compared with stagnant or negative growth in most other countries in the region.

Chile's economic success came at a high price. Economic reforms were imposed by a regime that brutally suppressed political dissent. The Pinochet
regime left power with one of the worst human rights records in Latin America, a legacy that Chile must still overcome. Even so, Chile has raised for some the question of whether economic restructuring must precede political reform for democracy to succeed in Latin America. Does the turmoil that has accompanied the return to elected government in other countries—food riots, labor strikes, crime waves, and continuing political violence—mean they will have to go through another period of authoritarian rule to put their economic house in order?

The problem with making that argument is that it overlooks the first reason why Chile is different—strong democratic traditions, which are no less important to Chile’s promising democracy than its relatively sound economy. Unfortunately, most Latin democracies are lacking on both counts. The question remains, can solid democratic institutions be built in traditionally nondemocratic societies during a time of economic crisis?

Latin leaders put the problem this way: democracy and development are inseparable, and unless democracy succeeds in satisfying the basic needs of the people, it will fail. It is a compelling argument and forms the basis of the Latin American appeal for economic aid and debt relief. But the response of international financial institutions and most Western governments is keyed primarily to progress on internal economic restructuring.

Democratic institutions and economic reforms

The Bush administration’s “Enterprise for the Americas” initiative announced in 1990 calls for a hemispheric free-trade zone, but little direct assistance and minimal debt relief. Latin American hopes for some kind of Marshall Plan, improbable to begin with, died with the end of the Cold War and the contraction of the U.S. economy. The Bush initiative does offer opportunity—the catch phrase is trade, not aid—but only for countries that make the reforms necessary for competing in the global marketplace.

The harsh reality is that in the age of democracy, democratic governance does not guarantee entry into the developed world. In the coming decade, Latin countries will be on their own in meeting the dual challenge of building viable democratic institutions and making painful economic reforms. Some may succeed, but others probably will not. The better bets are those like Uruguay and Venezuela that already have in their histories some appreciation for democratic principles.

Failure will not necessarily mean that countries will return to military rule. The region’s armed forces know that seizing power again will mean immediate international isolation. Also, they are no more interested in trying to resolve the economic crisis now than they were a decade ago when they handed it off to civilians.

Instead, the prospect is that a number of countries will regress into some hybrid form of authoritarian democracy, in which leaders will push for economic reforms at the top while relying on the military and security forces to suppress mounting popular protest below. The trappings of formal democracy might remain, but participation would be limited. Argentina may be headed in that direction. In 1990, President Carlos Menem decreed that responsibility for maintaining internal stability would be returned to the military, stating that nothing would stand in the way of economic restructuring.

If Latin democracies regress in this fashion, they may look something like Mexico, where an authoritarian government allows significant independent political activity, but continues to control the country. In fact, it is the dominance of his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that has allowed President Carlos Salinas to impose a remarkable economic and fiscal restructuring. The climate for foreign investment and economic growth has been vastly improved, and Salinas has won praise from the Bush administration and international financial agencies.

But what Salinas’s admirers conveniently overlook is the increasing extent to which his government has relied on force, intimidation and gross electoral fraud to stay in power. Although Salinas has promised that he will also implement political reforms, he is clearly holding out until his economic effort starts paying dividends. However, if his economic project succeeds, it does not mean that Mexico will then experience a full political opening. Mexico has no tradition of democracy to draw on and, in that sense, many Latin countries that have held free elections are still more comparable to Mexico than to Costa Rica or Chile.

Peru, Colombia and Costa Rica’s neighbors in Central America are the countries in danger of major reversals. Peru and Colombia are besieged by powerful drug cartels and left-wing guerrilla insurgencies, and civilian governments have already ceded significant authority to the military and security forces. Both countries are threatened with broad institutional collapse, and Peru may actually be in the process of disintegration.

Central America

Except for Costa Rica, Central America remains the least economically developed, most politically stunted
region in Latin America. Political violence and human rights violations are rising sharply again, the judicial systems don't function, and a majority of people live in poverty. Despite numerous relatively free elections, still powerful militaries continue to exercise veto power over weak civilian governments. That includes Nicaragua where, despite the electoral victory of President Violeta Chamorro, the Sandinista army remains the dominant force in the country. The prospects for Panama are better, but Panamanians still confront the daunting task of reconstructing their country after the years under Gen. Noriega and the U.S. invasion that removed him.

In the 1990s it will be more difficult to generalize about Latin America. There will be uneven political and economic progress in some countries, and setbacks in others. There could be a few real success stories, but there might be some disasters too. There might even be a change in Cuba, where Fidel Castro is under more pressure now than at any time because of the monumental changes in the Soviet Union. Someday, Cuba will be free of Fidel Castro. That's when the Cuban people will start learning how difficult building democracy can be, something the rest of Latin America already knows. —•

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In contrast to the dramatic advances and setbacks for freedom in Asia in recent years, 1990 was essentially a standoff between opposing forces. Australia, New Zealand, Japan and India remained functioning democracies. South Korea and Taiwan maintained the democratic gains of recent years. Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka continued to have systems based upon elections and representative government, but with significant limits imposed by entrenched institutional forces or continuing ethnic or ideological rebellions.

The dramatic moves toward freedom in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 had little direct impact on the Communist regimes in Asia except for Mongolia. That country held relatively free elections in July that returned the Communists to power but also provided opposition parties with significant official representation. Declining Soviet support to Vietnam and North Korea left them with little choice but to try to improve relations with the non-Communist nations, which in time could have domestic political repercussions. In the short run, however, the demonstration of how quickly Communist power could erode once a liberalizing process began made Asian Communist leaders more aware of the dangers of such moves. Thus they faced the dilemma of how to keep necessary economic reforms from undermining their political control.

The repercussions of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created serious economic strains for many Asian countries, and these could have adverse political consequences. Higher oil prices are creating economic disruptions, as is the loss of Middle Eastern markets. South Asian countries and the Philippines were hit with an additional blow as hundreds of thousands of their citizens working in Iraq and Kuwait lost their jobs, halting their large-scale remittances and forcing them to return home and seek employment despite chronic labor surpluses.

South Asian troubles

Afghanistan remained a land of violence and stalemate in 1990, with the beleaguered Communists able to hold the major cities despite the early 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops. Large-scale Soviet arms shipments and support by some elements of the population were a partial explanation, but disarray among (and at times fighting between) the anti-Communist guerrillas was the major cause of the survival of the Kabul regime. A U.S. government divided over whether to place top priority on military or diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict, and Moscow’s preoccupation with more pressing issues, prevented them from agreeing on a formula for a settlement, and their respective roles declined relative to that of the various Afghan forces and the Pakistanis. Whichever combination of forces eventually emerge on top, the outlook for human rights and democracy remains bleak.

Pakistan: New leader, old problems

Since winning a plurality of seats in the November 1988 national elections, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto managed to accomplish little while alienating many key forces in the country. As leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), she spent most of her energy directing political maneuvers against opposition parties at the national and provincial level, increasingly antagonized the powerful military and civil service establishments, and failed to halt the rising violence between ethnic groups. Her government was finally dismissed in August by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the “representative” of the civil-military establishment, on the grounds that it was corrupt and had accomplished virtually nothing. While Pakistan’s Supreme Court upheld the president’s right to dismiss Bhutto on such nebulous grounds, the
establishment was motivated as much by its inability to control her as by her dismal record.

Yet the military recognized that a return to direct rule would be widely opposed, and elections were held on 24 October. Despite predictions of a close contest between Bhutto's PPP and the nine-party conservative Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), the latter won a decisive victory. Ms. Bhutto charged the election had been stolen, but an international observer delegation supported by the United States (which had warned that U.S. aid was dependent on continued democracy) said that the election was "generally open, orderly and well-administered" and that whatever irregularities took place "did not significantly alter the outcome." This was not the "free and fair" verdict given the 1988 election, but it helped to establish the legitimacy of the new government.

Nawaz Sharif, head of the IDA, and his associates face a formidable task in dealing not only with the country's serious economic problems, but in making progress in overcoming the institutional weaknesses, the shallow party loyalties, and the traditional focus of Pakistani politicians on power and the spoils of office rather than on sound government policies. Moreover, if his government's hawkish views lead it to reverse Ms. Bhutto's attempt to secure a detente with India, a crisis between South Asia's major powers could result.

Two dangerous developments dominated Indian political life in 1990. Religious and caste violence rose sharply, costing thousands of lives and threatening the country's cohesion. The second was the inability of the minority government (formed after the failure of any party to win a majority in the November 1989 elections) to hold together and implement a coherent program or to stop the growing violence in Indian public life.

Secessionist movements, especially by Sikhs in the Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir, are raising fundamental questions about Indian secularism and national unity. Punjab, without an elected state government since 1987, has been plagued by terrorist and counterterrorist violence. The Sikhs, divided over whether they want greater autonomy or independence, initially began the violence on the grounds that they were discriminated against by India's Hindu majority. The Sikhs have been further alienated by the virtually indiscriminate use of force by the security forces. The writ of the terrorists now runs through most of the Punjab, although the population is only 60 percent Sikh. Thousands die each year, and no one seems able or willing to stop the downward spiral. In Kashmir, years of Indian heavy-handedness and incoherence finally led to mass demonstrations and terrorism by the 95 percent Muslim majority in the populous Vale of Kashmir, with security forces torturing and killing suspects as well as terrorists. New Delhi's inability to find credible local allies forces it to try to crush the rebellion or concede its demand for independence—risking it would join Pakistan, which is unthinkable to India.

India was also beset by rising Hindu militancy. In October hundreds of thousands of militant Hindus organized a march in northern India in an attempt to tear down a mosque and build a temple to the Hindu god Rama on the site. The government's deployment of massive security forces prevented the Hindus from succeeding. However, its stance further weakened Prime Minister Singh's support, which had already been eroded by growing inflation and his plan to implement an affirmative action program reserving a large proportion of government jobs for lower castes—a plan that alienated upper castes and resulted in additional violence. These actions not only led the once supportive Hindu revivalist Bharatiya Janata Party actively to oppose Singh but they split his own party as well. His government's fall in November resulted in a shaky new coalition, but whether it lasts or collapses and India holds new national elections—perhaps returning Rajiv Gandhi's Congress Party to office—the outlook for Indian political life is somber.

The class and ethnic violence that has characterized Sri Lanka for several years continued in 1990, but gradually the democratically elected government has been gaining the upper hand. Having expanded its armed forces about three-fold to 60,000 men, it was successful in largely eradicating the leftist Sinhalese People's Liberation Front, although many innocent people as well as active insurgents were killed in the process. The army also made some progress against Tamil separatists—whom Indian forces had failed to subdue before leaving the country—in the northern and eastern provinces, but the government still lacked the ability either to defeat the insurgents militarily or to win Tamil trust with its offers of a large measure of provincial autonomy.

The one bright spot in South Asia was Nepal, where nation-wide mass agitation early in 1990 forced King Birendra to withdraw the thirty-year old ban on political parties. A democratic constitution was drafted and elections scheduled for April 1991, but Nepal has only begun to create a stable representative political system.

Asian Communist dilemmas
A combination of serious economic problems and the collapse of Communist rule from Berlin to Vladivostok left China, North Korea and Vietnam bewildered and beleaguered. The regimes remained in firm
if uneasy control of their countries. Despite some recognition that economic liberalization was necessary, they feared it would increase pressures for a loosening of political controls, and that more than token political liberalization would acquire a momentum of its own.

North Korea, perhaps the nation closest to pure totalitarianism in the world, retained its Orwellian political controls but its desperate economic situation meant it could no longer afford its past isolation. North Korea adopted a slightly more flexible policy toward an increasingly strong and prosperous South Korea, which had won diplomatic recognition from the Soviet Union and was engaged in substantial trade with China. Lest it be completely isolated politically, Pyongyang agreed to the first exchange of high level North-South visits in nearly two decades, but it made no significant substantive changes in its views on normalization of North-South relations or Korean unification. (East Germany's fate could hardly have escaped North Korean leaders.) Finally, North Korea adopted a more flexible stance toward Japan for the obvious purpose of securing Japanese funds, if possible as "reparations" for Japan's occupation from 1910-1945. While none of Pyongyang's moves had any immediate domestic political ramifications, an opening to the non-Communist world probably was an essential if not a sufficient condition for internal political ferment to begin.

Vietnam's position is even more complicated. It faces a sharp decrease in Soviet aid, as well as a need for a settlement of the Cambodian problem in order to normalize its political and economic relations with the non-Communist world. For both ideological and political reasons Hanoi and Beijing moved to overcome their animosity. Moreover, Hanoi in recent years has been forced by economic necessity to loosen its grip on the economy, and collectivized agriculture has been dismantled and private firms allowed to operate. Some observers see signs of greater freedom of expression, and others see evidence of continued arrests for "political" crimes—and both groups probably are accurately describing a complex reality.

There apparently is a power struggle going on over how far to move toward economic reform and how repressive the regime should be politically to keep economic liberalization from weakening its political control. The U.S. policy shift away from full support of the anti-government Cambodian coalition in mid-1990 because of fears that the end result would be the replacement of the pro-Vietnamese Cambodian government by a regime dominated by the genocidal Khmer Rouge could work to Hanoi's benefit. Yet such an outcome depends upon the success of an incredibly complicated and expensive international and regional peace plan that—even if finally agreed to—would tax the patience, skill and goodwill of all the involved parties and place unprecedented demands on U.N. officials assigned the task of implementing the scheme.

Events in China in 1990 also pointed in various directions, with some arrested dissidents freed, some kept in prison, and new arrests of political and religious figures occurring. Arrests of workers involved in the 1989 upheaval apparently have been more widespread than jailing of students, suggesting the regime's greatest fear is of a Solidarity-like workers movement. Progress was made in controlling inflation—one cause of political turmoil in recent years—but the earlier movement toward market-oriented reforms has not resumed and in some respects has been reversed.

All of this suggests that the jerry-built coalition of leaders now on top in China are semi-paralyzed with fear or divided among themselves over the best course for China—or both. In this atmosphere the regime's ability to impose rigid political controls and ideological dogmas has been quite limited for two reasons. First, relatively few officials or citizens believe in Marxist ideology of any variety any longer, and thus the renewed emphasis on indoctrination programs is largely a charade. Moreover, many officials believe the current policies as well as the present leaders are likely to be short-lived, and they prudently temper the enforcement of such policies to position themselves to survive the next shift in course.

Underlying these disparate developments is a growing pessimism among educated Chinese of their country's ability to adopt and implement a coherent reform strategy. The Communist political system is decaying and to a degree fragmenting, and some thoughtful Chinese fear that what will occur will not be a necessary decentralization but a collapse of national unity and a return to the chaos of the 1920s and 1930s. Since China lacks the ethnic divisions of the USSR and has the advantage of modern communications and transportation systems that were unavailable before midcentury, such an outcome seems unlikely. Nonetheless, even if a new generation of leaders attempts economic and political reform, China's size, poverty and deep-seated political culture at odds with the ideas and values of modern society present daunting obstacles. Under such conditions, any actions by outside powers are likely to have only a marginal effect, and even that only over a period of decades.

Other Asian developments
The major political development in South Korea in
1990 was the decision of President Roh's Democratic Justice Party to merge with two conservative opposition groups. This merger gave the new Democratic Liberal Party—in fact a coalition of convenience modeled on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party—a majority in the National Assembly and enabled it to overshadow the Party for Peace and Democracy led by Kim Dae Jung, President Roh's strongest opponent. The move also demonstrated what shallow roots the political parties have, as they are largely the instruments of authoritarian political leaders maneuvering to advance their own interests. Party mergers and splits have occurred repeatedly among Korean parties, in part because of the enduring tendency toward factionalism in the political culture. Moreover, the National Assembly was the scene of several days of physical violence in July when important bills were passed in a manner contrary to democratic process and the assembly rules. Such habits, as well as the still powerful position of the security forces in domestic affairs, indicate that South Korea's democracy remains fragile. Yet opposition parties win key by-elections, security officials are fired for activities that were once routine, and the press is far freer than in the past—all of which suggests that a return to authoritarian rule is unlikely.

Cautious movement toward democracy marked Taiwan in 1990, following the December 1989 elections in which the opposition won about 40 percent of the vote. In March President Lee Teng-hui, the island's first native Taiwanese president, was re-elected to a six-year term by the National Assembly. Yet re-election by a group of mainland legislators largely selected before the Kuomintang lost the civil war to the Communists in 1949 carried with it less than complete legitimacy, a fact recognized by Taiwan's highest court's 1990 decision that such legislators must resign by the end of 1991. After President Lee moved to reassure hardline Kuomintang (KMT) mainlanders by appointing former army general Hua Po-tsun as premier, the president convened an unprecedented national conference composed of a diverse group of politicians and scholars that agreed on further democratic reforms, provoking a backlash from hardline KMT forces. Political turbulence and some physical violence are likely to continue to characterize the reform process, but the slow and steady shift of power from the minority mainlanders toward the majority Taiwanese probably is irreversible.

The situation and outlook in the Philippines are more somber. While President Aquino successfully restored democracy, the country's high hopes of a few years ago have given way to cynicism and even despair. Except in a few provinces blessed with able leadership, old patterns of corruption and ineffective government have dashed hopes for a reduction of poverty and a reasonably just social order. Despite the need for forceful action to push reforms through the legislature and to utilize the large amounts of unspent foreign aid, President Aquino seems unable or unwilling to translate her popularity into power. (One welcome development is that better security programs have contained and perhaps begun to reverse the strength of the insurgency of the Communist New People's Army.) Events beyond Philippine control—such as major natural disasters, rising oil prices, and sharp cutbacks in remittances from Filipinos working in the Middle East—have darkened the economic outlook. The government's apparent determination to reduce and then eliminate the U.S. military bases in the country may provide psychological satisfaction to nationalist elements, but it will reduce the estimated $1 billion annually the country derives from the bases and could reduce congressional willingness to give the country priority among America's foreign aid recipients.

The military regime in Myanmar (Burma), finally responding to the widespread 1988 riots against its rule, allowed national elections in May. To its astonishment, the opposition National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi (the daughter of the country's founder) won 396 of the 485 seats at stake, while the military-backed National Unity party won 10 seats—a result not announced until early July. Since then the regime, possibly divided internally, has refused to even begin the process of handing over power and has periodically arrested additional opposition leaders as it ponders how to react to its humiliating repudiation. In September it also raided dozens of Buddhist monasteries and arrested monks who had refused to perform religious services for soldiers. The country's long-term economic decline and the regime's widespread brutality have made Myanmar a nightmare for its people, who see no chance for peaceful change and little prospect for overthrowing one of the world's worst governments.

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The Cold War has ended, the world is no longer bipolar, and the changes resonate within much of the African continent.

Namibia, Africa's last colony, attained its independence on 21 March 1990. Thus a long and sometimes bloody struggle came to an end. A new order claiming to be Africa’s most democratic is now being built. Namibia can be considered a model for post-apartheid South Africa given its peaceful transition to independence and its democratic constitution for a multi-ethnic and multi-racial people.

Namibian independence was linked to the withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola, an agreement exemplifying Soviet-United States collaboration in southern Africa. The Angola-Namibia agreement required election of a Constituent Assembly charged with the task of writing a constitution. Elections were monitored by a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). In balloting, the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) received 57 percent of the vote. Ninety-seven percent of the eligible voters cast ballots. However, the requirement for a two-thirds majority for adoption of constitutional provisions assured that SWAPO would have to compromise with the other parties.

Constitutional negotiations went smoothly, indicating a broad agreement among the delegates for independence, democracy and racial equality. SWAPO's approach is apparently no longer driven by Marxist-Leninist ideology, and its position of leadership was accepted by the other parties. SWAPO prevailed in its proposal for an executive presidency, but conceded on provisions for a bicameral parliament, proportional representation, checks and balances, and a bill of rights. Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's leader, was elected president and he was inaugurated by the U.N. secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar. A SWAPO-dominated cabinet launched a program for unity and reconciliation and pledged allegiance to democratic practices. The government's economic policy is pragmatic and includes a call for American investment. Namibia's good start was amply rewarded when governments committed over $200 million in development funds in a two-day United Nations conference.

South Africa
F.W. de Klerk has been called the Gorbachev of South Africa. He has brought changes in South Africa comparable to those Gorbachev effected in the Soviet Union.

The past year has been one of remarkable progress in the dismantling of apartheid. In February, Nelson Mandela was freed, with appropriate fanfare, after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. His release became the basis for negotiations between black leadership and the government on the abolition of apartheid and on the establishment of a post-apartheid South Africa. During the year, political parties, long driven underground were allowed to surface. Peaceful protest was no longer suppressed. Political prisoners were freed. The state of emergency was lifted. Freedom of the press, the right to free speech, and the right of peaceful assembly are now the rule.

For its part, the African National Congress (ANC) has committed itself to the peaceful transfer of power. Armed struggle has been suspended. Negotiation between the government and the ANC is an ongoing process. Leaders of other black, Colored and Asian organizations are consulted. The ruling National Party (NP) is now open to nonwhite members. Mandela, himself, has referred to the ANC/NP relationship as one of "alliance." De Klerk, according to public opinion polls, is popular with South African blacks. The legal edifice of apartheid is largely
dismantled. What remains of apartheid law are the
Group Area Act, the basis for segregation, and the
Land Act which assigns "homelands" to various
African ethnic groups. De Klerk is committed to the
termination of these laws in the next session of
Parliament.

Also on the statute books is the Population Regis-
tration Act which identifies persons by race. This
law is to be abolished as part of the negotiations
process for post-apartheid South Africa. Similarly,
enfranchisement of blacks, the most important sign of
the demise of apartheid, will be specifically asserted
in the new constitution.

Potential negotiation groups agreed that apartheid
in all of its manifestations must be brought to an
end. They also agreed that the new South Africa
must be a restructured democracy, requiring a com-
mon role for voters, majority rule, and protection of
minority rights. South Africa is a pluralistic society,
with diverse interests that must be recognized in the
fashioning of the new political order.

The world has changed and South Africa is af-
ected by that change. The Soviet Union and the East
bloc countries are no longer partisans of the ANC.
Poland and Hungary have reestablished diplomat-
ics with Pretoria. The Soviet Union has agreed to
sell its uncut diamonds through DeBeers of South
Africa. Moscow and Washington collaborate in
southern Africa. Both endorse peaceful change.

Socialism has lost its luster. Africans are taking a
pragmatic approach to economic policy. Marxism-
Leninism is frequently disavowed. Even Communists
aren't Communists anymore. Peaceful change makes
guerrilla bases and guerrilla training obsolete.

Both Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk have
travelled abroad in 1990. Mandela's visit to the
United States was the high point of his foreign
travels. There was no hint of the zealot or revolu-
tionary firebrand in his speeches. In his address to
Congress, he paid tribute to the United States, to
American values, and to the freedom it spawns. He
embraced the lessons of democracy bequeathed by
Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln. He honored the
memory of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other Afri-
can-American leaders who preceded him. He called
on Congress to continue sanctions until "the people"
of South Africa, through their ANC spokesmen, call
for their abolition. Later in the year the ANC in-
dicated that it was reconsidering its endorsement of
the international economic sanctions.

De Klerk's September visit was considerably lower
key. He talked of South Africa being on a great
journey "...toward full democracy at home and full
participation in the family of nations." He recognized
the U.S. constitutional system as a model for the
future South Africa. While he stopped short of asking
for the lifting of sanctions, he said, "We're not doing
what we do because of sanctions. We're doing what
we do because we believe it is right."

1990 has been one of the bloodiest years in South
Africa's recent history. The killings and maimings
were caused mainly, but not entirely, by the quarrel
between the ANC and the rival Inkatha party. The
ANC claimed this was an ideological conflict be-
tween their militant anti-apartheid stance and the
conservative Inkatha. Others considered it a clash
between Xhosa and Zulu ethnicities. Rivalry between
leaders also played a part Prior to 1990, internecine
fighting took place primarily in Natal, in the vicinity
of the Zulu territory. This year the battle moved into
the townships around Johannesburg. The ethnic di-
mension of this warfare is clearly a factor. The
fighting intensified after Mandela's release from
prison and after Mandela cancelled a scheduled meet-
ing with Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha's leader, to
make a joint appeal for an end to the fighting. Later
in the year, such a meeting was scheduled and the
fighting subsided.

As 1990 drew to a close, it was generally agreed
by all, outside the far Right Conservative Party and
the Far Left AZAPO movement, that negotiations
must go forward. At issue is the nature of the
negotiating process. Who will sit at the table? How
will the negotiators be chosen? Will a negotiating
body make decisions by majority votes?

The ANC will convene its Congress in July 1991
where its positions will be determined. An acceptable
process has to be hammered out. No doubt substan-
tive issues on the future political, economic and
social order will receive attention. However, process
and procedures have priority now.

Angola

Angola is inching toward a settlement that would end
fifteen years of civil war. The government and
UNITA met in mid-November, with Portugal acting
as mediator, in the hope that the meeting will result
in a final agreement to end the war.

After the accord of 22 December 1988 which
required the withdrawal of Cubans and South Afri-
cans from Angola and independence for Namibia, it
was expected that an Angolan settlement would soon
follow. In fact, the fighting continued as the warring
parties were unable to compose their differences.
MPLA, Angola's governing party, wanted to hold
power while permitting selected leaders of UNITA to
join the party. Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's leader was to
go into temporary exile. The one-party state would endure.

As the Cubans withdrew, MPLA rule grew more precarious. UNTTA's plan called for a cease-fire followed by a multi-party conference to draft a new democratic constitution that would provide for a freely elected government. Savimbi's hand was strengthened as the Bush administration with Congressional support authorized $60 million in aid for UNITA. To be sure, Moscow provided the Angolan government even higher levels of aid, about $500 million. However, the Kremlin also warned Luanda that Soviet funds would be cut. In October, Moscow and Washington urged a political settlement that they were prepared to oversee jointly. Terms for settlement included: a cease-fire; the creation of a government of national reconciliation; agreement on a multi-party political system; and abandonment of a centralized economy.

Mozambique

Mozambique, once considered Africa's most Marxist-Leninist country, is rapidly abandoning socialism. It has given up the name "Peoples" which hung before "Republic of Mozambique." It has negotiated with Renamo, seeking an end to the particularly brutal civil war which they have waged. They have conceded the need for a multi-party political system and have proposed elections in 1991. They even lowered the minimum age of eligibility for the presidency from forty to thirty-five to allow Renamo's leader, Afonzo Dhlakama to run. Renamo, no longer supported by South Africa and under international pressure to end the civil war, has edged toward an agreement.

Ethiopia

In Ethiopia yet another decade-long civil war is moving toward resolution. Recently, Issaias Afwerki, secretary general of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, predicted that Eritrean secession from Ethiopia will be achieved in a "matter of months." The Eritrean war for self-determination was launched after Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea in 1962. The territory had been an Italian colony. The U.N. General Assembly voted to make Eritrea an autonomous province of Ethiopia. In 1962, Haile Selassie abolished Eritrean autonomy and integrated the land into Ethiopia, thereby causing the Eritrean struggle for secession.

A coup which brought Mengistu Haile Mariam to power (1974) did nothing to alter Ethiopian determination to suppress the Eritreans. Mengistu prosecuted the war with vigor and gained Soviet and Cuban support. Under Mengistu's dictatorship, Ethiopia became a Marxist-Leninist state, but despite his ruthlessness the Eritrean forces could not be defeated. Cuban troops were withdrawn and, under Gorbachev's revised foreign policy, the Soviet Union cut military aid and withdrew their military advisors. On the battlefield, the Eritreans scored significant victories. The port of Massawa fell into their hands. A large Ethiopian force is surrounded in the city of Asmara, Eritrea's capital. Mengistu's military situation is desperate. He is fighting another battle against Tigrean forces who seek to free Ethiopia from Mengistu's rule.

Mengistu has undertaken political and diplomatic initiatives to save his regime, but the likely prospect is that the Ethiopian military effort will fail and that Mengistu will fall. As one unnamed diplomat observed, "He has...gone too far in blood and violence to turn back now...." An independent Eritrea is virtually assured.

Rwanda

An invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi soldiers living in Uganda threatened to spark a civil war. The conflict between Tutsis and the Hutus is of long standing. For centuries, the tall Tutsis ruled as an aristocracy over those smaller in stature—the Hutu majority. This situation endured during the years of German colonial rule and in the period of U.N. trusteeship. When the trusteeship was terminated, the territories emerged as two separate countries, Rwanda, where the Hutus took power and Burundi, where the Tutsis controlled.

The animosity between these groups continued. In Burundi, the Tutsis carried out several large-scale pogroms on the Hutus with much loss of life. The Hutus gained control of Rwanda in a 1959 civil war in which 100,000 Tutsis were slaughtered and others driven into exile, primarily into Uganda.

The October invasion was ostensibly mounted to force the repatriation of Tutsis from exile and to drive from power the government of President Juvenal Habyarimane. About 1,000 Belgian, French and Zairian soldiers were sent to help defend Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, and to bolster the small Rwandan army. The invaders sought popular support, promising an end to undemocratic and corrupt practices of the ruling regime. However, few have rallied to their cause and the invasion has apparently failed.

Liberia

A challenge to Samuel Doe's rule in Liberia began on 24 December 1989 with an invasion of the country by a small force led by Charles Taylor. The
incursion had the support of the Gio and Mano peoples. Over a period of several months, the guerrillas gained strength and advanced toward the capital, Monrovia. Some guerrillas, led by Prince Johnson, broke with Taylor and waged their own fight.

Violence and mayhem escalated. Government troops killed Gio and Mano tribesmen. They massacred 600 people who had taken refuge on the grounds of a church in Monrovia. The Taylor guerrillas were equally brutal with members of Krahn and Mandingo ethnicities. Monrovia, itself, was cut off, its people left without water, food or electricity.

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) met on 7 August, called for a cease-fire, and established a mediation committee. Great Britain and the United States stationed warships off the coast of Liberia to evacuate their nationals. Ecowas forces intervened on 23 August and then convened a "Liberian National Conference" which appointed Professor Amos Sawyer the interim head of government.

In September Samuel Doe was captured and executed by Prince Johnson’s troops. Charles Taylor has laid claim to the presidency and has been unwilling to give up the battle with his demands unsatisfied. His guerrillas were pushed out of Monrovia by forces of Ecowas, Prince Johnson and the remnants of Doe’s army. At least 10,000 Liberians were killed in the war and as many as half the country’s people fled into exile. Sawyer returned to Monrovia to take command on 21 November. Hostilities ebbed, but a political settlement has not yet been reached.

**AIDS**

AIDS now commands the attention of African leaders. The disease is burgeoning and engulfing an increasing number of countries and a growing population. In 1987, the World Health Organization reported 2.5 million cases in Africa. By 1990 the number exceeded 5 million. Blantyre, Malawi reported a 2 percent infection rate in 1984. Today 22 percent of its people have AIDS. Lusaka’s AIDS population doubled in the last three years. Kigali hopes to stabilize the infected population at 30 percent.

The human tragedy aside, African governments are beginning to assess the impact of the loss of large numbers of persons in the prime of life. In Malawi, the economic consequences of the disease are already keenly felt. The government, having rejected AIDS tests as required by South Africa, has suffered a large reduction in the numbers of Malawians working in South Africa and lost much of the $21 million in remittances.

The most severely hit countries with at least 20 percent of the population infected are Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. Four African countries report an urban rate of infection in the range of 10 to 20 percent. Five other fall into the still high 5 to 10 percent range.

While AIDS in Europe, North America, and among whites in South Africa is mainly a sickness of gays, in black Africa it is a disease of heterosexuals. A major cause of infections is the prevalent use of prostitutes, often infected, by highly transient African men. The threatened AIDS epidemic has energized measures to stem and reverse its flow. At the international level, the WHO has increased its budget from $20 million in 1987 to $90 million for 1990, with half of that sum earmarked for Africa. African countries are now screening blood for transfusions for AIDS and trying to halt the re-use of needles. They have mounted a vigorous educational effort on disease prevention, and they have promoted the use of condoms.

**Democracy gains**

Political developments around the continent during 1990 suggest a trend toward democracy and free market economies. In the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny abolished his Democratic Party’s monopoly on power. He was challenged for the presidency by Laurent Gbabgo, leader of the Ivorian Peoples Front. While the eighty-five-year-old leader was reelected handily, a multi-party system has taken hold. Benin renounced Marxism-Leninism, revised its constitution which legalizes opposition parties, and elected a dissident as the new prime minister. Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia since 1964, agreed to a referendum on the legalization of opposition parties. Julius Nyerere, the still-influential former president of Tanzania, told his people that they could learn a “lesson or two from Eastern Europe.” In Gabon, President Omar Bongo gave in to public pressure for multiple parties and appointed an opposition prime minister. Even President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire has, after twenty-five years of not entirely benevolent dictatorship, announced the right of up to two parties to challenge his own.

Only Kenya defies this trend. The regime of Daniel arap Moi has become increasingly oppressive. Because Kenya has enjoyed relative prosperity in a free market economy, a significant and vocal middle class has emerged. When two former cabinet members, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, called for the legalization of opposition parties, they were vilified, harassed and eventually arrested. Demonstra-
tions and riots ensued producing a brutal crackdown. Moi vowed to stay in office ten years or more and promised to hunt down his opponents "like rats."

Simmering tensions exist within the country. Moi's behavior is condemned in Europe. Kenya's relations with the United States are markedly embittered. Smith Hempstone, the U.S. ambassador to Kenya asserted, in a speech to the local Rotary Club, that Congress is likely to concentrate foreign aid to countries with a good record in human right and multi-party politics. The party newspaper responded with an editorial under the headline, "Shut up, Mr. Ambassador." Now Congress threatens a reduction or a freeze on foreign aid to Kenya. —

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During 1990, the international crisis precipitated by Iraq’s August invasion of Kuwait overshadowed other events in the Middle East. Iraq's refusal to abide by United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for withdrawal from Kuwait raised prospects of a new Middle East war, and pushed efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict into the background. During 1990 nearly every country in the region was cited by Amnesty International and/or the U.S. Department of State for violations of human rights. The total number of political prisoners was in the thousands and the number of prisoners of conscience, several hundred.

Israel, Arabs & the U.S.

Until August major attention focused on international attempts to restart the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Differences between the U.S. and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir over peace negotiations, over settlement of new Jewish immigrants in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, and over relations between Israel and Arabs in the territories, strained ties between the two countries. A major issue was the selection of Palestinian Arab representatives for prospective negotiations with Israel. Shamir adamantly opposed representation of any Palestinian associated with the PLO or who resided in Jerusalem. The issue also led to collapse of the National Unity Government (NUG) formed in 1988, when the two leading parties in the NUG, Likud and Labor, differed over acceptance of an American compromise proposal. The Likud party itself was also divided between those who opposed and those who supported a plan offered by Shamir.

In February, Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon resigned from Likud’s Central Committee, charging that the plan proposed by Shamir would lead to separation of the territories from Israel and eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. A few days later the Labor party Central Bureau faced Shamir with an ultimatum calling for acceptance of a compromise with the U.S. This led to Shamir’s firing of Deputy Prime Minister and Labor party leader Shimon Peres in March, the resignations of all other Labor cabinet members, and a Knesset vote of sixty to fifty-five dissolving the government because of Shamir’s refusal to accept a U.S. framework for talks with Palestinians.

By March it was evident that there would be an influx to Israel of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union as a consequence of both an easing of emigration restrictions and a rising tide of anti-Semitism. By the end of the year the number of Jews moving to Israel was well over 100,000, larger than any annual immigration since the early years of the state. Although only a small number of these new immigrants had been settled in Arab territories captured by Israel in 1967, there was apprehension among Palestinians and in the surrounding Arab states that many more would be established in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Arab concerns alerted the U.S. and the international community despite Israeli assertions that large numbers would not be moved to the territories. Nevertheless, Israel refused to guarantee that these areas would be closed to new immigrants, maintaining that such pressures were interference in the country’s internal affairs.

The dispute arose as Israel was requesting from the U.S. guarantees for $400 million loans to construct immigrant housing. The situation was exacerbated in April when 150 orthodox Jewish settlers moved into several buildings belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church near the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem’s Old City. This incident touched off rioting by Arab protesters, divisions within the Jewish community, and further undermined
relations with the United States. A few days later Israel's High Court ordered the settlers to evacuate the occupied buildings.

It took three months until a new government could be formed; Peres failed to obtain support necessary for a cabinet, whereupon Shamir started negotiations and in June was able to form a right-wing nationalist coalition with support from several religious parties. When Shamir imposed restrictive new conditions on his own plan for talks with the Palestinians and for Gaza and West Bank elections, he so irritated U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that the secretary remarked: “There won’t be any dialogue and there won’t be any peace, and the United States of America can’t make it happen... everybody over there should know that the telephone number is 1-202-456-1414; when you’re serious about peace, call us.”

Relations between the U.S. government and the PLO, which had been initiated in 1988, were also jeopardized in May as the result of an abortive speed-boat attack on Israel’s Mediterranean shore. The attack was planned by Abul Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, one of the groups associated with the PLO. Although the raid failed, President Bush suspended American contact with the PLO until its leaders explicitly denounced Abul Abbas, an action that PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat refused to take, although he rejected terrorism in general terms.

Within Israel, the Intifada, or Palestinian Arab uprising, that began in December 1987, continued through its third year. During the spring there was a decrease in violent incidents; Shamir’s new defense minister, Moshe Arens, appeared to relax pressures in the occupied territories by decreasing the presence of Israeli troops in heavily populated Arab areas. However, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August, tensions between Israeli Jews and Arabs again intensified. Many Palestinians became ardent supporters of Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein, attracted by his vehement anti-Israel and anti-U.S. rhetoric; the years of living under occupation so alienated many of them that in desperation they seem to be taken by promises of a "solution" to their problems through force. Furthermore, the leaders of the PLO, although officially neutral, seemed to be sympathetic to Iraq’s position in the dispute.

Several incidents during 1990 drove the wedge deeper between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. In addition to the question of settling Soviet immigrants in the territories, there were a number of attacks by Jews on Arabs and Arabs on Jews, usually followed by widespread demonstrations and protests. The most severe of these incidents occurred in October when 18 or more Arabs were killed and over 100 wounded by Israeli security or police forces in Jerusalem during a melee at the Wailing Wall and the Haram es-Sharif (Temple Mount), the Jerusalem sites holiest to Jews and Muslims respectively.

The incident was sparked by rumors spread among worshippers at the mosques within the Haram that Jewish zealots were on their way to lay the cornerstone for a new Jewish temple within the Muslim enclosure. Muslim protests against the rumored Jewish intrusion erupted into violence as mobs within the Haram began to throw stones on Jews who were praying at the Wailing Wall, adjoining and just below the Temple Mount. The resulting violence and casualties were the worst in Jerusalem since the 1967 war.

The issue was brought to the U.N. Security Council where it became the subject of heated debate for several days, distracting international attention from the Iraq-Kuwait crisis that had been the focus of world concern and Security Council efforts for the previous two months. After intense bargaining between the U.S. and other Council members who desired severe censure of Israel, a compromise resolution was passed unanimously condemning Israel and calling on the secretary general to report on the situation following dispatch of an investigation mission to Jerusalem.

The resolution was notable because it was unanimous and the first public condemnation of Israel by the U.S. since the invasion of Lebanon in 1982; it was only the third time in U.N. history that the U.S. had taken such a step. It seemed to many observers that U.S. action in this instance was motivated by fear of disrupting the international consensus that Washington had developed toward the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. Although the U.S. and several of its European allies had attempted to prevent linkage between the Arab-Israel and the Iraq-Kuwait crises, it seemed that the Jerusalem disturbances and several other eruptions of unrest associated with the Arab-Israel conflict did link the two situations, if not from the American, then from an Arab perspective.

The Iraqi invasion

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute became an international crisis when President Saddam Hussein sent his troops across the border on 2 August. The dispute had been brewing for several months since Kuwait exceeded by some 20 percent the production of the oil quota allocated to it under agreement within OPEC. Over-production of quotas by OPEC members resulted in a decline of world oil prices which fell below $20 per
barrel prior to August, a price generally accepted as reasonable by both producers and consumers. (During the crisis the price fluctuated, at one point over $40 a barrel.) Iraq maintained that it was losing $1 billion a year for every dollar decline in the price of oil.

Baghdad also demanded that Kuwait forgive some $15 billion in loans advanced during the Iraq-Iran war, a conflict that according to Saddam Hussein saved the Arab Gulf states from the threat of Iranian Shi’ite fundamentalism. Additional demands included surrender by Kuwait of Bubiyan and Warba, two islands adjoining Iraq’s outlet to the Persian Gulf, and control over the Rumaila oilfield, one of the world’s largest petroleum reserves on the border between the two countries.

After several weeks of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait that lasted until early August, Saddam Hussein invaded, defeating Kuwaiti forces within a day or two. As his forces reached the border of Saudi Arabia, apprehension grew that he would also invade that country. Saddam’s assertions that he did not intend to attack Saudi Arabia were discounted because he had made similar denials about his intentions in Kuwait before taking it over. Furthermore, after invading, Iraq promised to withdraw. Instead, Iraq’s military dismanded all local authority and declared that Kuwait was its nineteenth province. Reports from Kuwait in the next few months indicated that the Iraqi occupation was brutal, marked by suppression of all civil liberties, killing of citizens, mass imprisonments or detention, the use of torture, looting Kuwaiti property and removing it to Iraq.

With the end of the Cold War and new amicable relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it was possible to develop an international consensus against the invasion; the result was a series of Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq, calling on it to leave Kuwait immediately, imposing an economic blockade, and several other measures intended to isolate the invader and pressure it into evacuation. On 29 November the Council authorized the use of military measures to dislodge Iraq should economic and other means prove unsuccessful.

As of November Saddam Hussein resisted these pressures, using counter-measures of his own. These included forcing all foreign embassies and consulates to close in Kuwait, or attempting to starve them out; seizing as hostages against outside military intervention several thousand Americans, Europeans, Japanese and other persons who were living in Kuwait or Iraq. Hundreds of these individuals were used as “human shields” and incarcerated at strategic sites to prevent attacks from outside the country. Saddam Hussein also attempted to deter military intervention by dividing the international opposition through releasing hostages of only some countries, by inviting notable figures to Baghdad for “peace” discussions, and by hinting that a compromise might be found between military measures against him and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Later, he offered to release all hostages.

In an effort to neutralize Iran in the new crisis, Saddam Hussein agreed to Teheran’s conditions for settlement of the eight-year-long Gulf War. These included evacuation of Iraq’s troops from areas it still held in Iran, an exchange of some 100,000 prisoners, and the relinquishment of claims to exclusive control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway by accepting the 1975 agreement Iraq had renounced at the start of the war in 1980.

**The U.S., the Gulf, and Arab division**

The U.S. took the lead in measures against Iraq, primarily by dispatch of over 250,000 American troops to Saudi Arabia in operation “Desert Shield,” initially intended to ward off invasion from Kuwait. By year’s end the number of American troops in Arabia was expected to be some 400,000. American policy fixed on total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq and restoration of Kuwait’s rulers as the basic condition for ending the crisis. Within the U.S. government and among some of its Arab allies, withdrawal by Iraq was not sufficient. Some insisted that Iraq’s military power be diminished, especially its capacity to use missiles, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons. However, most European nations, including the USSR, focused on the immediate problem of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, preferably by peaceful rather than military means.

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute divided the Arab world more than ever before. Only twelve of the twenty-one Arab League members supported a League resolution in August condemning the invasion and calling on Iraq to withdraw. Six members, Djibouti, Jordan, Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen and the PLO voted against. Disagreements among League members led to resignation of the organization’s secretary general and of its representative in the U.S. Yemen, the current Arab member of the Security Council, abstained on several U.N. resolutions calling for sanctions such as interference with diplomatic missions. Jordan’s King Hussein and PLO Chairman Arafat attempted to be mediators between Iraq and the rest of the world. Although Jordan agreed to obey the Security Council blockade, it attached conditions. King Hussein’s position was extremely difficult because the 60 percent of his population that is Palestinian vociferously supported Saddam. Many Jordanians started
voluntary campaigns to succor Iraq when it appeared that food shortages might arise there.

The economic impact of the crisis was worldwide, but felt most heavily in the Middle East, especially in Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, and among foreign workers in Kuwait and Iraq. The initial decline of petroleum available on the world market caused by the severance of supplies from Kuwait and Iraq (about 10 percent of marketed oil) led to a 50 percent rise in gasoline prices in the U.S. Even when the shortages were overcome as a result of increased production by Saudi Arabia and other producers, the world market price remained far above its pre-August level.

Among those most seriously affected by the crisis were several hundred thousands of the more than 2 million foreign workers in Kuwait and Iraq. Most of these were low-paid employees—in services such as restaurants, hotels, street cleaning and the like—from lesser developed countries including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Bangladesh and so forth. After the invasion, hundreds of thousands fled to neighboring countries, principally Jordan, leaving behind homes, years of savings, and most other property they had acquired in Kuwait. Because neither they nor many of their governments had funds for repatriation, thousands were trapped in the desert for weeks along the border between Jordan and Iraq. After several months most of the refugees were, with international assistance, returned to their homelands or located in Middle East refugee camps.

In addition to these Asian refugees, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians, Egyptians, Palestinians and Yemenis were dislocated from Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where they had also been employed. The Arab workers returned to Middle Eastern countries which were among the most impoverished, unable to provide the returnees with employment.

They became, thus, a major drain on already overburdened economies.

Jordan's economy was disrupted because a major portion of its energy was provided by oil imported from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Because of King Hussein's reserve toward sanctions against Iraq, the Saudi government cut off its supply of oil. As a result of the economic blockade, Jordan lost more than half its imports and exports, which had come via Iraq. Its only port city, Akaba, was nearly shut down because most cargos had been designated for Iraq.

In retaliation for Yemen's reservations about measures against Iraq, Saudi Arabia forced hundreds of thousands of its estimated million Yemeni workers to leave; return to their homeland was a blow to its economy, ranked by the U.N. as one of the poorest in the world.

Despite Egypt's full support for the international efforts against Iraq, its economic problems were also intensified. It lost several billion dollars from its three principal sources of income—workers' remittances, Suez Canal revenues and tourism. This and other losses of income totaled over $9 billion, the equivalent of almost half its gross domestic product. Turkey, another supporter of quarantine measures against Saddam Hussein, also lost substantial revenues—from oil pipeline revenues and trade with Iraq—totaling some $7 billion.

In an effort to assist countries whose economies were disrupted by the crisis, the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group was established in September. Its members included the United States, the European Community, Japan and Persian Gulf oil production states. Early in November they promised to give $13 billion to the nations most hard hit—Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Morocco, Pakistan, and the Philippines were also mentioned as possible aid recipients.

During May, North and South Yemen ended years of hostility by uniting in the new Republic of Yemen, the first time in over 1,000 years that the two Yemens were one. With a total of 13 million, it became the most populous state in the Arabian peninsula. However, it was a union of poverty, desperately poor South Yemen with a per capita income of just over $400 combined with North Yemen where per capita income was about $600.

In Lebanon violence reached new peaks. But by November it appeared that the fifteen-year-long civil war might be ending. The stand-off between the Syrian-backed, internationally recognized government and the dissident force of General Michel Aoun was broken in October when Syrian troops, at the Lebanese government's request, smashed General Aoun's army. Casualties were heavy—over 750 killed and thousands wounded. To avoid further bloodshed, General Aoun surrendered, seeking refuge in Beirut's French embassy. Within the next few weeks President Elias Hrawi, with Syrian support, called on parliament to implement provisions of the 1989 Taif agreements that provided for fundamental constitutional changes. These recognized the population distribution that favored the country's several Muslim groups. The various militias that had divided the capital began to leave and barriers between Christian and Muslim sectors were gradually removed.

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1990: A Europe Transformed

Wayne C. Thompson

Not since the 1815 Congress of Vienna redrew Europe's map in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars have Europeans, joined by the U.S. and Canada, gone so far to replace conflict with cooperation. On 19 November 1990 the thirty-four members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), meeting in Paris, declared an end to "the era of confrontation and division in Europe" and welcomed "a new era of democracy, peace and unity." French President Francois Mitterand noted a significant difference from the Congress of Vienna: "There are no winners and no losers sitting around this table."

In many ways, the agreements merely ratified and codified far-reaching developments already underway since Mikhail Gorbachev had declared the end of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, for which he was awarded the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize. In the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union, defense budgets were being cut everywhere in Europe. The Warsaw Pact had become moribund, and the dismantling of its military structure is possible in 1991. The newly democratic Eastern European countries have already negotiated the gradual withdrawal of all Red Army forces from their territory. A freshly united Germany is not only diminishing its Bundeswehr to 370,000 troops in 1992, but is being slowly relieved of most of the foreign troops and weapons on its soil since 1945.

Soviet nuclear arms have been taken out of the eastern part of Germany, leaving a de facto nuclear-free zone; the 380,000 strong Red Army contingent is scheduled to follow by 1994. The U.S. began withdrawing 50,000 troops and hundreds of its best tanks and equipment from Germany for use in Saudi Arabia, a prelude to further troop cuts. Its nuclear weapons in Europe had sunk from 6,500 to fewer than 3,500, with a further 1,200 nuclear artillery shells slated for removal. Its artillery shells filled with poison gas had been removed in September for destruction on an isolated Pacific island. France, Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium and Canada were also drawing up plans for bringing their forces home from a much-changed Germany.

The CSCE nations pledged to refrain from using or even threatening force against each other. Reiterating an earlier NATO announcement that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy, they declared that "they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship." While ceilings on troop levels will be worked out in 1991, they agreed to destroy a quarter million conventional arms in what the Economist called "the biggest scrap-metal deal in history." Neither side will be permitted to have more than 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters from the Atlantic to the Urals. Since the Warsaw Pact countries had an overwhelming quantitative advantage, they will have to make more than 90 percent of the reductions. Thanks to a complicated monitoring and verification system, a surprise attack will be impossible. A conflict prevention center was established in Vienna.

Americans have misgivings about the CSCE gaining an institutional structure that could one day replace NATO, in which the U.S. still assumes the lead. However, many Europeans wish to see a stronger CSCE in order to ensure that the USSR and Eastern Europe will not be excluded from economic and political advancements in Western Europe. As a compromise, a small CSCE secretariat was created in Prague, and annual foreign minister meetings are to be held in a new CSCE Council. The agreements bind the signatories to respect free elections, free markets and human rights. The new harmony and the
extent of American-Soviet cooperation were reflected in the common action supporting U.N. and U.S. efforts to confront Iraq's 2 August invasion of Kuwait.

German unification

The meeting crowned a development that Chancellor Helmut Kohl had said in Moscow two years earlier he would never see in his own lifetime: German unity. Since 1945 many observers had come to regard a divided Germany as essential to a stable and peaceful Europe. But on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall tumbled down, and in December and March, the last two Communist governments, led by Egon Krenz and Hans Modrow collapsed. East Germans conducted the only successful revolution in German history, and it was a bloodless one. On 18 March East German voters handed the conservative "Alliance for Germany," led by Kohl's Christian Democrats, a stunning victory in their first free election since 1932. As in 1949, Germans turned to the CDU as the party of prosperity and assured democracy.

The train was speeding toward unity, and the best the Bonn government could do was to make it an orderly, legal process. There was no time for a transition, no pause to "study the problems." A breathless Kohl, seeing a unique opportunity, announced in February: "We are jumping with a single leap!" He waved aside Social Democrats' call for a more deliberate process and the demand of many intellectuals for a "better" East Germany treading a "third path" between capitalism and socialism.

The next steps toward unity on 3 October were taken with dizzying rapidity. On 1 July the West German mark was introduced in the GDR in a currency reform without precedence on such a large scale. In a stunning diplomatic breakthrough, Kohl went to the Soviet Union 14-16 July to get Gorbachev's assurances that he would not stand in the way of German unity and that a united Germany could decide "freely and by itself if, and in which alliance it desires membership"; in other words Germany would not have to leave NATO in order to be united. Returning to Moscow on 12 September, Bonn's leaders joined GDR Chancellor Lothar de Maiziere and the foreign ministers of the four Allied Powers to sign the "two plus four" treaty granting full sovereignty to Germany and suspending the four powers' rights. The CSCE endorsed this agreement in New York on 1 October. It went into effect at midnight on 2 October.

Unity left unsettled business for a part of Germany in which the economy had to be privatized and in which the secret police, Stasi, supported by 85,000 officers and over a half million informants, had penetrated every niche of GDR society and maintained files on 6 million persons. Germans must wrestle with the problem of what to do with such files, which were assembled with a complete disregard for the individual's privacy. The files hold many of the keys to rooting out and punishing those persons who suppressed citizens' freedom, but their misuse could again endanger that freedom. They shed light on the GDR's extensive contacts with terrorist organizations and the sheltering of eight fugitive West German Red Army Faction killers. They also can help Bonn uncover spies who had infiltrated the FRG more thoroughly than had ever been imagined. Revelations were made almost daily. The biggest catch was Klaus Kuron, a senior West German counter-intelligence officer in charge of converting East German spies into double agents. Gabriele Gast, who helped prepare a top-secret intelligence summary for Chancellor Kohl, had passed copies to East Berlin for six years. Former GDR citizens must confront their own troubled past.

The campaign for the first free all-German election in almost six decades was marred by bloodshed, as SPD chancellor candidate, Oskar Lafontaine, and CDU interior minister and reported heir to Kohl's party leadership, Wolfgang Schauble, were seriously wounded by deranged assassins. Other political figures were attacked by terrorists, making it dangerous for public servants to face their people. The prelude for the 2 December federal elections were state elections in the five newly recreated lands in the former GDR on 14 October; the CDU won in four of them. Therefore, few observers were surprised to see the CDU/FDP coalition win a resounding victory in December and Chancellor Kohl reap the electoral reward for presiding over the mendig of Germany's division.

Columbia University historian Fritz Stern noted that "Germany has been given something uncommon: another chance. The century is ending as it began, with a major German lead in Europe based on economic clout, technological advance, and human efficiency and performance... [but] under much more favorable circumstances than in the pre-1914 age of rough-hewn nationalism." There were few signs that unification would make Germany more assertive; a survey taken by Der Spiegel in October indicated that only 23 percent of German respondents thought Germany should be a major power in Europe, versus 47 percent who opposed it.

Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher knew that while no European country wanted to thwart German unity, there was uneasiness about the
possibility that an economically powerful Germany, 43 percent larger than before and more populous than any country West of Russia, would dominate Europe. Most European leaders were too polite to express these fears publicly, but they had a lively private existence.

To minimize these fears, Germany maintained its low diplomatic profile, eschewing all suggestions of having a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, signing landmark treaties with the USSR and Poland, and, above all, continuing to push for European unity. On 9 November it signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union that amounted to the closest links the Soviet had with any major Western nation. It contains a section affirming that both nations "will refrain from any threat or use of force which is directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other side." Neither country would aid an aggressor against the other. The French had avoided such a far-reaching nonaggression statement in the treaty of cooperation it had signed with the Soviet Union in October. But Bonn officials insist that their agreement was aimed at forging a new relationship with the USSR in a way consistent with Germany's obligation with NATO, which is a defensive alliance.

The ink was hardly dry when Germany signed a treaty with Poland on 14 November fixing their mutual border along the Oder-Neisse Line. The formerly German land to the East of this line constituted a third of Poland's territory. Genscher stated bluntly that "we Germans are aware that the treaty does not surrender anything that was not lost long ago as the result of a criminal war and a criminal system." But he also admitted that settling this last major dispute of the war: "For those who have lost their homelands, who suffered expulsion [after 1945], it is an especially painful one."

The march toward European unity
The most important German reassurance is its press for further European unity. President Mitterrand and EC President Jacques Delors were especially determined to dilute German power by binding it more tightly into Europe. In April they extracted a promise from Kohl to step up European integration and accept European Monetary Union (EMU) by the end of the decade. The FRG's central bank, which has had its hands full operating the present European Monetary System (EMS) and keeping the mark stable after the currency union with the GDR in July, is not pleased. However, the Bundesbank's objections are technical, whereas those of Britain's then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, were rooted in principle. "In my view, we have surrendered enough." Her foot-dragging on European unity proved to be her undoing.

The willingness of France and Germany to relinquish more sovereignty to Europe widened the chasm between the U.K. and its continental partners. This was at exactly the time that French and British workers were burrowing their way toward each other under the English Channel, opening the path for completion of the "Chunnel" in mid-1993. Thatcher's cabinet had been rocked by high-level resignations stemming from disagreements over Europe: In 1986 Michael Heseltine stormed out because he wanted a European consortium, not one from the U.S., to purchase a British helicopter company. In 1989 Nigel Lawson left because he wanted to include the pound in EMS. The fatal resignation—and the catalyst for her downfall—was that of Sir Goeffrey Howe, the last surviving member of her original 1979 cabinet and an architect of "Thatcherism." He charged in parliament that her obstruction in Europe carried "serious risks for our nation."

This devastating speech led to a successful challenge to her leadership in late November. After a historic eleven-year rule, the longest prime ministership since the Victorian era and the longest consecutive one since the Napoleonic age, Thatcher resigned. The events leading to her downfall related to Europe, but the reason why 45 percent of her parliamentary party colleagues voted against her was that she was leading her party toward defeat in the next election scheduled for mid-1992. For eighteen months her party had trailed in the polls a Labour Party that has become more moderate and friendlier toward the EC. The Britain which she had changed irreversibly was again experiencing 11 percent inflation, the highest of any major industrial country, a growing trade deficit, a slow-down in economic growth, and intense domestic opposition to her poll tax for local governments. With her passing, the U.K. entered a period under John Major, Britain's youngest prime minister this century. Since he was the Iron Lady's protege and hand-picked successor, Thatcherism will survive, albeit in a less strident form.

Another woman's star rose across the Irish Sea. Mary Robinson, endorsed by the minority Labour Party, was elected president of the Irish republic. For years she has opposed Catholic positions on contraception, divorce and homosexuality. Although her hard-won post is largely ceremonial in Ireland's parliamentary democracy, her election signals a potentially important change from traditional social attitudes. The fact that she is married to a Protestant
manifests tolerance on this religiously torn island. The IRA failed to get the message, though, as it crossed another grisly threshold in its effort to murder the British out of Ireland: It forced innocent drivers, whose families were held hostage, to drive explosive-laden vans into British check-points in Northern Ireland. Such disregard for life helped prompt the pope to appoint Bishop Cahal B. Daly, a fierce critic of IRA terrorism, as Ireland's primate.

The irresistible logic of European unity has affected countries all over the continent. Austria, Malta and Cyprus have formally applied to the EC, and interest has quickened in the Nordic countries, even though the EC announced that it would accept no more applications for full membership until 1993. Sweden faces debilitating economic problems, which include high inflation and current-account deficit and low productivity. This caused Ingvar Carlsson's Social Democratic to fall briefly in 1990 and to rethink Sweden's position toward the EC. The jolt of competition that membership would bring could lift Sweden out of the doldrums. Therefore, Foreign Minister Sven Andersson recommended that Sweden, Norway and Finland should jointly negotiate.

With the Cold War over, the Soviet Union no longer opposes their entry, and neutrality ceases to be the obstacle it once was. The new attitude was shown by the leader of the ruling Conservative party (KOK) in Finland, Ilkka Suoninen: "If the world changes from confrontation to more cooperation, then where does neutrality lie?" Finland's entire approach to foreign affairs, which has centered on not provoking the Soviet Union in any way, is drifting toward formal ties with the West. The same applies to Switzerland, where interest in EC membership is rising. It submitted its applications to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and, for the first time ever, it joined an economic embargo, supporting U.N. policy against Iraq.

It was controversy over European policy that caused the collapse of the Conservative-led coalition in Norway, led by Jan Syse. Norway had negotiated EC membership in 1972, but its voters rejected it, fearing adverse cosmopolitan effects on Norwegian society. In 1990 public opinion polls showed that citizens now favor membership. During talks between the EC and the six European Free Trade Association countries (EFTA) aiming at a link with the EC known as the European Economic Area (EEA), the Center party objected to allowing foreign firms to operate in Norway without government permission and therefore scuttled the coalition. This left Gro Harlem Brundtland and her Labor party to form yet another minority government. In an effort to obtain authority to reform Denmark's system of taxes, which range from 52 percent to 68 percent of personal income, Europe's second-highest rate after Sweden, the Conservative Prime Minister Poul Schluter called early elections in December 1990.

**Immigration: political dynamite for Europe**

People flee from collapsing empires and economies. The peace settlement after the First World War left a quarter of Eastern Europeans as minorities under alien rule, and each of the USSR's fifteen republics is a patchwork of ethnic groups. Communism's released grip, the break-up of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European empire, and the potential splintering of multi-national states such as Yugoslavia, have unleashed a westward migration which could become a flood. Economic distress and population explosions in northern and western Africa have sent millions of Arabs and blacks northward. Such a massive influx threatens to overwhelm welfare systems, exacerbate social unrest in Western Europe, and make the EC's plans for the free flow of goods, capital, and people by 1993 a dangerous pipe-dream. In this century massive migrations in Europe have sparked ethnic massacres and pogroms. This time it is causing domestic backlashes and fueling the rise of xenophobic right-wing parties, despite the fact that foreigners are needed in many countries to compensate for low birth rates and that prosperous Europeans want others to do their dirty and dangerous work.

Germany tightened its asylum laws, but still accepts ethnic Germans from the East, who have numbered 700,000 since the Berlin Wall fell. According to 1990 polls, two-thirds of respondents believe that immigrants have unfairly taken advantage of the welfare system. Polish street vendors and Romanian Gypsies are blamed for rising crime and have been attacked by rowdy youths. Even more embarrassing for a country with Germany's past was Bonn's decision to halt Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union; 4,000 had entered Germany in the summer of 1990, and the government concluded that too many wanted to resettle in Germany. This incensed some members of Germany's 40,000-strong Jewish community. While others are debating whether to encourage Bonn to accept more Soviet Jews, one German Jewish leader admitted that "it's the old internal conflict between German Jews and Jews from the East They are different from us and much more different from the Germans. We get along well with the Germans."

In September, Austria, which had helped spark the fall of the GDR by opening its border in the summer...
of 1989, began requiring entry visas for Poles. It sent 1,500 soldiers to its border with Hungary to prevent Romanians from sneaking in through the woods. In October, the anti-immigrant backlash was visible in parliamentary elections. Led by the youthful and charismatic Jörg Haider, the far-right Freedom Party (FPO) increased its share of the vote from 10 percent to 17 percent, at the expense of the Christian Democrats (OVP), which fell from 41 percent to 32 percent. FPO posters saying "Don't Let Vienna Turn into Chicago!" found a receptive audience. Despite scandals within the Social Democratic Party, the SPO, led by Chancellor Franz Vranitsky, emerged the big winner, garnering 43 percent of the votes.

The OVP must bear the onus that one of its members, President Kurt Waldheim, remains an international outcast because of his part in Nazi atrocities in the Balkans. In July, for the first time since he became president in 1986, he was visited by a Western head of state, Cypriot President George Vassiliou. His hopes that the international boycott was being permanently broken by visits from Presidents Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia and Richard von Weizsacker of Germany were dashed when Havel said in his presence that "whoever fears to look his past in the face must necessarily fear what is to come. Lies cannot save us from lies."

Racism
Racism was the main domestic political problem in France, which is particularly vulnerable: it has 4.5 million legal immigrants, half of whom are Arabs and a fourth black. This represents over 7 percent of its population and does not include illegals or their children born in France, who therefore automatically become citizens. A government survey in 1990 revealed that three-fourths of respondents thought there were too many Arabs in France, and almost half believed there were too many blacks. Arabs are the targets of attacks and harassment, and conflict in the Middle East heightens the tensions even further. Earlier immigrant groups are often among the opponents of the new arrivals. Portuguese- and Spanish-born workers in the Marseilles area are among Jean-Marie Le Pen's most fervent supporters. His right-wing National Front consistently rides the xenophobic crest to win almost 15 percent of the votes in any election.

Jacques Chirac, former prime minister and leader of the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) party, noted that "today's racism is the result of exasperation with too many foreigners who make life unbearable for the native French." Worse, France experienced another outbreak of anti-Semitism, which manifested itself in appalling desecrations of Jewish grave sites. In the words of Socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard, the government has tried in vain to "stop the gangrene from spreading." As in many other Western European countries, some inner-city schools have non-French majorities, which are blamed for rising crime and lower educational standards. At the same time, many of the student protestors demanding tighter security in schools, more teachers, smaller classes and better facilities were themselves immigrant children, who saw their chances for advancement being curbed by inadequate educational opportunities.

The Socialist government, held responsible for the 9 percent unemployment, faced strikes from other sectors as well. In June and October, hundreds of judges, prosecutors and prison wardens protested a lack of equipment and funding. They also retaliated against a controversial amnesty law which rescued party officials from prosecution for illicit campaign financing. Nevertheless, the popular prime minister survives with his minority government, despite serious feuding within the Socialist Party (PS) over who should succeed Mitterrand as presidential candidate in 1995. In November Rocard narrowly defeated the ninth vote of no-confidence in the National Assembly leveled against his cabinet, which contains only twenty-two Socialists among forty-eight ministers. His opponents were not only the badly divided conservative parties, but also the Communists, whose decline continues. Rocard might be the first prime minister in the history of the Fifth Republic to survive the full five years of a parliamentary term.

Italy as a bridge
Until recently Italy was a land of emigration, but its long coastline facing North Africa has made it a natural bridge between the burgeoning populations of Africa and the rich nations of Europe. Not wishing to damage its good relations with its Arab neighbors on the other side of the Mediterranean, Italy has not wanted to impose quotas. To encourage its growing number of illegal residents to register with the authorities, it offered its generous welfare benefits to non-EC citizens, but this merely stimulated even greater immigration. In a country which thought it was above racism, daily headlines now report racial strife. Nowhere was that more visible than in Florence, where the presence of hundreds of North African street vendors sparked a protest march in February to decry the influx. Gangs of white rowdies set upon the newcomers with baseball bats and iron
Around the World

bars. Unable to agree with his Communist allies on how to deal with this problem, Socialist mayor Georgio Morales resigned, declaring that "not even God could resolve the present situation in Florence!"

In Northern Italy competition between African immigrants and southern Italians for blue collar and other low-paying jobs has sparked outbreaks of violence. Profiting from the tensions are several regional autonomy parties, especially the Lombard League, which rocketed to 19 percent of the vote in that region's elections. They have capitalized on local dissatisfaction against what they see as misrule by Rome, which does not seem to act vigorously enough to stem the wave of immigrants and to reverse Northern Italy's subsidizing of the South. They charge that too much of those funds end up in the pockets of Mafia contractors. Indeed, the Neapolitan Camorra and Calabrian 'Ndrangheta families were believed to have been behind the killing of nine candidates or outgoing members of municipal and regional assemblies during local election campaigns in Campania and Calabria; other candidates were threatened or shot in the legs. This was an obvious underworld effort to influence the vote. In Sicily, 100 judges and magistrates threatened to resign if more state protection were not offered them. The murder of the eighth judge in eleven years by the increasingly violent organized crime networks prompted President Francesco Cossiga to order special measures against organized crime.

Sensing that the term "Communist" now connotes failure, Italian Communists changed the name of their party to the "Democratic Party of the Left" and their insignia to a spreading tree, with the hammer-and-sickle practically hidden in the roots. The party has seen its vote decline from 34 percent in 1976 to only 24 percent in local elections in May. Not to be outmaneuvered, the rising Socialist Party, led by Bettino Craxi, changed its own name to Socialist Unity. Craxi hopes to unify the left so that it can challenge the Christian Democrats' (DC) strangle-hold on power. The DC suffered a mild embarrassment when Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti admitted that in 1956 the government, aided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, had set up a clandestine paramilitary network (code name: Gladio, Latin for "sword") to resist a possible Communist occupation. Weapons and explosives were hidden in 139 caches. A national scandal ensued when suspicions were aired that renegade Gladio agents might have used some of the explosives to make right-wing terrorist attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, a charge that the government vehemently denied. The revelations also stirred debate in Belgium, on the suspicion that right-wing terrorists there might have gotten their weapons from similar caches.

After two parliamentary elections in 1989 had failed to produce a majority, Greek voters finally realized that continued "nongovernment" was hurting them, domestically and internationally. Therefore, in elections on 8 April 1990, the conservative New Democracy party won a razor-thin majority. A delegate from the Independent Right joined with it to form a government under Constantino Mitsotakis. PASOK, the former ruling party, was left on the sidelines struggling against charges of financial impropriety and mismanaging the ship of state after winning power in 1981.

Mitsotakis granted full diplomatic recognition to Israel, thus ending Greece's role as the only EC member without such ties. He also moved to fulfill one of his main foreign policy planks, "the full normalization of relations with the U.S.," after the acrimonious Papandreou years. Negotiations were resumed with Washington on a defense cooperation agreement that would include U.S. bases in Greece, which had been the target of considerable nationalist ire. They ratified Washington's prior unilateral decision at the beginning of the year to relinquish its two bases on the Greek mainland, reduce its troop presence, and retain only two bases in Crete, whose leases were extended to eight years. Greeks' traditional good feelings toward America were hurt when Atlanta was picked over Athens as the site of the 1996 centennial of the modern Olympic games. A doubly stung Melina Mercouri, whose bid to become Athens' mayor was defeated in October, exclaimed: "Coca-Cola has prevailed over the Parthenon!"

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The USSR and Eastern Europe: A Turbulent Year One of the Post-Communist Era

Arch Puddington

According to a headline in the New York Times, 1990—Year One of the post-Communist era in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—will be remembered as a “time of disillusion.” The most bitterly disillusioned, we are told, are the people of what was until recently referred to as the Soviet bloc, for whom the death of communism has meant economic upheaval, political instability and a revival of inter-ethnic strife.

In fact, most of the problems afflicting the USSR and Eastern Europe were entirely predictable, the major exception being the aggressive drive for sovereignty, and even independence, of the Soviet Union’s non-Russian peoples. Nor has the past year’s record been as uniformly bleak as many believe. If some East Europeans betray exhaustion at party politics—the fact remains that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have made substantial progress towards laying the foundation of a democratic system. And with the exception of Romania, itself under the domination of members of the old Communist nomenklatura, the new governments have exhibited a surprising degree of tolerance towards their old oppressors, eschewing the show trials and mass purges that were so distinctive a feature of rule in the “people’s democracies.”

Communism’s legacy: a black cloud

Unfortunately, the legacy of communism hangs like a black cloud over the societies of Eastern Europe; the psychological and economic toll of state socialism will stand as a roadblock in the path of normality for many years to come. As the totalitarian system par excellence, communism was subversive of practically every civic institution, from religion to trade unions to the press to education, and Eastern Europe’s democratic forces are only just discovering the daunting costs of that legacy. To cite but one example, the new, independent media already have a credibility problem because of popular skepticism shaped by four decades of politically managed news. At the same time, the new, inexperienced post-Communist media have tended to behave much like a political press, lining up behind a party, movement or leader, and have yet to grasp the essential difference between news coverage and editorial opinion.

Considering the extent of the damage, the wonder is not that post-Communist societies are mired in crisis, but rather that in some spheres at least, impressive progress has been made towards a democratic transformation. Indeed, a notable feature of the past year has been the rapid and complete collapse of a number of the Communist world’s most vaunted institutions, including Comecon, the Warsaw Pact, the “mass” organizations for youth and women, the trade unions, the party press. Entire structures built up and, it was widely assumed, legitimized over the decades fell apart almost overnight. In the most humiliating rebuff, East Germans in effect voted their country out of existence, choosing the near-term uncertainty of union with West Germany over the guarantees of life under state socialism.

The loss of credibility suffered by the Communist variant of socialism seems also to have rubbed off on the newly formed parties of the democratic left. Social Democratic parties were handed huge setbacks in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and voters showed a marked preference for parties of a centrist or liberal orientation, or, as in Romania and Bulgaria, parties that evolved from the old Communist structures. Another feature of East European politics is the continued dominance of personalities like Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel and broad movements like Solidarity or Czechoslovakia’s Civic Forum as opposed to strong, European-style parlia-
mentary parties. A number of parties, in fact, had become severely factionalized within months of formation, including parties with strong historic roots in the pre-Communist era.

Progress was made in uncovering the facts about the seamier details of Communist rule. We learned, for example, that many of the charges about Communist involvement in international terror—charges which were vigorously denied both by Communists and by many in the West—were altogether justified. From Vaclav Havel’s revelation that the old regime had sold thousands of tons of the explosive chemical semtex to Libya, to Hungary’s acknowledgement that former officials had provided safe haven for the notorious terrorist Carlos, to the admission by East Germans of official involvement with the Baader Meinhof group and other terrorists, conclusive evidence mounted of the Soviet bloc’s central role in the international terror network.

More was also learned about the old system’s neglect of the people’s health, safety and social welfare. Among other things, it was revealed that years ago serious nuclear reactor accidents had barely been averted in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; as a result, movements to close down Soviet-model nuclear plants emerged in several countries. The deterioration of medical care, once a crown jewel of regime propaganda, was finally addressed, as was the region’s environmental crisis. Great expenditures of time, effort and capital will be needed to clean up the land, water and air that have been severely contaminated. In some cases, unfortunately, these problems are likely to worsen before conditions improve; thus there are strong prospects for an East European energy crisis brought on by reductions in Soviet exports of oil and the Persian Gulf situation.

**Nationalist implications, economic instability**

Likewise, one must judge the implications of the revival of East European nationalism within the context of four decades of Communist rule. Although nationalism, or, more accurately, national conscious-ness, is presently decried as a threat to democracy, it was crucial to communism’s disintegration in the former satellite states. Membership in the world socialist camp proved no competition for Polish or Hungarian self-identity. As temporarily unsettling as the sudden release of national feelings may prove to be, it is unlikely that the newly liberated countries will be engulfed in a wave of xenophobic reaction. The societies of Eastern Europe want above all to rejoin the West, to become integrated in the Euro-

pean economic system, to participate in western culture, and enjoy the fruits of western democracy. Inevitably, this will entail an adherence to western standards of political and ethnic tolerance and a rejection of the extreme national chauvinism which has roused so much apprehension.

In any event, it is not nationalism that stands as the most pressing source of today’s nervousness and gloom, but rather the economic instability triggered by the shift from a bureaucratic socialist economic model to one driven by the market and private ownership. In Poland, where the most radical changes have been implemented, almost 1 million people are now unemployed and, throughout the region, living standards are falling. All this has taken place before the inevitable scaling back or liquidation of the region’s huge, economically worthless industrial enterprises, the former showcase of the Communist system.

In fact, the pessimistic prospect for Eastern Europe’s massive industrial working class ranks as one of the most important potential sources of instability. The tractor works and steel mills which undergirded communism’s antiquated industrial structure have elicited little interest from potential western investors, and, given the acute shortage of internal capital for modernization, seem destined for failure. At the same time, workers have discarded the old Party-controlled labor fronts, formed independent unions, and made use of a wide variety of protest tactics, including the strike. In economics still dominated by state ownership, strikes automatically take on both political and economic dimensions. Thus a taxi drivers’ strike over major increases in gasoline prices brought Budapest to a virtual standstill, compelling the government to modify its pricing policies and, by extension, its entire economic program. Yet the temporary success of this or that industrial action cannot hide the fact that a paring down of the working class—a difficult enough process in the West over a period of several decades—is destined to take place in Eastern Europe, probably within the course of a few short years.

The strike was also widely used as a weapon in the Soviet Union, idling some 65,000 workers on an average day. However, close analysis indicates that most strikes were triggered by political, not primarily economic factors, with a big percent taking place in the country’s restive non-Russian republics.

**The USSR: Terminal crisis?**

The events of the past year have reinforced the perception that the USSR has entered a state of
terminal crisis. Already five republics—the three Baltic states plus Georgia and Moldavia—have as much as declared their independence, and their national patriotic forces in the other republics show little enthusiasm for Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal for a revised union federation that would allow Moscow to retain a high degree of control.

Ironically, the authority of the central government has steadily declined as Mikhail Gorbachev has strengthened his hold on the levers of central power. Having substantially stripped the Communist party of its governing role, and having concentrated more and more power in the office of the presidency, Gorbachev enjoys, on paper, more individual authority than any Soviet leader since Stalin.

Gorbachev's newly acquired authority is to a considerable extent illusory. The flurry of decrees, restructurings and constitutional proposals emanating from the president's office has totally failed to sway the more independent-minded republics. Nor have non-Russians been convinced by repression: While the Red Army's invasion of Baku and the show of force in Lithuania were responsible for a temporary period of calm, a sense of steady disintegration prevails.

Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the breakdown of central authority—indeed, the repudiation of the system itself—is the growing anti-military mood, particularly significant because of the Soviet people's traditionally high regard for the Red Army. Again, the most widespread expressions of anti-military sentiment came from the non-Russian republics, with huge numbers of young men simply refusing to fulfill their military service obligations because they feel that the army is an alien, that is, Russian, institution. But even in Russia, a series of anti-military protests has been triggered by widespread reports of recruits being subjected to violent forms of hazing, resulting in hundreds of suicides or otherwise unexplained deaths.

Although Gorbachev has presided over formidable changes in the system—some of which he initiated, others of which represent a bowing to the inevitable—there is validity in the criticism that, given the depth of the economic crisis, he is guilty of indecisiveness and overcaution. On this score, it can no longer be argued that Gorbachev faces a serious challenge from the forces of Communist conservatism. The much-vaunted party of orthodoxy has, in fact, suffered a series of crippling political setbacks, and its leading public figure, Egor Ligachev, has apparently retired from public life.

Concern that perestroika would trigger a possibly violent reaction from the advocates of chauvinistic Russian nationalism has proved unwarranted. Russian nationalism has produced talented writers and has tapped a reservoir of popular frustration through its protests over the destruction of the symbols of the Russian heritage. But nationalist hostility to modern culture, particularly American culture, finds little response among the young, who are attracted precisely to those features of western life that the nationalists hold in contempt. Thus nationalists have fared poorly, and extreme nationalists extremely poorly, in the recent local and national elections.

Another positive sign is the respect enjoyed by independent civic institutions that, until recently, were the focus of systematic persecution. After having been subject to seven decades of anti-religious propaganda, the Soviet Union has experienced an explosion of interest in spiritual matters; religion today ranks as the most respected institution of Soviet life. Similarly, the independent press continues to flourish. While Pravda and other organs of the old Party media wither away from lack of popular interest, newspapers which early on took advantage of the opportunities opened by glasnost have become progressively bolder in their examination of Soviet society. In a society often said to be lacking in civic responsibility, thousands of associations, political parties, environmental groups and historical societies have emerged, a testimony to totalitarianism's ultimate failure to crush the human spirit.

These signs of a mobilizing civic culture coexist with considerable alienation on the part of people terrified by economic uncertainty. The fact that there were some 200,000 applications for exit visas in the first half of 1990 alone, including a flood of applications for emigration to, of all places, South Africa, testifies to the powerful fear that the Soviet Union's economic plights has generated. It is precisely in the arena of economic policy that Gorbachev's response has been least reassuring. His baffling proposal to conduct a referendum on the question of private property is but one example of Gorbachev's uncertainty over the ultimate goals of Soviet policy. We still do not know whether Gorbachev's objective is a transition to an economy dominated by private ownership and driven by the market, or the perfection of some form of "socialism." Another troubling question is Gorbachev's intentions for the military budget A massive scaling back of military spending would, at a minimum, help deal with the country's huge deficit and might even stimulate the long neglected consumer sector. In fact, Soviet military spending remains much higher than is necessary to carry out Gorbachev's modest foreign policy agenda, something that should concern western nations that must decide whether to provide aid if the Soviet food situation reaches crisis conditions.
The key question is whether the USSR’s political and economic crises will prevent further progress towards democracy. One might answer that neither problem can be dealt with without a further deepening of popular sovereignty. Certainly the various economic formulas drafted by the advisors to Gorbachev and his chief rival, Boris Yeltsin, all envision a reduction in the power of the state, considerable expansion of private ownership, and unprecedented freedom of economic activity. Nor is it likely that the current leadership will yield to the temptation of the old methods. They cannot wish to continue, for example, the agricultural practices that allowed an estimated one million tons of grain to spoil each day due to deficiencies in transportation and storage, and that sent thousands of urban dwellers to the fields in a desperate attempt to salvage the potato crop.

But if there is no incompatibility between democracy and economic reform, the same cannot be said for the relationship between democracy and Gorbachev’s current “solution” to the national question. Given the depth of the non-Russians’ hostility to rule from Moscow, Gorbachev’s determination to keep the union intact appears to be a prescription for protracted unrest and bloodshed.

Mikhail Gorbachev has demonstrated a willingness to change course when confronted with uncomfortable realities and a genius for making ideological compromise appear an act of statesmanship. He was far-sighted enough to quickly recognize that his country could not be dragged out of economic stagnation with exhortation and discipline campaigns. His judgment was sufficiently sober to understand the futility of trying to impose “socialism” in the Third World, and, after an initial attempt at victory, he began the process of disengagement from regional conflicts. He even came to recognize that the costs of empire in Eastern Europe outweighed the benefits. He is now facing an even greater challenge: to acquiesce in the further dismantling of the Soviet/Russian empire. His response will in large measure determine whether the part of the world now known as the Soviet Union will move toward internal peace and economic success.

Historians may see 1990 as the year when the idea of liberal democracy gained global domination for the first time in history. The road to functional democracies is strewn with enormous obstacles; yet for the first time in the history of the Survey, liberal democracies, even in a fragile or embryonic form, far outnumbered any other political system.

Last year's seismic collapse of communism as a viable political system reverberated across the world. The democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and even the liberalization process in the Soviet Union stimulated a dialogue concerning multiparty democracy throughout the developing world. While the first free elections in Eastern Europe captured the headlines, Africa was experiencing a sweep of multipartyism that represents the most significant phenomenon since decolonization three decades ago.

Latin America, after a decade of democratic transitions, began to confront the longer-term problems of reviving long dormant democratic institutions and balancing civilian-military relations during a period of internationally enforced austerity programs. Throughout the subcontinent of Asia, democratic institutions faced enormous difficulties this year, particularly in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and even India as ethnic and religious violence accelerated at a frightening pace.

Nostalgia for authoritarian and totalitarian forms of government so far has not materialized in this brief period of global democratization. However, the disintegration or impending collapse of such multi-ethnic nations as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India (and even the recent tensions over the Meech Lake Accords in Canada) clearly raises the question of whether the resurgence of nationalism and the politics of ethnic identification are antithetical to the democratization process.

Perhaps Western policymakers should examine the opposite notion: the growth of democratic nationalist movements around the world may, in fact, provide the political force necessary to press for decentralization, authentic federal systems of government, and local self-rule. Western political leaders, clearly, are aghast at the prospect that the Soviet Union, a vast land-based empire, might splinter into several states and that Yugoslavia may become authentically "Balkanized." But alternative views of commonwealth or confederation might be adopted that offer nationalities a realistic way to achieve their legitimate demands and provide new mechanisms and structures allowing central governments to transform their systems without risking national integrity. From Eastern Europe to Africa, the way national and tribal aspirations are reconciled with centralized political systems in transition will become the burning issue of the 1990s.

The very nonrational basis for the popular upsurge of nationalism in multi-ethnic nations has led some observers to argue that the temptation to lurch toward independence and secession may eventually overwhelm any democratic dimensions of these movements. The nationalist revival in the world, which in many cases reflects long repressed aspirations, may in fact lead to the dissolution of the modern nation state as we have known it in the twentieth century. Whether this development is ultimately inimical to stability, peace and democratization may depend on Western responses. The trend toward integration in Western Europe, as well as the unifying force of national economic prosperity in fostering a higher sense of community over parochialism, may serve as a model for nations emerging under repressive regimes.

Western policymakers can no longer ignore the larger geopolitical implications of these nationalist movements. As they seek to rectify past grievances or reaffirm historically based sovereignty claims, the West could play a constructive role in encouraging a greater understanding of and commitment to such fundamental democratic principles as minority and cultural rights within their borders. It is clear that central governments can no longer stage-manage or brutally suppress national aspirations for freedom or self-determination, nor should the West support such endeavors. Simply upholding the status quo ante may, in all likelihood, only invite increased political strife, civil war and the chronic instability that breeds wars.
The population of the world this year is estimated at 5.323 billion residing in 165 sovereign states and 62 related territories, a total of 227 places. The level of political rights and civil liberties as shown comparatively by the Freedom House Survey is:  

**Free:** 2.088.2 billion (39.23 percent of the world's population) live in 65 of the states and in 50 of the related territories.  

**Partly Free:** 1.485.67 billion (27.91 percent of the world's population) live in 50 of the states and 3 of the related territories.  

**Not Free:** 1.748.72 billion (32.86 percent of the world's population) live in 50 of the states and 9 of the related territories.

### Record of the Survey  
(population in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURVEY DATE</th>
<th>FREE</th>
<th>PARTLY FREE</th>
<th>NOT FREE</th>
<th>WORLD POPULATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>January '73</td>
<td>1,029.0 (32.00%)</td>
<td>720.5 (21.00%)</td>
<td>1,583.0 (47.00%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>January '77</td>
<td>789.9 (19.60%)</td>
<td>1,464.0 (36.40%)</td>
<td>1,765.9 (43.90%)</td>
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<td>January '79</td>
<td>1,483.2 (35.10%)</td>
<td>1,042.7 (24.70%)</td>
<td>1,700.9 (40.20%)</td>
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<td>January '81</td>
<td>1,613.0 (35.90%)</td>
<td>970.9 (21.60%)</td>
<td>1,911.9 (42.50%)</td>
<td>4,495.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January '83</td>
<td>1,665.1 (36.32%)</td>
<td>918.8 (20.04%)</td>
<td>2,000.2 (43.64%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>January '85</td>
<td>1,671.4 (34.85%)</td>
<td>1,117.4 (23.30%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,842.5 (37.10%)</td>
<td>1,171.5 (23.60%)</td>
<td>1,949.9 (39.30%)</td>
<td>4,963.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>January '89</td>
<td>1,992.8 (38.86%)</td>
<td>1,027.9 (20.05%)</td>
<td>2,107.3 (41.09%)</td>
<td>5,128.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>January '90</td>
<td>2,034.4 (38.87%)</td>
<td>1,143.7 (21.85%)</td>
<td>2,055.9 (39.28%)</td>
<td>5,234.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January '91</td>
<td>2,088.2 (39.23%)</td>
<td>1,485.7 (27.91%)</td>
<td>1,748.7 (32.86%)</td>
<td>5,322.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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While all fifteen Soviet Republics have adopted resolutions on differing forms of autonomy, the degree to which each is committed to a truly democratic system, with institutionalized guarantees for minority rights, is unclear. National movements in the Baltics, the Ukraine and the Russian republic are dominated by democratic parties and associations that are rediscovering and identifying with those short periods of their history which might be seen as liberal or democratic. Strategies of these prodemocracy movements, such as the Ukrainian RUKH, have largely avoided the past problems of ethnic exclusivity by incorporating ethnic minorities and diverse faiths in their governing bodies.

In South Africa, the unbanning of black political organizations and discussions on future negotiations over majority rule have sparked an escalation of violence among competing political organizations that has both an ethnic and ideological basis. The debate in Africa over the appropriate way to develop multiparty democracy focuses on the issue of maintaining national unity in the face of the inevitable political fragmentation along ideological and tribal lines.

While it is still too early to judge the success and even the authenticity of these transition processes, it is clear that liberal democracy, both in rhetoric and deed, has become the preferred model of political development. Of the 165 countries monitored by the Survey, formal liberal democracies account for 76 countries and another 36 (112 of the 165 monitored) could be said to be in varying stages of transition to a democratic system.

The remaining governments represent a combination of traditional monarchies, as in the Middle East; military regimes such as Burma; and nearly twenty-eight dominant, one-party or Communist regimes. However, it should be noted that 11 of the democratic countries and all those in transition are either Partly Free or Not Free because they lack the institutional safeguards for the preservation of the political rights and civil liberties to which they aspire.

1990 continued the trend toward greater freedom in the world begun in the 1980s. In measuring political rights and civil liberties around the world, the Survey classified 65 nations and 50 territories as Free, 50 nations and 3 territories as Partly Free and 50 nations and 9 territories as Not Free. Measured against last year, this represents a gain of four among the Free countries and a decline by eleven of Not Free countries.

Using population estimates, this means that out of a world population of 5.3 billion, 2.09 billion, or 39.23 percent, live in countries categorized as Free, 1.49 billion, or 27.91 percent live in Partly Free states, and 1.75 billion, or 32.86 percent live in Not Free societies. Of those living in Not Free states, nearly 1.12 billion are citizens of the People’s Republic of China. In sum, 1990 was the first year of the Survey in which both the number of Free countries and
population living in Free societies outnumbered both the Not Free countries and their populations.

The countries in which 67.14 percent of the world’s population lived in free societies or those with middling degrees of freedom were almost uniformly liberal democracies possessing institutional safeguards—albeit often rudimentary and fragile—for their citizens, and some juridical mechanisms for correcting and redressing injustices. Such institutional safeguards were not present in the 50 Not Free countries, and are not found to an appreciable extent in some Partly Free countries, even those undergoing democratic transitions.

Of the many countries in transition, a significant number will not evolve into democratic systems because they either lack a political culture that encourages tolerance and pluralism, face persistent insurrections, or have fragile organizations and institutions that form a civil society indispensable for democratic development. Countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Sri Lanka may fail because of the refusal by political, social and revolutionary elites to agree on a common national agenda.

Nongovernmental efforts at conflict resolution might provide the unofficial assistance necessary to strengthen the entrenchment of democratic norms in such countries. The creation of a civic culture that can foster and sustain a democratic national consciousness is vital for societies trying to overcome a past where large segments of the population were complicit in repressive rule.

Surprisingly, over the past year the East European democracies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have exhibited extraordinary restraint toward old oppressors and in their efforts to overcome the psychology of totalitarianism that still inhibits citizen participation in building civic institutions.

The thirty-four members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) recently declared "a new era of democracy, peace and unity." To become a reality this hope needs an aggressive Western strategy to assist those around the world working for structural changes in their societies. The most cost-effective way to encourage the development of open, free-enterprise societies is political assistance to those working to build democratic institutions. The promising December talks between the USSR and the U.S. laid the groundwork for peaceful resolutions of conflicts in Angola and Afghanistan. These, however, will not lead to a stable peace unless Western countries can provide significant help to construct the nongovernmental institutions necessary to support a democratic resolution of prolonged wars.

In the past American assistance packages appeared to be based on some new form of economic determinism: the notion that the primary need of a country in democratic transition was the vital aid to help it make the change to a free market system. While market economies are indeed one goal of these transitions, neither foreign assistance nor private investment can achieve much beyond a temporary relief of economic stress as long as the essential structures of society are either in disarray or remain in the hands of retainers from the old regime.

If U.S. economic assistance is not accompanied by profound changes in the civic and political character of these societies, Western aid will inevitably fail, encouraging the retention of bloated government bureaucracies and the perpetuation of corrupt political elites who adopt the new "democratic" line.

Democratic political development is, in our view, a prerequisite for attracting domestic and foreign capital investment, preventing the emigration of the most educated and productive workers, and for the preservation of human rights. Throughout newly emerging democracies, citizens are pressing for reforms to make governments more accountable, legislatives more effective, and legal systems more accessible. Accountability and responsiveness will be necessary to curb the endemic violence in many of these societies and to foster authentic stability.

For the past decade, there have been promising beginnings in political development assistance. Numerous programs of the National Endowment for Democracy and its affiliates, USAID Democratic Initiatives programs, and the various initiatives of Western European countries continue to support democratic reforms. Equally encouraging have been the new, active roles of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) in verifying cease-fires in regional conflicts and monitoring elections in previously war-torn societies.

That the language of democracy is accepted as the framework for all discussions concerning human rights has been a welcome occurrence over the last few years. But the consolidation of democracy will be greatly helped by the development of an infrastructure of nongovernment institutions that mediate between the citizen and the state. If democratic political development is not considered a higher priority in our foreign policy the world will face grave political reversals, sooner rather than later.

The trends in our Survey clearly indicate rather difficult times ahead for countries undergoing the painful but liberating transition to democracy. It should be our purpose as Americans to prolong this democratic moment.
The Survey 1990—A Summary

The Comparative Survey of Freedom is an institutional effort by Freedom House to monitor the political rights and civil liberties in 165 nations and 62 related territories on an annual basis. Expanded in the early 1970s, this year-long project is produced by our regional experts, consultants outside the country and human rights specialists and derives its information from a wide-range of sources.

The year in review
The difficulties in evaluating the state of freedom around the world have been inherent in the Survey project since its beginnings two decades ago. This has been especially true over the past two years as the rate of political change around the world has accelerated with a gale force.

In 1989, an unusually volatile period, saw 27 countries change their ratings. In 1990 fifty-six nation-states, or over one-third of the world, changed because of real political events, rather than methodological considerations. Thirty-six countries improved their human rights situations, while declines were registered by eighteen. Two countries—Antigua and Barbuda, and Turkey—showed mixed results. Seventeen countries changed ratings, moving between the categories of "Free," "Partly Free" and "Not Free." Of these, fifteen improved categories, while two—the Philippines and Kuwait—lost ground.

Category changes
Five nations joined the Free community. After seventeen years of military dictatorship, Chile inaugurated the freely elected government of President Patricio Alwyn. The foremost question in the country remained the issue of military subordination to civilian authority. The government amnestied remaining political prisoners, created a commission to investigate past human rights violations and ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.

Czechoslovakia faced the formidable challenge of transforming its "velvet revolution" into a democracy. President Vaclav Havel’s Civic Forum won the June parliamentary elections and promptly faced a number of difficult issues: the pace and scope of free-market reforms, growing nationalism in Slovakia, the surprising resiliency of the Communist party and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Prague government reformed the judiciary system, dismantled the secret police force and sought to improve prison conditions.

Hungary held its first free national elections in more than forty years, which resulted in a coalition government led by the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum and the emergence of a well-organized parliamentary opposition. However, a low voter turnout in the fall elections revealed a growing apathy.

Lech Walesa, who led Solidarity for ten years, was elected Poland’s president in December amid a national debate over the rate of economic and political reform. Walesa argued Poland lagged behind other East European countries that had already ousted the old guard in open parliamentary elections.

Namibia joined Botswana, the Gambia and Mauritius as Africa’s only Free countries by adopting a multiparty democratic system.

The most decisive change this year doesn’t appear in the Survey. Long the most Stalinist regime in Eastern Europe, the German Democratic Republic held its first free election since its creation in 1949, resulting in a stunning victory for the Christian Democratic-led "Alliance for Germany." By October, the country was dissolved and Germany reunited again. This left the new Germany with the massive problem of integrating two disparate economic systems and dealing with the Stasi, its 85,000 officers and half-a-million informants.

Within the category of Free, five countries declined in their ratings. Argentina confronted another army revolt and the Menem government is relying on executive decree to implement its economic policies. Brazil continued its stable transition with the inauguration of President Collor de Mello, but experienced continued violence against the Indian population in rural areas. In the troubled Dominican Republic aging President Joaquin Balaguer won a narrow victory over his archrival Juan Bosch, and was promptly besieged by national labor strikes and charges by the Catholic church that he had lost his authority to deal with the nation’s crisis. Papua New Guinea was accused of human-rights violations in its handling of the Bougainville uprising. The United
Kingdom dropped one point in civil liberties for restrictions on the media and revelations about forced confessions and faked evidence to obtain convictions in terrorist incidents. While their rating didn’t change, three countries in the Free category experienced serious threats to freedom and democracy. India became the most threatened democracy in the world, rocked by two consecutive years of sectarian and secessionist violence in the Punjab, Assam and Kashmir, where tens of thousands have been killed or injured. Militant Hindus and Muslims clashed over a disputed religious site at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh and by November this sense of national crisis brought down the government of Prime Minister V.P. Singh.

Trinidad-Tobago was shaken at the end of July by a bloody coup attempt by a small band of Muslim extremists, who stormed the National Parliament and held the prime minister hostage for five days. Antigua and Barbuda experienced another arms shipment scandal, which implicated high officials in the Bird administration and caused public pressure for new elections.

Several countries moved from Not Free to Partly Free. For the first time in the Survey’s history the Soviet Union is now ranked as "partly free." The year ended with President Gorbachev threatening to use new powers to halt economic chaos and restore "law and order," a reference to the independent-minded republics. The new draft union treaty supported by Gorbachev calls for the protection of human rights and the creation of a democratic state based on popular representation and law. Despite the democratic dressing, most republics have rejected the new union treaty.

The year saw all fifteen Republics declare some form of sovereignty and state that their constitutions take precedence over the Soviet one. While the powers of the Soviet presidency have been greatly enhanced, Gorbachev’s actions have largely been ignored. Six of the republics established their own presidential systems, and Armenia refused to enforce a presidential decree ordering paramilitary groups to lay down their weapons. Leningrad and Moscow are now governed by reformers, and reform candidates appear to be winning local elections throughout the USSR.

The Soviet Parliament also passed laws guaranteeing freedom of the press and freedom of religion. The Russian Republic, led by Boris Yeltsin, drafted a democratic constitution (to be approved by referendum in 1991), and developed extensive economic and diplomatic relations with the other republics, paving the way for a possible reconfiguration of the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria became Partly Free because of multiparty elections in June contested by a burgeoning opposition. The Communists, renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party, won at the polls, making it the only ruling party in Eastern Europe to be returned to power in a multiparty election. However, by year’s end the government of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanclov collapsed, besieged by party factionalism, national unrest and a rash of strikes.

Mongolia became the first Communist nation in Asia to drop Marxism as its official ideology and hold competitive multiparty elections.

Benin saw the formation of a transition government by Prime Minister Soglo and the adoption of a new constitution. After a negotiated settlement was reached with exiled political leaders, President Mathieu Kerekou voluntarily stepped aside. Presidential and legislative elections were scheduled for January 1991. After a mercenary attempt to take-over the country, Comoros President Djochar came under pressure from French President Francois Mitterand to democratize, a promise he made amid irregularities in the March election.

The former Portuguese colonies of Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde abandoned a commitment to a one-party state and adopted multiparty democracy. In Cape Verde, despite irregularities in the

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registration process and constraints on political organizing, the January 1991 legislative elections will be the first contested by several parties. Sao Tome’s leading opposition figure, Alfonso Dos Santos was released in April, and direct competitive legislative elections were announced for the first time. Gabon also held competitive elections, although the results were protested by the opposition, which won nearly half the seats.

Following the American invasion that removed General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power in December 1989, the Endara government in Panama faced the enormous tasks of economic and political reconstruction. The only "4," "2" in the Survey, Panama is unique for having a duly elected president installed by a foreign power. American forces have provided the security protection for most of 1990 and suppressed a military coup attempt later in the year.

Two countries—Kuwait and the Philippines—dropped categories, the former from Partly Free to Not Free after its brutal occupation by Iraq and the latter, which dropped from "free" to Partly Free because the Survey team felt President Aquino had been too reluctant to translate her popularity into any real reforms, thus allowing corruption, political violence and military domination to overwhelm the once hopeful transition.

Within the Partly Free category, there were nine improvements and nine declines.

After a stunning victory over the Sandinistas in the 25 February elections, the Chamorro government in Nicaragua took office with little control over the military and persistent labor unrest.

Taiwan continued its attempts at democratization under its first native president, Mr. Lee Teng-hui. The December 1989 elections, called by international observers as the freest and fairest in that nation's history, saw opposition parties, such as the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), make significant gains.

King Birendra of Nepal was forced by a broad-based opposition to lift a twenty-nine-year ban on independent political activity and accepted a draft constitution that called for a constitutional monarchy and a popularly elected parliament.

In Africa, several countries improved. Algeria's liberalization made advances with the June local and regional elections that saw the ruling FLN defeated by the opposition Islamic Salvation Front. It was the first multiparty election in Algeria and the first election anywhere in which an Islamist party won a majority.

Registration began for voters and banned politicians appeared with two new parties, as Nigeria’s transition plan for 1989 remained on schedule.

Demonstrations and civil unrest forced Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny to accede to demands for a multiparty system and national elections. The eighty-five-year old patriarch was elected in October in elections marred by widespread fraud. Madagascar legalized opposition parties in March and eased censorship.

After twenty-seven years of imprisonment, Nelson Mandela was freed. Black political organizations were unbanned and the state of emergency was lifted. There was a wide agreement in South Africa on the need to create a democratic political system, majority rule and a bill of rights to protect both minorities and individuals. Despite the movement toward negotiations by 1991, this was one of the bloodiest years in the country's history with internecine fighting erupting between the African National Congress and Inkatha, the Zulu-based party.

Long resistant to multiparty elections, President Kenneth Kuanda had to capitulate as the worst rioting in Zambian history hit the capital of Lusaka. Throughout the year advocates for a democratic transition were arrested by police. Finally, earlier plans for a constitutional referendum were shelved for competitive elections this coming year.

Of the nine declines in the Partly Free category, the most notable was Uganda, where President Museveni postponed scheduled elections and extended his own term until 1995. In the eastern and western parts of Uganda, counter-insurgency efforts forced 200,000 civilians into overcrowded camps.

Before her dismissal from office on nebulous charges, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto managed to alienate the powerful military and civil service establishments, while ignoring rising violence between ethnic groups. The October elections, won by the conservative Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), were generally fair, but irregularities may have inflated the alliance's majority.

Throughout the year, Bangladesh saw flareups of political violence and large anti-government protests after President Lt. General Hossain Ershad suspended civil liberties. While he insisted the 1991 elections would be fair, he was finally forced to resign in December amid mounting social unrest.

Guatemala, Peru and Suriname experienced declines typical of Latin American countries in transition: military authority overwhelming civilian control because of insurgency. Indonesia, Mexico and Tunisia also experienced slight downturns.

Although Sri Lanka's ratings didn't change, Tamil insurgents renewed their warfare and opened another front earlier in the year.
### Gains in Freedom without changing category

- Albania
- Algeria
- Brunei
- Central African Republic
- Congo
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Ivory Coast
- Madagascar
- Mali
- Mozambique
- Nepal
- Nicaragua
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Romania
- South Africa
- Taiwan
- Tanzania
- Tonga
- Zaire

### Declines in Freedom without changing category

- Argentina
- Bangladesh
- Brazil
- Dominican Republic
- Guatemala
- Indonesia
- Iraq
- Liberia
- Mexico
- Pakistan
- Papua New Guinea
- Peru
- Suriname
- Tunisia
- Uganda
- United Kingdom

Some of the more interesting improvements in the *Survey* came in the Not Free category. Of the twelve countries which gained in ratings in this category, nine were African countries that implemented partial reforms or professed a new commitment to multiparty democracy. These were the Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania and Zaire.

National protests in Haiti forced the resignation of General Prosper Avril in March 1990 and elections were held in December. The Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide won overwhelmingly. On that basis, Haiti is now rated Partly Free. If the military and Duvalierists accept the winner as president, then Haiti will remain, if precariously, Partly Free.

Romania experienced serious problems in establishing both political stability and legitimacy after last year’s violent revolution that toppled the thirty-four-year regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. The National Salvation Front (NSF), led by former senior Communist officials, many with close ties to Ceausescu, won an overwhelming victory at the polls in May. But the Front frequently used force to quell protests by the democratic movement.

Albania, long the most repressive regime in Europe, unbanned religion and lifted travel restrictions. These tentative steps toward liberalization included a pledge by Ramiz Alia, the first secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, to adopt a multiparty state, and the request by one opposition group to register as a political party.

Brunei freed political prisoners in 1990.

### The most repressive regimes

The Gulf crisis once again focused world attention on the appalling state of political rights and civil liberties in the Middle East. The Iraqi government, led by Saddam Hussein, remains one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. The government’s vast secret police apparatus subjected citizens to a wide range of human rights abuses, including forced relocation and deportation, arbitrary arrest, torture and summary executions.

Reports from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait alleged widespread looting, rape and executions of scores of people, some-times in front of their families. Iraqi forces have ruthlessly repressed any demonstrations of resistance by the remaining Kuwaiti population.

Iraq’s former adversary and new ally, Iran officially boasted of public beheadings and hangings of its political opponents. There are reportedly thousands of political prisoners, and religious and ethnic minorities are vigorously persecuted. It is
reported that since the 1988 ceasefire, 23,000 political detainees alone have been executed. While perhaps this number is too high, the published executions in 1990 have been 443. Some political prisoners are now executed on "drug charges."

The Gulf allies also have serious human rights problems. In retaliation for Yemen's reservations about measures against Iraq, Saudi Arabia forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of its nearly 1 million Yemeni workers. The Syrian regime possesses an extensive security apparatus which persecutes political opponents as well as ethnic and religious minorities. Syrian military units reportedly killed dozens of people demonstrating against Syrian involvement with the allied forces in Saudi Arabia.

In Asia, the People's Republic of China lifted martial law in January, yet continued the harassment and jailing of students. The Chinese security forces were purged and substantially beefed up in anticipation of further unrest. The full extent of repression against the workers movement is just beginning to be known in the West. Widely publicized releases of political prisoners were aimed more at improving its international image than revealing any significant shift toward liberalization. Chinese and Soviet military officials have met to discuss internal crackdowns in both countries. The 1990 Law on Hong Kong limited human rights and provoked increased emigration from that territory.

Reacting to the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, North Korea recalled 2,000 students and officials and scattered them about remote provincial areas for fear of contamination by democratic ideas. Only the slightest signs of economic reforms were visible as Marshal Kim Il-Sung began a new four-year term.

Burma allowed national elections in May, only to be shocked by the landslide victory of the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the country's founder. The military refused to hand over power and arrested hundreds of leading opposition leaders in a brutal campaign of repression. Castro strengthened his grip over the party, and attempted to shift the Thai-border populations back into liberated zones.

Khmer Rouge suppressed religion in areas it controls and attempted to shift the Thai-border populations back into liberated zones.

Afghanistan remained a land of horrifying violence and the war drifted into a stalemate as super power negotiations could not bring any agreement between the mujahideen and the Najibullah regime.

Liberia was engulfed in a savage civil war that brought down the regime of General Samuel K. Doe and launched a wave of inter-tribal slaughter encouraged by rival guerrilla movements. In Ethiopia, mediation efforts between guerrillas and the Mengistu regime ended in failure and there was increased dissent within the military.

After five different rounds of talks between UNITA and the Luanda government, it appears that the fifteen-year old war in Angola might end in 1991. Hard-liners resist the short timetable for elections and the creation of a multiparty state, but the two sides in the conflict under pressure from Moscow and Washington appear to be approaching an agreement of an internationally verified ceasefire and elections sometime in 1991.

The Said Bane government in Somalia scrapped plans for a multi-party elections in 1990 and ended the year having lost all but the capital to the various guerrilla factions.

With the loss of allies in Nicaragua and Panama and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Fidel Castro defiantly reinforced the Stalinist political system in Cuba and jailed all but a handful of some 200 human rights activists. Castro strengthened his grip over the party, the military and government, and re-employed the Committees in Defense of the Revolution to squelch dissent. Castro suppressed religious processions and sabotaged a proposed visit to the island by His Holiness John Paul II.

The Survey underscores Freedom House's concern that the enhancement and support of democratic movements and human rights monitors abroad be seen as vital to America's national interest. Recent attempts to revive the bloodless power politics of the 1970s will flounder in this revolutionary age. Democratic internationalism has been supported in the post-war period by a bipartisan consensus. The "New World Order" will not be built solely on agreements between political elites; it will be constructed through a myriad of separate institutions and organizations that mediate between the citizen and the once-powerful state.
This map is based on data developed by Freedom House's Comparative Survey of Freedom. The Survey analyzes factors such as the degree to which fair and competitive elections occur, individual and group freedoms are guaranteed in practice, and press freedom exists. In some countries, the category reflects active citizen opposition rather than political rights granted by a government. More detailed and up-to-date Survey information may be obtained from Freedom House.
### The Map of Freedom—1991

#### FREE STATES

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#### NOT FREE STATES

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The purpose of the *Comparative Survey of Freedom* since its inception in the 1970s has been to provide an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties everywhere in the world.

The *Survey* attempts to judge all places by a single standard and to point out the importance of democracy and freedom. At a minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not chosen by the government. Putting it broadly, freedom is the chance to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of government and other centers of potential domination. Normally, Westerners associate the adherence to political rights and civil liberties with the liberal democracies, such as those in North America and the European Community. However, there are also such Third World democracies as Costa Rica and Botswana. In another case, Western Samoa combines political parties and competitive elections with power for the *matai*, the heads of extended families.

Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the *Survey* recognizes that a democratic country does not necessarily belong in our category of "free" states. A democracy can lose freedom and become merely "partly free." Peru and Colombia are examples of such "partly free" democracies. In other cases, countries that replaced military regimes with elected governments can have less than complete transitions to liberal democracy. El Salvador and Guatemala fit the description of this kind of "partly free" democracy. (For an explanation of the designations "free," "Partly Free," and "not free," see the section on The Map of Freedom below.)

Just as democracy is not a static concept, the *Survey* itself adapts to changing conditions. Readers of the previous editions of the *Survey* will note that the ratings of many countries and related territories have changed since 1989. Events have changed some ratings, but other changes reflect methodological refinements developed by this year's *Survey* team.

**Definitions and categories of the Survey**

The *Survey*’s understanding of freedom is broad and encompasses two sets of characteristics grouped under political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process. By the political process, we mean the system by which the polity chooses the authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional or local community. In a free society this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. A system is genuinely free or democratic to the extent that the people have a choice in determining the nature of the system and its leaders.

The *Survey* employs checklists for these rights and liberties to help determine the degree of freedom present in each country and related territory, and to help assign each entity to a comparative category.

The checklist for political rights asks whether (a) the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority, and (b) the legislative representatives, are elected through free and fair elections. Freedom House considers the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among competing candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. The checklist asks specifically whether there are fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest tabulation of ballots.

The mechanics of the election are not the only concern. We also examine whether the voters are able to endow their elected representatives with real power, or whether unelected elements reduce or supersede this power. In many Latin American countries, for ex-
ample, the military retains a significant political role, and in Morocco the king maintains significant power over the elected politicians.

A fully free political system must allow the people to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and the system must be open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings. The Survey looks for the occurrence of a significant opposition vote, *de facto* opposition power, and a possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections. The definition of political rights also includes a country's right of self-determination and its citizens' freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or any other powerful group. The more people suffer under such domination, the less chance the country has of getting credit for self-determination.

Finally, the Survey examines minority rights and subnational political power: Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process? Is political power decentralized, allowing for local, regional and/or provincial or state administrations led by their freely elected officials? (For entities such as tiny island nations, the absence of a decentralized system does not necessarily count as a negative in the Survey.)

For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, the Survey gives discretionary credit for systems that provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler.

Freedom House does not have a culture-bound view of democracy. The Survey team rejects the notion that only Europeans and those of European descent qualify as democratic. The Survey demonstrates that, in addition to those in Europe and the Americas, there are free countries with varying kinds of democracy functioning among people of all races and religions in Africa, the South Pacific and Asia. In some South Pacific islands, free countries can have competitive political systems based on competing family groups and personalities rather than on European or American-style parties.

Civil liberties are the freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state. The checklist for civil liberties begins with a requirement for free and independent media, literature and other cultural expressions. In cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit. The checklist also includes the rights to have open public discussion and free private discussion, and freedom of assembly and demonstration. Freedom House looks for evidence that a country or territory allows freedom of political or quasi-political organization. This includes political parties, civic associations, ad hoc issue groups and so forth.

The Survey considers whether citizens are equal under the law, have access to an independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary, and are respected by the security forces. Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees for the respect for human rights in practice. The checklist also includes protection from unjustified political terror, imprisonment, exile or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system, and freedom from war or insurgency situations. Freedom from war and insurgency situations enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurrections does not in itself make an unfree society free.

The standards for civil liberties also include free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, free professional and other private organizations, free businesses or cooperatives, and free private and public religious expression and free religious institutions. For tiny island countries and territories and other small entities with low populations, the absence of unions and other types of association does not necessarily count as a negative unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking association.

The checklist for civil liberties has an item on personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, property rights, freedom of movement, choice of residence, and choice of marriage and size of family. The Survey also rates equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type of denigrating obstacle to a share of legitimate economic gains. Equality of opportunity also implies a free choice of employment and education. Extreme inequality of opportunity prevents disadvantaged individuals from enjoying a full exercise of civil liberties. Typically, desperately poor countries and territories lack both opportunities for economic advancement and the other liberties on this checklist.

The final point on the civil liberties checklist is freedom from extreme government indifference or corruption. When governments do not care about the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population, the human rights of those people suffer. Gross
government corruption can pervert the political process and hamper the development of a free economy.

The Survey rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House. The numbers are not purely mechanical; they also reflect judgment. The team assigns initial ratings to countries by awarding from 0 to 2 points per checklist item, depending on the degree of compliance with the standard. The highest possible score for political rights is 18 points, based on up to 2 points for each of nine questions. The highest possible score for civil liberties is 26 points, based on up to 2 points for each of thirteen questions.

After placing countries in initial categories based on checklist points, the Survey team makes minor adjustments to account for factors such as extreme violence, whose intensity may not be reflected in answering the checklist questions. The Survey team recognizes that one factor may overwhelm others so that the suggested initial category is not necessarily the most accurate. For example, in a few cases, such as Colombia, the team adjusted political rights ratings to reflect extreme violence. For the sake of better comparative accuracy, the team also reevaluated a few countries to reflect the degree of military influence on their political systems. These exceptions aside, in the overwhelming number of cases, the checklist system reflects the real world situation and is adequate for placing countries and territories into the proper comparative categories.

The map on pages 14-15 divides the world into three large categories: "free," "partly free," and "not free." The Survey places countries and territories into this tripartite division by averaging the category numbers they received for political rights and civil liberties. Those whose category numbers average 1-2.5 are considered "free," 3-5.5 "partly free," and 5.5-7 "not free." The dividing line between "partly free" and "not free" falls within the group whose category numbers average 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either "partly free" or "not free." The total number of raw points is the factor which makes the difference between the two. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-14 points are "not free," and those with combined raw scores of 15-29 points are "partly free." "Free" countries and territories have combined raw scores of 30-44 points.

The differences in raw points between countries in the three broad categories represent distinctions in the real world. There are obstacles which "partly free" countries must overcome before they can be called "free," just as there are impediments which prevent "not free" countries from being called "partly free." Countries at the lowest rung of the "free" category (category 2 in political rights, category 3 in civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the "partly free" group (category 3 in both). Typically, there is more violence and/or military influence on politics at 3,3 than at 2,3 and the differences become more striking as one compares 2,3 with worse categories of the "partly free" countries.

The distinction between the least bad "not free" countries and the least free "partly free" may be less obvious than the gap between "partly free" and "free," but at "partly free," there is at least one extra factor that keeps a country from being assigned to the "not free" category. For example, Zimbabwe (6,4) has a court system that is capable of ruling against the government party on electoral matters, and Bahrain (6,5) has a system of consultation between ruler and subjects, and rights of petition. These are examples of aspects that separate these countries from their respective "not free" neighbors, Ethiopia (7,7) and Iraq (7,7). The gap between "partly free" and "not free" is easier to see if one compares Benin (6,4) with Burma (7,7). Benin began moving from dictatorship towards democratic transition in 1990, and it expanded civil liberties. By way of contrast, Burma (Myanmar) halted and reversed democratic trends after the opposition won the legislative election. The Burmese military crushed dissent and reinforced its harsh rule.

Freedom House wishes to point out that the designation "free" does not mean that a country has perfect freedom or lacks serious problems. As an institution which advocates human rights, Freedom House remains concerned about a variety of social problems and civil liberties questions in the U.S. and other countries that the Survey places in the "free" category. Similarly, in no way does an improvement in a country's rating mean that human rights campaigns should cease. On the contrary, we wish to use the Survey as a prod to improve the condition of all countries.

The approach of the Survey

The Survey attempts to measure conditions as they really are around the world. This approach is distinct from relying on intense coverage by the American media as a guide to which countries are the least free.
The publicity given problems in some countries does not necessarily mean that unpublicized problems of other countries are not more severe. For example, while U.S. television networks are allowed into Israel and El Salvador to cover abuses of human rights, they are not allowed to report freely in North Korea, which has far less freedom than the other two countries. To reach such comparative conclusions, Freedom House evaluates the development of democratic governmental institutions, or lack thereof, and also examines the quality of civil society, life outside the state structure.

Without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free individual and group expressions in nonpolitical matters is not likely to make an exception for political ones. As though to prove this, there is no country in the Survey that places in category 6 or 7 for civil liberties and, at the same time, in category 1 or 2 for political rights. In the overwhelming majority of cases in the Survey, countries and territories have ratings in political rights and civil liberties that are within two categories of each other.

The Survey rates both countries and related territories. For our purposes, countries are internationally recognized independent states whose governments are resident within their officially claimed territories. In the unusual case of Cyprus, we give two ratings, since there are two governments on that divided island. In no way does this imply that Freedom House endorses Cypriot division. We note only that neither the predominandy Greek Republic of Cyprus nor the predominandy Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the de facto government for the entire island. Given the difficult situation in the Middle East at press time, Freedom House faced a choice between counting Kuwait as an independent country or as a related territory of Iraq. Pending the outcome of the crisis, we continue to count Kuwait as an independent country for this 1990-91 report A few internationally recognized states, such as Monaco and San Marino, count as related territories here, due to their officially dependent relationships with other states. With those exceptions, related territories consist mostly of colonies, protectorates, occupied territories and island dependencies. Although many countries recognize the PLO as the government of Palestine, we do not count Palestine as an independent country, because the PLO does not govern a Palestinian state.

The Survey excludes uninhabited related territories and such entities as the U.S.-owned Johnston Atoll, which has only a transient military population and no native inhabitants. Since most related territories have a broad range of civil liberties and some form of self-government, a higher proportion of them have the "free" designation than do independent countries.

The 1991 Survey has made some changes in its coverage of related territories. We list Tibet as a related territory of China, East Timor and Irian Jaya as related territories of Indonesia, and Kashmir as a related territory of India. In each case, the separate listing allows Freedom House to call attention to the human rights situation in areas in which there are serious questions about self-determination.
The accompanying Table of Independent Countries (pages 454-455) and Table of Related Territories (page 456) rate each country or territory on seven-category scales for political rights and civil liberties. Each entity is then placed in a broad category of "free," "partly free" or "not free." On each scale, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free.

Political rights
In political rights, generally speaking, states rated 1 come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections. Those elected rule. There are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings, and the opposition has an important role and power. These entities have self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy (in the case of related territories). Usually, those rated 1 have self-determination for minority groups or their participation in government through informal consensus. With the exception of such entities as tiny island countries, these countries and territories have decentralized political power and free subnational elections.

Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are free, but are less free than those rated 1. Such factors as violence, political discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics are present and weaken the quality of democracy. The same factors that weaken freedom in category 2 may also undermine political rights in categories 3, 4 and 5. Other damaging conditions are at work as well, including civil war, very strong military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections and one-party dominance. However, states and territories in these categories still have some elements of political rights, such as the freedom to organize nongovernmental parties and quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or other significant means of popular influence on government.

Typically, states and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies and autocrats. These regimes allow only some minimal manifestation of political rights such as competitive local elections or some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities. A few states in category 6 are traditional monarchies that mitigate their relative lack of political rights through the use of consultation with their subjects, toleration of political discussion, and acceptance of petitions from the ruled.

Category 7 includes places where political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent, due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or extreme oppression in combination with civil war.

Civil liberties
States and territories rated 1 in civil liberties come closest to the ideals of freedoms of expression, assembly and demonstration, religion and association. They also do the comparatively best job of protecting the individual from political violence and from harms inflicted by courts and security forces. Entities in this category have free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity. There is no such thing as complete equality of opportunity, but free places tend to come comparatively closer to the ideal than less free ones. In general, these countries and territories are comparatively free of extreme government indifference or corruption.

The political entities in category 2 in civil liberties are not as free as those rated 1, but they are still relatively free. In general, these countries and territories have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil liberties. In each case, the country is otherwise generally free.

Independent countries and related territories with ratings of 3, 4 or 5 have progressively fewer civil liberties than those in category 2. States in these categories range from ones that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those which have partial compliance with only eight standards. Some countries have a mixture of good civil
liberties scores in some areas and zero or partial credit in others. As one moves down the scale below category 2, the level of oppression increases, especially in the areas of censorship, political terror and the prevention of free association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state carry out political terror that undermines other freedoms. That means that a poor rating for a country is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government. The rating may simply reflect the real restrictions on liberty which can be caused by nongovernmental terror.

Typically, at category 6 in civil liberties, countries and territories have a few partial rights. For example, a country might have some religious freedom, some personal social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free private discussion. In general, these states and territories severely restrict expression and association. There are almost always political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror.

At category 7, countries and territories have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of the state’s repressive nature characterizes the society.

The accompanying Tables of Combined Average Ratings average the two seven-category scales of political rights and civil liberties into an overall freedom rating for each country and territory.
Introduction to Country Reports

The Survey team at Freedom House wrote reports on 165 countries and 62 related territories. Each report begins with brief political, economic, and social data. This information is arranged under the following headings: polity, economy, political rights, civil liberties, status, population, human development index, population, life expectancy, and ethnic groups. More detailed information follows in an overview and in an essay on the political rights and civil liberties of each country.

Under polity, there is an encapsulated description of the dominant centers of freely chosen or unelected political power in each country. Most of the descriptions are self-explanatory, such as "Communist one-party" for China or "parliamentary democracy" for Ireland. Such nonparliamentary democracies as the United States of America are designated "presidential-legislative democracies." European democratic countries with constitutional monarchs are designated "parliamentary democracies," because the elected body is the locus of most real political power. Only countries with powerful monarchs (e.g. the Sultan of Brunei) warrant a reference to the monarchy in the brief description of the polity. Dominant party polities are systems in which the ruling party (or front) dominates government, but allows other parties to organize or compete short of taking control of government. There are other types of polities listed as well. Among them are various military and military-influenced or -dominated regimes, transitional systems, and several unique politics, such as Iran's clergy-dominated parliamentary system. Countries with genuine federalism have the word "federal" in the polity description.

The reports label the economy of each country. Non-industrial economies are called traditional or pie-industrial. Developed market economies and Third World economies with a modern market sector have the designation "capitalist." Mixed capitalist countries combine private enterprise with substantial government involvement in the economy for social welfare purposes. Capitalist-statist economies have both large market sectors and government-owned productive enterprises, due either to elitist economic policies or state dependence on key natural resource industries. Mixed capitalist-statist economies have the characteristics of capitalist-statist economies plus major social welfare programs. Statist systems have the goal of placing the entire economy under direct or indirect government control. Mixed statist economies are primarily government-controlled, but also have significant private enterprise. Developing Third World economies with a government-directed modern sector belong in the "statist" category. Economies in transition between statist and capitalist forms may have the word "transitional" in the economy description.

Each country report mentions the category of political rights and civil liberties in which Freedom House classified the country. Category 1 is the most free and category 7 is the least free in each case. Status refers to the designations "free," "partly free" and "not free," which Freedom house uses as an overall summary of the general state of freedom in the country.

Each entry includes a population figure which is sometimes the best approximation that is available. For all cases in which the information is available, the Survey provides life expectancy statistics for males and females.

Freedom House obtained the Human Development Index (HDI) from the U.N. Development Program. This figure combines life expectancy, literacy and real per capita GDP, and carries the designation "low," "medium" or "high," depending on the country's degree of deprivation of each of these three variables. In some cases, Freedom House doubts the validity of the data, and indicates these reservations with the symbol /d on the Table of Social and Economic Comparisons at the back of the book.

The Survey provides a listing of countries' ethnic groups because this information may help the reader understand such questions as minority rights which the Survey takes into account.

Each country summary has an overview which describes such matters as the most important events of 1990 and current political issues. Finally, the country reports contain a section on political rights and civil liberties. This section summarizes each country's degree of respect for the rights and liberties that Freedom House uses to evaluate freedom in the world. These summaries include instances of human rights violations by both governmental and nongovernmental entities.

Reports on related territories follow the country summaries. In most cases, these reports are comparatively brief and contain fewer categories of information than one finds in the country summaries.
Afghanistan

**Polity:** Communist one-party  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Population:** 15,900,000  
**HDI:** 0.212 (low)  
**Status:** Not Free  
**Political Rights:** 7  
**Civil Liberties:** 7  
**Life Expectancy:** 37 male, 37 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Pathan, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, others

**Overview:**

Almost two years after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Soviet-supported President Najibullah (Najib) remained in power in 1990, fighting an inconclusive battle against a factionalized Muslim resistance mujahideen. Although the Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed that the twelve-year conflict should be resolved through broadly based, internationally supervised elections held under the present Kabul government, President Najibullah made only cosmetic democratic reforms. The majority of the Afghan resistance (supported variously by Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia) sought strict electoral guidelines or a military solution to bring about an Islamic regime.

Throughout the year, the United States and the Soviet Union held intensive talks on the Afghan issue. The Soviet Union reduced the flow of supplies and money to the Kabul government, and the U.S. Congress cut $50 million from the $300 million in annual military aid to the mujahideen. By year's end, Washington concurred with Moscow’s proposal that during the elections the Najib regime, rather than a transitional government, should remain in power, with Najib heading the security forces.

The core of the mujahideen, composed of a loose and often fractious coalition of seven disparate Muslim groups, and financed by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, was represented by the Afghan interim-government set up in Peshawar after the Soviet invasion of 1979. The most radical group, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, remained the best equipped rebel group. Since the Soviet withdrawal, the mujahideen has been torn by infighting, drug trafficking and defections to the Kabul regime.

In March, President Najibullah's government foiled a coup attempt led by Defense Minister Shanawaz Tanai, a hard-line Marxist who was supported by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It was the most serious of five coup attempts since the Soviet withdrawal. Kabul was reportedly bombed for twenty-four hours by mutinous fighter pilots, and in outlying strongholds like Jalalabad and Khost rebellious troops allied themselves with mujahideen fighters. Approximately 623 people were arrested and two ministers were executed in connection with the attempt.

The failed coup revealed the deep rift between two bitterly opposed factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). President Najib and the majority of his government belong to the Parcham (Flag) group, supported by students, intellectuals and professionals. Tanai and most of the armed forces, particularly the air force, belong to the Khalq (Masses) faction, popular among the working and rural classes.

For much of the year, fighting continued between the government and rebel forces. In April, at a supposed arms surrender ceremony, members of a rebel faction killed twenty-five officials and twelve civilians. Government tanks responded by opening fire on the crowd. The day after, state security forces in Nangarhar province seized a rebel arms caravan, killing fifty caravan guards and ten others.

In October resistance fighters launched a two-pronged attack on Kabul
and overran the provincial capitals of Kalat and Tarin Kot, the first cities to fall to the resistance fighters since the Soviet withdrawal. Rocket attacks on Kabul killed at least 100 people. But the attack, led mostly by Hekmatyar, failed to secure the capital. Other rebel leaders, angered by what they called Hekmatyar's "opportunistic" alliance with Tanai, offered no support and considered the attacks futile.

In May, President Najibullah lifted the state of emergency, in effect since the Soviet withdrawal, and restored to Parliament powers that had been delegated to the cabinet under emergency laws. In addition, Kabul held a Loya Jirghah, or assembly, which amended the constitution to introduce pluralism and a market economy. The president announced that the PDPA, now called the Watan (homeland) Party, would become a non-Communist group open to Afghans of all political affiliations. He also proposed a peace plan that included a six-month cease fire, U.N. supervised elections and the demilitarization of Afghanistan; the plan was rejected by Abdul Sayyaf, the interim-government's prime minister.

Some war-weary rebel leaders made their own attempts at forging peace and democracy on a local level in the countryside. In May, field commanders from different resistance parties, who had been meeting secretly, formed a council independent of the interim-government.

In response to the superpowers' plans, the mujahideen came up with its own election proposal late in the year. In the elections for choosing a national assembly and a council of leaders empowered to name a national government, participation would be limited to a group of military commanders who have thirty or more armed followers, Islamic scholars and elders acceptable to the guerrilla leaders. These voters, estimated to be no more than 5 percent of the population, must be tested supporters of the mujahideen. The election regulations'practically rule out the moderates and "ordinary people." Many criticized the mujahideen's regulations as exceedingly restrictive.

In December, the mujahideen agreed to elections while Najib was still in power. The national elections would be held simultaneously in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; electoral precincts would be organized in mujahideen camps in Pakistan and Iran with international supervision. By the end of the year, no date had been set for the election and the situation in the country remained volatile.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Citizens of Afghanistan cannot change their government democratically. The war has caused one-third of the population to flee the country and has killed another 1.2 million. Landmines left behind by Soviet troops threaten the remaining rural population and refugees seeking to return. Torture, disappearances and executions are widespread. Both mujahideen and regime forces have been accused of executing prisoners. Impressment of youth into the Afghan army and "voluntary labor" for military construction are still reported. The judiciary is controlled by the party-state apparatus. Arbitrary arrest and detention on an individual basis is routine, but mass arbitrary "roundups" have ceased. The right to council and a fair trial have been recently adopted but, as the legal system is controlled by the ruling Party and there is no legal tradition in Afghanistan, this change has had no practical impact.

The media, government-owned and -operated, are tightly controlled by the regime. Some press controls have been eased. Some articles from foreign newspapers have been published in Afghanistan. Private criticism of the regime can result in detention. Political prisoners are estimated at around 3,000.
A new law on assembly was adopted which allows demonstrations and strikes that do not violate public security. A change in the law on association allows the formation of any group that does not desire the overthrow of the regime. However, no new parties exist.

The PDPA officially supervises all religious organizations, but little interference with religious practice is reported. The Central Council of Trade Unions is a party-dominated umbrella organization for labor.

**Albania**

**Polity:** Communist one-party (transitional)  
**Political Rights:** 7  
**Economy:** Statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 6  
**Population:** 3,300,000  
**Status:** Not Free  
**HDI:** 0.790 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 69 male, 73 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Predominantly Albanian (two main ethnic-linguistic groups: Ghegs, Tosks)

**Overview:**

In 1990 the rapid collapse of Communist regime's in Eastern Europe reverberated into this small, isolated bastion of Stalinism. Exceedingly fearful of the type of massive unrest that led to the sudden fall and execution of Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu in late 1989, Albania's leader, Ramiz Alia, first secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor (Communist), announced tentative steps toward liberalizing one of the world's most repressive societies. In late June, however, some 6,000 Albanians sought refuge in foreign embassies in the capital of Tirana. While most were eventually permitted to leave the country, by year's end the situation in the country remained tense.

The Socialist People's Republic of Albania was established as a one-party Communist regime in 1946 and was led by Enver Hoxha until his death in 1985. Hoxha fluctuated from Stalinism to a home-grown Maoism, eventually severing relations with the USSR and China. An umbrella Democratic Front of Albania (DFA) includes all social and political organizations and, theoretically, all Albanian citizens. The unicameral, 250-member People's Assembly, elected every four years, traditionally met only twice a year to rubber-stamp decisions by the party Presidium. Under Hoxha, all religion was abolished, and the notorious, 30,000-member secret service, the Sigurimi, became a pervasive and intrusive force of state control.

In January, there were unconfirmed reports of unrest in several Albanian cities. The same month, Alia, addressing a central committee meeting, announced plans for reform that included multi-candidate elections to the People's Assembly, decentralization of light industry and transport, more private housing, and productivity-linked wage increases. The move was aimed at precluding the kind of civil unrest that hit Eastern Europe in 1989. Most Albanians have access to Italian, Greek or Yugoslav television broadcasts and were aware of the dramatic political changes in the East bloc. Economic conditions were also a factor. Under Hoxha, the regime had imposed an autarkic model of economic self-sufficiency, and the system was enshrined in the constitution, which bans foreign debt. By 1990, industrial output had stagnated because of outdated technology and a desperate shortage of spare parts and new equipment for the Soviet- and Chinese-built factories of the 1950s and 1970s. Once thoroughly isolated from the world, Albania
began taking steps to broaden diplomatic and economic relations with Balkan and West European countries after Alia assumed power in 1985.

In March, further reforms were announced. The government promised to create a Ministry of Justice; limit government office terms to ten years, with a fifth-year review of performance and the possibility of dismissal by peers; and transfer authority from government ministries to district officials and individual enterprises. Direct phone links were established with the West, including the United States. In May, restrictions were eased on foreign travel, and the government restored the right to practice religion.

In late June, several hundred Albanians in Tirana, some braving gunfire from security forces, sought refuge in several foreign embassies, among them those of Italy, France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Turkey, Greece and Poland. Several people who entered the Bulgarian, Cuban and Egyptian compounds were turned over to Albanian authorities. By early July, the number of refugees had swelled to nearly 6,000. After the intervention of the United Nations, the crisis was resolved, and most of the asylum-seekers were put on ships and allowed to leave Albania. In August, the government began constructing a barricade around the diplomatic quarter in Tirana in a clear effort to prevent further defections.

The July exodus marked growing public impatience with the pace of reforms. Later in the month there were reports of demonstrations and strikes, as workers staged a sit-in at the large Stalin leather-processing plant in Tirana.

On the diplomatic front, Albania re-established formal relations with the Soviet Union in July, and expressed a desire to join the thirty-five-nation Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During a Balkan summit meeting in Tirana, Albania was sharply criticized for its human rights record and the alleged mistreatment of its Greek minority.

On 25 October, Ismail Kadare, Albania's best known writer, defected while in France, saying that he was "convinced that the Communist leadership has no intention of emulating the political reforms of Eastern Europe."

On 11 December, after three days of revolt by university students, the leadership of the Communist party announced its endorsement of the creation of independent political parties and the ouster of five members of the ruling Politburo.

The reform debate has not been resolved within the country's leadership. President Alia is known to be opposed by hardliners in the factionalized party, among them Mr. Hoxha's widow, who has backing among elements in the security apparatus.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Albanians cannot democratically change their system of government. The regime has pledged itself to several reforms. A draft law on elections, due to have been sent to Parliament on 12 November, offered voters a secret ballot and a choice of candidates, but stopped short of allowing the formation of political parties. In May, the People's Assembly passed laws liberalizing the justice and penal systems. A justice minister was appointed to create a new system of courts and defense attorneys. Under the new legislation, defense lawyers will be admitted to the bar and permitted to represent their clients from the moment they are arrested throughout the trial. Parliament announced that the new measures would close "a loophole for subjective interpretations" of laws, under which "even persons who are not such might be described and condemned as enemies." The government admits to holding eighty political prisoners.
There are no independent groups or associations. The media remain in the control of the party-government apparatus, and reflect official policy. Foreign broadcasts are received from nearby nations. The public's ability to openly criticize the regime is still circumscribed by fear of the security apparatus. New laws lifted the ban on religion, but it was not made clear how Muslims, Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Christians would be able to resume their religious practices. Before the Communist takeover, Albania was about 70 percent Muslim, 20 percent Orthodox and 10 percent Catholic. Religion was abolished in 1967, and mosques and churches were razed or turned over for government use. New laws also lifted travel restrictions, entitling all Albanians to travel abroad. In the four months after the law, some 25,000 Albanians went abroad, many with no intention of returning. Workers are forbidden from striking or organizing, and belong to government-controlled unions.

**Algeria**

- **Polity:** Dominant party
- **Political Rights:** 4
- **Economy:** Statist
- **Civil Liberties:** 4
- **Population:** 25,600,000
- **Status:** Partly Free
- **HDI:** 0.609 (medium)
- **Life Expectancy:** 59 male, 62 female
- **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Berber

**Overview:**

In Algeria's local and regional elections on 12 June 1990, the National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria's ruling party since the country gained independence from France, received a resounding defeat at the hands of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). It was not only the first multi-party election ever held in Algeria, but the first in the Arab world in which an Islamist party won a majority of votes. Signalling the deep decline of the FLN, the results led President Benjedid Chadli to move up elections for the National Assembly, where the FLN is the only party represented, from fall of 1992 to the early part of 1991.

With 65 percent of eligible voters casting ballots, the FIS won over 55 percent of the popular vote and gained control of over half the town councils and two-thirds of the regional departments, including Algiers and the countryside. The FLN finished second with 32 percent of the vote, and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), which seeks to promote the Berber language, received 7 percent.

Although a total of eleven parties participated in the elections, some of Algeria's most important opposition political groups were either barred from the election or called for a country-wide boycott. The Algerian Popular Party, the National Liberation Front's rival during the independence struggle against France, was among several parties denied official recognition by the government and hence forbidden to field candidates.

Boycotting the contest were the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), led by a Berber Algerian independence hero, Hocine Ait Ahmed, and the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, led by former President Ben Bella. The reasons for the boycott were charges of election fraud, the FLN's disproportionate access to state funding and media, and assertions that parliamentary elections should have been held first. Another concern was the legitimacy of elections for local councils, which lack power in Algeria's centralized state dominated by the FLN.
Underlying Algeria's political agitation is the country's economic atrophy. The wealth from the oil-boom of the 1970s concealed the failure of Algeria's inefficient state-socialist economy, whose subsidy policies drastically stunted domestic production of staple products. For each of the last four years production has slipped, and population has grown, at an average of 3 percent. Unemployment idles more than one-fifth of the population, with a much higher percentage among young men. In the minds of most observers, the Islamic victory in largely secular Algeria signified a protest vote against an incompetent and corrupt party that has wrought economic chaos in a country rich in oil, gas, uranium and gold. That the FIS fared so well reflects not necessarily an inherent preference for its program, but the failure of more secular parties to establish themselves in the formerly one-party state.

Algeria's new democratization was started in 1988, after economic hardship provoked widespread food riots and a subsequent government crackdown that killed 500 students. Left without a shred of popularity, the FLN government began a sweeping liberalization plan, including constitutional reforms to allow the formation of political parties other than the FLN, and the transition of the state socialist economy to a more market oriented system.

The FIS, led by philosophy teacher Abassi Madani, has established a solid foundation of grass roots support. The group reportedly has 650,000 members, mostly among Algeria's mass of unemployed youth, and bases its political activities around a network of some 9,000 mosques; the group helps poor Algerians with food and clothing. Abassi Madani, the president of the FIS, who took the limelight during the campaign, is considered the more moderate among Algeria's Islamic leadership. He has stated he will attempt to establish Islamic law, or *shari'a*, slowly, and says he believes in having a political opposition.

On the other hand, Madani's young deputy, Ali Belhadj, a popular clergyman with a large grass-roots following, believes that Islam and democracy are incompatible, and that *shari'a* law should be completely and immediately applied. After the elections, he called on President Benjedid to resign. Madani made no such demands, and said that the president deserves credit for bringing on the liberalization which made the Islamic victory possible. The FLN's loss spurred an almost formal split between members who support liberalization and "the old guard" who want to maintain the status quo. President Benjedid's dissolution of the secret police demonstrated his and Prime Minister Mouloud's desire to rid the state apparatus of the old guard, which campaigned during the elections before sometimes indifferent or hostile audiences.

Many consider The Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA), led by former president Ben Bella, who has just returned from exile, as the force that can save Algeria from its current economic and political disentegration, and banish the specter of a fundamentalist government.

Beyond the FIS, there are more radical Islamic groups, including the Party of God, which have been denied legal recognition as a political party. All are represented by the Islamic Mission Union, an umbrella organization of Islamic groups. In the months leading up the elections, the country witnessed increasing polarization and periodic violence between secular and Islamic groups. Some fundamentalists have attacked bars, porn theatres and women in the street for wearing Western dress. Critics accused the FIS of being linked with the Islamic groups carrying out these attacks. Since the elections, the FIS has set new restrictions in the many cities whose local governments
it controls, such as the banning of bars, brothels, modern music festivals, co-
ed classes and the wearing of bathing suits. While the FIS continues to lead
massive demonstrations advocating Islamic law, women’s groups and other
parties hold counter-demonstrations calling for democracy and tolerance.

Though Algerians’ rights to freely elect their representatives and change their
government remain to be tested on the national level, Algerian society has
undergone tremendous liberalization. The FLN and the executive branch
retain considerable power, but the new constitution approved in 1989 has
allowed the formation of over thirty political parties, all of which will be
allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections scheduled for early 1991.

Most reports suggested that the local elections in June 1990 were for the
most part free and fair. Some voters, such as men who were trying to vote
on behalf of their wives under the Islamic family law, were turned away for
failing to have proper documentation. Nineteen-eighty-nine's electoral law
gave all the seats of a constituency to the party which took more than 50
percent of the vote. The new electoral law undermines the likelihood that a
single dominant party will win massive majorities by giving a proportional
share of seats to parties winning over 7 percent of the vote.

New freedoms of political association and expression are helping to unleash
democracy in Algeria. All political parties can freely publish their own periodi-
cals and set up media stations. Millions of Algerians now receive CNN and Eu-
ropean television via satellite. While a new press code provides for fines or jail
sentences of up to ten years in jail for spreading false information, threatening
state security or public unity, or insulting Islam and other religions, criticism of
the government has been met with little or no interference. To the dismay of
the Berber community, the press code requires that all publications be written
in Arabic, but certain publications may apply for permission to use other lang-
uages. Some foreign publications, such as the Paris-based Jeune Afrique are
banned, and an issue of the Movement for Democracy's periodical was seized
by authorities in July on charges that it lacked required prior authorization.

Although the UGTA is still the only legal labor organization, at least two
new professional unions have formed with tacit government acceptance. The
right to strike is guaranteed by the new constitution, yet reportedly strikers
have occasionally been arrested on charges of “disturbing the right to work”
of other workers. Public demonstrations and meetings in which Algerians
speak their minds are widely held.

Reports suggest that there have been no cases of torture since 1988. Some
compensation has been paid to a few of the families of those tortured during
and after the 1988 riots, yet the government has failed to prosecute the
security force personnel who were responsible. Pre-arraignment detention for
questioning a suspect cannot exceed forty-eight hours, after which the suspect
must be charged or released. Accused persons held in detention have access
to their lawyers at any time. Free legal counsel to defendants who cannot
afford lawyers is provided by the Algerian Bar Association.

The relative independence of Algeria’s judiciary was reinforced by the new
constitution of 1989, as well as by the efforts of Justice Minister Benflis to
enhance the judiciary’s autonomy. The court system is composed of military
and civil courts; the government abolished the State Security Courts in 1989.

Islam is the official religion, as established under the new constitution, but
there are no Islamic courts, and the tiny Christian and Jewish communities
are allowed to practice their faith freely. With the rise of Islamic activism,
legal and societal discrimination against women has become a serious concern. Women cannot obtain a divorce and are considered to be under the guardianship of their husbands, fathers or brothers; physical abuse of women is for the most part culturally acceptable. 

Algerians are free to travel within the country, although traveling abroad is made difficult by strict currency controls.

**Angola**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity:</th>
<th>Communist one-party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights:</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Economy:</td>
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<td>Civil Liberties:</td>
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<td>Population:</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
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<td>HDI:</td>
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<td>Life Expectancy:</td>
<td>40 male, 44 female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups:</td>
<td>Ovimbundu (37 percent), Mbundu (25 percent), Kongo (13 percent), mulatto (2 percent), European (1 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overview:**

During much of 1990, high hopes successively rose and fell that, as a prelude to internationally supervised elections in 1991 and eventual national reconciliation, a cease-fire between the armed forces of the government in Luanda and the opposing UNITA movement would be agreed to by year's end.

A former Portuguese colony on the Atlantic coast of southwest Africa, Angola gained independence in 1975 after fourteen years of guerrilla war led by the three principal independence movements: Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA); the Marxist, Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) headed by the poet Agostinho Neto; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi.

After the Portuguese commissioner left on 10 November, the MPLA, which controlled the capital of Luanda, declared a People’s Republic of Angola. Two weeks later, the FNLA-UNITA forces, which controlled the northern, eastern and southern parts of the country, announced the creation of a democratic republic based in Huambo and began an ultimately unsuccessful military drive on the capital.

Before the end of the year, Cuba had dispatched some 20,000 troops to Angola to buttress the MPLA regime. Over the next several years, the Cuban presence grew to over 50,000. With the virtual elimination of the FNLA by 1979, Savimbi’s UNITA forces, backed by millions in U.S. aid and South African forces, continued guerrilla activities, controlling several areas in the southern part of the country.

The government of Angola is a one-party state controlled by the MPLA-Labor Party now led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who took over after the death of former MPLA leader and president Neto in 1979. The 223-member National People's Assembly, with MPLA-approved members indirectly designated by locally elected provincial delegates, serves as the legislature. Within roughly the southeastern one-third of Angola, UNITA operates as the sole political force in the territory which it controls at any given time.

Nineteen-ninety began with a proposal by the Luanda government for a peace settlement in which members of UNITA would run in elections as independent candidates and not as representatives of UNITA. The political system would still allow for only one legal political party, the MPLA, though
implicit in the proposal was that UNITA could continue to function as an "association" of its membership. However, a law later drafted by the government prohibited independent associations "with a political nature." Multi-partyism was expressly ruled out by MPLA representatives allegedly because of high illiteracy in the country and Angolan ethnic diversity. The expressed fear was that a competitive election might lead to a heightening of inter-tribal animosity and a renewed civil war. An MPLA spokesperson commented at that time that the government still felt that it was advisable for Savimbi to "step aside," at least temporarily.

UNITA had presented its own five-point peace plan the previous September, proposing direct talks between itself and the MPLA as equals under a ceasefire, the release of all political prisoners, a transitional government of national unity to which UNITA would be able to nominate its own members, a rewriting of the constitution, and fair multiparty elections.

In late January 1990 a major military offensive was launched by the government against UNITA positions in the vicinity of Mavinga in southeast Angola. The offensive had apparently sputtered to an end by May. Meanwhile, guerrilla attacks by UNITA were stepped up in the capital city of Luanda and the region around it. Civil war compounded the effects of drought and reputed bureaucratic ineptitude within the country to create famine conditions. The U.N. estimated that close to 2,000,000 were at serious risk of starving. The two sides had difficulty coming to an agreement to create safe routes to funnel famine-relief to stricken areas. Nonetheless, a relief convoy finally was dispatched into southern Angola in early November after receiving assurances of safe passage from both sides in the conflict.

President dos Santos and members of his Cabinet maintained in interviews and speeches that the government fully intended to build a free-market economy and that the possible evolution of the present political system into one with more than a single party was by no means precluded. This has not been guarantee enough for the UNITA leadership, who resist the idea of being required to slough off formal political affiliation with UNITA and to integrate themselves individually into the existing political structure as a precondition to the later possibility of multipartyism. The MPLA leadership has suggested a national referendum to determine whether or not Angolans really preferred a multiparty system, and asserted that logistical difficulties make multiparty elections impossible before 1993.

A new attempt to reach an accommodation between the two sides began in Portugal in April, the first serious face-to-face negotiations since talks brokered by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko collapsed in mid-1989. Three interrelated issues were on the agenda in the rounds of talks that followed: the nature and timing of a ceasefire, mutual recognition of the parties as actors having equal rights to political participation in Angola, and setting a date for multiparty elections. Despite its earlier refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the MPLA's People's Republic of Angola, UNITA proposed to recognize the Angolan state, President dos Santos as its head, and the MPLA as a political party. In return, it demanded that the MPLA explicitly recognize UNITA as a political force to be directly negotiated with instead of referring to it as "elements of' UNITA or "armed bandits." UNITA dropped its demand for a formal role in a transitional government before free elections were held.

The MPLA said that it could not extend immediate de jure recognition to UNITA since one-party rule was institutionalized in its Angolan constitution.
Parties or movements of opposition to the government could only be permitted after constitutional revision, and the MPLA stated that only the Party Congress convened for December 1990 could take such action. In addition, negotiators for the MPLA stated that such a process of revision could only begin after an effective ceasefire had been achieved, since recognition of UNITA as a politico-military force before a ceasefire agreement would be "tantamount to legalizing armed violence." UNITA, suspecting that the call for it to lay down its arms prior to receiving formal recognition from Luanda might be a ploy, demanded legal status at the latest in the instant of its act of signing a ceasefire. UNITA also refused to lay down its weapons and merge its forces into the Luanda regime's army before elections.

The continuing stalemate in efforts to end the war led to a fifth round of talks in November. Each side publicly called the other intransigent. Earlier that month, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. accepted the invitation of the two Angolan parties to assist in the process of seeking a settlement. The superpowers agreed to join a team monitoring a ceasefire and elections. Meanwhile, Cuban expeditionary troops continued to be withdrawn from Angola on schedule in accord with the southern Africa regional peace accord that also resulted in Namibian independence from South African rule.

At an MPLA party congress in early December, Dos Santos stated that the Party must move to embrace democratic socialism and the free market. He said that plans to revise the constitution to permit multipartyism will go forward whether or not a ceasefire agreement is soon reached with UNITA. Nonetheless, resistance from committed Marxist-Leninist "hard-liners" to such changes was reported in the Central Committee, Politburo, and among delegates in the congress.

As a result of a mid-December agreement between Luanda and UNITA, another round of peace talks are expected to resume in January of 1991. The civil war has left the Angolan economy in ruins, with a foreign debt of $650 million. Manufacturing output is low, and the country desperately lacks managers and technicians. The government has made some recent moves in the direction of privatization. Attempts at restructuring have been assisted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Less than 10 percent of the rail system is currently operational, due in part to UNITA sabotage. Rising oil prices due to the Gulf Crisis make short-term economic prospects for Angola somewhat rosier, however.

Angola remains a one-party Marxist state and the people do not have the legal means to democratically change their government. The ongoing civil war has led to persistent reports of political killings, torture and disappearances perpetrated by the government. Suspects in political cases can be held without charge for up to three months. The judiciary is not independent of MPLA control, and does not meet internationally recognized standards of fairness and impartiality. Citizens cannot freely express their views without risking persecution, and the government-controlled press reflects official policy. The president has stated that the government has no intention of privatizing the media, despite movement toward a mixed economy. Freedom of assembly is circumscribed for all but the MPLA and related groups. Churches are allowed to function, but they are highly regulated by a government official committed to atheism. The ongoing civil war has resulted in domestic travel restrictions, and the issuance of passports is restricted. Workers cannot form free trade unions, and the National Union...
of Angolan Workers (UNTA) is controlled by the MPLA. The government has offered UNITA the chance to participate in the drafting of a new, liberal constitution once a ceasefire has been reached.

Antigua and Barbuda

Polity: Parliamentary democracy  
Economy: Capitalist-statist  
Population: 100,000  
HDI: 0.898 (high)  
Life Expectancy: 68 male, 72 female  
Ethnic Groups: Relatively homogeneous

Overview:

Antigua and Barbuda was rocked in 1990 by a scandal involving the transshipment of Israeli arms through Antigua to Colombian drug lords, with the apparent involvement of high officials in the long-ruling government of Prime Minister Vere Bird. As a judicial inquiry headed by a British jurist proceeded into the fall, the government was under pressure from the political opposition and the private sector to resign and call new elections.

Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general who acts as ceremonial head of state. The islands, three altogether counting the uninhabited Redondo, became self-governing in 1969 and gained independence in 1981.

The political system is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament consisting of a seventeen-member House of Representatives elected for five years, and an appointed Senate. In the House of Representatives there are sixteen seats for Antigua and one for Barbuda. Eleven senators are appointed by the prime minister, four by the parliamentary opposition leader, one by the Barbuda Council and one by the governor-general. Barbuda has achieved limited self-government through the separately elected, five-seat Barbuda Council.

In the 9 March 1989 general election the ruling Antigua Labour Party (ALP) recaptured fifteen of the sixteen seats it held in the House. The opposition United National Democratic Parly (UNDP) won one seat. The Barbuda People's Movement (BPM) took the Barbuda seat which was not contested by the ALP. Also competing were the leftist Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), the Barbuda National Party (BNP) and the Barbuda Independent Movement (BIM). In separate elections two weeks later, the BPM took all five Barbuda Council seats.

The general election, although free of violence, was marred by a number of irregularities, including the late arrival of ballots, which caused five-hour delays in ten of the seventeen constituencies. In response to a petition filed by the UNDP, a high court annulled the results in one constituency. Before it could rule on six other contested constituencies, the ALP parliamentary members holding the contested seats resigned and the ALP government announced that by-elections would be held in August. The ALP also named a new electoral supervisor.

The UNDP boycotted the by-elections, stating they would not participate until reforms were made in the electoral system. The ACLM did not nominate candidates either, citing financial reasons. The ALP, led by the eighty-one-year-old Vere Bird, now in his fourth term as prime minister, therefore retained the fifteen seats it had won in March. The opposition has charged
over the years that the ALP exerts undue influence over the nominally independent electoral supervisor, and uses bribery and intimidation at polling time.

By the end of 1989, the ruling ALP confronted a looming succession crisis as Vere Bird Jr. and Lester Bird competed for the party mantle held for decades by their now ailing father, with Papa Bird said to favor Bird Jr. However, the rivalry became a full-scale clash with the outbreak of the arms scandal in 1990, and the apparent involvement of Bird Jr.

The brouhaha began in April when the government of Colombia protested that Israeli arms discovered in the possession of the Medellin drug cartel had been sold to the Antiguan government, then shipped to Colombia with the knowledge of Bird Jr., the minister of Public Works and Communication and national security advisor to Papa Bird. Bird Jr. denied the allegation, but brother Lester, the deputy prime minister, convinced his father to allow an independent judicial inquiry and force Bird Jr. to step down from his government positions pending the outcome of the investigation. A commission of inquiry headed by prominent British jurist, Louis Blom-Cooper, began its investigation in June and initiated hearings in July. In his testimony Bird Jr. denied any involvement in the affair and blamed his brother, Lester, for conducting a "witch hunt" against him for political purposes. The Blom-Cooper report, issued on 2 November, stated that Antigua and Barbuda faced being "engulfed in corruption," and recommended that Bird Jr. be barred from public office for life.

The scandal instilled new vigor into political opponents of the government. The call by opposition parties in May for a protest march turned out several thousand people. The affair also widened the schism in the ruling ALP between supporters of Bird Jr. and backers of his brother. Nonetheless, the government survived a no-confidence vote tabled in July by Baldwin Spencer, leader of the official UNDP opposition in parliament.

In September, the UNDP charged that the country was in disarray because of the scandal and called for new elections "as soon as possible." The government rejected the proposal, but was challenged again in October when the Antigua Chamber of Commerce demanded that the government resign in favor of an interim administration pending the results of the judicial inquiry.

Political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are free to organize and express themselves. The free exercise of religion is respected. Labor unions have the right to strike and are politically active. There is an independent Industrial Court to mediate certain labor disputes between unions and the government.

The judiciary is relatively independent and the rule of law is enhanced by an inter-island court of appeals for Antigua and five other small former British colonies in the Lesser Antilles. There are no political prisoners.

Newspapers are associated with political parties, and include the leftist ACLM's outspoken weekly, Outlook. Some have been subject to systematic legal harassment by members of the ruling ALP. Radio and television are either owned by the state or members of the Bird family; the opposition charges both with favoritism. Such charges were lent weight in 1990 as the Antigua Broadcasting Service declined to provide live television or radio coverage of the arms scandal inquiry, despite the approval of Mr. Blom-Cooper, the British jurist heading the investigation.
Country reports

Argentina

**Polity:** Federal presidential-legislative democracy

**Political Rights:** 1

**Civil Liberties:** 3

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Status:** Free

**Population:** 32,300,000

**HDI:** 0.910 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 66 male, 73 female

**Ethnic Groups:** Relatively homogeneous

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**Overview:**

Since taking office in July 1989, President Carlos S. Menem has struggled to keep his government's free market experiment afloat. He has encountered strong resistance from opposition parties and from within his own Peronist movement, particularly among the powerful Peronist labor unions. In 1990, as belt-tightening policies pushed the country into deeper recession, Menem caused concern by authorizing the military to guarantee order in the event of social unrest. He was praised in early December after he ordered the military to put down an armed rebellion by a group of radical, nationalist officers, the fourth such attempt since the return to civilian rule in 1983. Weeks later, however, Menem was widely criticized for pardoning eight former military officers, including two former presidents, who had been tried and convicted for human rights violations committed during the 1970s "dirty war" against leftist insurgents.

The Argentine Republic was proclaimed upon achieving independence from Spain in 1816. A federal constitution was drafted in 1853. In this century, democratic governance has been frequently interrupted by military takeovers. The end of the dictatorship of Juan Peron (1946-55) marked the beginning of an era of political instability, left-wing violence and right-wing military government. Following seven years of repressive rule by successive military juntas, and after the military's defeat by the British in the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas war, Argentina returned to civilian and democratic government in December 1983.

Most of the constitutional structure of 1853 was restored in 1983. The president and vice-president are designated for six-year terms by a 600-member electoral college. The electoral college is chosen on the basis of proportional representation, with each of the twenty-four electoral districts, twenty-three provinces and the federal district of Buenos Aires having twice as many electors as the combined number of senators and deputies. The legislature consists of a 254-member Chamber of deputies directly elected for six years, with half of the seats renewable every three years, and a forty-six-member Senate nominated by the legislatures of each of the twenty-three provinces for nine-year terms, with one-third of the seats renewable every three years. Provincial and municipal governments are elected.

In the October 1983 general elections, the moderate-left Radical Civic Union (UCR) led by Raul Alfonsin won a decisive victory over the Peronist Justicialist Nationalist Movement (MNJ). It was the first Peronist electoral loss in nearly four decades. President Alfonsin was inaugurated in December 1983.

Following the prosecution of former military leaders for human rights abuses during the "dirty war," the Alfonsin administration was buffeted by three military rebellions, two in 1987, the last and most serious in December 1988. There were also, in early 1989, three left-wing guerrilla attacks on military installations by a resurgent faction of the dissolved Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP), the All for the Fatherland Movement (MTP).
In the primary elections held in late 1988, the UCR nominated Eduardo Angeloz for president, and the Peronist MNJ selected Menem. Menem led in the opinion polls throughout the campaign as Angeloz was unable to overcome the incumbent UCR’s inability to arrest the collapsing economy. On 14 May 1989 Menem won the presidency with 49 percent of the vote against 37 percent for Angeloz, and the Peronists secured a working majority in the legislature.

The transition was scheduled for 10 December 1989. However, food riots, symptomatic of the country’s worst economic crisis since the nineteenth century, led both major parties to agree to an early succession. President Menem was inaugurated on 8 July 1989, the first time in sixty-one years that one democratically elected civilian had succeeded another.

Menem had campaigned as a populist in the traditional Peronist manner, but once in office he stunned the nation by initiating an economic liberalization and austerity program designed to cut inflation and privatize huge, bankrupt, state-owned enterprises. Then, in October 1989, he pardoned 280 officers and civilians accused of corruption and human rights violations, including eighteen generals and admirals and the former junta members convicted in 1984. The pardons were a clear attempt to placate the restive military and guarantee political stability. Also pardoned were sixty-four individuals accused of belonging to terrorist groups in the 1970s.

By early 1990, Menem’s economic policies, dubbed "Menemstroika" by some analysts, had angered many Peronists, forcing him to depend on a number of smaller conservative parties for political support, and to rely more on executive decree. In March, following a new round of food riots and the increased activity of a shadowy left-wing guerrilla group, the Che Guevara Brigade, Menem authorized the military to take responsibility for internal security. The armed forces appeared to have little interest in an actual takeover, which would leave the country an international outcast, but have been angling since Menem took office for a greater role in running the country.

The enhanced role given to the military sparked protest by opposition parties and human rights activists. But Menem retained a large degree of popular support—a 62 percent positive rating according to one poll in mid-1990—primarily for having brought inflation down from nearly 200 percent per month to less than 15 percent. By the fall of 1990, however, other major economic indicators remained in decline, particularly unemployment, and labor actions by the nationalist faction of the Peronist labor movement had begun to imperil his privatization program.

In October, Menem issued a decree restricting the right to strike in the massive public sector, the backbone of the Peronist movement. The measure sharpened divisions within the Peronist MNJ. A series of bomb attacks were directed against targets associated with the government’s privatization program by a new group calling itself the Eva Peron Command. By the end of 1990, it appeared that Menem would be hard-pressed to lead a united MNJ into the legislative and gubernatorial elections scheduled for the fall of 1991.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression, free exercise of religion and the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions are respected. Although the political scene is currently dominated by two parties, there are dozens of active smaller parties from Communist and Trotskyist on the left to fascist on the right. Political expression is occasionally restricted by violence associated with political campaigns, labor activities, and deteriorating economic conditions.
During the May 1989 food riots in Buenos Aires and a number of civilics in the interior, over a dozen deaths and over a thousand arrests were reported by the government. Nonetheless, security forces and police appeared to respond with relative restraint. However, amid a mounting urban crime wave in 1990 and bolder actions by the Che Guevara Brigade, there were increasing reports by human rights groups of harsh measures by the police and security forces, including illegal arrests and searches, as well as violent intimidation.

The human rights community is well organized and consists of numerous organizations dating back to the 1970s. These groups played an influential role in the prosecution of military officers during the Alfonsin administration and have mobilized in 1989 and 1990 against Menem’s rapprochement with the military.

The judiciary is an independent body headed by a nine-member Supreme Court. However, Menem confronted charges of packing the court when he expanded the formerly five-member body after taking office. There are also federal appeals courts and provincial courts. The judicial system proved to be effective and thorough in handling the numerous human rights and criminal cases brought against military officers and former leftist guerrilla leaders during the Alfonsin administration. However, Menem now appears to have majority support on the expanded Supreme Court, which will be a factor as human rights groups continue to contest his policy of pardoning convicted military officers.

Labor is well organized and politically powerful. The approximately 3 million unionized workers are dominated by the Peronist-led General Confederation of Labor (CGT), which carried out numerous one-day general strikes during the Alfonsin administration. Antiquated labor laws, a legacy of the Peronist era, make it virtually impossible to fire anyone. Menem’s decidedly non-Peronist economic stabilization program and his push to change the labor code have caused a serious split in the CGT between pro- and anti-Menem factions.

Newspapers are privately owned, vocal and uncensored. There are numerous independent dailies reflecting various points of view. Circulation has been hurt, however, by the country’s severe economic deterioration. Television and radio broadcasting are both private and public. The Menem administration has moved to privatize a number of state-owned television stations.

**Australia**

**Polity:** Federal parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 17,100,000  
**HDI:** 0.978 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 72 male, 79 female  
**Ethnic groups:** European (95 percent), Asian (4 percent), Aboriginal (1 percent)

**Overview:**

The key political highlights in Australia in 1990 were a national election that saw the incumbent Australian Labor Party (ALP) retain power by the narrowest winning margin since 1961, and a government proposal for a two-stage program of constitutional reform that could lead to modification or abandonment of the federal system set up in 1901.

The ALP’s political problems were rooted in a sluggish economy. In February, Prime Minister Bob Hawke, a former trade union leader who led
Labor to victory in every election since 1983, announced elections for 24 March. The announcement came on the heels of opinion polls that showed the ALP 3 percentage points ahead of the opposition coalition of the Liberal and National parties, led by Andrew Peacock. The ALP had been trailing in the polls in late 1989, as the economy was plagued by a record federal deficit approaching $100 billion, a prime lending rate of 20 percent and 8 percent inflation. Local elections that year resulted in a 10 percent shift from the ALP. However, a cut in interest rates, the second within a few weeks by Australia’s central bank, had cleared the way for a reduction in mortgage rates, thus prompting Mr. Hawke’s decision to call for a vote and seek an unprecedented fourth term.

The opposition coalition had its own problems. Peacock, who replaced John Howard in a bitter internal coup in 1989, suffered from the perception, even among members of the coalition, that he was not an effective leader. In mid-February, the perception of opposition disunity was reinforced when Peacock was forced to fire a senior Liberal front-bencher for derisive comments made in a television interview.

The opposition needed to win only 10 seats to take power from Labor, which held 83 of the 148 seats in the lower house of parliament, where the government is formed. (Only half of the 76 senators who occupied Australia’s upper house, or Senate, faced elections. A minority party, the Australian Democrats, held the balance of power in the Senate, which can block legislation.)

In the 24 March elections, the ALP took 78 seats, 69 going to the Liberal/National coalition and one to an independent. Only 39.7 percent of the voters made labor their first choice. Following the vote, the Liberal Party (the senior party in the opposition coalition with the rural-based National Party), chose John Hewson as leader to replace Peacock.

In July, the government announced its constitutional reform plan under former governor-general Ninian Stephen. Prime Minister Hawke said he had also invited local leaders, the premiers of the six state governments, and the chief ministers of the two self-governing territories to meet him in Brisbane at the end of October to discuss ways of streamlining the existing system. The founding fathers of Australia opted for federalism because of the difficulty of persuading the colonial governments to cede their powers to a central government, and because of the difficulties of administering a sparsely populated country of 7.6 million sq. km. Hawke is only one of a number of political leaders who have questioned whether a nation of only 17 million people equipped with modern communications really needs nine separate governments, all of which have substantial powers.

In August, the government announced privatization plans that called for selling off at least 49 percent of Qantas and Australian Airlines. Also on the block was at least 30 percent of the Commonwealth Bank and parts of the telecommunications system. The issue was put on the agenda to be debated at a special ALP conference.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Australians have the democratic means to change their government. The judiciary is free and independent from government interference. Fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, press, association, religion and movement are codified and respected in practice. Unions are independent and workers have the right to strike. Despite laws forbidding discrimination based on race, and affirmative action laws, Australia's aborigines continue to be disproportionately represented among the country's disadvantaged and
incarcerated. The government has yet to deal effectively with the issue of aboriginal land claims.

**Austria**

**Polity:** Federal parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Mixed-capitalist

**Population:** 7,600,000

**HDi:** 0.961 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 70 male, 77 female

**Ethnic Groups:** Austro-Germans, a Slovene minority, and Eastern European and immigrant and refugee groups

**Overview:**

The most important Austrian development in 1990 was the parliamentary election in October. The senior partner in the ruling coalition, the Socialist Party, won 43 percent of the vote and 81 seats, a gain of one seat. Its junior partner, the more conservative Austrian People's Party, garnered only 32 percent and 60 seats, a 17-seat decline. Picking up conservative votes, the right-wing populist Freedom Party took 17 percent and 33 seats, a gain of 15 seats. The environmentalist Greens attracted 4.5 percent and won 9 seats, a gain of one. The election did not excite the public, which appears to have been bored with the coalition government and annoyed with former ministers who were charged with involvement in an illegal arms deal with Iran.

The small Republic of Austria began in 1918 after the defeat of its predecessor, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in World War I. Austrian independence ended in 1938 when Nazi Germany annexed its territory. After Germany's defeat in World War II, the Republic of Austria was reborn in 1945, but the Western Allies and the Soviet Union occupied the country until 1955 when they signed the Austrian State Treaty. This agreement guaranteed Austrian neutrality and restored its national sovereignty.

The Austrian head of state is President Kurt Waldheim, who was elected directly for a six-year term in 1986. The president belongs to the People's Party, but his position is primarily ceremonial. He appoints the chancellor, the government's chief executive, whose party or coalition commands majority support in the National Council, the 183-member lower house of parliament. Its members are elected directly for four-year terms. The upper house is the 63-member Federal Council, which the provincial assemblies choose by proportional representation. Federal Council members have four- to six-year terms, depending on the term of their respective provincial assemblies. The chancellor is Socialist Franz Vranitzky, who took office in 1986. Following inconclusive National Council elections in 1986, the Socialists began a grand coalition government with the People's Party. Following the People's Party's disappointing performance in the 1990 election, the Socialists announced their willingness to renew the coalition, in order to keep the Freedom Party out of government.

Joerg Haider, the Freedom Party leader, gave a campaign speech against neutrality and other limits imposed by the 1955 State Treaty. Following criticism of these views, Haider backed away from the positions in the speech, at least officially. One Freedom Party representative had to resign after making anti-Semitic remarks. Haider appealed to the growing sentiment against foreigners in Austria, which has accepted thousands of immigrants and refugees from Eastern Europe. Projecting a modern, youthful image, Haider and other Freedom Party leaders tried to jettison the long-held view
that their party was simply a haven for aging Nazis. Haider had shocked the Socialists in 1989 by winning the provincial election in Carinthia and forming a coalition with the local People’s Party.

Austria's international reputation has been damaged by allegations concerning President Waldheim's activities during the Nazi period. Most heads of state have avoided public meetings with Waldheim, and Václav Havel of Czechoslovakia drew international criticism for meeting him in 1990.

Domestically, the coalition government has been concerned with economic reform and deficit reduction.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Austrians have the right to change their government democratically. Four parties won seats in the 1990 National Council elections. Nazi organizations are illegal, and the 1955 State Treaty prohibits Nazi from enjoying freedoms of assembly and association. However, for many years old Nazis found a home in the Freedom Party.

The country’s provinces have significant local power and can check federal power by choosing the members of the upper house of parliament. There is a Slovenian minority that has had some disputes with the Austro-Germans over bilingual education.

The media are generally very free. There are a few, rarely used restrictions on press freedom that allow the removal of publications from circulation if they violate laws on public morality or security. Broadcast media belong to an autonomous public corporation. There is freedom of religion for faiths judged consistent with public order and morality. Recognized denominations must register with the government.

The judiciary is independent. Refugees have long used Austria as the first point of asylum when they leave Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Until mid-March 1990, Austria had an open door policy for people fleeing Eastern Europe. On 14 March 1990, 5,000-7,000 Romanians poured across the Austrian border. They were attempting to beat the rule taking effect on 15 March that would require all prospective newcomers to apply for a visa first. The country concluded that it needed to draw a distinction between economic refugees and politically persecuted arrivals.

Business and labor groups are strong and play a major role in formulating national economic policy. Most Austrian workers must belong to Chambers of Labor, which represent workers’ interests to the government. Trade unions, on the other hand, negotiate for workers with management.

Austria has generous welfare provisions and several state enterprises. However, the current government is trimming the size of the public sector.

Bahamas

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 200,000

**HDI:** 0.880 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 64 male, 69 female

**Ethnic Groups:** Relatively homogeneous

**Political Rights:** 2

**Civil Liberties:** 3

**Status:** Free

Overview:

The Commonwealth of the Bahamas, a member of the British Commonwealth, became internally self-governing in 1967 under the leadership of Lynden O. Pindling and the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). Independence, which
was not supported by the opposition Free National Movement (FNM), was granted in 1973. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general.

Under the 1973 constitution there is a bicameral parliament consisting of a forty-nine-member House of Assembly directly elected for five years, and a sixteen-member Senate with nine members appointed by the prime minister, four by the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and three by the governor-general. The prime minister is the leader of the party commanding a majority in the House. Islands other than New Providence and Grand Bahama are administered by centrally appointed commissioners.

The PLP under Prime Minister Pindling has remained in power since independence. At the two most recent parliamentary elections of 1982 and 1987, the PLP retained control of the House of Assembly but fell short of the three-quarters majority it had previously enjoyed. In the 1987 elections, the PLP won thirty-one seats, the FNM sixteen and independents two. The results were expected to be closer as evidence revealed in U.S. courts pointed to high official corruption in connection with narcotics trafficking. The PLP countercharged that it was the FNM that was involved in drugs. The FNM alleged that fraud had taken place, charging that throughout its tenure, the PLP government had enhanced its electoral advantage by dispensing favors to supporters.

In April 1990, the PLP increased its majority in the assembly to thirty-two seats when independent parliamentarian Perry G. Christie re-entered the PLP fold by accepting a cabinet position offered by Prime Minister Pindling. In a by-election in June marred by charges of fraud by both parties, the FNM narrowly retained the parliamentary seat of Marco City, Grand Bahama, vacated by the death of FNM leader Cecil Wallace-Whitfield. Hubert A. Ingraham was selected by the FNM as the new official opposition leader. The next general election is due in 1992.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions are generally respected, as is the free exercise of religion. Labor, business and professional organizations are generally free. There is a right to strike, but demonstrations are often broken up by police, with demonstrators subject to temporary detention, as was the case during a state employees strike at the end of 1988. Nearly 30 percent of the work force is organized and collective bargaining is extensive.

There is an independent Grand Bahama Human Rights Association, as well as at least two other independent rights groups, which frequently criticize the government on police, constitutional and other issues. In 1990, there were continuing reports of police brutality during the course of arrests and interrogations. Human rights groups also criticized harsh conditions and overcrowding in the nation’s prisons.

Full freedom of expression is constrained by strict libel laws which the government uses against the independent press. On occasion, newspapers have been ordered by the government not to print certain materials. Radio and television are controlled by the government-owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas and often fail to air different points of view. In August 1990, the Grand Bahama Human Rights Association announced it was creating its own radio station because the state radio station refused to sell broadcast time to human rights groups. In an apparent challenge to the government, the association stated it would begin broadcasting whether it was issued a license or not.

The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and a Court of
Appeal, with the right of appeal under certain circumstances to the Privy Council in London. There are local courts, and on the outer islands the local commissioners have magisterial powers.

Despite recent antidrug legislation and a formal agreement with the U.S. in 1987 to suppress the drug trade, there is evidence that drug-related corruption continues to compromise the Bahamian Defense Force, which includes the police, as well as the judicial system and the government at the highest levels.

**Bahrain**

**Polity:** Traditional monarchy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 500,000  
**HDI:** 0.737 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 67 male, 71 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Bahraini, Asian, Arab

**Political Rights**

**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Political Rights:** 6  
**status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August sent shock waves through Bahrain, a tiny oil-producing nation located on the Arabian Peninsula. Following the invasion, Bahrain voted its support for the international coalition against Saddam Hussein.

Since 1782 the Al Khalifa family has ruled this Persian Gulf nation as a traditional monarchy. Presently the country is run by Sheikh ’Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa; his eldest brother and prime minister, and his son, the Crown Prince. Once a British protectorate, the country became independent in 1971 and sought to establish a constitutional monarchy. A constitution approved in June 1973 provided a National Assembly with thirty popularly elected members and a cabinet and considered the emir as hereditary ruler. In 1975, however, the emir dissolved the Assembly and began to rule by decree, as he was entitled to do under the constitution. One of his decrees was to suspend the constitutional provision for an elected assembly, which he found to be dominated by "alien ideas."

The ruling family is Sunni Muslim while roughly 60 percent of the population is Shiite. The regime has been wary of possible fundamentalist upheaval, especially since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The most threatening underground opposition groups have been the Iran-backed Shiite Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which launched a coup attempt in 1981 and the Islamic Call Party, which seeks to establish an Islamic state. There are two secular radical groups with apparently limited appeal.

In a limited way citizens participate politically by attending the emir's open-air audiences, but political rights are otherwise sharply curtailed. Criticism of the regime's legitimacy is not tolerated, political parties are proscribed, and meetings with any political undertones are banned. The Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Bahrain recently published a report entitled "Bahrain: Systematic Repression."

Although newspapers are privately owned, traditionally they adhere to government positions: past censorship and suspensions by the Information Ministry has produced self-censorship. Foreign journalists have had their credentials revoked for unfavorable coverage. Radio and television are state-owned.

Some private professional associations are allowed to function, and public religious events are tolerated, but they too are monitored closely for possible
political discussions. "Workers' committees," comprising more than 10 percent of the work force, are sponsored by the government. Workers do not have the right to strike, and expatriate workers, half of the work force, are not allowed to form unions and are inhibited from organizing by the threat of forced repatriation by their sponsors.

Jews, Baha’is and expatriate Christians are allowed to practice their faith in their own places of worship. Sunni Muslims are generally better off than Shiites. They hold better jobs—including key government jobs—and have easier access to social services. Citizens are free to move within the country; passports for foreign travel have been denied in the past for political reasons.

There are continuing unconfirmed reports of torture of detainees by the Security and Intelligence Service. Political activity is strictly controlled, and arbitrary, prolonged and incommunicado detention is practiced; security laws allow the arrest of suspect political activists and the right to enter private homes. Defendants before the security court do not receive a fair, open trial.

Women face far fewer cultural and legal restrictions than do women in other Islamic societies, but there have been reports of physical abuses of expatriate female domestics.

Bangladesh

**Polity:** Transitional  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 114,800,000  
**HDI:** 0.318 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 48 male, 47 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Bengali (98 percent), Bihari (1 percent), various tribal groups (1 percent)

**Political Rights:** 5  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

The key development in 1990 in this poor and densely populated nation (formerly East Pakistan before gaining independence in 1971 after a nine-month war) was President Lt. Gen. Hossain Mohammad Ershad's abrupt resignation in early December after weeks of escalating protest against his authoritarian rule. At the end of the year, a caretaker government was in place and, under the constitution, elections had to be held within three months.

Other issues included elections to rural councils, several labor disputes and the fifteen-year insurgency of the 600,000 mostly Buddhist and Hindu Chakma tribemen, concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) on the India-Burma border.

President Ershad, chairman of the National Party (Jatiya Dal), seized power in a March 1982 coup, appointed himself chief martial law administrator, and suspended the constitution. He assumed the presidency in 1985, a move confirmed by a referendum. He was elected in 1986 in an election boycotted by the major opposition parties. An amended constitution was reinstated. He was reelected under a state of emergency in 1987 amid violent political unrest and civil disorder. The unicameral National Parliament of 300 seats (plus thirty reserved for women) is dominated by the Jatiya Dal, a coalition of four main parties. Major opposition parties, including the eight-party Awami League and the Bangladesh National party (BNP), boycotted the March 1988 legislative elections amid violence that left hundreds dead.

A significant political test for President Ershad and his party came in the
March elections for chairmanships of 460 upazila, or subdistrict, councils in the Bangladesh countryside. Although the elections were "partyless," in the sense that party symbols could not be used, voters were familiar with the affiliation of candidates. In addition to the Awami League and the BNP, other major parties include the Jamaat-i-Islami, a militantly pro-Muslim group and a leftwing, five-party alliance. Five years earlier, most opposition parties boycotted the local elections. The vote was important because the subdistrict councils disperse development money, which gives them considerable powers of patronage. The twelve-day upazila elections ended on 25 March, and despite reports of widespread rigging and violence (at least twenty-three people were killed and hundreds injured in poll violence), candidates affiliated with opposition parties did well. Out of 406 upazila results confirmed, the ruling party won 140 chairmanships, the Awami League 99; Jamaat-i-Islami 24; and independents and others 143.

In May, President Ershad announced that he would contest for another term in the 1991 elections, a move aimed at throwing the disjointed opposition off balance and to overcome factionalism and political intrigues in his own party. Commenting on the subdistrict chairman elections, the president told party MPs: "While our officials fought with one another, our political rivals swept the polls." He also said that nearly 100 of the 250 party MPs in a parliament of 300 were unlikely to be renominated "because of their poor performance." On 28 May, a dawn-to-dusk general strike was held peacefully.

A key issue was whether the country's bickering opposition parties could mount a united front against the regime. The Awami League, the party of Bangladesh's first prime minister, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, announced a general strike for 17 June and demanded the resignation of the government and the holding of fresh parliamentary elections under a neutral and impartial government. The BNP, headed by the widow of Gen. Ziaur Rahman, who was president from 1977 until his assassination in 1981, also planned anti-government activities. In July, the country's major opposition parties rejected the president's offer for a dialogue on conducting free and fair elections in 1991, contending that no election conducted with President Ershad in power could be free and impartial. Begum Khaleda Zia, chairman of the BNP, said President Ershad's government brought the country to ruin and urged security forces to join the anti-government campaign.

The main opposition parties faced a challenge from their respective student wings after violence touched off by a sit-in demonstration on 10 October left eight people dead in Dhaka. University students announced the creation of an all-party united front. They called on the two chief opposition leaders—Khaleda Zia of the BNP and Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League—to unite in order tooust what they called an autocratic regime. In response, the government ordered the closure of all educational institutions in Dhaka for an indefinite period. On 11 October, police shot at student marchers. On 15 October, 5,000 activists marched in the capital to protest the sit-in killings and the forced closure of educational facilities. President Ershad's response to the turmoil was dismissive: "A sit-in of a few thousand people in a city of 7 million people cannot change the government." However, he promised to repeal the draconian Special Powers Act of 1974 by early 1991.

On 6 November, separate opposition rallies in Dhaka drew 50,000 people to keep pressure on the regime. President Ershad continued to insist that the 1991 elections would be free and fair, and in a public speech said he had
invited former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to lead a team of observers to
next year's balloting.

Labor unrest surfaced in 1990. In July, some 750 workers of the state-run
Radio Bangladesh staged a nineteen-day stoppage over promotions and other
issues. The same month, 8,000 government doctors went on strike to protest
a new health policy that proposed a ban on private practice. Reports from
Dhaka said that at least fifty people died due to lack of medical care during
the early days of the planned two-week strike.

Another key issue was the insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts led by
the outlawed Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) guerrillas, who have been fighting
the encroachment of Bengalis and for CHT autonomy since the early 1970s.
In March 1989, parliament passed four bills aimed at resolving the long-
standing conflict, and autonomy was granted to the area’s three districts—
Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban. Despite guerrilla attempts to disrupt
elections for the council, where the tribes would be guaranteed roughly a
two-thirds majority, they were established and empowered to appoint police
and approve or prohibit land sales, a crucial issue in an area where indig-
ousenous people have been almost outnumbered by settlers. However, there were
reports that many people voted for fear of army reprisals, and in some cases
the army voted for people who did not come to the polls. The government
hoped that these concessions would undermine the Shanti Bahini. But in
1990, the civil war continued, largely because the new councils had no
control over reserved and protected forests, a hydroelectric project area and
the industrial parts of the CHT, which make up 90 percent of the area. The
government also retained the power to dissolve the councils at any time.

Massacres by both Bengali settlers and guerrillas after the council elec-
tions seriously undermined a political solution to the problem. In January
1990 the Shanti Bahini launched attacks on government troops in northeastern
CHT. Frequent reports of human rights abuses in the area have embar-
rassed the government, which is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The
fighting has caused tens of thousands of refugees to flee to India. The
government has accused the Indian intelligence agency of providing sanctuary
for the CHT guerrillas along the strategically important border area.

Despite the sudden resignation of President Ershad and the presence of sev-
eral opposition parties, citizens cannot change their government democrati-
cally. The military has been accused of human rights abuses, particularly in
the rebellious Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Civil courts are fair, and the
judiciary is independent. In 1990, the president promised to lift the 1974
Special Powers Act (SPA), which allowed the government to arbitrarily re-
strict the press, as well as detain individuals without charge. The press has
been formally or informally censored since 1982, independent newspapers
practice self-censorship and are subject to being closed down, and the gov-
ernment radio and television generally reflect official policy. On 9 April,
President Ershad lifted bans on three publications: Dainik Millat, a daily
published by the opposition Freedom party, Ashey Din Jai, and Robbar.
Several other periodicals remain banned in Bangladesh.

In 1988, Islam was declared the state religion, but the government
generally respects the rights of Buddhist, Hindu and Christian minorities. Yet,
Hindu-Moslem antagonisms have led to violence in the CHT and elsewhere.
On 31 October, authorities imposed a curfew on parts of Dhaka after Muslim
crowds attacked Hindu temples and set fire to homes and shops in response
to the Hindu-Muslim dispute in neighboring India. Freedom to move within the country is, with some exceptions, unrestricted, and citizens can freely emigrate or travel abroad. Workers are allowed to organize, and even though strikes are not allowed under law, work stoppages occur, as evinced by the strikes by doctors and government radio personnel in July. Labor unions represent less than 5 percent of the workforce in this largely agrarian society. The garment industry is the fastest-growing sector in the country. About 80 percent of workers in this area are women, and 15 to 20 percent are children under twelve. The female workers face illegal job dismissals and rape.

A major human rights issue continues to be the plight of some 250,000 Bihari, Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees who opted for East Pakistan after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, but favored (West) Pakistan in the 1971 civil war. Scattered in refugee camps, the Bihari await emigration to Pakistan, but the issue has been in a diplomatic tangle involving the U.N., Bangladesh and Pakistan. Living conditions in the crowded camps are generally appalling.

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**Barbados**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Political rights:** 1  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Population:** 300,000  
**Status:** Free  
**HDI:** 0.925 (high)  
**Life expectancy:** 70 male, 75 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous

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**Overview:**

Although general elections were not constitutionally due until August 1991, Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford stated in August 1990 that a vote would be held by the following May. Following Sandiford's announcement, and amid speculation that a snap election might be called before the end of 1990, political parties began organizing their campaigns, with economic issues predominating.

Barbados, a member of the British Commonwealth, became internally self-governing in 1961 and achieved independence in 1966. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general.

The system of government is a parliamentary democracy. The bicameral parliament consists of a twenty-seven-member House of Assembly elected for five years by direct popular vote, and a twenty-one-member Senate, with twelve senators appointed by the prime minister, two by the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and seven by various civic interests. Executive authority is invested in the prime minister, who is the leader of the political party commanding a majority in the House.

Since independence, power has alternated between the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) and the Barbados Labour Party (BLP), the DLP under Errol Barrow until 1976, and the BLP under Tom Adams from 1976 until his death in 1985. Adams was succeeded by his deputy, Bernard St. John, but the BLP was soundly defeated in the 1986 elections. The DLP took twenty-four seats to the BLP's three and Barrow returned as prime minister. Barrow died suddenly in June 1987 and was succeeded by Erskine Sandiford.

The DLP's majority was reduced in February 1989 when four House members, led by former finance minister Richie Haynes, broke away from the DLP to form the National Democratic Party (NDP). As per the constitution, Haynes became the leader of the opposition on the strength of the
NDP’s four-to-three seat advantage over the BLP. The ruling DLP retained twenty seats.

The manner in which the NDP emerged and became the official opposition led to a call from some quarters for legal reforms that would require House members who cross the aisle to vacate their seats and face by-elections. However, a significant body of public opinion held that the emergence of the NDP injected new life into the political system which has been dominated for decades by the two moderate, labor-based parties.

With an eye toward upcoming general elections, the three major political parties moved in mid-1990 to complete their candidate lists. In an opinion poll published in June, the ruling DLP led with 27 percent, followed by the BLP with 16 percent, and the NDP trailing with 7 percent. The poll of 600 voters conducted by the University of the West Indies also found 36 percent of the voters undecided, and 13 percent not intending to vote.

As the campaign began to heat up in the fall, the economic news was not encouraging for the ruling DLP. In the first half of the year, gross domestic product had declined by 2 percent, primarily because of declines in tourism and manufacturing. Higher oil prices, a result of the Persian Gulf crisis, also were starting to pinch. The opposition parties were pressing their case on unemployment, which the government put at 17-18 percent, and increasing drug abuse and crime, particularly among youth.

Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic organization are respected. Apart from the parties holding parliamentary seats, there are other political organizations including the small left-wing Workers’ Party of Barbados. Human rights organizations operate freely. There are two major labor unions and various smaller ones, which are politically active and free to strike.

Freedom of expression is fully respected. Public opinion expressed through the news media, which are free of censorship and government control, has a powerful influence on policy. Newspapers are privately owned, and there are two major dailies. There are both private and government radio stations. The single television station, operated by the government-owned Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), presents all political points of view.

The judicial system is independent and includes a Supreme Court that encompasses a High Court and a Court of Appeal. Lower court officials are appointed on the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission. The government provides free legal aid to the indigent.

Belgium

Polity: Parliamentary democracy
Economy: Capitalist
Population: 9,900,000
HDI: 0.966 (high)

Life Expectancy: 70 male, 77 female
Ethnic Groups: Fleming (55 percent), Walloon (33 percent), mixed and others (12 percent)

Overview:

Modern Belgium dates from 1830 when the territory broke away from the Netherlands. A constitutional monarchy, Belgium has a largely ceremonial king who symbolizes the unity of this ethnically divided state.
In 1990, there was a brief constitutional crisis involving King Baudouin. Following parliamentary passage of legislation legalizing first trimester abortions, the Catholic monarch announced that his conscience would not allow him to sign the new law. Under normal constitutional circumstances, no bill can become law without the royal signature. The cabinet solved the problem by suspending Baudouin from his throne for a day, and invoked a clause in the constitution which allows the ministers to sign laws if they determine that the monarch is "unable to reign." Although that clause was meant to cover episodes of royal illness or insanity, parliament did not object to using it, and voted 245 to 0, with 93 abstentions, to restore Baudouin to the throne after the ministers signed the law.

The Dutch-speaking Flemings comprise about 55 percent of the population, and the Francophone Walloons make up about 33 percent. The rest of the population is of bilingual, mixed or other background. There is a small German minority near the German border. Belgium is divided into separate linguistic zones for the Flemings, Walloons, Germans, and multi-cultural Brussels, the headquarters of the European Commission. There have been frequent disputes between the two dominant language groups. For much of Belgian history, the Walloons dominated culture and the economy, while the Flemish had no legal status. To inspire Flemish enlistment in World War I, King Albert promised "equality in right and in fact." However, there were no Flemish university courses until 1932. In addition to native ethnic tensions, Belgium must deal with assimilating North African, Turkish and other immigrants.

Due to ethnic divisions, Belgians have political parties split along linguistic lines. Both groups have their own Socialist, Conservative, Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. Governments come and go rapidly. There have been more than thirty cabinets since World War II. However, many of the same politicians and political parties reappear frequently in coalition governments. The bicameral parliament has a Senate, which combines directly and indirectly elected members, and a Chamber of Representatives, which the people elect directly on the basis of proportional representation. Each house has a term of up to four years. The heir to the throne (Baudouin’s nephew) has the right to a Senate seat. The current Senate has 181 members, while the Chamber of Representatives has 212.

Following the 1987 general elections, there were five months of political stalemate before Wilfred Martens of the Christian People’s Party formed a center-left coalition government. Belgium has been a traditionally generous welfare state, but the recent economic problems have led to budget cuts.

Belgians have the right to change their government democratically. Voting is compulsory. Nonvoters are subject to fines. Numerous political parties organize freely, usually along ethnic lines. Each language group has the right to autonomy within its own region. However, tensions and constitutional disputes arise when members of one group get elected to office in the other's territory and refuse to take competency tests in the regionally dominant language. The voters elect regional councils, but the national government appoints the provincial governors.

In general, there is freedom of speech and of the press. However, the law prohibits some forms of pornography and incitements to violence. Libel laws may have some minor restraining effects on the press, while restrictions on civil servants’ criticism of the government may constitute a small reduction of freedom of speech. Autonomous public boards govern the state television
and radio networks, and ensure that public broadcasting is linguistically pluralistic. The state has permitted and licensed private radio stations since 1985. There is freedom of association. The overwhelming number of workers belong to trade union federations. The largest labor group is Catholic, while another major federation is social democratic.

Belgium has freedom of worship. The state recognizes and subsidizes Christian, Jewish and Muslim institutions. Other faiths have complete freedom. The monarch and his consort have a religious role. According to Belgian tradition, the seventh son or seventh daughter born to any Belgian family has the king or queen as godparent.

The judiciary is independent. The government appoints judges for life tenure. Belgium has a generally good record on prisoners' rights questions, but there have been some problems with extended pretrial detentions. Since 1985, the municipalities around Brussels have had the right to refuse to register new residents from countries outside the European Community. In 1988 the central government set up a commission to handle political asylum cases.

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**Belize**

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<tr>
<th>Polity:</th>
<th>Parliamentary democracy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Rights:</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy:</td>
<td>Capitalist</td>
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<td>Civil Liberties:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status:</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy:</td>
<td>67 combined</td>
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| Ethnic Groups:     | Majority of mixed ancestry,  
|                    | including Carib, black, Creole, and Mestizo |

**Overview:**

Belize is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. Formerly British Honduras, the name was officially changed to Belize in 1973. Internal self-government was granted in 1964 and independence in 1981. Because neighboring Guatemala refused to recognize the new state, Britain agreed to provide for Belize's defense; a small British military force remains because of Guatemala's continued nonrecognition.

Belize is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral National Assembly. The assembly consists of a twenty-eight-seat House of Representatives with members elected to five-year terms. Members of the Senate are appointed, five by the governor-general on the advice of the prime minister, two by the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and one by the Belize Advisory Council.

In the country's first post-independence election on 14 December 1984, the center-right United Democratic Party won twenty-one seats in the House, overturning thirty years of rule by George Price's center-left People's United Party (PUP) which took the remaining seven. The UDP's Manuel A. Esquivel replaced Price as prime minister.

The next elections were due by December 1989, but the UPD called snap elections on 4 September, three months early, to take advantage of gains in the economy. After a hotly contested campaign, however, the PUP won a narrow victory, securing fifteen seats in the House to the UPD's thirteen, and George Price returned as prime minister. A third party, the Belize Popular Party (BPP), has been unable to win any seats in the House.

In early December 1989, the PUP followed its return to national office with a sweeping victory in Belize City municipal council elections. The PUP
won all nine of the council seats, ending twelve years of UDP control of local government in the nation's capital, where nearly 30 percent of the population resides.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

While the UDP and the PUP dominate the political scene, there are no restrictions on the right to organize political parties or civic groups. Labor unions are independent and are free to strike. There are nearly a dozen active trade unions, and close to a third of the work force is unionized. There is freedom of religion.

The judiciary is independent and nondiscriminatory and the rule of law is guaranteed. However, the creation of the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) by the UPD government in 1988 was roundly criticized by PUP. The UPD argued the SIS was needed to combat drug traffickers and deal with the threat of subversion from the increasing number of Central American refugees in Belize. The PUP charged that the SIS was an instrument of harassment, set up and utilized by the UPD for domestic political purposes. The Belize Human Rights Commission, established in response to the creation of the SIS, voiced concern in late 1988 and 1989 about growing complaints of physical and verbal abuse and wrongful arrests by security forces. The SIS was a major issue of the 1989 electoral campaign and the PUP dissolved it in November 1989 during the first legislative session following the elections.

In 1990, human rights concerns focused on numerous charges of abuse of migrant workers and refugees from neighboring Central American countries by Belizean employers. There are an estimated 40,000 aliens in Belize, and public resentment toward them has increased. The government committed itself in 1990 to addressing the problem in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

There are five independent newspapers representing various political viewpoints. Belize has a literacy rate of over 90 percent Radio and television, however, have come to play an increasingly prominent role in recent years. There are fourteen privately owned television stations including four cable systems, but political advertising is controlled by the government-appointed Belize Broadcasting Authority (BBA). In 1989, the PUP charged the BBA, as well as government-controlled radio, with favoritism, and promised to reduce government involvement in the media in 1990, a turnaround from its position when last in power.

**Benin**

- **Polity:** Transitional
- **Economy:** Statist
- **Population:** 4,700,000
- **HDI:** 0.224 (low)
- **Life Expectancy:** 42 male, 46 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Fon, Adja, Yoruba, Bariba

**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

In 1990, this narrow, central-west African country (known until 1975 as Dahomey) took some steps toward political reform and democratization that began in December 1989 when the government of President Ahmed Kerekou reached an agreement in Paris with exiled political leaders. By the end of the year, the country was in the hands of a transition government led by Prime
Minister Nicephore Soglo, and legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for January 1991.

Gen. Kerekou seized power in 1972, and three years later established a Marxist-Leninist state under the leadership of the Benin People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB). On 2 August 1989, the 206-member National Assembly elected him to another five-year term amid continued social unrest, strikes and serious economic problems.

Following the Paris agreement, the Central Committee of the PRPB convened a special joint session of the Standing Committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly and the Cabinet. The joint meeting then announced that Marxism-Leninism would no longer be the official ideology; the PRPB would no longer direct the affairs of state, thus separating party and state affairs; the post of prime minister, responsible to the national Assembly, would be created; and that a new National Convention would complete a new constitution.

In January 1990, various strikes and work stoppages paralyzed virtually all administrative machinery, and calls continued for the removal of President Kerekou. On 29 January, the Beninese military called for the establishment of a two-party political system, for the army to "keep out of politics and return to the barracks," and for the drafting of a new constitution that guarantees separation of powers.

A National Convention aimed at drawing up a new national charter met in Cotonou on 19-24 of February, with over 488 delegates representing a wide range of political opinion. Six Beninese opposition groups launched a joint program of demands for the conference, calling for the "recognition and legalization" of all political groupings and for the PRPB to be put on equal footing with other organizations. Among the participants were prominent exiles. The conference set up a fifteen-member committee to draft a new constitution as well as "a national monitoring organ, charged with monitoring the transition process and to set up institutions for the new republic." The draft would be submitted to the people for referendum. The declaration stressed "the total lack of credibility and legitimacy of the PRPB that has ruled the country since 1975." The conference also demanded the release of all political prisoners and the investigation of torture allegedly carried out by officers close to Kerekou.

The end of the conference led to a potential conflict between the government and the participants when it was decided to suspend the existing constitution and select an interim prime minister to lead the country through a transition period. President Kerekou had earlier warned delegates against proceeding with what he described as a "civilian coup d'etat" The conference selected Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank official, as prime minister for an eleven-month transitional period. His nomination needed the approval of Gen. Kerekou, who retained his functions as head of state and chief of the Armed Forces. Legislative power during the transition period was entrusted to a High Council of the Republic (HCR), whose role included control of the executive.

On 28 February, Gen. Kerekou endorsed all the decisions adopted by the conference, and received the new prime minister. Gen. Kerekou's concessions allowed the new prime minister to form a government of professionals and technocrats, without either military men or former Kerekou ministers, and the prime minister also took the defense minister's portfolio previously held by the president. However, Kerekou remained head of the Army and in control of the Presidential Guard (BGP), consisting of loyal followers from his ethnic tribe. On 12 March, the new government was installed.
Also in March, the Cabinet announced the release of teachers, students, union leaders and civil servants detained during the social upheavals earlier in the year. A month later, students launched a demonstration to protest poor living and studying conditions. More protests took place in June. Similar demonstrations last year resulted in government troops firing on students. Later in the month, railway workers went on strike.

The new constitution proposed by the HCR, chaired by Msgr. Isidore De Souza, provides for presidential and legislative elections to be held on 27 January 1991. The unicameral legislature would be elected by direct universal suffrage, and the president would be elected by popular vote and serve no more than two consecutive five-year terms. However, in August debate still continued in the press about the HCR’s methods and whether the country would be better served by a presidential or semipresidential system. In a controversial decision, the HCR voided local mayoral elections because the HCR had not been consulted on election procedures. In a July interview, Msgr. de Souza defended the HCR’s actions and criticized the traditional practice of candidates distributing money to get themselves elected, calling it a "perversion of democracy in action."

Prime Minister Soglo also faced the formidable task of tackling the country’s critical economic and social problems and implementing political changes in the shadow of a still powerful president and army. The country remains very poor, and budget cuts made under International Monetary Fund restructuring guidelines have caused privation, particularly in the public sector.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Despite the diminished power of Gen. Kerekou and the naming of a transitional prime minister, Benin's citizens did not have the means to change their government democratically in 1990. Reforms in the judicial system have yet to be completed. An amnesty was granted to those detained for their involvement in the coup plots of 1981 and 1988, and there were believed to be no political prisoners by the end of 1990. The independent press has become increasingly vocal in offering diverse opinions and views. *Gazette du Golfe*, which was banned in 1989, published lengthy commentary and analyses of the country’s political and social problems. A new bimonthly magazine, *L’Opinion*, was launched by philosophy professor Paulin Hountondji in February. Today, there are about twenty privately funded newspapers in Benin, although many face severe financial constraints. The new prime minister has openly encouraged and praised the role of the press as part of the process of democratic renewal. Private social, service and professional organizations are permitted. There are no major restrictions on religion, and domestic travel is not restricted. In January, Ibrahim Zakari, secretary general of the National Union of Posts and Telecommunications Workers of Benin (SYNAPOSTEL) was arrested and detained. He was subsequently released. The union declared its autonomy from the National Federation of Workers' Union of Benin (UNSTB), the sole trade union confederation, which has been regarded as an arm of the PRPB. The right to strike is not protected, but strikes have become common.
Bhutan

**Polity:** Traditional monarchy  
**Economy:** Preindustrial  
**Population:** 1,600,000  
**HDI:** 0.236 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 46 male, 49 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Bhotia (60 percent), Nepalese (25 percent), indigenous (15 percent), Tibetan refugees

**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

In 1990, this isolated Himalayan Buddhist kingdom was shaken by ethnic violence as Hindu Nepalis clashed with government forces throughout the southern part of the country in September.

The country is led by King Jigme Singye Wangchuk, who succeeded his father in 1972. The government consists of a 150-member National Assembly, two-thirds of whom are elected every three years by universal suffrage, with the remaining third designated to several religious bodies and secular interests supported by the monarch.

Wedges between the most populous countries in Asia—China and India—Bhutan has sought to isolate itself from the political turmoil of its neighbors in an effort to preserve its unique culture and traditions. Bhutanese officials are aware that other Himalayan Buddhist nations have been swallowed by their neighbors: Tibet in 1950 by the Chinese; Sikkim in 1975 by the Indians.

In 1988, in a move aimed at safeguarding Bhutanese identity, the king, who is a member of the indigenous Drukpa tribe, ordered a census aimed at disenfranchising illegal immigrants. He chose 1958 as the cut-off date for legal migration, outraging Nepalis who had entered later. Bhutan also began curbing the influx of Indians, most of whom are Hindus, which led Indians across the border to encourage Hindu Nepalis in the Bhutanese south to raise protests. The fertility of Bhutan has been a magnet for immigrants from Nepal for nearly a century, and Bhutan's original mountain tribes are now swamped by Nepalis and their descendants.

In 1989, the king banned the teaching of Nepali in school and said everyone should wear the national dress and do their hair in the Drukpa style. This further fueled Nepalese resentment. The government has argued that it is merely seeking to enforce a "Bhutanese way of life," including national dress, architectural styles and languages.

Although Bhutan forbids political parties, the Nepalese Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and other outlawed organizations based in India were formed in 1990, ostensibly to press for greater democracy. However, regional experts—including many in India who would be naturally sympathetic to their Hindu brethren—see the BPP as representing essentially economic refugees and that its emphasis on democracy is merely a ploy to gain international sympathy.

Between 19 September and 23 September, there were bloody clashes throughout southern Bhutan. The BPP claimed that soldiers killed over 300 people during peaceful demonstrations. The story was picked up by two international news agencies, Kyodo and Agence-Presse. Both subsequently transmitted denials after the government and several journalists reported that in fact several thousand armed Nepalese militants crossed the border from India and tried to foment an uprising among Bhutanese of Nepali descent. Bhutanese officials said that two people were killed and more than 400 arrested. All but thirty-six were subsequently pardoned by the king.

Sundanda K. Ray, editor of *The Statesman* in Calcutta, who has spear-
headed efforts to set the record straight, called developments in the country little more than a "propaganda war against Bhutan."

"No question of democratic dissent lies at the heart of the turbulence," a Statesman editorial said on 26 September. "The truth of the matter is that a large number of ethnic Nepalese who are not bonafide citizens of Bhutan have gathered on the kingdom's border in an attempt to force entry. Putting it bluntly, they are economic refugees spoiling for a showdown to win the world's sympathy."

For its part, the Indian government has long had a policy of not letting its soil be used for overt political activity against a foreign government. It prohibited a proposed BPP procession into Bhutan on 26 August. But the large border is open, and there is little either India or Bhutan can do to keep Nepalis from crossing over. However, India has long controlled Bhutan's external affairs, and there were persistent reports in the Indian and Nepalese press that Indians, including intelligence agents, were fostering an anti-monarchy movement using militant Gurkha groups based in the Darjeeling Hills. Through a similar process, Sikkim fell to India in stages in the 1970s.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The citizens of Bhutan do not have the ability to freely elect their government. The legal system does not provide for due process in the Western sense, but trials are open and adjudicated expeditiously. In familial cases, Hindu law applies to the Nepalese and Buddhist law governs the majority of Bhutanese. The media consist of one government-controlled newspaper and one television station. Satellite dishes have been banned to prevent foreign, especially Indian, broadcasts from penetrating a nation without a network of its own. Journalists are not generally welcome in Bhutan. Criticism of the monarch is permitted in the Assembly but not in the public media. Political parties are prohibited, and there are no laws guaranteeing freedom of assembly or association. Buddhism is the state religion, but other faiths are free to worship. Proselytizing is forbidden. Thousands of refugees from Tibet have found haven in Bhutan. There are no significant restrictions on domestic and foreign travel. There are no labor unions in this agricultural country.

Bolivia

Polity: Presidential-legislative democracy
Economy: Capitalist-statist
Population: 7,300,000
HDI: 0.548 (medium)
Life Expectancy: 49 male, 53 female
Ethnic Groups: Mixed (25-30 percent), Quechua Indians (30 percent), Aymara Indians (25 percent), European (10-15 percent)

Overview:

After taking office in August 1989, the coalition headed by President Jaime Paz Zamora struggled to maintain the economic austerity policies initiated by the previous government. However, it was constrained by strong opposition from the powerful labor sector and growing differences in 1990 between Paz's party, the social democratic Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and its coalition partner, the conservative Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN).

Since achieving independence from Spain in 1825, the Republic of Bolivia has endured recurrent instability and extended periods of military rule.
Country reports

The armed forces, responsible for over 180 coups in 157 years, returned to the barracks in 1982, and the 1967 constitution, suspended in 1969, was restored with the election of President Hernan Siles Suazo.

The constitution provides for a president elected for a four-year term by universal adult suffrage and a 157-member Congress consisting of a 130-member House of Representatives and a 27-member Senate similarly elected for four years. If no presidential candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes, Congress makes the selection from among the three leading contenders. Although the constitution calls for biennial municipal elections, local balloting was conducted in 1987 for the first time in thirty-nine years.

In the July 1985 general elections, the ADN, headed by former military dictator Hugo Banzer, obtained a narrow plurality of the votes cast for president. The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by former President Victor Paz Estenssoro won a plurality of congressional seats. With the support of left-wing parties in the Congress, Paz Estenssoro was selected to be president over Banzer. It was the first peaceful transfer of power between two democratically elected presidents in twenty-five years.

The candidate of the ruling MNR in the 7 May 1989 election was Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, President Paz’s planning minister and architect of a market-oriented austerity program that had ended hyperinflation and rationalized the economy. The two main challengers were Banzer, whose ADN had formed an alliance with the government to support the MNR’s economic program, and Jaime Paz Zamora of the formerly radical, now social democratic MIR. All three candidates vowed not to make any major changes in the government’s economic policy.

The balloting resulted in a virtual three-way tie as Lozada obtained a slim plurality over Banzer in second and Paz Zamora in third; only 54,000 votes separated the three. Although an array of international observers praised the electoral process, the tight finish led to mutual accusations of fraud, and fierce horse-trading in the new Congress where the MNR took forty-nine seats, the ADN forty-six and the MIR forty-one. Banzer, still smarting from an acrimonious ending to the ADN-MNR alliance prior to the election, finally decided to back Paz Zamora for president in exchange for the ADN receiving over half the cabinet positions. With the ADN support, Paz Zamora was easily elected president by Congress in August 1989.

Municipal elections were held on 3 December 1989. Despite a ninety-day state of siege declared in November in response to a national labor strike, restrictions on political campaigning were minimal and the voting process was not hampered. Results were mixed, as the ruling MIR-ADN coalition lost in a number of major cities but narrowly won in the capital, La Paz. The elections were marked by mounting voter apathy, with abstention running close to 40 percent, and the increasing strength of nontraditional political forces, particularly the Conscience of the Fatherland party headed by the television talk-show host, Carlos Palenque. The populist, nationalist Palenque won a plurality in the La Paz mayoral race, but was deprived of the office when the opposition MNR backed the MIR-ADN candidate.

In 1990, President Paz’s efforts to privatize money-losing state-industries and open Bolivia, the poorest country in South America, to foreign investment were hindered by continuing labor strikes led by the powerful Bolivian Workers Central (COB). The Paz government also encountered broad domestic opposition to deploying the 20,000-member military in a U.S.-sponsored drug crackdown.
By fall 1990, the MIR-ADN coalition was threatening to come apart amid mutual accusations of corruption and double-dealing. The opposition MNR, already eyeing the 1993 elections, was boycotting congressional sessions to protest the government's apparent unwillingness to reform the unwieldy electoral system. Further pressure came with the emergence of a new leftist guerrilla group, the Nestor Paz Zamora Commando (CNPZ). The CNPZ, named for President Paz's late brother, a former guerrilla leader in the 1970s, initiated activities in October with a series of bombings and an attack on a U.S. Marine residence. There was also sporadic activity by the Indian-Marxist Zarate Willka Armed Liberation Front (FALZW), which had initiated hostilities in April 1988 with an unsuccessful attack on the car of visiting U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Constitutional guarantees regarding the right of free expression, of religion, and the right to organize political parties, civic groups and labor unions are generally respected. However, political expression is often restricted by recurring violence associated with the illegal $600-million-a-year coca trade, and in the struggle between the government and traditionally powerful unions. Although the languages of the indigenous population are officially recognized, the 40 percent Spanish-speaking minority still dominates the political process.

There are over two dozen legal political parties ranging from the fascist right to Trotskyism Maoist and Communist on the left. There are also a number of Indian-based peasant movements.

There continues to be strong evidence that drug money has penetrated the political process through the corruption of government officials and through electoral campaign financing. The drug trade has also spawned private security forces that operate with relative impunity in the coca-growing regions.

Unions are permitted to strike and have done so repeatedly against the government's austerity program; this has left more than 20 percent of the work force idle. In response, the government has often resorted to force, and there have been allegations of police brutality. Workers still have a generous social welfare program and are usually compensated when dismissed from state-owned enterprises.

Headed by a Supreme Court, the independent judicial system has become stronger and more effective since the return to civilian rule. There are nine District Courts, and local courts to try minor offenses. The judiciary has struggled against the compromising power of the narcotics traffickers; after being apprehended in 1988, drug kingpin Roberto Suarez was tried, convicted and sentenced to prison.

There are human rights organizations, both government-sponsored and independent. They continue to report on allegations of police brutality and harsh prison conditions including torture.

The press, radio and television are privately owned and free of censorship since the end of military rule. There are a number of daily newspapers including one sponsored by the influential Catholic church. Public opinion polling is a growth industry. In 1985 there was no television; in 1989 there were forty-seven television stations. The impact was most evident in 1989 in the media-based campaigns of the prominent political parties.
Botswana

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy and traditional chiefs

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 1,200,000

**HDI:** 0.646 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 53 male, 56 female

**Ethnic groups:** Tswana (95 percent), Baswara, Kalanga and Kgalagadi (4 percent) European (1 percent)

**Overview:**

The land-locked, sparsely populated Republic of Botswana, located in the heart of southern Africa, is one of the continent's few genuine democracies, with eight competing political parties and a bicameral Parliament (consisting of a 38-member National Assembly, 34 members of which are directly elected by universal suffrage) and a consultative House of Chiefs.

The current president is Dr. Quett KJ. Masire, who was re-elected following legislative elections in October 1989 in which his party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), won 28 parliamentary seats. The BDP has ruled the country since independence in 1966. The other seats were captured by the left-of-center Botswana National Front (3 seats), which contested every seat, and the Botswana People's Party (BPP), which won 3 seats.

In May 1990, the two main opposition parties, as well as the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and the BPU, announced intentions to form a multi-organizational United Front. Dr. Kenneth Koma, leader of the BNF, told a political rally in May that if his party and the BPP had combined forces, they would have defeated the BDP in some constituencies. Yet, in August, Motsamai Mpho, leader of the BIP, told a political rally that he was disturbed by statements made by BNF activists indicating that they would soon resort to other means to attain power because, in their view, it was impossible to remove the ruling BDP through the ballot box. Mpho said the BIP had pulled out of the United Front unity talks because of reported statements by the BNF that its members would take to the bush in the event of the ruling party winning elections continuously.

In 1990, Botswana remained a prosperous and stable country. As a producer of more diamonds than any other country in the world, Botswana's foreign exchange reserves stood at $2.7 billion, the highest in Africa and the second-highest (behind Singapore) in the Third World. Some opposition leaders have voiced concern that the country's military budget jumped from $40 million to $80 million at a time when the threat from South Africa, which carried out bombing raids in the mid-1980s in pursuit of accused members of the African National Congress (ANC), had faded.

Another key issue continued to be the growing disparity between wealthy, urban businessmen and the almost three-quarters of the population that live in rural areas and are dependent on animal husbandry and subsistence agriculture. A government survey found that 60 percent of the people, most of them in the far-flung rural areas, earned less than $100 a year. And while provision of services such as health clinics, schools and electricity by the government to these areas is high, a population growth rate of 3.4 percent—half the people are under the age of twenty—and more and more people in the urban centers, mean that unemployment threatens to be a problem. Only 5,000 people are employed in Botswana's three diamond mines. Because the country is land-locked, South Africa plays a major role in the nation's economy.
Botswana is a parliamentary democracy in which citizens have the power to democratically elect and change their government. The judiciary is independent of government interference. Freedom of expression, both public and private, is honored and respected. The government media report on the activities of the opposition, and the three privately owned weeklies can be barbed and highly critical of the government. Freedom of assembly and association is granted and observed in practice, and citizens are free to practice their religion. There are no significant restrictions on domestic or foreign travel. The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and workers are permitted to strike, but that right is limited by a requirement for government arbitration.

**Brazil**

**Polity:** Federal presidential-legislative democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 150,400,000  
**HDI:** 0.784 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 61 male, 66 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** White (54 percent), mixed (39 percent), black (6 percent), pure Indian (less than 1 percent)

**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 3  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

President Fernando Collor de Mello was inaugurated on 15 March 1990, the first directly elected president in nearly three decades. Despite limited success in implementing a drastic economic reform program, his position was enhanced when progovernment candidates won decisively in the October congressional elections. However, mounting human rights violations by the police were a cause of major concern.

Brazil retained a monarchical system after achieving independence from Portugal in 1822, but became a republic in 1889. Democratic rule has been interrupted by periods of authoritarian rule, most recently under military governments between 1964 and 1985.

The return to civilian rule in 1985, the result of a controlled transition sanctioned by the military with opposition political parties, culminated in the January 1985 electoral college balloting won by Tancredo Neves. Neves died soon after and his vice-presidential running mate, Jose Salmey, became the first civilian president in twenty-one years. Direct elections for a bicameral National Congress were held in 1986. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies formed a constituent assembly that produced a new constitution.

The 1988 constitution, Brazil's eighth in 167 years, provided for a president to be directly elected on 15 November 1989 for a five-year term. The bicameral Congress was retained, with a 72-member Senate directly elected for eight years and a 503-member Chamber of Deputies directly elected for four years. Brazil is divided into 26 states and the Federal District of Brasilia. State governors and legislatures are elected, as are municipal governments. The constitution provides for a national plebiscite in 1993 to decide whether to keep the presidential system, move to a parliamentary system, or return to a monarchy.

The top contenders out of 22 candidates for the 15 November 1989 presidential election were Fernando Collor de Mello, a political newcomer and candidate of the center-right National Reconstruction Party (PRN), Luis
da Silva of the Marxist-oriented Workers' Party (PT), and Leonel Brizola of the social democratic Democratic Labor Party (PDT). There was concern that the military might not accept the election of either leftist candidate. Campaign issues included Brazil's massive foreign debt and hyperinflation, government corruption, urban crime, and the deteriorating living conditions of the nation's poor, who make up roughly two-thirds of the population.

In November, Collor obtained 28 percent of the vote. Silva, with 16 percent, edged out Brizola for second. Collor won the 17 December run-off, taking 53 percent of the valid vote, to 47 percent for Silva. The new president was inaugurated on 15 March 1990.

President Collor kept his pledge to hit the economy with a "shock cure," implementing a harsh, recessionary anti-inflation package. After some initial success in reducing inflation, the measures began to bog down amid widespread labor unrest and legal challenges based on the heavily populist constitution. However, in the 3 October 1990 legislative and gubernatorial elections, Collor apparently won increased support for his radical free-market reforms. Progovernment conservatives from about a dozen different parties won a narrow majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The big losers, in the gubernatorial races as well the congressional races, were the parties of the left.

During his first six months in office, Collor also moved decisively to cut the perquisites and privileges enjoyed by the armed forces during the term of his predecessor. He cut their share of the national budget from 6 to 2.2 percent, and placed the state security service under civilian direction. For the first time since the military took power in 1964, it appeared civilian government was exercising real authority over the military.

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are generally respected. All political parties, including the Brazilian Communist party (PCB), were legalized by 1986. In 1989, the PCB ran its first presidential candidate since 1945.

Virtually all forms of media constraints were removed by the 1988 constitution. The press is privately owned, vigorous and uncensored. There are daily newspapers in most major cities and many other publications throughout the country. Radio is mostly commercial. Although overseen by a government agency, television is independent and a powerful political instrument; roughly two-thirds of the population is illiterate. The huge TV Globo dominates, but there are three other networks, plus educational channels. The power of television was evident in the sudden popularity of the telegenic Collor during the 1989 campaign, and the tumult caused by the attempted candidacy of television star Silvio Santos.

Labor unions are well organized and politically influential. The right to strike is permitted by the 1988 constitution. Although unions have protested that subsequent legislation is vague and restrictive, the populist constitution guarantees job security to workers with more than five years service and more than 500 strikes were carried out by different labor sectors during Collor's first six months in office.

The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court whose members must be approved by the Senate. It was granted substantial administrative and financial autonomy by the 1988 constitution. There are federal courts in the state capitals and states have their own judicial systems. There are also special labor and electoral courts.
Brunei

**Polity:** Traditional monarchy  
**Political rights:** 6  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Population:** 300,000  
**Status:** Not Free  
**HDI:** 0.770 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 70, male 73 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Malay (65 percent), Chinese (20 percent)

**Overview:**

This tiny, oil-rich Islamic monarchy on the north coast of Borneo was proclaimed an independent sultanate on 1 January 1984 and is ruled by Sultan Muda Hassanal Bolkiah, who is also the prime minister. The 1959 constitution was amended in 1962 to permit the sultan, whose family has ruled the area for some 500 years, to override decisions of the legislative and executive bodies.

In January 1990, the government released six political prisoners held since a failed coup attempt against the late Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin in December 1962. Five of the six were former members of the left-wing Brunei People’s Party (PRB), which was outlawed following the failed coup and the imposition of emergency powers by the sultan. Several months later, the government released two members of the Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP), Abdul Latif Hamid, its president, and Abdul Latif Chuchu, its general-secretary, who were arrested under the Societies Act in 1988. Abdul Hamid died of an asthma attack on 14 May, two months after his release. Ironically, the BNDP was founded with the sultan's blessing in May 1985, a year after independence. The party wanted the sultan to institute a constitutional monarchy in three steps: lifting a twenty-seven-year-old state of emergency, standing down as prime minister and calling for national elections. The party claimed 4,000 members, mostly businessmen and professionals. The party was declared illegal in 1988.

In 1990, the vice-president of the BNDP, Zaini Ahmad, now living in Malaysia, said that he expected to see political parties and popular elections within the next five years. But this assessment is seen by analysts as optimistic in light of previous arrests and bans on political parties and the lack of popular civic activism that is partly the result of unparalleled prosperity enjoyed by citizens from some $2 billion a year in oil revenues. Per capita income is over $20,000, government workers get generous salaries and low- or no-interest loans to purchase homes, cars and appliances. There is free medical care, schools, university training for all citizens. Brunei has no income tax. Brunei Shell, the second-largest employer, provides generous salaries and benefits, and the government provides substantial low-cost housing plans to help the poor and landless. The Chinese minority are not citizens, but few have emigrated.

In August, it was reported that Brunei had offered to let U.S. armed forces operate from its territory. Singapore is the only other country in Southeast Asia that wants a continued U.S. military presence.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

The citizens of Brunei do not have the means to democratically change their government. The judiciary is derived from the British system and is generally independent. But suspects may be detained without trial for renewable two-year periods under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Despite the release of a number of the participants in the 1962 coup attempt, it is believed that others are still being held, although the exact number is not known. Although freedom of the press and speech is not restricted by law, the government-owned television,
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radio and a major newspaper steer clear of controversial issues. Since there is no formal political opposition, it is impossible to gauge government tolerance of political criticism. Islam is the official state religion, but the constitution provides protection for Christian and Buddhist minorities. There are no travel restrictions for citizens, permanent residents or expatriates, although the latter face some restrictions on overseas travel. Trade unions are legal, but must be registered with the government Total membership is less than 5 percent of the workforce. There have been no strikes in recent memory.

Bulgaria

Polity: Dominant party (transitional)  Political Rights: 3
Economy: Statist transitional  Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 8,900,000  Status: Partly Free
HDI: 0.918 (high/d)
Life Expectancy: 69 male, 74 female
Ethnic groups: Bulgarian (Slavic) (85 percent), Turkish (9 percent), Gypsy (3 percent), Macedonian (3 percent)

Overview:

In 1990, the Bulgarian Communist Party, renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), won national elections held in June, making it the only ruling party in Eastern Europe to be returned to power in a multiparty election. The prime minister was Andrei Lukanov, a member of the Party's reform wing that emerged after a purge on 10 November 1989 ended the thirty-five-year rule of hardliner Todor Zhivkov. However, by year's end the government collapsed, besieged by party factionalism, economic stagnation, national unrest and strikes.

Bulgaria's transition from a one-party, Communist dictatorship to a multiparty system was made more difficult by an entrenched Communist bureaucracy; a fragmented opposition loosely organized under the sixteen-member Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), whose new leader resigned in December after charges that he was a police informer, the lack of a coherent plan to replace a collapsing command economy; the emigration of hundreds of thousands educated professionals; and long-standing ethnic tensions between Slavs and the 1.5 million Turkish minority.

On 15 January, the 400-member, unicameral National Assembly voted to delete from the constitution the phrase that guaranteed the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) a monopoly of power. The parliament also adopted an eleven-point declaration pledging equal rights to the Turkish-Muslim minority and repealed a 1946 law that banned the old Agrarian Party, a leading political force in Bulgaria before World War II. (The party was later revived as puppet of the BCP, holding 99 seats in the rubber-stamp National Assembly.) The decision to restore and safeguard the rights of Turks came after weeks of massive anti-Turkish demonstrations in its capital, Sofia, and other cities, as historic animosities appeared to overshadow the political reform process.

Later in the month, the BCP, led by former Zhivkov foreign minister Petar Mladenov, met with leaders of the UDF at round-table discussions on the country's political course. The UDF, a coalition of democratic groups ranging from the Eco-Glasnost independent environmental movement to the 500,000-strong Podkrepa (Support) free trade union, demanded office space and materials for its newspapers.
On 31 January, BCP leader Mladenov, addressing an emergency BCP Congress, invited the independent opposition to form a government of national consensus, an offer that was flatly rejected by the UDF, headed by philosopher Zheliu Zhelev. The offer came amid growing divisions in the ruling party and a spate of labor unrest. In January, nearly 300 strikes took place around the country, as miners, bus drivers and hospital workers staged work stoppages.

On 2 February, the last day of the Party Congress, Communist Prime Minister Georgi Atanassov and his twenty-two-member cabinet resigned in a Party power struggle over how far the governing Party should reform. Alexander Lilov, a hard-liner, replaced Mladenov as party leader. New Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov formed an all-Communist cabinet on 8 February after failing to persuade his Party's old allies and the opposition groups to join a broadly based government. Paradoxically, it was Bulgaria's first exclusively Communist government in four decades, as Lukanov failed to convince the Agrarian Party—the BCP's long-time coalition partner—to join a national unity government. Several days after the government was formed, a group of Bulgarian intellectuals quit the BCP and founded the Alternative Socialist Party.

Meanwhile, social unrest continued to build. On 3 April, parliament adopted legislation for free elections and elected former BCP leader Mladenov to a newly created republican-style presidency. The Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of the formation of political parties to contest the elections, formally scrapping the principle of one-party rule. The BCP also renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Under the election law, half of the parliament's 400 seats would be filled by direct elections and the other 200 based on the percentage of votes each party received. Mladenov's election as president was agreed to by the party and the opposition on 30 March. Under the agreement, Mladenov was to be replaced after the newly elected parliament completed approval of a new constitution.

Utilizing its financial clout, manpower, national structure and access to state media, the renamed Communists were better organized to mobilize voters. Moreover, there were persistent reports of the BSP resorting to strong-arm tactics to intimidate voters and opposition candidates. These and other acts of campaign violence prompted the U.S. State Department to deplore the bloodshed.

In May, the opposition UDF published its manifesto, promising to return land to the peasants, introduce a market economy and guarantee rights for all minorities if elected. Yet, as the election neared, polls showed that UDF support was eroding, and that the BSP was gaining momentum, partly because of the perception that Prime Minister Lukanov was one of the few competent officials capable of coping with the country's economic crisis. The BSP was also strong in the countryside, where old Party bosses still had considerable influence and power.

On 10 June, the BSP won a decisive victory in the country's first multi-party election in forty years. International observers invited by the government and opposition groups judged the elections generally free and fair, with a voter turnout of over 83 percent. While the UDF won in Sofia, the BSP won almost everywhere else; the Turkish Rights Movement won in two regions where ethnic Turks made up a majority. The BSP won 47 percent of the vote and 172 seats outright in the first round, while the UDF won in 32 constituencies and the Turkish movement won nine. Runoffs were needed in eighty-one constituencies where no single candidate received the required majority.
The BSP clinched a parliamentary majority in the run-off. After both rounds of elections, it had captured 211 seats, with the UDF picking up 144; 23 went to the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedom, and 22 went to smaller parties, some of which pledged to work with the UDF. The BSP victory, which made Bulgaria the only country in Eastern Europe to have returned its rulers to power in free elections, caused further political polarization and a sense of disappointment, particularly among the better-educated urban class. In the week between the two elections, 800 well-educated professionals left the country, bringing the total to 50,000 since January. After the vote, the BSP again insisted that, despite its mandate and parliamentary majority, it wanted a coalition government. However, UDF leaders declined, saying it is not up to the opposition to save the disastrous economy, for which it was not to blame.

On 6 July, amid increased student protests, President Mladenov abruptly resigned after it had been revealed that in December 1989 he called for tanks to smash an anti-government protest Student leaders also demanded the resignations of Prime Minister Lukanov, Defense Minister Dobri Djurov and Interior Minister Atanas Semerdjiev.

On 10 July, the new parliament convened in Veliko Tamovo. The continued divisions between Slavs and Turks were highlighted when several hundred militant nationalists blockaded the old parliament building to keep out the twenty-three members from the Turkish party. One week later, the country's political crisis deepened after Prime Minister Lukanov said he would refuse to head a government led only by the BSP.

The prime minister also faced pressure from international financial institutions to draw up an economic reform package aimed at tackling the country's $10 billion debt. The issue was made more urgent following the decision by the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank to suspend debt repayments. But economic reform was made difficult by continued political paralysis.

In an effort to solve the political crisis, on 1 August parliament elected UDF chairman Zhelev as the new president to replace Mladenov by 284 of the 389 votes cast. But the election caused polarization within the ruling BSP. Entire organizations and individuals sent telegrams to party leaders saying they were quitting the BSP in protest.

The new president seemed to hint that he would end his objection to working with the BSP, saying he favored the formation of a government of experts supported by both the Socialists and the UDF. But he continued to rule out a formal coalition.

In September, President Zhelev appealed to all parliamentary factions to help work out a new government program despite the opposition's refusal to accept a coalition with the BSP. That decision posed a serious challenge to Prime Minister Lukanov, who three months after the elections still refused to form a new all-BSP government. The UDF continued its refusal even after the prime minister offered the opposition half of the ministries in a new government.

The crisis intensified at the end of the month when parliament approved Prime Minister Lukanov's BSP-dominated government; the UDF and other opposition deputies refused to participate in the vote. Only 219 of 400 members of the Assembly voted. Five days later, the BSP elected a presidium of 13 leaders, only 5 of whom were known reformers.

November saw a resumption of demonstrations and renewed calls for the government to step down. On 10 November, some 30,000 BSP loyalists
marched through Sofia, but strains within the party continued to emerge. Party boss Lilov resisted a strong challenge to unseat him, as reformers and the Communist old guard within the government debated its direction and the growing national crisis. One week later, Konstantin Trenchev, leader of the 500,000-strong Podkrepa union, called for a general strike unless the prime minister and government resigned within a week.

The demonstrations were held just as the beleaguered prime minister was preparing to submit his austerity package of market reforms to parliament. The UDF walked out of parliament when the prime minister managed to win support for next year's budget. Scuffles had broken out in parliament after the UDF voted against the budget, even though Prime Minister Lukancov had amended the package to meet all its demands. The prime minister, who had survived two arson attacks on his home and a smear campaign in the opposition press during the year, said the UDF was obstructionist and undemocratic, refusing to accept the results of fair elections in June that gave the BSP a legal mandate and all offers to join in a government of national consensus.

On 26 November, tens of thousands of workers stayed away from their jobs in a nationwide strike, putting further pressure on the government to step down, which it did on 29 November. Several days later, Mr. Beron resigned as head of the UDF after it was disclosed that he once worked for the secret police and had the code name "Bontcho." On 11 December, he was replaced by Filip Dintrov, a thirty-five-year-old lawyer and vice-president of the Green Party.

A year of political paralysis did little to help the country's deteriorating economy. In April, the government suspended payments on the country's $10 billion foreign debt. In May, prior to the election, the government announced wage hikes and measures to alleviate consumer shortages. Limits were put on scarce goods that could be exported from the country, either by Bulgarians or foreigners. The economic crisis was compounded by the failure of the USSR to make contracted supplies of raw materials, a halt in Iraqi oil shipments, and the greater cost of Soviet oil, and the gradual disintegration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). In the first quarter of the year, industrial production had stagnated and actually contracted by 8 percent. Hard currency earnings dropped because the authorities diverted exports to domestic markets. The Soviet Union cut back on tool and machinery orders by 17 percent. The closing of some unprofitable enterprises and the collapse of others led to unemployment, unofficially estimated at about 120,000.

In 1990, Bulgarians had the means to change their government through democratic mechanisms, and national elections in June were generally free and fair, despite some irregularities. The campaign prior to the vote was marred by violence and the intimidation of opposition candidates and their supporters by the ruling party, which won the election. There were some reforms in the judiciary system, and in February the government announced during talks with the opposition that the "traditional state security structures have been disbanded." The interior minister said that "law enforcement authorities will become new and modern bodies independent of any political party and guided solely by the interests of the people and the state." Authorities arrested several former officials, including former leader Todor Zhivkov and several officials charged with running labor camps where prisoners were tortured and killed in the 1950s and 1960s. But the former Communists remained in key security and judicial posts.
Citizens freely express their views, and there is de facto freedom of assembly. Independent political parties were legalized in 1990. The government-controlled media generally follow the BSP line. Dozens of independent newspapers and publications have been created, although throughout the year the government’s monopoly on printing facilities and newsprint was used to keep their circulation down. The UDF paper *Demokratyiya* was eventually permitted to print 300,000 copies. The opposition was denied access to the state-run media before and during the election campaign. In August, the Western music station, MTV, announced it was setting up a station in Bulgaria.

The predominant Orthodox church, as well as Roman Catholic, Uniate, and Protestant churches function under some government regulation. The key minority religious issue involves the Turkish-Muslims. In 1989, the Zhivkov regime began expelling Turks from the country. A few years before, Turks were forced by the government to adopt Bulgarian (Slavic) surnames and the open practice of Islamic customs was banned. In 1990, the new government passed legislation safeguarding the rights of Turks, and in March parliament adopted a measure allowing Turks to restore their Turkish surnames. Nevertheless, there were several huge anti-Turkish demonstrations, and the issue remains explosive. Another issue was the treatment of the estimated 25,000 Vietnamese guest workers stranded in the country. Living on the margins of the society where they came to work and abandoned in the political and economic upheavals in 1989-90, the Vietnamese in some cases resorted to illicit and semilegal practices to make their livelihood. The Vietnamese face pervasive job discrimination and, should they be fortunate enough to find work, get paid less than Bulgarians doing the same job. There are few restrictions on domestic and foreign travel. An independent trade union, Podkrepa, has 500,000 members, and emerged as a potent political force in 1990, organizing several major strikes.

**Burkina Faso**

**Polity:** Military

**Political Rights:** 6

**Economy:** Mixed statist

**Civil Liberties:** 5

**Population:** 9,100,000

**Status:** Not Free

**HDI:** 0.150 (low)

**Life Expectancy:** 44 male, 47 female

**Ethnic groups:** Mossi, Fulani, Lobi, Malinke, Bobo, Sehufo and Gurunsi

**Overview:**

Ruled since October 1987 by the broad-based Popular Front led by President Blaise Compaore, who overthrew Thomas Sankara, this land-locked, arid and extremely poor central-west African nation (once known as Upper Volta) took cautious steps in 1990 toward addressing the increased demands for greater pluralism that have swept the country and the region.

The Compaore government’s so-called "democratic opening" was launched at the First Congress of the Popular Front, held on 1-4 March, which resolved to draft a new constitution, although it remained unclear as to the adoption of a multiparty model. In an April interview, President Compaore said that "multipartyism is not the ultimate solution for resolving Africa’s problems. Creating a multiparty system in Africa will only encourage those on the outside to descend upon these parties and push into power those who serve their interests." The president also added that political freedom must not be developed "at the expense of sovereignty which protects
the country against capitalist exploitation." But in May, Major Arsene Bongnessan Ye, chairman of the Constitutional Commission, told a news conference that the Front "did not discard the idea of a multiparty system."

The Front congress also admitted two groups considered to be on the right of the revolutionary spectrum, the National Convention of Progressive Patriots (CNPP) and the Union of Democrats and Patriots of Burkina (UDPB). But despite this, and the continued exclusion of the radical-left Volta Revolutionary Communist Party (PCRV) and the African Independence Party (PAI), the Front continues to be dominated by the Organization for Popular Democracy and Labor Movement (ODP/MT), a conglomeration of left-wing groups that, since its formation in 1989, has absorbed several other left-wing groups into its ranks. The president has on several occasions had to deny suggestions that he was in the process of forming a single party.

The Popular Front now includes four national unions and seven political groups, four belonging to the right, three to the left. Within the Front's executive committee, however, the right has only token representation. It is likely that many Front organizations were created by the FP to help convey an image of pluralism. Groups excluded from the Front have pointed out that the central question regarding democracy in Burkina Faso is not whether the Front is open to other organizations, but whether individuals and organizations will be free to express their political views openly.

The atmosphere of political harmony in the country, the theme of the Front congress, was shattered in April with the firing of Clement Ouedraogo, the deputy chief of the Front and the secretary-general of the ODP/MT. The dismissal appeared to be the result of an ideological power struggle between Ouedraogo and Bongnessan Arsene Ye, who is not only the head of the Constitutional Committee but also Secretary for Organization. The sacking left many in the country with the impression that all the official talk of democratic openness may in reality be a rhetorical cover for consolidating power.

On 15 October, the Constitutional Commission presented to the president a draft constitution that outlined a multiparty system. The draft was scheduled to be submitted later for debate and revision to a National Conference. Although popular apathy toward PF structures seems to indicate a general lack of enthusiasm for the Compaore regime, opposition from outside the military structures has been limited. On 25 December 1989 the government announced that it had uncovered another coup plot masterminded by Capt. Boukary Kabore, a Sankara loyalist living in Ghana. The accused were not executed, largely due to visits in January 1990 by Pope John Paul II and Jacques Pelletier, France's minister of cooperation and development.

Despite its many problems, the country's economy has been managed with more caution and realism than that of some other African countries. Recent macroeconomic figures attest to a respectable performance. In late 1989, the government agreed to make an economic memorandum prepared by the World Bank the basis of an economic revival drive that will aim at a growth rate of 6 percent by 1992 through a structural adjustment program. The formula calls for balancing the budget, paying debt arrears, and revitalizing trade and enterprises.

The people of Burkina Faso cannot change their government democratically. Revolutionary Courts try corruption cases, while criminal and civil cases are handled by a judiciary based on the French model and are generally fair. People arrested in connection with the alleged conspiracy against the govern-
ment were long held in detention awaiting trial. The government allowed the independent human rights groups, Mouvement Burkinabe Des Droits De L’Homme Et Des Peuples (MBDHP) to meet with and ascertain the condition of the prisoners. The government Written Press Board continues to oversee the press, and the government maintains its monopoly of media. The government has pledged its acceptance of the principle of a free press some day, but in 1990 the regime retained control. Nonpolitical business, social, cultural and religious organizations are generally free to function. There are no significant restrictions on freedom of religion; foreign travel is usually unencumbered. There are four labor federations and, though the unions enjoy limited independence, anti-government activities are not permitted. Unions have the right to strike, but in 1990 strikers lost their jobs at the Paura gold mines.

### Burma (Myanmar)

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### Overview:

In 1990, an already bleak political situation in Burma got even bleaker as the nine-member State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) junta, set up following violent prodemocracy demonstrations in 1988, refused to accept the results of the 27 May elections it sanctioned but that were won overwhelmingly by the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD).

The SLORC junta, headed by army Chief of Staff Gen. Saw Maung but widely believed to be influenced by long-time strongman Gen. Ne Win, paved the way for multiparty elections in October 1988, some two months after the military killed thousands of Burmese during prodemocracy protests. Thousands more fled into exile in Thailand. The junta scrapped a 1974 constitutional provision establishing the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) as the only legal party. In December, the BSPP changed its name to the National Unity Party (NUP).

By 1989, two main opposition parties emerged: the NLD, led by general-secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, the widely popular daughter of the late Aung San, the man who led Burma to independence before his assassination in 1947; and the League for Democracy and Peace (LDP) led by former Prime Minister U Nu. In response, the government instituted campaign laws that severely restricted political activity, and on 20 July 1989, Ms. San and her deputy, NLD party chairman Tin Oo, were placed under house arrest. Hundreds of NLD members were jailed. Before the year was out, Mr. Oo was sentenced to three years' hard labor for "attempting to divide the army." In December, U Nu was also placed under house arrest.

In early 1990, the SLORC continued its repressive efforts to undermine the opposition. On 16 January, an election commission established by the military government disqualified Aung San Suu Kyi, who was still under house arrest, from running in the May election. The government argued that since she is married to a Briton, she was disqualified under a clause of the 1947 constitution, which disqualifies "any person who is under acknowledge-
ment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights and privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power..." Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi always held a Burmese passport.

The government in late 1989 began forcibly removing at least 500,000 Burmese from cities to ill-prepared outlying towns where malaria and hepatitis were rampant. Under the guise of "beautification," the forced relocation was intended to break up areas where anti-government sentiment erupted in 1988.

In April, further restrictions were placed on the conduct of the general election. The SLORC refused to sanction public rallies, and restricted each party to one ten-minute precensored statement on government-controlled radio and television. The regime also refused to issue a complete list of candidates and parties. Before the vote, SLORC leader Gen. Saw Maung said that any transfer of power would occur only after the new parliament wrote a new constitution.

Nevertheless, despite government intimidation, on 27 May a heavy turnout in the country's first multiparty parliamentary elections in nearly thirty years provided a landslide victory for the NLD. When the official results were finally announced in July, the NLD won 396 of the 485 seats at stake, nearly 82 percent of the total. Since the party contested only 450 seats, it actually won an overwhelming 88 percent of the seats for which it ran. The military-backed NUP, the direct inheritor of Gen. Ne Win's BSPP, won just 10 seats. The remainder went to 19 smaller parties opposed to the military or representing the country's ethnic minorities.

The stunning repudiation at the polls shocked the regime, which assumed that Burmese were too cowed to vote for the NLD, or that none of the 93 competing parties would gain an overall majority.

On 13 July, Brigadier Gen. Khin Nyunt head of the feared Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) confirmed that Aung San Suu Kyi would not be released, and warned the opposition about trying to form a government: "If a political party convenes a parliament and forms a government according to its own wishes then such a government can only be a parallel government. If it happens, the SLORC government, which is the legal government, will not look on with folded arms."

At a Rangoon meeting on 28-29 July, the NLD called for the SLORC to convene the National Assembly in September and allow it to begin governing the country. But the SLORC pre-empted the demand by announcing the day before its own framework for adopting a new constitution, which it said must first take place before a new government is formed, a contravention of existing law. Meanwhile, repression continued. Some protestors were killed, others jailed and the junta added to its armaments.

The government clampdown continued into October, as the military government raided monasteries and rounded up opposition leaders. Growing impatience over the government's stalling tactics did lead to an eruption of sharp differences in the NLD over whether the party should stick to its original program to demand the early transfer of power from the SLORC, or go along with the SLORC's call for it to settle down to the lengthy process of drafting a new constitution. Many younger members of the party rejected any concessions to the junta, viewing it as an illegitimate government.

But as the government repression intensified in the closing weeks of October, the last few opposition leaders not in jail reportedly gave in to Army demands that they abandon claims to an overwhelming mandate to rule. The regime's questionable legal status began to erode its international standing.
All former aid donor countries announced after the election that there would be no more assistance as long as the SLORC refuses to step down.

In 1990, the country continued to face about a dozen ethnic insurgencies. The largest rebel group is the Karen National Union (KUN), which has been fighting the government for some forty years. Other include the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), smaller groups of ethnic Mons, Shans and Chins, and Communists. Heroin smugglers and traders, many with private armies, carry on a lucrative business in border areas known as the “Golden Triangle.”

Political Rights

In 1990, Burma continued to be ruled by a military junta that ignored the results of multiparty parliamentary elections which gave the opposition NLD an overwhelming popular mandate to form a new government. Most civil liberties have been suspended under martial law. The DDSI, or secret police, is a pervasive and intrusive presence in society. Regional military commanders are invested with summary judicial powers that gave them discretion to try offenders either by courts formed under existing law or by military tribunal. Military tribunals, operating in complete secrecy, need not call witnesses, do not provide for defense, and the minimum sentence they can impose is three years' imprisonment with hard-labor. Defendants are not presumed innocent. In 1990, Burma had an estimated several thousand political prisoners, including leading members of opposition parties. Torture, beatings and mistreatment of prisoners are commonplace.

In April 1990, it was revealed that it had become common practice for Burmese troops or police to kidnap women and children off the streets, and then conscript husbands or fathers who cannot pay a huge ransom as "voluntary" unpaid porters for soldiers fighting ethnic rebels along Burma's borders. Deaths among those press-ganged as porters has been high as they are often unfit for the task and forced to carry heavy burdens through jungle and into combat zones.

The government controls all media. Freedom of assembly is restricted. Political parties were allowed to form, but they faced severe restrictions and unremitting government interference and intimidation. Trade and professional associations must be sanctioned by the government, and their activities are monitored. Freedom of religion in this secular state is provided for in the constitution and generally observed in practice. All religious organizations in this largely Buddhist country must register with the government, and there is discrimination against Muslims. Burmese can travel freely in the country (except in some insurgency areas), but must inform local authorities of their temporary residence. There are some restrictions on foreign travel, emigrants face severe limits on what they can take out with them, and all refugees are viewed as illegal immigrants. There are no trade unions or independent labor movements in Burma.
Burundi

**Overview:**

In 1990, the Republic of Burundi, a densely populated, poor country bordering Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and Lake Tanganyika, remained a one-party state dominated by the thirty-one member Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN), and the Unity for National Progress (Uprona), the country's only political party. In March, President Maj. Pierre Buyoya, who seized control of the former Belgian colony in September 1987, explicitly rejected a multiparty system, arguing instead that "democracy within a single party" would foster national unity. The country has long been wracked by tribal violence between the majority Hutu tribe and the minority Tutsis who control the government. The last major outbreak of violence in August 1988 killed thousands, mostly Hutus, in the country's two northern provinces.

In May, President Buyoya formally introduced a National Unity Pact, based on a 165-page report which had been drawn up a year earlier by a government-appointed, twenty-four-member National Unity Committee. In announcing the pact, the president said that it would be put to a national referendum after first gaining party approval. He also pledged to hold an extraordinary Uprona party congress to approve the pact. Speaking at the Kigobe Congress Palace in Bujumbura, the capital, he said that the congress would set up new bodies which will run the country until Burundians approve a party Central Committee which will replace the CMSN. The president promised to invite Burundians outside the party to take part in the congress.

In July, President Buyoya issued a decree establishing a new National Security Council "aimed at assisting the president in the formation and implementation of national policy in the field of security, as the country's security should not be the preoccupation of the security forces alone." The ten-member council is chaired by the president.

In August, the government reported an attack on a military installation, allegedly by Burundians from refugee camps in Tanzania. The same month, the Paris-based opposition Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipe-Hutu) said that its leader, forty-five-year-old Remi Gahutu, had died "under circumstances which verged on murder" at Ukonga Prison in Tanzania's capital, Dar es Salaam. Mr. Gahutu had gone into exile in Tanzania in 1979. The Palipe-Hutu communiqué said he was arrested in Tanzania in May 1989 at the request of Burundi authorities.

Days before national celebrations marking the third anniversary of the Buyoya regime, the government announced an amnesty for all political detainees, among them those involved in March 1988 ethnic massacres and an undisclosed number of former CMSN officers who led an abortive coup in March 1989.

The president acknowledged socio-economic problems caused by the IMF-inspired structural adjustment program (SAP). The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) announced an aid package worth $16 million for 1990: $10 million for support of the SAP; $3 million as support for the...
balance of payments in light of the fall in the world coffee market; and $3 million as support for development projects. World Bank officials promised to secure the release of $3 million in the framework of the second stage of the SAP. The World Bank also decided to finance a transport project worth over $40 million.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Burundi remains a militarily dominated one-party state in which the people cannot change their government through democratic means. The judiciary is not independent of the government and the ruling CMSN. The police and state security police can make arrests without warrants. The creation of a new National Security Council led by President Buyoya suggests that he has increased his own involvement in security issues. Separate courts deal with state security, military and criminal (civil) cases. Despite announcements of amnesties in 1989 and 1990, it is widely believed that several Hutu activists and political leaders are still held as political prisoners. The government controls all media, and open political debate is generally limited to Uprona meetings. Nonpolitical associations are permitted, but must be registered with the government; political parties are banned and freedom of assembly restricted. The Buyoya regime has abandoned the repressive religious policies of its predecessor, but all religious associations must register with the government and cannot engage in activities deemed "political." There are regulations on domestic travel, but emigration and foreign travel are generally unencumbered. The majority Hutu tribe still faces de facto discrimination in many levels of society, despite the National Unity Pact and the presence of several Hutu's in the Buyoya regime. The national Trade Union Confederation is controlled by Uprona, and worker rights are effectively curtailed.

**Cambodia**

**Polity:** Communist one-party  
**Political Rights:** 7  
**Economy:** Statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 7  
**Population:** 7,000,000  
**Status:** Not Free  
**HDI:** 0.471 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 42 male, 45 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Khmer (90 percent), Chinese (5 percent)

**Overview:**

In 1990, several international attempts to mediate an end to the eleven-year old civil war between the Vietnam-installed government and guerrilla groups were frustrated, as the various factions could not agree on a United Nations plan to administer the country and oversee elections. The year also saw a major change in U.S. policy, after Secretary of State James Baker announced that the U.S. would no longer support a guerrilla coalition that included the Khmer Rouge, whose 1975-78 regime under Pol Pot murdered an estimated one million Cambodians.

The country has been torn by war and civil strife since gaining independence from France in 1953 as the Kingdom of Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk. From then until 1979 the country was ruled under alternating regimes of Sihanouk and Lon Nol until the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot took over in 1975. In January 1976 Sihanouk formally resigned as head of state and the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea was declared under a new constitution. The Khmer Rouge launched a brutal social restructuring campaign, forcibly removing people from large cities and resettling them in
rural areas. Between 1976 and 1978, when the Vietnamese invaded Cambod-
bia, some one million died in the "killing fields" of Cambodia.
In 1979 the Vietnamese occupying forces renamed the country the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), and established a government under
Heng Samrin. In 1982, three and-Vietnamese factions meeting in Malaysia
formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), with
Sihanouk as president. The three were the Khmer Rouge, with an estimated
40,000 armed fighters; the non-Communist Khmer People’s National Libera-
tion Front (KPNLF), with about 10,000 troops; and the ArmeS Nationale
Sihanoukienne (ANS), led by the prince, with a reported 20,000 troops.
In 1985, Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge commander who defected to the
Vietnamese, became chairman of the Kampuchean Council of Ministers. In
mid-1988, Vietnam removed 50,000 of its estimated 120-140,000 troops to
Vietnam. Later, representatives of all factions, as well as regional representa-
tives, met in Jakarta, Indonesia, to discuss the future of Cambodia.
In 1989, an international effort to end the conflict collapsed, when the
various factions—meeting in Paris—could not agree on the future role of a
U.N. peacekeeping force, the terms of a ceasefire, or the framework of a
provisional government.
At the start of 1990, with improved superpower relations leading to efforts
to resolve long-standing regional conflicts, the U.N. once again launched
diplomatic efforts to revive negotiations for a peace settlement. The catalyst
was an Australian proposal that called for warring Cambodian factions to
allow the U.N. to administer the country for at least a year, pending free
elections, with the presence of a strong international peacekeeping force and
control mechanism to monitor a ceasefire in place. On 15 January, senior
officials of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the
U.S., Soviet Union, China, France and Great Britain—met in Paris to discuss
the Australian proposal. They outlined the principles that would form the
basis of a resolution to the Cambodia problem, among them a commitment to
a political solution, the total withdrawal of foreign troops, a ceasefire, the
cessation of outside military assistance, and free democratic elections.
At the end of the month, in search for a peaceful settlement to the civil war,
Prime Minister Hun Sen proposed that his country be divided as a temporary
measure. The plan centered on three main points: the temporary division of
Cambodia with two separate administrations running their own economies and
social services, and preserving law and order in their areas; a U.N. Interim
Administration to control the implementation of international agreements re-
garding Cambodia and organize elections; a Supreme National Council with
representatives from both "governments" to represent Cambodia and occupy
the U.N. seat pending elections. The U.N. seat was awarded to the guerrilla
coalition after Vietnam’s invasion. After three days of discussion, talks be-
tween the government and guerrilla factions in Jakarta broke down on 1 March
after disagreement about the role of the U.N. in administering the country.
On 14 March, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
called on the four Cambodian factions to agree to "transfer all necessary
powers" to U.N. peacekeepers. They also urged all sides to agree to establish
a Supreme National Council that would delegate to U.N. officials "all nec-
essary powers including those to conduct free and fair elections," and take
Cambodia's seat at the U.N.
The formation of a Supreme National Council foundered on severe
factional disputes when the principals met in Tokyo in June.
In July, the U.S. and Vietnam held formal talks on Cambodia, the first official discussions on the issue between the two countries in a major policy reversal, Secretary of State James Baker announced in Paris that the Bush administration was withdrawing diplomatic recognition of the Cambodian guerrilla coalition and opening negotiations with Vietnam on settling the conflict. "We want to do everything we can to prevent a return of the Khmer Rouge to power," Secretary Baker said in announcing the policy shift. The U.S. policy change was criticized by its Southeast Asia allies, who said that until further progress was made toward peace they would vote to keep Cambodia's U.N. seat in the hands of the guerrilla coalition. Meeting in Jakarta, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), consisting of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines, noted that the Khmer Rouge, however heinous, was an important part of the opposition and had to be included in any political settlement.

On 22 August, the country's three resistance factions, under pressure from China, agreed to follow the U.N. peace plan. Six days later, the five permanent members of the Security Council announced in an agreement on the main elements of a wide-ranging political settlement to transfer temporary control of Cambodia to the U.N. Under the program, the U.N. would supervise and, if necessary, control five major Cambodian government ministries—Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Security, Finance, and Information. It would verify a ceasefire and oversee the departure of the remaining Vietnamese troops. The plan also recommended that Prince Sihanouk be chosen as the nominal leader of the country until free elections.

In September, the four warring Cambodian factions agreed in Jakarta on the formation and composition of an all-party national leadership and formally committed themselves to the U.N. framework for a comprehensive peace settlement. In a joint statement, the Phnom Penh government and the three opposition factions agreed to convene the first session of the new Supreme National Council and to allow the U.N. a major role in administering the country. The council would be made up of six representatives of the government and two from each of the three resistance groups. All parties agreed to ask Prince Sihanouk to chair the council.

Throughout the fall, the four factions continued to haggle over the formation of the Supreme National Council. There were also signs of discord among the permanent Security Council members who backed different factions in the conflict. On 25 November, after three days of talks in Paris, the five permanent members of the Security Council completed the peace plan, and called for the reconvening of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. But by year's end, as the dry season approached, fighting escalated between the various factions, and the Hun Sen government said that any new talks in Paris would "be a 99.99 percent failure."

In domestic affairs, Cambodia was plagued by widespread corruption and a weakening economy. One key factor was that the Soviet Union, which had provided the government with about $120 million yearly, was phasing out aid. And while some free-market reforms resulted in markets full of goods from Thailand and Singapore, only a handful of wealthy Cambodians could afford them. The value of the riel dropped from 200 to the dollar in 1989 to more than 600. The cost of rice tripled between March and October, as production plummeted due to drought and the displacement of thousands of farmers by an increase in guerrilla activity. Inflation was hovering at 200 percent. The cutback in gasoline imports from the USSR and Vietnam led to shortages.
**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**
Citizens of Cambodia live in a one-party state under a regime imposed by Vietnam, and do not have the right to change their government democratically. In May, the transport minister and at least six other senior officials and army officers were arrested for attempting to launch an opposition Democratic Freedom Party. Political killings, torture and disappearances are common in this war-torn country. Arbitrary arrest is common, and suspects have no legal rights and generally receive brutal treatment. The judiciary and security apparatus is controlled by the regime. All media are strictly controlled by the government and reflect official policy. Cambodians cannot openly criticize the government or guerrilla groups without fear of reprisals. There is no freedom of association or assembly. Buddhism was declared the state religion, and Christian communities are not allowed to meet. The Khmer Rouge has repressed religion in areas it controls. Government policies and the guerrilla war have restricted domestic travel. In 1990, the Khmer Rouge embarked on a campaign to forcibly shift their Thai-border populations back into their "liberated zones." Unions are controlled by the regime, and workers do not have the right to strike.

### Cameroon

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**Overview:**

Nineteen-ninety was marked by violence, domestic unrest, a crackdown on human rights activists in Cameroon, and President Paul Biya's grudging acknowledgement of domestic and foreign pressure on the government to democratize and introduce a multiparty system. Despite a brief period of national euphoria caused by the Cameroon soccer team's remarkable showing in the World Cup, the country experienced growing disillusionment with the government and the one-party system under the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), the only legal party in the country.

The present-day Republic of Cameroon (called the United Republic of Cameroon until 1984), located on the Gulf of Guinea in west-central Africa, was formed in 1961 with the merger of former French and English territories. Until 1965-66, the country was governed under a loose federal structure and separate regional governments to accommodate its tribal, linguistic and religious diversity.

The unitary system calls for a strong presidency directly elected by universal suffrage. Legislative authority is vested in the 150-member National Assembly. Provincial officials are appointed by the president.

In February 1990, Mailre Yondo Black, former president of the Cameroonian Bar Association, was arrested along with ten others for subversion, apparently for his attempt to form an opposition political party. He had been attempting to merge his own fledgling **mouvement national pour la démocratique** with a new English-speaking group, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), led by Albert Mukong, a writer who had served eleven months in prison until his release in May 1989. In April, Black and the others were sentenced to three years in prison by a military tribunal. The opening of the trail was preceded by a lawyers' strike, and the sentences were protested by
Cirac, a Cameroon human rights group. In the summer, President Biya ordered the release of Black and a number of political prisoners.

Pressure on the regime intensified in May, when six people were killed by government forces during a SDF-sponsored demonstration of 20,000 at Bamenda. The government’s violent response prompted the resignation of Dr. John Ngu Foncha, the first vice-president of the ruling CPDM. In his letter of resignation, Dr. Foncha cited the government's failure to avert the violence as further proof that President Biya had “become an irrelevant nuisance that had to be ignored and ridiculed.”

In June, President Biya surprised the nation by announcing his commitment to a multiparty system in his address to the CPDM congress. Observers felt that the president's apparent change of heart was a result of continued domestic disquiet, defections from the CPDM, democratic openings in neighboring Benin, Gabon and other nations in the region, and French President Mitterrand’s warning that French aid would be markedly more enthusiastic towards those countries embarked on programs of democratization.

Following the president’s remarks, the congress passed a resolution calling for the “rapid implementation” of measures enabling the formation of different political parties, even though political pluralism is already enshrined in the constitution.

In 1990, the government continued to implement an austerity plan under the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (DSA) Program and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The economy continued to be hurt by depressed oil and commodity prices. The basic objectives of the SAP are to reduce progressively all obstacles to industrial and commercial competition; to reduce the state’s direct control over the production and distribution apparatus; to reorient public services towards programs designed to improve the Cameroonians’ well-being and productivity while taking into account the social dimensions of the program.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Despite President Biya’s promises of political liberalization, Cameroon remained essentially a one-party state in which citizens cannot change their government Decisions of judicial magistrates are generally not subject to government interference, and trials are usually conducted fairly. However, there are no limitations on preventive detention for defendants formally indicted. Subversion statutes continued to be used against political opponents, as exemplified by the arrest and imprisonment of lawyer-activist Maitre Yondo Black and ten others in the spring. In April, President Biya announced the release of 102 prisoners detained without trial, including twenty detainees involved in a 1984 coup attempt. Mr. Black was released in the summer. Security laws limit freedom of expression and the ability of citizens to openly criticize their government. The government has pledged to lift censorship that has hampered the independent media. The government publishes two newspapers and controls television and radio, which reflect official government positions. Regarding freedom of association, President Biya promised to change regulations that required all organizations to register with the government, and government approval for public meetings and demonstrations. Freedom of religion is generally unrestricted, except for some small sects, and travel inside the country is generally unencumbered. Regulations on foreign travel have been loosened. The umbrella Organization of United Cameroonian workers (OCWU) is controlled by the ruling party; strikes are illegal.
Canada

Overview:

The most important issue in Canada in 1990 was the country’s failure to ratify the terms of the constitutional amendment known as Meech Lake, which was named after the place where the constitutional negotiations took place. This was the latest episode in Canada’s long struggle to come up with a distinctly Canadian constitution which could satisfy both the largely French-speaking province of Quebec and the predominantly English-speaking provinces.

The French and British colonized Canada in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Following the Treaty of Paris in 1763, Britain governed both the Francophone and Anglophone areas until it granted home rule in 1867. The British monarch remains the titular head of state, acting through the largely ceremonial Canadian governor-general. Britain retained a theoretical right to overrule the Canadian Parliament until 1982, when Canadians established complete control over their own constitution.

Canada adopted an overhauled constitution in 1982 and added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which had been covered previously by common law. Limiting the binding nature of the rights and freedoms, one constitutional clause, known as the "notwithstanding clause," permits provincial governments to exempt themselves from applying the charter within their jurisdictions. After holding out against the new constitution, Quebec agreed to accept it in 1987 in return for a recognition by the federal government and the other provinces that Quebec constitutes a "distinct society" within Canada. This was the heart of the Meech Lake accord. Quebec invoked the "notwithstanding clause" to keep its provincial language law that restricts the use of English in signs. Many English-speaking areas reacted by declaring themselves official English zones. There was a widespread feeling among Anglophone Canadians that recognizing Quebec as a distinct society in the constitution could give it extraordinary powers to limit the rights of non-French Canadians. Anglophone Canadians did not dispute Quebec’s distinctive nature, but questioned whether its distinct status justified curtailing the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and whether Quebec deserved to have constitutionally implied powers that other provinces would not get.

There was a deadline of 23 June 1990 for the Canadian provinces to ratify Meech Lake. Under the terms of the deal, all provinces had to ratify in order to make the pact effective. After months of national debate, two provinces, Newfoundland and Manitoba, failed to ratify Meech Lake. Newfoundland, which remained a British territory until 1949, did not bring it up for a vote. Elijah Harper, a Cree Indian and member of the Manitoba Provincial Parliament, used a series of parliamentary maneuvers to prevent his legislature from voting on Meech Lake. Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells reflected the view of his constituents that the adoption of Meech Lake would strengthen Quebec at the expense of his poor province. Newfoundlanders also believe that if Quebeckers are distinct, so are they.

The defeat of Meech Lake was a sharp political setback for Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. His Progressive Conservative Party won the 1988 federal parliamentary election with strong support in Quebec. A bilingual Quebecker, Mulroney sought to keep his province within Canada through the adoption of the Meech Lake agreement. The pact's failure angered Quebec's Francophone majority and increased support for Quebec sovereignty. With the death of Meech Lake, the provincial government appointed a panel, the Belanger-Campeau Commission, to investigate Quebec's constitutional options. The leading segment of Francophone public opinion in Quebec seems favorable towards "sovereignty-association," under which Quebec would achieve independence or something like it, while still maintaining economic ties with the rest of Canada. The possibility of the break-up of Canada has many serious implications. For example, no one is sure whether a sovereign Quebec would be entitled to participate automatically in Canada's existing trading arrangements with other countries, most notably with the U.S. Mulroney campaigned in the 1988 election, supporting a Canadian-American free trade agreement. The major opposition parties, the Liberals and the social democratic New Democrats, opposed the deal as detrimental to Canada's economic and cultural interests. Under the pact with the U.S., major trade barriers between the two countries will disappear during the 1990s.

Following the Meech Lake controversy, another ethnic dispute broke out in Quebec. During the summer of 1990, Mohawk Indians engaged in a violent dispute over land rights with the Quebec government. The conflict sparked native confrontations across the country, including Indian barricades of rail lines reaching British Columbia. Security forces and the Indians confronted each other in Oka and the Montreal area. One policeman was killed. In the eyes of many Canadians outside the province, the Mohawks were hitting Quebec with the same questions about ethnic minority rights and self-determination that the French Quebeckers had raised about themselves with the rest of Canada.

The two-house Canadian Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and a House of Commons, which is elected from 295 single-member districts (ridings) for a maximum term of five years. As of late 1990, the House of Commons had 158 Conservatives, 78 Liberals, 44 New Democrats, 9 members of Bloc Quebecois, 1 Reform Party member, 3 independents, and 2 vacancies. Many Canadians, especially Westerners, had demanded that an elected Senate be added to the Meech Lake agreement. Senate reform remained a live issue in 1990 even after the defeat of Meech Lake. In October 1989, the province of Alberta held an extra-constitutional election for senator. After several months of pressure, Prime Minister Mulroney appointed the winner, Stan Waters, a member of the anti-government, anti-bilingual Reform Party. Long dominated by the Liberal Party, the Senate rejected a major government bill on unemployment insurance in February 1990. After a Senate majority opposed Mulroney's plans for a national goods and services tax (GST), the prime minister named twenty-six new senators. He sought and received royal permission to name eight of these under an obscure part of the constitution. By late 1990, there were 112 Senate seats and 111 Senators.

Politcal Rights and Civil Liberties:

Canadians have the right to change their government by democratic means. Traditionally, Canadians have held that theirs is basically a two-party system, but at the federal level there is an increasingly fractious multi-party system. The leading opposition party to Prime Minister Mulroney's Conservatives is the Liberal Party, headed by Jean Chretien, who became leader at a party
convention in 1990. Local party associations chose delegates to the convention at local caucuses. The Chretien forces signed up many "instant Liberals," who backed his convention delegate slates right after becoming party members. The second opposition party is the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP), led by Audrey McLaughlin. The NDP received a major boost when it captured control of the province of Ontario in 1990. Formed by dissident Conservatives and Liberals in the Commons and headed by ex-Conservative Lucien Bouchard, the Bloc Quebecois advocates sovereignty for Quebec.

There is also one Reform Party member in the Commons. Some purely regional parties exist at the provincial level. The most notable of them is Parti Quebecois, which also advocates sovereignty for Quebec. In the West, the Social Credit Party has controlled some provincial governments. Founded as a movement to control the economy through currency manipulation, the "Socreds" are an otherwise conservative party, popular in Western agricultural areas. Due to canvassing every five years by government census-takers, Canada has nearly 100 percent effective voter registration.

Events in 1990 proved that Canada has a mixed record on self-determination for ethnic and cultural minority groups. In general, civil liberties are very strong and protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, the "notwithstanding clause" allows liberties to be curtailed. Rights may also be limited to some extent by unevenly enforced laws which prohibit some forms of pornography and hate literature and by measures which allow some censorship by provincial film boards. The provisions against hate literature gave the government a legal basis to restrict the importation of Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*. In September 1990, Canada Customs seized and held three homosexual books at the border and prevented their shipment to a Toronto bookstore. However, it was revealed in 1990 that bureaucratic corruption had allowed government funds to subsidize strip clubs with $17 million in loans dating back to 1972.

The media are free. There is an autonomous government broadcasting system, the CBC, which has both English and French channels. There are also private broadcasters, magazines and newspapers. A generous welfare system supplements a largely open, competitive economy. The government plans to privatize Petrocanada, the national oil corporation. Trade unions and business associations are free and well-organized. The Canadian Supreme Court ruled in February 1990 that Quebec's ban on public sector strikes was unconstitutional, because the collective bargaining agreements were not translated into English. The Supreme Court weakened the power of professional associations to restrict their members in 1990 when it ruled that they have no right to prohibit their members from advertising.

Religious expression is free and diverse. However, there are some special rules about religious education. Since the founding of the Canadian government in 1867, various provinces have state-supported religious (or "separate") school systems, but not all denominations have government-backed systems. Complying with an appeals court ruling, the province of Ontario ordered its public schools to avoid education in a particular religion, but it also specified that the schools may provide an education about religions in general. There was a debate in 1990 about whether Sikhs in the police forces could wear their turbans on duty. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police decided to allow variations in the uniform on a case-by-case basis.

The judiciary is independent, and the courts often overturn government policy. Judges have constitutional protection from political interference. Jean
Charest, the federal minister of Fitness and Amateur Sport, had to resign in 1990 after he intervened with a judge in a coach’s case.

The Supreme Court strengthened the rights of the accused in June 1990 when it ruled that confessions are inadmissible as evidence if police obtain them undercover from those who have refused to be questioned. Drug testing in the transportation industry is likely to be a major civil liberties issue in the 1990s, since it may be contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Canadians have generally high personal social freedoms. However, Quebec’s language laws limit the cultural and educational rights of non-French Canadians. For example, immigrants may not send their children to Anglophone schools in Quebec, although Anglo-Canadians may do so under some circumstances. Anglophone children may attend English schools in Quebec if at least one parent is an Anglophone Canadian and if that parent had an English-language education for the last three years of secondary school.

Ontario took an important step towards greater equality of opportunity in 1990 by spending $96 million to end wage discrimination against female-dominated job classifications.

### Cape Verde

**Polity:** Multi-party transitional  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Population:** 400,000  
**HDI:** 0.534 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 61 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Creole/Mulatto (71 percent); Black African (28 percent); European (1 percent)

**Political Rights:** 5  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

This cluster of ten islands and smaller islets off the coast of west-central Africa is a former Portuguese dependency that gained independence in 1975. The 1980 constitution established Cape Verde as a single-party state under the tutelage of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), with legislative authority vested in a unicameral National People’s Assembly charged with electing a president for a five-year term. The Assembly was directly elected in 1985 from a PAICV-approved list of candidates, with a few nonparty independents included on the list.

The country has been led by President Aristides Pereira, who also served as general secretary of the PAICV, from independence until 1990. Pereira resigned his PAICV leadership post at a party congress in July in preparation for a presidential election on 17 February 1991 that new electoral regulations stated could not be party-based. Former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Mascarenhas has announced that, with the support of the Movement for Democracy (MPD), he will challenge Pereira for the presidency.

At a party congress in February of 1990, the PAICV National Council advocated that the 1980 constitution be amended to pave the way for multipartyism through the elimination of reference to the PAICV’s guiding role in Capeverdian society. The National Council later voted to recommend to the Assembly that the legislative body permit alternative slates in elections. In addition, the Council recommended that the Assembly amend the constitution to allow for universal suffrage in presidential elections, a departure from the practice of electing the president by Assembly vote in a body dominated by a sole legal party.
Legislative elections have been scheduled for 13 January 1991 and political parties are permitted to contest seats in the Assembly. Prime Minister Pedro Pires, who now heads the PAICV, seeks to retain his position against the challenge of Carlos Veiga of the MPD, now an independent deputy in the Assembly. In opposition to the PAICV's newly discovered democratic socialism, the MPD advocates a more vigorous turn to capitalism and liberalism.

Factions of Capeverdian opposition consider international gestures of support as bolstering the PAICV's chances in upcoming multiparty elections, voter registration procedures as favoring the PAICV, and the national budget as being open for appropriation by the government to serve its partisan ends. The PAICV-dominated media are accused of serving as apologists for the party and blocking access to the public by the opposition. Despite the charge that its validation of multipartyism exposes its own narrowly representative origins, the Assembly continues its legislative role. The opposition is composed of the MPD and the Independent and Democratic Cape Verdean Union (UCID), the latter not having put forward a candidate for prime minister by early December.

Cape Verde has among the highest per capita incomes in West Africa ($500). Support for many citizens comes from remittances sent by expatriates to family members or Social Security checks sent to retirees who have spent their working lives in the U.S. Hope is pinned on developing the tourist industry, which was reputedly neglected since independence in a deliberate attempt to avoid the servility, promiscuity and other corrupting influences seen as consequences of catering to the sand and surf set of Europe and North America.

It appears that in early 1991 the citizens of Cape Verde will be able to vote for non-PAICV-endorsed candidates for the legislature and for the presidency for the first time since independence. Statutory changes allowing for greater political rights and civil liberties are anticipated in the coming year, but to date there are still restrictions. Defendants in state security cases can be detained without trial for five months, though there are no known political prisoners. Criminal and civil cases are adjudicated fairly and expeditiously. The media are government-owned and reflect government policy, although there is a Catholic newspaper (Terra Nova, in Portuguese) which provides social criticism. More scope is permitted for public criticism of the government by citizens, particularly during opposition rallies, and freedom of association seems to be increasing. Freedom of religion is respected by the government, and there are no significant restrictions on freedom of movement. All unions must belong to the Workers Union of Cape Verde, which is affiliated with the PAICV. The right to strike is not explicity prohibited, and there have been work stoppages.
The Central African Republic, a mineral-rich largely agricultural country in central Africa, has been led since 1981 by Gen. Andre Kolingba, who overthrew the notorious regime of Col. Jean-Bedel Bokassa and in 1986 established the Central African Democratic Assembly (RDC) as the country’s sole legal party under the constitution.

In 1990 the RDC addressed the issue of greater pluralism at an extraordinary Congress in May. In its report, the interim steering committee of the RDC, noting the changes in Eastern Europe and "some African countries," concluded that "the multiparty system does not constitute an absolute basis for democracy and economic development" and recommended maintaining a one-party state. Shortly thereafter, some 250 executives, intellectuals and former political officials called on Gen. Kolingba to organize a national conference on the nation’s political future in light of continued tribal discrimination, corruption and social injustice. In his closing remarks to the conference, however, Gen. Kolingba flatly rejected multipartyism, calling it destabilizing.

The RDC did acknowledge a lack of coordination between the government and the party, and recommended a revision of the Constitution to create a post of prime minister. The steering committee also expressed concern that corruption, fraud and embezzlement by some officials and civil servants were not being adequately investigated. The steering committee also recommended that "press freedom be guaranteed and that people in the field of communication be properly trained." However, the edict appeared to have had no practical effect on the nation's government-controlled media.

In mid-October, just days before the first congress of the RDC was due to convene, the capital was rocked by three days of anti-government protests. The violence started on 13 October when police broke up a meeting of the opposition Coordinating Committee for the Convening of a National Conference (CCCN). Several thousand who had gathered at a school where the meeting was to take place were routed by police. Opposition supporters took to the streets, barricades were set up and official vehicles were set on fire. Calm was restored on the morning of 15 October.

On 25 October the RDC congress reasserted the party's authority over the country's political life. The congress indicated that the country faced "civil war" if a multiparty system were introduced. The final report, however, insisted on individual freedom and free expression. The RDC's position came at a time of increased pressure by academics and government opponents for holding a national conference to determine the political structure of the country.

The government continued efforts to implement an IMF-sanctioned austerity program to cut government spending. The strike at the university was sparked by cuts in teacher salaries and compensatory housing allowances.

The Central African Republic remains a one-party state dominated by the RDC; citizens do not have the power to change their government democratically. In 1989, municipal elections brought a degree of self-determination to local government. International human rights organizations reported in 1990 that several persons arrested in late 1989 for political reasons remained in custody as of mid-August 1990. Civil and criminal cases are adjudicated by a court system based on the French model and trials are generally fair. Despite the RDC's calls for greater freedom of expression, the government-controlled media reflect official policy and citizens cannot openly criticize the regime. Debates in the unicameral, RDC-dominated National Assembly reflect diverse views. Freedom of association and assembly is circumscribed, and nonpolitical groups must regi-
ster with the government. In May, during the teacher-student strike, university officials, invoking the 1986 constitution and other ordinances, banned all unapproved meetings on campus. Government interference in religion is minimal, and freedom of movement is generally unrestricted. In late 1989, six months after a new law ended a seven-year suspension of most trade union activity, some fifty unions—mostly organized by profession—held elections. Thirty-seven had submitted their statutes to the Ministry of the Interior and twenty-eight of them had been officially recognized. In 1990, the unions sought to broaden their base outside the capital and organize on a regional level.

Chad

**Polity:** Military  
**Political Rights:** 7  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Civil Liberties:** 6  
**Population:** 5,000,000  
**Status:** Not Free  
HDI: 0.157 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 41 male, 45 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Sara and other African

**Overview:**

In March and November of 1990, Chadian rebels and an alleged group of nationals of various Sahelian and Saharan countries belonging to an "Islamic Legion" under the command of Idris Deby attacked from their bases in Sudan's Darfur region. The first time, after weeks of intense fighting, Chadian government forces threw back the invasion with the aid of French forces, now numbered at some 1,000 in Chad. The second time, however, the rebels were able to rout government forces and drive on the capital, which was captured on 2 December. President Hissen Habre fled to the Cameroons and Deby assumed the presidency.

Deby, a former army commander, fled Chad in April 1989 after he led a failed coup attempt, though he disclaims any attempt to topple Habre at that time. He and other top ministers from the Zagawa tribe were reputedly disenchanted with Habre's reconciliation with certain former opponents in October 1988. After fleeing, Deby formed the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) and for months planned incursions into areas he believed to be sympathetic to the MPS. Habre's power base remained in the area inhabited by his native Goran tribe.

Deby has been backed by Libya and Sudan. The incursions in March-April took place, in fact, on the same day that Libya and Sudan announced a comprehensive integration accord. In the spring, Chad captured a Libyan convoy of trucks and personnel in Darfur that it claimed was supplying Deby. Some see the war as primarily a personal feud between Deby and Habre, both of whom were deeply anti-Libyan in the past.

Located in north-central Africa, Chad was a French colony for most of the century until gaining independence in 1960. Upon the withdrawal of French troops in 1965, domestic factions began to struggle for control, presaging an on-again, off-again civil war. After years of conflict, two main factions emerged, Hissein Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN) and the People's Armed Forces (FAP), led by Goukhoumi Oueddei. Both groups cooperated in the formation of a government in 1979 with Oueddei serving as president and Habre as defense minister. After a rift, fighting continued for many years. FAP received assistance from Libya, which had occupied the mineral-rich Aouzou strip since 1973. Habre, with French assistance, overthrew Oueddei's regime.
Country reports

and became president in 1983. Habre attempted to recover Aouzou, but the turning point in the fighting did not occur until March 1987 when his forces overran Libyan forces in northern Chad and pursued them into southern Libya. By November 1988 Qadhafi formally terminated the war.

In August 1989 Chad and Libya agreed to give themselves one year to negotiate a solution to their dispute over the Aouzou strip, and, failing this, to have the issue taken up by the International Court of Justice. Discussions made no progress, however, so Habre and Qadhafi agreed to refer the border dispute to the Court as well as continue bilateral contacts with the hope of reaching a settlement. Libya's continuing involvement in the Darfur and support for Deby further impeded progress. Deby asserted after his ascension to power that he has every intention of fighting to regain complete Chadian sovereignty over the entire region, including the Aouzou strip.

Elections for the 123-seat National Assembly, the first elections since independence, were held in July, but they were less than President Habre asserted, "the first free and democratic elections." Candidates had to run as independents, although they were allowed to belong to the ruling party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution. Other parties, banned in Chad, were prohibited from competing in or organizing during the elections. The National Assembly seats carry a five-year term. However, declaring that the MSP will institute a multiparty democracy, Deby has dissolved the Assembly and suspended the constitution. No date has yet been set for new elections.

Chad remains among the poorest countries in the world. Some 50 percent of the annual budget has repeatedly been devoted to the military.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

A new constitution was adopted in December of 1989. It guaranteed freedom of association and expression, the right to a fair trial and freedom from arbitrary arrest and humiliating or degrading treatment while detained. President Deby has since suspended the constitution.

Notwithstanding constitutional protections for the individual, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, based in New York, has characterized the Habre regime as having been among the worst in Africa. Amnesty International has reported that under the auspices of the large and powerful National Security Service (D.D.S.), frequent torture, secret detention, arbitrary arrest, "disappearances," starvation of those imprisoned and the summary executions of political prisoners took place. President Habre is alleged to have personally ordered the torture of particular prisoners. According to reports, almost two-thirds of all those imprisoned on suspicion of political crimes died in detention. Some 2,000 Libyan prisoners and internees remained in Chad during the Habre regime, and little information on their identity, treatment, state of health, or conditions of their imprisonment was available. The International Committee of the Red Cross was unable to see them, in violation of principles of international humanitarian law. Representatives of the African Jurists Association were permitted to meet with a limited number of the Libyans, but always in the presence of Chadian officials. A presidential pardon released hundreds of political prisoners in 1989 but a substantial number implicated in uprisings in 1987, 1988 and 1989 were detained without trial or charge. Some returned exiles have also been imprisoned. The D.D.S. was employed to control anti-Habre forces.

The judiciary is not independent of the executive. Of those imprisoned for political reasons since 1982, not one was brought to trial before Habre was overthrown. Criticism of the government is rare and has led to arrest.
Citizens are unable to choose their representatives freely. The president rules with a strong centralized bureaucracy, and appoints a National Consultative Council and the Council of Ministers. Habré’s government party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR), was the only recognized party in Chad during his regime.

The media are controlled by the government. Freedom to practice all religious faiths is respected, and proselytizing by Christian missionaries is permitted. Chadians can move freely through the country except in designated northern security areas, and they may emigrate. A tiny proportion of the work force is unionized, belonging to the government-controlled National Union of Chadian Trade Unions. Striking is discouraged, but assembly is tolerated to the extent it avoids anti-government positions.

### Chile

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 13,200,000  
**HDI:** 0.931 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 67 male, 73 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Relatively homogeneous

**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

The inauguration of the freely elected government of President Patricio Aylwin on 11 March 1990 capped the transition to civilian government after seventeen years of military rule. Despite residual tension over the question of military subordination to civilian authority, Chile appeared on the road to regaining its status as one of Latin America’s model democracies.

The Republic of Chile was established after achieving independence from Spain in 1818. Democratic governance predominated in this century until the overthrow of the socialist government of Salvador Allende by the military in 1973. In 1974, Gen. Augusto Pinochet became head of state, presiding over a four-man junta representing the four branches of the armed forces. The regime dissolved the National Congress, banned Marxist parties, placed all other parties in indefinite recess and prohibited all political activities. Until August 1988, the government operated under either a state of siege or other states of exception.

A new constitution was approved in a state-controlled plebiscite in 1980. This undemocratic document established a permanent tutelary role for the military in a protracted transition to a "protected" democracy. But it also provided for a second plebiscite in which voters could reject another eight-year presidential term for a government candidate.

In October 1988, 55 percent of 7 million voters said "no" to a second term for Gen. Pinochet, despite the enormous advantage exercised by the government in the campaign. The "no" victory meant the government was constitutionally bound to hold competitive presidential and legislative elections by the end of 1989.

The 1988 campaign of the sixteen-party Command for the No was based on the democratic opposition’s determination to reform the constitution. After losing the plebiscite, right-wing supporters urged Pinochet to negotiate with the Command, leading to an agreement on fifty-four constitutional changes that were passed in another plebiscite in July 1989. The key reform was the addition of one civilian to the National Security Council, giving civilians equal
representation with the military. Other changes included increasing the number of elected senators in the Congress from twenty-six to thirty-eight (nine would still be appointees of the Pinochet government); the end of the ban on Marxist parties; and the reduction of the presidential term from eight years to four.

For the December 1989 presidential elections, the seventeen-party, center-left Coalition for Democracy (formerly the Command for the No) nominated Christian Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin. Most right-wing parties backed Pinochet’s former finance minister, Hernan Buchi, while the rest supported businessman Francisco Errazuriz.

Because Aylwin vowed not to make major changes in the free-market, free-trade thrust of the economy, civil-military relations was the main issue. The 1980 constitution allows Pinochet to remain commander of the army, the strongest branch of the 57,000-man armed forces, until 1997. The Coalition stated it would seek to diminish the role of the military under civilian rule, and that Pinochet should retire early. It therefore hoped to win the two-thirds majority in the Senate and the 120-member Chamber of Deputies required to amend the constitution.

On 14 December 1989, Aylwin won the presidency with 55.2 percent of the vote, with Buchi taking 28.9 percent, and Errazuriz 14.4 percent. The Coalition secured a 72-48 majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and won 22 of the 38 elected Senate seats. However, with nine senators appointed by the outgoing government, it fell short of a majority in the 47-seat Senate. Within the Coalition, Aylwin’s Christian Democrats were the big winners, with 13 senators and 38 deputies.

After Aylwin’s 11 March 1990 inauguration, the question of military subordination to civilian authority remained the foremost national issue. Prior to leaving office, Pinochet implemented a new military charter that restated the role of the armed forces as ”guarantors of the constitution,” and announced he would remain as army commander. In contrast, the heads of the air force and the national police, Generals Matthei and Stange, publicly favored a full transition to civilian rule and the Aylwin government angled to isolate Pinochet by keeping them on.

Tension marked the first months of civilian rule as human rights groups pressured the new government to bring charges against the military and the disbanded security forces for human rights violations committed during the dictatorship. In May, the government created a commission to investigate past violations. Pinochet protested, but the heads of the air force, navy and national police agreed to cooperate. There was an apparent consensus within the government that the investigations should lead not to prosecutions but to financial reparations for victims’ families. However, the discovery of a number of mass graves during the summer put added pressure on the investigating committee, which was expected to issue its report in 1991.

In mid-1990, President Aylwin, buoyed by an almost 80 percent positive rating in the polls, warned Pinochet about violating the constitutional prohibition against military interference in political affairs. After a series of one-on-one meetings, Aylwin seemed to have the upper hand. The other military commanders were abiding by the prohibition, and the army had been shaken by a financial scandal. Also, there appeared to be a significant number of officers within the army favoring an apolitical role for the institution. However, despite his weakened hand, it was evident that Pinochet wanted to stay in the political game, certainly as an obstacle to the ongoing human rights investigations, and possibly to run for office in 1993.
**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

All political parties are able to achieve legal status following the constitutional reforms of 1989. Some Marxist parties registered before the 1989 campaign. The Communist Party (PCCh) did not apply for legal status until late 1990, but in 1989 freely ran legislative candidates under the umbrella of a registered coalition, the Broad Party of the Socialist Left (PAIS). The PCCh announced it would run candidates in the 1991 municipal elections, the first to be held since the 1973 coup.

Under the new government all forms of peaceful political activity and religious expression are respected. Most of the laws restricting political expression were eliminated by the constitutional reforms in 1989. Despite provocative armed actions by remnants of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), the former armed wing of the Communist Party, and the bizarre Lautero Front, the national police have responded in a generally professional manner.

Labor organizing and the right to strike were restricted under military rule by a severe labor code. The new government committed itself to full respect for labor rights and held tripartite talks with the unions and the private sector. In mid-July 1990, a package of amendments was presented to the Congress that would ensure the right to strike and greater compensation for dismissals, and ban the hiring of replacement workers during strikes. The issue of industry-wide collective bargaining remained a hurdle, but most labor leaders appeared confident in the eventual full restoration of labor rights.

Under Pinochet, the power of military courts was greatly expanded at the expense of the Supreme Court and the civil court system. The new government has made headway in reversing the process, but the key test of the judiciary’s independence will come when the special government commission issues its report in 1991 on human rights violations committed under military rule. In September 1990, the Supreme Court upheld the controversial law issued by the former government granting amnesty for violations committed in 1973-78. However, the court’s decision did not effect the work of the government investigative commission, and further challenges to the 1978 amnesty law by Chile’s exceptional, independent human rights organizations were expected.

Upon taking office, President Aylwin gave amnesty to 43 of the nearly 400 political prisoners held by the former government. The remaining prisoners were those convicted by military courts for acts of violence. The new government proposed legislation that would allow these prisoners to be retried in civil courts, and by fall 1990 over a hundred had been released pending retrial. Despite opposition from the right-wing majority in the Senate, the legislation was expected to pass by the end of 1990.

Since the constitutional reforms in 1989, any person or group is free to start, edit, operate and distribute newspapers or magazines without government permission. After taking office, the new government committed itself to complete media freedom and submitted legislation that would remove the remaining restrictions on free expression, including the power of military courts to convict journalists for libeling members of the armed forces.

Radio is both private and public. Independent radio played a key role in the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 election with extensive coverage of independent, parallel vote counts. The national television network is operated by the state but open to all political voices. There are three noncommercial television stations run by universities. During the 1988 and 1989 campaigns, all parties were allotted time on the state-run network. The 1989 campaign featured a nationally televised debate between the two major candidates.
In August 1990, Chile ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and formally recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court for the interpretation and enforcement of the provisions contained in the convention.

**China**

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<th>Communist one-party</th>
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**Overview:**

China returned to legal normalcy with the lifting of martial law on 11 January, but it continued to grapple throughout 1990 with a wide variety of domestic and international consequences of the 4 June 1989 massacre of protesters at Tiananmen Square.

China's leaders have remained deeply divided since they split over how to respond to the Tiananmen demonstrators. Deng Xiaoping (still China's senior leader despite bequeathing his last formal position to Party Secretary Jiang Zemin) apparently remains committed to economic reforms and has clashed with central planners on a range of issues. Each side seems to have only enough power to block the other's initiatives. The resulting deadlock has led to the apparent rise and fall of Politburo member Li Ruihuan's political status; several postponements of key meetings, including those intended to complete China's next five-year economic plan due to start in 1991; and contradictory ideological messages. Conservatives ousted Zhao Ziyang as party secretary in 1989 and have kept him under house arrest since, but they have never gained the support needed to expel him from the Party. A compromise seems to have been reached in November, which allows Zhao to remain in the Party but not in office. The purge of CCP members who "deviated from the correct political stand" last spring, launched by conservatives on 25 June 1989, similarly fizzled. Over 99 percent of the Party "re-registered" and many of Zhao's supporters remain in office.

The anti-Communist revolutions in Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania, clearly rattled China's leadership. Especially troublesome were the roles of the church and, in Romania's case, the army. China reacted by editorializing against religion (including threats to expel religious Party members), restricting the foreign contacts of official churches, and clamping down on underground churches. Since it was the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that saved the regime in 1989, Beijing strove to reward the PLA to ensure continued loyalty. The Communists both revived Lei Feng as an example of the military serving the Party and sizably increased the army's budget. They also re-organized it to provide better internal security by creating a Rapid Deployment Force in each of China's seven military regions. Finally, the government in February sacked the entire senior leadership of the People's Armed Police for failing to control the demonstrations in Beijing, replaced them with regular military officers, transferred several army divisions into the police force (thereby bringing its strength up to 600,000), and purchased new riot gear. The end of martial law was essentially a
legalistic technicality that brought few substantive benefits to Beijing’s citizens.

Even with these security changes, China’s leaders remained nervous about internal dissent. Although they re-opened Tiananmen Square to the public with the end of martial law, they closed it several times in the spring of 1990 to prevent demonstrations on the anniversaries of sensitive events. Demonstrations fell short of dissidents’ hopes but proved substantial enough to reflect continued popular discontent. Individuals were arrested on several occasions for attempting to demonstrate in the Square. Hundreds of students (perhaps as many as 2,000) marched around Beijing University’s campus on the night of 34 June in an apparently spontaneous protest.

Despite predictions that many Chinese would refuse to participate in a census, preliminary totals showed 1.13 billion residents, slightly more than Beijing had estimated.

Several of China’s fifty-five ethnic minorities deeply resent Han intrusions into regions they have traditionally dominated. In February Premier Li Peng urged government "vigilance" to "wipe out splitism" among minorities. (For a description of the continuing troubles in Tibet, see the section under Related Territories.) The recent emergence of a democratic movement in Mongolia raised the specter of similar activities in Chinese Inner Mongolia.

By far the most serious ethnic unrest of the year, however, emerged in Xinjiang region in Western China on 5-6 April. Initial reports indicated that Uyghurs (Turkic Muslims) had killed two Han officials sent to diffuse tensions and then rioted until the authorities restored order, killing about fifty. Beijing initially denied that there had been troubles, but later admitted that there was an "armed counterrevolutionary rebellion" in Baren, a town near the city of Kashgar, and that twenty-two people died and thirteen were wounded. Since China closed the area to foreigners, many specifics remain unknown or unconfirmed.

Beijing faced another sort of rebellion from the provinces in 1990. Provincial governors refused to accept Beijing’s plan to recall some of the powers which had been decentralized in the 1980s. Particularly disputed was the percent of revenues that provinces should contribute to the central treasury. This unheard of rebellion—manifested at two meetings in the fall—seriously jeopardized the preparations for the next five-year economic plan. The CCP’s Central Committee met on the last six days of the year in a last ditch effort to agree on the 1991 targets for China’s troubled economy.

Urban unemployment climbed to its highest level since 1979. Rural incomes fell, despite a record harvest. Beijing defied market principles underpinning agricultural growth and increased state interference in farming. Village officials in some areas attempted to resuscitate the pre-Deng communal farming system. "Key party and government departments" endorsed the return to collective agriculture.

The Communists voted in late December for representatives to local People’s Congresses, the PRC’s only directly elected institutions. The elections, which take place every three years, are essentially meaningless, however, as the government must approve all candidates and the Congresses exercise little power.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

China’s citizens cannot democratically change their government. Although the 1982 constitution provides for "multiparty" communism, in reality China remains a one-party state. In addition to the ruling Communist Party of China
Country reports

(CCP), claiming 47 million members, there are eight minor satellite parties, with a combined membership of about 300,000. All must accept the CCP's guidance and leading role in society. None has any real power and the Communists can ban them, or restrict their activities. Party and state remain virtually indistinguishable. The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's legislature. Consisting of about 3,000 delegates, it meets once a year for about fifteen days. The NPC broadened its rubber stamp role during the 1980s, but it has been compliant since the leadership quashed an attempt by some delegates to revoke martial law.

Serious rights abuses accompanied China's May anti-crime campaign. Official sources reported more than 800 executions this year, in China's biggest crackdown on crime since 1983. While the majority of those executed had been accused of violent crimes, some were convicted only of political offenses or such petty crimes as gambling and pickpocketing. The Chinese do not benefit from institutions capable of limiting governmental excesses. China's judiciary answers to the Party/state. Defense attorneys rarely bother to protest their client's innocence. By Beijing's own reckoning, over 99 percent of defendants are convicted. Pre-trial detention can last indefinitely; alternatively, some prisoners are rushed from arrest through trial to execution within two weeks.

Prisoners often face harsh conditions in Chinese jails. Forced labor frequently accompanies imprisonment in one of the 3,000-5,000 "re-education through labor" centers. Prisoners can be handcuffed for weeks continuously. Famous political prisoners are frequently housed at Qincheng Prison near Beijing, where conditions can be surprisingly tolerable. Most political prisoners are jailed with common criminals, who may beat them at the guard's instigation. Torture appears endemic in Chinese prisons, especially before trial when police try to exact confessions to ensure quick convictions. In 1985 the government launched a campaign to eradicate this practice; the campaign ended, however, following the Tiananmen massacre, despite the fact that torture has increased continually since 1985. Former prisoners—particularly political offenders—often have trouble finding work and even housing.

The government claims to have released 573 dissidents in small groups between July 1989 and January 1990, 211 more in May and 97 more on 6 June, leaving only 334 in jail, with several individual releases since. Observers generally believe the initial figure of 573 to be exaggerated. Later amnesties included several prominent dissidents, and at least two students on the government's most wanted list. The authorities allowed leading dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife to leave their asylum at the U.S. Embassy for exile in Britain.

The releases, however, seemed aimed at improving China's image abroad—particularly with an eye on restoring World Bank and bilateral aid and retaining U.S. most favored nation status for low tariffs—and do not indicate any significant change in the regime's positions. Restrictions have been placed on the movement and activities of some of those released; some have been harassed and even re-arrested. Beijing University administrators officially warned 137 students, who were never arrested, about their "political offenses." Observers estimate that some 1,000 dissidents remain imprisoned since last spring, not counting the many political prisoners still in jail for earlier protests, of whom the most famous is Wei Jingsheng, a worker sentenced to fifteen years for his role in the Democracy Wall movement. Seemingly emboldened by the decrease in Western pressure concerning human rights, which accompanied the need to avoid a Chinese veto on U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the Persian Gulf crisis, Beijing, in November,
formally charged several prominent dissidents with "spreading counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement" which mandates a minimum sentence of ten years. Intellectuals Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were additionally charged with sedition. The two defendants face fifteen years to execution. Closed trials will probably follow shortly (some may have started already); convictions are certain.

China severely restricts freedom of expression. While the Party/state has always controlled most of the media, the government effectively shut down those independent publications that dared to support the Tiananmen demonstrators. Then-Party secretary for Shanghai Jiang Zemin suspended in April 1989 publication of the World Economic Herald—a newspaper popular among Shanghai intellectuals—for challenging Communist rule. The editor-in-chief remains under house arrest, two reporters are in jail and the others are out of work. China imposed new restrictions this year on Hong Kong journalists who cover the mainland. Foreign reporters in Beijing suffered harassment and intimidation this year. An anti-pornography campaign expanded beyond its original target as authorities destroyed 32 million books and closed 12 percent of China’s newspapers, 13 percent of social science journals, and almost 8 percent of publishers.

China also constrains other basic freedoms. Regulations effective 1 September banned all unofficial posters, except those whose content and locations the state specifically approved in advance. Officially an atheistic state, China hampers the free practice of religion. In response to Muslim unrest this spring, Xinjiang province tightened religious restrictions in May and again in September.

Citizens may not choose where they want to live. A rigid permit system keeps peasants from flocking to the cities. As many as 50 million Chinese, many of them migrants who bring rural products to sell at city markets, technically violate this law. Government policies dictate such personal choices as contraception and family size. An unknown number of Chinese have more than one child and seek to avoid the required penalties and fines (commonly known as "the extra baby fee") by not registering their additional children. Even government officials admit that forced abortions probably still occur, but the problem has dwindled substantially.

Students occupy a special place in Chinese society. Hardliners have reintroduced political indoctrination (and in some cases military training) to the curriculum. The government now requires five years of manual labor or heavy fees in order to study abroad.

**Colombia**

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 31,800,000  
**HDI:** 0.801 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 61 male, 66 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Relatively homogeneous population, scattered minorities

**Political Rights:** 3  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

President Cesar Gaviria took office in August 1990 following an electoral campaign that saw three presidential candidates murdered by drug traffickers, and hundreds of other people killed by traffickers, paramilitary groups and
the military. However, despite unprecedented levels of political and drug-related violence, Gaviria forged ahead on his plan to strengthen the country's weak and besieged institutions through constitutional reform.

Colombia achieved independence from Spain in 1819, and the Republic of Colombia was established under the constitution adopted in 1886. The Liberal and Conservative parties have dominated the political system. In 1957, they agreed to a constitutional amendment establishing a National Front under which they participated equally in government until 1974. Since 1974, the president and a bicameral Congress have been directly elected for four-year terms. The governors of the country's twenty-three departments are appointed by the executive branch. In March 1988, municipal elections were held for the first time.

Throughout the last decade, Colombian governments have been under attack by an array of loosely allied left-wing guerrilla movements. Despite numerous negotiating efforts, only the April 19th Movement (M-19) has agreed to end hostilities in exchange for the right to form a legal political party. The three other main groups—the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the People's Liberation Army (ELP)—remain active.

A greater threat is the power and ruthlessness of the hemisphere's two largest drug cartels, based in the Colombian cities of Medellin and Cali. Fueled by billions of dollars in profits, the cartels are a combined political and military force capable of challenging the existence of the state. Through bribery and extortion, they have penetrated nearly every branch of government, including the Congress, the judicial system, the military and security forces. They have been responsible for thousands of murders, including the killing of a number of cabinet ministers and presidential candidates, a dozen Supreme Court justices, the editor of Colombia's second largest newspaper, and more than fifty judges.

In 1989, the Liberal government of President Virgilio Barco ordered the fourth major crackdown since 1984. The Medellin cartel, by far the most ruthless of the two drug organizations, responded by assassinating Luis Carlos Galan, a Liberal party presidential candidate and anti-drug crusader. Barco struck back by reinstating extradition procedures for traffickers wanted in the U.S. Amid a wave of lethal shootings and bombings unprecedented even by 1980s standards, the Medellin cartel offered to negotiate a truce in exchange for impunity. The Barco administration rejected the offer and the cartels began killing ten judges for every trafficker extradited. In November 1989, the entire Colombian judicial system went on strike for a week to demand protection, raising the specter of wholesale institutional collapse.

Amid the mayhem, the campaign for the March 1990 presidential primary, legislative, and municipal elections continued. Candidates were suffocated by security measures and rarely appeared outdoors, forcing the government to lift the traditional ban on campaigning through the broadcast media. According to opinion polls, the country was divided over whether the government should accept the cartels' offer to negotiate. Cesar Gaviria, the leading Liberal presidential candidate following the murder of Galan, argued that giving in to the traffickers would mean forfeiting the nation's sovereignty. Other prominent politicians, including some Social Conservatives (formerly the Conservative party), countered that the drug war was futile.

On 11 March 1990, less than half of the eligible voters turned out in the races for seats in the bicameral Congress, the Liberals increased their
legislative majority to nearly two-thirds. They also took a majority of the municipal posts. In the Liberal party primary held simultaneously, Gaviria easily won the nomination for president.

The main candidates for the 27 May 1990 presidential elections were Gaviria, Rodrigo Lloreda and Alvaro Gomez of the badly split Social Conservatives, Bernardo Jaramillo of the Patriotic Union (UP), and Carlos Pizarro of the newly legalized M-19. During the campaign, the astounding level of violence reached new heights. After the April murder of Pizarro by the Medellin cartel, Antonio Navarro became the M-19 candidate. After the traffickers killed Jaramillo, the UP declined to put up another candidate. Since the UP’s formation in 1985, over a thousand of its leaders and members have been killed by drug traffickers and right-wing paramilitary groups linked to the Colombian military.

On 27 May, nearly 60 percent of eligible voters stayed away, clearly intimidated by the wave of assassinations and car-bombings by the drug traffickers that killed hundreds in the weeks before the vote. However, of those that did turn out, 47.5 percent voted for Gaviria and his strong anti-cartel position, enough to give him the presidency. The M-19’s Navarro made a surprisingly strong showing, coming in third with 13 percent.

President Gaviria took office on 7 August 1990, pledging to fight drug traffickers "without concessions," and to continue seeking negotiations with still active guerrilla groups. By early fall, two of the still active guerrilla groups expressed interest in at least discussing a ceasefire. The Medellin cartel, calling themselves the "Extraditables," demanded that the government negotiate with them too, offering to end the violence in exchange for amnesty and freedom from extradition. When Gaviria turned them down, they kidnapped seven prominent journalists, many of them members of prominent families. In October, after unleashing yet another wave of bombings and attacks, the Extraditables threatened to kill the journalists if the government did not end its crackdown. Gaviria refused, and by early November the stand-off continued.

At the same time, Gaviria moved ahead on his pledge to revamp Colombia’s old-fashioned, corrupted and besieged institutions through constitutional reform. In early fall 1990, it was announced that Colombians would vote for a seventy-member constituent assembly on 9 December 1990. The assembly was to propose a new constitution within six months, without any limitations on the type of reforms it could consider. It was expected that the drug traffickers would attempt to influence the reform process, particularly on the question of extradition.

Constitutional rights regarding free expression, freedom of religion and the freedom to organize political parties, civic groups and labor unions are severely restricted by political and drug-related violence and the government’s inability to guarantee the security of citizens, institutions and the media. Political violence in Colombia takes more lives than in any other country in the hemisphere. While drug-traffickers have laid siege to the state itself, those responsible for the thousands of killings, kidnappings and disappearances annually include the military and security forces, as well as left-wing guerrilla groups, hired assassins, and right-wing paramilitary groups. All these elements continue to operate with a high degree of impunity.

There are a number of independent human rights organizations that report...
on the hundreds of disappearances and killings by paramilitary groups linked to the army, and on the abuses of the military and security forces in the counterinsurgency war against left-wing guerrilla groups. Human rights activists themselves, as well as labor, peasant and student organizations, are consistently the targets of violence and abuse. The government has been slow to recognize the source of these rights abuses, and emergency measures enacted because of the drug war have only reinforced the sense of impunity within the army and security forces.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary headed by a Supreme Court, but the entire judicial system has been weakened by the decade-long onslaught of the drug cartels and generalized political violence. Much of the system has been compromised through corruption and extortion. Those who refuse to be bribed are murdered, and in the last ten years over 50 judges, 170 judicial employees, a justice minister, and an attorney general have been killed. The Supreme Court decision in October 1989 to approve the reinstatement of extradition showed renewed courage, but led to the murder of numerous lower-court judges. In August 1990, President Gaviria proposed to create a specialized court system to deal with cases involving drugs, terrorism and paramilitarism, and to build "fortress cities" where judges could live free from intimidation.

The media are both public and private. Radio includes both government and independent stations. Television is a government monopoly. The press, including several major daily newspapers, is privately owned and uncensored. In April 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that not even during states of emergency can the government take actions that restrict the full freedom of the press in a general way.

Although no sector of Colombian society has been left untouched, the predominantly anti-drug press and broadcast media have been hit especially hard by the cartel's campaign of bombings and killings. Since 1980, over sixty journalists have been murdered, nearly two dozen in the last two years alone and mostly by drug traffickers. In 1989, traffickers declared an "all-out war" against the press. In 1990, they turned to kidnapping journalists to reinforce their demands for amnesty and an end to extradition. Nearly every newspaper, radio station and television news program has been repeatedly threatened, a number of newspapers have been forced to close their offices in Medellin, some radio stations have gone off the air, and an increasing number of publications admit to practicing self-censorship.

Comoros

Polity: Dominant party
Economy: Capitalist
Population: 500,000
HDI: 0.399 (low)
Life Expectancy: 48 male, 52 female
Ethnic groups: African-Arab

Overview:

In late 1989, this tiny Islamic state consisting of three main islands in the Indian Ocean off Madagascar was rocked by violence as a gang of mercenaries under Bob Denard took over the country after the murder of President Ahmed Abdallah, who seized power in 1978 with Denard's help. On 15 December 1989, Denard and twenty-one other mercenaries left the country
for South Africa after turning control over to French military authorities. Said Mohamed Djohar was installed as interim president.

By 26 January, eight candidates had filed to contest the first free presidential elections since independence from France in 1975. Scheduled for 4 and 11 March by the Council of Ministers, the first round resulted in allegations of irregularities, as Interim President Djohar, head of the ruling Unity (UDZIMA) Party, and opposition challenger Mohamed Taki, a former National Assembly speaker, headed for a run-off. Supporters of Taki, leader of the National Union for Democracy (UNDC), said that their candidate had actually received more votes than the 22 percent announced and that soldiers supporting the government had voted more than once. President Djohar allegedly got 22 percent of the vote. In the 11 March run-off, the interim president reportedly won 55.27 of the vote to Taki’s 44.73 percent, according the Elections Commission. After the announcement, Taki lodged a complaint about fraud and irregularities in at least fifteen polling stations. On 13 March, the Supreme Court validated the elections and proclaimed Djohar the president for a six-year term.

In early April, police used tear gas to break up a demonstration by some 700 supporters of defeated candidate Taki, who claimed the election was rigged. In a 10 May address, President Djohar described himself as resolutely committed to democratization of political life and the rehabilitation of political and economic life ruined by corruption and the embezzlement of public funds. Yet the president remained under pressure from multiple sources to return to the authoritarian and corrupt system of the Abdallah years. In the face of a deteriorating economy, the president in June asked French President Francois Mitterrand for more French aid. Mitterrand indicated that aid would not be increased until the democratization process is underway and corruption and inefficiency are weeded out of the economic system.

By August, there were rumors that pro-Denard forces were plotting to assassinate key government officials. On 18 August the Foreign Ministry announced that a coup attempt had been foiled with the arrest of a supporter of Mohamed Taki, the unsuccessful presidential candidate, and another islander.

Despite charges of election fraud, the country held presidential elections contested by seven candidates representing various political groupings. The court system is based on Islamic law and the French legal code. In civil and criminal cases, the judiciary is independent, but security provisions allow for indefinite detention. Public criticism of the government is tolerated and there are many discussion groups and political groupings. The government-controlled media follow the government line. In early January, the chief editor of Radio-Comoros resigned because "after having undergone pressures and threats" he considered he was no longer able to fulfill his responsibilities. Twelve other radio reporters announced that they would resign if prevented from providing pluralistic reporting. Also in January, an article in the Comoran weekly Al Watway was partly censored. Foreign publications generally enter the country unimpeded. Private cultural and community organizations exist. Although Islam is the state religion, adherents of other faiths are allowed to worship freely. There are no serious restrictions on freedom to travel. Trade unions and strikes are permitted, but the lack of industry and wage labor have hindered union organizing. There is a teachers' association and workers in some industrial sectors have formed temporary worker groupings.
Like other nations in central-west Africa, the African People's Republic of the Congo, which in 1970 became a one-party, Marxist-Leninist state dominated by the Congolese Labor Party (PCT), promised some cautious measures toward liberalizing political life. On 10 December, the PCT ended a seven-day conference after officially abandoning its Marxist ideology and adopting a social democratic platform. Opposition parties were slated to be legalized on 1 January 1991.

In June, President Gen. Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the chairman of the PCT who has ruled the country since 1979, told a meeting of the party's central committee that he was committed to greater democracy. On 4 July the central committee issued a communique suggesting that an extraordinary congress to lay the foundations for the introduction of multi-partyism would take place in 1991. It also emphasized that the PCT, the sole legal party, had to become a "party of the masses." Marxism-Leninism was dropped as the official ideology, but the communique noted that "socialism remained the final objective of the struggle in Congo."

The communique also stated that the PCT was committed to promoting freedom of expression, press, association and demonstration.

In September, the Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches of Congo, in a document titled Contributions of Religious Bodies by Members of the ECC, deplored the fact that the CTL "has reserved the debate on the democratic process exclusively to itself." Later in the month, an extraordinary session of the PCT Central Committee announced its commitment to a multi-party system. Informed sources reported that Gen. Sassou-Nguesso would step down as head of the PCT in January 1991, and a transition government under a prime minister would be named.

In October a wave of strikes led the president to warn that labor unrest was undermining the political reform process. Reacting to the charges, Jean-Michel Bokamba-Yangouma, secretary-general of the normally quiescent, PCT-controlled Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC), said the strikes were "neither anarchic nor illegal." The labor movement has become increasingly independent and outspoken, particularly after the government tried to break-up a CSC congress in September.

There were instances of political repression in 1990. Four people were arrested on 9 and 11 July for "subversion" by Congo's police after they signed an open letter to the president calling for multiparty democracy. Messrs. Clement Mierassa and Celestin Nkoua were accused of using state materials to draft the open letter. Mr. Gongara was arrested for printing the letter, which was drafted by more than 100 intellectuals and army officers. Mr. Auguste Gambou was arrested for being found in the printing plant where the letter was published.

In the letter, the signatories called for a national conference in view of a move towards multiparty democracy, the scheduling of elections, and the creation of a transition government. The letter was signed by several former
government officials, including Jean-Pierre Thystere-Tchikaya, the former number two man in the PCT; Pierre Nze, former foreign minister, and well-known writer Sony Labu Tan’si. The signatories demanded unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners as "a precondition for pluralistic democracy." Several days after the arrests, the government denied that the men were held for drafting and distributing the letter, and claimed that they were involved in a plot to overthrow the government.

On 15 August, President Sassou Nguesso granted amnesty to political prisoners in the country, including former head of state Gen. Joachim Yhomby-Opongo, who was overthrown in 1979. In October, both Messrs. Yhomby-Opongo and Thystere-Tchikaya expressed support for the PCT's action and the introduction of a multiparty system and next year's national conference.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The Congo remains a one-party system dominated by the military in which citizens do not have the democratic freedoms to change the political system. The internal security apparatus is pervasive and intrusive, and the judiciary is subservient to the party and the state. Freedom to criticize the government is restricted, and the media are controlled by the state. In 1990, several people were arrested and detained for writing an open letter to the president demanding a multiparty state. Political prisoners were released in August after a presidential amnesty. Only the PCT can hold political meetings, but government permission is not required for social or political meetings unless they use official facilities. Professional organizations need government approval. The government does not generally interfere with the practice of religion; the Roman Catholic Church publishes an independent publication.

The government maintains some control over freedom of movement and Congolese wishing to travel abroad need permission from the security apparatus. The umbrella Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC) is controlled by the PCT. Independent unions are prohibited, and workers do not have the right to strike, though strikes have occurred. On 12 September, President Sassou-Nguesso annulled the CSC congress after trade unionists demanded their independence from the government. By 17 September, an agreement was reached, the strike ended and the congress was allowed.

Costa Rica

Polity: Presidential-legislative democracy
Economy: Mixed capitalist
Population: 3,000,000
HDI: 0.916 (high)
Life Expectancy: 71 male, 76 female
Ethnic Groups: Relatively homogeneous

Overview:

In general elections on 4 February 1990, Rafael A. Calderon Jr. of the center-right Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) defeated Carlos Manuel Castillo, the candidate of the ruling National Liberation Party (PLN), for the presidency. The social democratic PLN had held the presidency for two straight terms, and sixteen out of the last twenty years.

The Republic of Costa Rica achieved independence from Spain in 1821, formally declaring itself a republic in 1848. Democratic constitutional government was instituted in 1899 and briefly interrupted in 1917 and 1948. The
1949 constitution, which proscribes the formation of a national army, has provided the framework for democratic governance ever since.

The 1949 constitution provides for three independent branches of government: The president and the fifty-seven-member Legislative Assembly are directly elected for four years and are prohibited from succeeding themselves. The Assembly has co-equal power including the ability to override presidential vetoes. Members of the judicial branch are elected by the Assembly.

In the February 1986 elections, Oscar Arias Sanchez of the PLN was elected president over the PUSC’s Calderon by a 52 to 46 percent margin. In the Assembly, the PLN saw its majority reduced from 33 seats to 29. Of the remaining seats, 25 were won by the PUSC, one each by two left-wing coalitions and one by an independent candidate.

Campaigning for the February 1990 elections began in late 1987 with primary campaigns in both major parties. The PLN elected Castillo as its presidential candidate, and the PUSC again elected Calderon as its nominee. By September 1989, seventeen political parties from across the entire political spectrum were registered by the independent five-member electoral tribunal. Among the nationally recognized parties was a new entry, a left-leaning coalition called the Progress Party (PdP) that joined the constellation of small political groups campaigning against the PLN-PUSC two-party monopoly. For the tenth time in forty years, the executive branch turned control of the nation’s police over to the electoral tribunal for the duration of the election process.

In the fall of 1989, Calderon led in the polls as the PLN tried to recover from widespread publicity surrounding charges of drug trade connections among high party officials. A number of PLN leaders, including former President Daniel Oduber (1974-78), were forced to resign party positions in the wake of damaging reports of involvement issued by a special Assembly commission. Because the Costa Rican election law prohibits the current president from campaigning on behalf of his party’s candidate, Castillo was unable to draw on the continuing popularity of President Arias.

In the months before the election, the campaign was marked by mutual accusations of corruption and illegal campaign funding by both major parties. Opinion polls, however, showed the electorate to be more interested in economic issues. In the 4 February elections, nearly 80 percent of the electorate went to the polls. By Costa Rican standards, however, the abstention rate was high. Calderon won the presidency with 51.4 percent of the vote, defeating Castillo, who obtained 47.3 percent. Exit polls showed that many voters turned away from the PLN because they feared an excessive concentration of power in one party. The array of other contenders netted a combined total of less than 2 percent, reinforcing the two-party system. President Calderon was inaugurated on 8 May.

In the Legislative Assembly race, the PUSC and the PLN swapped positions; the PUSC rose to a majority position with 29 members (up from 25), while the PLN dropped to 25 (down from 29). The 3 remaining seats were won by the left-wing Pueblo Unido party, the Cartagines Agricultural Union, and the Generalena Union. The PUSC also won a majority of the local races that took place in the country’s 81 municipal districts.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Constitutional guarantees regarding freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions are fully respected.
Labor unions are active and permitted to strike. There were a series of stoppages in 1990 by various federations over the increased cost of living and the tight austerity measures taken by the new Calderon administration to reduce the government deficit. In 1990, there was also a continuing confrontation between the independent labor movement and the Solidarismo movement. The unions, with support from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), charge that Solidarismo is a private sector instrument for coopting workers. Although independent labor rights are guaranteed by law, in 1990 the independent unions, particularly the Permanent Workers Council (CPT) with a membership of about 100,000, continued to battle the Solidarismo Union in public debate and in the courts.

Press, radio, and television are free of censorship. There are a number of independent dailies and assorted weeklies serving a society that is ninety percent literate. Television and radio stations are commercial, with six private television stations providing an increasingly influential forum for public debate. Freedom of expression, however, is marred by the existence of a twenty-year-old licensing requirement for journalists. A 1985 Inter-American Human Rights Court ruling determined that licensing of journalists is incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights.

The judicial branch is fully independent, its members elected for eight-year terms by the Legislative Assembly. There is a Supreme Court that has the power to rule on the constitutionality of legislation, as well as four courts of appeal and a network of district courts. The members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal are elected by the Supreme Court.

In 1989, the judiciary began investigations into numerous and unprecedented charges of human rights violations made by the four-year-old, independent Costa Rican Human Rights Commission and other rights activists. Fourteen cases, including accusations of brutality and torture committed in secret jails, were made against the Costa Rican Special Police.

For decades, Costa Rica’s Civil and Rural Guards, which answer to civilian cabinet ministers, had about 9,000 personnel. However, as a result of the conflict in next-door Nicaragua and the hemispheric drug emergency, that figure tripled during the 1980s. In mid-1990, a special legislative commission formed to investigate human rights violations by the police was pressing for a mandate to expand its focus to what the human rights commission called the “militarization” of the police.

**Cuba**

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<tr>
<th>Polity: Communist one-party</th>
<th>Political Rights: 7</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economy: Statist</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population: 10,600,000</td>
<td>Status: Not Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI: 0.877 (high/d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy: 72 male, 75 female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups: Relatively homogeneous admixture of Caucasian and black</td>
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**Overview:**

With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the loss of allies in Nicaragua and Panama, and the squeezing of Cuba’s economic life line due to the upheaval in the Soviet Union, the regime of Fidel Castro was under more pressure in 1990 than ever before. Castro, however, remained defiant, reinforcing the centralized political system, imposing harsh economic austerity measures on the already strapped population, and stifling any semblance of dissent.
Cuba achieved independence from Spain in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. The Republic of Cuba was established in 1902, remaining subject to U.S. tutelage under the Piatt Amendment until 1934. On 1 January 1959 left-wing revolutionary forces under Fidel Castro overthrew the right-wing dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, who had ruled for eighteen of the preceding twenty-five years.

Since 1959, Castro has dominated the Cuban political system. Under his direction, Cuba has been transformed into a one-party, Marxist-Leninist state. Communist structures were formally institutionalized by the 1975 constitution approved at the first congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).

The constitution provides for a National Assembly whose members emerge from an indirect electoral process controlled by the PCC leadership. Theoretically, the Assembly designates a Council of State which appoints a Council of Ministers in consultation with its president who serves as head of state and chief of government. In reality, Castro is responsible for every appointment. As president of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council of State, commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the first secretary of the PCC, Fidel Castro controls every lever of power in Cuba. The PCC is the only political party authorized by the constitution, and it controls all governmental entities from the national to the municipal level. All political activity outside the PCC is outlawed.

Castro has defied the radical changes sweeping the Communist world, reaffirming Cuba's adherence to Marxism-Leninism and making "Socialism or death" the government's primary slogan. Since 1986, the PCC has been conducting a "rectification" program designed to eradicate any semblance of capitalist behavior in society, and any political behavior, either inside or outside the PCC that appears to take its cue from Soviet programs under Mikhail Gorbachev. In mid-1989, the distribution of two Soviet publications critical of Castro's intransigence was suspended. Since then, the availability of other Soviet publications has decreased.

A major crisis shook the Castro regime in mid-1989. A drug trafficking scandal involving senior officers in the FAR and the Ministry of Interior (MININT) led to a series of show trials, four executions and long jail sentences for nearly a dozen other individuals. The trial and execution of Gen. Amalido Ochoa, one of only five recipients of the "Hero of the Republic" award and the former commander of Cuban military advisors in Nicaragua and troops in Ethiopia and Angola, evinced undercurrents of an incipient power struggle within the regime. Hints of fissures in the Castro monolith were underscored as he rushed to purge the leadership of the MININT, the backbone of state security, in the wake of the executions. All of the senior and many of the middle-ranking officers were replaced by army officers under the command of Gen. Raul Castro, Fidel's brother. Many state enterprises were also brought under direct army control.

After a February 1990 plenum, the PCC announced that its 4th Congress would be held some time during the first half of 1991, and would be aimed at strengthening the "rectification" process and "perfecting a single, Leninist party based on the principles of democratic socialism." During the plenum, and again in the fall, there was a shuffle of the party leadership which strengthened Castro's direct control over the party, the military, and the government. The assignment of General Sixto Batista to head the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs), the party's neighborhood watchdog network, signaled the increased importance assigned to the CDRs in sup-
pressing dissent. In June, the PCC reaffirmed "the idea of a sole, Marxist-Leninist party."

By the fall of 1990, faced with a reduced flow of aid from the Soviet Union, Castro announced that Cuba was entering a "special period in peacetime," a euphemism for a drastic austerity program involving severe cutbacks in energy consumption, and more stringent rationing of food and consumer items. The program was covered exhaustively in the Cuban military press, suggesting that it would be overseen by the army. However, the real crunch was expected to come in January 1991 when, at Moscow's direction, Cuba's heavily subsidized trade with the Soviet Union was to be switched from a barter to a hard currency basis. The consequences looked to be severe, as Cuba's hard currency reserves had dropped to less than $50 million by the fall of 1990. But Castro, although known for sharp turns in domestic and foreign policy in the past, seemed locked in a bunker mentality.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

All political and civic organization outside the confines of the PCC is illegal. Political dissent, spoken or written, is also a punishable offense. With the possible exception of South Africa, Indonesia and China, Cuba under Castro has had a higher proportion of political prisoners for longer periods than any other country. The educational system, the judicial system, labor unions, professional organizations, cultural groups and all media are tightly controlled by the state; outside of the Catholic church, whose scope remains severely limited by the government, there is no semblance of independent civil society.

Freedom of movement and freedom to choose one's residence, education or job are greatly restricted. Travel outside the country is also restricted and tightly controlled. People who practice religion are formally discriminated against unless they pledge loyalty to the government and its stated goals. In July 1990, Castro announced that religious believers would be allowed to join the Communist Party, but as part of a "strategic alliance between Marxists and Christians." At the same time, he sabotaged negotiations over a possible papal visit, arrested lay leaders of a Catholic church-sponsored rights group, and tightened the screws on the church by banning popular religious processions held by parishes around the country in anticipation of the pope's visit.

In mid-1987, after agreeing to schedule a September 1988 visit from the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the government appeared to soften its position on human rights. A small group of human rights activists was allowed to be interviewed by foreign journalists, hold indoor meetings and gather testimony. International organizations were permitted for the first time to inspect Cuban prisons. Castro, who had denied the existence of political prisoners for three decades, admitted in 1988 to holding 429, a number of whom were released. In 1990, according to international human rights organizations, there were still between 250 and 300 political prisoners.

Since the visit of the U.N. delegation, however, the narrow opening has been shut. Dozens of human rights activists who had tested the waters by organizing tiny quasi-political groups were arrested. During Mikhail Gorbachev's April 1989 visit, a month after the U.N. decided to downgrade its monitoring of Cuba, about two dozen individuals were arrested for planning a demonstration seeking the Soviet leader's support for free expression in Cuba. Then, as Castro reverted to Communist fundamentalism, the small human rights movement was decimated as over three dozen dissidents were jailed. Of the eighty-seven individuals interviewed by the U.N. Commission in September 1988, twenty-two were in jail twelve months later.
The crackdown accelerated in 1990. By March, all but a handful of Cuba's approximately two hundred rights activists had been jailed, and the few remaining were the targets of threats and mob attacks orchestrated by the government. In July, eleven activists were sentenced to prison terms of up to fifteen years for alleged terrorist conspiracies. There were also reports that children of defectors were being placed in reform schools to deter others who would think of leaving the country.

There are continued allegations of torture in the prisons and incarceration in psychiatric institutions. A number of the dissidents arrested in the 1989 sweep were reportedly placed in a psychiatric hospital. In 1988 the Cuban government agreed to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit Cuban prisoners, but in mid-1990 the ICRC's access was restricted.

As was evident during the 1989 show trials of officers charged with drug-trafficking, and during the trials of human rights activists in 1990, due process is alien to the Cuban judicial system; the job of defense attorneys accepted by the courts is to guide defendants in their confessions.

The government has also moved toward restricting the ability of foreign media to operate in Cuba. In 1989, a number of foreign journalists were denied visas to cover the Ochoa trial, and at least one resident foreign journalist was expelled for filing "false reports." In 1990, another resident foreign journalist, a Czech reporter, was also expelled, as was a Mexican television crew over a report by the network on a leading Soviet newspaper's criticism of Fidel Castro.

### Cyprus (Greek)

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 550,000 (est.)  
**HDI:** 0.928 (high), sector not specified  
**Life Expectancy:** 72 male, 76 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Greek, Turk  
**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

### Cyprus (Turkish)

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary democracy (Turkish occupied)  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 150,000 (est.)  
**HDI:** 0.928 (high), sector not specified  
**Life Expectancy:** NA  
**Ethnic Groups:** Turk, Greek  
**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

### Overview:

In March 1990, after two years of U.N.-sponsored discussions, integration talks between Greek Cypriot President George Vassiliou and Turkish leader Rauf Denktash broke down, with Mr. Denktash insisting that Vassiliou recognize Turkish Cyprus as a separate, co-equal state. At the end of 1990 talks had not resumed.

Cyprus, an island nation in the eastern Mediterranean, has been marked by communal tensions and violence before and after gaining independence in 1960. A 2,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force was introduced in 1964. In 1974, Greek rightists staged a coup in Nicosia and Turkish paratroopers secured the northern third of the island, allegedly to defend the persecuted
Turkish-speaking community. Since then, the country has been split into a Greek south and a Turkish north. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed an independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TNRC), which is recognized as a state only by Turkey. Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces face each other over an island-wide buffer zone patrolled by U.N. peacekeeping forces.

Tensions between the two sides are sometimes heated, especially when troops attempt to expand their fortified positions. In April, a band of Greek students entered Turkish territory through the Lederala Palace checkpoint, the only gateway from the Greek South to the Turkish North, and pulled down the northern republic's flags. In response to the arrest of the students, other Greek Cypriots held a round-the-clock blockade of the crossing.

Observers initially thought the prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough on the island's separation were propitious in 1990. The end of the Cold War seemed to imply that Turkey had lost its leverage of threatening an intra-NATO conflict with Greece over the Cyprus issue. Some diplomatic sources believe that Turkey, miffed at its rebuff for full membership in the European Community, encouraged Denktash's intransigence during the U.N.-sponsored talks.

Although Denktash and Vassiliou have agreed in principle to a federal state with Greeks and Turks guaranteed control of their autonomous areas, the leaders were unable to overcome fundamental obstacles. Denktash maintains that Turkish Cyprus should have equal rights of statehood, such as membership in international bodies and landing rights in foreign countries for passenger aircraft.

While Vassiliou insists that Greeks and Turks should live and work wherever they want, Denktash wants an eighteen-year moratorium on Greek Cypriots resettling in the Turkish zone and reclaiming and owning land there. 160,000 Greeks—20,000 more than the total Turk population in Cyprus—left the northern region with the influx of Turkish troops in 1974. The two leaders also failed to resolve the question of removing some 35,000 Turkish troops and the question of the 40,000 Turkish settlers in the northern region.

Days after the aborted talks Denktash resigned and called an early presidential election, which took place in April and amounted to a vote of confidence for his hard-line position. He ran as an independent and took 67 percent of the vote. In legislative elections in May, Denktash's National Unity Party (NUP) defeated the Democratic Struggle, a coalition of three opposition parties which took a more flexible stance on reunification and campaigned on an anti-corruption platform.

The unexpectedly big NUP win was attributed to Turkish settlers' turning away from their own New Dawn party, which had allied with leftist parties in the Democratic Struggle coalition. The NUP received 55 percent of the popular vote, but in accordance with an electoral law passed by an NUP-dominated assembly in 1989 which allows large parties a disproportionate number of seats, the NUP took 34 out of 50 seats. The Democratic Struggle received the remaining sixteen seats, which were allocated to its member parties: the Republican Turkish party and the Communal Liberation party each took seven, while the New Dawn took two seats.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Both the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the Republic of Cyprus (Greek) are multiparty systems marked by vigorous debate. Elections in both are considered free and fair, yet in the TRNC an electoral law passed in 1989 gives large parties a disproportionate number of seats in parliamen-
The approximately 1,000 Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north may vote in elections in the Greek Cyprus. The TRNC is a presidential-parliamentary system dominated by President Denktash’s ruling National Unity Party (NUP). The popularly elected president serves a five-year term and appoints a prime minister. A unicameral, fifty-member Assembly also sits for five years.

The Republic of Cyprus is governed by a presidential-legislative system. A popularly elected Greek president serves for five years and appoints his own cabinet. A House of Representatives is vested with legislative authority.

All Cypriot workers have the right to strike; in general, strikes are infrequent and of short duration. Most of the labor force is unionized and trade unions in both Greek and Turkish Cyprus are independent and function freely. The Cyprus Turkish Trade Unions Federation (TURK-SEN) and the largely Greek Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK), both affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), carry on a mutually supportive exchange which includes reciprocal visits, joint educational activities and cooperation on union issues. It was announced in 1990 that over 500 retired workers from Turkish Cyprus, who are members of the TURK-SEN but have worked all their lives in the Greek area, are now able to claim their right to retirement. There have been reports that in the north, like the press, unions have sometimes been harassed by the government.

All Cypriots and foreign residents are free to practice their own religion. This includes Sunni Muslim Turks in the republic and Greeks and Christians in the north. Proselytizing is also permitted. Turkish authorities once heavily restricted the entrance into the north by Greek Cypriots and the movement of Turks south, but this has reportedly eased. Greeks living in the north may apply to visit the south, but if they do not return within a specified time, they risk forfeiting their property and their right to return.

Although both governments control radio and television broadcasting, the private printed press is uncensored and critical. Rights of privacy are respected. Fair, public trials are the norm, and there were no reports of indefinite or incommunicado detention. There is no evidence of torture by officials and no suspected disappearances.

Police have been accused of inaction on wife abuse charges. The Republic does not honor refugee claims, saying it is overburdened by Greek Cypriots who have come from the north in the mid-1970s.

Czechoslovakia

Polity: Federal presidential-parliamentary democracy
Political Rights: 2
Economy: Statis transitional
Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 15,700,000
Status: Free
HDI: 0.931 (high/d)
Life Expectancy: 68 male, 75 female
Ethnic groups: Czechs (65 percent), Slovaks (30 percent), Magyars

Overview:

Czechoslovakia in 1990 faced the formidable challenge of transforming its peaceful “velvet revolution,” which in late 1989 ousted the forty-one-year Communist regime, into a democratic system of governance. The Civic
Forum headed by Vaclav Havel, who had been elected president on 29 December 1989, won the free multiparty parliamentary elections in June. But the post-Communist government had to grapple with a number of difficult issues, among them the pace and scope of free-market reforms, growing nationalism in Slovakia, the surprising resilience of the Communists, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Early in the year, the Civic Forum sought to consolidate its power and adopt measures to squeeze out remnants of the former Communist regime. In January, the Federal Assembly adopted a constitutional amendment that enabled it to co-opt members to fill seats vacated by Communist hard-liners. Several former dissidents and members of the formerly banned Charter 77 human rights movement were named as deputies. Prime Minister Marian Calfa formally resigned from the Communist party, leaving the Communists with just 7 members in the 21-member coalition cabinet. The Communists were originally granted 10 places in the "national consensus" government agreed upon in talks between the party and the Civic Forum led by Havel.

On 31 January the Communists lost their parliamentary majority when both houses of the federal parliament—the House of Nations and the House of the People—voted to replace deputies who resigned or were recalled by their parties. The reconstruction introduced 120 new members, 8 of whom were Communists.

In April, three of the country's fifty-odd political parties that sprang up after the fall of the Communist regime agreed to form a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) for the June elections. Josef Bartoncik, chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party (CPP), told a party congress that it would put up a joint list of candidates with the smaller Christian Democratic Party and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement. The CPP, the country's second-largest party after the Communists, would be the senior partner in the alliance. The party, established in 1919, was under Communist control from 1948 until 1989.

By the spring, some slippage began to appear in the popularity of the Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart, the Public Against Violence (PAV), which had served as umbrella organizations for diverse anti-Communist forces. In traditionally Catholic Moravia, which along with Bohemia forms the Czech Republic, the Civic Forum was threatened to be eclipsed by the CPP and the Christian Democratic coalition. Some Civic Forum leaders were criticized for cooperating with the Communists during last year's transition period. Czechs and Slovaks began arguing over the name of the republic, with Slovaks insisting that the new name be Czecho-Slovakia, and the Czechs resisting the hyphen. The official name became the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

A new political landscape was taking shape. On the right, the CDU stepped out of the Civic Forum umbrella. On the left, a decimated Communist party, under new young leaders, still claimed a membership of 1.1 million. The Social Democrats, though badly divided, represented a once respectable pre-war party. Other emerging parties included the Socialists, who played up their links to revered Czech patriots Tomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, Czechoslovakia's first presidents, while playing down their role as an "ally" of the Communists over the past forty years. To complete the spectrum, there were farmers' parties, liberals (some inside Civic Forum), and a Green Party, which had growing support in this ecologically devastated country. Fringe parties included the Beer Lovers' Party and the Independent Erotic Initiative.
In the face of a proliferation of parties and its own flagging support, Civic Forum admitted that it had been a mistake to delay the election and introduce a controversial election law, which replaced the old first-past-the-post system with proportional representation for parties winning at least 5 percent of the vote.

In Slovakia, the PAV also appeared to be losing support. Opinion polls in April showed the group trailing the Christian Democrats, the Greens and the Communists. Demonstrations in Bratislava demanded a separate Slovak state. The PAV announced a coalition with the Hungarian Independent Initiative, representing some of the 600,000 ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia.

The campaign took place in an atmosphere of hope and suspicion, with twenty-three parties strong enough to field candidates. There were fears that the interim political settlement and the Civic Forum’s dominance as a non-party would harden into an established order that could impede the development of democracy.

Under the electoral system for the 300-member bicameral parliament, the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia (10 million people) and Slovakia (5 million) would split the seats in the House of Nations with 75 each, and in the House of the People 101 would be from Czech lands and 49 from Slovakia. Voters would also pick Czech and Slovak national assemblies, with 200 and 150 seats, respectively. Under the system, each voter would cast three ballots: one for each house of the national parliament and a third for the national assembly. Ballots would be cast only for party lists.

Contending in the Czech Republic were the Civic Forum, the CDU, the Movement for Autonomous Democracy in Moravia and Silesia, and the Beer Lovers’ Party. Running in Slovakia were the PAV; the Christian Democratic Movement; the Freedom Party, made up of Christian and Slovak nationalists; the Democratic Party; and Slovak Nationalist Party, the most nationalist group advocating Slovak self-determination.

Two days before the national election, former Communist party chief Milos Jakes, as well as four other former party leaders, were seized for interrogation involving "criminal offenses," including Jakes' role in the Soviet-led invasion of August 1968. The move was seen as an attempt by the Civic Forum to show that it was not soft on former senior Communists.

On 8 June, over 90 percent of eligible voters turned out for the election. The Civic Forum and the PAV captured 170 of the 300 seats in the parliament (87 in the House of the People). The Communists polled 13.6 percent of the vote across the nation, earning 48 seats (24 in the House of the People), making the Party the official opposition. The CDU, which came in fourth in the Czech republic and a distant second in Slovakia, got 40 seats (20 in the House of the People).

"The surprise was the quite big support for the Communists, the partial failure of the Christian Democrats and the huge increase in the percentage of the vote for parties of nationalistic tendencies," said Civic Forum spokesman Petr Kucera at a victory news conference.

The Movement for Autonomous Democracy in Moravia and Silesia got 5.4 percent of the vote and 9 seats in the House of the People, the Slovak National Party 3.5 percent and 6 seats. The Socialists and the Green Party failed to reach the 5 percent minimum necessary to be awarded seats. The Civic Forum fell short of the three-fifths majority needed to make constitutional changes, and announced it would seek to form a broad coalition with
the Christian Democrats and other parties. But the election demoralized and embittered the Christian Democrats, especially in Czech lands.

President Havel named the incumbent prime minister, Marian Calfa, to form Czechoslovakia's first democratically elected government in forty-four years. The absence of the CDU from the talks indicated that it might not be included in the government, despite earlier talk of a broad coalition, but when Parliament opened on 27 June, the CDU had agreed to join the government. The decision was linked to the party's strong representation in the regional Slovak government where it got 8 of 23 ministries, to the PAV's 12. The Civic Forum and the PAV took 9 of 17 cabinet seats.

Václav Havel, who ran unopposed in a secret ballot, was re-elected president by a vote of 234 to 50. Both parliament and President Havel were scheduled to serve initial two-year terms.

In October, Communist party leader Vasil Mohorita, suggested that the Party was prepared to oppose the government's economic reforms. The government announced that it would submit legislation to expropriate property the Communist party had "gained in unjust ways, giving it an advantage over other political parties and movements in contradiction to democratic principles."

The specter of Communist resilience was an issue in the November elections for newly structured local governments. Before the vote, President Havel said that the municipal elections at the end of the month should dismantle the remnants of the former "totalitarian system." Some 56 parties were contesting races, with the Communists fielding candidates in the highest number of districts, 71. The Communists won 24.2 percent, or 660 mayoralties. In the Czech Republic council vote, the Communists finished second with 17.2 percent of the vote, compared to 35.6 for the Civic Forum. In Slovakia, the CDU outpolled the PAV by 27.4 percent to 20.4 percent, the Communists getting 13.6 percent. The ultranationalist parties in Slovakia, including the Slovak National Party, did poorly.

A key issue that threatened to undermine Civic Forum cohesion was the rate and reach of free-market reforms. The debate pitted President Havel, who favored gradual reform that would not cause sudden social destabilization and dislocations, against Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, an aggressive promoter of privatization and a rapid road to a free-market economy.

Following the elections in June, Klaus narrowly survived an attempt by President Havel to dismiss him by playing strongly on his own good showing in the election, his popularity in the opinion polls (second only to President Havel), and the respect accorded to his reforms by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the international financial community.

The Czech economy, though relatively better than others in Eastern Europe, was also the most nationalized, the most closely bound with COMECON (two-fifths of the country's exports) and more dependent on Soviet oil than that of any other Eastern European country except Bulgaria. Moscow's squeeze on the oil pipeline to Czechoslovakia was a further blow to an economy already suffering an increasingly severe slump in important exports of machinery and equipment to the USSR, and President Havel's morally admirable decision to ban arms exports to Third World countries.

Under Klaus, Prague undertook several novel reforms. From April to May, the government went further than any other East European country to break monopolistic conglomerates into smaller units to help create competition. Klaus hoped to remove all price controls by 1 January 1991. Food
subsidies were so large that farmers had used bread as fodder for their animals, and consumers paid only half of what farmers received for milk. Recognizing that Czechoslovaks had little money to buy corporate stock, Mr. Klaus planned to distribute stock-buying vouchers to acquire stock in the companies of the citizen’s choice once state-run enterprises were privatized.

By September there seemed a lack of momentum behind laws designed to help foreign investors. Would-be entrepreneurs and foreign investors were unhappy that the government appeared to be dragging its feet in implementing laws on private enterprise. The voucher idea for citizens to buy state companies came under attack as inflationary, not offering enough return for investors, and unmanageable. Similar confusion surrounded the formation of joint-stock companies and joint ventures with foreign partners. In October, Klaus’s election as head of the Civic Forum put him in a position to marginalize the left wing of the movement and push forward radical reforms which Prime Minister Calfa was reluctant to support. At the end of the year, the rift over future economic policy appeared to widen, and the drive for economic reform had slowed.

In August, tens of thousands of Slovaks demanding an independent state demonstrated at a rally. In addition to demanding greater language rights, Slovak nationalists also raised uneasy feelings and outrage in the Czech Republic by bringing into the open revisionist views of Slovakia’s history from 1939 to 1945, when Hitler created an “independent” state under Roman Catholic Msgr. Jozef Tiso as president. Commemorations in 1990 of Msgr. Tiso as a “hero of the Slovak nation” embarrassed the government. In September, the republics announced sweeping plans that would relieve the federal government of some authority and allow them to draw up their own constitutions. Responsibility for key areas such as energy and metallurgy was to be devolved to the republics.

Another key issue was the withdrawal of the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. Talks with the Soviets began in January, with the Czechs demanding a total pullout by the end of 1990. On 7 February, Moscow told Prague at a second round of talks held in the Soviet capital that it needed more time to pull out its troops. But after a Moscow meeting later in the month, Soviet leader Gorbachev and President Havel agreed that all Soviet troops would be out by 1 July 1991. The first 18,500 troops, along with 1,200 tanks, began leaving on 24 February. By late August, half the Soviet troops had pulled out.

Citizens of Czechoslovakia have the democratic means to change their government under a multiparty system. In April, Interior Minister Richard Sacher was criticized by his own deputies for not getting rid of former secret policemen in his office. In May, investigators were told to step up the complicated task of identifying and ferreting out the secret police and web of informants who terrorized people under the Communist regime. Two cabinet ministers—the minister of information and the minister of agriculture—resigned after it was discovered they had links to the secret police. The same month, more than 1,000 officers of the secret police were fired. The Havel government, many of whose members were former political prisoners, also sought to improve prison conditions. In January, President Havel amnestied about two-thirds of all Czech prisoners. Overtly political statutes such as offenses for criticism of the state and unauthorized attempts to leave the country were removed from the legal codes. Citizens are free to criticize the
government. Freedom of association and assembly is respected. The independent press is free from government interference and newspapers represent diverse viewpoints. Previously banned books are openly available and legal.

In April Pope John Paul II visited the country to find a revitalized Catholic church. Between January and April, all the thirteen bishoprics, some of which had stood vacant for thirty years, had been filled. Two new seminaries opened in the fall. The Protestant church in the Czech Republic was also revitalized. State-run radio resumed religious broadcasts. Freedom of religion is respected by the state. In June, the parliament voted to allow the church and other private institutions to run their own schools, a move that broke the state's forty-year monopoly on education. There are no restrictions on domestic or foreign travel. Workers are organized in the independent Czechoslovak Confederation of Trade Unions (CCTU), which took over the building that formerly housed the Soviet-backed Communist world labor federation, the World Federation of Trade Unions. In Slovakia, the Independent Slovak Unions (NSO) was organized in March, representing 2.5 million of the nation's 6 million trade union members.

**Denmark**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Mixed capitalist  
**Population:** 5,100,000  
**HDI:** 0.971 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 72 male, 78 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Overwhelmingly Danish, a small German minority, various small immigrant groups

**Overview:**

The Danish economy and changing attitudes towards the European Community were major developments in 1990.

Conservative Prime Minister Poul Schluter has proposed tax reform and spending cuts, but the parties in his center-right coalition have not reached agreement about the details of his plan. Schluter has headed a series of such governments since 1982. The country faces both a big current accounts deficit and growing unemployment. There is a growing consensus in Denmark to solve its economic problems within the European Community. Even the formerly hostile Social Democrats support the Community, albeit with criticisms of the Brussels bureaucracy.

A constitutional monarchy since 1849, Denmark has a well-established system of parliamentary democracy. The largely ceremonial head of state is Queen Margrethe the II, who appoints the head of government from the party or coalition commanding the broadest parliamentary support. The country's unicameral parliament, the Folketing, has 179 members, of whom 135 are elected in 17 districts. Forty additional seats are allocated to parties that receive at least 2 percent of the vote, in order to bring the results more into line with proportional representation. There are also two representatives each for the related territories of Greenland and the Faeroe Islands.

The most recent elections (May 1988) yielded a minority coalition government consisting of the Conservative People's Party, the Liberal Party and the Radical Liberal Party. Opposition parties in the Folketing include the Social Democratic Party, the left-wing Socialist People's Party, the right-wing Progress Party, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party. There
Cou/Ury reports

are several other Danish parties, but none has parliamentary representation. The Social Democrats, the largest opposition party, have moved to an explicit acceptance of a market economy moderated by welfare measures and co-operative enterprises. Denmark’s anti-nuclear weapons policies caused tensions within NATO in the 1980s. Schlueter called the 1988 election on the defense issue, but did not win enough support for tougher defense policies.

Danes have the right to change their government by democratic means. They also have the right to settle issues (e.g. membership in the European Community in 1986) through national referendums. Denmark has granted home rule to Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. Any citizen who feels mistreated by the national government or local authorities has the right to protest to the ombudsman, an independent watchdog appointed by the Folketing. There is freedom of expression and no censorship. Newspapers are private, but radio and television belong to a public corporation.

There is freedom of political association for groups ranging from left to right, including pro-Albanian Communists and supporters of the nineteenth-century American economist, Henry George. Unions and management recognized each other’s right to organize in 1960. The overwhelming majority of workers are union members. Religion is free, but churches are state-subsidized. Although the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the established denomination, religious discrimination is prohibited by law. While the current cabinet is attempting to scale down government programs, the state retains a major role in the country’s mixed economy. There are some tensions between Danes and recent immigrants from Asia. A small German minority lives near the Danish-German border.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Djibouti

**Polity:** One-party  
**Political Rights:** 6  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Population:** 400,000  
**Status:** Not Free  
**HDI:** 0.073 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 47 combined  
**Ethnic Groups:** Somali, Afar

**Overview:**

In 1990, President Hassan Oouled, whose Popular Rally for Progress (RPP) has ruled this east African republic since 1977, reportedly faced the prospect of armed opposition by some disgruntled Djibouti tribes after an explosion in a cafe killed several people. However, by year’s end, the bombing appeared to be an isolated incident, and not a serious threat to the regime.

The sixteen-member cabinet was reshuffled in late November. The government also condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

In 1977, Gouled, a member of the Somali-oriented Issa, the single largest tribe, was indirectly elected president by the Chamber of Deputies and has been twice reelected by direct vote. Although Gouled has consistently named a member of the rival Afar tribe as prime minister, Issas control the ruling party, the army, and the bureaucracy. The constitution allows the president to serve two terms only, but Gouled stood for election in 1987 because he had been first elected indirectly.

In 1981, Afars, disturbed that Gouled ran unopposed, formed the Djibouti
People Party (PPD). Shortly after, party leaders were arrested and a National Mobilization law approved a one-party system. Since then, all candidates have been RPP members, with citizens voting for or against the approved candidate in parliamentary and presidential elections.

In 1987 a former Gouled associate and RPP member, Robleh Awaleh, created the National Djibouti Movement for the Installation of Democracy (MNDID). In 1990, the MNDID joined with another Afar-led underground opposition group, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Djibouti, to form the Democratic Union. A French garrison of military and naval personnel in Djibouti serves to protect the nation from external aggression.

Citizens do not have the means to change their government democratically. Freedom of speech and the press is severely constrained. There is no secret ballot and citizens must cast votes in "for" and "against" boxes in open-air. All media are government-controlled; there is no reported criticism of the regime, the RPP, or government policies. Journalists are considered civil servants. Public demonstrations require prior authorization; violators face imprisonment if they fail to obtain previous permission. Cultural and commercial associations are allowed. Political dissidents are usually detained without charge beyond the legal limits. In 1989 the torture and cruel interrogation of Somali refugees and others were reported, and one Afar died in custody.

Djibouti is predominantly Sunni Muslim, but Islam is not the official religion. There is no official pressure to abide by Muslim diet and dress regulations. Expatriates worship freely. Freedom of travel inside and outside the country is respected, except for trips to South Africa or Israel. The country has a large refugee population, but the authorities do not recognize as refugees Somalis fleeing the civil war in their country and have forcibly repatriated many of them. In political cases, the judiciary is not independent. Decisions by the State Security Court may not be appealed. There are few unions and few strikes. All unions must belong to a government-controlled labor federation.

**Dominica**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 100,000

**HDI:** 0.906 (high)

**Life expectancy:** 57 male, 59 female

**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous with a minority Carib enclave

**Overview:**

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, the first woman to head a government in the English-speaking Caribbean, narrowly won a third term in general elections held on 28 May 1990. Although opinion polls had pointed to an easy victory, the ruling Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) won in just eleven of the twenty-one constituencies.

The Commonwealth of Dominica has been an independent republic within the British Commonwealth since 1978. It became internally self-governing in 1967. Dominica is a parliamentary democracy headed by a prime minister and a House of Assembly with twenty-one members elected to five-year terms. Nine senators are usually appointed, five by the prime minister and four by the leader of the opposition in the House.
Prime Minister Eugenia Charles has been in office since 1980 when her right-of-center Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) won seventeen seats in the House. In the 1985 elections, the DFP took fifteen seats, with the leftist Dominica Labor Party (DLP), a coalition of three opposition parties, taking five seats. The DFP upped its majority to sixteen in a 1986 by-election, and to seventeen in 1987 when a DLP representative crossed the aisle to join the DFP.

In the late 1980s, there was controversy over municipal elections. Elections for the city council of Roseau, the capital of the country, were postponed for a year at the end of 1988, the prime minister stating that polling would interfere with ongoing sanitation and environmental projects. Opposition parties denounced the move as political and accused Charles of authoritarian behavior. There were also charges by the opposition of DFP gerrymandering in the 1987 municipal elections in Portsmouth, the other town governed locally by a city council.

The 1990 general election campaign centered on economic and development issues, with Charles giving priority to road construction and a new international airport able to accommodate commercial jet aircraft. Opposition parties, including the two-year-old United Workers Party (UWP) which was contesting its first election, made age an issue, contending that Charles, seventy-one, should step aside. The UWP also charged the ruling party with using government-owned media to its advantage, and came out against the use of U.S. military personnel in the construction of the proposed airport.

Attempts by the UWP and the DLP to reach an electoral coalition were unsuccessful. Some local observers believed that had they combined forces, Charles might have been defeated, given the fact that her DFP garnered but a one-seat majority against a divided opposition. The centrist, business-oriented UWP, led by Eddison James, former head of the Banana Growers Association, took second with six seats and replaced the DLP, which came third with four seats, as the official opposition.

There are no restrictions on the right to organize political, labor or civic organizations, and freedom of religion is recognized. A fourth political party, the small Dominica Progressive Party (DPP), was formed in early 1990, but was out of the running in the May elections, fielding candidates in only five of the twenty-one constituencies.

The press is generally free, varied and critical. Television and radio, both public and private, are open to views from across the political spectrum. Opposition political parties have charged that the board appointed to oversee state-run media is manipulated by the government. Nonetheless, in 1990, television was used for the first time as an effective campaign tool by all parties, particularly the UWP.

There is an independent judiciary and the effectiveness of the rule of law is enhanced by the court system's embrace of the inter-island Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. There are no political prisoners. The government has criticized the attendance of citizens at conferences in Cuba and Libya, but does not restrict travel to those countries.

The Dominica Defense Force (DDF) was disbanded in 1981 following attempts to overthrow the government by supporters of former Prime Minister Patrick John with the assistance of the DDF. John subsequently won a seat in the House in the 1985 election, but was forced to resign in 1986 following conviction for involvement in the 1981 coup attempt, leading to the 1986 by-election. John was given a twelve-year prison sentence, but was released by executive order in May 1990.
President Joaquin Balaguer narrowly defeated arch rival Juan Bosch in the hotly contested 16 May 1990 general elections. However, after being sworn in for a sixth term, the aging, near-blind Balaguer found himself in the weakest political position of his career. Besieged by labor strikes and a worsening economic crisis, and with Bosch refusing to accept the disputed results of the vote, Balaguer hinted in the fall of 1990 that he might step down.

Since achieving independence from Spain in 1821 and Haiti in 1844, the Dominican Republic has endured recurrent domestic conflict. The assassination of Gen. Rafael Trujillo in 1961 ended thirty years of dictatorial rule but led to renewed turmoil. The military overthrow of the elected government of Marxist Juan Bosch in 1963 led to civil war and U.S.-Organization of American States military intervention in 1965. A truce was imposed and in 1966, under a new constitution, civilian rule was restored with the election of Joaquin Balaguer of the right-of-center Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC).

The 1966 constitution provides for a president directly elected for four years and a Congress consisting of a 120-member Chamber of Deputies and a 30-member Senate also directly elected for four years. The Senate elects the judges of the Supreme Court. The governors of the twenty-six provinces are appointed by the president. Municipalities are governed by elected mayors and municipal councils.

Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and 1974 but defeated in 1978 by Silvestre Antonio Guzman of the social democratic Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). Guzman’s inauguration marked the first time in the country’s history that a democratically elected president had transferred power to an elected successor. The PRD repeated in 1982 with the election of President Salvador Jorge Blanco, but Balaguer was elected again in 1986, as the PRD was stricken with factional strife.

The campaign for the 16 May 1990 general election, the country’s seventh in a row, was well underway before the eighty-three-year-old Balaguer officially announced for reelection in late February. The eighty-year-old Juan Bosch, having moved his left-wing Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) in a more moderate direction, emerged as the main challenger in a battle of the doyens of Dominican politics. The other major candidates were the PRD’s Jose Pena Gomez, and Jacobo Majluta, who had formerly split from the PRD to form the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Four minority-party candidates also competed.

The main issues in the campaign were the country’s strapped economy, poverty and unemployment, government corruption, and the increasingly violent climate in the country. Although marred by sporadic violence resulting in a number of deaths and numerous injuries, the campaign was one of the most wide-open and democratic in the nation’s history.

Under the observation of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and other
international observers, voters turned out on 16 May to cast ballots for president, as well as legislative and municipal candidates. The abstention rate of 40 percent was the highest since the establishment of democratic rule. The initial count gave Balaguer a razor-thin edge over Bosch, with Pena Gomez making a strong showing in third. A potentially explosive situation developed when the two leading candidates claimed victory, with Bosch charging fraud and threatening to send his followers into the streets. With Carter mediating, however, both front-runners agreed to await a recount by the Central Electoral Council in the presence of international observers.

The recount was not completed until June, and Balaguer, with 35.1 percent of the vote against 33.8 percent for Bosch, was not officially declared the winner until 13 July. Balaguer's PRSC, however, lost its legislative majority. In the Chamber of Deputies, Bosch's PLD took 44 seats, the PRSC took 42, the PRD 32, the PRI two. In the Senate, the PRSC obtained 16 seats, the PLD took 12, and the PRD 12.

Balaguer avoided another general strike in September by agreeing to dilute substantially his economic restructuring programming. Bosch, however, stood on his demand that Balaguer resign and convene new elections. After the Catholic church expressed concern that Balaguer had lost the authority to deal with the nation's economic crisis, the president hinted that he might step down in favor of his vice-president, Carlos Morales Troncoso.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic groups are generally respected. However, political expression is often restricted by an atmosphere of violence associated with political campaigns and government-labor clashes, and by the repressive measures taken by security forces and the military. The activities of small leftist parties including the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), which was legalized in 1977, are occasionally curbed.

Labor and peasant unions are well organized. While legally permitted to strike, they are often subject to government restraints and repression. Labor has become more militant with the deterioration of the economy and public utilities in recent years, and the government has increasingly responded with force to break up labor actions. General strikes called by the unions in 1989 and 1990 were repressed by the military, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries.

The government has also come under harsh criticism from international bodies and human rights organizations for the harsh treatment of Haitians forcibly recruited to work on state-run sugar plantations. The Balaguer administration has denied the allegations despite damning evidence. In October 1990, for the second time, the government refused to allow an investigation of the situation by the International Labor Organization.

Human rights groups are independent and active. In 1990, these groups reported a number of disappearances, as well as an increase in allegations of police brutality and arbitrary arrests by the security forces.

The press, radio and television are mostly privately owned. Newspapers are independent and diverse but occasionally subject to government pressure through denial of advertising revenues. There are dozens of radio stations and at least six commercial television stations, but broadcasts are subject to government review. In September 1989 the Supreme Court ruled that the licensing of journalists was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court, whose members are elected by the Senate, operates
in a generally independent manner. The court appoints lower court judges and is also empowered to participate in the legislative process by introducing bills in the Congress.

Ecuador

| Polity: Presidential-legislative democracy | Political Rights: 2 |
| Economy: Capitalist-statist | Civil Liberties: 2 |
| Population: 10,700,000 | Status: Free |
| HDI: 0.758 (medium) |
| Life Expectancy: 62 male, 66 female |
| Ethnic Groups: Complex, Indian (approximately 25 percent), mestizo (55 percent), Caucasian (10 percent), and black (10 percent) |

Overview:

In the mid-term legislative elections held in June 1990, the social democratic government of President Rodrigo Boija lost its narrow legislative majority. In the ensuing months, disparate opposition parties combined forces in an attempt to throttle the government by targeting cabinet officials and Supreme Court judges for removal. By the fall, however, Borja appeared to retake the advantage when a number of parties shifted their allegiance back to the government.

The Republic of Ecuador was established in 1830 after achieving independence from Spain in 1822. The nation's history has been marked by interrupted presidencies and periods of military rule. The most recent military government paved the way for a return to civilian rule with a new democratic constitution approved by referendum in 1978.

The 1978 constitution provides for a president elected for a four-year term by universal adult suffrage. If no candidate wins a majority in the first round of voting, the two top finishers compete in a second round. There is a seventy-two-member unicameral National Chamber of Deputies with fifty-nine members elected on a provincial basis every two years, and twelve elected on a national basis every four years.

In the January 1988 general election, the candidate of the ruling, right-of-center Social Christian Party (PSC) ran a poor third to Rodrigo Borja of the social democratic Democratic Left (ID), and Abdala Bucaram of the populist Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE). Borja defeated Bucaram in the May runoff and was inaugurated in August 1988, succeeding President Leon Febres Cordero of the PSC. Febres' term had been marked by clashes between the executive and legislative branches over Supreme Court nominations and other constitutional issues, as well as two abortive rebellions by nationalist military officers. Borja became the third democratically elected president since the return to civilian rule in 1979.

Borja took office with majority support in the Chamber thanks to a governing alliance with the Christian democratic Popular Democracy (DP); Borja's ID had won thirty-one seats in January and the DP eight. The other seats were divided among nine other parties, a number of which supported Borja's candidacy but later joined the divided opposition.

In late 1989 and through the first half of 1990, there were strains in ID-DP alliance and Boija was hard-pressed to maintain a parliamentary majority. However, the ID and DP seemed compelled to maintain the alliance in response to increased cooperation between right-wing and populist parties, particularly in coastal Guayaquil, the country's largest city and traditional base of right-wing political forces. Borja's presidency has also been marked
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by mounting labor pressure against the government’s economic policy. The major unions, led by the United Workers Front (FUT), backed Borja’s candidacy in 1988, but have since carried out series of strikes against his government’s economic austerity measures.

In the 17 June 1990 legislative elections, Borja’s ID lost over half of its seats, leaving it with fourteen. A resurgent PSC ended up with sixteen seats, the PRE finished with thirteen, and the DP retained its eight. The surprise was the strong showing of the Marxist Socialist Party (PS), which doubled its previous representation to eight seats.

In the ensuing legislative session, the PSC, PRE, PS and a number of smaller parties ganged up on the government, using a narrow parliamentary majority to impeach two cabinet ministers. They then attempted to replace the entire Supreme Court two years before the end of its term. But the tide appeared to turn when the sixteen judges declared the legislative maneuver unconstitutional. Soon after, a number of legislators who had backed the anti-government maneuvers switched their support, leaving Borja again with a slim, unstable majority. Given the fragmented nature of the country’s political spectrum, it is likely that institutional confrontations will remain a staple of government activity for the foreseeable future.

In spring 1989, the Borja government reached an agreement “to restore peace and consolidate democracy” with the Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) guerrilla group. The left-wing AVC had been active against the Febres government, but had renounced military tactics in early 1989. Despite continued negotiations, by the fall of 1990 a definitive peace agreement had not yet been reached.

However, the Borja government appeared more concerned with the unprecedented political aggressiveness demonstrated in 1990 by the nation’s indigenous groups, which account for an estimated 30-40 percent of the population. The non-Indian population was stunned when the National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador mobilized more than a million people across the country on 4 June. The confederation’s demands—land grants and special sovereignty to Indians, including oil and mineral rights—were rejected by the government amid fears of an outbreak of violence.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are generally respected. Nearly two dozen political parties occupy the political spectrum from radical right to radical left and are highly competitive.

Labor unions are well organized and permitted to strike. By fall 1990, there had been three general strikes led by the Marxist-dominated United Workers Front (FUT), the country’s largest labor federation, since the Borja government came to office. The labor actions were against the gradualist economic adjustment program introduced by the Borja government in early 1989.

Newspapers, including at least six dailies, are privately owned or sponsored by political parties. They are free of censorship and generally outspoken. Radio and television are privately owned and supervised by two independent associations. There are nearly a dozen television stations, most of which are commercial.

Under the 1978 constitution, the judiciary is independent, headed by a Supreme Court appointed by the legislature. During both the Febres and Borja administrations, however, the Court has been caught in a tug-of-war between the executive and legislative branches. Under Borja, questions of
judicial impartiality remain, particularly on issues involving party nominations and allegations of government corruption. The Supreme Court supervises the superior courts which in turn supervise the lower court system.

Independent human rights organizations operate freely and there have been occasional allegations of police brutality and torture by security forces. Such allegations appeared to diminish after the AVC renounced armed activities in spring 1989. There are no political prisoners.

**Egypt**

**Polity:** Dominant party (military dominated)
**Economy:** Mixed statist
**Population:** 54,700,000
**HDI:** 0.501 (medium)
**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 60 female
**Ethnic groups:** Eastern Hamitic (90 percent), Greek, Syro-Lebanese

**Political Rights:** 5
**Civil Liberties:** 4

**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

The issues which dominated the Egyptian political scene in 1990 were the Persian gulf crisis and a national legislative election. President Hosni Mubarak became the leading Arab supporter of the United States policy against the August Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and skillfully marshalled an Arab front to oppose Saddam Hussein. Mubarak took a diplomatic lead in convening an Arab summit, gaining support for sanctions against Iraq, and committing the deployment of Arab forces in Saudi Arabia, thereby putting an "Arab face" on the coalition against Iraq.

Popular opinion at home in support of Egypt's stand against Saddam Hussein was initially strong and was reinforced by hostility created by reports of Iraq's treatment of some 2 million Egyptian workers who had traveled to Iraq and Kuwait in the 1980s. However, support for Mubarak's gulf policy may be diminished by the increasing wariness some Egyptian officials and citizens feel about the large Western military presence in the Saudi desert.

Ostensibly a multi-party parliamentary democracy, Egypt remains dominated by President Mubarak and his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which controls both houses of parliament. Since the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy, real power has been exercised by the ruling elite with strong roots to the military. The traditional role of the People's Assembly, Egypt's national legislative assembly, for which elections were held on 29 November 1990, has been to approve the policies of the president.

President Mubarak is both head of state and chairman of the NDP. Elected not by direct popular vote but by a two-thirds majority vote of the People's Assembly, the president is also commander-in-chief and is empowered to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and other cabinet ministers. Although Mr. Mubarak has been prudently cultivating a multi-party system and has in fact made Egypt one of the more open societies in the Arab world, liberalization has been cautious. Since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the country has been run under a set of emergency laws that allow wide powers to the police. Despite constitutional guarantees of pluralism, freedom of political association is limited, and the state-owned media do not allow the full expression of diverse political views.

The ruling NDP maintained its dominant position in parliament after the People's Assembly election, and boycotted by Egypt's strongest opposition groups. Only 25 percent of the population voted due to widespread belief...
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that the election was rigged. The NDP won three-fourths of the 444 seats. The remainder went to independents, some of whom were NDP supporters or opposition members straying from the boycott.

The election was called after Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral law which governed the 1987 election of the People’s Assembly was unconstitutional. To pave the way for the November election, a national referendum, in which 58.56 percent of eligible voters cast ballots, was held on 11 October to endorse the president’s dissolution of the existing legislature.

In a landmark decision, the Court ruled that the 1986 law discriminated against independent candidates. A new law was then issued which eliminated party lists, increased the constituencies to 222, reduced the number of seats from 458 to 454, and allowed candidates to run as independents.

The election was boycotted by Egypt’s strongest opposition groups—the New Wafd, the Socialist Labor Party, the Liberal Party and the illegal but tolerated Muslim Brotherhood—on the grounds that it was tainted by electoral fraud and continued restrictions on campaigning by opposition candidates. Together, these four groups received 27.9 percent of the vote in the 1987 election of the People’s Assembly. Human rights activists confirm opposition reports of electoral fraud, a long-time practice in Egypt. In Egypt, where half the population is illiterate, making radio and television the major source of news, the state-owned radio and television provide disproportionate coverage of the ruling party candidates. The opposition demands, in addition to improvements in the electoral process, the abolition of the emergency laws in effect since 1981, which have resulted in thousands of arbitrary arrests. The opposition also presses for constitutional reform that would transfer more power from the executive to the legislative branch.

The New Wafd party, which held 35 of the 458 seats of the last parliament, was outnumbered by the tripartite alliance between the Labor and Liberal Parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, a moderate Islamist group that rejects the use of violence to make Egypt an Islamic state. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is banned, due to provisions in Egyptian law which prohibit religious parties, it has participated in two successive elections under the banner of legal parties, and many observers contend that it is the largest opposition force in the country.

The November elections took place amidst continuing social and economic problems. Throughout 1990, violent sectarian confrontations occurred periodically between Copts and Muslims in Upper Egypt and tension and violent clashes continued between security forces and Islamic extremists. The assassination on 12 October 1990 of Dr. Rifat Al Mahgoub, the speaker of the Peoples Assembly, led to increased internal security and widespread arrests of alleged Islamic militants.

The Gulf crisis exacerbated Egypt’s persistent poverty, debt and inflation. Like many Third World countries, Egypt looks to the International Monetary Fund to help resolve its foreign debt, which is more than $50 billion. Egyptian officials fear that the cuts in subsidies required by IMF agreements may lead to disastrous results, such as the food riots of 1977.

Various restrictions on political activities call into question the ability of citizens to change their government through democratic means. Electoral fraud orchestrated by ruling party officials remains a common practice in Egypt. Though Egypt is theoretically a multi-party democracy, there are significant limitations on freedom of political association; under the emer-

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:
ergency law in effect since 1981, the government has limited the constitutionally guaranteed right of assembly. There have been several cases of persons detained for their political activities.

All prospective political parties are required by law to apply for legal status to a committee dominated by ruling NDP appointees. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists and the Nasirites continue to be denied legal status as political parties. Members of these groups are forbidden to run for office under their party affiliations. Theoretically a parliamentary system, Egypt is presidentially dominated, with the NDP-dominated parliament serving as a rubber stamp for executive policies.

The Egyptian press is relatively free. Both legal and illegal opposition groups are allowed to publish views critical of the regime in their own periodicals with little government interference. Egyptian radio and television, owned and controlled by the state, are also lively compared to mass media in other Arab countries, yet fail to present fully the diverse political views that exist in Egypt and, during political campaigns, provide disproportionately wide coverage of ruling party candidates.

Egyptian workers have the right to organize and join local labor committees linked with national trade unions, which are required to affiliate with Egypt's single labor federation, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), dominated by the ruling NDP. Critics maintain that requiring trade unions to join a single federation violates workers' right of freedom of association. The labor law provides for a system of arbitration to resolve disputes about wages and working conditions. The Criminal Code provides penalties of up to two years imprisonment for those who strike, and more severe punishments for those who incite others to strike. Collective bargaining is allowed in the private sector, but not in the public sector, which employs the most union members.

Islam, Christianity and Judaism are Egypt's recognized religions. Egypt guarantees freedom of religious expression, but conversion from Islam is discouraged by the government, and Christian missionaries who proselytize Muslim Egyptians may be prosecuted. Sectarian violence between Coptic Christians and Muslim extremists erupted periodically in 1990. Persons suspected of involvement in militant Islamic activities are routinely and arbitrarily detained by security forces.

The Egyptian judiciary, which has four types of regular courts, and two types of special courts (the Court of Ethics and State Security Courts), is relatively independent of the executive branch of government. Though State Security Courts are less independent because their decisions may be challenged by the executive, procedural safeguards (such as the right to legal counsel) exist to protect the rights of the accused. The Court of Ethics and its investigating agency, the Office of the Socialist Prosecutor, have been criticized as potentially dangerous to the judicial system.

The emergency legislation that allows administrative detention without charge or trial has led to thousands of arbitrary arrests. Human rights groups charge that brutality and torture are commonly practiced "as a matter of policy" against detainees in Egyptian prisons and detention centers. Although they are denied official recognition by the government, human rights groups in Egypt, such as the Egyptian chapter of the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), continue to actively promote respect for human rights in Egypt. However, members of the AOHR have been denied access to prison facilities and prevented from meeting with prisoners.
El Salvador

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy (military influenced)

**Political Rights:** 3

**Civil Liberties:** 4

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Status:** Partly Free

**Population:** 5,300,000

**HDI:** 0.651 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 63 male, 67 female

**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous with small Indian minority

**Overview:**

Despite six rounds of U.N.-mediated negotiations between the conservative government of President Alfredo Cristiani and left-wing guerrillas in 1990, there appeared little prospect of achieving a ceasefire in the decade-long conflict before the March 1991 legislative elections. Although both sides reiterated their commitment to a negotiated solution to the war, by the end of 1990, extremists seemed to be getting the upper hand, threatening to polarize the country yet again.

El Salvador declared independence from the Captaincy General of Guatemala in 1841, and the Republic of El Salvador was established in 1859. Decades of turbulence and military rule followed. A new constitution in 1962 became the instrument for a succession of unfairly elected military presidents. Increased repression of political opponents led to escalating conflict between right- and left-wing groups.

The 1979 coup by reformist military officers was the first breach in the historical ruling alliance between the military and the landed oligarchy. The new ruling junta included democratic political leaders, and attempted to institute a partial democratic opening. However, the new alignment led to polarization and civil war between the Marxist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), and the military and right-wing forces.

Despite the conflict, a majority of Salvadorans turned out for the election of a constituent assembly in 1982. A democratic constitution was drafted in 1983, and Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected president in a relatively free election in 1984. The 1983 constitution provides for a president and vice-president elected by direct popular vote for five-year terms, and a unicameral, sixty-member National Assembly elected for a three-year term. Municipal elections are held every three years. The country's fourteen departments are administered by governors appointed by the executive.

Although talks in 1984 between the Duarte administration and the FMLN failed to end the war, Duarte's Christian Democratic party (PDC) defeated the right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) in the 1985 legislative and municipal elections. ARENA was founded in 1981 by Roberto d'Aubuisson, a cashiered army officer linked to right-wing death squads who lost the 1984 presidential election to Duarte.

After being marginalized by three democratic elections in four years, the FMLN turned to bombings, civilian assassinations and attacks on the country's economic infrastructure. In response, the military again resorted to repression at the expense of the civilian population. But the FMLN's failure to disrupt the democratic system was manifest in 1987 when the leadership of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), exiled political leaders allied with the FMLN since 1980, accepted Duarte's invitation to return to El Salvador. In 1988, the FDR combined with a small social democratic party to form the Democratic Convergence (CD).

The weakening of the extreme right was evident in the emergence of a
more moderate ARENA leadership. Businessman Alfredo Cristiani replaced d'Aubuisson as ARENA’s president in 1986. He initiated a process of internal party democratization and led the party to victories in the 1988 legislative and municipal elections.

The campaign for the 19 March 1989 election was hotly contested in rallies and in the media. The electorate was offered the widest array of choices in the country's history as eight parties, ranging from left to right, nominated candidates. The main contenders were ARENA’s Cristiani, the PDC’s Fidel Chavez Mena, and the CD’s Guillermo Ungo. The FMLN mounted a renewed campaign of terror and sabotage, threatening to kill all of the nation’s 262 elected mayors unless they resigned. Eight were killed, along with one provincial governor, and over 100 resigned.

The election, overseen by an independent electoral commission, took place on 19 March despite FMLN attempts to disrupt it. Voting took place in over 90 percent of the country and the military was generally unobtrusive. With 54 percent of the vote, Cristiani won a first round victory over Chavez Mena who obtained 36 percent Guillermo Ungo, who later acknowledged that his candidacy was badly damaged by the FMLN’s election week offensive, came in fourth with less than 4 percent.

President Cristiani was inaugurated on 1 June 1989 and offered to negotiate a ceasefire and the FMLN’s integration into the political system. The FMLN finally agreed to negotiate in the fall, but after talks stalled amid mutual recriminations it mounted its largest offensive in nine years in November. During the month-long assault six Jesuit priests were murdered, evidently by members of the army.

The November 1989 offensive proved the FMLN remained a potent military force but lacked the popular support to overthrow the government. It also proved that the government could not end the war, a requirement for reactivating the economy, through military means. Confronting a deteriorating stalemate, both sides agreed in April 1990 to U.N.-mediated negotiations to end the war. By October, however, after six rounds of talks, little was accomplished. The government offered a number of political and military reforms and the promise of further discussion in exchange for a ceasefire. The FMLN, however, while remaining on the offensive throughout the talks, demanded the armed forces be completely dismantled prior to a ceasefire.

Throughout the talks, both sides watched Washington. The U.S. supplies approximately $1 million per day in economic and military assistance. However, because of the Cristiani government’s failure to make progress on bringing the killers of the Jesuits to justice, and the apparent cover-up by the military in the case, the U.S. Congress in October cut military aid to El Salvador by 50 percent for 1991. Those in favor of the cut believed it was necessary to pressure the military toward a negotiated solution. Those who opposed reducing aid believed it would undermine further the Cristiani government’s weak authority over the military, and also boost FMLN confidence in the armed option.

By November, in fact, the FMLN appeared to be mobilizing for a new offensive. The aid cut also strengthened the position of hard-liners in ARENA and the military who wanted to dispense with U.S. human rights concerns and unleash a nationwide crackdown. With radicals on both the left and right in the ascendency, prospects for a negotiated solution diminished, as did the likelihood of achieving a ceasefire before the March 1991 legislative and municipal elections.
The constitution guarantees free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, civic groups and labor unions. However, political expression and civil liberties are restricted by the terrorist activities of the FMLN guerrillas and right-wing death squads, and by repressive measures of the military and security forces against left-wing political parties, and labor, peasant, university and human rights organizations.

Political space has widened significantly since the lifting of the state of emergency (temporarily reinstated for four months after the November 1989 offensive), and the administration of an amnesty in 1987. The return of political allies of the FMLN to run in the 1989 election presented the electorate with the widest choice and most open campaign in the country's history. There are currently eight legal political parties ranging from social democratic on the left to conservative on the right. Five other parties lost their official status for failing to obtain 0.5 percent of the vote in 1989. However, they are allowed to function and were free to reapply for the 1991 legislative and municipal elections. Also allowed to operate is the National Democratic Union (UDN). The UDN is associated with the Communist Party of El Salvador, a member of the FMLN, but its leaders were permitted to return from exile in late 1988 and open an office.

The wider political space is reflected in the press, radio and television. Most media are in private hands, but the limited, rightist perspective has opened considerably. The 1989 campaign featured televised interviews with all candidates and unprecedented debates between left- and right-wing politicians. All parties and opinion poll results were given extensive news coverage, as were both sides in the on-and-off negotiations between the government and the FMLN. New publications appeared, including a centrist daily newspaper and a number of union and political party organs. Leftist literature is freely published by university presses and mass organizations. However, the media continue to be targets of political violence. Several journalists, both domestic and international, were killed in 1989 and 1990, and many others remain subject to intimidation by the military and security forces.

The limits of political space, however, remain marked by murder at both ends of the political spectrum, although at considerably reduced rates. Political killings committed by the military and right-wing death squads reached 800 per month in 1980-82. According to Tutela Legal, the Catholic church's human rights office, the rate had dropped to 8 per month in 1987. The rate rose incrementally in 1988 and 1989. However, there was a sharp increase in 1990 in the wake of the big FMLN offensive. In the first half of 1990, rights monitors attributed more than five dozen killings to the military and death squads. There was also a sharp increase in reports of torture of detainees in the custody of the police and the military.

Assassinations by the FMLN, according to Tutela Legal, rose from 33 in 1987 to 41 in 1988. Civilian deaths caused by land mines of unknown origin, but widely used by the FMLN, rose from 29 in 1987 to 65 in 1988. In September 1989, the FMLN vowed to discontinue using land mines. The FMLN's systematic use of urban car bombs beginning in November 1988 resulted in the death of at least five civilians by 1990. While both the military and the guerrillas have killed suspected collaborators, FMLN summary executions remained the stated policy of the guerrilla high command until mid-1990.

Prominent figures killed by the FMLN between 1988 and 1990 include nine mayors, one provincial governor, four conservative intellectuals, the attorney general and a cabinet minister in the Cristiani administration. The
FMLN also has been implicated in the killing of the wife of a right-wing journalist and the daughter of a ranking military officer, as well as in a series of attacks against homes and families of ranking military officers. In October 1990, the FMLN assassinated an ARENA National Assembly deputy.

During the Duarte years, labor, peasant and university organizations reestablished themselves after being decimated in 1980-82. Strikes, as well as marches and other forms of assembly, are permitted and occur frequently. However, in the context of renewed urban terror tactics by the FMLN and renewed government crackdown, these events frequently end in violence. In the last two years, thousands of members of leftist unions and other labor organizations have been detained, with many abused while in custody, and numerous unionists have been killed.

Underlying all rights abuses, however, is the absence of an effective system of justice. The judicial system is understaffed, riddled with corruption, and intimidated by the military and security forces. No military officer has ever been tried or convicted for a human rights violation, despite overwhelming evidence of military involvement in the deaths of thousands of civilians. In 1990, three notorious cases in which the U.S. had pressed particularly hard for convictions fell apart. In November, a year after the murder of the six Jesuits, the investigation had stalled amid mounting evidence of a military cover-up. In 1989, the Cristiani government introduced legislation that would establish an independent commission for selecting judges, increase the number of civil courts, and reduce the number of military courts. However, there was little follow-up on judicial reform in 1990.

Equatorial Guinea

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Military</th>
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Overview:

This former Spanish colony in west-central Africa—consisting of mainland Rio Muni and the islands of Bioko (formerly Fernando Poo), Elobey Chico, Corisco, and Elobey Grande—became an independent republic in 1968. Macias (later Macie)Nguema Biyogo of the Popular Idea of Equatorial Guinea was elected president, defeating Bonifacio Ondo Edu of the Movement for the National Unity of Equatorial Guinea.

In 1969, amid tribal and political conflict, President Macie seized emergency powers and unleashed a decade-long reign of terror. Declaring himself president for life in 1972, he decimated virtually every segment of society: suppressing the Roman Catholic Church; shutting the school system; expelling Nigerian contract workers who harvested cacao, the mainstay of the economy; sinking the fishing fleet to prevent people from escaping; forcing the exodus of most remaining Spaniards and skilled and educated citizens; and murdering and publicly crucifying opponents.

On 3 August 1979, President Macie was overthrown by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in a military coup. Macie was hunted down and eventually executed for crimes that included treason and genocide. On assuming power, Col. Obiang banned political parties and oversaw the
drafting of a new constitution, adopted in 1982, which provides for a
president elected for seven years and a Council of State. A unicameral House
of People's Representatives consists of elected members hand-picked by the
president. In 1987, President Obiang launched the Democratic Party of
Equatorial Guinea, the only legal party. There have reportedly been four coup
attempts since 1983, the last in September 1988. Some of those implicated in
coup attempts were released from detention in 1990 on order of the presi-
dent. The judicial system is subject to the power of the president to appoint
and dismiss judges at his pleasure.

On 25 June 1989 President Obiang, running unopposed, was elected in the
first presidential elections since the coup. Obiang has recently stated that
democratization will pursue a path consistent with domestic realities, appar-
endy a reference to the existing one-party system, and has noted that the
fratricidal war in Liberia provides a caution to those who wish to push change
without taking the maintenance of domestic peace into sufficient consideration.

Notwithstanding an explicit provision in the 1982 constitution which
prohibits the use of torture or inhumane forms of punishment, there have
been reports of human rights abuses under the current regime, although at a
substantially reduced level from that which occurred during the Macie period.
Amnesty International reports that the use of torture by those in the employ
of the government against both criminal suspects and political prisoners has
remained an accepted practice in 1990. With rare exception, torturers have
apparently enjoyed impunity. Although the constitution contains important
human rights guarantees such as the prohibition of arbitrary and illegal arrest
and provision for amparo and habeus corpus procedures to challenge the
legality of detentions, no implementing statutes exist.

With the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, the regime is trying to rebuild an economic structure almost com-
pletely eradicated during the Macie years. As the only Spanish-speaking ex-
colony in sub-Saharan Africa, Equatorial Guinea has recendy made efforts to
strengthen cooperation with Latin America. At the same time, it has joined
the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, a part of the franc zone,
to cement its economic ties with the francophone nations that surround it

Citizens of Equatorial Guinea do not have the power to democratically
choose or change their government. Arbitrary arrests and detentions are
common despite constitutional prohibition. The judicial system is weak and
cannot effectively review executive policies. Laws are enacted by decree.
Citizens are not free to criticize the government and all media are govern-
ment-owned. Independent political association and assembly are banned, and
nonpolitical groups must register with the government. Freedom of religion in
this largely Roman Catholic country faces certain restrictions, and Protestant
sects have been harassed or persecuted. Internal travel is generally free.
There are no labor unions, and the right to strike is prohibited. Unemployed
citizens can be subject to periods of forced labor.
Ethiopia

**Polity:** One party (military dominated)  
**Economy:** Statist  
**Population:** 51,700,000  
**HDI:** 0.282 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 39 male, 43 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Oromo, Amhara, Tigrean, Sidamo, Shankella, Somali

**Political Rights:** 7  
**Civil Liberties:** 7  
**Status:** Not Free

Overview:

In 1990, separatist rebels of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) won several major battles, threatening the sixteen-year Marxist rule of Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, who overthrew long-time Emperor Haile Selassi in a 1974 coup. During the year, millions of Ethiopians faced the prospect of famine caused by severe drought and subsequent food blockades by government and rebel forces who use food as a weapon in the civil war.

Of the two main separatist groups, the most significant is the EPLF, which has been fighting for Eritrean independence since 1961. Formerly Marxist, the EPLF this year adopted a pragmatic tone that helped attract donations from wealthy Eritrean businessmen and technocrats. Less widely known is the Oromo Liberation Front, a secessionist movement representing the country's largest ethnic group, which is closing in on the capital from the west and south. TPLF, which is fighting for greater regional autonomy and the overthrow of Mengitsu, has controlled its entire province for more than a year.

The TPLF and the much smaller Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) made up the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). New groups that joined the EDRDF included the Ethiopian Democratic Officers' Revolutionary Movement (EDORM), which in June held its first organizational congress in land controlled by the EDRDF, and the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), a counterweight to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Outside the EPRDF umbrella are the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, a condition that was reinforced by the failure of the government's collectivized-farm programs. Four million Ethiopians, primarily in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, were at risk of starvation in 1990, the second successive year of drought. The main international efforts to deliver food aid were paralyzed through most of the year. In February, heavy fighting at Massawa, the main entry point for Western-donated food, halted the delivery of 50,000 tons, enough for 3 million people for a month. When the EPLF took Massawa, it sank five relief vessels in the process. Mengistu then tried to recapture the port and bombed the area, destroying food or preventing its transfer.

Under pressure from the USSR and the U.S., Mengistu halted the bombing in June after earlier refusing to match the EPLF's offer of a cease-fire to allow relief supplies to enter. In July, the U.N. was compelled to abandon its efforts to ferry food through the port because Eritrean rebels refused to let relief vessels dock. By the end of November, the government and the Eritrean rebels reached a tentative agreement to open Massawa to relief vessels.

The EPLF capture of Massawa, a major victory signifying the success of the Eritrean Movement, besieged the government-controlled Eritrean capital of Asmara, trapping 120,000 army troops and one million inhabitants. The government accused the rebels of seeking to starve the garrison into surrender. Government forces reportedly requisitioned food from the local population.

Sapped by military defeats, and facing the specter of famine and interna-
tional isolation, Mengistu, once Africa's most ardent Stalinist leader, re-
nounced Marxism-Leninism in March and announced plans to liberalize Ethio-
pia's stagnant, centrally controlled economy. His economic reform program
calls for operation of state enterprises on a profit basis, reductions in govern-
ment market controls, private enterprise, private and foreign investment and
the private use of state-owned land. The ruling Workers Party of Ethiopia, the
country's only party, was renamed the Democratic Unity Party and ostensibly
opened to non-Marxists, but Mengitsu did not endorse a multiparty system.

The changes were overshadowed by mounting discontent over policies
such as the deeply unpopular forced conscription of youth, in violation of
Ethiopian law.

At the end of August, representatives from the various EPRDF member
groups met and reiterated their plan to facilitate the establishment of a transi-
tional government in Ethiopia. In September, the Eritrean Democratic Move-
ment (EDM) decided to fight alongside the EPLF. Meanwhile, the Oromo-
based OLF intensified its war against the regime in eastern and western Oromo.

The U.S. has in recent years tried to distance itself from Mengitsu, but in
August 1990 the U.S. sought Ethiopia as an ally in the Gulf crisis. The
Soviet Union began to disengage from Mengistu in 1988, and in March 1990
withdrew all its military advisors and stopped its cargo planes from making
supply flights to Asmara. Israel, on the other hand, re-established diplomatic
relations with Ethiopia in 1989, and in 1990 provided advisors and military
aid, reportedly including U.S.-made cluster bombs.

Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:

Ethiopians do not have the right to change their government peacefully and
democratically. In March, Mengitsu dropped Marxism from the ruling party
platform, endorsed reform toward a market economy, and opened the party to
non-Marxists, but continued to reject a multiparty system. The constitution
provides for freedom of speech, press, assembly and peaceful demonstration,
but in practice these freedoms are not respected. Public pronouncements by
individuals are carefully monitored; several persons have been imprisoned for
expressing antigovernment views. All forms of expression are lightly con-
trolled by the government; all media are government-owned and -operated.
Limited assembly is allowed with government authorization, a policy backed
by stiff penalties. Almost all demonstrations are government organized, with
many events calling for mandatory participation. Some private associations
are allowed to organize under close government watch. Academic freedom is
curtailed; education is heavily politicized.

Human rights groups have sharply criticized the Ethiopian government for
its callous treatment of the civilian population in the course of the war.
Hundreds of thousands have been denied food, subjected to intense aerial
bombardment, and blown up by carelessly planted landmines. There is forced
conscription of youths into the Ethiopian army. The army has been accused
of killing, looting and raping civilians in garrison towns.

Torture, against which there are no specific constitutional protections, is a
frequent post-arrest, anti-opposition tool. The constitutional provisions for
lawful arrest and detention are not applied in practice, especially with regard
to political dissidents. Persons are often held incommunicado detention
without charge or judicial review for indefinite periods, sometimes without
even a pro-forma trial. The judiciary is not independent in political cases. A
state of emergency in rebel occupied areas allows authorities to arrest and
detain suspects at whim.
Fiji

**Overview:**

In 1990, this small Pacific nation of 830 islands and islets continued to be run by an interim government installed by current army head Major Gen. Sitiveni Rabuka, who overthrew the elected Indian-dominated government of Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra. The present nonelected civilian government is led by seventy-year-old Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara who, as head of the Alliance Party which ruled the island since independence in 1970, lost the 1987 election to a combined coalition of the Indian-backed National Federation Party (NFP) and the trade union-supported Fiji Labor Party. The loss led to a military coup, as most Fijians and the powerful Great Council of Chiefs opposed a government dominated by Indian Hindus. Maj. Gen. Rabuka remains the power behind the interim government.

The key political issue was the adoption of a constitution that restricts Indian representation in the unicameral parliament to twenty-two out of seventy-one seats, thus guaranteeing the native Melanesians a permanent majority. The restrictions were opposed by an opposition NFP-Labor Party coalition led by Adi Kuini Bavadra, the widow of the overthrown prime minister who died of cancer on 3 November 1989. Elections are scheduled for 1991.

The issue has contributed to increased ethnic tensions and the emigration of Indians and Chinese, who made up a substantial percentage of skilled workers, professionals, merchants and sugar cane farmers. In May, a twenty-four-hour protest by ethnic Indians over the closure of the Indian Embassy left the capital city of Suva virtually deserted because 99 percent of shops were Indian-owned. The government closed the embassy, charging the Indian government with "unfriendly and unwarranted" acts.

Since the military coup three years ago, some 23,000 people, mostly Indian and Chinese, have left Fiji. Local unions have reported that the exodus resulting from the government’s discriminatory policies had caused an alarming outflow of doctors, engineers, teachers and lawyers. Doctors have been hired from Thailand, while engineers, magistrates and accountants have been recruited from Sri Lanka. The Fiji Sugar Corp. has been forced to hire senior staff from Britain and the Philippines. Two-thirds of all sugar farmers are Indian, and in June half of the farmers threatened not to cut cane unless a commercial dispute over the division of profits was settled.

Despite the simmering political turmoil, Fiji’s economy was growing in 1989 and early 1990. Traditional sectors such as sugar, gold-mining and tourism were booming. New industries, like tuna-canning, pine chips and garments also did well. In 1989, the GDP grew by 12 percent. However, by midyear there were indications that the political situation had led to growing economic uncertainty.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

In 1990, Fiji remained a military-dominated government. The new constitution curtails the democratic rights of the country’s Indian population. Indians are also restricted from owning and leasing land. In 1990, the government

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**Fiji**

- **Political rights:** 6
- **Civil Liberties:** 4
- **Population:** 800,000
- **Economy:** Capitalist
- **Polity:** Military-civilian transitional
- **Status:** Partly Free
- **HDI:** 0.806 (high)
- **Life expectancy:** 67 male, 71 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Fijian Indians (49 percent), Fijians (46 percent), other Pacific islanders, Europeans, Chinese (6 percent)
placed restrictions on the foreign press. In May, Fiji expelled Pacnews, the South Pacific regional news service which compiles radio reports from 13 Pacific island nations and reissues them as news bulletins. Intimidation by the Fiji military and licensing laws has compromised accuracy and produced self-censorship among local media, according to a report by the International Federation of Journalists. Another law was amended to make libel a criminal rather than a civil offense that would be prosecuted by the state. The law was aimed at further intimidating journalists. Freedom of travel is unrestricted. Freedom of religion is guaranteed, but existing tensions between Hindu Indians and Christian Fijians have been exacerbated by bans on commercial activities on Sunday and occasional remarks by Maj. Gen. Rabuka, a devout Methodist, about "Christianizing" the Indian community. Free trade unions and strikes are legal, and the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) is a member of the ICFTU and the ILO.

**Finland**

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Mixed capitalist  
**Population:** 5,000,000  
**HDI:** 0.967 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 70 male, 78 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Finns, Swedes, Lapps

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The major development for Finland in 1990 was the upheaval in the neighboring Soviet Union. Long in the shadow of its powerful neighbor, Finland has begun to rethink the meaning of its neutrality. Finns have become increasingly interested in joining the European Community, a move which the Soviets would no longer be likely to block. Reacting to the greater freedom of movement for Soviet Jews, Finland offered to let them fly to Israel from an airport near the Soviet-Finnish border. Finland also played host to the Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting in September 1990.

Located in Northern Europe, Finland lived under Swedish and Danish domination for centuries until it became a Russian territory in 1809. The country achieved independence in 1917. The Finns and Soviets fought each other during World War II, resulting in a loss of Finnish territory to the Soviet Union. Following the war, two strong presidents dominated Finnish politics: J.K. Paaskivi (1946-56) and Uhro Kekkonen (1956-81). Social Democrat Mauno Koivisto has been president since 1981. The voters elect an electoral college that chooses the president for a six-year term. The head of state is responsible for foreign affairs and can initiate and veto legislation. The president appoints a prime minister from the party or coalition commanding the confidence of the parliament. The parliament has 200 members, elected by proportional representation, who serve for a maximum term of four years. The first governing coalition to rule without the Communists took office in 1972. In the 1987 parliamentary election, the conservative National Coalition (53 M.P.s) came within three seats of the Social Democrats, the largest party. Other parties represented include: the leftist People's Democratic League, the Rural Party, the Swedish People's Party, the Christian League, and the Greens. After inter-party negotiations, a center-right coalition took control of the government under Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. The
ruling parties support private enterprise interests. The Soviet Union remains influential, but when Soviet President Gorbachev visited the country in 1989, he assured Finns that they were free to make their own policies.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

The people of Finland have the right to change their government by democratic means. However, the Soviet Union interfered in past presidential elections and cabinet selections. The law guarantees freedom of speech and the press, but Finns have tended to avoid issues that would create public tensions with the Soviet Union. Broadcast journalism is split between private and government control. There are both Finnish and Swedish programs. Religious practice is free, but the Lutheran and Orthodox churches are state religions. The government provides subsidies to both faiths, and allows both to teach their beliefs in the public schools. There is no religious discrimination. Amnesty International followed the cases of three conscientious objectors in 1990. They went on hunger strikes on 23 April 1990, and received presidential pardons on 31 May 1990. Association is free. The overwhelming majority of workers belongs to trade unions. The Swedish-speaking minority has autonomy, cultural rights, and a political party.

**France**

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary democracy  
**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Status:** Free

**Economy:** Mixed capitalist  
**Population:** 56,400,000  
**HDI:** 0.974 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 71 male, 79 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** French (mixed Celtic, Latin, and Teutonic) and various Arab and African immigrant groups

**Overview:**

Severe ethnic tensions, the increasing appeal of the ultra-right National Front, and divisive squabbles in the political mainstream were the most important developments in 1990.

Modern French political history dates from the French Revolution in 1789. Since then, the country has had various republican, imperial and monarchical forms of government. The current system of government, the Fifth Republic, dates from 1958. As designed by Charles De Gaulle, the presidency is the dominant institution in this mixed presidential-parliamentary system. The people elect the president directly through a two-round system. In the first round, candidates of all parties appear on the ballot. If no candidate reaches a majority, then a run-off takes place between the two top finishers of round one. The parliamentary bodies are the 577-member National Assembly, which the people elect directly, and the 318-member Senate, which is chosen by an electoral college of local elected officials.

Socialist President Francois Mitterrand has been in power since 1981, having won re-election in 1988. During the first term, Mitterrand’s policies included the nationalization of several major industrial groups and banks. As the economy weakened in the mid-1980s, the Socialists abandoned many of their statist polices. After the Socialists lost the 1986 National Assembly election to the center-right, Mitterrand appointed Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac prime minister. During this period of so-called ideological cohabitation in government, France denationalized many previously nationalized
Country reports

enterprises. After the National Assembly elections of 1988, the Socialists and their Left Radical allies regained power. Mitterrand appointed moderate Socialist Michel Rocard prime minister.

France was the location of a series of racially motivated hate crimes in 1990: brutal killings of Arab immigrants, the bombing of a mosque, attacks on immigrants by right-wing "skinheads," and grotesque desecrations of a Jewish cemetery. After the cemetery episode, religious, human rights and political leaders (including Mitterrand) held a protest march. As public opinion data made clear, the French were becoming increasingly hostile to immigrants. According to a government survey, 50 percent of the public believe that campaigning politicians should be allowed to say that "blacks and North African Arabs are racially inferior to Europeans." The same poll showed that 76 percent feel that France has "too many Arabs" and 46 percent assert that the country has "too many blacks." The survey also reported that 24 percent claim that France has "too many Jews."

Led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the anti-immigrant National Front became the focal point for voters with racial and other frustrations. Le Pen equated racism with patriotism in his speeches, but had to pay a price for his remarks. Back in 1987, Le Pen dismissed the Nazi Holocaust as a mere "detail" of history. Eleven religious and human rights groups sued him. In 1990 a judge ruled that Le Pen would have to pay the legal costs for his opponents in the case and would also have to give them one franc each in symbolic damages. All of the mainstream political parties have felt the effects of the National Front's success, and the Communists lost many working-class supporters to the ultra-rightists. Prime Minister Rocard suggested a drastic curtailment of the right to print racist remarks in the press. The National Assembly passed a bill barring inciters of race hatred from holding office or government jobs. It is not clear what effect this would have on the Front.

The ultra-rightists created problems for the mainstream center-right In a local election near Lyon in June, a Front candidate defeated both the conservative Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the center-right Union for French Democracy (UDF). The RPR began expulsion proceedings against Alain Carignon, the mayor of Grenoble, after he suggested that the center-right should back the Socialist candidate in the run-off against the National Front. After a long period of bickering, the UDF and RPR announced in June 1990 that they would form a coalition, called the Union for France, which would enable them to present a common platform against the National Front.

The Socialists were concerned about both the National Front and their own future. Rocard responded to the economic concerns of working-class Front supporters by raising the minimum wage. Although unemployment stood at over 9 percent in 1990, inflation was low and the economy was stable. Since the failed nationalization experiments of the 1980s, the Socialists have given up many of their traditional policies. Personality disputes replaced ideological debates at the party's 1990 congress. Socialist Party Secretary Pierre Mauroy and Education Minister Lionel Jospin contended with National Assembly President Laurent Fabius for control of the party machinery.

In 1990, National Assembly debates on corruption and education threatened to bring down the government. The cabinet proposed an amnesty for corrupt local government officials and a new anti-corruption law to cover future abuses. Opposition politicians and the public realized that corrupt Socialists would be the beneficiaries of the proposed amnesty. Many local
party machines had benefitted from contractors’ contributions that passed through dummy consulting firms to party coffers. The episode tarnished the party’s image, and suggested that political careerism threatened to fill the party’s ideological void. After days of student protests against the school system, the Socialist government survived a confidence vote in November 1990.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The French have the right to change their government by democratic means, The electoral system allows the French to elect a new president every seven years and a new National Assembly at least once every five years. Under the Fifth Republic constitution, the president has significant emergency powers and the right to rule by decree under certain, circumstances. These represent potential threats to democracy. Reacting against the weak executives of earlier forms of government, De Gaulle insisted on a strong presidency when he supervised the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

Fiance’s anti-terrorist policy includes the expulsion of suspected Basque terrorists, a procedure that is also applied to foreigners believed to be assisting Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. In July 1990, President Mitterrand pardoned a pro-Iranian terrorist. This set off a chain of prison protests and complaints by nonterrorist inmates that the government was not treating them fairly. The pardon was part of a deal to free French hostages in Lebanon.

There is free religious expression. Religious schools receive financial assistance from the national government. In general the press is free, but there is government involvement in subsidizing journalism and registering journalists. The state is secretive, and limits criticism of the president. The broadcast media became increasingly free and competitive in the 1980s. There is no government monopoly; private radio stations are growing.

Business, agricultural and labor groups have freedom of association. The labor movement has competing Communist and non-Communist federations. There is a significant government sector in the economy. France has a long tradition of state direction under governments of all ideological stripes. After the experimentation with nationalization in the early 1980s, France has developed a more market-oriented economy. Prime Minister Rocard identifies with moderate social democracy and with American liberalism rather than with the more doctrinaire elements of the French left.

Gabon

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<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
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Overview:

In 1990, this former central-west African French colony underwent a wrenching political transformation as massive civic unrest, a series of strikes, and violence forced President Omar Bongo to abandon his stated commitment to the existing one-party system, to legalize political parties and call for the first multiparty legislative elections since independence in 1960. This ended the ruling Gabonese Social Democratic Rally’s (formerly the Gabon Democratic Party) monopoly on power.
Following three rounds of voting for the unicameral, 120-member National Assembly on 16 September and 21 and 28 October, the PDG won 62 seats, with seven opposition parties sharing 55. Unlike the September vote, the October elections were relatively incident-free, although disruptions in two constituencies led to new elections in November for 3 seats. The PDG picked up 1 (giving it a total of 63), while another went to the Union for Democracy and Development in Mayumba, which did not pick up a seat in the earlier rounds.

Of the opposition groupings, the MORENA-Bucherons Party, led by the Rev. Paul M'Ba Abessole, won 19 seats, despite Abessole's persistent calls for a boycott. The Gabonese Progress Party (PGP), led by Maitre Agondjo-Okawe, won 18 seats, while the remaining seats were split between the original MORENA Party (7), the Association for Socialism in Gabon (6), the Gabonese Socialist Union (4), the Circle for Renewal and Progress (1), and the Union for Democracy and Development in Mayumba (1). It is unclear who won the remaining seat.

Gabon's transition to multipartyism was by no means smooth. The PDG Central Committee had adopted a series of resolutions in January that reaffirmed its commitment to the "pluralism of ideas" within one party, noting that "pluralism is not synonymous with multipartyism."

Less than a week after the meeting, students at Omar Bongo University in Libreville, the capital, staged strikes to protest the poor quality of education. By February, there were new student demonstrations and a series of strikes affecting telecommunications, air transport and schools. Postal and telephone workers staged a two-day strike, ignoring calls to return to work. The government banned strikes and demonstrations and curtailed rights to assembly in an attempt to stop the wave of protest that swept across the country. President Bongo announced that the PDG would be dissolved at a national conference at the end of March and replaced by a new "grouping," the Gabonese Social Democratic Rally (RSDG), to bring together "all those who sincerely want to continue working for the building of our country in unity and concord...." The move was seen by some as an attempt to preclude the creation of opposition parties by forming a "one-grouping" system.

At a March national conference on democracy, President Bongo agreed to extend the legalization of seventy-four political associations up to the time of October's legislative elections. He described the meeting as an "apprenticeship to multipartyism." After a suspension caused by a media strike, the conference resumed on 6 April, and topics included the dissolution of parliament, the formation of a national union government, and a review of the constitution.

In June President Bongo announced that legislative elections would be held in September, and said that only parties with a considerable number of votes would be allowed to exist after the vote. Later in the month, President Bongo hosted members of opposition political associations to discuss the elections.

The elections were scheduled for two rounds: 16 September and 23 September. The first round of elections was marred by violence and charges of vote-rigging by the ruling party, as 520 candidates vied for 120 seats. The government acknowledged that "irregularities" had taken place, but rather than declare the poll invalid, devised a compromise solution by which 58 of the 120 seats in the National Assembly were allocated on the basis of votes cast in trouble-free constituencies. The 23 September round was cancelled as a specially appointed, multiparty commission set to work on making arrange-
ments for two fresh rounds on 21 and 28 October. The solution was broadly acceptable to the opposition parties. The October vote went relatively smoothly. However, the turnout was very low, possibly because of the chaotic situation a month earlier.

Gabon is generally regarded as prosperous by African standards, thanks mainly to considerable mineral and oil resources for a relatively low population. But early in the year, industrial expansion ground to a halt. The government blamed constraints put on by the International Monetary Fund and its austerity regimen. Disturbances in Port Gentil interrupted oil output in the summer. Due to an underdeveloped transportation system and bad soil, the country’s commercial agricultural sectors are poorly developed, and food and manufactured goods must be imported. The country does have substantial off-shore oil reserves (with new discoveries made in 1990), and the sharp escalation of oil prices in the fall promised a boost to the economy.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

In 1990, Gabon became a multiparty system under a new transitional constitution, and legislative elections in the fall gave citizens a wide range of choices. The former ruling party retained a majority in the new Assembly, and President Omar Bongo, who has ruled since 1967, did not stand for election. Criminal cases are generally handled fairly by the courts, but the government can interfere in security cases, and suspects in such cases can be held indefinitely without charge. Most media are controlled by the government, but in 1990 there were indications that reporting was becoming more objective. There are independent publications that print investigative reports and take views at variance with the government. In May, the government banned two French publications in connection with articles critical of government actions during that month’s civic unrest. Restrictions on association and assembly were loosened, and political rallies and meetings were generally not interfered with. Freedom of religion is generally respected in this overwhelmingly Christian nation. There are no significant restraints on domestic travel, but some civil servants must get permission to travel abroad. Most unions are affiliated with the Gabonese Trade Union Federation, long dominated by the ruling party. Although the right to strike is restricted and government employees cannot join unions, work stoppages and protests were common in 1990.

Gambia

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy  **Political Rights:** 2  
**Economy:** Capitalist  **Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Population:** 900,000  **Status:** Free  
**HDI:** 0.094 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 34 male, 37 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Mandingo (40 percent), Fulani (19 percent), Wolof (15 percent), Jola (10 percent), Serahuli (8 percent)

Overview:

The West African Republic of The Gambia, a narrow strip of land on the Atlantic coast surrounded on three sides by Senegal, has been ruled since independence was declared in 1965 by President Sir Dawda Jawara of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP). He has been directly elected under a multiparty system since 1982. Critics have suggested that PPP’s political dominance has been inimical to a democratic society, but opposition parties operate freely and have contested every election.
The unicameral, directly elected House of Representatives serves for five years and is controlled by the PPP, which won thirty-four seats in 1987. The official opposition is the National Convention Party (NCP), with five seats. Other legal parties include the Gambian People's Party and the leftist People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism.

An important regional issue in 1990 was the civil war in Liberia. In August, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation Committee opened meetings in Banjul, Gambia's capital, to try and end hostilities in Liberia. ECOWAS planned to broker a cease-fire and send a multinational force into Monrovia, the Liberian capital, to monitor observance. The peacekeeping included troops from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Togo and Sierra Leone. In domestic affairs, the country celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary of independence.

In late summer, President Jawara met with NCP opposition leader Sheriff Mustapha Dibba to discuss the possibility of the latter's group joining the PPP. After a thirty-minute meeting attended by senior party officials from both sides, it emerged that Dibba—a founder member of PPP who served as Gambia's first vice-president—proposed three options to bring himself and the NCP into the political mainstream. The NCP and the PPP could either form a coalition or loose alliance. Alternatively, Dibba proposed his party members could individually cross over to the PPP. The proposals were scheduled to be put to the PPP executive committee before the end of the year.

The Gambian economy is small but the population of some 700,000 enjoys a relatively high standard of living in comparison with others in the region. The fishing industry has increased productivity, and the port of Banjul hosts fleets from other West African nations and fish processing is an attractive area of development. Groundnut, the main export of the country, has also been increasing, although there have been marginal declines in cotton and coarse grain. Tourism is up, and Banjul has become a popular winter resort area for Western Europeans. The IMF has made funds available under both the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and the Structural Adjustment Loan, both geared to reduce the budget deficit, eliminate external debts and increase living standards.

A growing issue for the government is the growing perception that AIDS is spreading rapidly in Gambia.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Despite the PPP's dominance, The Gambia is a multi-party, pluralistic system in which citizens over eighteen can vote to change their government by secret ballot. The judiciary is independent of government interference, and the court and general law system is based on the English model. Muslim law governs marriages, and customary law covers marriage and divorce for non-Muslims, local tribal government and traditional social and civil relations. Gambians can exercise free speech, and although there are no major newspapers, political party newsletters and other publications can and do criticize the government. The radio is government-owned. There are generally no restrictions on association and assembly, and the secular state protects religious rights. Gambians are free to emigrate and travel is generally unrestricted. There are two main labor federations, and workers have the right to strike.
In one of the most significant political developments in a half century, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formally united with the once-Communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October 1990. This ended post-World War II partition of the country, opening a new era in East-West relations and creating a powerful new nation in the heart of Europe. The reunification came after a remarkable year of intense diplomatic and political activity, including elections in the GDR, Soviet and Western negotiations on a united Germany's future role in existing security alliances, and the first all-German elections since 1932, which Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democratic coalition won decisively on 2 December.

The process toward reunification began in 1989, when the collapse of the Honecker regime in October followed a summer of social unrest highlighted by the mass exodus of East Germans, mainly via neighboring East European nations. By November, the ruling Communist Socialist Unity Party (SED) was in disarray, the Berlin Wall was opened, and newly emerged opposition groups were demanding greater political freedom.

In January 1990, the momentum toward reunification accelerated, as reports from Moscow indicated that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had accepted German unity as inevitable. In early February, West German Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher went to Moscow to discuss the future of military alliances and other related issues with the Soviet leadership and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. At the same time, a Germany unity committee was set up in Bonn, the capital of the FRG, to create a blueprint for monetary unity that would rescue the GDR from economic disaster and to prepare detailed plans for political reunification. Bonn’s actions were also intended to slow the heavy influx of East Germans emigrating to the West. The West Germans also proposed that a united Germany remain in NATO, but that no troops be stationed in what was once East Germany; the East Germans pushed for a neutral Germany.

The prospect of a united Germany generated anxiety in Poland, which in late February demanded a guarantee of its western border. Chancellor Kohl generated controversy both at home and abroad by insisting that a united Germany would recognize Poland’s existing borders only if Warsaw renounced all World War I reparations claims against Germany. On 6 March, Chancellor Kohl’s coalition government, which included the CDU, its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democrats, reached an agreement on steps to reassure the Poles. Under the plan, the East and West German parliaments would adopt identical resolutions renouncing any territorial claims to Poland. Meanwhile, Soviet leader Gorbachev emphatically rejected NATO membership for a reunited Germany after meetings with East German
Prime Minister Hans Modrow, a reformer in the now SED-PDS, (Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) having been added to its name in January).

In March the first free East German elections were won overwhelmingly by a group of conservative parties, led by the Christian Democrats and actively supported by Chancellor Kohl. Lothar de Maiziere, the CDU leader, became prime minister.

On 24 April, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister de Maiziere agreed to set 2 July as the date for the monetary, economic and social union of the two countries. Two days earlier, the Kohl government offered to exchange the wages, pensions and some savings of East Germans at a one-to-one rate when the West German mark replaced the East German currency in the monetary union.

In early May, Chancellor Kohl rejected Moscow’s suggestion that the Germans could except unification before all the implications for other countries were worked out. On 15 May, the chancellor's center-right CDU lost important elections in the northern states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the parliamentary opposition. The elections gave the SPD a majority in the Bundesrat, the FRG’s upper house, which has veto power over some legislation out of the Bundestag (lower house). The Bundesrat is a key player in financial and budget issues such as the states' share of the financial burden of reunification.

West Germany’s federal and state governments agreed to create a "German unity fund" totaling $70 billion to finance the reconstruction of East Germany’s deteriorating economy and crumbling infrastructure. The opposition SPD, after a heated leadership meeting, announced that it would batde the economic union treaty in parliament. Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD chairman, said the treaty did not provide enough safeguards to protect East German industries during the transition to a market economy. The party ultimately decided to support the treaty, but a bloc of twenty-five SPD members broke ranks and voted against it.

On 21 June, the parliaments of both countries adopted matching measures, one a resolution guaranteeing Poland’s existing borders and the other the treaty on monetary and economic unity. The sessions in Bonn and East Berlin marked the first time that the parliaments approved matching measures.

As the new economic unity took effect, the East German government decided to support all-German elections for 2 December, a date welcomed by Chancellor Kohl. The GDR also agreed to reconstitute the five states that existed before Communist rule as a necessary condition for joining West Germany under Article 23 of the FRG constitution. The West Germans agreed to assist the task of removing some 360,000 Soviet troops and their 200,000 dependents stationed in East Germany over a period of four years. At the "two-plus-four" talks in Paris—the two Germanies plus the four victorious World War II allies: The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—East and West Germany again promised to guarantee the post-war German-Polish frontier.

In late July, however, the GDR’s elected coalition government split over the timing of reunification. In an abrupt shift, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister de Maiziere announced on 9 August that the two countries should merge on 14 October, and that the first-all German elections should be held on 2 December.

After weeks of wrangling and bitter debate, East Germany's parliament voted on 24 August to formally unite with West Germany on 3 October. The four wartime allies signed a treaty in Moscow relinquishing all their occupa-
In 1990 the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which was established on 7 October 1949, four years after the defeat of Nazi Germany led to the division of Germany, ceased to exist as of 3 October. Its demise began after the sudden collapse in 1989 of the Communist regime led by Erich...
Honecker, the first secretary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), who succeeded Walter Ulbricht in 1971.

At the start of the year, the GDR was led by Prime Minister Hans Modrow, a reformist SED leader from Dresden. The new SED chairman was Gregor Gysi. On 3 January, six opposition groups had agreed to draft a common program for the country’s first free elections. The group, Alliance 90, united the New Forum, a grass-roots movement which emerged in late 1989; the Social Democratic Party (SPD); Democratic Awakening; Democracy Now; Initiative for Peace and Human Rights; and the United Left. But just three days after being formed, the coalition crumbled, with the United Left withdrawing and the New Forum announcing it would run candidates independently.

On 10 January, three non-Communist parties in the GDR’s government—Liberal Democratic, Christian Democratic and National Democratic—threatened to withdraw if the prime minister did not accelerate the reform process. In the face of growing dissatisfaction, the prime minister urged the opposition to join his cabinet, but the parties declined. The SED-PDS purged many of its leaders, but declined to dissolve itself. On 2 February, parliament added eight officials from prodemocracy groups to the Modrow government, giving the opposition and parties formerly aligned with the Communists nineteen of thirty-six seats.

With elections set, and expectations of eventual unity with the FRG rising, the GDR was swamped by politicians from West Germany, who quickly usurped political activity. In February, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the FRG formed a committee for unity, and polls indicated that 75 percent of East Germans favored reunification. West Germany’s ruling CDU campaigned for its GDR counterpart, and former FRG leader Willy Brandt toured on behalf of the Social Democrats. Both parties campaigned on a platform of unification.

In the 18 March elections, CDU-aligned parties swept to victory. The three-party coalition—the CDU, its sister party, the German Social Union, and the Democratic Awakening—won 48 percent of the vote, which gave it 193 seats in the 400-member parliament. Finishing a distant second were the Social Democrats, led by Ibrahim Boehme. The SED-PDS finished third. The New Forum, once at the vanguard of popular opposition, got barely 3 percent along with its allies. The Free Democrats, the counterpart of West Germany’s ruling coalition partner, won 5.2 percent of the vote, and 21 seats.

CDU leader Lothar de Maiziere asked the SPD to form a coalition, but they refused. On 2 April, SPD Chairman Boehme resigned after it was alleged that he was an informer for the Stasi. On 8 April, CDU and SPD leaders announced that they had reached an agreement on a coalition. The new government encompassed 24 ministers and five parties: the CDU, the SPD, the German Social Union, Democratic Awakening, and the Liberals.

In the summer, East Germany agreed to reconstitute the five states that existed in the east before Communist rule in preparation for an all-German election. After months of negotiating a comprehensive unification treaty with the FRG, international diplomatic negotiations, and several weeks of often bitter procedural debate in both the GDR and West Germany, the date for reunification was set for 3 October, with all-German elections slated for 2 December. On 3 October, the GDR ceased to exist.

In 1990, with the decline of Communist dominance and the prospect of reunification, life for citizens in the GDR changed suddenly and dramatically.
The economy was in disarray. The budget deficit for the second half of the year was projected to hit over $6 billion. Unemployment was expected to hit 450,000. A quarter of the country's 8,000 industries faced eventual dissolution.

Between the end of Communist rule and the reunification of Germany, the GDR's citizens experienced the positive aspects of liberalization. There was a revival of religious life, as the Evangelical church, long a repository for the muted dissent under the Communists, was no longer restricted. Travel restrictions had all but disappeared. In education, East German students and teachers were free to learn and teach subjects previously off limits.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Germans have the right to change their government by democratic means. Former citizens of the GDR now enjoy the same rights and are protected by the same laws as West Germans. The judiciary is independent; accused have free access to counsel. The only exceptions have been a few terrorists who have used this access to carry on terrorism. An issue in 1990 was what to do with the tens of thousands of former agents and informers of the Stasi, the East German secret police. In December, former GDR prime minister and member of the West German cabinet, Lothar de Maiziere, was being investigated for ties with the secret police. There was debate about what to do with Stasi files, and how much information should be disclosed publicly.

As a consequence of the Nazi era, West German Basic Law requires political parties to be democratic. Using this provision, the Federal Constitutional Court outlawed the Communist party and the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party in the 1950s. However, the Communist party reorganized, and new neo-Fascist parties have formed since then and function freely. Germans have freedom of expression, but the use of Nazi symbols is illegal.

Germans enjoy freedom of religion, and the federal government collects a tax from all self-identified Catholics and Protestants to support their religious institutions. The press is free. Broadcast media are operated by independent public corporations, and offer pluralistic points of view. Business, labor and farming groups are free, highly organized, and politically influential. Under Germany's codetermination law, management and labor have equal representation on the boards of major companies.

Ghana

Polity: Military
Economy: Capitalist-statist
Population: 15,000,000
HDI: 0.360 (low)
Life Expectancy: 50 male, 54 female
Ethnic groups: Some fifty ethnic groups, the majority being Akans (including the Fanti), followed by the Ashanti, Ga, Ewe and the Moshi-Dagomba

Overview:

Unlike some of its neighbors in central-west Africa, the Republic of Ghana in 1990 did not experience the social and civic upheavals associated with greater demands for political pluralism, and head-of-state Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings reaffirmed the leading role of the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) in framing and defining the debate on "democratization." During the year, however, several prominent civic and student associations and newly created organizations called for a genuine multipartyism.
Flt. Lt. Rawlings, chairman of the PNDC, led a coup that toppled the elected government of Dr. Hilla Limann in 1981. He suspended the constitution, dissolved the unicameral National Assembly and outlawed political parties, which were legalized in 1979 after being banned in 1972.

One year after seizing power, Rawlings disbanded local governments and established a national network of committees to implement government policies on the local level. In 1988 elections were held for District Assemblies (DAs), which were supposed to replace the committees. In 1990, the key issues facing the government were the role and function of the DAs; the review of political life by the PNDC-appointed National Commission for Democracy (NCD); the future of the Economic Recovery Program, (ERP); and the bloody civil war in nearby Liberia.

In establishing the DAs under PNDC Law 207 in 1988, the government sought to institutionalize a mechanism for local government that would gradually contribute to national policy, and at the same time revive a traditional national culture. Since the creation of the DAs, chiefs have taken an increasingly prominent role in local affairs, and government officials now consult them rather than the undifferentiated mass rallies of the early PNDC tenure. However, in 1990, gaps in the law and conflicts with extant legislation led to some conflicts between the DAs, local chiefs and the central government. In April the NDC announced that it was undertaking an assessment of the performance of the DAs to find out the extent of public interest in the assemblies and the extent to which members interact with their constituents.

Flt. Lt. Rawlings said that for Ghanaians democracy cannot simply mean holding elections periodically while people continue to suffer poverty, poor health and unemployment. After noting the turnout in the DA elections, he said no objective observer could doubt the PNDC’s commitment to a free and fair electoral approach. However, other organizations questioned the PNDC’s brand of "democratization." During a 24 July press conference in Accra, the capital, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) called on the PNDC to immediately lift the ban on political activity and restore multiparty democracy. The KNRG also called for the immediate release of all political prisoners, an unconditional amnesty for all political exiles and the convocation of a constituent assembly of representatives of various groups to draw up a constitution to be approved by a national referendum. In August a new organization, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ), was launched to "campaign for the restoration of democratic rule in Ghana to fight for the recognition of the fundamental human and democratic rights of the people of Ghana to decide how they shall be governed and against all forms of dictatorships and domination." The group, led by Prof. Adu Boahen, a well known historian, said it was not a political party, but it planned to campaign for multiparty democracy and civilian rule in Ghana. An inaugural rally of the MFJ scheduled for 15 September had to be cancelled because the police refused to give a permit for the event.

Students, workers, teachers and Catholic church leaders also called for a national debate on the country’s political evolution.

In other issues, the economy showed signs of decline. In 1983, faced with a severe drought, food shortages, a bloated civil service and high unemployment, Ghana—under the IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP)—launched a free-market oriented Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The program ended price controls, curbed inflation, dropped import restrictions, devalued the currency, tripled prices paid to growers of cocoa (the
nation's leading export), and laid off 50,000 civil servants. Since the program's implementation, Ghana's economy had grown an average of 6 percent a year, the highest consistent growth rate in Africa. While the economy continued to grow in 1990, Fit. Lt. Rawlings acknowledged that the effects of the ERP "remain to be felt in most households and pockets" and that many Ghanaians "continue to experience severe constraints on their household budgets."

There were indications that the SAP program was beginning to falter. The government was criticized for its failure to divest itself of state-owned enterprises. Of the 235 enterprises that the government controlled when the SAP began, 21 have been liquidated and just 5 have been fully divested. Although the gold sector was flourishing and cocoa was holding its own, analysts agreed that recovery could not be sustained without broad-based investment.

In regional issues, Ghana became a member of a five-nation west African peacekeeping force organized to end the civil war in Liberia that led to the fall and death of President Samuel K. Doe. The government pledged about 1,000 troops. In September Ghanaian planes were used to bomb rebel positions.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The citizens of Ghana do not have the means to change their government democratically. Political parties are illegal, there is no constitution, and the country remains a military dictatorship run by the PNDC. Ordinary criminal cases are handled by courts based on the British system. The security apparatus and military tribunals are controlled by the PNDC, and laws such as the Preventive Custody Law (PNDC Law 4) provide for indefinite detentions without trial for political cases deemed a threat to national security. The Habeus Corpus Amendment Law (PNDC Law 91) allows prisoners to be held without charge or trial. Since Ghana has no constitution, such rights as freedom of speech, press, assembly and association are not guaranteed, but granted at the discretion of the ruling junta. The Newspaper Licensing Law (PNDC Law 21) is used to muzzle the press. The government-owned media never criticize the government, but some of the few remaining private newspapers have on occasion attacked government economic and foreign initiatives. In August, the government and local media attacked Ghanaian journalists who work for the foreign press, and accused them of collaborating with organizations such as the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) that criticized the government. Nonpolitical professional and civic organizations are allowed to exist. The Religious Bodies Registration Law restricts freedom of religion. The Catholic Standard, a religious newspaper, continues to be banned. Ghanaians are generally free to emigrate and travel inside and outside the country. The government does not interfere with labor, and the independent Trade Union Congress (TUC), with seventeen affiliates, is well organized and active. Unions have and exercise the right to strike. The TUC has criticized the government's minimum wage legislation, and called for greater democratization and political pluralism.

Greece

Polity: Parliamentary democracy
Economy: Mixed capitalist
Population: 10,100,000
HDI: 0.949 (high)
Life Expectancy: 72 male, 76 female
Ethnic groups: Greek (98 percent), Turkish (1 percent)
A parliamentary election, two general strikes, and Greek-Turkish tensions were the major Greek developments in 1990.

Located on the southern tip of the Balkan peninsula, Greece fought for independence from the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the 1820s and 1830s. After its victory, Greece became a monarchy in 1835. In a series of wars in the early twentieth century, the country increased its territory in Europe, and took in Greek refugees from Turkey. After Axis occupation during World War II, civil war broke out between Communist and royalist forces. With Western aid, the constitutional monarchy prevailed. In 1967, a military junta took control and held power until 1974. Then the country turned to parliamentary democracy.

The parliament has 300 members who serve for a maximum term of four years. Greece has both single-member and multi-member parliamentary districts. There is a largely ceremonial president who is elected by a two-thirds vote of parliament. The conservative New Democratic Party controlled the government from 1974 until 1981, when the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) took control. Under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, PASOK renewed agreements for U.S. bases in Greece and reversed its anti-NATO and anti-EEC positions. After winning re-election in 1985, Papandreou carried out austerity measures that caused strikes and friction between PASOK and the Greek Communists. Charges of scandal mounted against Papandreou in 1987-88. The prime minister was accused of improper financial dealings, and he left his wife for an airline stewardess.

Greece held three parliamentary elections during 1989-90. In June 1989, no party won a majority, but New Democracy and the Communist-led Left Coalition formed a temporary coalition government to deal with the corruption of the PASOK administration. New Democracy leader Constantine Mitsotakis became prime minister. A new general election in November 1989 produced inconclusive results. The cabinet which emerged was a so-called ecumenical government of New Democracy, PASOK and the Left Coalition, under the premiership of the nonpartisan economist, eighty-five-year-old Professor Xenophon Zolotas. The party leaders remained outside the cabinet. The government was unable to develop a consensus on much of anything. No party wished to initiate a major austerity program, or was able to elect a president on its own, so the parties agreed only on a minimal program. The parties withdrew their ministers from the cabinet in February and necessitated another parliamentary election in April 1990.

PASOK and the Left Coalition formed an alliance for the April contest. The left-wing parties agreed to support a common candidate in each of the country's five single-member districts. New Democracy campaigned by emphasizing the need for decisive action against the economic crisis. Winning 150 of 300 seats, New Democracy made gains. PASOK took 123 seats. The Communist-led Left Coalition won 19 seats. The remaining seats went to four candidates sponsored jointly by the Socialists and Communists, one independent conservative, one Green, and two Turkish Muslims. New Democracy formed the new government with the independent conservative's support. Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis offered a program of price hikes and cutbacks in government spending. State subsidies rose by only 2.9 percent in the 1990 national budget. The government put up several state companies for possible privatization, and announced that it would abolish the indexation of wages to inflation in 1991. In the peculiar Greek economy, farmers paid no taxes in 1990, but the 1990 budget included a 27 percent increase in farm subsidies.
In a major test of the government's popularity, Greeks voted in local government elections in October 1990, but the results were mixed, and both sides claimed victory. Nonetheless, New Democracy got a boost when its candidate, Antonis Tiritis, defeated the Socialist politician and actress, Melina Mercouri, for the Athenian mayoralty. The Communists lost significant local strength for the first time since World War II.

The Greeks have the right to change their government democratically. The media are generally free, but there are some restrictions on expression in the libel laws. The television stations are owned and operated by the government, but they allocate time to all the major political parties. There is freedom of association. The trade unions are divided by political party affiliation. Strikes against the government are allowed and are effective.

Greek Orthodoxy is the state religion. Proselytizing is forbidden and there is some discrimination against the non-Orthodox religions in building church facilities. The government picks the mufti, the leader of the Muslim community, after consulting with the Turkish minority. In January and February 1990, there were clashes in northeastern Greece between Greeks and Turkish Muslims. The Greek government has upset the ethnic Turks by resettling ethnic Greeks from the Pontos region of the USSR in western Thrace, a Muslim area.

Grenada

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Overview:

Nicholas Braithwaite of the centrist National Democratic Congress (NDC) became prime minister on 16 March 1990, despite the inconclusive results of the 13 March general election.

Grenada is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general who acts as ceremonial head of state. Grenada became self-governing in 1958 and gained its independence in 1974 as a parliamentary democracy. The state also includes the islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique.

In free and fair elections held in late 1984, the New National Party (NNP) of Herbert Blaize defeated Eric Gairy's Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). The NNP, a coalition of three parties, won an overwhelming parliamentary majority, taking fourteen of the fifteen seats in the House of Representatives. The bicameral parliament also consists of an appointed Senate, with ten members appointed by the prime minister and three by the leader of the parliamentary opposition.

By mid-1989, the NNP coalition had unraveled, leaving Prime Minister Blaize with the support of only six representatives in the House. In September, Blaize formed The National Party (TNP) from among his six remaining supporters. Opposition parties questioned the constitutionality of Blaize remaining in office without a parliamentary majority, but continued to jockey for position in preparation for elections constitutionally mandated for no later than March 1990.
Blaize died in December 1989 after a prolonged illness and was replaced by his former deputy, Ben Jones. Following the dissolution of parliament eight days later, elections were scheduled for 13 March 1990. The five main contenders in the campaign were: the TNP headed by Jones; the NDC led by Braithwaite, former head of the 1983-84 interim government; the GULP headed by Gairy; the New National Party (NNP) headed by Keith Mitchell; and the leftist Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM) led by Cuban-trained medical doctor Terry Marryshow. The main issues were government corruption and the economy, particularly unemployment, which the outgoing government put at 28 percent, and the heavy national debt.

On 13 March, the NDC won seven seats, the GULP won four, and the NNP and the TNP two each. The absence of an overall majority opened up the possibility of a GULP-NNP-TNP coalition government. When these three parties were unable to come to terms after three days of intense negotiations, Braithwaite was appointed prime minister by the governor-general. On 19 March, Edzel Thomas, one of the GULP’S victorious candidates, defected to the NDC, giving the new government a one-seat parliamentary majority. At the end of March, Jones and the second TNP candidate also accepted cabinet positions, giving the NDC a comfortable 10-5 majority.

GULP vice-president Winnifred Strachan was named official opposition leader because party leader Gairy had failed to win in his own constituency. The GULP suffered a further blow when yet another of its parliamentary representatives left the party in May, leaving it with only two scats.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

All constitutional guarantees were reinstated in 1984 and there are few restrictions on the right to organize political, labor or civic groups. There are numerous independent labor unions, and the right to strike is recognized. The exercise of religion and the right of free expression are also generally respected, although some imported leftist publications were banned by the government in early 1989.

In 1989, the MBPM held a three-day conference and rally. The events took place without government interference, although invited guests from the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) of the United States were expelled from the country before they could attend, and publications of the SWP-operated Pathfinder Press were confiscated. However, the MBPM was able to participate freely in the 1990 general elections, as it had in 1984, and saw its share of the vote fall from 5 to 2.4 percent.

Newspapers, many of which are weekly political party organs, are independent. Radio is operated by the government but open to independent voices. There have been some complaints that the government has impeded the establishment of independently operated radio. Grenada’s Discovery Television-Channel 11 is the Eastern Caribbean's only independent, privately owned TV station, although it was reportedly being sold to a consortium of government and business interests.

There is an independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary which is generally respected by the police. There are no political prisoners.

After a two-year trial, thirteen men and one woman, including Bernard Coard and Gen. Hudson Austin, were found guilty in 1986 of the 1983 murder of Maurice Bishop and sentenced to death. The proceedings continued into late 1990 as the defendants, as well as others who received lesser sentences for involvement in the murder, appealed their sentences.
Overview:

In November 1990 and January 1991, Guatemalans went to the polls in the second series of national elections since the return to elected government in 1985. However, civilian authority remained weak against the still powerful armed forces, and political violence rose to the highest level since the years of military rule.

The Republic of Guatemala was established in 1839, eighteen years after independence from Spain, and following the breakup of the United Provinces of Central America (1824-1838). The nation has endured a history of dictatorship, coups d'état and guerrilla insurgency, with only intermittent democratic government. After more than thirty years of repressive military rule, Guatemala returned to elected civilian government in January 1986 with the inauguration of President Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian Democratic party.

In August 1984, seventeen political parties participated in balloting for a constituent assembly. The assembly drafted a democratic constitution that was promulgated in May 1985. Presidential elections were held in November 1985 and won by Cerezo after a run-off vote. The constitution provides for a five-year presidential term. There is also an elected, unicameral National Congress. In the 1985 legislative elections, the Christian Democrats gained fifty-one seats, with the remaining forty-nine divided among eight other parties. The governors of twenty-two departments and the municipality of Guatemala City are appointed by the president.

According to the constitution, the president is responsible for national defense and security. The 55,000-member military, however, exerts inordinate influence on the civilian government, more so since defending it against two coup attempts by disgruntled junior officers in 1988 and 1989. The army, which directs the counterinsurgency effort against the guerrilla forces of the Marxist Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), controls most of the country’s rural administration. The guerrillas have been fighting for three decades, but were weakened by the fierce repression of the early 1980s and lost further support after the return to elected government. Since 1988, however, the URNG has intensified its military activities.

In 1990, a series of U.N.-monitored talks took place between the URNG and the country’s main social, economic and political groups. The talks were conceived as a prelude to formal negotiations between the guerrillas and the government, which were expected to begin after the 11 November 1990 general elections. The military high command stated its support for negotiations.

Campaigning for the elections began in 1989. In the country’s first-ever primary, the Christian Democrats went to the polls to choose a candidate to succeed Cerezo, who under the constitution is bound to a single term. The winner was Alfonso Cabrera, a close Cerezo associate. Amid charges of fraud and allegations of corruption and involvement in drug-trafficking
against Cabrera, party patriarch Rene de Leon Schlotter broke away to become the candidate of the Social Democratic party.

By September 1990, thirteen presidential candidates had registered, mostly from centrist and right-wing parties. A total of nineteen parties were running legislative and municipal candidates. Most of the parties represented small interest groups, and total party membership is less than 10 percent of the electorate. In June, the national electoral commission approved a National Congress proposal to increase the number of legislators from 100 to 116. The country has about 300 municipalities.

According to opinion polls, the leading presidential candidates were newspaper publisher Jorge Carpio Nicolle of the center-right National Center Union (UCN), and former military dictator Gen. Efrain Rios Montt who was backed by three small right-wing parties. Amid a surging wave of political and criminal violence, Montt's law-and-order campaign had struck a resonant chord. By late October he was the frontrunner in the polls with close to 30 percent, with Carpio scoring a little better than 20 percent, and a large percentage of undecideds.

However, Article 186 of the 1985 constitution explicitly prohibits anyone who has previously come to power through force from running for president Montt ruled for a year after seizing power in a 1982 coup. Montt’s application was rejected by the electoral council, the Supreme Court and Finally by the Constitutional Court in late October. After it was determined that Montt would not be on the ballot, there were indications of unrest within the military and rumors of a coup. Carpio became the new frontrunner, and Montt called upon his supporters to nullify their ballots on election day.

Amid the spiraling political violence, which left over a dozen leading figures of various parties murdered during the campaign, Guatemalans went to the polls on 11 November 1990. Carpio came in First with 26 percent of the vote, followed by Jorge Serrano of the evangelical Christian-based Solidarity Action Movement (MAS), with 24 percent. The runoff election was scheduled for 6 January 1991.

The constitution guarantees the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions. There are nineteen legally registered political parties from social democratic left to radical right. However, political expression is severely restricted by the dramatic increase in the last two years of criminal and political violence including disappearances, murder, bombings and death threats. Political parties, student organizations, peasant groups, labor unions, Indian communities, human rights organizations and the media are all targets of political violence.

In the early 1980s, 200 or more people a month were slain. Under civilian government, dissent and political organizing are no longer tantamount to suicide. However, in the months before the November 1990 elections, the level of violence and the rate of political killings were the highest since the return to civilian government in 1985. During the campaign, over a dozen political party figures, including some from the ruling Christian Democrats, were killed, and over half the presidential and legislative candidates received death threats.

The principal human rights offenders are the military, particularly the G-2 intelligence unit, the police and security forces, both of which are under military authority, and a network of assassins linked to the armed forces and right-wing political groups. In 1989, public threats by the "White Hand" death squad appeared for the first time in over five years.
In 1990, the human rights office of the attorney general reported 276 political murders and 145 disappearances in the first nine months of the year, and stated that "the government lacks the political resolve to protect people's human rights." In January 1990, the National Congress elected an official human rights ombudsman, but as of the end of the year no member of the military or security forces has ever been convicted despite overwhelming evidence of involvement in the deaths of tens of thousands of people in the last three decades. The military was also implicated in the January 1990 murders of Hector Oqueli, a prominent Salvadoran social democrat, and Hilda Flores, a leader of the Guatemalan Social Democratic party, but a six-month government probe led to no arrests.

The civilian government's failure to address human rights violations is most evident in the dysfunctional judicial system and the corruption-plagued police force. The security forces retain a monopoly over criminal investigations and civil courts are intimidated by the military, making the entire system a black hole for any legal or human rights complaints. In mid-1990, the Center for Criminal Justice of Harvard University pulled out of a U.S.-sponsored project to reform the system citing the government's unwillingness to investigate political killings.

There are a number of independent human rights organizations, but numerous activists have disappeared, been murdered or attacked, and all are constantly threatened. These groups, particularly the Mutual Support Group (GAM), report on the killings of street children and the torture of criminal detainees by the police, as well as on the political violence. GAM's offices have been bombed and a number of its monitors have been killed or disappeared.

The Runejel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities (CERJ) works on behalf of the country's Indians, possibly the most segregated and oppressed indigenous majority in the Western hemisphere. Although mass killings of Indians during army anti-guerrilla sweeps have dropped since 1985, they have not stopped. CERJ also reports on the systematic violation by the military of the constitutional article that states no individual can be forced to join any type of civil-defense organizations against his will; the rural civil-defense network is a key component of the military's counter-insurgency program. Since CERJ was founded in 1988, over a hundred members have received death threats, and nearly a dozen abducted or killed. In October 1990, two CERJ activists were kidnapped, with one of them found dead three weeks before the general elections.

Labor unions have re-established themselves since the return to elected government and have often exercised their right to strike. There have been more labor actions in the last three years than in the last three decades. However, a number of unionists have been killed and most remain subject to attacks and death threats, particularly in rural areas. In 1990, a number of labor leaders fled into exile.

The press and a large portion of the broadcast media are privately owned and uncensored by the government. There are several independent daily and weekly newspapers offering different points of view. There are approximately ninety radio stations, only a half-dozen run by the government. Five of the six television stations are commercially operated. Since 1989, however, a number of newly established, left-leaning magazines and periodicals have been subject to bombing attacks and death threats. A number of journalists associated with these and other publications went into exile and at least one
weekly was forced to shut down when its staff resigned. A number of radio stations have also closed because of threats, and one radio station owner was murdered in October 1990. In the same month, there were two armed attacks against journalists, including one against the vice-president of the national journalists association who fled into exile.

Guinea

| Polity: Military | Political Rights: 6 |
| Economy: Mixed capitalist | Civil Liberties: 5 |
| Population: 7,300,000 | Status: Not Free |
| HDI: 0.162 (low) | Life Expectancy: 39 male, 42 female |
| Ethnic groups: Fulani, Malinke, Soussou, others |

Overview:

The key issues facing the regime of President Brig. Gen. Lansana Conte in 1990 were the pace of plans for a return to civilian rule, the civil war in neighboring Liberia, and continuing economic difficulties.

President Conte assumed power after a bloodless coup in 1984. He suspended the 1982 constitution, outlawed political parties, and dissolved the 210-member unicameral National Assembly, which had been dominated by the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) under a one-party system. The country, located on the Atlantic coast of west-central Africa, is governed by the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN), headed by President Conte, and a Council of Ministers designated by the CMRN.

In 1990 President Conte pledged that the country would be returned to civilian rule by 1995. A new constitution was drawn up by a fifty-member commission and was expected to be put to a national referendum in November. Under the proposed system, the CMRN was to be dissolved and replaced by a new body composed of both civilians and military men that would supervise the creation of new institutions.

Throughout the year, however, the president seemed to waffle on the exact timetable for the transition and the precise nature of political change. There were indications of opposition, particularly among the military, to the president’s plan, which called for a two-party system. Some in the military suspected that President Conte was using democracy as a means of getting rid of them, particularly in light of the president’s plan that every soldier who wanted to remain in politics resign his army post.

Opponents of the president’s transition plans were also found abroad. The French government strongly advised against the creation of two competing political parties. Part of France’s concern was rooted in the fear that political lines would be drawn along tribal loyalties and lead to unrest and violence. President Conte’s Soussou tribe is centered around the area of Conakry, the capital, and dominates existing power structures. Following a 1985 coup attempt by then-Prime Minister Diarra Traore, members of his Malinke tribe were massacred.

In July the government announced several incursions by rebels from Liberia into border villages in Guinea. Fighting in Liberia forced 300,000 refugees into Guinea by midsomer. In August, the government pledged troops to a regional five-nation, 3,500-member peacekeeping force established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The proposed transition to a more democratic political system was
undertaken in an unfavorable economic climate. To repair the economy, based on the export of such mineral resources as bauxite and diamonds, the government in 1989 undertook a program of restructuring and reform that included cutting back the civil service, stimulating private enterprise by creating producers' cooperatives, and promoting foreign investment. In 1990, with the gradual implementation of IMF conditions, many government workers were laid off. In a bid to encourage denationalization several industries were sold to the private sector. But some have since closed, thereby increasing the already rising unemployment rate. Corruption remains a crucial problem for the economy, and the president pledged in April to reduce malpractice among government officials and civil servants, though he offered no specifics. One encouraging development was the expansion of shipping activities, particularly the Port Autonome de Conakry, whose facilities are being extended with the assistance of a $95 million loan from the World Bank, GTZ of West Germany and the African Development Bank.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Guinea remains a military dictatorship and citizens do not enjoy the right to change their government using democratic means. The judicial system includes civilian and military courts, and local civil cases are often handled by village chiefs or councils. A Court of State Security handles "crimes against the state." The government continues to regulate the media, and 90 percent of journalists are still government employees. Self-censorship is practiced, and criticism of government policies is rare. There are still legal restrictions on free expression by individuals. The national news agency (AGP), revived in 1985, provides news items and features to the national radio and the country's only newspaper, *Horoya*, which is struggling to come out once a week. Foreign news agencies are represented by Guineans employed by the state.

The government must approve all public gatherings. A new law in 1990 safeguarded the rights of private, professional and business organizations. Religious freedom is respected in a country where 85 percent of the people are Muslim. There are some restrictions on domestic travel, and the right to travel abroad has been denied for political reasons. The Guincan National Labor Confederation (CNTG) is the only recognized labor federation and is closely associated with the government. Workers need CNTG permission to legally strike. In the wake of a teacher's strike, Guinea's president felt it necessary to stress that the right to strike remained "intangible."

**Guinea-Bissau**

- **Polity:** One-party (military dominated)
- **Economy:** Mixed statist
- **Population:** 1,000,000
- **HDI:** 0.074 (low)
- **Life Expectancy:** 41 male, 45 female
- **Ethnic Groups:** Balanta, Fulani, Manjaca, Malinke, Papcl

**Overview:**

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau, located on the Atlantic coast of west-central Africa between Guinea and Senegal, continued its policy of economic restructuring and in 1990 there were signs that President Brig. Gen. Joao Bernardo Vieira was prepared to consider a measure of political liberalization in the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.
President Vieira came to power in 1980 after a coup overthrew Luis de Almeida Cabral, who had led an armed struggle against the Portuguese in the 1960s and had assumed the presidency after independence in 1974. The 1984 constitution codified the supremacy of the PAIGC and reconstituted the unicameral, 150-member National Assembly, whose members are designated by eight popularly elected regional councils and elect a Council of State, whose president is also head of state. In elections held in June 1989, Vieira, the only candidate, was elected to another five-year term as president.

On 9 March a decree issued by President Vieira as head of the Council of State reshuffled the cabinet, abolishing four ministries and creating seven new ones. Later in the month, former Prime Minister Vitor Saude Maria, who was dismissed from his post in 1984, accused of treason and expelled from the PAIGC, was appointed president of the Bissau Municipal Chamber. Observers in Bissau indicated that his rehabilitation was part of the president's effort at national reconciliation.

In January members of a special Expanded Commission of Reflection established by the PAIGC Central Committee created three working groups dealing with the party, new by-laws and a so-called transition platform. Yet it remains unclear whether the government is truly committed to multiparty pluralism. In April and May, President Vieira on several occasions announced his commitment to a multiparty system on a nontribal basis. In June he told a Lisbon newspaper that he envisioned a two- or three-year transition period followed by "free and democratic" elections. Yet, during the country's most recent legislative elections, also dubbed "democratic," the number of affirmative votes was greater than the number of registered voters.

The president's pronouncements aside, many key PAIGC leaders—while acknowledging that the days of state socialism are numbered—have proposed democratization within a one-party system.

In September, it was reported that the Central Committee of the PAIGC adopted a document providing an outline for the transition to political pluralism, and that the adoption of multipartyism by 1993 was supported by the president. The main opposition group, the so-called Bafata Movement based in Lisbon, sought to broaden its contacts inside the country to put pressure on the government and offered an eight-point plan for a peaceful transition to democracy.

The government economic restructuring began two years ago under IMF and World Bank guidelines with the country on the verge of economic collapse. President Vieira's pledge last year to privatize the country's industry began to be implemented, with no sector exempt. Yet, privatization has led to corruption and a long list of abuses by the members of the nomenklatura, who—like some of their East European counterparts—have taken advantage of their influence and privileged access to take over newly privatized concerns. For example, 51 percent control of a new shipping company, despite bidding from a foreign firm, is held by close relatives of three ministers and PAIGC leaders. Small service businesses and markets have proliferated rapidly. A new class of entrepreneurs is emerging. Foreign investment has increased. Private medical clinics have sprung up. Although inflation was running at nearly 78 percent last year and layoffs in the public sector brought unemployment, economic liberalization did succeed in stimulating the economy. After some years of negative growth, internal production and exports increased.
Guinea-Bissau continues to be a one-party state dominated by the PAIGC in which citizens cannot democratically change their government. Despite ongoing reviews of the political system, the judiciary remains a part of the executive branch, although it offers some safeguards in criminal cases. The government retains the power to arbitrarily detain individuals suspected of anti-state activities. In January, the government released all remaining political prisoners. The government controls all media, which generally reflect official policies. However, some criticism of policy is tolerated. Radio National, which in 1977 had won the award as the best radio station in West Africa, is nothing but a shadow of its former self. Experimental Television (TVE-GB), though an official information organization, includes critical and independent reports alongside the propaganda. TV coverage of poor care at a hospital was enough to bring about the immediate dismissal of the doctor in charge. The new economic restructuring and privatization has seen a growth in embryonic associations of engineers, architects and doctors, and government approval is not required for peaceful, nonpolitical assemblies. Christians, Muslims and animists can worship freely, and proselytizing is allowed. Travel, both foreign and domestic, is unrestricted. The only union, the National Union of Guinea-Bissau (UNTG), is effectively controlled by the party. The constitution does not provide and protect the right to organize and bargain collectively. In the past, strikes have been broken up by force and rarely occur.

Guyana

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

**Guyana**

**Politics:**
- Dominant party: PNC
- Political Rights: 4

**Economy:**
- Mixed statist
- Civil Liberties: 4

**Population:**
- 800,000
- Status: Partly Free

**Life Expectancy:**
- 66 male, 71 female

**Ethnic Groups:**
- Complex, East Indian (50 percent), black (31 percent), mixed (12 percent), Amerindian (4 percent), and the remainder European

**Overview:**

Under increased domestic and international pressure, the government of President Desmond Hoyte agreed to significant electoral reform in 1990, opening the possibility of the first relatively free elections in decades. However, with the opposition divided, the long-ruling People's National Congress (PNC) still looked like the dominant political force in the run-up to the vote due by May 1991.

The Cooperative Republic of Guyana is a member of the British Commonwealth. Since independence in 1966, the nation has been ruled by the black-based PNC. The 1966 constitution established Guyana as a parliamentary member of the Commonwealth, but the monarchical structure was abandoned in 1970 in favor of a titular president elected by the National Assembly. Under President Forbes Burnham, Guyana was redesignated as a " coop-
In the 1970s, the PNC retained power through fraudulent elections. In 1980, two years after a controversial referendum, the PNC installed a new constitution which formalized the “paramountcy” of the PNC in all government spheres. It provides for a popularly elected executive president with virtually unlimited powers, including the right to veto all legislative enactments. There is a National Assembly with fifty-three members directly elected for five years, plus twelve members designated indirectly to represent regional and local interests.

In 1980, Burnham was re-elected president in elections that were fraudulent in practically every respect. After his death in mid-1985, he was succeeded by Hoyte, who was elected for a full term in a similarly fraudulent exercise a few months later. In 1986, the opposition formed a coalition, the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), composed of the Marxist, East Indian-based People’s Progressive Party (PPP), the social democratic, mixed-race Working People’s Alliance (WPA), and three small centrist parties. But the PCD’s demand for negotiated electoral reform was stonewalled by the Hoyte government.

In January 1990, the Guyanese Action for Reform and Democracy (GUARD), a civic movement for electoral reform, was established. The GUARD, backed by the Anglican and Catholic churches, the Guyanese Human Rights Association (GHRA), independent labor unions and media, and business and professional groups, pressed the government for an independent electoral commission, new voter registration rolls, vote-counting at polling places, and international monitoring. By the summer, GUARD was attracting thousands to weekly rallies, the largest opposition gatherings under PNC rule.

At the same time, the PCD was having success in obtaining international support for free elections. Since 1988, Hoyte had been implementing an economic liberalization program and seeking assistance from Western sources, particularly the U.S. and Great Britain. In 1990, key U.S. congressman and international human rights organizations pressed Washington to tie economic assistance to political reform.

In mid-1990, Hoyte began making concessions, inviting electoral observation missions from the British Commonwealth and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. He later conceded on two of the opposition’s main demands—vote-counting at polling places, and a complete revision of the voter registration rolls. Hoyte also agreed to an independent electoral commission, but it was unclear how the PNC-dominated body would be reformed. Elections in Guyana are traditionally held in December, but because of the time involved in a new voter registration, Hoyte said they would be delayed until 1991.

As Hoyte was making concessions, however, the PCD was unraveling over the issue of presenting a single presidential candidate. When the PPP’s Cheddi Jagan, leader of the PCD’s largest party, insisted on running, the other parties were left to run someone else, or to back the independent lawyer and trade unionist, Ashton Chase, the candidate promoted by the GUARD. A divided opposition worked to the advantage of the PNC, as the constitution requires only that a candidate receive a plurality of the vote to be elected president.

The constitution grants the right of free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions. Although the pervading fear and intimidation that existed under Burnham
have lessened, official policies still place inordinate restrictions on political expression. Political rights and civil liberties rest heavily on government tolerance rather than institutional protection.

Political parties remain subject to harassment and brutality by police and armed gangs reportedly linked to the security forces. Opposition leaders are arrested during demonstrations, even when legally approved. The right of habeas corpus is not consistently respected. The judicial system is nominally independent but heavily influenced by the government, which often ignores the courts on the infrequent occasions they rule against it.

There is an independent and well-respected Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA) which is backed by independent civic and religious groups. The government has sought to impede its activity through intimidation and a series of libel actions. There are no political prisoners but the threat of internal exile remains. In 1989 and 1990, the GHRA reported an increase in police brutality, including rape and torture during confinement, as well as shootings and killings attributed to the police.

Under Bumham, labor unions were either coopted through the Trade Union Council (TUC) or subject to repression. However, in 1988, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Guyana (FITUG) was formed by seven dissident unions when the TUC split over the Hoyte government’s IMF-inspired economic austerity program. Since 1988, the FITUG has held a series of successful demonstrations and strikes that throttled the vital bauxite and sugar industries. However, strikers have been subject to mass arrests and arbitrary dismissals.

In 1986, the Hoyte administration permitted a new independent newspaper, the Stabroek News. But the government, in the Bumham tradition, continues to make excessive use of libel suits and controlled access to newsprint and hard currency to curb the independent press, particularly the Catholic Standard, an outspoken church weekly. Political party publications are similarly affected. Public radio is primarily an instrument of the ruling party. The two television stations are nominally independent, but program content is heavily influenced by the government.

Haiti

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary democracy (military influenced)  
**Political Rights:** 4  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Status:** Partly Free  
**Population:** 6,500,000  
**HDI:** 0.356 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 51 male, 54 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous  

**Overview:**

In the internationally monitored national elections held on 16 December 1990, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president by an overwhelming majority of Haitian voters. His inauguration was scheduled for 7 February 1991. The military, having allowed a provisional civilian government to take office in March 1990, cooperated with the independent electoral council in conducting the vote. However, the military remained the dominant institution in the country, and its relationship with the incoming government of Aristide, a staunch anti-Duvalierist, remained uncertain.

Since becoming independent following a slave revolt in 1804, the
Republic of Haiti has endured a history of poverty, violence, instability and dictatorship. A February 1986 military coup ended twenty-nine years of rule by the Duvalier family, but it did not end the corruption, repression and terror. In rapid succession the new military government of Gen. Henri Namphy was followed by those of Leslie Manigat (January-July 1988) and Gen. Prosper Avril. The latter promised new elections and a transfer of power to a civilian government.

However, he actively recruited former Tontons Macoute into the army, cashiered or imprisoned democracy-minded officers, and did little to reduce the level of generalized violence in the country. In January 1990, Avril unleashed a brutal crackdown against politicians and human rights advocates who had issued a statement critical of his rule. When the state of siege was lifted, he was confronted by nationwide protests—backed by political, civic, and business leaders—that shut down the nation for a week in early March. On 10 March, Avril handed over power to Gen. Herard Abraham and left the country.

Gen. Abraham fulfilled a pledge to yield to a civilian president within seventy-two hours, accepting the selection of Ertha Pascal-Trouillot by the Unity Assembly, a coalition of political parties and civic organizations. President Pascal-Trouillot, the only woman member of the Supreme Court, was sworn in on 13 March. She agreed to share power with a nineteen-member Council of State appointed by the Unity Assembly, and promised that her provisional government would hold elections within six months. The 1987 constitution was reinstated, and Gen. Abraham claimed the 7,000-man army would support the electoral process.

The 1987 constitution provides for a directly elected president, a legislature composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives, and an independent judiciary. It bans Duvalierists from holding public office and authorizes an independent commission to supervise elections.

At the beginning of May, Pascal-Trouillot swore in a new nine-member electoral council, the fourth since 1987 and the best trained. However, the president's authority was undermined by mounting violence attributed to soldiers and Duvalierists and by a bankrupt government unable to pay employees or provide the most basic services. On 21 June, four gunman, two wearing army uniforms, killed a union official and a member of the Council of State and wounded two other politicians in an attack at a Port-au-Prince hotel. On 29 June, the electoral council announced that general elections were scheduled for 4 November, but would not be held unless the political violence ended.

The climate of insecurity intensified in July when Roger Lafontant, the former chief of the Tontons Macoute, and Williams Regala, the military chief believed responsible for the 1987 election day massacre, returned to Haiti. They formed a new Duvalierist movement, with Lafontant defiantly announcing his candidacy for president and claiming that his primary constituency was the 300,000 former members of the Tontons Macoute. The government issued an arrest order for the two men, but the army failed to act upon it.

On 15 August, the Council of State passed a vote of no-confidence against Pascal-Trouillot because of her government's inaction. In September, the electoral council, citing the lack of security, moved the election date back to 16 December. However, the president managed to hold on when her appeals for international support of the electoral process received a positive
response. In addition to U.S. electoral and security assistance, Canada, Venezuela, France, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter offered technical and economic support. The most important contribution came from the United Nations, which approved Haiti's request for a 400-member electoral observer mission, including an unarmed security contingent, for the period leading up to the election.

During the voter registration period, the electoral council praised the military coordinating committee for electoral security established by Gen. Abraham for its cooperation. However, although the notorious tactical units of the army—the Dessalines Battalion, the Presidential Guard, and the Leopards—had been disbanded, it was unclear whether Gen. Abraham was in full control of competing factions, a number of them clearly aligned with the Duvalierists.

When candidate registration ended in mid-October, there were twenty-six presidential candidates. The early leader appeared to be Marc Bazin, a moderate conservative backed by a three-party, centrist coalition, the National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP). But the unexpected late entry of Aristide, a charismatic, leftist priest who was backed by an array of popular and grassroots movements united in the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD), dramatically altered the equation.

Despite the disqualification on technical grounds of Lafontant and a number of other Duvalierist candidates, the campaign was marked by only one major violent incident, an attack on an Aristide rally on 5 December which left seven people dead. Eleven days later, voters turned out amid relative calm, and without military interference, to choose a president, a bicameral parliament, and municipal officials. There was a consensus among international observers that the election was free and fair.

On 24 December, Aristide was officially declared the winner. With over half the votes counted, he had received nearly 68 percent, while Bazin trailed in second with about 15 percent. However, it was uncertain whether Aristide's FNCD would also win a majority in parliament. According to the constitution, the president must appoint a prime minister with the approval of parliament. Without an FNCD majority, Aristide would face the prospect of having to select a prime minister from outside his coalition, resulting in a "co-habitation" government.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

The 1987 constitution guarantees the right of free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions. However, it was not until the election campaign in late 1990 that these rights were respected with any consistency. Even so, a climate of insecurity remained because of the military's continued failure to disarm or throttle the Tontons Macoutes, including factions still active within the army and rural security forces.

Labor unions are well organized—there are four confederations—and have made effective use of the right to strike, particularly in cooperation with political parties. A twenty-four-hour general strike called by thirty-two groups representing farmers, workers, opposition parties and other civic organizations halted nearly all public transportation and economic activity at the end of September 1989. Another nationwide protest forced Gen. Prosper Avril out of power in March 1990. A general strike was held in July 1990 to protest the return to Haiti of two notorious Duvalierists. In 1990, the army did not open
fire on demonstrators as it has in the past, but a number of labor leaders were murdered in isolated incidents.

While nominally independent, the judicial system is weak and ineffective, and irrelevant in rural areas. The judiciary hears only about a dozen major crime cases a year, provided juries can be found during its annual two-week session. The Port-au-Prince bar association appears to be under the influence of Duvalierist sympathizers. Arbitrary arrests are common, as is torture during confinement. Political assassinations occur regularly.

There are independent human rights organizations, but they are targets of intimidation, subject to physical attacks, and depend on international support. These groups report that over half of the hundreds of killings that take place each year are committed by soldiers.

There are a number of newspapers but independent publications are self-censored in varying degrees because of continuing intimidation. There are approximately three dozen government commercial and religious radio stations. Independent radio is critical of the government and influential. A private commercial television company broadcasts over two channels.

Honduras

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy (military influenced)
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist
**Population:** 5,100,000
**HDI:** 0.563 (medium)
**Life Expectancy:** 58 male, 62 female
**Ethnic Groups:** Relatively homogeneous, approximately 7 percent Indian

**Political Rights:** 2
**Civil Liberties:** 3
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

The inauguration of President Rafael Leonardo Callejas on 27 January 1990 marked the third consecutive peaceful transfer of government to an elected civilian administration since 1982 and the first ballot-box transfer of power to an out-party in fifty-seven years. In his first year in office, Callejas and his ruling National Party (PN) attempted to revive the strapped Honduran economy through a program of market-oriented measures, but encountered strong labor opposition. Amid a climate of growing violence, the still powerful military appeared to be taking a more prominent role in the nation's affairs.

After achieving independence from Spain in 1821, and after the breakup of the United Provinces of Central America (1824-1838), the Republic of Honduras was established in 1839. Its history has been marked by armed rebellions, coups d'etat, military rule and only intermittent democratic government. A process of democratization began with the election of a constituent assembly in 1980, the election of President Roberto Suazo of the Liberal Party (PL) in 1981, and the promulgation of a democratic constitution at the time of his inauguration in January 1982.

The 1982 constitution, the seventeenth in the nation's history, provides for a president and a 130-member, unicameral National Congress directly elected for four years. In the 1981 and 1985 presidential races, parties could nominate more than one candidate; the winner was the leading candidate of the party with the highest total aggregate vote. Thus, Jose Azcona, one of three PL candidates, was elected to succeed President Suazo in the November 1985 vote with only 27 percent of the vote, less than the 43 percent received
by Callejas of the PN, the country's other major political party. Smaller parties received collectively less than 5 percent.

At the end of 1988, however, the independent electoral tribunal instructed the parties to hold primaries to determine presidential nominations. In primary balloting, Roberto Flores won a four-way race to become the PL candidate. Callejas was selected to run again for the PN. Two smaller, left-leaning parties also nominated candidates. During the campaign, the central issues were government corruption and the declining economy. Honduras remains one of the hemisphere’s poorest nations, with over half the population either unemployed or active in the informal economy.

In the internationally monitored general elections held on 26 November 1989, Callejas soundly defeated Flores, taking just over 50 percent of the vote. The PN also won a clear majority of the congressional seats, as well as control of over two-thirds of the country’s 283 municipal governments. The governors of the country’s eighteen regional departments are appointed by the executive.

After taking office, the Callejas government moved quickly to implement a sweeping economic austerity program, and succeeded in restoring some of the U.S. and international development assistance cut off during the Azcona administration. However, this bold approach, including massive layoffs and government spending cuts, alienated the well-organized labor sector, as well as private business and the Catholic church. A nationwide public sector strike that shut down half the government in May was followed by strikes at the nation’s only oil refinery and a crippling seven-week shutdown of the key banana industry.

The banana strike ended only after Callejas sent in military troops and authorized the hiring of strikebreakers. Further government-labor conflict appeared imminent in the fall of 1990, as thousands of banana workers were laid off in the wake of the strike that caused more than $18 million in damages, and as peasant organizations began to mobilize in demand of a new agrarian reform policy.

Since the return to civilian rule, the 22,000-member military has retained influence over civilian governments on security issues. Theoretically, the National Congress elects the chief of the armed forces, who commands for a three-year period, from a list of nominees provided by the military. In reality, however, the military’s first choice is routinely approved.

The influence of the military appeared to be enhanced in 1990 after Callejas resorted to the use of troops during the labor confrontations. The military has also used the stepped-up guerrilla activities of the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (MPL) and the Morazanista Patriotic Front (FPM) as an opportunity to assert itself further. These groups have less than five hundred members between them, but in 1989 and 1990 they have attacked high-profile targets including government offices and U.S. servicemen. In response, security forces have increased repressive measures against all leftist political activity, including the use of threats and illegal arrests and searches. In the fall of 1990, amid a climate of increasing violence, President Callejas was forced to publicly reassure the nation that constitutional guarantees remained in effect.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression, freedom of religion and the right to form political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are generally respected. There are a half dozen legal political parties ranging
from the right to the social democratic left. The Honduran Communist Party (PCH) gained legal status in 1981, but since 1983 has been operating clandestinely after declaring support for the MPL and FPM guerrilla movements.

Political expression has been restricted, however, by an increase in political violence since 1988. Left-wing guerrilla actions, including the murders of at least one right-wing politician and a retired armed forces chief, have been accompanied by several political killings carried out by right-wing extremist groups, particularly against the labor sector and left-wing student activists.

Several of these clandestine extremist groups have issued public death threats. There were also reports from independent human rights organizations of extra-judicial killings and torture committed by security forces. Independent rights monitors, in turn, have been subject to threats and violent intimidation.

The government human rights office has acknowledged a pattern of abuses by police but states that the policy of the government and armed forces was to stem the violence. In 1988, the government cooperated on a case brought against Honduras at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and in 1990 it paid monetary damages assessed by the Court for two killings committed by security forces earlier in the decade. However, the Honduran judicial system, headed by a Supreme Court, remains weak and subject to pressure by the military. Investigations of human rights charges against the military and security forces are short-lived, and the military does not make public its own internal investigations.

Labor unions are well organized and permitted to strike. Labor leaders, however, as well as religious groups and peasant unions pressing for land reform, have been subject to official intimidation and violent attacks. Independent rights monitors have reported illegal detentions and torture in rural areas.

The press and broadcast media are largely private. There are several daily newspapers representing various political points of view. In recent years, however, several of the approximately one hundred radio stations have been threatened with suspension by the government for interviewing independent human rights monitors and labor activists.

**Overview:**

In 1990 Hungary continued its smooth political transition from Communist rule to a genuine multiparty democracy. The country's first free national elections in more than forty years resulted in a coalition government led by the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and the emergence of a well-organized parliamentary opposition. By far the most crucial challenge facing the new government was restructuring and reviving a sputtering economy. Other important issues included the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the country's future in the Warsaw Pact (now dissolved).

In June 1989 the reformist wing of the badly fragmented Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) gained dominance by adopting a four-man ruling presidium that included Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, party Chair-
man Reszo Nyers, popular State Secretary Imre Pozsgay and General Secretary Karoly Grosz. The move was designed to undercut the authority of Grosz, an indecisive moderate who took over as party leader in May 1988 after the ouster of long-time hardline leader Janos Kadar. The restructured government immediately began round-table talks with the burgeoning civil opposition groups, the main ones being the populist, Christian-based Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Alliance of Free Democrats, and FIDESZ, a dynamic student group. In October 1989, the HSWP reconstituted itself as the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) headed by Nyers; hardliners regrouped around the rump HSWP.

As 1990 approached, the HSP reformers appeared to be firmly in control, and many experts both in and outside Hungary were touting Mr. Pozsgay as the next president of Hungary. Presidential elections had been scheduled for 26 November. However, the Alliance of Free Democrats and FIDESZ presented the government with a petition, signed by 200,000, demanding a national referendum to decide whether the president would be picked directly by the voters or by the next freely elected parliament. The election was called off, and on 26 November Hungarians voted to postpone a presidential election until after a new parliament was chosen.

In early 1990, the government was stung by allegations made by the Free Democrats and FIDESZ that the Hungarian secret police had been spying on registered opposition parties. On 13 January Interior Minister Istvan Horvath admitted that the spying had occurred, and he subsequently resigned. Opinion polls indicated that public support for the HSP had slipped to some 10 percent.

As the campaign for the two-round legislative elections began, some sixty parties were registered, but only twelve were strong enough to field a national list of candidates for the vote on 25 March and 8 April. The biggest parties were the Free Democrats, the MDF, and the Independent Smallholders’ Party, a prewar party that won 57 percent of the vote in 1945 before the Communist takeover. Early polls showed each party with about 20 percent support.

An underlying division during the campaign had its roots in the arguments in the 1920s between so-called "urbanists" and "populists." The Free Democrats, led by philosopher Janos Kis, called for radical steps toward a free market, an attack on the 30 percent inflation rate, and a program of rapid privatization. In foreign affairs, the party called for Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and an economic integration with Western Europe. Their main rival was the MDF, led by Jozsef Antall, a populist-Christian movement that had worked closely with the reform-minded Communists. The party’s economic aims were broadly similar to those of the Free Democrats, but the Forum said that privatization had to be more gradual. The rivalry between the two often grew bitter.

With neither the Free Democrats nor the MDF commanding a majority in opinion polls and with the differences between them making a coalition unlikely, attention focused on the smaller parties. All the parties appeared to agree that the HSP would not be in the new government. This was particularly irksome to HSP stalwarts, who argued that it was talented reform Communists who forced the ruling party to accept multiparty democracy.

As a result of agreements ironed out during the roundtable, the campaign was relatively open. The Social Democrats confirmed that they did receive considerable help from Western European social democratic parties, while the MDF acknowledged that it had received money and equipment from Christian Democratic parties from West Germany and elsewhere. The Free
Democrats said that a significant sum for campaign expenses had been contributed by the West German Free Democrats and other Western sources.

Some 65 percent of eligible voters turned out on 25 March for the first round of the elections for 386 parliamentary seats. The results were close, with the MDF polling 24.7 percent of the vote and the Free Democrats 21.4 percent. The Independent Smallholders won 11.8 percent, followed by the HSP, 10.9; FIDESZ, 8.9; the Christian Democrats, 6.5; the HSWP, 3.7; the Social Democrats, 3.6; and others, 8.5 percent. Under the complex election system, parties had to gain 4 percent of the vote to win seats by proportional representation, so only six parties were qualified to seat candidates in parliament. A two-tiered election procedure allowed citizens to vote on two ballots, one giving party preference and the other selecting individual candidates. Only 5 candidates for the 176 constituency seats (where an absolute majority was needed to win on the first round) got a big enough margin to declare victory, among them Prime Minister Nemeth. However, Imre Pozsgay, who just a few months earlier had been considered a possible presidential contender, finished a distant third behind a twenty-eight-year-old FIDESZ nominee.

The election, which was monitored by a delegation of sixty-four election observers from sixteen countries, was declared generally free and fair. On 8 April the MDF won a decisive victory in the second-round, winning 43 percent of the vote and 165 seats, with the Free Democrats polling 24 percent, hardly more than in the first round, earning them 92 seats. MDF leader Antall said he was confident he could form a government with the help of the Smallholders, whose 11 percent gave them 43 seats, and the Christian Democrats, who got 5 percent and 21 seats. The HSP won 33 seats, while FIDESZ took 21. Other parties split 11 seats. Only 45 percent of eligible voters turned out to vote.

On 2 May, as a freely elected parliament convened in Budapest for the first time in four decades, the country's leading parties agreed that Arpad Goncz, a Free Democrat and writer jailed for six years after the 1956 uprising, would be elected president. In exchange for getting the MDF to back Goncz, the Free Democrats agreed to support an amendment to the constitution so that a two-thirds parliamentary majority would no longer be required to pass any law considered of national importance. The MDF and the Free Democrats also agreed to amend the constitution so that the president would be elected to a regular four-year term by parliament rather than by an expensive and draining national election. On 3 May, the new president chose Antall to form Hungary's first freely elected government, succeeding Prime Minister Nemeth.

The government was formally voted in by parliament on 29 May, with 218 votes for, 126 against, and 8 abstentions. Prime Minister Antall reiterated his pledge to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and take the country into the European Community. One impediment to swift and decisive government action was the bureaucracy the new government inherited from the Communists. Nevertheless, by early August the parliament passed eleven laws, twenty-four amendments of laws, and twenty-two parliamentary resolutions. The legislation made possible the passage of two crucial laws on the local self-government system.

In July, responding to pressure from the International Monetary Fund to bring down a ballooning budget deficit, the government announced a series of price increases on cigarettes, alcohol and energy. On 29 July, less than 15
percent of eligible voters turned out for the referendum on the presidency, far below the 50 percent needed to validate the measure. The vote thus passed to the parliament.

On 23 July the government announced it had reached an agreement on the reprivatization of farms, which could involve more than half the nation's arable land. Members of the ruling coalition told a news conference that they wanted a farm system based on private ownership.

Political apathy also marked the local elections on 30 September and 14 October. Less than 30 percent of eligible voters went to the polls in the second round. Nevertheless, the elections were a boost to the opposition. In Budapest, the capital, opposition parties won 20 of the cities 22 electoral districts. The voter apathy and the defeat of MDF candidates were seen as a barometer of the national mood. Janos Kis, president of the Free Democrats, took comfort from the division of power between central and local government critical for the depoliticization of the public service.

The economy continued to be the most critical domestic issue in 1990. When the new government took office, the economy was floundering. The foreign debt stood at $21 billion, the highest per capita debt in Eastern Europe. Inflation was nearing 30 percent, compared with 17 percent in 1987 and 5 percent in 1986. The GDP continued to decline. Production in key industries was falling, and an increasing number of people were living below the poverty line, including 65 percent of all pensioners. Unemployment reached almost 100,000 by the end of the year. In a broad sense, the government strategy of privatization, price increases to cut down on subsidies, and the aggressive courting of Western investors met with some success. Trade with the West increased. In the first half of 1990, exports to COMECON were down by nearly a third, while those to hard-currency markets grew by 17 percent. Although large industries were in trouble, output of firms with fewer than 50 people had risen some 200 percent by 1990, as Hungary saw the emergence of a small entrepreneurial class. Efforts to join the European Community continued.

The government's three-year program was conceived to convince critics that the government was committed to decisive reform. On 18 September, the parliament approved a law on privatization that aimed to transfer to private hands some 10,000 shops, restaurants and small businesses offering services. A month later, the government announced plans to sell off large state enterprises. Foreign investment was also up in 1990. The number of joint-ventures was about 2,000 near the end of the year. In July, Ford, the world's second-largest automaker, announced it would invest $80 million in an automotive components plant in Hungary. General Motors and Suzuki of Japan had already agreed to projects in the country.

In foreign affairs, the important issues were the withdrawal of Soviet troops and Hungary's determination to leave the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union agreed in 1989 to withdraw its 53,000 troops from Hungary. In March 1990, the agreement was formalized and the troops began leaving on 11 March. The government forged important ties with Western Europe and the European community, as well as regional cooperation with Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Relations with Romania, however, remained strained over the rights of the Hungarian minority living in Romania.

Hungarians can change their government through democratic means. The 1990 legislative elections, which saw the emergence of an MDF-led coalition in parliament, were generally free and fair. The opposition has a realistic
chance under the system to gain power, and won decisive victories in local elections. The judiciary is not wholly independent as yet, but the government has undertaken legal reforms, and overtly political offenses have been excised from the criminal code. No judge, member of the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court can be a member of a political party or engage in political activity. The constitution establishes the presumption of innocence, and trials are open. Early in the year, the interior minister resigned after admitting that the secret police were spying on political parties. The security apparatus is no longer an intrusive arm of state repression. Citizens are free to express their views, the state-owned media offers diverse view; there are more than 100 independent publications, several owned by foreign publishing giants such as Rupert Murdoch, Axel Springer and others. Freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed and respected.

On 25 January, parliament formally buried the anti-religion practices of four decades by adopting a law making freedom of conscience and religion a fundamental liberty not granted by the state or any other authority. On 6 February, Hungary removed forty-year-old restrictions on the Roman Catholic Church, and the Vatican announced it was re-establishing diplomatic relations with Budapest. Hungarians are free to travel abroad and there are no internal travel restrictions. In addition to the official trade union organization SZOT, there are several independent unions and federations, among them the Union of Scientific and Technical Workers (TDDSZ), formed in 1988, and unions of teachers, film workers, ambulance drivers and pharmacists, railway workers, and building maintenance workers. Also, there are independent local unions of transport cooperatives and a blue-collar union, Workers' Solidarity. A Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions was established to coordinate the work of independent unions. Workers have the right to strike.

Iceland

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 300,000

**HDI:** 0.975 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 74 male, 80 female

**Ethnic groups:** Icelandic (mixed Norwegian and Celtic)

**Overview:**

Located far north in the Atlantic Ocean, Iceland has a parliamentary tradition dating back to the tenth century. Ruled by Denmark for over 500 years, Iceland won home rule in 1918 and complete independence in 1944. Since independence, coalition governments have been the norm. The country’s proportional voting system encourages multi-party representation in the 63-member, bicameral parliament, the Althing. The voters elect 49 Althing members by proportional representation from 8 election districts. The remaining members are chosen according to the parties' national voting strength. After the election, the Althing members elect 21 of their number to form the upper house. The remaining 42 form the lower house. For some legislative matters, the two houses sit jointly. The Althing has a maximum term of four years. Every four years, the voters choose the largely ceremonial president, who appoints a prime minister from the majority party or coalition in the Althing.
Six parties won seats in the 1987 elections. With 18 seats, the Independence Party supports moderate and conservative policies. The Progressive Party has 13 seats, and represents primarily agricultural interests. The Social Democratic People's Party advocates policies of the democratic left, and has 10 members in the Althing. The People's Alliance, composed of Communists and left-wing socialists, won 8 seats. A break-away group from the Independence Party, the Citizens' Party, captured 7 places in parliament. The feminist Women's Alliance won 6 seats. A former Progressive Party member won the remaining seat. The government of 1987-88 was a coalition of the Independence and Progressive parties. This arrangement broke up in September 1988. The current governing coalition consists of the Progressive Party, the Social Democratic People's Party, the People's Alliance, and the Citizens' Party. Steingrimur Hermannsson is prime minister. Iceland's defense relationship with the U.S. and Icelandic fishing rights remain major political issues.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Icelanders have the right to change their government democratically. There is complete freedom of expression. The newspapers are a combination of independent and party-affiliated publications. There is a public broadcasting service, which is run by an autonomous board. Iceland has freedom of assembly and demonstration, with the largely theoretical exception of events which could become riots. The Lutheran Church is the established denomination, but there is complete freedom for other religions. There is freedom of association. Most workers belong to the unions affiliated with the Federation of Labor. Businesses belong to the Federation of Business. In 1989, the International Labor Organization (ILO) found that Iceland had violated bargaining rights in 1988 when it limited or set aside portions of labor contracts that allowed wage increases larger than those in contracts negotiated prior to 20 May 1988. Despite its problems with income policy, Iceland remains a welfare state with generous benefits for workers.

**India**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 847,400,000

**HDI:** 0.439 (low)

**Life Expectancy:** 56 male, 55 female

**Ethnic groups:** Indo-Aryan (72 percent), Dravidian (25 percent), other

**Political Rights:** 2

**Civil Liberties:** 3

**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

In 1990, this huge, diverse country was rocked by political crisis, sectarian and secessionist violence, social unrest and religious and caste polarization that threatened to undermine the world's largest democracy. Tens of thousands were killed or injured in separatist turmoil in the Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir, in state election violence and in murderous clashes between militant Hindus and Muslims. (A separate essay on Kashmir appears in the section on Related Territories.) A controversial affirmative action program to improve the lot of lower castes led to deadly rioting and numerous cases of suicide by self-immolation. By November, a sense of national crisis helped bring down the thirteen-month-old government of Prime Minister V.P. Singh, leader of the Janata Dal (People's Party). The party spearheaded the three-party National Front coalition that had defeated then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the India National Congress (INC) in 1989. After losing a vote of
confidence on 7 November, the government of Prime Minister Singh collapsed. On 10 November he was replaced by Chandra Shekar, an old-guard socialist who had the support of Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress party.

Nineteen-ninety began with a crisis, as separatist violence flared up in January and February in predominantly Muslim Kashmir, two-thirds of which is part of the Indian state of (mainly Hindu) Jammu and Kashmir. The province, which was divided between Pakistan and India after the two-month Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48, has been in dispute ever since, and the renewed violence strained relations between India and Pakistan.

On 27 February, assembly elections were held in eight of India's twenty-five states: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and the federally administered territory of Pondicherry. The elections appeared to confirm the rise of the radical Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a force in Indian politics. Gandhi's party lost six of eight state governments in the election of November 1989. The surging BJP won absolute majorities in Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The party also won the highest number of seats of any party in Rajasthan and, trailing slightly behind Prime Minister Singh's own Janata Dal Party, was second in Gujarat. The Janata Dal's most sweeping success was in Orissa, where it won 127 of 147 assembly seats. Although Gandhi's Congress party, which had dominated Indian politics since independence, still held the largest number of seats (163) in the 525-member federal parliament, state assembly losses further dispirited the party. The prime minister's party controlled the parliament with 141 seats supported by its National Front coalition partners and the BJP (88 seats) and two Communist parties (44 seats).

Since January, some 500 people have been killed in fighting between government forces and Sikh militants. The escalation of Sikh militancy was somewhat surprising, given the prime minister's attempts to ameliorate the situation in the state. Soon after assuming office, he went to pray at the Golden Temple of Amritsar, the religious group's sacred shrine; repealed a constitutional amendment suspending civil rights in Punjab; and reopened an investigation into responsibility for the massacres of Sikhs in New Delhi in 1984. By June, government efforts to create a security zone around the Golden Temple had razed more than 1,000 houses and small shops, dislocating people. Growing tensions over a disputed religious site at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh state ignited new tensions between the country's majority Hindu's and its large Muslim minority.

Although the prime minister promised to implement bold political changes, after six months in office he appeared stymied by some of the country's most ancient problems—caste warfare, factionalism, separatism and unstable relations with neighboring countries. By June, the prime minister, undermined by rivals in Janata Dal and its allies, had yet to establish a real alternative to the Congress party, from which many Janata Dal had leaders defected in 1989. The lack of bold action strengthened the BJP, which began attracting the secular middle class in addition to its fundamentalist core supporters. Prime Minister Singh was further weakened by alienating Mr. Lai, the near feudal-leader of the increasingly prosperous farmers belonging to the Jat caste, and Changra Shekhar, a veteran politician who sought to be prime minister in 1977, when another non-Congress government was in power.

New problems for the government arose in August when three well-armed leftist insurgencies in India's strategic and oil-producing northeast agreed to coordinate their military activities, the first such move in the troubled region in
thirty years. But perhaps the most serious problem for the government arose in August after the prime minister announced that 27 percent of government and public-sector-company jobs were to be set aside for "intermediate" castes, which account for almost half of India’s population. Almost immediately, riots broke out in several states, notably Bihar, with upper-caste students protesting that caste rather than merit would decide who fills thousands of plum jobs. Social scientists argued that a quota system based on caste would hamper, not advance, the ideal of destroying the system.

By September, street battles erupted, with dozens of people killed and hundreds injured. Schools were shut down in four states and universities in many more. The proposal also angered the prime minister's two key political supporters. The BJP, which had been trying to unite Hindus under the banner of Hindu chauvinism, now faced a plan that split Hindus along caste lines. The Marxists were angered by what they saw as the government's commitment to caste war not class war. The plan also angered the Janata Dal's strongest supporters, who belonged to the upper castes. Meanwhile, the violence intensified, and dozens of students committed suicide, most by self-immolation.

On 30 September, the eve of a special session of parliament, the beleaguered prime minister faced an open revolt against his leadership within the Janata Dal when twenty MPs, believed to be followers of Chandra Shekhar and Devi Lai, the recently dismissed deputy prime minister, signed a memorandum demanding his resignation. The prime minister won a unanimous vote of confidence at a meeting of the National Front parliamentary party. The revolt came before parliament was to consider a bill to amend the constitution to prolong the president's rule (direct administration from New Delhi) in Punjab and postpone elections in the troubled state again.

In October, India's crisis intensified, as public protests, including public suicides, continued against the affirmative-action measure, left-wing guerrillas launched murderous raids, and Hindu-Muslim clashes escalated dramatically over militant Hindu plans to build a shrine on the site of a 400-year-old Muslim mosque. Moreover, the BJP withdrew its support for the prime minister, threatening to bring down the government.

On 5 November, less than forty-eight hours before Prime Minister Singh was to face a confidence vote in parliament, dissidents split the Janata Dal and named a rival leader, Chandra Shekhar. Mr. Shekhar announced he would try to form a government with Mr. Gandhi’s opposition Congress party, without a national election. Mr. Shekhar took nearly a quarter of the Janata Dal MPs with him. But the split damaged the party's image as an alternative to the discredited Congress party. On 6 November, Gandhi gave a guarded pledge of support to Mr. Shekhar, and on 7 November the government of Prime Minister Singh collapsed after losing the confidence vote by a wide margin. Mr. Singh immediately submitted his resignation. Days later, the sixty-three-year-old Mr. Shekhar, an old-guard socialist, was asked to assume the prime ministership. With the support of the Congress party and its allies on which his survival now depended, Mr. Shekhar accepted and was installed as India's eighth prime minister on 10 November.

New Hindu-Muslim fighting continued through November even as the prime minister appealed for an end to separatist conflict. The deaths raised the toll in the Punjab to more than 3,400 in 1990. The new prime minister urged Sikh groups to negotiate and defended the arrest of scores of top moderate and extremist Sikh politicians. On 28 November, Indian troops began a crackdown against the Front in Assam. Prime Minister Shekhar
ousted the state's government, which was led by a regional party accused of aiding the rebels. Troops were authorized by New Delhi to capture, interrogate, search and even shoot to kill suspected terrorists under a special powers law. Assam became the third state under direct federal rule, along with Kashmir and Punjab.

At the end of the year it remained to be seen if the new prime minister would be able to govern effectively given his political debt to the Congress party (which could pull the government down at any time) and the growing power of the BJP. The new cabinet was made up almost entirely of Janata Dal renegades once loyal to former Prime Minister Singh.

Other issues in 1990 included the need for economic reform. Yearly GNP per person was only $340, on a par with the average in black Africa. Around 320 million Indians still lived below the poverty line. India's economy performed poorly in comparison with other East Asian economies. In 1990, the budget deficit was 1.4 percent of GDP, the current-account deficit stood at 3.3 percent of GDP, inflation was rising and the foreign debt stood at $63 billion, twice what it was in 1985.

In other domestic issues, the government, prodded by fears of impending demographic catastrophe, prepared to decentralize the administration of population control programs that had failed to curb runaway growth in the world's second-most-populous nation. The country's population continued to grow by at least 2 percent a year, and women continued to have an average of five or six children as land, forests, housing, food, water and jobs were said to be running out.

In foreign affairs, India completed withdrawing its peacekeeping force from Sri Lanka. Relations were normalized with Nepal. In June, fifteen months after imposing crippling trade restrictions and blockading Nepal, India agreed to lift its embargo while beginning negotiations on new trade treaties. However, long-simmering tensions continued to mount between India and Pakistan, which India blamed for enflaming passions in Muslim-dominated Kashmir and Punjab. Tensions were especially high along the 880-mile Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Pakistani Kashmir that was established by the U.N. after the last war in 1971.

Indians have the democratic means to change their system of government. In November 1990, the thirteen-month-old government of Prime Minister Singh collapsed; he was replaced by a prime minister from a splinter faction whose power depended on the Congress party, which lost badly in last year's vote. Many state governments are rife with corruption and patronage, and entire regions of the country remain under a feudal system. Under the constitution, the federal government can take over the administration of a state, and in 1990 Punjab, Kashmir and Assam were directly run by the federal government.

Although political killings are not sanctioned by the government, sectarian and separatist unrest and police actions cost thousands of lives and resulted in massacres, murders, kidnapping and torture. A National Security Act permits detention of security risks, and police are allowed special powers; in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir police have powers to detain, interrogate, or shoot on sight suspected terrorists. Abuses by security forces were common, especially in Kashmir. Sikh activists and moderate politicians were imprisoned. The judiciary is independent, and civil and criminal proceedings are free and generally open. But the legal system is cumbersome and sluggish. Courts are hopelessly backlogged.
Free speech is protected and generally respected, and India has a lively independent press that publishes diverse opinions. However, in 1990 there were restrictions and controversy. Early in the year, authorities in Jammu and Kashmir moved to restrict foreign and local journalists from covering growing separatist unrest. Several journalists were expelled from the region by New Delhi after authorities deemed their presence "prejudicial to the security of the state" and several journalists were briefly detained. In mid-April, authorities closed several newspapers in Kashmir, among them the Urdu-language dailies Aftab, Al Safa, Azam and Wadi-ki-Awaz. The independent and government media were accused of biased or shoddy reporting and becoming emotionally involved in sensitive issues. Coverage of affirmative action job quotas for lower castes was also faulted.

Peaceful protests and demonstrations are generally allowed, though they sometimes require permits. India is nominally a secular state, but violent tensions between religious groups led to massacres and injuries in 1990, as Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs clashed throughout the year. Domestic travel is generally free, except in some security areas. Emigration and foreign travel are allowed. Private civic, business and special-interest associations are free to operate. In June, the All-India Eunuch Welfare Association, which estimates 1.2 million eunuchs in the country, asked the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to recognize eunuchs as a "third sex" overlooked in the international drive for gender equality. In 1990, UNTCEF reported that more than 500,000 children are forced to work in New Delhi alone. Child labor is outlawed in India only for certain hazardous jobs. Many of the children are latter-day slaves, and face verbal, physical and sexual abuse. The London-based Anti-Slavery Society estimated that there are 5 million bonded laborers in India, and said 15 percent of the children were sold into bondage even though India outlawed debt bondage fourteen years ago. Workers can join a wide range of free trade unions. Strikes are forbidden in certain essential industries.

**Indonesia**

**Polity:** Dominant party (military dominated)

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 188,230,000

**HDI:** 0.591 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 52 male, 55 female

**Ethnic Groups:** A multi-ethnic state—Javanese (45 percent), Sundanese (14 percent), Madurese (7.5 percent), Coastal Malays (7.5 percent), other (26 percent)

**Overview:**

Over 180 million people live on this ethnically diverse archipelago of 13,500 islands, making the Republic of Indonesia the world's fifth most populous nation. Nineteen-ninety featured a more open political dialogue, but it had little effect on decision-making since the reins of state remain firmly in the hands of President Gen. (Ret.) Suharto and the military (Abri). Despite President Suharto's Independence Day (17 August) speech promising democratization and greater respect for human rights, little improvement materialized. Serious human rights abuses continue, particularly with regard to ethnic minorities.

President Suharto, who assumed emergency power from President Sukarno in March 1966, in the aftermath of the failed coup of 1965, retains full executive power. Suharto was named acting president in 1967 and the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR), which meets every five years to select the president and vice-president, elected him in 1968. Suharto has been re-elected four times since, most recently in March 1988. The dominant political issue in 1990 was speculation over whether Suharto, sixty-nine, would seek re-election to a sixth term in 1993 and, if not, who would succeed him. Though Suharto actively discouraged this speculation—his word is usually the last word in Jakarta—discussion continued in various forms: fifty-eight Muslim intellectuals signed a petition urging that Suharto retire and that future presidents serve no longer than two terms; a former cabinet minister collected signatures for a similar petition; and the military top brass met in the fall to determine Abri's position on Suharto's continued tenure. The debate began following indications that Suharto planned to retire in 1993, but it continued even after he suggested in mid-August that he would run again, in which case he would certainly win.

Suharto ensures the certainty of his re-elections by instituting a complex system of political controls that have enabled Indonesian democracy to continue to exist on paper without becoming a reality. The 1,000 members of the MPR choose the president and vice-president by unanimous consensus at their two week meeting in March of every fifth year. The 500 members of the People's Representative Council (DPR), Indonesia's other legislative body, all join the MPR. The military and Golkar simply appoint 100 members of the DPR—and the other 500 members of the MPR. While technically not a party, Golkar is the coalition that supports Suharto's government; it is funded almost exclusively by the Dakab yayasan, a foundation funded by Suharto himself. Elections held every five years, in the year before the MPR meets, fill the DPR's remaining 400 seats. It is forbidden to campaign for the presidency more than two weeks before the MPR makes its choice, so candidates for the DPR cannot run on a platform promising to oppose Suharto at the next MPR.

Golkar dominates the elections, winning 73 percent of the vote and 299 of the 400 available seats in 1987. If they are not actually required to vote for Golkar, civil servants are certainly pressured to do so. Added to the 600 appointees, Golkar had 899 representatives at the last MPR. The remaining seats were divided between the two other legal parties: the United Development Party (PPP), a coalition of Islamic groups, and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PD1). Neither of these parties constitutes a true opposition, however, as both receive government funding and support Suharto. Both parties adhere to the 1985 Law on Mass Organizations which requires that every organization in Indonesia accept the state ideology, pancasila, which consists of the five principles of monotheism, humanitarianism, national unity, social justice, and democracy by consensus. This last requirement assures Suharto's easy re-election as it would be impossible for any other candidate to muster the necessary support in just two weeks. In 1988, for the first time, someone opposed Suharto's chosen vice-presidential candidate, but ultimately he withdrew.

While Abri debated in 1990 its future role in Indonesian politics, for the short-term future it seems certain to remain one of the dominant players. The practice of dua-fungsi (two functions) continues, in which active officers also serve in important civil service positions. The top brass seeks to ensure that a general becomes the next president. There have been indications, however, that the younger generation of officers seems willing to accept a civilian president as commander-in-chief.
While the constitution allows the DPR to initiate legislation, it restricts itself to debating government-sponsored bills. Observers considered this year's debates to be markedly more open than usual. The judiciary is more independent on paper than in reality. This year, in response to some land appropriation disputes in which residents accuse Jakarta of paying substantially less than market value, some Indonesians have sued the government. While the government does not outright ban such suits, the plaintiffs are widely seen to have little chance of victory. There is no judicial review of constitutional issues, so the courts have no power over the executive.

Most political restrictions in Indonesia target two groups of extremists: Communists and Islamic fundamentalists. Restrictions on Communists are a legacy of the 1965 coup attempt. Many Communists and alleged Communists, including several prominent political prisoners (e.g., Sukarno's foreign minister), are still imprisoned. The government recently allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit all prisoners from 1965. At least twenty prisoners have been executed in the last five years for their alleged participation in the coup. Six men, jailed since 1965 and sentenced to die in 1966, are still on death row. Indonesia's appeals process in capital cases, particularly for political prisoners, is considered inadequate and the lengthy delays are themselves the subject of international questioning. At least 500,000 (some estimates go much higher) suspected Communists are under surveillance. Of these 33,000 are released prisoners who may not vote, run for office, or join political parties; they cannot work as teachers, soldiers, clergy, journalists, or government officials; and some cannot travel abroad and need government permission to leave Jakarta. President Suharto's call for a crackdown on Communist publications has led to more book bannings, investigations of several publishers suspected of hiring Communists, and the Information Ministry's firing thirty-seven employees suspected of being former Communists.

While the state recognizes Islam as one of four officially permissible religions—along with Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity—it bans the Bahai sect (Atheism and Jehovah's Witnesses are also illegal.) The government discourages all proselytizing and exacts a mandatory monthly "contribution" from all Muslim civil servants to build mosques.

Indonesia generally does not officially discriminate against ethnic minorities, anti-Chinese discrimination remaining the big exception.

Indonesia is still plagued by ethnic unrest in some provinces. (For details on the continuing troubles in East Timor and Irian Jaya, see Related Territories.) A new separatist movement emerged this year in Aceh, the northernmost province on Sumatra. Reports on the revolt were hazy as the military denied access to both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Indonesian Legal Aid Society and escorted individual human rights workers from the province. Reports from Aceh include: the imposing of a curfew in the province's largest town; house-to-house searches, with collective justice (including beatings) administered on suspected rebels and their families; the marshalling of locals into town squares and requiring them to pledge loyalty; and requiring all houses to fly the Indonesian flag. The Aceh Liberation Front further claims that the military has established at least sixteen concentration camps where it has slaughtered 5,000 Acehnese this year.

The 1945 constitution guarantees all basic civil liberties, but the government imposes numerous restrictions nevertheless. Government censorship peaked this year in September and then ministerial promises initiated a period
of comparative openness. In October, however, the government banned *Monitor*, Indonesia's third largest periodical. The government justified its first press shutdown since 1987 by asserting that *Monitor* had "incited unrest" in printing a readers' poll which ranked Muhammed eleventh among fifty public figures. Interestingly the government cracked down despite the fact that President Suharto placed first in the poll. There are two TV stations: the state runs one and Suharto's family the other. Citizens may own short-wave radios and television satellite dishes with which to receive foreign broadcasts, but these technologies can be prohibitively expensive. The interior minister announced this year that all campaigning for the 1992 DPR elections must be conducted by television.

Indonesia also constrains freedom of association. All groups must honor pancasila. Organizations need official approval to accept foreign funding or to hold regional or national meetings, but the government generally grants such permission. Groups sometimes need local government permission to hold smaller meetings. Government influence on the All Indonesian Workers Union (SPSI) keeps international labor from recognizing it as a free trade union and prompted Indonesian activists to found a rival union in November 1990. With the exception of Islamic fundamentalists, Indonesians generally may practice religion freely. Barriers exist against free movement, both domestic and international.

Corruption appears endemic in the Indonesian court and prison systems. Reports of torture remain common, even for those arrested for trivial offenses. Some positive signs have recently appeared as the government sentenced several prison guards for beating inmates; allowed Asia Watch to visit seven prisons; and released General Hartono Dharsono, a prominent political prisoner, in September despite his continued determination "to straighten out what is crooked in this country."

Despite Indonesia's dominant Muslim population, women are equal under the law. The government recognizes that domestic violence is a problem and is beginning to work to prevent it.

Indonesia has treated its few refugees very well. With Malaysia now apparently preventing many refugee boats from landing there, many more refugees have reached Indonesia this year, raising concerns that Indonesia's past record may tarnish somewhat in the future.

### Iran

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary (clergy-dominated)

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 55,600,000

**HDI:** 0.660 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 57 female

**Ethnic Groups:** Persian, Turkic, Arab, other

**Political Rights:** 6

**Civil Liberties:** 5

**Status:** Not Free

**Overview:**

Three major developments affected Iran in 1990: an economic depression, a devastating earthquake, and a settlement with Iraq. The country also experienced factional squabbles, a largely rigged election, crackdowns on dissent, and border problems with the Soviet Union.

Unemployment ran at roughly 25 percent and the country's industrial capacity fell sharply. Inflation was estimated to be 100 percent annually.
Some unrest and food riots were reported, and heavy rural-urban migration and housing shortages compounded the strain. The regime has been unsuccessful in reversing a severe "brain drain," and the population is believed to approach an astounding 3.9 annual growth rate. Iranians were upset with the decline in their living standards and with the causes of the slump: years of disruption from the Iran-Iraq war and official corruption and mismanagement.

The death toll of the earthquake that struck in June 1990 was reported to be as high as 40,000, with over a half million left homeless. The consequences of the earthquake provoked a major national debate on whether to accept foreign humanitarian assistance.

In spring 1990, after months of controversy and opposition from radical elements who fear dependence on the West, President Rafsanjani passed an economic reconstruction plan through the parliament, or majlis, that called for $27 billion in foreign, largely Western, investment. Again amid great opposition, Rafsanjani accepted earthquake relief aid from the United States, Britain and Saudi Arabia, its hated enemies, in what may have been a move to build support for the reconstruction plan.

Iran's fortunes received an unexpected boost in August 1990 when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gave in to the Iranian positions on the issues over which they had fought in the 1980s. Iraqi soldiers left Iranian soil, and both sides exchanged prisoners of war. Iraq stopped demanding that peace be conditioned on a renegotiation of the border around the Shatt-al-Arab waterway.

Since overthrowing the monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in 1979, Iran has developed a unique form of government which combines clerical domination with parliamentary elements. Standing above the more conventional republican structures a faqih, or supreme religious leader, has the right to dismiss the president. For the first decade after the Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dominated Iranian politics. He served as the first faqih until his death in 1989. The current religious leader is former president Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei. President Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani succeeded Khamenei as president in 1989. An elected Assembly of Experts chooses the religious leader and interprets the constitution. A Council of Guardians screens legislation for Islamic conformity and tests the religious qualifications of potential Expert candidates. The parliament consists of 270 deputies elected for four-year terms. In the 1988 election there were 1,400 parliamentary candidates, but no party designations appeared on the ballot.

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the country's leadership remained divided between so-called moderate and radical factions. They differ over how open the country should be to the West, how fully Islamicized Iranian society should be, and how much to support Islamic radicals abroad. President Rafsanjani and spiritual leader Khamenei belong to the less radical camp and have neutralized much of their more radical opposition.

The majlis, often at odds with the president, is the locus of the radicals' power. Its speaker, Mehdi Karrubi, was reelected to another one-year term in 1990. The leading radical deputy, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, elected in 1990, is a former interior minister dismissed by Rafsanjani in August 1989. Mohtashemi has been linked to the Pan Am 103 bombing and helped found Lebanon's Hizbollah party.

The Council of Guardians ruled that several radicals, including Karrubi, were ineligible to run in the October 1990 national elections for the Assembly of Experts. In the past, three senior clerics determined candidates' eligibility, but in July 1990 Rafsanjani pushed to have the Assembly change
the rules. Radicals charged Rafsanjani was deliberately trying to rig the elections with the new eligibility requirements. In the October 1990 election, the so-called moderates won overwhelming control of the Assembly of Experts. A majority of Iranians boycotted the election.

Despite Rafsanjani’s victory in the Experts’ election, it is not clear whether he can "de-Khomeinize" internally over the heads of the radicals. Breaking away from Khomeini’s revolutionary orthodoxy, or being "liberal," (synonymous with Western decadence) still carries great political stigma.

Showing that it was not "too soft" on "liberals," the government arrested many associates of former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan’s Freedom Movement in 1990. Those arrested were among ninety dissidents who had sent Rafsanjani an open letter, broadcast on the BBC, calling for free expression and association. Whether Rafsanjani approved of the arrests is uncertain. The security forces might have timed the arrests to prevent an upsurge of protest when United Nations Human Rights Commission representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl visited Iran in autumn 1990. Galindo Pohl’s first visit to Iran, which occurred in January, reportedly stirred some protests and demonstrations on behalf of greater freedom. The government charged that he concentrated on "trivial matters," and that he did not really understand an Islamic republic. Although the second Galindo Pohl report was more critical than the first, the opposition People's Mujahideen maintained that the U.N. representative had been too lenient with the government.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

There is universal suffrage beginning at age fifteen. Iranians do not have the right to change their government by democratic means. Although there are elections for president, parliamentary deputies, and the Assembly of Experts, small groups of Islamic clergymen and politicians wield effective control over the country. The religious test for political office and the absence of an organized, legal opposition prevent the voters from having a free choice.

The regime exercises strict control over the media. Independent journalists and publications face shutdown, censorship, and arrest for disseminating anti-regime information or views. The Ministry of Information scrutinizes and censors books before publication. The state owns radio and television. There are competing newspapers, but the major ones operate within and do not usually question the boundaries of the dominant fundamentalist discourse. While the state tolerates some criticism of government mismanagement, it represses attacks on the regime, Islam, Islamic government, and the ill-treatment of minority groups. The government arrested signers of a critical open letter to Rafsanjani in May 1990. Security forces jailed at least twenty-one of the signers and beat some of them at the time of their arrests.

In November 1990 teachers and students at universities held marches and went on strike in protest against deteriorating conditions at their institutions. In general, the government suppresses anti-government and non-Islamic assemblies.

Summary execution persists. There were more than 400 announced executions in 1990. According to Amnesty International, there have been 5,000 executions over the last three years. The government has executed many political opponents on bogus drug charges. Physical and psychological torture with official approval are still common in prison. Arbitrary and indefinite, incommunicado detention is also frequent and not prevented by law. The People's Mujahideen accuses the government of holding thousands of political prisoners. U.N. investigator Galindo Pohl reported in February 205
1990 that no executions had been carried out since the fall of 1989, but later admitted he was wrong.

In April 1990 the Iranian government sent a hit squad to assassinate Kazem Rajavi in Geneva. The victim was the brother of the leader of the People's Mujahideen. The victim, a human rights lobbyist, had discredited Galindo Pohl's first report Revolutionary courts, which try all political defendants, offer little legal protection. Revolutionary courts may overrule decisions by regular civilian courts.

Non-Shiite religious groups face many social and legal obstacles. International pressure forced Iran to stop executing members of the Baha'i faith, but the government gives limited, reluctant toleration to other minority religions. Islamicization of civil society remains pervasive, and the enforcer of fundamentalist discipline, the Komiteh, has wide police powers. Storeowners are required to display posters of all prominent clergy. The Islamic order in the universities discourages students from raising questions. Universities base admissions on knowledge of and faith in Islam. Courses on Islam are compulsory. Female and male students who talk to each other inside or outside of class risk expulsion. The Komiteh has a vast spy network throughout the universities to report on liquor use and illicit romances. The Komiteh discourages public displays of affection between the sexes.

In May 1990 the regime instituted and then rescinded what it called "Operation Fight Bad Hejab," which aimed at strict enforcement of Islamic dress codes for men and women. The government is extremely hostile to notions of gender equality. In late 1990 President Rafsanjani sparked a controversy about sex and marriage when he advocated "temporary marriages" to provide a legal outlet for sexually frustrated young males and lonely war widows. Under Shiite Islamic law such "temporary marriages" could last for any period from one hour to ninety-nine years. This practice allows the bride and groom to negotiate the bride's price and to declare themselves married without a religious ceremony. Rafsanjani's speech led to demonstrations and articles for and against "temporary marriage." The more modern sectors of the population denounced the idea as a form of prostitution, but Rafsanjani replied: "Just because a few louts have abused the institution of temporary marriage, suddenly the whole idea...becomes taboo in our society. This is not right. This is not healthy. This is fighting nature."

Freedom of association is circumscribed. Private, independent organizations are rare. The Islamic Union, the main trade union confederation, is run by the Labor Ministry. Travel abroad is difficult because of a high exit tax, and politically suspect persons are unable to leave the country.

**Iraq**

**Polity:** One-party | **Political Rights:** 7
**Economy:** Statist | **Civil Liberties:** 7
**Population:** 18,800,000 | **Status:** Not Free
**HDI:** 0.759 (medium) |
**Life Expectancy:** 62 male, 63 female
**Ethnic Groups:**

**Overview:**

In 1990, President Saddam Hussein touched off the most serious post-cold war crisis when on 2 August Iraqi air and ground forces invaded and occupied neighboring Kuwait, disrupting world oil prices and radically altering the
political situation in the Middle East. By year's end, Iraqi forces faced an unapproved military force in Saudi Arabia that included 500,000 American troops, the largest U.S. military deployment since the Vietnam War. As Hussein showed no signs of meeting a U.N. deadline to withdraw his forces by 15 January 1991 or face a sanctioned military response by multinational forces, many people feared open warfare while hoping for negotiated settlement.

After the invasion, Iraqi forces immediately established a "free provisional government" and President Hussein declared that Kuwait had been annexed as Iraq's nineteenth province, which the U.N. Security Council unanimously declared null and void in international law. During and after the invasion Iraqi forces killed thousands of Kuwaiti and other Arab civilians, reportedly committed brutal beatings and rape, and pillaged Kuwaiti homes, businesses, public institutions and industrial sites.

The invasion set off a flurry of diplomatic and political activity. In an emergency meeting on 3 August, fourteen of fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution condemning the invasion and called for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. On 6 August, the Council approved a resolution ordering a mandatory international embargo against all financial dealings and trade with Kuwait and Iraq, including the purchase of oil. Viewing Iraqi forces as a threat to Saudi Arabia's oilfields and future world oil supplies, President George Bush called for an international deterrent force to be deployed, with an initial commitment of 15,000 U.S. troops. Critical to the international coalition against Iraq was the inclusion of troops from Arab countries, among them Egypt, Morocco and Syria. As the crisis intensified due to Saddam's intransigence, the U.S., under "Operation Desert Shield," launched a massive build-up of men and military equipment that continued through the year.

Saddam's motives for invading Kuwait were economic and strategic as well as political. Iraq never ratified the border agreement with Kuwait when that country became independent in 1961. Subsequent Iraqi threats were foiled by British forces (and a reported payoff of some $84 million), until border skirmishes occurred in 1973 and 1976. Iraq control of the two Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warba after the invasion gave it direct access to the Gulf.

Western alarm about Iraq's military potential began to build in March, with particular attention focused on Iraq's massive unconventional weapons procurement. Experts reported that Iraq had the largest chemical weapons program in the Third World. On 28 March British and U.S. investigators intercepted an attempt by Iraq to smuggle electronic devices used to trigger nuclear weapons. Saddam later claimed that, despite the interdiction, he had acquired the needed parts to activate nuclear weapons and that they could be reproduced in Iraq. American intelligence reported that Iraq had launchers for missiles with a range that included Tel Aviv and Damascus.

In April, President Hussein boasted that he had acquired advanced chemical weapons that would "gas half of Israel" if Israel attacked Iraq. Iraq did not hesitate to use chemical weapons against Iranian troops and its own Kurdish dissidents in 1988. Later that month Hussein threatened that Iraq would retaliate with its full might against any country that attacked an Arab country. Saddam's aggressive posture coincided with a growing militancy among Palestinians under Israeli occupation and the apparent collapse of the moderate peace policies of Egypt and Jordan in the face of Israel's adamant stand. His anti-Zionist and anti-U.S. rhetoric, combined with his increased military ability, appealed to many in Arab circles who viewed Iraq as a possible
"liberator" of the Occupied Territories. After the U.S. suspended dialogue with the PLO, Saddam proclaimed that a Mideast war was inevitable unless the U.S. sought to halt Israel's aggressive policies against Palestinians.

Hussein began threatening Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates if they did not cease exceeding their OPEC oil production quotas. After Iraq mobilized 30,000 troops on the Kuwaiti border, Kuwait agreed to a higher OPEC target price and not to exceed its revised quota. While many members of Congress took a hard line on Iraq's unconventional military procurements and human rights violations, the Bush administration lobbied against calls for sanctions against the country it had supported in the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, U.S. policymakers, despite contrary intelligence predictions, received assurances from Egyptian and Jordanian leaders that Saddam did not intend to invade.

After the invasion, the U.N. ordered a total trade embargo of Iraq, which is dependent on imports for three quarters of its food needs. As the sanctions against oil from Iraq and Kuwait took hold, oil prices skyrocketed and financial markets around the world tumbled, exacerbating fears about the already shaky world economy. In mid-August, Saudi Arabia agreed to increase oil production by 2 million barrels a day to compensate for half of the oil lost to the world market because of the embargo.

After Saddam had positioned several hundred Western "guests," as he termed them, as shields against any attack, he gradually released them in December and announced a general amnesty of all foreigners. Saddam appealed to the Arab masses, calling on them to wage a holy war, and linking the resolution of the Kuwait crisis to Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.

Supporting Iraq were Libya, Sudan and the PLO. King Hussein of Jordan, Iraq's main trading partner, called the invasion "justified" and failed to enforce the trade embargo. Arab governments aligned against Iraq began to lean toward a tacit consensus that military action was needed to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroy Saddam's powerful arsenal. By the end of 1990 prospects for a solution short of force appeared dim.

On 19 November, Baghdad announced that it would send an additional 250,000 troops to Kuwait, bringing the estimated total to 680,000 Iraqi troops in the region. The U.S. rebuffed the Iraqi government's suggestion that any direct talks between Iraq and the U.S. on Kuwait should deal with the issue of a Palestinian homeland. In December, in a second major shuffle, President Hussein dismissed his defense minister and replaced him with a battle-hardened commander who was a hero of the war with Iran. Yet given the vast internal security network, and the average Iraqi's isolation from outside information, a popular uprising against the regime was unlikely.

In other issues, Iran and Iraq made little progress in settling deep differences over their border and the exchange of 100,000 prisoners of war—the result of their eight-year war—until, after the invasion, Saddam offered Iran a peace settlement which amounted to virtual capitulation, including an unconditional troop withdrawal, an exchange of prisoners of war, and acceptance of the 1975 Algiers Treaty, which recognized Iran's sovereignty over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.

Iraq's human rights record, termed "abysmal" by the U.S. State Department, received world-wide attention this year. After accusations that Iraq used poison gas against Kurdish rebels earlier in the year, Iraq offered to sponsor a private visit by the U.N. Human Rights Commission, but retracted the invitation after the U.N. stipulated that the mission be an official one.
Country reports

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Iraqi military and police personnel and civilians included routine murder, torture, beating, rape, pillage, arbitrary arrest, detention and expulsion.

Iraqis do not have the right to choose their leaders democratically. President Saddam Hussein wields virtually absolute authority. President-for-life, Saddam serves also as prime minister, head of the Baath Socialist Party, and head of the top executive body, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a body composed of the leaders of the Iraqi wing of the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baath) Party. Head of state since 1979, Hussein has been effectively in power since a 1968 coup. Most high-level officials are related to Hussein or come from his village of Tikrit.

President Hussein and the RCC have never been elected. All 250 members of the unicameral National Assembly, a rubber stamp for RCC decisions, are either Baath candidates or pre-screened “independents.” A semi-autonomous Kurdish region set up in 1974 has a fifty-member legislative council and a thirty-member executive council, for which candidates are also pre-screened. No political opposition groups are allowed in Iraq.

The draft of a new constitution approved by the 250-seat national assembly was under consideration for ratification by the president later in 1990. It proposes only cosmetic changes that would not challenge the overwhelming power of the president and the Baath Party. The most significant proposed change was the abolition of the RCC. Much of the legislative power was given to the president, and the rest to a shura (a kind of senate) with half of its fifty members appointed by President Hussein.

Middle East Watch described Iraq as “one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today.” All forms of opposition are brutally repressed. Political dissidents are subject to forced relocation and deportation, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and summary and political execution. Severe torture is reportedly employed even against children of political dissenters. Trustworthy reports allege that hundreds of political and summary executions took place in Iraq, and that the secret police have sought and killed dissidents abroad.

The Kurdish insurgency, often backed by Iran, headed by the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, is Iraq’s main insurgency group. In 1988, the government launched poison gas attacks on Kurdish villages, killing over 5,000 Kurds and began a massive resettlement of 400,000 Kurds along the Iranian border to inland towns closely supervised by security forces. Kurds continue to be persecuted.

Iraqis are often scared to voice their opinions even within the family; Iraq’s fearsome secret police apparatus makes the country a nation of informers. All Iraqi media are state-owned and operated, and strictly controlled by the state. New press laws under consideration in 1990 were not expected to lessen the brutal repressiveness of the present press code. Members of Iraqi media are severely punished for even the slightest form of dissent. In March, London Observer correspondent Farzod Bazoft, the first foreign journalist to be executed by a government, was sentenced to death and hanged on charges of espionage, despite international appeals for clemency.

Trials of ordinary cases are held in civil, criminal and religious courts and are normally open; all criminal cases are tried by judges and there are no juries. Though there are no Shari’a (Islamic law) courts, family courts administer Shari’a law. The Revolutionary Court and special courts established by the RCC for specific incidents are virtually exempt from constitu-
tional safeguards of the rights of defendants. Confessions extracted by torture are admissible.

Freedom of assembly is not respected; public meetings may be held only under the auspices of the Baath party or the government. Unions are banned in the public sector and collective bargaining is proscribed. All trade union activity is controlled by the General Federation of Iraqi Trade Unions, an umbrella group controlled by the Baath party which links all trade union committees.

Freedom of religion is recognized in theory and Iraqi citizens practice their faith but may not proselytize. The government regulates religion severely, controlling areas such as appointments of clergy. Muslim clerics are considered government employees.

Iraqi military, police personnel and civilians carried out abominable and arbitrary human rights violations in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, including murder, torture, beating, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, expulsion, theft and pillage. Eyewitnesses reported that tortured bodies were dumped on their families’ doorsteps to warn against further resistance. The death toll of Kuwaiti citizens was estimated at 1,000. Much of the abuse is directed at Arabs whose countries are allied with the U.S.

Kuwait was systematically plundered with official authorization. Commercial establishments were looted, luxury automobiles and other valuables stolen from Kuwaiti homes were taken back to Iraq along with money and gold bullion from financial institutions. Blood banks were plundered, hospitals were stripped of vital equipment such as baby incubators, leaving patients dead. Rape was widespread, with Iraqi soldiers taking women at gunpoint.

Ireland

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 3,500,000  
**HDI:** 0.961 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 70 male, 76 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Irish (Celtic), English  

**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

The most publicized news story in Ireland in the summer of 1990 was the country’s enthusiasm for its national team’s showing in World Cup soccer. The most extraordinary political development was the totally unexpected election of Mary Robinson, a feminist lawyer, as president.

Following centuries of British domination and occupation, twenty-six of Ireland’s thirty-two counties won home rule within the British Commonwealth in 1921. The six counties of Northern Ireland have remained part of the United Kingdom. In 1949 Ireland proclaimed itself a republic independent of the Commonwealth.

The head of government is Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Charles Haughey, the leader of the Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny) party. Haughey failed to secure a majority in the Dail (lower house of parliament) in the general election on 15 June 1989. Consequently, he was forced to form a coalition with the small Progressive Democrats Party. The largest opposition groups are the Fine Gael (Family of the Gaels) and the Labour Party. Other parties include the Workers Party and the Greens. The Dail has 166 members elected by proportional representation for a maximum term of five years.

The largely ceremonial, popularly elected president of the Republic is head
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of state and appoints the Taoiseach from the party or coalition able to command a majority in the Dail. Due to the two-term limit on presidential tenure, President Patrick Hillery had to retire in 1990. In the presidential election the governing Fianna Fail nominated Defense Minister Brian Lenihan. Fine Gael selected Austin Currie, a former civil rights leader from Northern Ireland who moved to the Irish Republic in 1989. The Labour Party and Workers’ Party candidate was Mary Robinson, a former senator, who supports women’s rights and liberal social legislation. Lenihan was expected to win, but in the final days of the campaign he lost credibility when a political science student’s videotaped interview showed that the candidate was not truthful in public about his role in a 1982 government crisis. After the truth came out, Haughey removed Lenihan from the cabinet shortly before the vote. The election took place on 7 November 1990. Using the single transferable vote system, voters cast first and second choice votes. Lenihan received 44.1 percent of first preferences to 38.9 percent for Robinson and 17 percent for Currie. Since Currie finished third, his votes were redistributed according to his supporters’ second choices. Most Currie voters preferred Robinson over Lenihan, so she became Ireland’s first woman president.

The upper house of parliament, the Senate, consists of sixty members, who serve the same term as the Dail. The prime minister fills eleven seats, universities name six senators, and occupational panels elect the remaining forty-three. The Senate is relatively powerless, but it can delay Dail legislation.

The Haughey cabinet has instituted austerity measures to deal with Ireland’s severe economic problems. Unemployment remains high, and wages are low. These factors have caused more than 130,000 people (especially young workers and graduates) to emigrate since 1986. The long-running troubles in Northern Ireland remain a concern of the Irish government, but the republic’s economy holds greater importance in daily politics. Nonetheless, in 1990 the Irish government talked with the British government and Northern Irish politicians about the possible return to provincial self-government for the North. Any new arrangement for the British-held portion of the island could affect the Irish government’s consultative powers and security arrangements with the North under the five-year old Anglo-Irish Accord.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Irish voters can change their government democratically, and respect for civil liberties is generally very high. Citizens register to vote through a government-sponsored household survey. In 1990 the Irish Labour Party proposed granting voting rights to Irish citizens who have emigrated in recent years.

Due to occasional spillovers from the violence in Northern Ireland, the police have special powers to detain and question suspected terrorists. In March 1990 the Irish Supreme Court voted not to extradite two members of the terrorist Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) to the United Kingdom. The pair had escaped Northern Ireland’s Maze Prison in 1983. The Court cited the “probable risk” that the two would be assaulted in prison in Northern Ireland. Some terrorist organizations, such as the Provisional IRA, are illegal, but their political fronts are legal, and have freedom of organization and expression.

There is no legal divorce. The voters rejected it in a 1986 referendum. The influence of the Roman Catholic Church remains strong, but there is freedom of religion for all faiths. There have been Protestant presidents and a Jewish mayor of Dublin. In this largely Anglophone country, the Irish-speaking minority forms the only significant minority cultural group. Irish-
speakers are concentrated in a small collection of areas called the Gaeltacht, which is located along the West coast. The government protects their linguistic tradition through various subsidies and other programs.

The press is free and independent. An autonomous public corporation, RTE, operates television and radio outlets. There was controversy in 1990 over government proposals to subsidize commercial broadcasting with broadcast license fees which have gone exclusively to RTE. The government changed its measures, and called instead for reducing RTE advertising revenues and obliging the commercial station, 2FM, to add news and current affairs programs to its existing music and talk show format. There is some censorship on moral grounds, affecting pornography, for example, but no censorship of political expression. Business is generally free, and free trade unions and farming groups are influential.

Israel

| Polity: Parliamentary democracy | Political Rights: 2 |
| Economy: Mixed capitalist | Civil Liberties: 2 |
| Population: 4,600,000 | Status: Free |
| HDI: 0.957 (high) | |
| Life Expectancy: 73 male, 76 female | |
| Ethnic Groups: Jewish, Arab | |

Overview:

The most important event affecting Israel in 1990 was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August. The Iraqi action had enormous short- and long-term repercussions for Israel on the national and regional levels. Other important developments were the arrival of more than 200,000 immigrants, several notable episodes of Israeli-Palestinian violence, a leadership struggle in the Labor Party, and the assassination of the ultra-right-wing politician, Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Israel’s national government structure combines a 120-seat parliament the Knesset, with a largely ceremonial presidency. President Chaim Herzog has the authority to appoint a prime minister from the party or coalition best able to maintain majority support in the Knesset. The current premier is Yitzhak Shamir of the right-wing Likud bloc, who governs with the support of conservative religious parties.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Defense Minister Arens asserted Israel would take military action if Iraqi troops entered Jordan. With U.S. urging, the Likud-led government kept a low profile. After several weeks the government worried that U.S. forces would not "finish the job" by eliminating Saddam Hussein and his weapons arsenal, but it limited itself to sharing intelligence with U.S. forces, for fear that any direct participation would transform the crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict and weaken the fragile Arab coalition against Iraq. By late December 1990 the Iraqi leader threatened to attack Tel Aviv, Israel, if the U.S. moved against his forces in Kuwait.

In Israeli domestic politics, the invasion and its widespread endorsement by the Palestinians weakened advocates of compromise and dialogue with Palestinians and strengthened the governing right-wing Likud bloc, which opposes PLO participation in any dialogue. The endorsement by Palestinians in and outside of Israel proper heightened growing concern of Israeli officials regarding the loyalty of the Israeli Arab population. The Islamic municipal governments in Israel that were elected in 1989, although praised for their
management ability, do not recognize Israel’s right to exist. Islamists may run in national elections in 1992, but in the meantime a growing question is if and when the Islamic movements within Israel will adopt the violent overthrow strategy of militant Islamists in the occupied territories. In early July 1990 the interior minister shut down a Haifa-based Islamic weekly for three months. The ministry charged the newspaper with incitement and propagating anti-Semitism, and with being an organ of Hamas, a militant Islamic movement.

Concern for the stability of Arab-Jewish relations has become all the greater due to an upsurge in Arab-Jewish violence in and around Jerusalem, which had been relatively insulated from the intifada. Mid-June 1990 saw a wave of Arab-Jewish violence and reprisals that included stabbings, pipe-bombs and stone throwing.

The most noted Palestinian-Israeli confrontation of 1990 took place in Jerusalem on 8 October 1990. A Palestinian crowd began to hurl stones at Israelis in the Temple Mount area. The police responded with live ammunition, killing 21 Palestinians and wounding 140. The United Nations passed a resolution criticizing the Israelis. Generally, other nations accused the Israeli police of overreacting to the stone-throwing. The Israelis launched an internal investigation of the police, but also responded defiantly to international opinion by deciding to settle Soviet Jewish immigrants in East Jerusalem.

Diplomatically, the Iraqi invasion postponed efforts at a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, but it was unclear how long it would do so. On the one hand, the Israeli government believed the invasion vindicated its position that the real obstacle to peace is hostile neighbors such as Iraq, and that the PLO is unfit to participate in dialogue. On the other hand, there was widespread speculation that Washington would have to pay its debt for crucial Arab support in the Gulf crisis by pressing still harder on the Israelis to negotiate. Saddam Hussein attempted to win favor in the Arab world by linking any Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the U.S. insisted that there could be no movement on the Palestinian question with Israel until after an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The Israeli-Palestinian dispute grew more complicated for another reason in 1990: the arrival of more than 200,000 Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. The arrival of so many new citizens, the highest number in forty years, strained the small country’s ability to house and employ its population. Some low-income natives of Israel found themselves displaced by Soviet Jews in apartments. Many Arab day-laborers discovered that the newcomers had reduced the Palestinians’ chances in the marginal sectors of the labor market. When the Israeli government proposed higher taxes to subsidize the immigrants, the unionized workers went on strike in late 1990. The major political groups, the Likud bloc and the Labor Party, worked hard to attract Soviet Jewish support, because the new voters could decide the outcome of the next national parliamentary election.

The leader of the ultra-right-wing Kach Party, Meir Kahane, died after being shot by an Arab-American immigrant in New York. Kahane, a former Knesset member, had attracted the support of a vocal minority in Israel that favors expelling the Palestinians from Israel and its occupied territories.

Israelis have the right to change their government by democratic means. However, the national system of proportional representation fragments the party system to such an extent that small parties can force changes in
governments between elections. Elections at all levels are free and competitive. Arab residents who live within the borders of pre-1967 Israel have the right to vote and organize politically. Traditionally, they have supported the Communists and other parties of the left.

Israel has ideologically diverse press and lively political debate, but also has significant censorship. The media are generally privately managed. The independent Israel Broadcast Authority, which runs radio and television, receives government funding and has a government-appointed board, but controls its own programming. Nevertheless, in 1990 a Jerusalem radio studio that received funds from the Israeli Foreign Ministry hired about a dozen freelance radio journalists who received government guidance on what to report. The freelancers claimed the government funneled money through the radio studio, and said the government started the program in 1986 to counter negative international press coverage of Israel.

There are also security-based restrictions on speech and press rights. The Prevention of Terrorism Act makes it illegal, for example, to display Palestinian nationalist symbols or to express open support for the PLO. It is also illegal to distribute material hostile to Israel for the purposes of inciting support for "terrorist" organizations. Shafiq Habib, an Arab poet, was placed under house arrest for what Israeli authorities said was "identifying with a terrorist organization" and for poems that incited violence. He was later released pending trial, but police confiscated eight books of his poetry. The February 1990 issue of the magazine Return was barred from the country; it contained information on an Amnesty International report on Israel and a poem by Mizar Quabbani. The government ordered military censors to screen information about Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel. The government said it was concerned about inflated figures and Arab alarm about the immigration. Representatives of Israel's Arab publications met in Nazareth on 10 August 1990 to discuss forming an Arab journalists' union. These journalists felt unprotected by the Israeli Journalists' Union.

Freedom of association is guaranteed, with the exception that contact with the PLO or other organizations classified as "terrorist" is illegal.

Freedom of religion is guaranteed by law, but Orthodox rabbis have the political clout to limit the activities of non-Orthodox Jews. For example, the Orthodox rabbis have the exclusive right to perform legally binding marriage ceremonies. The Orthodox retain such authority because the major Israeli parties depend on religious parties to stay in power.

Israeli Arabs have not attained the same socio-economic status as Jewish citizens. Since Israeli Arabs are exempt from Israeli-required military service, and because Israelis give employment preference to those who have served in the army, Israeli Arabs find they are often turned away from jobs. In addition, Arabs volunteering for service are usually rejected on security grounds. Growing violence between the two communities in 1990 led to an increasing Israeli reluctance to hire Arab day-laborers from the occupied territories. Arab municipalities within the borders of pre-1967 Israel argue they receive less government funding than much smaller Jewish villages.

During the outbreaks between Arabs and Jews in summer 1990, Arabs complained that police took a lenient attitude toward violence by Jews. Police reportedly failed to intervene in the July riots and initially they released Jewish suspects unconditionally, though they later chose to prosecute.

Sex discrimination is forbidden by the Equal Opportunity Law. Women receive wages equal to those of men, and they are also required to serve in
the military. However, women experience some discrimination in family matters that are decided by religious courts.

A very high percentage of Israeli workers are unionized. The General Confederation of Labor in Israel (Histadrut), to which 80 percent of Israelis belong, is also an employer, owning and operating a quarter of Israeli industry. Palestinians who live in the occupied territories and work in Israel and temporary foreign workers are barred from being Histadrut members, but they may enjoy representation. Striking is legally protected and occurs frequently.

Political killings and disappearances are outlawed, and there is no evidence of these practices. Shin Bet, the domestic security service, has resorted in the past to psychological and physical punishment to extract confessions. There is habeas corpus, and the judiciary is independent. Israeli law protects against arbitrary arrest and provides for fair open trials with rights to counsel. Freedom from government interference in the home is guaranteed.

Faisal Husseinin, a prominent Palestinian living in East Jerusalem and believed to be a PLO supporter, was barred from traveling to the West Bank and Gaza from December 1989 to June 1990 and on 18 January 1990 was also arrested for questioning. Israeli authorities say his presence in the territories stirs up violence. Observers believed his arrest and travel restriction were aimed at discrediting him as a potential member for a Palestinian negotiating team.

**Italy**

- **Polity:** Parliamentary democracy
- **Economy:** Capitalist-statist
- **Population:** 57,700,000
- **HDI:** 0.966 (high)
- **Life Expectancy:** 71 male, 78 female
- **Ethnic Groups:** Italian (Latin), various immigrant groups, and a small Austro-German minority

**Overview:**

The most important development in Italian politics in 1990 was the Communist party's attempt to restyle itself as a post-Communist party on the democratic left. Following the collapse of Communist regimes in East Europe, the Italian Communists' reform-oriented leadership understood the need to repackage the Party to avoid a loss of its chance to gain power.

Modern Italian history dates from the nineteenth century movement for national unification. Most of Italy had merged into one kingdom by 1870. Italy began World War I on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but switched to the Allied side. As a consequence, Italy won territory that had belonged to Austria. The country lived under the fascist dictatorship of Benito Mussolini from 1922 to 1943 and was allied once again with Germany in World War II. A referendum in 1946 ended the monarchy of the House of Savoy, banished the royal family, and brought in a republican form of government.

Since the abolition of the monarchy, the head of state has been a president, who is elected for a seven-year term by an assembly of members of parliament and delegates from the Regional Councils. The president chooses the prime minister, who is often, but not always, a member of the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament. Members of the 630-member Chamber are elected directly by proportional
representation for a term of up to five years. There are 315 senators elected regionally for five-year terms. The president can appoint 5 senators for life and becomes one himself upon leaving office.

Most prime ministers since World War II have been Christian Democrats, and have headed multi-party governments of short duration. Although cabinets come and go frequently, many of the same Christian Democrats and their coalition partners are back in government repeatedly. For example, after the fall of Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita’s government in 1989, five-time Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti replaced him. Andreotti has held senior cabinet posts in twenty-eight of Italy’s forty-nine postwar governments. The De Mita government had fallen because the Socialist Party (PSI) leader, Bettino Craxi, had withdrawn his support.

World events in late 1989 made the Communist label an embarrassment. At a Party congress in March 1990, Communist leader Achille Occhetto proposed that the Party adopt a new name, symbol and philosophy. He argued that the Communists had to break with the past and become a broader party of the left possibly as an affiliate of the Socialist International. The Christian Democrats and the Socialists both understood that the reconfiguration of the Communists would change both inter- and intra-party relations, especially left of center. Both hoped to profit from the Communists’ problems and to make gains at each other’s expense. Led by Ciriaco De Mita, the left-wing members of the Christian Democrats quit various party posts in January 1990, saying that the party was too subservient to the Socialist Party, the Christian Democrats’ largest coalition partner. For their part, the Socialists reacted to the Communists’ prospective name change by altering their own name to Socialist Unity. By October 1990, the Communists seemed ready to become the “Democratic Party of the Left.”

In local government elections in May 1990, the Communists lost ground, and the regionalist Lombard League made big gains in Lombardy. The League represents those in the industrialized North who resent sharing their wealth with the underdeveloped South.

There were national referenda on environmental issues in June 1990. If they had counted, the measures would have banned hunting and restricted the use of pesticides in farming. All the referenda passed with at least 92 percent of the vote. However, only 43 percent of the voters participated. The law requires at least a 50 percent turnout for referenda to take effect. Farming and hunting interests waged successful abstention campaigns.

Italians have the right to change their government by democratic means. However, Italy often gets a new cabinet between elections as a result of the shifting pattern of political deals rather than as a consequence of changing public opinion. There is freedom of political organization, but Mussolini’s Fascist movement was outlawed. Elections at the national, regional and local levels are competitive. There is some friction between the Italians and the Austro-German minority in the northern area of Alto Adige, which was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until World War I.

The media are generally free and independent, but there are some minor restrictions on the press in the areas of obscenity and defamation. Broadcasting is a mixture of public and private companies. The concentration of private broadcasting power in the hands of Silvio Berlusconi was a major political issue in 1990.

Italians have freedom of assembly and demonstration. In January 1990,
students carried out major protests against decentralizing the university system. They feared that private corporations would dominate higher education. The Italian court system is notoriously slow. The government instituted trial reform in 1989 with the hope of getting speedier justice. In July 1990, an appeals court overturned thirteen convictions in the 1980 killing of eighty-five people in the Bologna railroad station. Those convicted in the original case included neo-Fascists, former military officers, and Licio Galli, the former head of the P-2 Masonic Lodge, a center of criminal activity.

Italians have freedom of association. There are competing Communist and non-Communist labor federations. Due to several episodes of friction between Italians and foreign workers in 1989, pressure grew to control immigration in 1990. Within the governing coalition, the Socialists favored stricter immigration policies, but the Republicans said such policies were guaranteed to fail. There is freedom of religion. Although the Catholic church is still dominant, it is no longer the state church.

Italy has a large state sector, including enterprises which date back to the fascist era. Although the government began a privatization move, the Liberal and Republican parties were disturbed that it seemed to halt in 1990. Organized crime remains a threat to free political expression and other liberties, especially in the South and in Sicily.

Ivory Coast (Cote D'Ivoire)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity:</th>
<th>Dominant party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights:</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy:</td>
<td>Capitalist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>12,600,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status:</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy:</td>
<td>49 male, 52 female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups:</td>
<td>Baule (23 percent), Bete (18 percent), Senoufou (15 percent), Malinke (11 percent), other African; 100,000 Lebanese, 60,000 French</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview:

The social turmoil that simmered in this central-west African nation in late 1989 came to a boil in 1990 as demonstrations and civil unrest forced President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who has ruled since independence in 1960, to accede to demands for a multiparty system and national elections. The 28 October presidential vote, won by the eighty-five-year-old president, was marred by widescale fraud and rigging by the ruling Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI). The party also won the legislative election by fraud.

Anti-government demonstrations began in mid-February when students in Abidjan, the capital, clashed with heavily armed police officers and soldiers. The students were protesting water shortages and power cuts at the university that resulted, they said, from the president's policy of economic austerity. After four years of slumping commodity prices for the nation's main exports—coffee and cocoa—the country faced its worst recession in more than thirty year's.

President Houphouet-Boigny's austerity program, worked out with the World Bank and the IMF, included public sector salary cuts of between 15 and 40 percent, as well as tax increases. A Solidarity Tax was scheduled to be raised from 1 percent to 11 percent. When the program was announced in March, civil servants went on strike. Amid mounting calls for greater
democracy, the president rejected demands for a multiparty system and said he would use force to keep order. Later in the month, doctors, dentists and pharmacists staged a forty-eight-hour strike to protest the planned pay cuts, ignoring a nationwide ban on meetings. On 30 March, the president ordered the release of 126 university lecturers who had been arrested four days earlier while demonstrating against the austerity measures.

After the death of a student during an anti-government protest, the government announced that all schools and universities would be closed for the entire academic year. Facing growing political pressure, the government announced on 18 April that it was postponing salary reductions and the Solidarity Tax on the private sector. The government's decision meant that investment capital from abroad needed to support the country’s economic restructuring program was jeopardized since new loans were contingent on their adoption.

When the government formally pledged itself to a multiparty system five parties registered with the government. The best known of the opposition groups was the Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI), a socialist coalition led by outspoken history professor Laurent Gbagbo. Other parties included the worker Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), led by Francis Wodie, the Union des Socio-Democrates (USD), led by Zadi Zaourou, and the Socialist Party (PS) led by Bamba Morifere. By June, twelve parties had registered for the fall legislative and presidential elections.

In May the government faced another crisis when hundreds of military recruits and servicemen rampaged through the capital. The disturbances were eventually settled without bloodshed, although scores of recruits were detained by police.

In response to calls that the president resign, the government used repressive measures that injured a number of people. Prior to the election, the opposition expressed fears of fraud and complained that parties did not have access to the state-run media. On 5 October the PDCI nominated President Houphouet-Boigny to stand for a seventh term. At the party meeting, the president declared that if he was re-elected he would relinquish the chairmanship of the PDCI. He also promised that if the PDCI won a majority of seats in the National Assembly in subsequent legislative elections, he would also relinquish his position as head of government to a prime minister.

On the eve of the elections, there were allegations that the distribution of electoral cards was being manipulated by the PDCI. The PIT announced an active boycott of the presidential elections, accusing the PDCI of widespread rigging.

During the ten-day campaign, Prof. Gbagbo, Houphouet-Boigny's sole challenger, implied that the president was too old and corrupt, and promised to implement a genuinely democratic political system.

The 28 October election saw a moderate turnout. The following day, after about one-third of the vote had been counted, the government announced that President Houphouet-Boigny had won 85 percent of the vote. Prof. Gbagbo said his computer count gave him a 50.09 percent to 49.91 percent lead. The challenger said the election was "a masquerade" of democracy, that there had been "massive arrests" of his supporters and that ballot boxes had been fraudulently stuffed with votes for President Houphouet-Boigny. The government admitted the election was poorly organized, but denied allegations of fraud. Yet, some of the recorded results certainly raised suspicions of heavy rigging. In one subprefecture in the president's birthplace of Yamoussoukro,
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Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

With the legalization of opposition parties in 1990, Ivorians have the means to change their government democratically, but the dominance of the ruling PDCI was underscored in the elections that were anything but free and fair. The judiciary is generally independent from executive interference, except in cases of national security. Freedoms of expression and assembly are constrained, and in 1990 the government systematically used force to breakup opposition rallies and public meetings. The government-controlled media follow government policy. During the elections, state-run radio and television was inaccessible to the opposition, and papers such as the government-owned daily, Fraternité Matin, was slavishly pro-Houphouet-Boigny. In August, the printer of Fraternité Matin was accused by the opposition FPI of breaking a legal contract in refusing to publish the party weekly, Nouvel Horizon. In March, the Ivorian correspondent of the Catholic French newspaper La Croix was arrested and detained for two hours after conducting an interview with an opposition politician. During the year, several opposition publications were established.

Apolitical, professional and social groups are permitted. Freedom of religion is respected by the government. During 1990 there were reports of violence against members of the 100,000-strong Lebanese community. The Lebanese own 80 percent of the buildings in the capital, as well as more than 70 percent of the wholesale and 50 percent of the retail trade, and some 120 industries. "Swindling is as old as the hills, but today the biggest swindlers are the Arabs and among the Arabs it's the Lebanese," President Houphouet-Boigny told a news conference on 5 March.

There is minimal interference with domestic travel. Foreign travel and emigration are permitted with some restrictions. Almost all unions are part of the government-sponsored General Union of Côte d’Ivoire Workers (UGTCI). Strikes are permitted under law. In 1990, doctors, dentists and pharmacists staged work stoppages. In August, 700 employees at three factories in Abidjan belonging to the Cacao Barry group launched a two-day strike demanding salary increases.

Jamaica

Polity: Parliamentary democracy
Economy: Capitalist-statist
Population: 2,400,000
HDI: 0.824 (high)
Life Expectancy: 70 male, 76 female
Ethnic Groups: Relatively homogeneous

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: Free

Overview:

Despite deteriorating economic conditions, the year-old People’s National Party (PNP) government of Michael Manley nearly swept the board in the March 1990 municipal elections. In the ensuing months, however, the government was buffeted by the worst outbreak of gang violence in three years and the prolonged illness of Prime Minister Manley.

Jamaica, a member of the British Commonwealth, achieved independence in 1962. It is a parliamentary democracy, with the British monarchy represented by a governor-general. The bicameral parliament consists of a sixty-
member House of Representatives elected for five years, and a twenty-one-
member Senate, with thirteen senators appointed by the prime minister and
the remaining eight by the leader of the parliamentary opposition. Executive
authority is invested in the prime minister, who is the leader of the political
party commanding a majority in the House.

Since independence, power has alternated between the democratic socialist
PNP and the conservative Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The PNP is led by
Manley, who was prime minister from 1972 to 1980. The JLP is led by
Edward Seaga, who was prime minister from 1980 until February 1989 when
his party was defeated in general elections and Manley returned as prime
minister.

The 1989 campaign was marked by a significant reduction in political
violence, owing in large part to an Agreement and Declaration on Political
Conduct signed by Seaga and Manley, and supported by civic and religious
organizations. More than 750 people died in election-related violence in
1980, thirteen in 1989. Overseen by an independent electoral commission,
and with security provided by the police and military, voting proceeded for
the most part in orderly fashion. With 57 percent of the popular vote, the
PNP won forty-four seats in the House, the JLP taking the remaining sixteen.
The PNP’s success was attributed to the more moderate, social democratic
program fashioned by Manley, and popular discontent among workers and
lower classes with the economic austerity measures applied by the JLP.

General elections are due again by 1994.

In local elections held in March 1990, the PNP won all but one of the
twelve disputed municipal councils. Only about half of the electorate turned
out to vote. The PNP vowed to restore meaningful functions to local govern-
ments, which have weakened over the last decade. Meanwhile, the JLP’s
heavy defeat led to a severe rift between JLP leader Seaga and five top party
officials who threatened to break away to form a new party.

Although the PNP was not unhappy about the apparent revolt within the
JLP, it was forced to deal with its own concerns. Manley’s poor health kept
him out of action and out of the country for much of the summer, and there
were suggestions within the PNP that he might be forced to consider early
retirement. When Manley returned, the government was struggling to respond
to mounting urban violence and a population increasingly distressed by the
PNP’s tight economic austerity program.

Constitutional guarantees regarding the right to free expression, freedom of
religion and the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and
labor unions are generally respected. While the JLP and PNP dominate the
political scene, there are a number of small parties ranging from radical left
to radical right. Labor unions are politically and economically influential and
have the right to strike.

Newspapers are independent and free of censorship and government
control. Broadcast media are largely public but open to pluralistic points of
view. For over a decade, public opinion polls have been an integral part of
the political process. Currently, there is one television station, which is state-
owned. The Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation (JBC) began public hearings
into a number of private sector applications for permission to operate the
new stations.

An independent judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and
includes a Court of Appeal and several magistrates’ courts. However, the
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The legal system remains slow in responding to charges of police brutality and severe prison conditions. There is a mounting backlog of cases due to a shortage of court staff at all levels of the system and a general lack of resources. The Jamaica Council for Human Rights, the country's only human rights organization, reports that allegations of police brutality, including some charges of extra-judicial executions, have been on the increase since 1989. Nonetheless, a number of cases have been successfully prosecuted, with victims receiving court-ordered, monetary reparations.

In response to the resurgence of gang violence, mostly drug related but with political overtones, the government re-introduced the controversial Suppression of Crime Act in August 1990. The act, first introduced in 1974 but phased out by the Manley government in 1989, gives the security forces sweeping powers of search and arrest. The reinstatement of the anti-crime act was criticized by the Human Rights Council and legal groups who claim it is unconstitutional.

**Japan**

| Polity: Parliamentary democracy | Political Rights: 1 |
| Economy: Capitalist | Civil Liberties: 1 |
| Population: 123,600,000 | Status: Free |
| HDI: 0.996 (high) | Life Expectancy: 74 male, 80 female |
| Ethnic Groups: Japanese (99 percent), Korean |

**Overview:**

In 1990, the key issues facing this populous and prosperous nation of 3,000 islands were a national election, strained relations with the U.S. over economic and trade issues, a stock-market slump and scandal, and Japan’s role in the multinational force sent to Saudi Arabia after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Other developments included negotiations over Japanese islands held by the Soviets since World War II and expanded relations with North Korea.

Modern Japan was established as a constitutional monarchy in 1947, two years after its defeat in World War II. Although the nominal leader is Emperor Tsugunomiya Akihito, who succeeded his father, wartime Emperor Hirohito, after the latter’s death in January 1989, Japan is a multiparty parliamentary democracy. For most of the post-war period, the government has been controlled by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The bicameral parliament, or Diet, consists of an upper house (House of Councillors) and a lower house (House of Representatives).

At the start of 1990, the government of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu faced what seemed a severe test of the LDP’s political dominance in the February elections. In 1989, the ruling LDP had been rocked by several corruption and sex scandals that brought down two prime ministers and contributed to the party’s losing control of the House of Councillors to the opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP) chaired by Takako Doi, one of the few high-ranking women in Japan’s male-dominated political system. In the spring of 1989, Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita resigned after several members of his cabinet and other high officials were forced to resign for their role in an ongoing money-for-favors scandal involving Recruit, a Japanese company. The scandal also highlighted the LDP’s complex faction system in which the party ran multi-candidacy races in districts, compelling candidates to raise large sums of money, part of which they used for gifts and donations to constituents. In addition to the scandals, the LDP lost public
support because of an unpopular 3 percent consumption tax and the liberalization of agricultural imports that disgruntled farmers.

In August 1989 the party chose little-known former education minister Toshiki Kaifu as prime minister. A back-bencher, he was untouched by the Recruit scandal and was seen by many both in and outside Japan as a "puppet" leader controlled by powerful LDP faction leaders.

The 1990 elections were held after one of the more bitter campaigns in memory. Opposition parties sought to capitalize on the LDP's unpopularity, asking for public support mainly on the basis of a commitment to abolish the 3 percent consumption tax. The LDP tried to frighten voters into believing that an opposition victory would mean the end of the free economic system. When the prime minister dissolved parliament on 24 January, the LDP held 295 of the 512 seats in the Diet, followed by the JSP with 83 and the Komei (Clean Government) Party with 54. LDP leaders hoped to maintain a bare majority. A record number 900 candidates entered the campaign.

Despite paying lip-service to political reform, the LDP spent $1.5 billion on a two-week campaign, about four times what was spent by all candidates in America's year-long presidential race in 1988. For its part, the JSP ran on a single issue—the consumption tax—and disenchanted voters by failing to run enough candidates to win a convincing majority. Its candidate list numbered only 148, which meant that Socialist candidates ran against each other in 18 of 130 constituencies from which the lower house is elected.

The February election drew an unusually high turnout, 73.27 percent. Despite earlier fears, the LDP scored a decisive victory, capturing 275 seats. The JSP won 136, up from 83. Eleven conservative independents were expected to join with the LDP, bringing its real total in the lower house closer to the level of 295 seats it enjoyed when parliament was dissolved. Another significant election trend was that 13 of 14 members of parliament tainted by last year's Recruit influence-peddling scandal won re-election, including former Prime Minister Yashuio Nakasone and former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, leader of a powerful LDP faction. The biggest losers were the Japan Communist Party and the tiny Democratic Socialist Party.

The electoral victory bolstered Prime Minister Kaifu, who was embarrassed, however, in mid-March by the leader of the LDP's largest faction. Former Prime Minister Takeshita announced—without consulting the prime minister—that the finance minister would visit the U.S. for negotiations. However, Prime Minister Kaifu's political fortunes improved dramatically in April when Japan and the U.S. agreed on an interim package of market-opening measures—notably an easier approval process for opening large shops, a tougher anti-monopoly law and more public works spending. The changes were greeted by U.S. officials as a positive step in a long-running effort. The pact was formalized on 28 June after a four-day marathon session in Tokyo that ultimately required the personal intervention of President George Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu.

Shortly after the April interim agreement, the prime minister told parliament that he wanted to introduce a "small" electoral system. He said he supported the findings of an electoral-reform commission and would try to push through legislation giving Japan more single-seat constituencies. The aim was to reduce the power of LDP factional bosses who raise the money for their faction members. The reforms would reduce the cost of politics and make it easier for other parties to gain power.

In economic matters, the year got off to a rocky start. In late February,
the stock market tumbled as inflation went up, forcing the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates and tighten credit. A falling yen threatened to stall efforts by the prime minister to trim Japan's $49 billion trade surplus with the U.S. Capital spending had been expanded by close to 20 percent a year, even with a dramatic contraction, projects already under way ensured that most companies would stay competitive well into the decade. Moreover, many firms had huge cushions of cash reserves, giving them the wherewithal to maintain research and new-product development.

Of potentially long-term impact on the Japanese economy was the government's 5 August decision to join its allies in halting all purchase of oil from Iraq and Kuwait, cutting off an eighth of the country's entire supply of oil. Japan imports all its oil, and is overwhelmingly dependent on oil from the Middle East. Government officials said that the embargo, if prolonged, could be far more damaging than the twin oil shocks that sent the country into an economic tailspin in the 1970s.

In foreign affairs, important developments included new accords with the United States on trade, and troop reductions in East Asia; some movement in negotiations with the Soviet Union over the disputed Kurile Islands; a diplomatic offensive to rebuild relations with China; acknowledgement of and apology for Japan's brutal subjugation of Korea a half century ago; and an agreement in October between Japanese and North Korean officials to open discussions on establishing diplomatic relations.

But the crucial and most nettlesome foreign policy issue was Japan's role in the multinational effort against Iraq. The extent of Japan's cooperation divided the government, which seemed uncertain about how to promote Japan's interests in the Middle East. Stung by criticism of the vagueness of its proposals, the following day the government announced it would provide $1 billion in assistance to the multinational forces.

The continuing debate threatened to seriously undermine the prime minister. He was openly challenged by two LDP faction leaders, and a bill to allow Japanese forces to operate overseas in U.N. military missions faced strong resistance in parliament. On 9 November the prime minister reached an agreement with key opposition groups on a new proposal to send a civilian contingent to operate in the Middle East.

### Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Japanese citizens can change their government through democratic means. The ruling LDP has been the dominant party for nearly the entire post-war period. Nepotism is endemic in Japan's politics, especially within the LDP. In the mid-1980s, it was calculated that only one LDP member of parliament under age forty was not related by birth or marriage to a sitting or retired member. In 1990, the prime minister introduced measures to weaken the LDP faction system. The independent judiciary and criminal justice system are fair, and the rights of defendants are guaranteed and protected by law. Free public expression is safeguarded and exercised, and there is a lively private free press. In a unique case, a publisher of the Japanese edition of a Dutch journalist's book ordered the book withdrawn after protests from the *burakumin*, descendents of tanners and butchers who have long been viewed as an unclean lower class in Japan and who are still outcasts.

The issue brought to light the plight of the 3 million burakumin, who are racially identical to most other Japanese. Known as "hamlet people," the burakumin faced centuries of discrimination before laws ended such practices. But they still have below-average educational attainment, salaries and social
status. Japan’s elaborate system of “family registers”—a permanent, official record of each person’s ancestry—makes it almost impossible for a burakumin to conceal his origins. The 700,000-member Korean minority also faces discrimination. In May, the government agreed to abolish fingerprinting requirements and to enhance the legal status for the youngest descendants of Koreans forcibly brought to Japan to do hard labor before World War II.

On 13 June, the foreign minister told the cabinet that the reason for the alarming decline in the country’s birth rate is the government’s policy of encouraging Japanese women to obtain a higher education. The statement appeared to suggest that Japan should take strong policy measures—perhaps including steps that would discourage women from continuing their education—to assure that Japan has a sufficient workforce to meet its economic growth plans. During the electoral campaign, a prominent member of the LDP suggested publicly that voters should be suspicious of JSP leader Takako Doi because she is unmarried and has no children.

Freedom of association, assembly and movement is unrestricted; freedom of religion is respected. Unions are free from government control, and the right to strike is implicitly guaranteed. The country’s unions are facing a crisis; although the national workforce has risen almost 50 percent in the last two decades, union membership has stagnated. In 1989, only 25.9 percent of the workforce was unionized, compared to 55.8 percent in 1950. On 6 October, police officers fought with rioting workers in Osaka as protests over what workers describe as police corruption entered a fifth day. Several plainclothes policemen were beaten nearly to death. The workers alleged that police took bribes from gangsters, who prey on ordinary workers.

Jordan

**Polity:** Monarch and limited parliament

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 3,300,000

**HDI:** 0.752 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 62 male, 66 female

**Ethnic Groups:** Arab

**Political Rights:** 5

**Civil Liberties:** 5

**Status:** Partly Free

The key issues facing this Arab monarchy in 1990 were the crisis in the Gulf brought on by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the continued influx of Palestinian and other refugees, and the impact of the international boycott of Iraq on the economy of this oil-poor country. On the political front, King Hussein, who has ruled since 1953, appointed a commission to draft a charter to institutionalize political parties and other changes begun in 1989 with elections to the eighty-member lower house of parliament, the first in twenty-two years.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August, King Hussein supported Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein while trying to retain his alliance with traditional friends like the U.S. He agreed to abide by the international embargo against Iraq, despite heavy cost to the Jordanian economy, but allowed goods to flow through Jordan into Iraq. The king also distanced himself from the U.S.-led military build-up and tried for months without success to broker a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. Squeezed between two regional military powers—Israel and Iraq—King Hussein maintained he was seeking to avoid a military conflict that would engulf his tiny kingdom.
Diplomatic and military ties between Jordan and Iraq were markedly strengthened early in 1990. King Hussein sought an Iraqi umbrella to cope with his fear of a massive transfer of West Bank Palestinians displaced by the Israeli crackdown and the prospect that the Israelis might settle newly arrived Soviet Jews in the disputed region. Because Jordan is already 60 percent Palestinian, King Hussein feared his kingdom would become a de facto Palestinian homeland. Some 46,000 additional Palestinians have arrived since the Palestinian uprising (intifada) in Israel began in 1987.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the prospect of further war in the Gulf led hundreds of thousands of Arab and Asian expatriate workers from Iraq and Kuwait to flee through the desert to Jordan in search of temporary refuge. Jordanian authorities were hard-pressed to accommodate the influx, and thousands, short of food, water and medical supplies, were encamped in the no-man's land between Iraq and Jordan. Several refugees reportedly died either during the trek or waiting in the desert conditions.

The international trade embargo against Iraq cost the kingdom an estimated $4.2 billion in 1990, as most of Iraq’s trade had been transhipped through Jordan. Iraq had supplied 90 percent of Jordan’s oil needs before the invasion, and Saudi Arabia, which took over supplying half of Jordan oil needs, cut off oil in late September for lack of payment. By year’s end, with the prospect of additional refugees, Jordan faced a budget deficit of $350 million, widespread unemployment, and drastic declines in exports, investment, foreign aid, tourism revenues and remittances.

The country’s political liberalization stayed on course in 1990, but its constitutional future remained uncertain because some of the king’s advisors continued to oppose the "democratic experiment" After the parliamentary elections in 1989 King Hussein appointed Mudar Badran as prime minister. In January, after three days of often tense debate, the prime minister was overwhelmingly approved by the new parliament in exchange for guarantees on the repeal of the anti-communism law, the abolition of martial law, the creation of an independent judiciary, the cancellation of security restrictions on work and travel for political activists, and the legalization of political parties.

In March, King Hussein appointed a commission to draft a National Charter. The commission consisted of sixty members from all political tendencies, including various leftists and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, unlike secular parties, was not banned in 1957 after an attempted leftist coup. The commission was constitutionally unassailable since it was formed by a legitimate royal decree. King Hussein sought to institutionalize a role for the monarchy through the charter in exchange for lifting a thirty-year ban on political parties. Leftist politicians backed off their initial opposition and joined the commission in a tacit acceptance of the monarchy.

Political activity intensified during the year. The repeal of anti-Communist laws allowed Communist party leaders and leftists to organize and make public statements. In July, the Arab Jordanian Nationalist Democratic Bloc, a patchwork of prominent leftists, pan-Arabists and Marxists, was formed. The left scored big victories in union and professional organization elections, and fundamentalists won student elections. In September, King Hussein allowed a visit by radical Palestinian leaders George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Nayef Nawatmeh of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The latter group became a political party in Jordan earlier in the year.

In November, the country's religious right scored a major victory when
the Jordanian parliament elected as speaker a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Adbul-Latif Arabiyat, by an unexpectedly wide margin. The Brotherhood, which commands 22 seats in the 80-member lower house, became increasingly insistent in demanding a share of power. Meanwhile, King Hussein increased his strident criticism of both U.S. Gulf policy and Israel.

At the end of the year, as Iraqi and U.S.-led international forces continued a tense stand-off on the Kuwati border, Jordan braced for an influx of refugees in the event of war. In the first six weeks of the crisis, the country took in 750,000 foreigners, and absorbed some 200,000 Jordanians, 40,000 of them children, who fled Kuwait and Iraq.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Jordan remains formally an absolute monarchy, but with elections to the lower house of parliament in 1989 Jordanian citizens demonstrated a partial exercise of their right to choose their own representatives. Parliament’s powers, however, are still greatly limited. De facto political parties were tolerated during the 1989 November elections, and they have continued to function openly in 1990, with some restrictions.

Martial law, which had been in effect for nearly twenty-three years, was suspended in 1990, though it has not been completely abolished. A royal decree dissolved almost all remaining military courts.

Freedom of the press and public expression expanded since 1988-89. By law the cabinet can suspend or abolish the license to publish, as well as suspend any journalist. But self-censorship is now less widely practiced, the ban on most journalists has been lifted, and press coverage has been bold and candid since the electoral campaign of 1989. In December 1989, the government restored the original directors of the three Arabic dailies. Television and radio remain government-controlled.

In 1990, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) was stripped of its power to withhold passports, bar travel and employment, and it reduced its surveillance of suspected political opponents. Most political detainees were released from prison in 1990. Some 170 former civil servants who had been dismissed for political reasons were formally reinstated.

Freedom of worship is generally respected in Jordan, which is 90 percent Muslim; freedom of movement is also respected. Palestinians on the East Bank have been granted Jordanian citizenship and can obtain Jordanian passports.

Ten percent of the labor force is unionized; most belong to the Jordanian Federation of Trade Unions. Fifty percent of the labor force works in the public sector, where striking is prohibited. Bargaining between labor and management is normally mild. Early in 1990, however, employees at Petra Bank, which had been taken over by the government, staged a sit-in, complaining of low wages and being treated as accomplices of the prior indicted owner. Management conceded to their demands despite government threats.

**Kenya**

**Polity:** One-party  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 24,600,000  
**HDI:** 0.481 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 51 male, 55 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Kikiyu (21 percent), Luhya (14 percent), Luo (13 percent), Kelenjin (11 percent), Kamba (11 percent), Kisii (6 percent), Meru (5 percent), Somali (2 percent), European, Arab, Asian and other

**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 6  
**Status:** Not Free
Bordering on the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria in East Africa, the Republic of Kenya has experienced sharply rising political tensions. The government's steadfast refusal to countenance a switch to a multiparty system has been punctuated by the arrest and detention of prominent individuals for their challenges to the current one-party system.

In 1978, President Daniel Teroitich arap Moi succeeded the first president of independent Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, on the latter's death. President arap Moi has continued in office and also as head of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) since then. A 1982 constitutional amendment established KANU, in existence since 1969, as the sole legal party. The president was redesignated to successive five-year terms in 1983 and 1988 by the unicameral National Assembly, whose representatives are solely associated with KANU. As he was uncontested, arap Moi was then declared re-elected without public vote. The president's political power is based on alliances with the country's various provincial barons and an inner circle whose members consist of his own minority Kelenjin tribe. The main illegal opposition groups are the socialist Union of Nationalists to Liberate Kenya, known as Mwa-kenya, and the Kenya Patriotic Front.

The key issue in 1990 was the government's resistance to all talk of multipartyism, such talk having swept Africa after the fall of the Communist governments in Eastern Europe at the end of 1989. Kenya seems to be one of the very few African states in which the government has actively tried to ban any further public discussion of ending one-party rule. Government officials continued to assert that a multi-party system would cause social fragmentation along tribal lines, threatening national stability.

The government has seemed to become increasingly less tolerant of free expression. Once it had articulated its own position on an issue, it tended to clamp down on those citizens who dared to sustain the debate on public issues by dissenting. The president accused Kenyan nationals who advocated increased political pluralism of "serving foreign masters," while essentially telling foreign nationals such as the U.S. ambassador to Nairobi, who also spoke out in favor of multipartyism, to mind their own business. The president has also charged that those advocating multiparty democracy are secret supporters of violent insurrection, and thus seditious. The local Nakuru KANU chairman typified the response of local party functionaries to public displays of dissent by calling for young party activists to cut off the fingers of those who signaled their support for multipartyism by flashing a two-fingered V-sign. Two advocates of political liberalization, Foreign Minister Dr. Robert Ouko and Anglican Bishop Alexander Muge, died in what were widely viewed as suspicious circumstances during the course of the year.

There were arrests for possession of literature and musical cassettes reputedly "exciting disaffection against the person of the president," conviction bringing a prison sentence of up to three years. There were also incidents of detention without charge involving academics, church leaders, lawyers and two former Cabinet ministers who had publicly laid the blame for Kenya's economic, political and social woes on the one-party system. Some of those held have been formally charged with treason, a capital offense. Sometimes the detainees were held in a prison psychiatric ward. Journalists covering anti-government demonstrations were beaten, while the periodical Nairobi Law Monthly, which took positions independent of the government line on human rights and legal matters, was branded as subversive by officials and banned from further publication.
Representatives of some foreign donors threatened to cut off development assistance unless political detainees were released, a serious threat in a country whose budget is made up of almost one-third foreign aid. Angered by what he considered gross interference in Kenya's internal affairs, the president expelled Norway's ambassador following his protest at the imprisonment of a Kenyan dissident after returning from exile in Norway. As a result, the $20 million Norwegian economic assistance program was suspended. Both the Danish and American governments will be trimming assistance based on human rights considerations, but the Kenyan government response is that the country's independence and sovereignty are not for sale. The important income-generating tourist industry slumped in the face of news about political disorder in Kenyan streets. Unemployment has been growing while a phenomenal population growth of 3.8 percent continues.

In March 1988, the National Assembly was elected by open queuing, a system where voters must stand behind photographs of nominees approved by KANU. President arap Moi has argued that a secret ballot is unnecessary, while opponents maintain that the open queuing system is undemocratic. A party commission holding public hearings throughout the country to explore how the one-party system might be internally reformed heard much testimony about incidents of corruption by officials, as well as demands that the office of the president be subject to free public elections, that the 70 percent rule be abolished, and that the secret ballot be used for both primary and general elections. Under this rule, secret ballot runoffs after a primary election in which the voters queue are only necessary if a candidate gets 70 percent or fewer votes. In the end, an extraordinary KANU party convention convened by arap Moi scrapped the 70 percent rule and reinstated the secret ballot at his prompting.

The continuing Kenyan government unease over Somalia's claims to a portion of northeastern Kenya, use of the border region by Somali rebels and game poachers, and occasional incursions by Somali army forces have likely all been contributing factors leading to the arrest and forced deportation of both refugees who have sought asylum from the civil war in the neighboring country and ethnic Somalis who are Kenyan citizens.

Kenya's one-party system does not allow for citizens to change the system through democratic, electoral means. There was a shift in primary elections to the secret ballot from the "queuing" method of voting, the latter precluding a private exercise of the franchise. The independence of the judiciary continues to be constrained by a 1988 statute augmenting the power of the executive, though the president has said that his government intends to restore the tenure of judges and the attorney general. Security provisions allow for unlimited detention for suspects in political cases, and such provisions have been increasingly put to use in 1990. Sedition laws restrict public criticism of the president and the party and have been extended to audio recordings with political lyrics and, apparently, even to the private notes of prominent dissidents. In 1990 the government shut down the Nairobi Law Monthly and jailed its editor. Under these circumstances, independent periodicals practice self-censorship. Television and radio are controlled by the government and reflect official positions and policy. Jailed dissidents have complained of torture and other ill-treatment by authorities. Freedom of assembly, particularly for political purposes, is curtailed. In the past year this has led to unauthorized demonstrations that have at times degenerated into riots. Several professional associations do exist.
Religious denominations need government approval to operate in the country. Authorities have frequently harassed, criticized and restricted the activities of Protestant churches and even implicitly threatened the lives of outspoken ecclesiastics who have called for multipartyism. Domestic travel is generally unrestricted, but there are some regulations on foreign travel. Except for civil servants, workers can unionize. The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) is the only legally recognized federation. In the past, the government has deregistered several unions. Workers nominally have the right to strike, but a host of laws makes it virtually impossible to do so legally.

**Kiribati**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 66,000  
**HDI:** NA  
**Life Expectancy:** 50 male, 54 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Kiribatian (Micronesian, 84 percent), Polynesian (14 percent), other, 2 percent

**Overview:**

An independent member of the Commonwealth since 12 July 1979, Kiribati comprises thirty-three Pacific islands in three main groups—the Gilbert Islands, the Phoenix Islands and the Line Islands—scattered over 2 million square miles. Most of the population lives in the Gilberts. The capital is Tarawa, site of one of the bloodiest battles in the Pacific during World War II.

The government is headed by President Ieremia Tabai, who was elected to a third four-year term on 12 May 1987. Under the constitution, he is not allowed to to seek a fourth term in 1991. The 1979 constitution provides for a parliamentary government, with the competitively elected president needing the support of a legislative majority. The president is both head of state and head of government. The unicameral House of Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, consists of thirty-five members representing twenty-three electoral districts, an additional member of the Banaban Rabi Council of Leaders, and the attorney general, *ex officio* if he is not an elected member. Traditionally, there were no formally organized parties; instead, ad hoc opposition groups tended to coalesce around specific issues. The only recognizable party is the opposition Christian Democratic Party (CDP), formed in 1985 to protest the fishing agreement with the Soviets that year.

Kiribati funds its annual $15.6 million budget from domestic sources, taxes, fishing license fees, and interest from the Revenue Equalization Reserve fund, set up in 1956. Returns from the fund have been reinvested in foreign government bonds. The country's main exports are copra, furniture, and fish. Phosphate deposits were exhausted by the late 1970s.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Citizens have the means to change their government democratically. The right to a fair trial is assured by law and observed in practice. Kiribati's radio station and only newspaper are government owned, but offer a variety of views. There are no significant restrictions on assembly and association, and there is complete freedom to travel. Freedom of religion is respected in the overwhelmingly Christian society. Workers can form unions and the right to strike is provided by law. There is a strong and effective labor movement. The 2,500-member Kiribati Trade Union Congress is affiliated with the ICFTU.
Korea, North

Overview:

In 1990, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a bastion of Stalinist orthodoxy, became increasingly isolated as the Soviet Union and former East European allies formalized relations with arch-enemy South Korea. While several rounds of high-level negotiations between North and South Korean officials held out some promise for future relations, the talks often degenerated into propagandistic rancor.

Established 9 September 1948, North Korea is a one-party totalitarian Communist dictatorship ruled for some forty-two years by seventy-eight year-old Marshal Kim II Sung, general secretary of the Korean Workers' (Communist) Party. In May 1990, after early speculation that he would turn over the reigns of power to his son, Kim Jong II (known as "Dear Leader"), Marshal Kim began a new four-year presidential term, defiantly lauding communism as he kept his iron grip on power.

Early in the year, reacting to the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the government in Pyongyang recalled about 2,000 North Koreans from Eastern Europe, as well as a number of ambassadors. Apparently afraid of contagion from those exposed to prodemocracy ideas, it scattered students and officials to remote provincial areas.

In February, Bulgaria became the fourth Eastern European nation to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea following Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland. But the big blow came in June, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco after months of improved relations between their two countries. North Korean officials were especially anxious since North Korea receives about 70 to 80 percent of its military supplies from the Soviet Union. Reacting to the meeting, Pyongyang called President Roh "an imperialist colonial stooge," and described his trip to San Francisco as "criminal" and "a disgraceful blot of flunkyist treachery." The North was further isolated when on 30 September the Soviet Union established full diplomatic relations with Seoul.

There was a slight improvement in relations with the U.S. In late May, prior to the Gorbachev-Roh meeting, U.S. and North Korean officials met in Peking for the tenth time since they started occasional bilateral discussions late in 1988. During the talks, the U.S. expressed appreciation for a May decision by North Korea to turn over the remains of five American soldiers killed during the Korean War, and tried to persuade the North that there was no intention on the part of Washington or Seoul to isolate Pyongyang.

North Korean-South Korean relations continued to be bumpy. On 3 July senior officials from the two countries resumed talks and reported progress in setting up a meeting between their prime ministers. But only hours after signing an agreement on 27 July to formalize the talks, each side denounced the other over plans for allowing citizens to cross the demilitarized zone as part of celebrations marking the anniversary of Korea's independence from Japan. In the end, plans for the border crossings were scuttled.

The first set of talks between Prime Ministers Kang Young Hoon of South
Country reports

Korea and Yon Hyong Muk of North Korea was held on 5 and 6 September in Seoul, and the second round opened in Pyongyang on 16 October. Within a day, Prime Minister Kang accused his Communist counterpart of "doing things that foment division and further put off peace" and using the talks "to interfere in our internal affairs." Prime Minister Yon scolded Seoul for submitting "abnormal and tragic" proposals that he said were aimed a preserving division between the two countries. Nevertheless, on 18 October, both sides announced that further talks would be held before the end of the year.

North Koreans continued to live under one of the most brutally oppressive regimes in the world. Everyday thoughts of individuals are molded by the juche (self-reliance) philosophy of "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung. Citizens are subjected to security ratings that determine access to employment, Party membership, food, health care and higher education. However, in 1990, there were some small signs of cautious reform.

A joint-venture law was passed and a Ministry of Joint Venture Industry established. There is reportedly increased worker-management dialogue, and the director of a factory can appeal against centrally imposed planning targets. Workers can earn cash bonuses for improved productivity. Private enterprise bicycle taxis are available for hire at railway stations, and the mostly women drivers can earn up to four or five times the average monthly salary. Private entrepreneurs—again mostly women—can peddle food and drinks on the sidewalk. Interest is paid on savings accounts, and the state even organizes lotteries that pay cash prizes.

The North Korean economy in 1990 was even worse than the Soviet Unions. It defaulted on its $3 billion foreign debt. Its GNP per person is between $900 and $1,500; South Korea's GNP per person is $4,000, and the gap is widening. With the possibility of a reduction in Soviet and East European aid, North Korea held high-level talks with its traditional enemy, Japan. Pyongyang released two Japanese fisherman held for seven years after being convicted as spies, and the Japanese offered billions of yen to North Korea as "compensation" for the 1910-45 occupation of the Korean peninsula.

As Kim's power wanes, the prospects for his son and heir designate "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il appear bleak. It has been known for some time that he is opposed by elements in the military, including the defense minister. "In the not-to-distant future," a Western diplomat said in 1990, "we will have a North Korean military leadership to deal with that will be a lot easier than dealing with Kim."

In 1990, reports continued that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. Moscow reportedly stepped up pressure on Pyongyang to accept nuclear safeguards following a Soviet delegation's inspection of the Yongbyon site.

Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:

Citizens do not have the means to change the one-party system through democratic mechanisms. The judiciary is completely subservient to the state-party apparatus. The penal code outlines various "political" crimes and prescribes the death penalty for over forty crimes. The number of political prisoners is believed to be over 100,000, housed in detention centers, re-education centers, labor camps and in at least a dozen maximum security prisons. The media are strictly controlled by the government and external publications are excluded. Foreign travel is severely restricted but, apart from strategic areas like Changjin, Hamhung, Panmunjom and the northern areas where defense industries are located, restrictions on internal travel have been relaxed. Religious believers have suffered official discrimination, and Christians and Buddhists
have been persecuted for over forty years. The government continues to interfere in family life by forcing children and young adults to attend indoctrination camps, and babies as young as three months are placed in state nurseries so mothers may be allowed to work. Trade unions are not allowed.

Korea, South

**Polity:** Presidential legislative democracy  
**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 3  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Status:** Free  
**Population:** 42,800,000  
**HDI:** 0.903 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 65 male, 71 female  
**Ethnic Groups:** Ethnically homogeneous—Korean

**Overview:**

The key political developments in 1990 included the unexpected merger of two opposition parties with the government party of President Roh Tae Koo, the eruption of the worst civil and labor unrest in three years, and a proposal to scrap the presidential system in favor of a parliamentary form of government. The year also saw high-level negotiations with Communist North Korea.

The Republic of Korea was established in August 1948. Intermittent, unpopular martial-law regimes and popular unrest led to amendments of the 1948 constitution in 1987 and the acceptance of sweeping political reforms. Today, full executive power is vested in a president, directly elected for a single five-year term, who appoints a prime minister and cabinet. Three-quarters of the 299-member, unicameral National Assembly are directly elected, 38 seats are allocated to the party winning the largest number of elections, with 37 divided among all other parties in proportion to seats gained.

The April 1988 legislative elections saw the emergence of a four-party system, the president's Democratic Justice Party (DJP) winning 127 seats; the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), 70; the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), 59; the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), 35; independents, 8. There are several smaller parties.

In late January, President Roh, who in 1987 became the first president elected directly by the people since 1971, announced that the DJP was merging with the RDP, led by Kim Young Sam, and the NDRP, headed by Kim Jong Pil. The new party was named the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). The merger left the PPD, led by Kim Dae Jung, who gained international prominence for his dissidence during the country's long period of military rule, as the sole opposition. The agreement came after two years in which important legislation had been botched up in the National Assembly as a result of partisan politics. The accord gave the new party 217 of 299 seats in the Assembly.

In February President Roh agreed to help drop charges brought against Kim Dae Jung because of a colleague's illegal visit to North Korea. He also agreed to free more political prisoners, amend laws which had come under opposition criticism, and activate new tax laws and recent legislation pertaining to land ownership and property-market speculation. The decision was part of an agreement with RDP and NDRP leaders. The new DLP was formally inaugurated on 9 February. Some two weeks later, the South Korean police crushed a peaceful protest against the new party in Seoul.

Despite the merger, the president was unable to break a deadlock on major bills in a special session of parliament that ended 17 March. Issues left un-
settled included the setting up of local elections, compensation for the victims of the government's brutal 1980 crackdown on dissent in Kwangju, and revision of the much-disputed national security law, which was the main reason for calling the session. After the legislative setback, President Roh overhauled his cabinet for the first time since the merger; he replaced fifteen of the cabinet's twenty-two members, installing a new economic team charged with re-invigorating the sagging economy. In the end, the lawmakers approved thirteen noncontroversial bills and seven resolutions in the twenty-five-day session.

The DLP suffered another setback in the 3 April parliamentary by-elections when it lost a seat from the Chinchon district of North Chungchong province. The voting results focused new attention on the tiny Democratic Party, formed in February from members of the RDP who refused to join the new ruling coalition. Predictably, violence and government interference marred the campaign in both districts. There were also signs of strain in the new party alliance. The RDP leader, Kim Young Sam, the second-ranking official in the DLP, charged that party colleagues had ordered his phones to be tapped and were intimidating his contributors.

In April thousands of workers and students clashed with riot police in the streets of downtown Seoul to protest a police raid that crushed a three-day strike at the Hyundai Heavy Industries complex in Ulsan, 200 miles southeast of the capital. The government deployed 10,000 officers to rout about 2,000 workers at the shipyard in its most concerted effort yet to quash labor unrest. Near the shipyard, about 3,000 workers staged running battles with police. Workers at the Hyundai Motor Company, members of the country's largest labor union, continued a work stoppage to protest the police action at the shipyard and press their own demands for higher wages. Other substantial strikes followed on 1 May and continued throughout the month.

Jolted by the massive demonstrations, President Roh formed a special fifty-four-member investigative team looking into suspicion of corruption involving high officials. The team was empowered to probe all levels of civil services including cabinet ministers and members of parliament. In early June, thousands of radicals hurling firebombs battled riot police in Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju and other cities. Police attacked protesters who tried to march from university campuses into the streets. On 12 June, students firebombed the newly opened American Cultural Center in Kwangju.

On 24 July all eighty opposition members of the National Assembly resigned to support their call for new general elections and to pressure the president to accept their demands. The resignations, which were not recognized by the government, came when the Assembly was in recess.

On 8 October, Kim Dae Jung began a hunger strike to press the government to meet his previously expressed demands, indicating that the opposition would continue to boycott the National Assembly. Twelve days later, Kim and about forty other legislators from his party fasting with him abandoned the action after a leading official of the DLP indicated that he would be willing to compromise on the opposition's two main demands: popular elections for local governments appointed by the national government, and the abandonment of plans to replace the presidential system. The same day, President Roh dismissed his defense minister and head of military counter-intelligence following allegations that the armed forces had been illegally spying on prominent civilians. At the end of the year, the debate over adoption of a parliamentary system put a further strain on the DLP. Leaders of the new party were jockeying to determine the number of
candidates each faction would nominate for the 1992 legislative elections and who would succeed President Roh in the 1993 presidential vote.

In other issues, 1990 saw renewed efforts to address the “reunification” issue with North Korea. Unprecedented meetings of the two nation’s prime ministers held out some promise for an easing of tensions, but while high-level talks were held throughout the year, they were marked by acrimony and rancor.

Although the South Korean economy slumped in 1990, it continued to expand. The growth rate was cut nearly in half in 1989 (to a still robust 6.7 percent); the inflation rate reached double digits and a trade deficit loomed at the end of 1990.

South Koreans have the means to change their government through democratic means. Civil and criminal cases are generally adjudicated fairly, but security provisions curtail legal rights and civil liberties and allow the government to detain both criminals and political prisoners by renewing their sentences. In February, Miss Lim Soo Kyung, a radical student, and the Rev. Moon Kyu Hyon were sentenced to ten and eight years, respectively, for making unauthorized trips to North Korea. In October the government released another priest jailed for the same offense in 1989. In the fall, a private human rights group estimated that there were 1,300 prisoners of conscience in South Korea. Hundreds were arrested during civil unrest throughout the year. People feel free to speak their minds, within some broad limits, and the Agency for National Security is not as pervasive as it once was. Nevertheless, late in the year it was alleged that the army had spied on prominent civilians, prompting the president to dismiss his defense minister and head of military counterintelligence. About twenty new newspapers have been started since 1987, and many take stridently anti-government positions. There are some restrictions on coverage of North Korea. In September, International PEN reported that two editors were arrested in June under national security laws. Government influence on radio and television remains strong. The government broke up a strike by broadcast workers who objected to the appointment of a pro-government president of the Korean Broadcast System. Assemblies that “undermine the public order” are forbidden, and force was used to break up several demonstrations. In light of the fact that student rioters often instigated the violence and used firebombs against the police, security forces did show restraint.

Although freedom of religion is guaranteed, politically active churches have run into difficulties. Freedom of movement is generally unrestricted, except for visits to North Korea. Unions are playing an increasingly political role, and the government has responded through legal channels and with riot police to put down strikes. Troops were used to attack workers at the Hyundai Motor Company and at Hyundai shipyards in Ulsan. Labor leaders maintain that the Roh government has unfairly imprisoned more than 200 union militants since taking office in 1988. The Central Labor Court, the country’s highest labor court, ruled in early 1990 that companies could not pay full-time union representatives despite the fact that this was standard practice for over forty years. Although the case in question was directed at Choonohyop, an illegal federation of prodemocracy unions, it was clear that the decision was a wedge to attack legal unions, such as the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). Only under vociferous FKTU protests was the ruling rescinded.
Kuwait (Iraqi-occupied)

**Polity:** Iraqi-occupied (Traditional monarchy in exile)

**Economy:** Pre invasion-mixed capitalist-statist

Under Iraq-statist

**Population:** 2,100,000

**HDI:** 0.839 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 70 male, 74 female

**Ethnic Groups:** Arabs (Note: Prior to the invasion the majority of the work force was foreign. Almost all of them fled after 2 August 1990.)

**Overview:**

Following a month of threats from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait on 2 August, seizing the country's oil fields, sending the Kuwaiti leadership, the Al-Sabah ruling family, into exile, and setting up a proxy government composed of Iraqi military officers. By year's end, war threatened as Iraq's 680,000 troops in Kuwait faced a U.N. approved military force in Saudi Arabia that included 500,000 American troops, and a U.N. deadline to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January or face a sanctioned military response by multinational forces.

Kuwait was ruled by the Sabah family since 1756. In 1990, the Emir's rule was virtually unchecked, though in the past the Emir shared power with a fifty-member National Assembly, which was dissolved in 1986 along with the suspension of the Kuwaiti constitution. Traditionally, adult male Kuwaitis could affect policy through *diwaniyyas*, discussion groups held in private homes.

Prior to the friction with Saddam Hussein, who began threatening Kuwait in July for exceeding its OPEC oil-production quotas, Kuwait had been grappling throughout the year with a homegrown democracy movement called the Harakah al Dusturyyia (Constitutional Movement) composed of increasingly outspoken citizens, including prominent members of the establishment. In 1990, however, the diwaniyyas of Kuwait's prodemocracy opposition called the Constitutional Movement, which demands the reinstatement of the National council, were forcibly suppressed by government security forces.

The Constitutional Movement, which had gained momentum in late 1989 after the Emir refused to accept petitions signed by 30,000 citizens, demanded the reinstatement of the fifty-member elected National assembly, dissolved in 1986 by royal decree, as well as freedom of opinion and press, the right of association and the right to organize independent institutions. In January, The Kuwaiti Interior Ministry warned citizens assembling in *diwaniyyas* not to discuss any concrete national issues and affirmed that legal action would be taken against violators. Soon after, a *diwaniyyas* was forcibly dispersed by Kuwait's elite special forces which used stun and sound grenades and wielded rubber and wooden truncheons.

In February, the government agreed to meet with parliamentarians associated with the *diwaniyyas* to discuss the reinstatement of the legislature. In April, the Emir vowed the return of parliament and declared the formation of a seventy-five member National Council, with fifty members elected and the rest appointed for four-year terms, to make nonbinding recommendations concerning the nature of the alleged future parliament.

The prodemocracy forces boycotted the 10 June election of the council
members, saying the Council, a shallow substitute designed to postpone restoration of the full parliament indefinitely, violated the constitution. Government supporters won all fifty of the Council’s elected seats; shortly afterward, a new cabinet and the remaining twenty-five seats of the Council were royally appointed.

Starting in March, Kuwait sharply assailed western criticism of Iraq’s arms buildup as "arrogant." In April, Kuwait again supported Iraq against western criticism and praised Saddam’s threat to Israel.

On other issues, Kuwait withdrew from the Arab Economic Unity Council (AEUC) in March on charges that other members were not paying their shares while Kuwait provided one-third of the AEUC budget, and that the Council was not carrying out its job properly. Also in March, the Kuwait Cabinet condemned the resolution by the U.S. Senate recognizing a unified Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Kuwait’s internal unrest became obscured by diplomatic efforts to appease Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who threatened Kuwait with force if it did not stop exceeding its oil production quotas and disputed Kuwait’s drilling rights in lands bordering Iraq. In a flurry of diplomatic activity throughout July, Kuwait stressed that the dispute be settled within Arab circles and suggested that an Arab arbitration panel help resolve the crisis.

On 2 August, Iraqi air and ground forces invaded and occupied the desert sheikdom, sending the leadership into exile and setting up a proxy government consisting of Iraqi military officers. By late August, Saddam Hussein announced that Kuwait had been annexed as Iraq’s nineteenth province. Kuwaitis were then forced to become Iraqi citizens and carry Iraqi identity cards. All Kuwaiti civil servants were made to sign Iraqi work contracts like those signed by Iraqi civil servants. Portraits of Saddam Hussein lined the streets, and the names of streets, hospitals and government buildings were changed.

Iraq demanded that all foreign embassies in occupied Kuwait close by 24 August, warning all remaining diplomats would lose their immunity. Major western nations ignored the warning and Iraqi forces surrounded embassies, halted water and electricity, and cut phone lines, making continued operation difficult. Diplomatic personnel were taken and held at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.

The invasion left over 2 million expatriates stranded in Kuwait and Iraq, including over one million Egyptians and hundreds of thousands of Africans, Latins, Indians, Thais, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Filipinos, who fled on hardship-filled journeys across the desert into Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Several thousand Westerners were prevented from leaving until December, several hundred of whom were positioned at key Iraqi military sights as shields against an attack on Iraq. Several hundred others were moved from Kuwait to select hotels in Iraq. Thousands of Kuwaitis fled through the desert into Saudi Arabia immediately following the invasion and thousands more after Iraqi troops opened a border crossing that had been closed since the attack.

The invasion devastated the country: Iraqi forces killed thousands of civilians, plundered public property, and looted Kuwaiti homes, businesses, food warehouses and industrial sites, transferring money, gold bullion, valuables and luxury goods to Iraq. The slightest form of resistance was brutally suppressed. Tortured bodies of resistance fighters were reportedly dumped on their families’ doorsteps to warn against further acts of rebellion. Men were arbitrarily detained and brutally tortured under interrogation.

The invasion caused a flurry of international political activity. The U.N.
security council quickly approved a resolution condemning the invasion, calling for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and ordering a mandatory international embargo against all financial dealings and trade with Kuwait and Iraq, including the purchase of oil. The United States called for an international deterrent force in Saudi Arabia with an initial commitment of 15,000 U.S. troops. As the crisis intensified due to Saddam's intransigence, a massive international force grew to include 500,000 American troops under "Operation Desert Shield," and forces from U.S. allies, and other Arab countries, among them Egypt, Morocco and Syria.

The Kuwaiti government-in-exile in Taifa, Saudi Arabia pledged more than $5 billion drawn from its estimated $100 billion in foreign assets to aid the allied military effort against Iraq and to provide aid for frontline countries such as Egypt, Syria and Turkey. By year's end, 100 Kuwaiti bureaucrats and planners were engaged in designing changes in Kuwaiti society. Emphasizing competition and merit, they proposed organizational changes in the bureaucracy and sought to redefine the roles of the government and private sector.

Kuwaitis under Iraqi occupation in 1990 lacked basic human rights, let alone the right to democratically change their leaders.

After Kuwaiti security forces dispersed diwaniyyas held early in the year, the Emir declared the formation of a seventy-five-member National Council, a type of transitional assembly that would serve for a four-year period and determine the nature of an alleged future parliament. Twenty-five members of the Council were royally appointed, the remaining fifty seats taken by royal supporters elected on 10 June. The democracy movement boycotted the election on charges that the Council was an unconstitutional "toothless substitute" for the real parliament. The opposition later claimed the elections were riddled with blatant vote buying and that some of its activists had been ousted from polling stations.

Before the invasion the right of association and the right to strike were recognized but both were highly restricted. The press was subject to pre-publication censorship. Foreign workers, representing 80 percent of the Kuwaiti work force, could join a union only after five years residency, and had no union voting rights. The government could fire any workers without explanation or judicial review. Women continue to be denied suffrage.

The state religion was Islam. The ruling family and most prominent citizens were Sunni Muslims.

Atrocious violations of human rights were carried out daily by Iraqi forces and continued until year's end. An Amnesty International (AI) report said violations included the arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and military personnel, widespread torture of detainees, and extrajudicial execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children. Hundreds of people effectively "disappeared" in detention. Iraqi forces pillaged public and private property, robbed persons fleeing Kuwait, and raped women. AI also reported that over three hundred premature babies were left to die after Iraqi soldiers stole incubators from Kuwait city hospitals. The slightest form of resistance was brutally suppressed by killings and torture. Kuwaitis harboring foreign refugees in their homes, which were constantly searched and robbed, were summarily executed. Persons found with opposition literature, the Kuwaiti flag or pictures of the Emir were arrested, and shopkeepers who refused to display portraits of Saddam Hussein were executed.
Laos

**Polity**: Communist one-party
**Economy**: Mixed statist
**Population**: 4,000,000
**HDI**: 0.506 (medium/d)

**Political Rights**: 6
**Civil Liberties**: 7

**Status**: Not Free

**Life Expectancy**: 48 male, 51 female

**Ethnic groups**: Multiethnic, Lao (50 percent), Thai (20 percent), Phoutheung (15 percent), Miao, Hmong, Tao and others (15 percent)

Overview:

The fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989-90 and changes in Soviet attitudes toward economic support of client states prompted the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party (LPRP) under Kaysone Phomvihame to recommit itself to one-party, political rule, and at the same time to seek new sources of financial aid in the West and accelerate the economic liberalization program begun in 1986.

In January 1990, after the upheavals in Eastern Europe, the official Laotian radio said that 1989 was "a nightmare year for socialism" but that the ideology would prevail and citizens should rally around the LPRP. "In 1990 it is necessary that we strengthen and consolidate the national unity and unification under the banner of the party leadership," the New Year's broadcast said.

But some ten days later, Deputy Foreign Minister Souban Sritthirath said in an interview that Laos, among the world's most underdeveloped countries, "cannot ask the Soviet Union today what we could ask three years ago." He noted that Prime Minister Kaysone, who came to power after the Communist Pathet Lao victory in 1975, had visited France and Japan at the end of 1989 to "find alternatives" to Soviet and East Bloc aid.

Although there were some modest signs of political liberalization during the 1989 elections when some non-Party candidates defeated corrupt officials, in 1990 the umbrella Lao Front for National Reconstruction (LNFR) flatly rejected any moves toward multiparty pluralism.

In February, there were persistent reports of stepped up attacks in the northern provinces begun in late 1989 by anti-Communist insurgents of the Hmong-led United Lao Liberation Front. In late 1989, the government seized Khambou Phimmasen, leader of the Lao Neutralist Salvation Movement, who was reportedly arrested on Thai territory. His whereabouts was unknown in 1990. Some analysts dismissed the fighting as a battle for control of this year's local opium trade. In June, reports by observers in Thailand indicated that 10,000 to 20,000 Vietnamese troops were fighting alongside the Pathet Lao against anti-Communist Hmong guerrillas. Laotian and Vietnamese forces reportedly used air power, heavy artillery, napalm and the chemical agent known as "yellow rain," as well as other poison gases against the insurgents.

But the key issue remained reforming the economy. In 1986, the Party's crucial Fourth Congress set in motion an economic reform program which included the replacement of cooperatives by family farms, the introduction of market mechanisms over centralized planning to revive struggling state-owned enterprises, joint-ventures, and relaxation of controls on foreign trade, which dropped the inflation rate from 100 percent a few years ago to 10 percent in 1988. By 1989, markets in the capital city of Vientiane were well-stocked with consumer goods from Thailand. Private service and enterprises also sprang up.

In August 1990, the seventy-nine-member Supreme People's Assembly passed various laws to encourage foreign investment and further steer the
economy towards a free-market system. The five laws cover property ownership, inheritance, business transactions, and banking and legal laws. But most analysts agree that since the laws have not been accompanied by any move to liberalize the political system, foreign investors will remain wary of investing in the country.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The citizens of Laos cannot democratically change their one-party system. The judiciary is not independent of the state-party apparatus, and severe restrictions remain on freedom of assembly, association and movement. No code of laws or a constitution exist, there is no guarantee of due process and the security apparatus remains an intrusive and repressive presence in society, although there have been reports that there are fewer signs of monitoring and control of citizens. A criminal code adopted in 1989 has not been published. While most re-education camps appear to have been closed, there are scores of political detainees, including insurgent leader Khambou Phimmasen. The media are controlled by the government, academic freedom is nonexistent and anti-government views are not tolerated. Ordinary citizens may not import foreign publications, and censorship is strict. The government controls all public meetings, except in religious, sports or communal events. Most Laos are Buddhists, and in 1990 there were signs that in some cases the government has taken the line that communism and Buddhism pursue common goals, above all peace and social justice. But while the official attitude is more tolerant toward Buddhism, the activities of the small number of Roman Catholics and Protestants are closely monitored. The government has eased some travel restrictions, but foreign travel continues to be carefully regulated. Labor laws do not exist in this predominantly rural and agricultural country, and the small government-controlled unions do not have the right to strike.

Lebanon

**Polity:** Parliamentary (military and foreign influenced)  
**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Not Free

**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Population:** 3,300,000  
**HDI:** 0.735 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 63 male, 67 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Eastern Hamitic (90 percent), Greek, Syro-Lebanese

**Overview:**

At the end of 1990, in accordance with a 1989 Arab League peace plan (the Taif Accord), Lebanon's various private Christian and Muslim militias evacuated Greater Beirut. This left the 250-square-mile zone, heretofore divided into a Christian East and Muslim West, reunited and peacefully under control by the official Lebanese Army for the first time since Lebanon's civil war began in 1975. With Syrian help, government forces had defeated General Michel Aoun, the country's interim-leader who had refused to recognize the Taif accord and to relinquish power to Lebanon's new legitimate government led by parliamentarily-elected Christian President Elias Hrawi. The deep-rooted conflict between the Muslim majority and Christian minority was still unresolved at year's end as key Christian leaders strongly opposed Hrawi's government, saying that the power-sharing arrangement (oudined by the Taif Accord) upon which the government was based favored
Throughout the year, armed battles continued between Lebanon's warring elements. Starting January 30, General Michel Aoun's mostly Christian faction of the Lebanese Army and Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces (the largest Christian militia) fought a fierce four-month war for control of the 300-square-mile Christian area in central Lebanon. Over 1,000 people were killed in the conflict, which left the area partitioned and Geagea holding about 80 percent of the region. In May, Aoun and Geagea agreed to a permanent truce, but their forces continued to fight intermittently until Aoun's ouster in October.

Lebanon's Shiite Muslim factions, the Iranian-backed Party of God and the Syrian-supported Amal, continued their three-year armed conflict in Southern Lebanon over control of the country's one million Shiites, Lebanon's largest sect. The more moderate Syrian-backed Amal is led by Nabih Bern, a Shiite lawyer who is a member of Elias Hrawi's government. In early January, the groups entered into a cease-fire, and in June held peace talks under the auspices of Syria, the first face-to-face meetings in sixteen months. Yet the bloodshed resumed soon after and continued throughout the summer, as Palestinian guerrillas joined Amal forces in the war for control of the Shia heartland. In November, the two main Shiite groups signed a peace agreement under the auspices of Teheran and Damascus, furthering the Lebanese government's attempt to extend its authority over the country.

Groups loyal to pro-Iranian Party of God continued to hold Western hostages. In April, two American hostages were freed, after intervention by the governments of Syria and Iran. Meanwhile a Shia Muslim leader declared that the United States House of Representatives resolution endorsing a united Jerusalem as Israel's capital complicated efforts to free more hostages. At year's end, six Americans, four Britons, two Germans and an Italian were still held captive.

The southernmost part of Lebanon remains in control by Israel, which deployed troops in the area to create a "security zone" in 1985 after withdrawing its forces from the rest of Lebanon. In April, eight years after its base in Lebanon was destroyed by Israeli armed forces, the PLO completed rebuilding its military forces in the country. In November, Israel declared that it would not allow the Lebanese government to regain control of the area, which the Israelis claim is vital to the defense of Israel's northern border against Muslim guerrillas from Lebanon.

A key obstacle to the advancement of peace under a unified government was the intransigence of General Michel Aoun, appointed as an interim-leader in 1988 by former President Amin Gemayel. In 1989, Aoun, strongly opposed to Syrian influence in Lebanon, had waged a six-month "liberation" battle in an attempt to drive Syrian forces from Lebanon. In 1990, Aoun insisted he was Lebanon's legitimate ruler and refused to recognize the presidency of Elias Hrawi, who was elected last November under the terms of the Taif accord. On 13 October, Syrian and Lebanese troops launched an all-out attack to defeat the Christian general, who had entrenched himself in the presidential palace, refusing to relinquish power to the central government.

The defeat of Aoun cleared the way for a major step in the peace plan, the evacuation of Beirut by its private militias: the Lebanese Forces (the largest Christian militia) and the Muslim militias, including the two main Shiite armies. Though east Beirut was officially policed by the Army, the
presence of the Lebanese Forces militia continued to be strongly felt. At year's end, the government controlled 10 percent of the country and, outside Greater Beirut, Lebanon remained divided into spheres controlled by the private armies.

The guidelines of the new government were laid down by the Taif Accord, which nullifies Lebanon's constitutional guarantee of Maronite dominance: Christians and Muslims have equal representation in Parliament, which formerly had a Christian majority, and the president, a Christian, relinquishes some of his power to an equally divided Christian-Muslim Cabinet led by a Sunni Muslim prime minister. The Speaker-of-Parliament should also be a Muslim. The Taif accord stipulates that in the absence of consensus among the ministers, decisions would be made by majority vote. The basic constitutional changes which established political equality between Christians and Muslims were adopted by Parliament in August.

In December, the year-old cabinet led by Selim al-Hoss, in which the Druze and Shiite Muslim militias were represented, while the Christian militia was not, resigned and Omar Karami replaced Selim al-Hoss as prime minister. Among the members of the new Lebanese cabinet were the leaders of seven of the main Christian and Muslim militias, who had previously faced each other only across firing lines. One of the main goals of the new government was to begin reuniting the rest of Lebanon and to disband and disarm all the remaining private armies by March 1991.

Pressure by key Christian leaders began to mount at the end of 1990 for a restructuring of the new government. George Saadeh, leader of the Phalange Party and Mr. Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, which is also part of the Phalange, opposed the new government on the grounds that the Taif guidelines were unfair to Christians. The Christian leaders demanded that the Cabinet formed on Christmas Eve be reshuffled and all decisions be made by consensus instead of by majority vote. Geagea and Saadeh prevented continued operation of the new government by refusing to take their seats in the Cabinet, and held a meeting attended by six ministers in an effort to gather support from other Christian leaders. Patriarch Nasralag Butros Sfair, the spiritual head of the Maronites, the country's largest Christian community, supported the claims made by Geagea and Saadeh.

The Christian leaders were further dismayed at the dominant role in Lebanon played by Syria, which entered the country in 1975 to aid Maronite Christian factions that were losing a civil war to an alliance of Lebanese Muslims and the PLO, and to date keeps 40,000 soldiers deployed on 70 percent of the country. President Hrawi, a Maronite Catholic, and five of his Christian cabinet ministers, are supported by Damascus. Geagea and Saadeh along with the Phalange Party have traditionally opposed the Syrian role in Lebanon; although their attitude had moderated somewhat, they remained hostile toward Syrian military presence in Lebanon. Many doubted whether the Lebanese army and government could sustain long-term stability without

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Lebanese citizens cannot change their government by democratic means. According to the constitution, direct elections for the parliament should be held every four years. In practice, direct parliamentary elections have not been held since 1972. Every six years, the parliament elects a president who appoints a cabinet, which must have the confidence of parliament. The present Lebanese government is based on the rules of a 1989 Arab League peace plan called the Taif Accord, which establishes political equality between Christians and

Muslims. The Accord nullifies Lebanon’s constitutional guarantee of Maronite Christian dominance, provides Muslims and Christians equal representation in parliament, gives some of the power previously held by the president, who must be a Christian, to an equally divided Christian-Muslim Cabinet, led by a Sunni Muslim prime minister, and stipulates that in the absence of consensus decisions should be made by majority vote.

Many basic rights have been circumscribed by the country’s civil war, which has resulted in the deaths and injury of hundreds of noncombatants. The government has largely been unable to control the actions by private militias. Both the government and private armies detain suspects arbitrarily for indefinite periods. Detainees are often held incommunicado. The legal system is formally independent and Lebanese law and custom provide for the right of fair trial, but fair judicial procedure has been disrupted by the breakdown of central authority. Militias often intervene on behalf of their supporters.

The right of privacy is not respected by militias or the Lebanese army. Freedom of movement was enhanced in Greater Beirut as the barricade dividing the capital into east and west was dismantled and the private militias withdrew. In the rest of Lebanon, sectarian violence and armed control of various areas still limit freedom of movement.

Lebanon’s lively media and press thrive on a tradition of liberty. With fourteen radio stations, several TV companies and eight daily newspapers, Beirut is one of the major publishing and broadcasting centers in the region. The Lebanese population receives Arab and Western music and news in French, English and Arabic. However, *Es Safir*, one of the country’s major newspapers, is banned in Israeli-controlled Southern Lebanon.

The country has no official religion and there are no restrictions on any particular religious groups. During the 1990 Christmas season, the capital displayed religious tolerance characteristic of pre-war Beirut. Yet the politico-religious civil war has fostered religious hatred and caused neighborhoods and villages to be separated according to religion; the segregation was often enforced by the private militias.

Women do not take part in politics and the women’s movement is extremely limited.

Lesotho

**Polity:** Militarystyle

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 1,800,000

**HDI:** 0.580 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 46 male, 52 female

**Ethnic groups:** Sotho

**Political Rights:** 6

**Civil Liberties:** 5

**Status:** Not Free

**Overview:**

The year’s key political development in this tiny nation, surrounded on all sides by South Africa, was the conflict between the military regime of Maj. Gen. Justin Metsing Lekhanya and King Moshoeshoe II, who was forced to flee to Great Britain on 9 March. The king, who was head of state after becoming paramount chief in 1960 and king in 1966 after independence, was reportedly stripped of his powers, and royalists in his government were fired and jailed after an alleged plot was uncovered.

Maj. Gen. Lekhanya has ruled the country since 1986, when he overthrew Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan of the Basotho National Party.
(BNP). After the coup, widely believed to have been engineered by South Africa, the ruling military Council dissolved the parliament, which had been appointed by Chief Jonathan in 1983 and consisted exclusively of BNP members after none of the opposition parties nominated candidates. All political activity was banned, and legislative and executive power was conferred on the Military Council by the king.

President Lekhanya has worked closely with South African security and intelligence forces and expelled the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) from the country, long a haven for guerrillas. Although the South African government is now talking openly with the ANC, Gen. Lekhanya still seeks to suppress the Congress and the trade unions associated with it. In Mid-August, when the Lesotho teachers' union struck for better pay and conditions, five union leaders were detained on suspicion of receiving "external"—ANC—money. One schoolboy was killed during the disturbances.

Gen. Lekhanya says he wants to hand back power to an elected parliament, and in July he convened a constituent assembly of about 100 members—traditional chiefs, church leaders, representatives of development councils—to talk about democracy. In September, a strongly worded statement by leaders of seven political parties appealed to Gen. Lekhanya to repeal an order banning political parties.

On 6 November, the military regime declared the king dethroned. Maj. Gen. Lekhanya said he was retracting a 24 October invitation for the king to return from exile. The government said the king set unacceptable conditions for his return, including dissolution of the government.

Better relations between the South African government and the ANC could have a negative impact on Lesotho's economy, whose main source of income is remittances from migrant workers working in South Africa. Any new South Africa regime would almost certainly want to give jobs in the mines to its own citizens. The ANC has resented the Basotho migrants, who tend to work hard, spend little and live quietly in substandard hostels, keeping out of South African politics.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Citizens of Lesotho cannot change their government democratically and are excluded from the political process. Political parties are not allowed. The judiciary is generally independent of executive interference in civil and criminal cases, but the 1984 Internal Security Act allows the government to hold individuals without charge. Customary courts exist in rural areas. The religious press frequently publishes opposition views, as do small, private papers. The government media mirror official policy. Public political assemblies are prohibited, but nonpolitical professional associations are free to organize and meet. Freedom of religion is respected. Domestic and foreign travel is generally unrestricted, except in political cases. There are two labor federations, the Lesotho Confederation of Free Trade Unions (LCFTU) and the Lesotho Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU), the latter supported by the government. Workers have the right to strike, but laws and regulations make it difficult to exercise that right.
Liberia

**Polity**: Transitional (military and foreign influenced)

**Economy**: Capitalist

**Population**: 2,600,000

**HDI**: 0.333 (low)

**Life Expectancy**: 47 male, 51 female

**Ethnic groups**: Sixteen principal tribes, including the Krahn, Mandingo, Gio and Mano

**Overview**: In 1990, this small west-central state established in 1847 by freed American slaves became a macabre charnel house. Rival rebel groups brought down the regime of Gen. Samuel K. Doe (whose subsequent torture, slow dismemberment and death was videotaped) and launched a savage wave of often ritualistic inter-tribal slaughter that left the capital of Monrovia a virtual ghost town of starving people and rotting corpses.

By the time the peacekeeping force of the five-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) arrived in midsummer, thousands of Liberians, mostly civilians, had been butchered by progovernment and rebel forces, and hundreds of thousands had fled to neighboring Sierra Leone, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. The country's economy had stopped functioning, and shortages of food, fuel and medicines led to death and starvation, particularly in the capital. Piles of bloated bodies left to rot in the streets raised the specter of epidemic.

The fall of Gen. Doe had its roots in ten years of brutal rule and simmering tribal conflict. In 1980, then-Master Sgt. Doe overthrew the elected government of William Tolbert, leader of the dominant Whig Party. Sgt. Doe, a member of the Krahn, the most rural and deprived of Liberia's tribes and known for savagery and cannibalism, became the first indigenous African to rule the country. After seizing power, he executed the cabinet before TV cameras on the beach, and there were reliable reports that he personally bayoneted the former president to death. He promoted himself to general and consolidated power by establishing and heading the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) and forming a hand-picked Interim Assembly, dominated by his Krahn tribe, that elected him president.

In 1985, Doe won what was widely believed to have been a rigged election. He enjoyed support from the Mandingo tribe, which made up much of the business and merchant class. The same year, he weathered a coup attempt by Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa, a member of a rival tribe. After the coup failed, Gen. Quiwonkpa was castrated, then hacked to pieces and the pieces paraded through Monrovia. Then, in order to assume the strength of the enemy, in front of reliable witnesses, Doe's men ate him.

Before the fall of Tolbert, ethnic hostility was minimal because hostility was directed primarily at the Americo-Liberian elite. Soon after seizing power, however, Doe appointed disproportionate members of his own tribe, who make up only 4 percent of the population, to key government, military and intelligence positions. The Gio and Mano increasingly charged that they were being oppressed by the Krahn. In December 1989, a small force of rebels, many of whom were Gio and Mano tribesmen, crossed the border from the Ivory Coast and attacked government installations in the northeastern Nimba region, scene of previous abortive coup attempts in 1985 and 1986.

By 1 May, the U.S. suspended the Peace Corps program and told...
American diplomats to be prepared to leave the country in the wake of escalating fighting. The State Department said it had evidence that the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), forces loyal to Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, was being partly financed by Libya.

Eyewitnesses reported that guerrillas, now numbering in the thousands, had turned hundreds of square miles of the country into a war zone of charred huts and crumbled and blocked bridges that gave them control of key roads. Nearly 270,000 people in Nimba had fled their homes and sought sanctuary in bordering nations or in Monrovia. The rebels announced that they would not negotiate with the Doe government.

On 31 May, as rebel forces moved closer to the capital, Liberian soldiers shot and bayoneted Gio and Mano refugees at a United Nations compound in Monrovia. The same day, the U.S. announced it was sending six Navy ships and 2,300 Marines to evacuate Americans from Liberia. With rebel forces within striking distance of Monrovia, President Doe announced that he would not seek re-election in 1991. Meanwhile, the capital became a city under siege, with water in critically short supply and frequent electrical outages. The Red Cross officially began protecting Gio and Mano refugees.

The rebel advance toward the capital was slowed as factional fighting erupted between forces loyal to Taylor and those of field commander Prince Johnson, who announced the formation of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).

By July, with rebel forces some five miles from Monrovia, widespread panic was reported in the city. Shortages of food, water and medicine led to outbreaks of disease. Anarchy spread in the capital, as Liberian soldiers looted shops, warehouses and restaurants. Troops in stolen cars roamed the streets, often killing people at random. Reports of starvation increased.

Ministers from ECOWAS—consisting of the Gambia, Ghana, Togo, Mali and Nigeria—met to discuss the mounting crisis and the refugee problem. Meanwhile, the civil war had turned into an outright tribal conflict.

Taylor announced the overthrow of President Doe, proclaimed himself the head of a new government and said he planned on crushing Prince Johnson after disposing of President Doe.

Negotiations for an interim government continued in the Gambia from 27 August to 2 September. Dr. Amos Sawyer was elected president of an interim government by members of Liberian political parties and interests groups including the warring parties. Dr. Sawyer, a political science professor and longtime Doe opponent, had lived in the United States for the last several years. Prince Johnson and supporters agreed to cooperate with the interim government, while the INPFL vowed to continue the war.

On 9 September, President Doe was captured by forces loyal to Prince Johnson. Questions arose as how the ECOWAS force could have failed to protect Doe in a meeting it had arranged at its own headquarters between him and Prince Johnson. According to accounts verified later, Doe appeared to have been set up by ECOWAS, which—probably correctly—believed that peace could not be achieved as long as he remained defiantly at large. A videotape shown to journalists by Johnson's forces later in September showed that President Doe met a particularly sadistic and grisly end. Prince Johnson insisted that, contrary to various reports, he was not ultimately eaten, but died of his wounds.

On 3 October, the ECOWAS force, now numbering 6,000 men, pushed Taylor's INPFL rebels out of central Monrovia in a drive to capture the
capital’s downtown airfield. By the end of the month, beefed up by 5,000 additional Nigerian soldiers, the peacekeeping force swelled to over 9,000. In the last week of October, the NPFL refused to sign a ceasefire agreement at peace talks in the Gambia.

A breakthrough appeared in late November. Amos Sawyer was sworn in as Liberia’s interim president in Monrovia on 22 November as head of the Liberian Interim Government of National Unity. Prince Johnson and the new head of the Liberian army pledged to support the government. The new president said his mandate was to repatriate and resettle Liberian refugees in neighboring countries, initiate the process of reconciliation, and conduct free and fair elections. Taylor refused to recognize the interim government, insisting he was president and had set up his own administration.

On 28 November, a ceasefire was announced in Mali after all-night talks between remnants of Doe’s forces, the two rebel factions and the ECOWAS force. INPFL commander Taylor told reporters he was “very happy that finally the Liberian people have within their reach the chance for a lasting and just settlement of the crisis.” He also said that the agreement meant that the interim government of President Sawyer had effectively been removed from power. President Sawyer indicated that he was still the head of an interim government, but would be glad to discuss the issue with Taylor. The agreement allowed all sides to retain their arms.

On 3 December, relief workers prepared to distribute food to starving people in Monrovia after order was restored. An unknown number of civilians had died of malnutrition in the months of fighting.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

In 1990, the country was torn by civil war that saw the fall and murder of President Doe. An unelected interim government was named in late summer headed by President Amos Sawyer, who took office in November. It was propped up by a 12,000-man five-nation West African peacekeeping force that occupied the country. For all intents and purposes, most civil liberties were suspended because of the conflict. Kidnapping, torture, murder and other abuses were rampant during the year-long conflict, as government and rebel factions engaged in executions, massacres, rapes, pillaging and hostage-taking. Tens of thousands of Liberians, mainly civilians, were killed or died of starvation, and hundreds of thousands fled as refugees. Eventually, the war pitted President Doe’s Krahn tribe and its Mandingo allies against the Gio and Mano groups, with murderous results. Rebels forcibly conscripted children, and both factions included heavily armed young boys, some of whom committed atrocities. The rule of law completely broke down. The judiciary (albeit a puppet of the state) and other institutions simply collapsed.

Basic freedoms disintegrated as various forces ruled by force of arms. The economy was a shambles. Under Doe, several independent newspapers were shut down. In March, the offices of The New Observer were torched by government soldiers. In April, Footprints Today and Suntimes were banned. As pressure on the regime mounted, Doe lifted the ban on newspapers and released several political prisoners. Before the war intensified, twenty unions functioned in the country, belonging to the Liberian Federation of Labor Unions (LFLU).
Libya

Overview:

In 1990, Libyan dictator Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi kept a relatively low international profile, with international accusations about his chemical weapons arsenal obscured by the aggressive policies of Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. maintained the economic sanctions against Libya initiated by President Reagan's administration. Qadhafi denounced this decision, and stated the sanctions would not have any effect on his country. In the spring, Qadhafi assailed the West's criticism of Iraq, supported Saddam's aggressive posture in the spring and condemned the U.S. House of Representatives resolution recognizing a unified Jerusalem as capital of Israel.

Libya's production of chemical weapons received worldwide attention in 1990. U.S. intelligence concluded that Libya, already producing a small amount of chemical weapons, was moving its Rabta pharmaceutical plant into full-scale production of chemical arms, including Sana, a nerve gas, and that plans for another poison gas factory were underway. Libya denied the allegations and maintained that the plant was producing only pharmaceuticals. A West German Company (Imhausen) was found to have played an instrumental role in the development of Qadhafi's chemical arsenal.

Libya joined the PLO in voting against condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and sending Arab forces to Saudi Arabia at the 3 August Arab Summit. Qadhafi, however, sharply criticized the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and Saddam's taking of Western hostages, and agreed to dispatch Libyan troops to enforce the blockade against Iraq. Qadhafi also assailed the West's military presence in Saudi Arabia and, along with leadership of the PLO and Sudan, stressed that the crisis should be resolved by Arabs.

Qadhafi's reputation for involvement in international terrorism may have attenuated slightly in October, when he ordered the expulsion of Abul Abbas and the Palestinian Liberation Front, the splinter group of the PLO responsible for the unsuccessful 30 May speedboat attack on Tel Aviv, reportedly launched from Libya with help from the Libyan military. Qadhafi earlier took action against Abul Nidal, a renowned terrorist who reportedly left Libya to move to Baghdad.

Part of the year was spent in promoting Libyan relations with other African and Arab countries. In January, Libya issued a joint communique with Sudan affirming the countries' goals of promoting bilateral links and pan-Arab unity. Later that month, Libya began operating a communications network between Libya and Egypt consisting of 180 telephone channels, 3 radio channels and 1 television channel. In February, Libya signed a pact with Tunisia to intensify exchange of information and promote joint cultural affairs, a policy designed to further Maghreb unity. In April, Qadhafi called on all Muslim nations to release all hostages and prisoners of conscience to mark the beginning of Ramadan. This call was reportedly instrumental in the freeing of a French hostage from Beirut.

Relations with Chad were stalemated, and no progress was made on the Algiers Treaty concerning the Azou strip claimed by Libya. Strained relations
with the former government of Hissein Habie were made worse by Libya’s support of the Chadian rebels led by Colonel Idriss Deby, who succeeded in overthrowing the Habre government in December. Qadhafi faced great pressure at home concerning the hundreds of Libyan prisoners of war held in Chad.

Qadhafi's tightly knit and brutal security apparatus squashes practically all opposition activity inside Libya. Some opposition to Qadhafi's regime has operated in exile in Chad; one such group is the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. After the fall of the Chadian government, Libyan dissidents living in Chad, fearful of being sent back to Libya, sought American help in finding refuge in other North African countries. Internally, Qadhafi continued to crack down on activity by Islamic fundamentalists. In 1990, all bearded males were subject to round-ups and detention on suspicion of being members of fundamentalist groups.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Libyan’s do not have the right to choose their leaders democratically. Theoretically a socialist Jamahiriya, a community based on mass support, Libya is actually a dictatorship of Col. Mu’ammarr Qadhafi, in power for twenty-one years. Qadhafi is the "revolutionary guide" who, along with very few associates, makes all effective decisions. Political parties are proscribed and no opposition is tolerated.

Nominal power lies with the general secretary of the General People's Congress. The GPC is indirectly elected by popularly elected municipal committees called People's Committees, which monitor the populace. The Revolutionary Committees oversee the People's Committees and screen all of its candidates. Libya's multi-layered surveillance network is coupled with an extensive security apparatus.

Only groups supportive of the regime are allowed to organize and demonstrate. Independent trade unions and vocational groups are banned. Libyan workers do not have the right to strike. The Libyan press lauds the regime; criticism of the government is impossible. Though the People's Committees provide some leeway for discussion, citizens generally do not express political views for fear of discovery by the revolutionary committees and huge informer network. At least one hundred political prisoners are believed to be held incommunicado in secret detention centers. Political dissidents living abroad risk regime-sponsored assassination attempts. The right to fair trial is often not provided by Libya's arbitrary judiciary system. Detainees are frequently beaten and deprived of counsel, and are sometimes sentenced without trial. The death penalty is applied for many offenses.

Predominantly Sunni Muslim, Libya rejects Islamic fundamentalism and the state closely monitors all mosques for potential political agitation. Foreign workers have been forcibly drafted into Libyan military. Travel abroad, especially throughout the Maghreb, has been made easier.

**Luxembourg**

- **Polity:** Parliamentary democracy
- **Economy:** Capitalist
- **Population:** 400,000
- **HDI:** 0.934 (high)
- **Life Expectancy:** 68 male, 74 female
- **Ethnic groups:** French, German and other European

**Political Rights:** 1
**Civil Liberties:** 1
**Status:** Free
Overview: The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg received international recognition as an independent neutral country in 1867. However, Germany occupied the country during both world wars. Since World War II, Luxembourg has been a major advocate of European unity, and belongs to both the European Community and NATO. The Luxembourger ambassador to NATO had to resign in May 1990, due to an unspecified breach of security.

Grand Duke Jean is head of state. He appoints the prime minister from the party or coalition able to command a majority in the sixty-member Chamber of Deputies. Voters elect deputies by proportional representation for a maximum term of five years. There is also an appointive Council of State, whose twenty-one members have life terms. The Chamber can overturn the Council's decisions. In the general election held 18 June 1989, the center-right Christian Social Party won twenty-two seats, the Socialist Workers' Party eighteen, and the liberal Democratic Party eleven. The growing Green Alternative won four seats, and the Communists captured one. Winning four seats, a new single-issue force, the Five Sixths Party, advocates pensions worth five-sixths of the final salary for all workers, and not just for the civil service. The prime minister, Jacques Santer, heads a Christian Social-Socialist coalition government. The future of NATO and the decline of the steel industry are major concerns in Luxembourg.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties: Luxembourgers have the right to change their government by democratic means. About one-quarter of the residents are foreign. Non-Luxembourgers have no right to vote in national elections, but they are free otherwise. There is freedom of speech and of the press. Print journalism is private and uncensored, except for restrictions on pornography. Broadcast media are state-chartered and free. The country has freedom of association. The steel industry, the agricultural interests, and small businesses all have lobbying groups. Affiliated with the Socialist and Christian Social parties, two competing labor federations organize workers. The population is mostly Catholic; there is religious freedom and no state church. The productive economy is largely private.

Madagascar

Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: Partly Free

Overview: The government of President Adm. Didier Ratsiraka, who has led the country since 1975, moved toward a measure of political liberalization by formally legalizing opposition parties in March and easing censorship.

President Ratsiraka, who was re-elected to a seven-year term by universal suffrage in March 1989, is head of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Arema), one of the political associations that made up the loosely knit and ideologically diverse National Front of the Malagasy Revolution (FNDR), that, until the March decree, was the country's only official party. In the 1989 elections, President Ratsiraka received 62.7 percent of the votes in
defeating two other candidates, Mandafy Rokotonirina of the center-right Proletarian Power Movement (MFM) and Jerome Razanabahiny of the moderate Drive for National Unity (VONJY). Both parties were formally part of the FNDR, and the presidential and subsequent legislative elections indicated a loosening of the FNDR coalition.

A failed coup attempt in May was limited to a small handful of students who briefly seized control of the radio station in the capital of Antananarivo. Six bystanders were killed and forty-four injured when police regained control of the station.

In 1990, a dozen or so parties were organized after a constitutional court decree (Number 90001) legalizing their formation. In March, Alexis Bezaka, a prominent exile, said that he was returning to re-establish the Christian Democratic Party. The same month, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), originally founded in 1957, held a constituent assembly and elected Andre Resamapa as general-secretary. Other parties include the National Union for Development and Democracy (UNDD), led by Zafy Albert, and the Malagasy Labor and Patriotic Movement (MTPM), a militant splinter group of the VONJY. The Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Reform (AKFM-Renouveau) announced that it was abandoning its socialist platform of the 1970s and 1980s in favor of a free-market approach. None of the new parties presents an immediate threat to Arema, although the situation may change during the next presidential and legislative elections, due in 1996.

The key issue facing the government in 1990 was the economy, among the poorest in the world with a per capita income of about $200. A government study found that half the population lives below the absolute poverty level. An outbreak of bubonic plague in the capital claimed hundreds of lives. There were some signs of progress, however, as the country implemented an IMF and World Bank program that encouraged greater privatization. In March, the World Bank pledged $48 million for the private sector. For most of the 1980s, population growth outran GNP. In 1989, for the first time in a decade, GNP took the lead. To attract businessmen, the president has introduced a new and generous investment law. Madagascar has gold, minerals and hardwoods. The rich coastal waters are underfished, and the European Community is helping to build a tuna-canning factory at Antsiranana.

**Malawi**

**Polity:** One-party  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 9,200,000  
**HDI:** 0.250 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 44 male, 46 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuka, Tao, Lomwe, others
Country reports

Overview: A small, densely populated land-locked sliver on Lake Malawi in southeast Africa, the Republic of Malawi has been ruled since independence in 1964 by Prime Minister H. Kamuzu Banda, head of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), who was designated president for life in 1971. The nearly ninety-year-old president has virtually dictatorial power; after a cabinet reshuffling in May 1990, he held the posts of minister of agriculture, minister of works, minister of justice, and minister of external affairs. The unicameral National Assembly is elected, but all candidates are MCP-approved.

In 1990, a key issue for the regime was the presence of nearly 800,000 refugees from Mozambique, who put a further strain on an economy that is among the poorest in Africa. Refugees make up nearly 10 percent of the population. Traditionally good farmers, Malawians were able to feed themselves and export maize until late 1988 when drought, combined with the demands of a swelling refugee population, depleted the maize stock and pests spoiled the cassava crop, forcing Malawi to import food. In 1990, a United Nations Children's Fund report stated that "only Ethiopia, a land of ecological depletion and frequent drought, has levels of child malnutrition comparable to those in Malawi." One in three children under five years of age dies.

Although Malawi has undertaken ambitious steps to improve economic conditions by privatizing key parts of the economy, inflation and debt continue to be a problem. Disruption of traditional transport routes by Mozambique's RENAMO guerrillas has also had an adverse impact on the economy.

Malawians live under one of the most repressive regimes in Africa, with authoritarian power vested in Life-President Banda and the MCP. The security apparatus is pervasive and intrusive, and criticism of the president and the party can lead to arrest. The judiciary is not independent, the president holding the minister of justice portfolio and appointing all justices. The government maintains the right to revoke the property rights of those suspected of economic crimes, but this right is often used in political cases. It is a crime to criticize the government publicly, and the press is severely restricted in its coverage of domestic affairs. Journalists have been jailed, and an exiled dissident journalist, Mkwapatira Mhango, was murdered in 1989. A 1973 law makes sending "false information" out of the country punishable by life imprisonment Malawi's tight visa restrictions for foreign journalists have made it one of Africa's undercovered countries. The country's leading poet, Jack Mapanje, has been detained without charge for nearly three years. Only the MCP can hold political meetings. Religious groups must register with the government. There are few restrictions on domestic travel, but government employees and civil servants must obtain written permission to travel abroad. The independent Trade Union Congress of Malawi is small, and unions are weak.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:
Malaysia

**Overview:**

The emergence of Malaysia's first Malay-led, multi-ethnic opposition raised hopes that 1990 would mark the country's transition from authoritarian ethnic politics to democratic coalition politics. Although the opposition indeed made significant gains through the 20-21 October election, Prime Minister Mahathir won again with more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament and seemed to reject the very notion of a loyal opposition.

The British granted independence to the eleven states of the Federation of Malaya in 1957. Malaya merged with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to form present-day Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Singapore, however, withdrew in 1965. Sabah and Sarawak retain their legal status as co-equals with Malaya, under the treaty creating Malaysia, but in reality Kuala Lumpur treats them as the twelfth and thirteen states and frequently marginalizes them. Malaysia remains a constitutional monarchy headed by a king and nine sultans, but executive power resides with a Prime Minister. A National Front coalition has ruled Malaysia since independence. Led by the New United Malays National Organization (UMNO-Baru), the coalition currently includes ten ethnic parties such as the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Parliament consists of an elected lower house with 180 members (expanded from 177 during 1990) and a Senate with 58 members (32 appointed and 26 indirectly elected). The Senate has little power and never blocks government initiatives.

Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Malaysia's fourth prime minister, has led the country since 1981. Since he narrowly survived an attempted party coup in 1987, he has appeared increasingly authoritarian, to the point of being criticized publicly by Malaysia's first premier. In an effort to shut down possible sources of future challenges, Mahathir has recently attacked Parliament, the media, the hereditary rulers, state autonomy, and the judiciary. Perhaps most troubling of all, the prime minister sacked the Supreme Court's Lord President Tun Mohamed Salleh Abas in 1988 when he objected to constitutional amendments restricting judges' ability to interpret statutes.

During the emergency period that followed Malay riots in 1969, the government promulgated a New Economic Policy (NEP) to guide Malaysia from 1971 to 1990. The plan was devised to narrow the economic gap between Malays and wealthy Chinese by bringing 30 percent of the country's corporate equity into Malay hands within twenty years. The NEP discriminates against ethnic minorities in education and government contracting; the government will not consider bids from Chinese businesses without Malay partners. Mahathir created a National Economic Consultative Committee (NECC), with 150 appointed delegates, half of them Malay, to review the NEP and recommend changes for its successor, which is due to begin in 1991. The opposition Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) and a group of Chinese educators withdrew in protest from the NECC, highlighting the delegates' inability to reach consensus on a follow-up policy. When Mahathir
threatened to implement his own plan if the NECC could not agree on one, five more delegates resigned.

Sabah is a predominantly Christian state which had been ruled by the Muslim Beijaya party until the 1985 election in which the Christian Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) narrowly ousted the incumbents. When two bombs followed PBS' re-election in July 1990, Beijaya joined PBS in condemning the violence, indicating that most Sabah Muslims are learning to live under Christian rule. Sarawak Christians, at 45 percent of the population the state's largest religious group, have not developed the same political muscle. Known as Dayaks, they are divided into twelve groups of farmers and nomads with little else in common, but they are now trying to unite politically to combat government lumber policies which jeopardize their traditional agrarian lifestyles.

Mahathir's five-year term was not due to end until October 1991, but he called an early general election on 20-21 October 1990. He was probably motivated to do so by the prospects of Malaysia's economy suffering in 1991 from the Persian Gulf crisis and the worldwide recession; bruising intraparty elections in November 1990; and ethnic strains developing within the National Front on the announcement of the NEP's successor.

After losing a 1987 bid to oust Mahathir as UMNO's leader, former Trade and Industry Minister Razaleigh Hamzah organized a splinter party called Semangat '46 (Spirit of 1946, the year UMNO was established). Semangat '46 took about 300,000 party members and 12 MPs into opposition, but Mahathir's party (reincarnated as UMNO-Baru) retained all of UMNO's resources. Personality clashes, rather than political differences, seem to have motivated the split, which threatened to divide the Malay vote and undermine Malay political dominance. Indeed, when Razaleigh managed to form Malaysia's first Malay-led, multi-ethnic opposition, the country seemed poised to develop a new kind of coalition politics. Razaleigh presented himself as Malaysia's first true opposition candidate for prime minister. His coalition included the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP), among other Islamic parties in the Muslim Unity Movement (APU), and the Chinese DAP. Even more impressively, the opposition coalition agreed to field single candidates in 138 of 180 Parliamentary districts and 298 of 351 state contests.

The campaign never really evolved from personality into issues and the opposition failed to deprive Mahathir of a two-thirds majority. The National Front took 127 Parliamentary seats and 253 of 351 state districts. With the help of PBS' defection, however, the opposition cut into the National Front's representation; the National Front lost 6 MPs, including 1 UMNO MP, despite the addition of three new seats. The National Front also lost enough state legislators to fall below the 75 percent mark. Mahathir had won 57 percent of the vote in 1986, but only 52 percent in 1990. Opposition candidates defeated two ministers, including the defense minister. The DAP leader ousted the head of Penang's state government. PBS' defection meant the opposition took over Sabah's government three months after the state election. And in Kelantan, Razaleigh's home state, the opposition won all 13 federal and 39 state districts. The Kelantan sweep embarrassed Mahathir. PMIP dominated the Kelantan election, followed by Semangat '46. Although PMIP's 24 state legislators were enough to form its own government, PMIP strove to keep the coalition together by inviting Semangat '46 to name one of Kelantan's two deputy chief ministers.

The opposition alliance remains quite fragile, particularly because it lacks issues to bind it together. Semangat '46, which spearheaded the effort,
emerged from the elections badly bloodied, having lost four of twelve MPs and winning only 8 of the 61 federal districts it contested directly. Tensions are sure to hurt relations between PMIP and the DAP. Discounting the fourteen seats gained in Sabah, the opposition actually lost two seats in Parliament. The opposition failed to convert Malays, allowing UMNO to win 71 of 92 Malay-dominated districts—the same number UMNO won in 1986. Predictions of an end to ethnic politics, furthermore, proved premature; Malays continued to dominate while minorities voted for junior partners in both coalitions. Prime Minister Mahathir is known to treat opponents vindictively and therefore seems highly unlikely to accept the concept of a loyal opposition. Mahathir deliberately excluded the governors of Sabah and Kelantan from a Cabinet meeting with the other eleven state chief ministers. To bring Malaysia democracy, the opposition must overcome considerable obstacles.

Domination of national politics by a single party and a single ethnic group hinders Malaysians in exercising their legal rights to change their government democratically. Malaysia has universal adult suffrage, 8 million citizens are registered, and 70 percent voted in October 1990. Although Commonwealth election observers found the 1990 election to be reasonably free and more free than others in South East Asia, they noted certain "peculiarities" and "imperfections." The government allowed only nine days of campaigning, which may not be enough time for an opposition to spread its message, particularly when the government seems to have easier access to the media. The government restricted the timing, location and size of campaign rallies, banning outdoor rallies, for example. Non-Malays remain politically marginalized and impotent to influence such critical issues as the NEP’s racial quotas. The government acts to further reduce minority, particularly Chinese, influence by concentrating Chinese into large urban districts which often have three or four times the population of typical Malay seats. PMIP signalled good news for Kelantan’s 5 percent minority population by calling for a constitutional amendment to ensure Chinese, Indian and Thai representation in the state legislature.

Prisoners can now be detained without trial beyond the previous two-year maximum. In 1989 the government created a commission to investigate human rights abused under the Internal Security Act (ISA).

Mahathir has acted recently to constrain judicial review over detentions. Execution is mandated for possession of such small quantities as one-half ounce of heroin or seven ounces of marijuana. Guards regularly whip those convicted of a variety of crimes. Despite international standards forbidding physicians from participating in torture, Malaysia requires doctors to certify prisoners fit for whipping and to witness the punishment.

Though predominantly Muslim, Malaysia generally allows its religious minorities to practice as they wish. But non-Muslims worry about an apparent rise in Islamic fundamentalism, particularly as the government seems to turn to Islam as a source of legitimacy. Laws ban criticizing Islam and proselytizing Muslims. The state of Selangor now allows minors to convert to Islam without parental permission. Despite reports from the state of Trengganu of floggings for drinking alcohol, the government has generally resisted pressures to impose Islamic law on non-Muslims.

The Malaysian press is partly free. The media practice self-censorship, but freely criticize the government. All periodicals, domestic and foreign, must register annually. Nineteen-eighty-seven amendments to the Printing Presses
and Publications Act of 1984 give the home minister (currently Prime Minister Mahathir) "absolute discretion" to ban publishing or importing works "likely to alarm public opinion." Such decisions are "final and shall not be called into question by any court on any ground whatsoever." Parliament acted in 1990 to strengthen the official news agency, Bemama, by making it the sole recipient of foreign wire copy and distributor of foreign periodicals.

The Bush administration has certified that Malaysian labor is free enough to justify Malaysia's continued participation in the Generalized System of Preferences, despite American labor's concerns over restrictions on electronics workers. Kuala Lumpur allows only in-house unions to organize in industries dominated by foreign investment. Malaysia has independent trade unions and an active labor movement.

In May 1989, Malaysia began denying first asylum to Vietnamese refugees, instead allowing them to land only long enough to receive food, fuel and boat repairs before dragging them back to sea. The Malaysians have expelled thousands of Vietnamese so far, many of whom have landed in Indonesia. Refugees allowed to stay appear to be treated well.

### Maldives

**Polity:** Nonparty presidential and legislative (elite clan-dominated)

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 200,000

**HDI:** 0.692 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 53 male, 50 female

**Ethnic groups:** Mixed Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab and black

**Political Rights:** 6

**Civil Liberties:** 5

**Status:** Not Free

**Overview:**

During the first half of 1990, the Republic of Maldives, a five-hundred-mile-long chain of 1,200 mostly uninhabited islands in the Indian Ocean, experienced a measure of political reform under President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Elected in 1988 to a third term, the president is a member of the small, hereditary, educated elite that has controlled the government since the replacement of a sultanate in 1968 by a national referendum. But by midyear, resistance to the reforms by hardliners and members of the ruling elite led to a wave of repression and threats against journalists and reformers in the forty-eight-member unicameral Citizens' Assembly (majlis), controlled by an elected majority in a nonparty system. It is the majlis, eight of whose members are appointed by the president, that designates the president for a five-year term.

Early in the year, President Gayoom spoke openly of freeing up the political process. Inaugurating the new session of the majlis in February, the president said: "The Maldivian people need to begin a new era of democracy, and for this fresh ideas and new thoughts are in demand." He said he would introduce legislation to share some of the powers bestowed on the presidency. Elections for the majlis, which one foreign diplomat said were freer than in the past, brought in younger activists who wanted to see real change and were ready to challenge the traditional powerholders. By April, there were arrests, smear campaigns against opponents of hardliners in the government, and death threats against politicians and journalists seeking a more open society. Police arrested eight people said to have distributed leaflets criticizing official corruption. Journalists of Sanu or the "Conchshell,"
a new fortnightly magazine in the vanguard of calls for reform, were accused of links to the 1988 coup led by Tamil mercenaries from Sri Lanka under the command of a disgruntled businessman.

On 30 May, Ilyas Ibrahim, defense minister, trade minister, and head of a state trading company with a near monopoly on external trade, was stripped of his government posts and accused by the government of "embezzlement and misappropriation of government funds." He left the country, purportedly without government permission, and went to Europe.

While Ibrahim's departure was greeted positively by those pushing for greater reforms, other relatives of the president remain in the government and there was little indication that the president was willing to further tackle hardliners opposed to changes that may jeopardize their power and influence. The political situation remained tense at the end of the year.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Maldivians do not have the means to change their government democratically. During the year, several people were arrested for political reasons. Private newspapers usually practice self-censorship. In 1990, when Sanu and other publications printed articles attacking government corruption, journalists were harassed and several received death threats. The government-owned newspaper, television and radio reflect official views. Clubs and associations are permitted as long as they do not contravene Islamic and civil laws. Islam is the official religion, non-Muslims are not allowed to proselytize, and conversions to other religions could lead to loss of citizenship. There are restrictions on residency and travel, particularly in the overcrowded main island of Male; there are no curbs on foreign travel or emigration. There are no unions, and no right to form them.

Mali

| Polity: One-party (military dominated) | Political Rights: 6 |
| Economy: Mixed statist | Civil Liberties: 5 |
| Population: 8,100,000 | Status: Not Free |
| HDI: 0.143 (low) |
| Life Expectancy: 40 male, 44 female |
| Ethnic groups: Malinke (50 percent), Fulani (17 percent), Voltaic (12 percent), Songhai (6 percent), others |

Overview:

The arid, land-locked Republic of Mali in west-central Africa is headed by President Gen. Moussa Traore, who ousted leftist Modibo Keita in 1968 in a bloodless coup. The Mali People's Democratic Union (UDPM), established in 1979, is the only legal party. President Traore, who is secretary general of the UDPM, was reelected to a second six-year term in 1985. All deputies in the unicameral eighty-two member National Assembly are members of the UDPM. Regional officials are appointed, and municipalities have elected councils.

Among the key issues in 1990 were continued border disputes with neighboring Mauritania. Mauritania's decision last year to expel its Senegal-ese population led to tensions along the border. Farmers pushed out of Mauritania raided Bedouin and Berber nomads in northern Mali, causing thousands to flee into Mauritania. The government also had to contend with the Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Azaouad Region, which called for the secession of northern Mali and the establishment of an Arab and Touareg state there.

In March a debate on a multiparty system took place in Bamako, the
capital, during a conference of national officials. While most of those contributing to the debate insisted that political pluralism was urgently needed, President Traore told a newspaper in Abidjan in June that he had ruled out the possibility of a multiparty system. During a June meeting of the country's most senior military officers, presided over by Defense Minister Gen. Mamadou Coulibaly, several officers asked for an opposition to be established within a single-party framework, while others openly advocated multipartyism. Gen. Coulibaly reportedly angrily accused the officers of being unfaithful to the party and allowing themselves to be influenced by civilians. "As soon as they invite you to share a bottle of whiskey, they turn your heads," he shouted. "There will be no multipartyism in Mali."

Despite appeals from senior officials, the independent press, Muslim and Christian leaders, trade unions, the bar association, human rights groups, and elements of the army, the congress refused to liberalize the system or consider multipartyism. Djibril Diallo, political secretary of the party's Central Executive Bureau (BEC) and officially the regime's number two man, resigned and according to the independent press, said that all of the party's local branches and the BEC were in support of a multiparty system.

In October, small groups of demonstrators demanding democracy and multipartyism protested in the capital of Bamako. Six days later, a group in Bamako announced the official creation of a National Committee for a Democratic Initiative (CNID), which called for freedom to establish political parties and associations. The CNID was chaired by Moutage Tall, general-secretary of the Mali Bar Association. It included prominent lawyers and civic leaders.

The Toureg rebellion strengthened the hand of hardliners, although the fighting had abated toward year's end. The Touregs, a nomadic Berber people, had been staging an armed campaign since at least March or April. In July, the government imposed a state of emergency in the north. The death toll for Toureg civilians and soldiers is estimated to be several hundred, and dozens of Touregs were reported to have been publicly and summarily executed. Unlike those in Niger, the Touregs in Mali seem well organized and well equipped. The government claimed that they belong to Libya's Islamic Legion and received arms and money from the Libyan government. The Touregs claim that they are not secessionist and want to liberate Mali from an oppressive regime. The government thought that it had mollified the Touregs by coopting the aristocracy, members of which serve in the Traore government. However, the rebellion has caused a rift between the Touregs and their dynastic leaders.

In September, the French newspaper *Le Monde* reported that Touregs in Mali and Niger were victims of widespread government atrocities. The paper quoted sources as saying that hundreds of civilians, women and children had been massacred by government forces, and that wells were poisoned to decimate livestock and kill people. President Traore condemned what he conceded were "abominable acts" committed by mercenaries.

The economy, based on animal husbandry and subsistence farming, continued to be plagued by drought, poor food distribution, malnutrition and unemployment. The government has continued working with the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Saudi Fund and the Japanese Fund for International Economic Cooperation in an effort to modernize the debt-ridden economy. Opposition to the IMF has been voiced by the president's brother-in-law, Abraham Dou Cissoko, director general of customs.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Maliens do not have the means to change their government democratically. In August, the ruling UDPM rejected popular demands for multipartyism. The rights of political detainees are circumscribed, and the judiciary is not independent of party or government interference. Government forces have committed human rights abuses and atrocities in quelling the Toureg insurgency; an unknown number of Touregs have been imprisoned. While the government controls major media, there are lively independent publications that frequently criticize the government and the party. Although political parties are not allowed, an opposition National Committee for a Democratic Initiative was created in October. Nonpolitical, independent organizations and associations function freely. There are no significant restrictions on religion or foreign and domestic travel. Workers’ right of association is limited to the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM), which includes twelve unions. Strikes are rarely allowed, and those deemed to be political are forbidden. The trade unions joined in calling for greater democracy and a multiparty system.

Malta

Polity: Parliamentary democracy
Economy: Mixed capitalist-statist
Population: 400,000
HDI: 0.898 (high)
Life Expectancy: 69 male, 74 female
Ethnic groups: Maltese(mixed Arab, Sicilian, Norman, Spanish, Italian and English)

Overview:

Pope John Paul’s visit to Malta in May was the outstanding news story in Malta in 1990. This was the first papal visit to the island since the arrival of Christianity there nearly 2,000 years ago.

Located in the central Mediterranean, Malta was under foreign rule for most of its history. The British occupied the island in 1800, and it became a British colony later. Malta gained independence from Britain in 1964. The socialist Malta Labor Party gained power in 1971 and held it until 1987. In office, Labor followed left-of-center economic policies and a neutral foreign policy. It also ordered some confiscations of church property and restricted private financing for Catholic schools. Labor turned to Libya for aid and support in the early 1980s. The socialists lost control to the Nationalist Party in the 1987 general elections. Nationalist Prime Minister Edward Fenech Adami advocates a more Europe-oriented foreign policy while maintaining Malta’s neutrality. The Pope asked the government to do more to make the church “free from undue pressures, obstacles, and manipulation.”

The parliament, called the House of Representatives, has 65 seats and a maximum term of five years. Voters choose the representatives by proportional representation. Elected by parliament, the largely ceremonial president serves for five years, and appoints the prime minister from the parliamentary majority party. Under a constitutional amendment adopted in 1987, a party getting a majority of the popular vote gets a majority of the seats in parliament. In the previous elections, it was possible for a party to receive a majority of votes and win only a minority of seats.

The Maltese have the right to change their government democratically, and power alternates between the two major parties. Malta’s constitution guarantees freedoms of speech and press. The only exception is a law passed in
1987 which forbids foreign involvement in Maltese election campaigns. Radio and television are state-controlled, but opposition views receive adequate air time. The press is free, but many newspapers are politically affiliated. Religion is free for both the Catholic majority and for religious minorities. During the papal visit, John Paul met with representatives of the tiny Protestant and Moslem communities. There is freedom of association for all groups. Many trade unions belong to the Labor Party’s General Union of Workers, but others are independent.

**Mauritania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity: Military</th>
<th>Political Rights: 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy: Capitalist-statist</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 2,000,000</td>
<td>Status: Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI: 0.208 (low)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy: 42 male, 46 female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups: White and Black Moors, black tribal Africans (Toucolour, Peuhl, Sarakole, Wolof)</td>
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**Overview:**

Mauritania, an Islamic republic, has been under military rule since 1978 when officers ousted President Daddah and established a Committee for National Recovery, later renamed the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN). Daddah and his Mauritanian People’s Party (PPM), supported by the Moorish elite, had run the country since gaining independence from France in 1960 as a constitutional one-party state. Upon taking power, the military suspended this constitutional arrangement and abolished the PPM, but has since failed to introduce democratic institutions at the national level and to act on a proposed constitution that calls for multi-party democracy. A brief attempt to return to civilian rule in 1981 was aborted. Col. Muawiya Ould Sidi Ahmad Taya is the country's current president, prime minister, and head of the CMSN. There are no scheduled national elections, although municipal elections have taken place since 1986.

Mauritania has been beset by severe animosity between its black African tribes, which are located largely within and adjacent to the Senegal River valley along the country’s southern border, and its politically and economically dominant Moors of the north and center. The Moors, both white and black, are culturally Arab-Berber and make up about three-fourths of the population. In 1980 the officers of the CMSN, as part of a general effort at extending Moorish hegemony throughout society, attempted to impose Muslim fundamentalism in Mauritania by establishing Islamic courts applying particular interpretations of religious law (shari’a).

Beginning in May of 1989, the government forcibly expelled 40,000-50,000 of its own non-Moorish citizens into Senegal. The forced expulsions followed a border quarrel between Mauritian herdsmen and Senegalese farmers—a quarrel that spilled over into attacks on the Mauritian shopkeeper population in Senegal and on Senegalese laborers in Mauritania. Thousands of Mauritanians and Senegalese were airlifted safely back to their homelands, but the policy of expelling native Mauritanians who are not Moors continues. Attempts to mediate the conflict by Egypt, Yassir Arafat, and the Organization of African Unity have not been fruitful.

In 1990, the ruling Military Committee for National Salvation extended
pogroms against both Senegalese residents and its own tribal populations. The official security forces and armed militias largely composed of black Moors have reportedly killed and disappeared Peuhl-speakers in particular, often burning their villages. Many Peuhl-speakers have subsequently fled to Senegal and Mali. The government denies that it is acting against Mauritanian citizens. Nonetheless, the targeting of Peuhl-speaking blacks in 1990 appears to be part of a still-greater Arabist militancy in CMSN policy. Col. Taya, president and CMSN chief, has dismissed leading officials considered too "pro-French" or too "soft" on Senegal, as well as tribal black officials.

After Mauritania's break in diplomatic relations with Senegal in April 1989 and subsequent border fighting that continued this year, Mauritania received weapons and advisers from Iraq. In February 1990 a military cooperation pact was signed. Mauritania made its desert territory available for Iraqi missile tests, although the CMSN has denied missile sites have been constructed.

Three dissident groups operate from outside the country. The African Liberation Force of Mauritania (FLAM) was formed in 1989 by black officers dismissed in 1987. More recently, the Resistance Front for Unity, Independence, and Democracy in Mauritania (FRUIDEM) and the United Front of Mauritanian Armed Resistance (FURAM) have formed.

The government was reported to have arrested and detained up to 1,000 non-Moors in November and December based on the allegation that there had been a conspiracy to overthrow the government. While some were later released, others continued to be held and there was fear that they were being subjected to torture while in military custody.

Mauritanians are ruled by the unelected Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN), which came to power unconstitutional in 1978. They are not allowed to form political parties or freely choose national-level representatives. Municipal elections, believed by some to be unfair, have taken place since 1986 and 1989, with the debate strictly confined to local issues.

Mauritania is an Islamic republic. Islam is the official and only recognized religion. Conversion to a non-Muslim faith is prohibited. In 1980, Islamic law, the *shari'a*, was imposed as national law and Islamic courts were established.

In 1990, human rights groups reported extra-judicial killings carried out by police under a night curfew, acts which are aimed at deterring expelled black Mauritians from returning across the Senegal river to gather cattle and other property. Slavery, long-practiced in the country, was formally abolished in 1980 but the practice of slavery persists. The UNHCR estimates there are still 100,000 Mauritians in slavery.

The authorities hold political prisoners without charge for prolonged periods, often without food, and are believed to torture them. Opposition figures have been expelled. Courts are under the sway of the military rulers in political cases; State Security Court decisions are non-appealable.

All unions must belong to the government-controlled general labor confederation, the UTM. Strikes and political involvement are severely discouraged.

Two privately owned publications exist, though they are loyal to the regime, and the Mauritanian League for Human Rights has been tolerated. In general, however, there is no free press and no freedom of individual expression. To criticize the government publically is to risk arrest. The government owns and operates the one daily paper and radio and television. All associations require government approval.
Mauritius

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<td>Population:</td>
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<td>HDI:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy:</td>
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<td>Ethnic groups:</td>
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Overview:

This small, multi-ethnic island nation east of Madagascar gained independence from Britain in 1968. It is currently led by Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth of the Mauritian Socialist Movement (MSM), elected in 1987, whose coalition controls 41 of 62 elected seats in the 70-member, unicameral Legislative Assembly. In addition to the MSM, the governing alliance consists of the Mauritius Labor Party (PT), the Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD) and the Rodriguan People's Organization (OPR). The main opposition party is the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), and there are five small parties. A governor-general representing the crown is the titular head of state.

At the end of 1989, there were strains in the governing coalition, as PMSD leader Gaetan Duval speculated that the official opposition, the MMM, would likely merge with the MSM, and called for demonstrations against the government. Duval, who was arrested in connection with a 1970 political murder (the charge was later dropped), charged that the Jugnauth government had increasingly abused its authority. The PMSD left the coalition.

In 1990, the key issue was the shifting political alliances and a government proposal to adopt a republican form of government. In March, PT leader Satcam Boolell called for Hindu solidarity to assure a Hindu prime minister. He also said his party did not plan to leave the ruling alliance. Meanwhile, the leader of the opposition MMM, Paul Berenger, called an alliance with the MSM "unlikely." In July, the prime minister announced that his party had formed an alliance with the MMM, a revival of an old partnership. Mr. Berenger was briefly finance minister in 1982 under Jugnauth.

Other key issues facing the country in 1990 were several controversial government decisions dealing with guest workers and increased tax rates in the face of growing inflation that was expected to reach 13 percent by the end of the year. The island also experienced labor unrest as the Mauritius Labor Council (MLC), the most representative labor confederation, demanded a 30 percent increase to compensate workers for a steady loss of purchasing power since 1986. An unsuccessful strike by electrical workers against the Central Electricity Board (CEB) led to the dismissal of several union leaders, and union demands that they be reinstated. Sabotage at a power station was blamed on the dispute.

Questions also continued to be asked about the prime minister’s handling of drug trafficking cases. There were charges that the government anti-drug and anti-smuggling unit, the ADSU, was corrupt and, in some cases, worked in collusion with traffickers. The government continued to deny the charges.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Citizens have the right to choose their government democratically in a vibrant multiparty system. In August, a new political party, the Christian Democratic Union, was formed. The judiciary, modelled after the British system, is independent of government and political control. Some sixteen privately
owned newspapers are free to print diverse viewpoints. Freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed and upheld, and there are no restrictions on religious freedom. Travel, both foreign and domestic, is unrestricted. There are nine trade union federations encompassing 300 unions. Labor leaders are represented in the National Assembly, and workers have the right to strike.

Mexico

**Polity:** Dominant party

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 88,600,000

**HDI:** 0.876 (high/d)

**Life Expectancy:** 64 male, 68 female

**Ethnic groups:** Mestizo (60 percent), Indian (30 percent), Caucasian (9 percent), other (1 percent)

**Political Rights:** 4

**Civil Liberties:** 4

**status:** Partly Free

Overview:

In 1990, the government of President Carlos Salinas drew praise at home and abroad for boldly restructuring the ailing Mexican economy. But he and the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) faced a growing chorus of criticism over electoral fraud, human rights violations, intimidation of political foes, and excessive use of executive authority.

Mexico achieved independence from Spain in 1810 and established a republic in 1822. Following the Revolution of 1910, a new constitution was promulgated. Under the 1917 constitution, the United Mexican States is a federal republic consisting of thirty-one states and a Federal District (Mexico City). Each state has its own constitution and elected governors and legislatures. The governor of the Federal District is appointed by the president. The president is directly elected for a six-year term. There is a bicameral Congress consisting of a 64-member Senate directly elected for six years, and a 500-member Chamber of Deputies elected for three years—300 by direct vote, and 200 through a system of proportional representation. Municipal governments are elected.

The near-total dominance of the executive, the Congress, and the state and local governments by the PRI since 1929 has been increasingly challenged in recent years. Despite continued widespread electoral fraud and manipulation, the PRI's presidential vote has declined by nearly half since 1976.

According to official results, PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari won with 50.36 percent of the vote in July 1988, taking only one of every four votes in Mexico City. The main challengers were Manuel Clouthier of the rightist National Action Party (PAN) with 17 percent, and a broad coalition of leftist parties and former PRI leaders including Cuauhtemoc Cardenas who received 31.3 percent With many observers in Mexico believing Cardenas had obtained a far greater percentage, Salinas was inaugurated in December with the weakest mandate of any PRI president. The PRI also failed for the first time to win a two-thirds legislative majority.

President Salinas took office in December 1988 promising to modernize the economy, end corruption, and usher in an era of true democracy. In his first two years, however, economic restructuring clearly outpaced political reform. The results of his commitment to cleaner elections have been mixed at best. In the 1989 state election in Baja California Norte, the PRI conceded defeat in a gubernatorial race for the first time ever. Still, there was evidence of fraud in that state's legislative contest, as well as in the legislative and
Country reports

municipal contests held in numerous other states where the PRI claimed
victory in 1989 and 1990. Although the Cardenas-led coalition began to
unravel in 1989, his newly formed Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)
appeared to have won clear victories in legislative races in Michoacan and
Guerrero. Meanwhile, less than five percent of Mexico’s nearly 2,400
municipalities are governed by opposition parties.

The Salinas government has made little progress on electoral reform. In
August 1990, a new law was enacted that left the federal electoral commis-
sion firmly in the control of the PRI and made public questioning of official
election results a punishable offense. The “governability” clause stipulates that
any party gaining a simple plurality in the direct vote for deputies, and only
35 percent of the vote nationwide, will be assigned enough deputies from its
proportional representation rolls to give it a one-seat majority in the Chamber.

Similarly, only partial measures were taken toward the democratization of
the PRI itself during its September 1990 party convention. Salinas was
cought between a number of dissident movements pressing for deep reforms
of the party, and the old guard, known as "dinosaurs," pressing for maintain-
ing the status quo. In the end, it was decided that some PRI candidates for
national office would be chosen by secret ballot in conventions, but not the
presidential candidate, who is traditionally hand-picked by his predecessor.

Salinas hoped these initial steps, coupled with his economic liberalization
program, would help bring back the many PRI voters lost in the last fifteen
years. However, he faced the dual challenges of preventing more dissident
PRI factions from deserting the party, and bringing the benefits of economic
reform to the lower layers of Mexico’s impoverished society. The midterm
legislative elections and a number of key gubernatorial contests slated for
summer 1991 loomed as major tests of Salinas’ commitment to bringing
modern democracy to Mexico.

Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding political and civic organization are gen-
erally respected. There are over a dozen political parties occupying the spec-
trum from right to left. However, opposition parties are subject to violent
repression, particularly during protests against electoral fraud, and the govern-
ment has turned increasingly to the military and security forces for dealing
with political and labor problems. Further, the government has been unable to
curb the extensive and systematic violation of human rights—including false
arrest, torture, murder, disappearances, and extortion—by the national police
and other law enforcement branches. Targets include political and labor
figures, journalists, human rights activists, as well as criminal detainees.

In mid-1990, under increasing pressure from domestic and international
human rights monitors, President Salinas created an official human rights
commission. It was immediately swamped with denunciations, particularly
against the anti-narcotics police, one of the most corrupt of Mexico’s security
units which routinely makes political arrests under the pretext of drug
enforcement. However, despite new anti-torture legislation, new rules of
evidence, the disbanding of certain police units, and some movement on
particularly notorious cases, the wave of abuses continued in the second half
of the year. In the fall of 1990, the head of the official rights commission
admitted that abuses were widespread, that many police units actually
considered torture to be part of their job.

The judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court whose members are ap-
pointed for life by the president with the approval of the Senate. Although it
is nominally independent, and the Supreme Court is empowered to rule on certain constitutional issues, the judicial system is weak and riddled with corruption. In many rural areas, respect for laws by official agencies is nonexistent. Lower courts and law enforcement in general are undermined by widespread bribery, as is the state bureaucracy. Drug-related corruption is evident in the military, police, and security forces, as well as in a number of state governments.

Labor unions are powerful, notoriously corrupt, and traditionally allied with the ruling PRI. However, as part of his anti-corruption campaign, Salinas utilized the military in 1989 to remove the leader of the mighty oil workers union. In 1990, the government used force to disrupt strikes by unruly unions that refused to toe the line in support of the government's economic liberalization program.

The press and broadcasting media, which are mostly private, still operate under a number of indirect government controls and are subject to intimidation. Newspapers and magazines depend on subsidies, normally deriving over half of advertising revenues from official sources. As a result, materials prepared by public officials are often published without attribution. In May 1990, the government lifted the ban on imports of newsprint, a traditional mechanism for influencing the press. The ban was lifted, however, amid a systematic campaign to discredit and intimidate media critical of the government. The government promised to investigate anonymous death threats against prominent national journalists, but appeared unconcerned by the slayings of dozens of small-town reporters in the provinces.

Radio and television operate under a number of government regulatory bodies and tend to favor government positions, particularly during elections. In early 1990, it was announced that Multivision, the nation's second private television network, would be competing with the giant Televisa system.

Despite the visit of Pope John Paul II in May 1990, and the warm personal reception by President Salinas, the harsh anti-clerical laws which prohibit the Mexican Catholic Church from operating in public or owning property remained in place. Salinas' cautious effort to improve state-church relations was hindered by pressure from the political left.

**Mongolia**

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<tr>
<th>Polity: Dominant party</th>
<th>Political Rights: 4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy: Statist</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 2,200,000</td>
<td>status: Partly Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI: 0.737 (medium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy: 60 male, 64 female</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups: Khalkha Mongols (76 percent), other Mongols (13 percent), Turkic (7 percent), Chinese, Russian, Tungusic (4 percent)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overview:**

This large, sparsely populated country, which in 1921 became the second country in the world after the Soviet Union to turn Communist, in 1990 became the first Communist nation in Asia to drop Marxism as the official ideology and hold competitive, multiparty elections.

Political change began late in 1989, as Communist regimes were overturned in Eastern Europe. Several rallies were organized in the capital of Ulan Bator by the unofficial Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) led by Sanjaasuren Zorig, a twenty-seven-year-old university lecturer. The group
demanded an end to one-party dominance, free elections and the introduction of free-market reforms.

At the start of 1990, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), led by General Secretary Jambyn Batmonh, indicated that it would be amenable to political changes. In February, members of the MDU announced the formation of the Mongolian Democratic Party, the first opposition party in the country's history. On 14 March, the MPRP replaced its entire leadership and voted to give up its constitutional monopoly on power. Batmonh was dismissed and Gombojavyn Ochirbat was named the party's new general secretary.

On 23 March, the Great Hural (Mongolia's unicameral parliament) chose Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat to be the new president and Sharavyn Gunjaadorj to be prime minister. New measures approved by the assembly included the removal from the constitution of the clauses describing the MPRP as the "guiding force" in Mongolian society and the "vanguard of the working people" and the drafting of legislation for the direct election by the Great Hural of a Little Hural as a standing legislative body. Elections were scheduled for July.

The 10-11 May session of the Great Hural took additional steps towards meeting opposition demands to consolidate democracy by legalizing political parties. The changes came following hunger strikes and rallies by the opposition. Under an agreement between the government and the opposition, a Consultative Council was set up to seek consensus on draft laws dealing with political affairs. The council comprised representatives of the MPRP and a coalition of democratic forces—the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Party of National Progress. (Two other parties were subsequently registered: the Party of Free Labor, formed by cooperative workers and owners; and the Green Party, concerned with environmental issues.) Under the political parties law, before elections parties have to register at the Mongolian Supreme Court, observe the Mongolian Constitution, reveal their financial support, and may not represent regional interests. Under amendments to the constitution, the 53-member Little Hural would deal with state economic plans and budgets and supervise the work of the government. Parties would be allocated one seat for every 2 percent of the votes received. The president would be elected by the Great Hural to represent the country, supervise the government and coordinate the work of both Hurals, but without presidential power, since there would also be a prime minister elected by the Great Hural.

On 22 July, Mongolians went to the polls in primary elections for local, provincial and national legislators. Nationwide, 2,400 candidates ran for the 430 seats in the Great Hural. Only 300 candidates were members of the opposition parties, which claimed that they did not have adequate time to properly organize and field candidates in all districts. In the second round on 29 July, the MPRP won nearly 70 percent of the seats in the Great Hural, and 60 percent in the Little Hural. MPRP boss Ochirbat, who won by only a 4 percent majority, called for a coalition. Of the opposition groups, the Mongolian Democratic Party gained 23 seats in the Great Hural, the National Progress Party 7, the Social Democratic Party and the Youth Union, 4 each, and the Free Labor Party, 1.

During a visit to Ulan Bator shortly after the vote, U.S. Secretary of State Baker said the U.S. offered Mongolia $1.1 million in aid and special trade status to help transform the economy into a democratic free-market system.
The first session of the new Great Hural opened on 5 September. Punsalmaagyn Ochirbat was elected president of the country; Dashiyn Byambasuren was appointed prime minister.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

In 1990, citizens of Mongolia were granted the means to change their government democratically. The July elections were judged by observers to be generally free and fair, although the novelty of multiparty voting did lead to some confusion and spoiled ballots among the 92 percent of eligible voters who went to the polls. During the year, the country became a far more open society, with greater freedom of expression, assembly and association. Rallies and demonstrations were common and generally free of government or military interference, political parties were legalized and open criticism of the government was tolerated. The government-controlled media became more open. In January, three members of the opposition Mongolian Democratic Association were invited to join a television debate against a representative of the ruling MPRP. Restrictions on religion were also eased, as the opposition demanded freedom of religion in this traditionally Buddhist nation. From 1944 to 1990, Ulan Bator’s 160-monk Gandan monastery was the only functioning monastery in the country. In April, Mongolia’s oldest monastery, Erdene-dzuu, formerly a tourist site, was re-established as a functioning monastery. Freedom of movement and residence, once tightly controlled by the government, have become less restrictive. Professional and labor organizations were, until recently, regulated and controlled by the government. At year’s end, the new government was in the process of re-evaluating regulations and drafting new legislation.

Morocco

**Polity:** Monarchy and limited parliament  
**Political Rights:** 4  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Status:** Partly Free  
**Population:** 25,600,000  
**HDI:** 0.489 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 60 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Arab-Berber

**Overview:**

In 1990, the central question facing the regime of King Hassan II and his inner circle was the implementation rate of austerity measures to improve a deteriorating economic situation that in December led to food riots that left dozens dead. Other issues included the crisis in the Gulf caused by Iraq’s August invasion of Kuwait, and the pace of political liberalization.

Early in the year, King Hassan, whose legitimacy rests in part on his place in a 350-year dynasty, faced conflicting advice on the best solution to an economy that took a sudden and sharp downturn in 1989, causing trade and budget deficits to soar. His political advisers argued for a gradualist approach, while technicians called for deep spending cuts.

In March, the king announced an austerity package that included a devaluation of the currency by 9 percent and a reduction of budget deficit to $112 million, down from a previously planned $800 million. Morocco’s foreign debt was estimated at $22 billion. Since 1989, as part of an IMF and World Bank plan introduced in the mid-1980s, the king slated some 600 companies for privatization, but few people were expected to benefit from
the move outside the small elite that controls most of the Moroccan economy.

In April the CDT, a trade union confederation, called a twenty-four-hour strike to protest price hikes and the lack of trade union rights; the strike was opposed by the rival Moroccan Workers Union.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the cabinet and parliament condemned the attack. On 14 August, a contingent of 1,200 Moroccans were sent to Saudi Arabia to join the multinational force.

Though there were rising expectations for a more limited constitutional monarchy, Morocco in 1990 had yet to undergo the liberalization experienced by neighbors such as Algeria or Tunisia. King Hassan can dissolve the unicameral 306-member National Assembly, postpone or call elections, and rule by decree or royal proclamation. Two-thirds of the Assembly are directly elected, and the other third indirectly voted upon by an electoral college. Legislative elections last took place in 1984; they had been postponed twice by the king because of rioting stirred up by Islamic fundamentalists.

Several political parties function openly, including the Constitutional Union, the National Rally of Independents, the Popular Movement, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, the National Democratic Party, the Party for Progress and Socialism, the Istiqlal Party, and the Justice and Welfare Party. Fundamentalists challenging King Hassan as "commander of the faithful" have been imprisoned and tried for political reasons, among them members of the moderate Justice and Welfare Party, led by Abdessalam Yacine, who has been under house arrest since 1982. Demonstrations in March protested the arrest of six party members. Many protestors were beaten and 2,000 were arrested.

A severe crisis erupted in December, when at least thirty-three people were killed in two days of rioting in the city of Fez. Hundreds of civilians and security personnel were injured in the unrest, touched off by economic hardship, bleak job prospects and unfulfilled government pledges. Several people were killed in Tangier, and there were disturbances in other cities. The disturbances broke out during a nationwide general strike called by two large union federations to back a list of demands, including a doubling of the minimum wage.

Immediately after the rioting, the government pledged to raise salaries, improve social benefits and open an investigation into the violence demanded by all political parties. France, which ruled the country until 1956, accused Moroccan security forces of "bloody and very harsh" repression.

Moroccans are limited in their ability to change and control their government, with King Hassan II, the country's hereditary ruler, wielding broad powers. In April, Amnesty International published a scathing report on physical abuse and torture of prisoners in police custody, especially political offenders such as Marxists, students and Islamic fundamentalists. King Hassan pardoned several hundred prisoners on the holiday of Ida al-Adha. The Moroccan legal system has no habeus corpus provisions. In political cases, the independence of the judiciary is limited. Freedom of expression is curtailed; government policy and particular ministers are sometimes criticized in the press, but criticism of the monarchy, foreign policy, Islam or the kingdom's claim on the Western Sahara is off limits. There is no strictly independent press; all are connected to a particular party. Journalists frequently practice self-censorship. Television and radio are government owned.
The government retains the authority to ban political assemblies. Nonpolitical vocational associations thrive in Morocco. Ninety percent of Moroccans are Sunni Muslim. Religious proselytizing is prohibited. Mosques are monitored by the authorities for radical fundamentalism. The minority Jewish population of 10,000 is free to organize and worship, but the Baha'i are not. Freedom of movement inside the country is generally respected, but passport issuance for foreign travel is slow. Thirteen percent of the workforce is unionized, belonging mainly to three nongovernment affiliated labor confederations. Under the law, workers have the right to strike and bargain collectively, but the government may ban striking on national security grounds. The ILO has noted some government interference with union elections, and union members have complained that dismissals for trade union activity have not been properly remedied.

**Mozambique**

**Polity:** One party transitional  
**Political Rights:** 6  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 6  
**Population:** 15,700,000  
**status:** Not Free  
**HDI:** 0.239 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 44 male, 46 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Makua, Lomwe, Thonga, others

**Overview:**

The two outstanding developments in Mozambique in 1990 were the country’s move towards a multiparty system and a possible end to civil war. After more than two decades of fighting Portuguese colonial occupation, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) successfully established the People’s Republic of Mozambique in 1975. Samora Machel led the Communist one-party state, located in southeastern Africa, until he was killed in an airplane crash in 1986. Joaquim Chissano succeeded him as president and Frelimo party leader. Frelimo has controlled all government and legal political activity since independence. A 250-member unicameral people’s assembly has been indirectly elected by provincial assemblies, with all candidates approved by Frelimo. Almost since its inception, the country has been torn by civil war and lawlessness. The primary armed insurgency group is the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), which began in the early 1970s, allegedly at the behest of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian government in reaction to Frelimo support for the armed insurgency against white-minority rule within Rhodesia. Since 1980, when South African private and public sources reportedly took on Renamo’s financial support, the 25,000 guerrilla force has carried on extensive guerrilla activities throughout the country, controlling large areas of rural territory.

The civil war has cut vital roads and railroad links, caused damage on the order of some $6 million, killed an estimated 900,000 Mozambicans through a combination of famine, disease, and assassination, and forced approximately one million to flee into adjacent countries as refugees while another 2.5 million have been displaced within Mozambique’s borders. The economy is a shambles as communication, transportation and production facilities have been paralyzed by war or deliberately sabotaged in a Renamo strategy of disruption that has also severely hit rural health clinics and schools. Hunger is pervasive. The kidnapping of peasants for forced labor in the service of the insurgency is common, and persistent evidence of atrocities against
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civilians by guerrillas characterize the conflict. Both armies conduct recruitment sweeps of streets and schools to fill their depleted ranks, and commonly force pre-adolescents to serve in combat.

Some 40 percent of the national budget in Mozambique is spent on defense and the military, though soldiers often go hungry and are short of weapons. Deserters from both the Army and from Renamo have taken to banditry or set themselves up as warlords in local fiefdoms independent of outside control. This brings into question whether a permanent ceasefire and political settlement between Frelimo and Renamo could end banditry in the nation anytime soon.

By late 1990 there was a limited ceasefire between the government and Renamo which constituted the first agreement between them since the beginning of the insurgency. Mozambique continued with its project of drafting a new constitution that would provide for universal suffrage, direct legislative and executive elections, separation of powers, and abolition of the requirement that candidates for office be members of Frelimo.

Renamo released a peace plan at the start of the Nairobi talks in 1989, calling for free elections, a liberal constitution, a joint Frelimo-Renamo government, withdrawal from Mozambique of Zimbabwean troops supporting Maputo's war effort, reinstallation of traditional chieftainries, and other changes. By August 1990, Frelimo had moved away from its position in opposition to multipartyism, had provided for free association, an independent judiciary, freedom to own private property, the right to strike, and religious freedom in its draft constitution, and had implicitly recognized Renamo as a political force by meeting with the insurgents in direct talks. However, Renamo has rejected unilateral action by the government to institute political and economic change of any sort without official Renamo participation in the process.

Direct talks between Renamo and the Mozambican government took place in July, and despite a subsequent Renamo withdrawal from negotiations, a series of confidence-building measures has followed. The government has called upon Renamo to lay down its arms and reconstitute itself as a political party. Meanwhile, political opponents in exile have begun to return to Mozambique, and there is speculation that they may soon take advantage of the opening for multipartyism.

Economically, the Mozambican government has continued to move toward a free-market system. The Program for Economic Rehabilitation (PRE), has been put into place under World Bank and IMF auspices. Abolition of price controls, privatization of state-owned industries, removal of subsidies on basic goods and services in order to eliminate public deficits, increasing prices paid to farmers for crops, and currency devaluation have been features of the program. Economic reform measures have led to strikes in industrial, construction, mining, transport, and public service sectors. The government response has been wage hikes.

The country, always among Africa's poorest, has continued to depend on large infusions of economic assistance from overseas donors, though there is fear of "donor fatigue" in light of conditions of persistent conflict Food aid continues to be sold on the black market, and reports of official corruption have increased.

As of late 1990, Mozambicans could not change their government by democratic means. The court system appears to be increasingly independent of direct Frelimo control, with nonpolitical trials in particular being usually

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free and fair, though government interference in the judicial process has been common in the past during the trial of political cases. There is a right of appeal, and the new constitution prohibits ex post facto laws and establishes a presumption of innocence for criminal defendants. Indefinite detention without trial is prohibited. Revolutionary tribunals have been abolished.

Freedom of the press is restricted, with foreign journalists subject to expulsion from the country for repealing the news unfavorably. Government-controlled media reflect official policy, with occasional criticism. Religious publications discuss sensitive issues and foreign radio and TV broadcasts from South Africa are received without interference.

The Organization of Mozambican Workers (OMW), to which all trade unions have had to belong, has begun to evolve away from being a body which seemed to be designed to manage labor discipline. Labor regulations have given workers the right to strike, provided that three to four day advance notice is given. Picketing is allowed, and elected representatives of strikers not affiliated with recognized trade unions may bargain on their behalf. Ties with Western labor organizations are being forged.

Frelimo-organized "popular" organizations and security forces continue to monitor the personal behavior of citizens in government-controlled areas. Opposition political demonstrations have been prohibited in the past, but would appear to be permitted formally under the new constitution. Business and professional associations are allowed.

**Namibia**

**Polity:** Presidential legislative democracy  
**Political Rights:** 2  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Civil Liberties:** 3  
**Population:** 1,500,000  
**Status:** Free  
**HDI:** 0.404 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 47 male, 50 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Ovambo (50 percent), Kavango (9 percent), Hercro (7.5 percent), Damara (7.5 percent), Baster and Colored (6.5 percent), White (6 percent), Nama/Hottentot (5 percent), Bushman (3 percent)

**Overview:**

On 21 March 1990, independence was celebrated in the national capital of Windhoek as Namibia became the last territory on the mainland of sub-Saharan Africa to achieve self-determination. Located in the southwestern corner of the continent and predominantly arid though rich in mineral resources, Namibia began its independent life by joining the select but growing number of nations in Africa with a functioning multiparty political system. Sam Nujoma, leader of the Southwest Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) insurgency movement, assumed office as the nation's first president as a consequence of SWAPO having gained a majority of the votes as a political party in free and fair elections five months previously.

Implementation of the United Nations independence program for Namibia began in April of 1989 with the deployment of the U.N. Transition Assistance Group. This was some ten-and-a-half years after the Security Council had adopted Resolution 435, which laid the basis for an internationally supervised ceasefire, withdrawal of South Africa military forces, and election. By early November of 1989, when pre-independence elections were held, ten political groupings had formed and mobilized themselves to contest the seventy-two seats up for grabs in a national constituent assembly. The results
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of this first open election were particularly significant. Since no party succeeded in winning a two-thirds majority needed to dominate subsequent proceedings to write a constitution, a one-party system was precluded.

Even before Namibians went to the polls, SWAPO reversed earlier statements favoring a preference for a one-party state by issuing public reassurances that it would respect democratic principles should it win. The position that it ultimately took on issues of civil liberties and political rights during deliberations to create a constitution indicated that it indeed seemed to have evolved philosophically. President Nujoma’s first sixteen-member cabinet, consisting of representatives of the major parties in the Assembly as well as the diverse ethnic and racial groups in Namibia, represented a visible commitment to pluralism.

Issues that could be controversial in the future for the newly independent state include the status of the Pretoria-controlled enclave of Walvis Bay, the heavy South African presence in the vital diamond and uranium extractive sectors, and the fact that all significant transportation and communications links are with South Africa. The Windhoek government has called explicitly for private Western investment in order to spur national development and to lessen Namibia’s economic dependence on South Africa, and has promised an investment code to facilitate such foreign activity in the national economy.

There is marked inequity in ownership of land and income between the black majority and the white minority. Land redistribution policies to favor the black majority by opening up "underused" farmland often owned by absentee white landlords—a major plank in SWAPO’s pre-independence program—have received relatively little attention since independence. The underdevelopment of water supply systems limits expansion of agriculture; most foodstuffs must be imported from South Africa.

Apart from attempting to reintegrate demobilized ex-guerrillas, and former members of the counter-insurgency Koevets force, the government must deal with as many as 100,000 refugees who have fled from the drought, famine, and war in neighboring Angola. Some SWAPO supporters are frustrated because they had hoped that electoral victory and independence would mean quick results in view of the leadership promises of land, jobs, health care and improved educational opportunities.

The most controversial issue during the first few months of independence was the appointment of former deputy commander of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia and SWAPO security chief Solomon "Jesus" Hawala as chief of staff of the Namibian Army. Known as "the Butcher of Lubongo" by political opponents, he has been accused of having overseen the torture, purge, and even killing of dissidents and suspected spies within SWAPO in the mid-eighties. Despite the storm of protest, which seemed to divide public opinion between SWAPO supporters and others, there was no indication by late 1990 that the government intended to withdraw the appointment.

Namibians will have the right to change their government by democratic means if SWAPO lives up to the provisions of the new constitution. An executive president was to be initially elected by simple majority in the National Assembly and later by direct popular vote, and would be limited to two five-year terms. Other provisions established regular elections for an eventual bicameral parliament whose members in the lower house would be chosen through proportional representation and in the upper house through equal regional representation. The bill of rights is justiciable.
Still uncharacteristic for much of Africa is the absence of any clause which would designate a particular party as the sole legal political movement or "guiding light" of the nation, or which would provide for a death penalty. Other provisions of note include the requirement of a two-thirds majority of both the legislative houses or of the voters in a referendum in order to amend the constitution, and the formal nonderogability of fundamental civil liberties, though administrative detention without charge or trial is allowed under a declared state of emergency. In addition, the right of private property is recognized, foreign investment is mentioned favorably, and a mixed economy is stated as a goal. The National Union of Namibian Workers, with links to the ICFTU, has worked to organize mining, industrial, commercial, and public employees unions since 1986. It considers the Nujoma government as more sympathetic to its goals and constituency than the prior colonial government. The right to strike exists and workers have used it

Nauru

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Mixed capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 9,000  
**HDI:** NA  
**Life Expectancy:** NA  
**Ethnic groups:** Indigenous Nauruans (mixture of Polynesian, Melanesian, Micronesian) (58 percent), other Pacific islanders (26 percent), Chinese (8 percent), European (8 percent)

**Overview:**

This tiny phosphate-rich nation of less than nine square miles located in the Central Pacific gained independence from Australia in January 1968. Executive power is vested in a president elected by an eighteen-member, popularly elected, unicameral parliament to a three-year term. There is also a directly elected Nauru Local Government Council (NLGC), which acts as a local government, is responsible for public services, and is the principal importer. There are no genuine political parties.

On 12 December 1989, forty-three-year-old Bernard Dowiyogo was elected the new president, beating former president Hammer DeRoubert, who lost a nonconfidence vote in August 1989 to Kenas Aroi. Mr. Aroi did not contest the election due to ill health. Parliamentary elections were held 9 December.

In a February 1990 address celebrating the twenty-second anniversary of the country's independence, the president pledged to reform the public service sector, and oversee improvements in the education system and the quality of medical care. He also reported on the investments of the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust, which owns properties around the world and is a source of valuable income. He outlined the economic difficulties caused by phosphate depletion.

As in 1989, a key political issue in 1990 was Nauru's $54 million claim against its former administrators—Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain—who control mining interests. Nauru demanded compensation for devastation to topsoil caused by mining. The three nations gained control of the island after World War I and mined it as a joint authority, the British Phosphate Company removing a third of the nation's available phosphate reserves by 1968. Nauru wants compensation to rehabilitate three-fifths of the twenty-
one sq km island, which has been left like a moonscape. The International Court of Justice directed Australia to file its reply before 21 January 1991.

Citizens have the means to change their government democratically. Although there are no political parties, diverse viewpoints are represented in the parliament and the NLGC, and opposition figures have been elected president on several occasions since independence. An opposition grouping in parliament was formed after the 1987 elections. The judiciary is independent. The government-controlled and independent media offer diverse viewpoints. There is freedom of assembly, religion and travel, both foreign and domestic. Trade unions have been discouraged from forming by the government, though there are no laws formally proscribing them.

Nepal

**Political Rights:** 4  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Status:** Partly Free  
**Polity:** Monarchy and multiparty transitional  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 19,100,000  
**HDI:** 0.273 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 47 male, 45 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Newar, Indian, Tibetan, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Bhotia, others

**Overview:**

In 1990, the Himalayan kingdom was wracked by violence and social unrest, as a broad-based prodemocracy alliance forced King Birendra to lift a twenty-nine-year ban on independent political activity, to agree to a transitional government led by an opposition prime minister, and to accept a draft constitution that called for a constitutional monarchy and a popularly elected parliament.

In January, the outlawed Nepalf Congress Party (NPC), which held power briefly in 1959, adopted a resolution that called for the abolition of the non-party "panchayat system" (which consisted of various levels of councils with the king holding near-absolute power as head of state), a restoration of a civilian democracy under a multiparty system and a nationwide protest for 18 February, officially Democracy Day in Nepal, a national holiday honoring the birthday of the king's father. Shortly thereafter, the NPC joined with a seven-member coalition of leftist and Communist groups, the United Left Front (ULF), to form the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) led by Ganesh Man Singh, a member of the NPC.

The February protests were marked by violence, as government forces clashed with demonstrators around the country. In April, as demonstrators began a general strike, King Birendra dismissed Prime Minister Man Singh Shrestha, dissolved the Council of Minister, and appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chanda as the new head of the government. Two days later, the king announced that he was lifting the twenty-nine-year ban on political activity.

As demonstrations intensified, King Birendra invited the opposition to form the first multiparty government in thirty years. Prime Minister Chanda resigned, and the king suspended a law requiring any candidate for parliament to be a member of one of six government associations.

Khrishna Prasad Bhattarai, president of the NPC, was named the new prime minister, and he was sworn in by the king on 19 April. The new prime minister swore in an eleven-member coalition cabinet, which included
four members of the NPC, including the prime minister; three Communists, two independents who are prominent human rights organizers; and two nominees of the king. Four days after the new government assumed power, new violence broke out in Katmandu, with ten people killed and over fifty injured. The government imposed a curfew. "Since the new interim government came to power, many people believe that the king has revived vigilante groups to create problems and discredit the new leaders," a Western diplomat said in assessing the violence. In all, some 500 people were killed in the February-April unrest.

In May, the king delegated the legislative powers of the dissolved parliament to the newly formed cabinet, empowering it to enact amend, and repeal legislation to enable the introduction of a multiparty democracy. The new government faced serious problems. By August rampant inflation, labor unrest, economic difficulties, communal violence between Hindus and Muslims, and differences between the NPC and the ULF put strains on the government. Nevertheless, the government dismantled all units of the panchayat system and announced elections for April 1991.

On 10 September, King Birendra was officially presented with the draft of a new national constitution that would preserve his status as chief of state but establish a multiparty democracy. The constitution called for a parliament consisting of a 175-member House of Representatives (lower house) elected by the people from 75 districts, with an upper house of 60 members to be determined by the party strength in the lower house. The king will nominate 10 percent of the members in the upper house on the advice of the prime minister. The army would be put under the control of a national security council headed by the prime minister, working with the defense and foreign ministers and the army chief of staff. The king would be allowed to exercise emergency powers only on the advice of the council of ministers—and then only for six-month periods at a time and for more than a year in total. Any such emergency powers will be subject to ratification by parliament within one month of their enforcement. The constitution calls for an independent judiciary.

In other developments in 1990, Nepal and India in February agreed on a formula to settle their trade and transit dispute. Last year, India, under then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, ordered a blockade of Nepal after trade and transit negotiations broke down. Nepal was forced to rely on emergency fuel airlifts from Bangladesh and China. The new Indian government of Prime Minister V.P. Singh promised to improve relations with its regional neighbors.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Political developments in 1990 led to the adoption of a constitutional mechanism that will allow citizens to elect a government democratically under a multiparty system. Violence and civil unrest led to the detention of thousands of people under the security provisions, but most were released after the new interim government took over. The new constitution calls for an independent judiciary. The legal system already provides the right to counsel, protection from double jeopardy and open trials. On 31 July, the government abolished the death penalty for murder and subversive activities. The new government allowed for greater freedom of association, expression and assembly. Even before the new constitution was drafted, the government had promised to liberalize the government-controlled media. Freedom of religion remains a controversial issue. Under the old constitution, freedom of religion in this largely Hindu country was granted, but proselytizing was forbidden. In June, the king declared a blanket amnesty for all people—
mostly Christians—who had been jailed or were awaiting trial on charges of encouraging the religious conversion of Nepalese. Although it did not specify it, the new draft constitution recognizes that Hindu will be the dominant religion and maintains the ban on religious conversion and cow slaughter. Domestic travel is unrestricted, as are emigration and foreign travel. Although trade unions were banned in 1960, worker interests have been represented by the official Nepal Labor Organization. Workers and worker associations played an important role in the prodemocracy movement.

**Netherlands**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Mixed Capitalist  
**Population:** 14,900,000  
**HDI:** 0.984 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 73 male, 80 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Dutch: mixed Scandinavian, French, and Celtic (99 percent), Indonesian and others (1 percent)

**Overview:**

The independence of the Netherlands dates from the late sixteenth century, when the Dutch provinces rebelled against Spanish rule. Located in Western Europe, the country has long-established traditions of representative government and constitutional monarchy. A formerly dominant maritime country, the Netherlands has reclaimed much of its land from the sea. The national economy was the major issue in 1990. The Dutch central bank warned in April that the budget deficit and a rapidly increasing money supply threatened the economy. Responding to these trends, the center-left cabinet proposed spending cuts to prevent a higher deficit in 1991. The Netherlands held its most recent parliamentary election in 1989. Christian Democratic Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers called the election after his right-wing Liberal coalition partners objected to his tough environmental proposals. The issues in the campaign were the environment, the economy, and the welfare state. The Christian Democrats emerged the leading party in the lower house with fifty-four seats. They formed the current center-left coalition government with the Labor Party, led by Wim Kok. The coalition's governing accord, which could have to be modified by economic trends, calls for limiting defense spending, increasing expenditures on social welfare and the environment, and cutting the value-added tax rate.

Prime Minister Lubbers has announced that he will retire in 1993. The people have the right to change their government democratically. It shifts back and forth between center-left and center-right coalitions with the Christian Democrats playing the pivotal role. The bicameral parliament, the States General, is divided into a seventy-five-member First Chamber, which the eleven provincial councils elect indirectly for four-year terms, and a more powerful 150-member Second Chamber, which the voters elect by proportional representation for a maximum term of four years. Due to the electoral system, the Second Chamber includes many parties from right to left.

Civil liberties are strong. The press is free, but it generally observes unofficial limits in writing about the royal family. Broadcasting is state-owned but autonomously operated, and offers pluralistic points of view on
social and political issues. Traditionally, commercials have been restricted, and banned on Sundays for religious reasons.

In 1990, there was controversy over RTL Veronique, a Luxembourg-based, Dutch language satellite television station. The Dutch government accused Veronique, a Dutch-subsidized producer of television programs, of using public money from the Netherlands to set up the station in Luxembourg. The government suspended Veronique from broadcasting for seven weeks. The Dutch parliament debated making the three public stations fully commercial by the end of 1990.

The Netherlands has accepted immigrants from its former colonies, Suriname and Indonesia, and granted asylum to various Third World refugees. However, the newcomers have encountered some discrimination in housing and employment. Religion is free. The state subsidizes church-affiliated schools based on the number of registered students. The extensive public sector regulates the private economy, and provides generous social welfare benefits. Organized labor is free. Only civil servants lack the right to strike, but they strike sometimes anyway.

New Zealand

| Polity: Parliamentary democracy | Political Rights: 1 |
| Economy: Capitalist | Civil Liberties: 1 |
| Population: 3,300,000 | Status: Free |
| HDI: 0.966 (high) | |

**Life Expectancy:** 71 male, 77 female

**Ethnic groups:** Predominantly Anglo-Saxon; Maori and Polynesians (12 percent)

**Overview:**

In the year marking the 150th anniversary of the country, New Zealand's opposition National Party, riding a wave of public discontent over a slumping economy, won a landslide victory over the incumbent Labor Party in parliamentary elections held on 27 October. The new government is headed by Prime Minister Jim Bolger. The National Party holds a record 39 seat majority in the 97-member, unicameral House of Representatives.

The problems of the Labor Party, which had ruled for 13 years, intensified in 1989, when Prime Minister David Lange resigned after a bitter two-year leadership feud within the party. The feud pitted the prime minister against former Finance Minister Roger Douglas, whose free-market, deregulation and privatization policies helped spur the New Zealand economy in the mid-1980s. Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer assumed the leadership on 8 August 1989.

In 1990, the country's economic slide continued to plague the Palmer government. Unemployment hovered around 7 percent and New Zealanders were angered by soaring fees for government services, and a series of business crashes arising from economic reform. With opinion polls showing mass public discontent with Labor, the party on 4 September dismissed Palmer, just seven weeks before the elections, and replaced him with Mike Moore, a former foreign minister. Palmer said he would not stand for re-election in his safe Labor constituency.

The National Party's sweep was seen by many as reflecting popular disillusionment with Labor and not a ringing endorsement for the National Party, which basically embraced Labor's free-market ideas but failed to make
a clean break with the interventionist ideological baggage of the past. In the campaign, both parties pledged to continue the anti-nuclear policy that badly frayed relations with the United States after it took effect in 1984; under the policy, nuclear-powered ships and ships with nuclear weapons were barred from making calls at New Zealand ports.

Shortly after the election, Prime Minister Moore said his economic goals for his three-year term include: 3 percent real growth a year; halving unemployment; a balanced budget, and a zero to 2 percent inflation rate.

In other issues, the United States in March ended a four-year ban on top-level contacts with New Zealand, brought on by its nuclear-free policy. Another long-standing concern facing the government is land claims by the aboriginal Maoris. The claims are based on the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. A government tribunal to investigate native claims was set up in 1985. It has been swamped with applications for hearings, and about 70 percent of the country is subject to land claims. In February, Chief Judge Eddie Duire, chairman of the tribunal, agreed that large-scale return of land was impracticable and the economy could not afford massive compensation. The Maoris are disproportionately represented in the lower income groups, prisons, and unemployment lines.

### Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

New Zealanders have the democratic means to change their government. The judiciary is independent of government interference. Freedom of assembly, association and religion is guaranteed and honored in practice. The large, private press represents diverse opinions. Government-owned television offers views and information that do not necessarily reflect official government policies. In 1990, New Zealand's only private television broadcaster, TV3, filed for bankruptcy after the station failed to attract viewers or advertising. New Zealanders are free to emigrate and travel both inside and outside the country. Unions are independent, but public sector unions are not allowed to strike if such action endangers public safety. The government has sought to address the plight of the indigenous Maoris, who are disproportionately represented among the disadvantaged and who have demanded compensation for, or return of, government-owned lands.

### Nicaragua

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<th>Polity: Presidential-legislative democracy (military influenced)</th>
<th>Political Rights: 3</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economy: Capitalist-statist</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population: 3,900,000</td>
<td>Status: Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI: 0.743 (medium/d)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy: 59 male, 61 female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups: Complex, with mestizo (approximately 70 percent), Caucasian (16 percent), black (9 percent), and indigenous (5 percent)</td>
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### Overview:

After a stunning victory over the Sandinistas in the 25 February 1990 elections, the Chamorro government took office with little control over the Sandinista military, the police or state security, leaving the government at the mercy of armed Sandinista labor unions carrying out former President Ortega's threat to "govern from below." After shutting down the country through armed occupations in May and July, the Sandinistas forced the Chamorro government into major policy concessions, lending credence to
The Republic of Nicaragua was established in 1838, seventeen years after independence from Spain. Power struggles between the Liberal and Conservative parties dominated the country's politics until Gen. Anastasio Somoza Garcia came to power in 1937. Right-wing authoritarian rule under the Somoza family lasted until the 1979 revolution that brought the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a Marxist political-military organization, to power.

The FSLN suspended the 1972 constitution and ruled from July 1979 until January 1985 through a provisional junta headed by FSLN Comandante Daniel Ortega. All policy decisions were made by the nine-member FSLN National Directorate and implemented by decree of the FSLN-controlled junta.

On 4 November 1984, elections for president, vice-president, and a National Assembly were held in what most generously can be described as a state-controlled plebiscite. Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez were elected president and vice-president with 67 percent of the vote, with the FSLN taking a sixty-one-seat majority in the ninety-six-seat Assembly. President Ortega was inaugurated in January 1985.

The FSLN-controlled Assembly drafted a constitution that was promulgated in January 1987. Provisions on civil liberties were automatically suspended under state-of-emergency regulations in effect since 1982 because of the Contra insurgency. The 1987 constitution provides for a president, vice-president, and National Assembly directly elected for six-year terms. It institutionalizes the Sandinista army as the national military. In practice, the sole source of authority in the country remained the the FSLN National Directorate.

In August 1987, President Ortega and the other four Central American presidents signed the Arias peace accord, committing each government to full democratization and negotiated solutions to internal armed conflicts. In January 1988, the Sandinista government lifted the state of emergency. A month later, the U.S. ended military aid to the Contras. At a follow-up meeting in February 1989, President Ortega committed Nicaragua to reforming its electoral code and media law, and moving up the scheduled November 1990 elections to 25 February 1990.

Pressured by Costa Rica and Venezuela, the Sandinistas agreed in July 1989 to a dialogue with the National Opposition Union (UNO), a coalition of fourteen political parties, ranging from Marxist left to conservative right In exchange for UNO support of Contra demobilization, the Sandinistas agreed to allow UNO to review voter registration lists and monitor vote-counting. But the Sandinistas denied it permission for a private television station, and refused to restructure the FSLN-dominated electoral council.

At the end of the summer, UNO nominated Violeta Chamorro, the publisher of opposition newspaper La Prensa, for president, and Virgilio Godoy of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) for vice president. The Sandinistas nominated Ortega and Ramirez for reelection. Candidates were also named for the National Assembly and municipal posts. Eight small parties also fielded candidates.

Voter registration took place in October, monitored by U.N. and OAS observer teams invited by the government to monitor the electoral process. Despite Sandinista intimidation, nearly 85 percent of the approximately 1.9 million eligible voters enrolled. Polls showed Chamorro moving ahead of Ortega, but with a large number of undecideds.

In the campaign that began in December 1989, the Sandinistas attacked charges by disaffected Chamorro supporters that the Sandinistas still controlled the country.
UNO as a U.S. puppet and Contra front, and used violent mob actions and threats to intimidate UNO candidates and supporters. They also combined flashy, Western-style campaign techniques with a populist, pork-barrel spending spree, using government funds and their dominion of the broadcast media to critical advantage. Despite substantial U.S. funding for UNO, the Sandinistas outspent UNO by at least five to one, prompting Costa Rican President Oscar Arias to state, "There's no separation between the army, government and political party, and they can use all the resources of the state."

The Chamorro campaign stressed that because of the international observers, the vote would be secret and people should not be afraid. She emphasized freedom and democracy, promised an open government and a nonpartisan civil service, and pledged to end the military draft. A month before the vote, the Chamorro campaign—backed by the Catholic church, independent labor unions and the private sector—developed momentum, holding the largest opposition rallies ever under Sandinista rule.

By the end of the campaign, polls conducted by North American firms showed Ortega with an overwhelming lead. Polls conducted by Latin American firms showed Chamorro would win. The Latin American firms were correct. The North American firms subcontracted the actual polling to Nicaraguan groups identified with the Sandinistas, and many Nicaraguans lied because of fear. On 25 February 1990, with over 1,000 international observers, nearly 55 percent of the electorate voted for Chamorro, about 40 percent for Ortega. UNO won 51 Assembly seats, with the Sandinistas taking 39, and two seats going to smaller parties. UNO also won in nearly two-thirds of the municipal races.

Prior to Chamorro's 25 April inauguration, Antonio Lacayo, her son-in-law and campaign chief, negotiated a transition agreement with Gen. Humberto Ortega, Daniel's brother and commander of the Sandinista military. With Daniel threatening the Sandinistas would "govern from below," Lacayo agreed, over the heads of UNO leaders, to let Humberto remain as military chief. In exchange, Humberto agreed that the defense and interior ministries would be headed by civilians, and the state security apparatus disband.

After the new government took over, however, it was evident the interior minister would have little authority, and the defense minister, President Chamorro herself, practically none. Before leaving office, Daniel Ortega had secretly decreed a military law, made public in mid-1990, which makes it virtually impossible to remove Gen. Ortega from his command and grants him complete control over the military's internal and external affairs. The national police, while part of the interior ministry, remained under the direct command of a longtime Sandinista militant. Finally, Gen. Ortega secretly transferred the state security apparatus from the interior ministry to the army. In sum, the new government took office with no control over the military, the police, or the state security forces.

If Lacayo, the minister of the presidency and power behind the throne, believed the transition agreement gave the new government a breathing space to establish itself on the strength of a market-oriented, economic reform program, he miscalculated. In May and July, the country was shut down through the occupation of ministries and state enterprises by armed militants of the Sandinista labor unions given practically free rein by the army and the police. Each time, the government caved in and suspended its economic reforms. The 1987 constitution gives broad powers to the president, power wielded to the maximum by former President Ortega. By mid-1990, however,
it was evident that in practice, the Chamorro government's authority was severely restricted by the actions of the armed Sandinista unions directed by former President Ortega, with the calculated acquiescence of the Sandinista-controlled military and police.

By the end of the summer, the fourteen-party UNO coalition was divided, with a majority disaffected by the government's inability to draw the line against the Sandinistas. The government had also alienated the private sector and the independent labor unions. Many of the workers and peasants who had braved Sandinista threats and intimidation to vote for Chamorro were disappointed too. However, with the already destitute economy getting worse in the wake of the shutdowns orchestrated by the Sandinistas, most were preoccupied with simply surviving.

Sandinista actions and the strapped economy had also prevented the government from providing assistance to the Contras as part of the June 1990 demobilization agreement. Although formally disarmed, many former Contras retained weapons and were resorting to land occupations, raising the possibility of renewed conflict in rural areas.

During negotiations in the fall, the government avoided another national shutdown by conceding to the Sandinistas a formal say in formulating economic policy. Humberto Ortega was given a prominent position on a new agrarian reform commission. President Chamorro then asked for the resignations of her economic team amid speculation that Sandinistas would be given cabinet positions by the end of the year.

The 1987 constitution permits the organization of political parties, civic groups and labor unions. However, the Sandinistas prepared the document with the expectation of holding power indefinitely, and the legal existence of independent organizations is contingent on, among other things, their contribution to "the construction of a new society" as interpreted by the Sandinistas. Individual rights, civil liberties, and the right to free expression are so narrowly defined and qualified as to often make them inapplicable in practice. In effect, the 1987 constitution does not guarantee political rights and civil liberties; rather it guarantees the right of the government to restrict them.

The Chamorro government has committed itself to the full respect of political rights and civil liberties, notwithstanding the constitution. However, even if the government were able to muster the two-thirds majority in the Assembly to amend the constitution, it would be unable to guarantee full respect for these rights and freedoms because the military, the police and state security remain under Sandinista control.

Since the new government took office, there have been frequent reports by Nicaragua's independent human rights organizations of intimidation and false arrest of government supporters by the police and security forces. More importantly, the police and security forces do not protect people and property—private or public—from the armed actions of Sandinista labor unions or rural paramilitary units. The judiciary, headed by a Supreme Court, provides no recourse as it remains in the control of judges appointed by the Sandinistas before the new government took office.

On the other hand, since leaving office the Sandinistas have demanded full freedom for their own organizations, and frequently justify the action or inaction of police and security forces as necessary for the protection of their rights. For instance, they claim the police did not intervene during the armed occupation of ministries and state enterprises in May and July, because it
would have impinged on the Sandinista labor unions’ right to strike. Under Sandinista rule, labor strikes were outlawed.

In 1988-89, international human rights organizations investigated long-standing charges of systematic, summary executions by Sandinista government forces. In a November 1989 report, Amnesty International concluded that Sandinista army troops had summarily executed dozens of unarmed peasants during operations in remote border regions between 1986 and 1989. In 1990, a number of mass graves were uncovered in rural areas, but as of November the army had refused to cooperate with investigations by human rights organizations. According to the new military law, the army alone is responsible for investigating charges of rights violations against its members.

The Chamorro government has committed itself to full freedom of expression, and although all voices are represented in the print and broadcast media, the Sandinistas have been the major beneficiaries. Just prior to leaving office, the Sandinistas finally legalized privately owned television and announced plans to start their own station. They also dismantled the seventeen-station state-run radio network and “privatized” it to mostly Sandinista loyalists, part of a massive, illegal transfer of state resources to the Sandinista party. They left behind two television channels which are operated by the new government.

During the election campaign, the Sandinistas maintained an enormous advantage through control of the state-run broadcast media. After leaving office, however, they became champions of independent media, at least if it belonged to them. During the July shutdown, Sandinista cadres blew up the transmitting tower of Radio Corporacion, the main voice of the country’s private business sector. They also occupied the government broadcast center, without interference from the police. A subsequent bombing of a Sandinista radio station was the result either of retaliation or an internal Sandinista squabble. The police claimed all attacks against media were under investigation, but by the end of 1990 there were no charges or arrests.

The exercise of religious freedom was intermittently restricted under the Sandinistas, but there are no restrictions under the Chamorro government. In fact, the Catholic church has been outspoken in its alarm over the Chamorro government’s inability to carry out its legal mandate.

**Niger**

- **Polity:** One-party (military)
- **Political Rights:** 6
- **Economy:** Capitalist
- **Civil Liberties:** 5
- **Population:** 7,900,000
- **status:** Not Free
- **HDI:** 0.116 (low)
- **Life Expectancy:** 41 male, 44 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Hausa, Djerma, Fulani, Touareg, Beriberi

**Overview:**

In 1990, the government of President Ali Seibou, re-elected to a seven-year term in December 1988, faced growing civic unrest, particularly among students and labor unions demanding an acceleration of democratization in this large, landlocked west African country. In a November address to the National Assembly, the president announced that the country would adopt a multiparty system based on the recommendations of special commissions set up earlier in the year to assess the country’s political structure.

In late 1988, President Seibou had announced plans to return Niger, which
declared independence from France in 1960, to constitutional life. On 24 September 1989, voters overwhelmingly adopted a constitution that calls for the institutionalization of the National Movement of the Society for Development (MNSD) as the sole political party. Earlier, the government had announced the formation of the Supreme Council of National Orientation (CSON), chaired by Gen. Seibou.

On 9 February, police opened fire on university students in the capital of Niamey who were protesting overcrowded classrooms and lack of job opportunities. Scores were reportedly killed. On 16 February, over 4,000 people rallied to protest the killings. The protest was organized by the Niger Workers’ Union Federation (UNSTN), which in May called for the introduction of a multiparty system, a demand Gen. Seibou had vehemently rejected in the past.

In March, Gen. Seibou reshuffled his cabinet in an attempt to calm unrest. Mahamidou Aliou was named to the newly restored post of prime minister. A month later, the cabinet—meeting in extraordinary session—banned all student demonstrations. The president asked the Political and Social Commissions of the CSON to examine the sociopolitical evolution of the country and the possibility of a democratic alternative.

In June, the CSON revised the constitution to provide for the introduction of political pluralism. The move was seen as a response to a general strike call earlier in the month by the USTN and student groups. There is no legal opposition in Niger, but there are three underground movements: The Muslim Integrist Party (PIM), the United Democratic Front (FDU) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR). The activity of these factions has been confined mainly to issuing tracts, but they are thought to enjoy considerable support within the trade unions and the student community. On 1 November, the country’s trade unions called a general strike on behalf of greater democracy.

In announcing the introduction of a multiparty system on 15 November, President Seibou said that a draft amendment of the Charter and the constitution would be submitted to national institutions for evaluation, adding that a multiparty system must be "established within a precise judicial framework that will guarantee its viability." He said that the MNSD would reorganize itself as a political party.

In May, the government faced allegations that its troops had massacred hundreds of ethnic Touaiegs in northwestern Niger. The Touaregs are a nomadic, Berber people found in Niger, Mali and other countries in the area.

Citizens do not have the means to change their one-party regime democratically; in November, the president announced the introduction of a multiparty system. Civil and criminal cases are generally conducted fairly, while security cases are tried by the State Security Court, which functions outside the normal legal framework. Special courts handle civil servant corruption cases. Political detainees can be held indefinitely without charge; the government claimed two political prisoners in 1990, but scores of ethnic Touaregs were arrested, detained, tortured or killed in the spring. Police forces gunned down student demonstrators in February. Almost all media are controlled by the government, though there are several independent publications that do vary from the government line. Freedom of religion in this overwhelmingly Muslim country is generally respected by the state. Travel is restricted and monitored; exit visas for foreign travel are generally granted. The UNSTN trade union federation consists of twenty-seven unions. Though partly funded by the government, it has grown into a significant political force, despite
warnings from the government that it should limit its activities only to labor
issues. The federation organized a national strike in November that paralyzed
the country.

Nigeria

**Polity:** Military transitional

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 118,800,000

**HDI:** 0.322 (low)

**Life Expectancy:** 47 male, 50 female

**Ethnic groups:** Hausa, Fulani, Ibo, Yoruba, others

**Political Rights:** 5

**Civil Liberties:** 5

**Status:** Partly Free

In 1990, the most populous country in Africa continued to implement
President Ibrahim Babangida’s plan to formalize a two-party system that the
president promised would lead to civilian rule in 1992. In April, the regime,
which seized power in 1985, survived a coup attempt. Other issues were the
state of the economy and the civil war in Liberia.

After taking power, Maj. Gen. Babangida established and became chair-
man of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), serving as both head of
state and chief executive. A ban on political parties was lifted in May 1989,
but with certain restrictions. However, by year’s end the government allowed
the registration of only two parties: the National Republican Convention
(NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The president described the
two as “a little right of center, and a little left of center,” respectively.

Nineteen-ninety began with renewed tensions between the predominantly
Muslim north and the Christian south, delaying a meeting between President
George Bush and President Babangida. In mid-January, several thousand
Christians peacefully demonstrated in several cities in the north to protest
what they claimed was growing Muslim influence in the upper levels of the
federal government. Since independence in 1960, the country has been
polarized by an underlying conflict: coexistence of the relatively wealthy,
largely Christian south and the poorer but politically dominant Muslim north.
The Christians form a third of Nigeria’s population, and control the oil rich
states in the south. The northern Muslims make up half the population and
run the army.

In stage-managing the establishment of just two political parties, President
Babangida hoped that Nigerians would back rival political organizations
rather than rival creeds or tribes. But with little ideological differences
between the NRC and the SDP, religion and tribalism continued to be a
factor in Nigerian political life.

In 1990, it became evident that the AFRC was orchestrating virtually
every aspect of the restoration of civilian rule. But President Babangida
maintained that his strategy was necessary to change the country’s political
culture and avert ethnic and religious strife. In a nationally televised address
he said he was determined to diminish the traditional pressures of tribe,
religion and money.

To implement its program, the government created the Directorate for
Social Mobilization (Mamser), which was charged with mobilizing citizens
and explaining details of the two-party system. On 22 April, troops loyal to
the military government thwarted an attempted coup, forcing rebel officers to
surrender after eleven hours of fighting. The coup was a fresh sign of
growing discontent by Christians at the expanding political power of Muslims. On 26 May ward elections for the SDP and the NRC were marred by some irregularities and confusion. Political activists opposed the open ballot system in which voters had to line up behind a placard with their candidate's name or picture. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) insisted that the open ballot system was meant to avoid rigging. On 17 June the NRC and the SDP in twenty-one states elected their delegates to attend the first conventions later in the year.

The NRC and the SDP held national conventions in Abuja on 21-25 July. The NRC, which included many wealthy businessmen, faced regional, factional and religious divisions. In the end, it elected a "southern" chairman, Chief Tom Dtimi. The SDP chairman was Amb. Baba Kingibe, a northerner. Both the northern and southern caucuses of the parties appeared uninterested in the chairmanships, believing that a win could compromise their chances of landing the presidency.

In the fall, primary elections were held to nominate candidates for local elections in December, which were expected to be followed by governorship and assembly elections in 1991 and presidential elections in 1992.

In economic matters, the government continued its economic austerity program, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), under IMF and World Bank guidelines. The program was instigated to offset the economic collapse brought on by the fall of oil prices and subsequent mismanagement in the early 1980s. The GDP grew by 4 percent, mainly due to agricultural growth of 6.1 percent. The poor performance of the private sector was offset by improvements in the oil sector, which accounted for 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings. With oil prices rising as a result of the Gulf crisis, the Nigerian economy got a shot in the arm late in the year. The news had a downside, however. Throughout the year, Nigeria had been negotiating to cancel its $33 billion international debt, but with new oil revenues coming in, it was expected that creditors would be unwilling to go along.

Other domestic issues were Nigeria's growing drug trade and education reform. Drug trafficking by Nigerians reached alarming proportions in 1990, forcing the government to adopt tougher measures. In regional issues, Nigeria was a key member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force sent to help end the civil war in Liberia.

In 1990 Nigeria continued to be ruled by a military regime and citizens could not democratically change their government. Political activity centered on the establishment of two parties, the NRC and the SDP, which were supposed to form the basis for a promised return to civilian rule by 1992. In 1990, the president promised a review of the dreaded State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984, which allows the government to detain without trial anyone suspected of posing a threat to national security. Military tribunals have jurisdiction over drug trafficking, armed robbery, embezzlement and other offenses. Although trials in the regular judiciary adhere to certain basic individual rights, the system is marred by executive interference and abuses. In 1990, 69 soldiers were executed for their part in the coup attempt, and hundreds were detained. Prison conditions are generally horrific. Lack of potable water and the primitive methods of disposing of human waste pose serious health hazards.

Nigeria's private newspapers frequently print articles critical of government's political, social and economic policies, but are subject to govern-
ment intimidation. On 30 April, journalists demanded the release of five colleagues detained after the attempted coup. The five worked for the government-run radio station, a weekly magazine and two daily papers. Security men ejected staff members at a popular Lagos daily, *Punch*, and sealed the premises in the wake of the coup attempt. The *Daily Champion* and the *Vanguard* were temporarily shutdown in June, and *Champion* editor Emmanuel Ifeanyu Agu was charged with publishing a seditious editorial on 8 June. Freedom of religion is guaranteed, but there are tensions between Muslims and Christians throughout the country. In the spring, the government banned the publication and broadcast of sponsored religious programs in any media except on Fridays and Sundays. The new guidelines also prevent the use of religious material sent to media houses by foreign embassies as well as all religious advertisements in government and privately owned newspapers. In July, the president warned religious leaders to desist from making provocative statements that could lead to a breakdown of law and order.

There are several independent human rights organizations in the country, as well as professional, civic, and social organizations. Travel both inside and outside the country is generally unrestricted. All unions belong to the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), created in 1978 by a government decree—denounced by the ILO as a violation of freedom of association—that forcibly merged unions and decertified others. The NLC, which is closely monitored by the government, has organized a number of strikes over the years.

**Norway**

| Polity: Parliamentary democracy | Political Rights: 1 |
| Economy: Mixed capitalist | Civil Liberties: 1 |
| Population: 4,200,00 | Status: Free |
| HDI: 0.983 (high) | |
| Life Expectancy: 73 male, 80 female | |
| Ethnic groups: Norwegian and Lappic | |

**Overview:**

The most important political issue in 1990 was Norway's trading relationship with the rest of Europe. A dispute over trade policy brought down Prime Minister Syse's Conservative-led government in October 1990.

The Kingdom of Norway is a constitutional monarchy established in 1905 with the dissolution of the union with the Swedish crown. The present monarch, King Olav V, ascended the throne in 1957. The government is a multiparty parliamentary system based on the 1814 constitution known as the Eidsvold Convention, one of the oldest written constitutions in Europe.

Executive power is exercised by the prime minister, who heads the Council of Ministers (*Statsrad*). The *Statsrad* is responsible to the 165-seat parliament (*Storting*), elected every four years by universal suffrage. The parliament elects one-fourth of its members to the upper house (*Lagting*), and the rest serve in the lower house (*Odelsting*).

In 1989, a center-right coalition consisting of the Christian People’s Party (KrF), the Center Party (SP), and the Conservative Party (H) took control after elections on 11 September. Jan P. Syse, the leader of the Conservatives, became prime minister, replacing Gro Harlem Brundtland of the Norwegian Labor Party (Ap), who had headed a minority government in coalition with the Socialist Left Party (SV) since 1986.

The center-right coalition capitalized on mounting dissatisfaction with the
economy and the social welfare system. The minority government, lacking a parliamentary majority, depended on the libertarian Progress Party (FrP), which did not join the coalition government but had helped bring down the Labor government.

A financial scandal in September 1990 endangered the coalition government. Prime Minister Syse admitted that he had violated the country's securities' laws by not registering his corporate accounts, which contained alleged examples of negligence and irregularities. Syse tried handling the situation by hiring two outstanding tax accountants. The government had to resign in October 1990, because it split over trade negotiations. The agrarian-based Center Party opposed plans for Norway to join a proposed European Economic Area (EEA), since joining would apparently have changed Norway's laws which limit foreign ownership. The EEA would have involved both European Community (EC) members and non-members. Syse and the Conservatives favor Norwegian membership in the EC, but had agreed not to press for it.

After the government resigned, the ministers stayed on as caretakers until some parties could coalesce to form a new government. Under Norwegian law, it is unconstitutional for a government to dissolve parliament between general elections. This rule forced the parliamentary parties to try to form a new governing coalition to hold office until 1993. The Center Party announced its willingness to back a Labor government since that party had not committed itself to the EC. Although Labor leader Brundtland favors European Community membership, the party's official position was unclear in late 1990. The new government must also deal with an economic slump and growing unemployment.

### Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Norwegians have the ability to change their government by democratic means through general elections every four years. However, the constitutional prohibition on dissolving parliament between scheduled general elections can leave the power to change the government in politicians' hands, not the voters' hands, at least for the duration of a parliamentary term. This differs from other parliamentary systems in which the head of state can dissolve parliament more frequently to seek a government with a fresh mandate.

In most regards, the law safeguards and respects fundamental human rights. There are no restrictions on free speech, free press, free assembly, or free association. However, there are some minor restrictions on religion. The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church (to which 93 percent of Norwegians belong), and the King and half the cabinet must belong to the Church. Employers have the right to ask job applicants in certain positions whether they respect Christian beliefs. Other religions are free to practice and proselytize. There is no official discrimination based on sex, language, social status, and race, but there has been some public concern over the immigration of non-Nordic peoples such as Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans. Both domestic and foreign travel are unimpeded. Some 60 percent of the workforce is unionized, and there is a right to strike.
Oman

**Polity:** Traditional monarchy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 1,500,000  
**HDI:** 0.535 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 51 male, 54 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Arab, Baluchi, Zanzibari, Indian

**Overview:**

The Sultanate of Oman, a small, oil-rich country, took cautious steps in 1990 toward a more open political system in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August and tacit U.S. pressure on Gulf countries to become more democratic.

The country has been ruled by Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id Al Sa'id since 1970 in consultation with an appointed cabinet. A fifty-five-member Consultative Assembly that meets quarterly was created in 1981. Governors of districts are appointed by the sultan. There is no constitution, no legal political parties and no elections.

On 18 November, Sultan Qabus announced that a new consultative council would be established within a year. He said the new council would include representatives from Oman's forty-two counties, and would be more representative than the existing council, which is made up of government officials and private citizens appointed by the sultan. The new council, he said, would exclude government officials. By year's end, it remained unclear how the council would be chosen. One official said it would be a popularly elected parliament, while others said the method of choosing members had yet to be determined.

The sultan also promised to strengthen the Omani armed forces and to support small businesses. He called 1991 the "year of industry" and reiterated his appeal to Omanis, who depend heavily on foreign labor, to work harder.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Citizens of Oman cannot change their government by democratic means. Legal protections are generally underdeveloped, but in practice the criminal code applies Islamic law by impartial Islamic judges. By law there is no right to a jury, counsel or public trial. The government owns and operates radio and television, and controls two of three newspapers. All printed material is subject to censorship. Criticism of the sultan or the legitimacy of the regime is not tolerated. An Islamic state, Oman forbids proselytizing by non-Muslims but allows non-Muslims to worship at specified sites. Since 1986, Omani men have been barred from marrying foreign women. Unions are proscribed, as are strikes. Workers may, however, file grievances.

Pakistan

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy (Military-influenced)  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 114,600,000  
**HDI:** 0.423 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 51 male, 49 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Punjab, Baluchi, Sindhi, Pathan, Afghan

**Overview:**

In 1990, amidst a fierce opposition campaign, deepening economic woes and regional ethnic violence, the twenty-month old government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, elected democratically in 1988 after eleven years of auto-
ocratic rule by the late General Zia ul-Haq, was dismissed on charges of corruption. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was subsequently defeated in national and local elections by the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA). Nawaz Sharif, IDA leader and Bhutto's arch rival, became the newly elected prime minister.

Tensions began to mount early in the year between Islamabad and the provincial government of Punjab ruled by Nawaz Sharif and the IDA. Punjab and another IDA province, Baluchistan, accused the central government of excessive central interference in provincial affairs and denying the provinces their just share of natural resources. The opposition challenged the federal monopolies in such sectors as banking, power distribution and electronic media, and demanded that the government redress the constitutional division of federal and provincial roles. Punjab set up its own television station and regional bank, projects traditionally under the jurisdiction of Islamabad. In addition, the IDA charged that the government was withholding funds earmarked for the provinces.

In March, the IDA leadership demanded that Bhutto step down as prime minister, in accordance with a constitutional amendment adopted under former Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq which says that the president retained full power until 20 March to nominate any member of the national assembly as prime minister and to dissolve parliament. The IDA maintained that Bhutto's post automatically expired after that date, and that a new prime minister should be elected. However, the IDA failed to put the legality of Bhutto's rule to a vote in the national assembly by the 20 March deadline.

During the summer, a shari'a bill calling for "Islamization" of Pakistan's judicial, economic and education system became a major issue. In August, just prior to Bhutto's dismissal, eleven political and religious parties formed a united front to try to compel the prime minister to accept the bill, which had already been ratified in the IDA-dominated Senate. Bhutto's party said it would not outright reject the bill, but wanted to amend some of its controversial clauses such as those reimposing punitive amputations and a requirement that rape victims produce four male witnesses.

Long-time ethnic tensions resulted in violence that continued throughout the year. Jhang, a city in Punjab Province was the scene of frequent Shiite-Sunni riots, leading the authorities to impose a curfew on the city in August. But the unrest in Sind province became one of the country's greatest problems. In the Sind cities of Karachi and Hyderabad there were numerous violent confrontations between native Sindis and Punjabis, and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), a group composed of Indian Muslims who emigrated to Pakistan following the Indian-Pakistan division in 1947. Mojahirs claim that they are discriminated against by Sindis and Punjabis, who are economically and politically dominant. In May and June, over 300 people were killed in Mojahir-Sindi clashes and Sind police reportedly massacred women and children demonstrators.

The Combined Opposition Parties (COP) in Pakistan's parliament accused Bhutto's ruling PPP, which controls Sind province, of leading the country to the brink of a civil war. The situation was brought under control in August, after the army assisted the civilian police in cracking down on the unrest.

On 6 August, invoking Article 58 of the constitution, President Ishaq Khan dismissed the government of Prime Minister Bhutto on charges of corruption, nepotism, misuse of state media and failure to restore law and order to Sind province. The army subsequently took control of mass commu-
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Communication centers and some federal government offices. Bhutto along with many outside observers contended that the president's move had the support of the military. Immediately following Bhutto's dismissal, President Khan swore in a caretaker government led by Mustafa Jatoi, declared a state of emergency, and announced plans for October elections. The president replaced Bhutto-appointed governors of Punjab and Sind provinces, and dissolved the legislatures of Sind and the North-West Frontier Province, both controlled by the PPP.

Bhutto called the presidential action a "constitutional coup" and claimed that it was part of a conspiracy organized by the same groups in the Pakistani establishment, including the military, that overthrew and sanctioned the hanging of her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1979.

Among the allegations of corruption were charges that Bhutto's government had given thousands of government jobs to her sympathizers, that Bhutto's husband and father-in-law had improperly used their political influence to make large sums of money, and that the prime minister had misappropriated Secret Service money. Bhutto and her husband were placed on a list of people prohibited from leaving the country. Two weeks before the election, Bhutto's husband was arrested and detained on charges of kidnapping a British businessman and extorting $800,000 from him.

Special tribunals were set up by parliament and empowered by presidential decree to weigh the charges of misconduct. Bhutto was tried in a special one-judge court which agreed not to jail her but had the power to ban her from the elections. Eleven special courts set up to try and sentence members of her government were empowered to proceed in absentia. Rejecting five petitions challenging the presidential action, the high court in Lahore upheld the constitutionality of the dismissal of Bhutto's government. The court also ruled that the appointment of Jatoi as caretaker prime minister was valid.

The issue of whether or not Bhutto's ousting was valid became the main issue in the October elections. The results showed that the People's Democratic Alliance, dominated by the PPP, won 45 of the 217 seats in the National Assembly, less than half the total it won in the 1988 elections. The Islamic Democratic Alliance won 105 seats, and its allies took 50. The returns of the subsequent provincial elections confirmed Bhutto's defeat, with the PPP failing to capture a majority in any of Pakistan's four provinces, including Sind, where the party had dominated for two decades.

Bhutto claimed that large-scale election rigging was executed at various levels before and during the polls. Independent observers differed on their assessments of the irregularities and the degree to which they affected the outcome of the election, with some international human rights groups backing Bhutto's claims.

Bhutto's successor was her arch foe Nawaz Sharif, formerly Punjab chief minister, who was elected parliamentary leader of the Muslim League, the main component of the nine-party IDA, and elected prime minister by the National Assembly. Sharif, a member of the industrialist middle class, became the first prime minister in more than thirty years who was not a feudal landowner from Sind province. Sharif emphasized economic development and told one journalist that he would run the country like an industry.

On other issues, relations with India were acutely strained in 1990 over Kashmir, formerly an Indian state that was divided between the two countries in 1947. India accuses Pakistan of providing arms and training to Islamic rebels in the Indian sector who say they would like the whole of Kashmir to
be independent or become part of Pakistan. Pakistan denies the charge, but expresses its support for the Kashmiri quest for self-determination. Indian and Pakistani troops sporadically exchanged artillery fire on the border with Pakistan, and Pakistan became seriously concerned over Indian military buildup there. Toward the end of 1990, India and Pakistan agreed that the directors general of military operations of the two countries would remain in regular weekly telephone contact to discuss the situation regarding deployment of troops so as to eliminate major flare-ups. In high level talks, Prime Minister Sharif and the Indian foreign secretary agreed to move ahead to reduce tension and normalize relations as quickly as possible.

Exacerbating Pakistan's economic woes, which worsened after the International Monetary Fund withheld over $200 million for failure to comply with its austerity measures, the U.S. suspended $580 million in aid because of evidence suggesting Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Sharif said that national integrity and security were a primary objective, hence Pakistan would not sacrifice their nuclear program to acquire foreign aid. Pakistan agreed to allow an international inspection of a nuclear reactor laboratory.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Pakistanis have been free to choose their representatives through democratic means since the 1988 national and provincial elections, but there were electoral irregularities in the 1990 parliamentary election. Article 58 of the constitution, which allows the president to dismiss the government, is controversial.

After Bhutto came to power, most political prisoners were released, but many persons convicted by martial law courts, which did not offer fair trials, remained in prison. Cases of torture and rape of detainees in police stations continued to be reported. Whipping was carried out as a punishment, and some prisoners were kept in chains.

In rioting in Sind in May 1990, police killed over 250 persons, and wounded 1,000; Sindi police allegedly raped Mohajir women. In Punjab province, angry mobs attacked police in protest over credible reports of police involvement in crime.

Pakistan's court system has four main high courts, one in each of the provinces. Modeled on the British system, the judiciary provides for legal council and appeal of sentences. Though the court system is generally independent, Bhutto's hearings reflected a partisan bias. The rights of the accused are somewhat constricted in special courts. Those which tried members of Bhutto's government were empowered to pass sentences in absentia. Shari'a courts operate in a manner similar to that of civilian courts.

The media are for the most part government-owned and operated, with the exception of the People's Television Network, formed under Bhutto, which is privately managed and 43 percent privately owned. Bhutto allowed CNN to begin broadcasting into Pakistani homes. Pakistan had previously relied on foreign news sources and Pakistan Television, a pro-regime monopoly.

The right to strike is severely circumscribed; unions are prevented from forming in many sectors of the economy.

Pakistanis are generally free to travel within the country. Pakistan is officially an Islamic republic, although its Christian, Parsi and Ahmadi minorities are well represented politically and economically. Yet Ahmadis still risk imprisonment on the basis of their beliefs.

Women's basic human rights are frequently violated. Rape is condoned by the authorities.
### Panama

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 2,400,000  
**HDI:** 0.883 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 69 male, 73 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Mestizo (70 percent), West Indian (14 percent), white (10 percent), Indian (6 percent)

**Political Rights:** 4  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Status:** Partly Free

### Overview:

Following the U.S. invasion that removed Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega from power in December 1989, the new government of President Guillermo Endara faced the enormous tasks of political and economic reconstruction, and the need to transform Noriega's Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) into a professional, apolitical police force. The weakness of civilian rule was evident when the Endara government was forced to rely on U.S. troops based in Panama to suppress a December 1990 coup attempt led by a recently retired military commander.

Panama remained a part of Colombia until 1903, when a U.S.-supported revolt resulted in the proclamation of an independent Republic of Panama. Until World War II, the Panamanian government was dominated by small groups of family-based, political elites. The next two decades, however, saw mounting nationalism and popular discontent over continued U.S. control of the Panama Canal. A 1968 military coup brought Gen. Omar Torrijos to power and he renegotiated the treaty that originally granted the U.S. control of the Canal Zone in perpetuity. A year after the signing of the 1977 canal treaties, Torrijos announced that Panama would become a full democracy with the direct election of a president in 1984.

However, after Torrijos' death in 1981, Gen. Noriega emerged as chief of the PDF and oversaw the rigging of the 1984 vote that brought to power the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the political arm of the PDF. From that point on, Noriega increased his grip on the government, and resorted to increased repression against center-right opposition parties and the private sector.

The 1972 constitution, following substantial revision in 1983, provides for the direct election of a president and a Legislative Assembly for five-year terms. The 1989 electoral process was fully controlled by the government and inherently unfair in virtually every aspect. Nonetheless, on the day of the vote Guillermo Endara, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition (ADOC), defeated Carlos Duque of the Noriega-controlled Coalition for National Liberation (COLINA) by a count of nearly three to one according to an array of international observers. Three days later Noriega's hand-picked electoral tribunal annulled the election, and ADOC rallies were violently repressed by the PDF and government-trained, paramilitary groups called "Dignity Battalions."

After the failure of a three-month effort by the Organization of American States (OAS) to effect a transfer of power, Noriega installed his fourth puppet president in five years, the PRD's Francisco Rodriguez. The 67-member Legislative Assembly was abolished, replaced in October by a 510-member Assembly of People's Power appointed by the PRD. On 15 December 1989 this Assembly named Noriega head of state. Five days later, a U.S. military invasion removed the government and ended Noriega's rule.

On 20 December 1989 Guillermo Endara, the winner of the nullified May election, was sworn in as president. His running mates, Ricardo Arias
Calderon and Guillermo "Billy" Ford, were sworn in as first and second vice-presidents respectively. At the end of December, the electoral tribunal, free of Noriega’s control, officially proclaimed Endara the constitutional president.

On 23 February 1990 the electoral tribunal, working on the 7 May 1989 returns, confirmed the winners of 57 of 67 legislative seats. Fifty-one seats went to the ADOC coalition—27 to Arias Calderon’s Christian Democrats, 15 to Ford’s Molirena party, 5 to Endara’s Arnulfista party and 4 to the Authentic Liberal party. Seven seats were allocated to the PRD. Because the tribunal did not have enough returns to determine winners of the 9 remaining seats, they were left unfilled until new elections could be held. With the Legislative Assembly in place, the government was able to fill out cabinet and judicial positions requiring legislative confirmation.

Following Noriega’s ouster, Vice-President Calderon began restructuring the PDF into a police force, renamed the Panamanian Public Force, which assumed responsibility for law and order after the last of the U.S. invasionary forces left in mid-February. After three successive military colonels, remnants of the old PDF, were removed as commanders of the new force, a civilian was finally appointed to the top job in September. At the same time, 142 of the highest-ranking officers, many who had balked at demilitarizing the 12,000 member force, were systematically retired.

By mid-1990, the economy was slowly beginning to pick up, with a 7 percent growth rate expected for the year, after a decline of nearly 20 percent in 1987-89. But unemployment remained over 20 percent, fueling a violent crime wave. The government also confronted a series of labor strikes and protests against its free-market policies.

In a January 1990 Gallup poll, nearly 90 percent of the population expressed support for the U.S. invasion and the new government. By the following September, however, a majority of Panamanians expressed concern about poverty and crime, with just a third supporting the government. The increasing popular pressure appeared to exacerbate divisions with the ADOC coalition, and in September it looked like Ricardo Arias and the Christian Democrats might pull out of the government. Arias, however, said he was committed to remaining until the next general elections in 1994.

In late October, a number of police officers were arrested for involvement in an apparent coup attempt. It was believed that the conspiracy was led by former Public Forces Chief Col. Eduardo Herrera, who retired in August. On 5 December, Herrera and about 100 heavily armed policemen mounted a coup attempt by seizing the Public Force headquarters. Following a quick call for assistance from Endara government, U.S. troops intervened. Within hours, and with few shots fired, the rebels surrendered and were incarcerated.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

After the removal of Noriega, the Endara government rescinded the decrees of the previous government restricting the constitutional rights of freedom of expression, organization, assembly and religion. The new government also announced there would be no limitations imposed on political parties or media that had supported the Noriega government. The PRD, once the ruling party and political arm of Noriega’s PDF, was allowed to take the Legislative Assembly seats it had won in the May 1989 election. It also has been free to sponsor its own publications. Aside from the PRD and the four parties of the ruling coalition, there are numerous other smaller parties spanning the political spectrum from left to right.

All media shut down under Noriega were allowed to reopen. Three
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private newspapers seized two decades ago under the rule of Gen. Torrijos were returned to their owners. In 1990, the media, both public and private, became a raucously critical assortment of daily newspapers, weeklies and talk shows. Broadcast media included live coverage of Legislative Assembly debates. In early November, a columnist for an opposition daily was arrested for criticizing President Endara’s connections with a bank under investigation for alleged money laundering. The new government has been criticized for retaining press laws decreed by Noriega that make slander a criminal offense.

Labor unions, including those associated with the former regime, are free to organize and permitted to strike. A number of stoppages occurred in 1990 as the public sector unions opposed government attempts to trim the bloated bureaucracy. Further disputes were expected when the government moved to change the labor code and fired thousands of public workers.

The judiciary, cowed into submission under Noriega through bribery and intimidation, was being revamped by the new government in 1990, and many new judges known for their integrity have been appointed. All nine members of the Supreme Court were replaced, along with sixteen of the appeals court judges and 70 percent of the lower court justices. The judicial system, however, was overwhelmed. During the invasion, the Supreme Court building was sacked by looters and hundreds of thousands of court records destroyed. The burdens caused by missing records were compounded by a sudden influx of cases. By October, there were some 17,000 cases pending, the vast majority of them involving common crimes. Less than 20 percent of the nation’s prison inmates had actually been tried and convicted, and the penal system was overflowing, provoking a rash of escapes and violence in prisons packed with up to four times their intended capacity.

At least four human rights organizations operate without interference, including one linked with the opposition PRD, which works on behalf of PRD members charged with crimes committed during the Noriega years. Of the hundreds of officials of the former government charged with crimes, about thirty were in jail as of October. However, prosecution of these officials was not expected to begin until 1992. The government has shown a disturbing tendency to arrest civilians and former Noriega officials on vague evidence. It was also slow in responding to reports of missing persons and charges of summary executions from the time of the U.S. invasion. However, the government has been open to investigations by international human rights organizations, and has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court.

Papua
New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity:</th>
<th>Parliamentary democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy:</td>
<td>Capitalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI:</td>
<td>0.471 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy:</td>
<td>51 male, 53 female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups:</td>
<td>A multiethnic, multiracial state—some 1,000 indigenous tribes</td>
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Overview:

The critical issue facing the government of this nation of several islands was the two-year secessionist rebellion on the large island of Bougainville, which erupted in November 1988 when militant tribal landowners on the copper-rich island demanded $12 billion in compensation from the Australian-owned Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), the country's biggest single export earner.
The ongoing rebellion, which led to the closing of one of the world's largest copper mines in mid-year and has severely hurt the country's economy, was the most serious crisis facing the government of Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu of the Papua New Guinea United Party (Pangu Pati).

In January, the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) extended the state of emergency on the island and a 600-man security force continued military action against the rebels, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), led by Francis Ona, a former miner. What began as an uprising against foreign exploitation of the island's resources turned into an armed campaign for secession and independence. By February, the government's military campaign, dubbed Operation Footloose, did little more than provoke more violent attacks from the BRA. On 1 March, the government and BRA Commander Sam Kauona signed a ceasefire. Following the total withdrawal of security forces on 16 March, the BRA took control of every district in the province. However, peace talks set for 23 April were stalled when the two sides could not agree on a site. Both sides also asserted that secession from Papua New Guinea was a non-negotiable issue.

In mid-May, the country's Defense Force recommended in a secret brief that the island be retaken in a military invasion. The brief stated that any such move should be aimed at capturing or killing Kauona. The report was leaked to the BRA which circulated it to media organizations. The government launched a full-scale blockade of Bougainville. In addition to a land and sea blockade, the sanctions led to a shutdown of electricity and telecommunications. Supplies of food, fuel, medical supplies and consumer goods to the island were cut off. On 17 May, the BRA unilaterally declared independence for the island; Francis Ona was appointed president of the new republic, Sam Kauona was made defense minister, and North Solomons Premier Joseph Kabui was named a senior minister. Mr. Kabui, a PNG government official, long suspected of being an active collaborator of the BRA, was attacked and beaten by riot police in July 1989.

As the months wore on, reports emerged of starvation, illness and deaths among the island's 120,000 inhabitants. By late summer, after heavy rains wiped out village gardens, basic foods became scarce according to first-hand accounts. The main hospital was closed due to lack of power and supplies, and there were reports that children were dying of malaria.

In August, a delegation from the island met with officials from PNG aboard the New Zealand navy ship Endeavour off Bougainville. The subsequent Endeavour Accord promised the restoration of health, education, banking, transport and electricity services to the island. The rebels agreed to defer their declaration of independence. The main issues of contention—secession and the future of the copper mine—were deferred to a second meeting, scheduled for 24 September.

The breakthrough appeared to be short-lived. In September, PNG Defense Force patrol boats were used to "land supplies" on the island of Buka, just north of Bougainville, where a group of community leaders had organized a petition calling on the government for assistance and denouncing the BRA. Within a week, more than 300 PNG troops and riot police landed on Buka. Several subsequent clashes with the BRA left dozens of rebels and government soldiers dead. While the PNG urged that the second round of talks be held on schedule, the BRA self-proclaimed interim government made immediate withdrawal of all PNG security personnel from Buka a prerequisite.

The ongoing Bougainville crisis had an adverse effect of the PNG econo-
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my. Rebel activity cut off tourism to the island, which led to the closing of cocoa and copra plantations. The government was forced to announce an austerity program. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank approved $152 million in aid to assist the PNG government through its financial crisis. The bad economic news was offset somewhat early in the year with news of oil strikes in Papua.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Citizens of PNG do have the means to change their government democratically. The crisis in Bougainville led to charges of human rights abuses by security force under the state of emergency. The BRA also killed or tortured civilians suspected of providing information to authorities. In all, at least several hundred have been killed since the uprising began.

The country's domestic press is considered one of the freest in the South Pacific. However, PNG has sought to restrict access for foreign media. As the Bougainville uprising intensified in 1990, the government restricted access for the foreign press. Government-owned radio and private television service air various viewpoints. Australian broadcasts are also received. Bougainville aside, there are no arbitrary restrictions on assembly, freedom to travel is unrestricted and freedom of religion is assured by law. Courts are free of executive, political, or military interference. Traditional tribal customs and practices in rural areas do put strictures on certain rights and freedoms, and tribal violence does occur. Labor unions are protected by law and are an active aspect of society. Over fifty unions exist; private sector unions are free to strike. The Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress is a member of the ICFTU.

Paraguay

Polity: Dominant party
Economy: Capitalist-statist
Population: 4,300,000
HDI: 0.784 (medium)
Life Expectancy: 63 male, 68 female
Ethnic groups: Relatively homogeneous with small indigenous groups

Overview:

Since the ouster of right-wing autocrat Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, the Republic of Paraguay has continued to struggle against deep-seated, authoritarian traditions that date back to the time of its independence from Spain in 1811. Following the 3 February 1989 coup that ended the thirty-five-year Stroessner era, the new government of Gen. Andres Rodriguez initiated a period of dramatic liberalization and Rodriguez promised a transition to full democracy by 1993. If he follows through, it would be the first time Paraguay has known democratic rule. In 1990, some of the necessary reforms were made, but progress was slow, particularly on elaborating a new voter registration list.

Gen. Rodriguez, hailed as a hero for having driven out the dictator, was easily elected on 1 May 1989 to finish Stroessner's last presidential term. But the enormous advantage exercised during the electoral process by Rodriguez and the ruling Colorado Party demonstrated that the traditions of authoritarianism, militarism and corruption continued to weigh heavily against democratic reform.

The wide open electoral campaign, free of violence but intensely fought, was unprecedented. But that did not obscure the fact that authoritarian structures remained intact. The three main opposition parties, the Authentic
Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), the Febrerista Revolutionary Party (PRF), and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), threatened to boycott the election unless constitutional and electoral reforms were made first. However, realizing that Rodriguez would win on popularity alone, they reconsidered and decided to participate. Gen. Rodriguez, the Colorado candidate, won 74.4 percent of the presidential vote, with the PLRA’s Domingo Laino taking second with 20 percent.

The bicameral Congress has a 32-seat Senate and a 72-seat Chamber of Deputies. Under Stroessner’s electoral law, the party with the most votes, even if only a plurality, automatically receives two-thirds of the seats in both bodies. Remaining seats are divided proportionally between other parties based on percentage of vote. With 70.3 percent of the congressional vote, the Colorados obtained 24 seats in the Senate and 48 seats in the Chamber. The center-left PLRA obtained 11 seats in the Senate and 21 in the Chamber. The social democratic PRF obtained 1 seat in the Senate and 2 in the Chamber.

President Rodriguez acknowledged the glaring irregularities and structural deficiencies and publicly promised to seek all reforms necessary for a full transition to democracy by the time of the next scheduled general elections in 1993. However, it was not until February 1990 that moderates within the Colorado party, backed by Rodriguez, were able to narrowly pass significant electoral reform. The new electoral law mandates a direct-vote system for selecting political party leaders, prohibits members of the military from joining political parties, and calls for the elaboration of a new voter registration list. It also calls for a second round if no presidential candidate secures an absolute majority in the first round of voting, and a new system of fully proportional representation in the election of the Congress.

Nonetheless, it was evident that hard-liners in the Colorado party and the government bureaucracy remained more interested in maintaining power and privilege than in reforms. In July 1990 foreign minister Luis Maria Argana was fired by Rodriguez after publicly stating the Colorado party would remain in power even if it required a revolution. Argana had backed Rodriguez in the 1989 coup, but afterward emerged as the leader of the Colorado traditionalists attempting to block the reform process. Despite Argana’s dismissal, he retained his post as president of the Colorado party executive board.

In October 1990, when seven non-commissioned officers were arrested for plotting a military coup, there was speculation they had been supported by Colorado hard-liners who feared losing control of the party as Colorado moderates pressed for internal elections. Although the government was never in danger, the incident underscored the fact that democratization of the Colorado party and professionalization of the military remain the two major challenges for President Rodriguez if he is to fulfill his commitment to full democratization by 1993.

A preliminary test of the government’s commitment will be in how it conducts upcoming municipal elections. Originally planned for October 1990, they were moved to March 1991 because of delays in the electoral reform process. Then, after the new electoral law was passed, there were problems in the new voter registration system. Because of bureaucratic inertia and apparent civic indifference, the electoral council had registered less than half of eligible voters by the fall of 1990. The Chamber of Deputies then voted to extend the registration period to 31 January 1991 and to reschedule the municipal elections for 26 May 1991.
Immediately after the February 1989 coup, Rodriguez decreed full freedom of expression, association and assembly. Political prisoners were freed and political exiles invited to return home. New and independent publications have also appeared. A degree of self-censorship remains, however, the main taboo being personal allegations against Rodriguez.

Since 1989, political parties, independent organizations and civic groups have operated in relative freedom. Meetings, rallies and demonstrations are held regularly. However, although the police are no longer ubiquitous on the streets as under Stroessner, a number of marches and demonstrations were forcibly broken up in 1990. At the end of 1989, the proscribed Paraguayan Communist Party held its first rally in Paraguay in forty-two years, and has operated publicly in 1990. In September, the party applied to the electoral council for formal legalization and announced plans to run candidates in the 1991 municipal elections.

Opposition parties, however, while acknowledging the dramatic liberalization under Rodriguez, continue to express legitimate concern that unless the new freedoms are formalized, they can be removed as arbitrarily as they had been decreed. The 1967 constitution grants sweeping powers to the executive, and under Stroessner the judicial and legislative branches became arms of the presidency. In mid-1989, the government formally abolished the notorious Defense of Public Order and Defense of Democracy laws, thereby limiting some of the president’s power, but constitutional reform is still needed to guarantee a separation of powers. In turn, the guarantee of civil liberties, and the existence of channels for legal redress of human rights violations past and present, will be contingent on establishing an independent and effective judiciary.

Since 1989, human rights organizations have operated with little interference, reporting on past abuses under Stroessner and on the arbitrary detentions and use of repressive measures by security forces that still occur with some frequency under the new government. Many of the current abuses take place in the countryside against landless peasants who have organized to demand agrarian reform.

Under the Rodriguez government, over a hundred trade unions and two major union federations have been legalized. However, reform of the restrictive labor code has proceeded slowly. Public sector unions remain banned and hundreds of workers were fired in 1990 for labor activism. The right to strike is not fully respected; a number of labor leaders have been arrested during stoppages, and the military has been used to break up demonstrations by striking unions.

**Peru**

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy  
**Political Rights:** 3  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Population:** 21,900,000  
**HDI:** 0.753 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 61 female

**Ethnic groups:** Complex, Indian of Inca descent (46 percent), Caucasian (10 percent), and mixed (44 percent)

**Overview:**

In a stunning upset, Alberto Fujimori, a political independent of Japanese descent, came in a close second to novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in the first round of presidential balloting in April 1990, and went on to win an over-
The independent Republic of Peru was proclaimed in 1821. The nation's history has been marked by alternating periods of constitutional civilian rule and military dictatorship. The military ruled most recently between 1968 and 1980. The May 1980 general elections that completed the transition to representative democracy were won by Fernando Belaunde Terry and the center-right Popular Action (AP) party. The 1985 elections were won by Alan Garcia of the center-left American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA).

The 1979 constitution provides for a president and a bicameral Congress directly elected for five-year terms. If no presidential candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff is held between the two leading candidates from the first round. The Congress consists of a sixty-member Senate elected on a regional basis and a 180-member Chamber of Deputies elected on the basis of proportional representation. Municipal governments are elected. In 1987, legislation was promulgated that divided the country's twenty-five departments into fifteen regions, each projected to have a popularly elected assembly. Elections for regional assemblies took place in seven regions simultaneously with the municipal elections held on 12 November 1989.

During its five-year term, the Garcia government's unsound policies and general mismanagement led the country into fiscal chaos and economic collapse, paving the way for the entrance into politics of prominent novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. In 1987, Vargas Llosa organized the Freedom Movement against Garcia's attempt to nationalize the banks. In 1988, the Freedom Movement formed the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) with Belaunde's AP and another center-right party, the Christian Popular Party (PPC). In January 1989, Vargas Llosa was named the FREDEMO presidential candidate for the April 1990 presidential election. By the end of 1989, opinion polls showed Vargas Llosa, running on a platform emphasizing a decentralized state and market economics, with a commanding lead over nine rivals, representing political parties from across the political spectrum.

In the campaign, economic issues were matched by concern over the Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the most virulent and tightly organized guerrilla movement in Latin America, and the Marxist Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The Shining Path is self-financing, with earnings estimated at $30 million a year from Peru's cocaine industry, and now challenges the military for control of half of Peru's national territory. In attempts to sabotage national elections, it has mounted increasingly larger terror and sabotage campaigns. The MRTA specializes in urban guerrilla attacks and kidnappings.

In February 1990, Fujimori, an agricultural engineer and political neophyte, received a rating of less than one percent in opinion polls. However, his Change 90 movement, with evangelical Christian support, rapidly gained momentum as he promised economic renewal, but without resorting to the shock treatment advocated by Vargas Llosa. The surge in popular support for Fujimori also reflected the mounting disdain among Peruvians for traditional politicians, a disdain evident in the victory of a television talk-show host in the Lima mayoral race in November 1989. Finally, many of the country's poor, primarily Indian and mixed race, began to associate Vargas Llosa with Peru's predominantly white political elites.
The 8 April 1990 election was held in an atmosphere of generalized violence. In the last two weeks of the campaign, the Shining Path and MRTA terrorists killed four congressional candidates, occupied radio stations to broadcast warnings against voting and, in at least 200 attacks, dynamited power pylons, party offices, banks, police posts, hotels, government offices, movie theaters and factories. Since 1989, over half the country's population has lived under a state of emergency, with Lima and the neighboring port city of Callao under virtual martial law.

Despite the conditions, and prodded by compulsory voting laws, nearly 80 percent of the electorate turned out, and gave Vargas Llosa 27.6 percent of the vote, and Fujimori 24.6 percent Fujimori's surprisingly strong showing put Vargas Llosa on the defensive, and in the run-off campaign Fujimori turned to an increasingly populist appeal and surged ahead in the polls. In the 10 June run-off, Fujimori won a resounding 56.5 percent of the vote, against 33.9 percent for Vargas Llosa. When Fujimori took office on 28 July he controlled only small minorities in the two houses of Congress, as Change 90 had obtained in April only 14 of 60 Senate seats, and 29 of 180 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

In his first weeks in office, Fujimori stunned the nation again, using his executive powers to impose a drastic economic austerity program, exactly what he promised not to do. Lacking an organized political party, and in expectation of a popular backlash, he turned to the armed forces, particularly the army, to prop up his government. The army was given control of the national police, and troops were called into the streets to prevent food riots. The army was also given a freer hand to step up counter-insurgency measures against the Shining Path, and in early October four more provinces were put under martial law, leaving about 60 percent of the country under army control. By absorbing the police, the military also took control of the anti-drug effort But in Peru, the world's largest coca producer, the military has been the institution most often implicated in drug-related corruption.

By October, Fujimori's shock program had succeeded in reducing hyperinflation, which had reached an annual rate of over 10,000 percent in August. Many Peruvians felt betrayed by his sharp turnaround, but with four out of every five lacking a steady job most were too busy with daily survival to protest. Nonetheless, political violence was on the increase as a result of a series of labor strikes, the heightened counter-insurgency effort, and a wave of guerrilla killings and kidnappings of politicians and government officials. In September, the government announced that it could no longer guarantee the security of elected officials or government functionaries.

The constitution guarantees free expression, free exercise of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions, and civic organizations. However, political expression is severely restricted by the climate of mounting violence and terror caused by the Shining Path and MRTA guerrilla insurgencies and the repressive counter-measures taken by the military, security forces, and associated paramilitary groups. Politically related killings by both sides were occurring at a rate of over ten per day in the first half of 1990, up from four a day in 1989, and appeared to be increasing in the second half of the year.

Constitutional guarantees remained suspended for nearly two thirds of the population by the state of emergency that covers over half the national territory. After the military took control of the national police in mid-1990, mass
arrests became common during urban sweeps carried out by army troops, particularly in the burgeoning shantytowns that ring the country's urban centers.

The Shining Path and the MRTA systematically target civilians, but independent Peruvian human rights groups, of which there are many, report that an increasing number of civilian deaths are caused by the military and security forces, including massacres carried out against Indian peasants. For the third year in a row, the number of disappearances reported to the United Nations was the highest in the world, nearly 400. Human rights groups, both domestic and international, are also targeted; in 1990, the Lima offices of Amnesty International, the Andean Commission of Jurists, and the International Committee of the Red Cross were all bombed.

The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court whose judges are appointed by the president with the approval of the Senate. There are also eighteen district courts. Virtually all of Peru's institutions are in crisis, but none more than the justice system. It is overwhelmed by cases, riddled with corruption, and subject to intimidation by both the Shining Path and the military. A number of government prosecutors have been driven into exile by death threats. Less than five percent of people arrested on terrorism charges are convicted. The prisons are overflowing, with an estimated 70 percent of prisoners still awaiting trial. A number of legislative efforts to strengthen the courts have failed to get off the ground. Meanwhile, military courts generally exonerate the armed forces of abuse charges.

Despite the climate of violence and the state of emergency, a wide array of political parties and well-organized labor unions remain active. Nearly two dozen political parties and coalitions, ranging from Marxist to far-right, nominated candidates for the 1990 general elections. Labor unions are permitted to strike and do so regularly, but strikes frequently result in violent clashes with police and security forces. The trade unions, however, like the political parties, are targeted by the Shining Path, particularly when they refuse to comply with the guerrillas' call for “armed strikes.” Marxist-led unions and left-wing student groups are subject to abuses by security forces.

The press is largely private and completely uncensored. Numerous daily and weekly newspapers reflect the widely diverse political spectrum. There are even publications espousing the line of the Shining Path. Radio and television are both private and public. Television is increasingly important in electoral campaigns. Journalists, however, are also the targets of political violence, with close to two dozen killed in the last decade, fifteen in the last three years. Radio stations are frequently attacked and occupied by both the Shining Path and the MRTA. Journalists investigating the flourishing cocaine trade receive death threats from drug traffickers. Journalistic activities are also restricted by the military in emergency zones.

**Philippines**

**Polity:** Presidential legislative democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 66,100,000  
**HDI:** 0.714 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 60 male, 64 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Christian Malay (92 percent), Muslim Malay (4 percent), Chinese (2 percent)

**Political Rights:** 3  
**Civil Liberties:** 3  
**Status:** Partly Free
In 1990, Philippine President Corazon Aquino faced growing political and economic problems. These included persistent threats of a coup, mutinous elements in the military, an ongoing Communist insurgency and mounting charges that nepotism and corruption had paralyzed the government and seriously undermined the "people power" revolution that swept her into office in 1986 and caused long-time strongman Ferdinand Marcos to flee.

In December 1989, President Aquino—with U.S. air support—survived a serious coup attempt, the sixth since assuming the presidency, but many of the plotters escaped and public confidence in her administration was further eroded. Among those who got away was cashiered Lt. Col. Gregorio B. Honasan, head of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) that attempted the aborted coup.

In January 1990, Mrs. Aquino attempted to reassert her authority. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, governor of Cagayan Province, was removed from office for supporting the coup attempt, and on 27 February Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, a former defense minister and Aquino ally, was arrested and charged with rebellion and murder. But on 4 March, government troops sent to capture Aguinaldo in Tuguegarao, 250 miles north of Manila, were ambushed by the former governor's 200-man private army. Aguinaldo escaped, but Gen. Oscar Florendo, the popular head of the armed forces civil relations service, was killed. A day later, the government was embarrassed when the Supreme Court ordered Sen. Enrile released on bail. Shortly thereafter, Sen. Enrile, who had become of Mrs. Aquino's outspoken opponents, announced that he would consider seeking the presidency for the Nacionalista Party (NP) in the May 1992 national elections.

On 27 April, Philippine intelligence agents arrested Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan, a core member of the RAM and a key figure in the December coup. He was the tenth ranking rebel officer arrested since December.

In 1990, the fragile Philippine democracy continued to be strained by several political factors, including Mrs. Aquino's lack of long-term policy initiatives, the absence of genuine political party structures, and growing disgruntlement in the powerful military. Under the 1987 constitution, the Philippines scrapped the parliamentary system and created a two-tiered Congress consisting of a House and Senate. Although Aquino supporters won 80 percent of 200 directly elected seats in the House and 22 of 24 in the Senate in the May 1987 elections, Mrs. Aquino never joined the pro-government Lakas ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) coalition, choosing instead to stay out of party politics. By 1990, it was clear that the 1986 "people power" movement did little to break the political domination enjoyed by the oligarchs and businessmen who have long controlled the reins of power.

The continuing elite make up of Congress and its consequent ineffectiveness suggest that politics in the Philippines has changed little from the Marcos and pre-Marcos years. Twenty percent of landowners hold 80 percent of the country's agricultural land (the most inequitable distribution in Southeast Asia). The land law finally passed by the House (90 percent of which is composed of landlords) contained high (for Asia) retention rates for landlords and land grants of prime hacienda land to current landowners' children.

Real political party structure, which would allow legislation and legislative priorities to be thrashed out, does not exist. As a result, party discipline is non-existent, a fact underlined by the 31,069 separate bills filed in the lower house since mid-1987. "Patronage is so strong that the way Congress is
formed it just can't get around it," said one critic in 1990. "Very little is decided in the national interest. It all comes down to who owes who."

The system has led to political gridlock and the continued prominence of powerful figures whose influence permeates all levels of Philippine society and who may present a formidable challenge to Mrs. Aquino in 1992, assuming she chooses to run or has not been toppled before then. The paralysis in the legislative branch partly explains President Aquino's decision not to work closely with Congress, but her distaste for national-level politics has, in the view of many experts, undercut her ability to follow through on policies.

To recapture the momentum of the "people power" movement, Mrs. Aquino used the 12 June Independence Day celebrations to announce the formation of a new nonpartisan political movement—separate from the LDP coalition—which she said would be open to all people who set the country's interests ahead of their own. Built around the support of governors, mayors and nongovernmental organizations, the Kabisig, or Linking Arms Movement, would function mainly as a lobby dedicated to speeding up unfinished projects. Trying to go directly to the people and circumventing Congress led, however, to a split in the progovernment LDP coalition. But Kabisig drew wide support among local officials who had been at odds with the Congress over claims for greater provincial autonomy.

Mrs. Aquino also faced problems in the military. The Young Officers Union (YOU), made up of self-styled nationalists and anti-feudalists, has replaced the RAM, in the opinion of some experts, as center for rebellious military officers disillusioned with government inertia, favoritism in military promotions, and the elitist political system. U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, Carl Ford, testified in 1990 that YOU played "an important role" in last December's coup attempt. Government anxiety about political intrigue in the military led to the formation of a Counter-intelligence Command (CIC) whose job is to monitor loyalty in the ranks. Using operatives from the Integrated National Police (INP), the CIC has been successful in tracking down RAM fugitives.

In October, President Aquino quelled an army mutiny in the southern island of Mindanao, with the surrender of rebel leader Alexander Noble, a former presidential bodyguard involved in last December's attempted coup. In 1990, the government had some successes against the Communist New People's Army (NPA), which marked its twenty-first anniversary. At the end of March 1990, government troops destroyed a heavily fortified NPA training camp after two days of fierce fighting in a remote area 540 miles southeast of Manila.

The other main insurgency concern involved the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a separatist Muslim group based primarily on Jolo Island, administratively part of Mindanao. In 1990, the key issue in the region was not the MNLF, which was relatively inactive, but the sudden eruption in the summer of violence between two warring Muslim clans that forced Manila to send in a Marine battalion to serve as a buffer.

A key issue in U.S.-Philippine relations in 1990 was the future of two large American naval installations, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, whose leases expire in September 1991. In May, tens of thousands of Filipinos rallied in several cities demanding the removal of the bases and four smaller installations. During talks in November, the U.S. announced that it was withdrawing fighter planes from Clark, which the Philippine government hopes to convert to an international airport. Manila was seeking full control of four smaller bases as well by September 1991. The Philippine government did offer
to grant the U.S. more time to withdraw from Subic Bay. Both sides said new security arrangements would likely be negotiated in 1991.

In other domestic affairs, the Philippine economy was battered by drought, floods, fast-rising oil prices, a weak currency, a large trade deficit and a major earthquake that killed nearly 1,000 people in July. Despite the commercial boom early in the year in parts of Manila and other cities, life for the common Filipino remained dire. In February, the Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Inc. made public a study ranking the Philippines on a 1-to-10 scale at a 6.5 in terms of business and investment, second only to China after the military crackdown as the worst nation in the region in which to invest. Even more damaging, the study gave the country a rate of 9 on graft and corruption, the worst in Asia.

In March, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rejected a new and sharply higher estimate for the country's public sector deficit for 1990, threatening a $900 million loan. In October, Philippine officials announced that the country would be unable to meet economic targets set in its three-year IMF program. Until the two sides reach an agreement, the IMF has held up $180 million of the loan facility. In the first four months of the year, foreign investors withdrew $98 million from the Philippines.

By midyear, there were indications that the four-year economic expansion had ended and the country was entering into a recession: the trade gap widened to $2.6 billion, an increase of 50 percent from the year before; the value of the peso had dropped dramatically; interest rates surged past 30 percent; and there was a chance that Manila would be forced to default on foreign-debt payments.

In the main, 1990 was a very difficult year for the country's fledgling democracy. President Aquino's new Kabisig movement had little practical effect as an alternative to cronyism and traditional feudal politics. The president's approval rating dropped to 30 percent, partly due to her indecisiveness in the face of stagnation and corruption. A special commission set up to investigate the December 1989 coup attempt criticized the president for a breakdown in basic services, corruption, poor leadership, and a lack of vision. "A democracy in a crisis of transition calls for a firmer and more direct hand at the helm," the report said.

Filipinos have the right to change their government through democratic means. The political system remains in the hands of traditional clans and elites, and political parties are weak. Patronage, corruption and nepotism are an integral part of the political culture. The judiciary is independent, and civil and criminal trials are open and generally fair. In June, leftist prisoners accused the Supreme Court of following a "double standard of justice" by leaving them in detention while allowing bail for alleged participants of the December 1989 coup attempt. Sen. Enrile and some twenty others charged in the coup attempt posted bail in March after the Court let stand a 1956 decision nullifying a charge called "rebellion with murder." The 1956 ruling said people who commit offenses as part of an armed uprising should be charged only with rebellion, a less serious crime than murder or illegal possession of weapons. Bail is permitted in cases involving rebellion. No bail is permitted when the charge is illegal weapons possession. Lawyers for NPA rebels and other activists have claimed that police and military personnel often plant weapons on the arrest scene to justify the more serious charges. Military courts are used to try police and military personnel, and abuses are
common. Political killings, disappearances and the use of torture are also frequent, and the military has repeatedly been accused of abuses in counter-insurgency operations.

Freedom of expression is generally respected, and the competitive private press presents diverse views. In the summer, outspoken journalists were shot dead by unknown gunmen in separate attacks. Freedom of assembly and association is generally respected, and there is a broad range of private and professional organizations. Religious rights are protected by law and respected in practice. Travel is generally unrestricted. Workers are allowed to join unions and most unions belong to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP). The May First Movement (KMU), the second-largest trade union grouping, is influenced by the Communist party.

Poland

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Population:** 37,800,000  
**HDI:** 0.910 (high/d)  
**Life Expectancy:** 67 male, 75 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Polish (99 percent), Ukrainian, Byelorussian, German

**Overview:**

In 1990, Lech Walesa, who guided Solidarity from being an underground movement to leading Eastern Europe's first non-Communist government, was elected president of Poland. His December election capped a year that saw a bitter schism between Walesa loyalists and supporters of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the man he hand-picked to head the government in 1989.

Other key issues were local and regional elections, the impact of radical free-market reforms implemented in January and Poland's role in securing the inviolability of its borders in the aftermath of German reunification.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki was named to head a Solidarity-led coalition government in August 1989 after two former Communist allies, the Peasant and the Democratic parties, which held the balance of power in parliament, defected to the opposition, making it impossible for the Communists to form a government. The next month, former leader Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, who declared martial law in 1981, was narrowly elected president by the new parliament. Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, who oversaw the crackdown on Solidarity, was named prime minister, but could not form a government because of Solidarity's objections, thus paving the way for a coalition government.

At the start of 1990, the Mazowiecki government enjoyed broad popular support. A radical economic austerity program introduced by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, which eliminated price controls, cut back subsidies and set a realistic official rate for the zloty, stabilized inflation and made available once-scare goods. Although production dropped and unemployment went up, Poles appeared willing to give the new reforms a chance.

In March, Mazowiecki scored a foreign policy triumph when the two Germanys and the four wartime Allies met in Bonn and agreed to Polish participation in border negotiations.

By April there were open tensions within the Solidarity movement over the pace of the country's transition to democracy as well as its efforts to install a free-market economy. Forces loosely allied with Walesa argued that,
while other post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe were holding open parliamentary elections, Poland was lagging behind. They maintained that the 1989 round-table agreement, which provided for the appointment of Gen. Jaruzelski as president and a free election for no more than 35 percent of seats in parliament, was undemocratic and could not meet the political challenge posed by an increasingly impatient populace.

In the middle of the month, Walesa tested the political waters by declaring (and then withdrawing) his intention to replace Gen. Jaruzelski as president. He also began sniping at the Mazowiecki government, drawing fire from leading intellectuals who were once his close allies. Meanwhile, the Solidarity trade union was floundering, undergoing an identity crisis, balancing between supporting the government and its economic policies and defending its members' interests hurt by those policies.

At the end of April, Walesa was re-elected Solidarity leader at the union's first national congress since it was legalized in 1989. At the conference, it became apparent that the union's syndicalist strain was gaining strength, demanding that the organization upgrade its trade union sections.

In May, Walesa lashed out at the government, declaring that Poland's revolution had stagnated and vowing to foment "permanent political war" that would shake the government he helped create. He insisted that he had allowed himself "to be taken in by the intellectuals." The Solidarity leader was responding to an open letter published in morning newspapers that warned against the political trends of "egoism," nationalism and "egalitarian demagoguery" spreading envy and frustration. Among those signing the letter were Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, a senator, Jacek Kuron, the labor minister and former member of KOR, a dissident group that supported the creation of Solidarity in 1980; and Adam Michnik, editor of Gazeta Wyborcza, the Solidarity newspaper. All had once been members of Walesa's inner circle.

While the split in Solidarity intensified, Poles went to the polls on 27 May in elections for 52,000 local and regional officials. More than 146,000 candidates from about eighty parties ran nationwide in races that many observers felt were critical to removing entrenched local bureaucrats who hampered reform. Candidates picked by local Solidarity Citizens' Committees won more than 40 percent of the vote, the Peasants Party 7 percent and the Social Democratic Party, formerly the Communist Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), 2 percent. But nearly 38 percent of the seats were won by locally organized groups or independent candidates. The elections were characterized by widespread voter apathy, with only 42 percent of eligible voters turning out.

By late June, the split in the Solidarity movement was becoming wider, competing wings calling for the dissolution of the 150-member national Civic Committee, the organization set up by Walesa as the intellectual and political soul of the movement. During an acrimonious meeting, sixty-three Solidarity leaders critical of Walesa signed a letter calling for the committee to disband. The squabbling turned personal. Responding to charges that he was sympathetic to Communists, Mr. Michnik responded: "If I am a crypto-Communist, my respected antagonists, then you are swine."

On 1 July, Prime Minister Mazowiecki was rebuffed when he suggested that local civic committees form a federation supporting his government. Most chose to remain under the loose guidance of the national Civic Committee led by Walesa.

The pro-Mazowiecki Solidarity faction made up the core of the Democratic Alliance, which was formed in late summer under the acronym ROAD.
It was led by Zbigniew Bujak and Wladiyslaw Frasyniuk, Solidarity trade unionists once thought to be anointed successors of Walesa. The Democratic Alliance attracted well-known intellectuals and politicians connected to the Mazowiecki government. The Walesa forces coalesced around the Center Alliance (Centrum), which was established several months earlier and had openly backed a Walesa presidential bid. Many observers both in and outside Poland believed that the split had more to do with personalities than ideology, and that neither group was a genuine political party with a clearly defined, distinct platform or a recognizable popular base.

In September, several days after Walesa declared that he would run for president, Gen. Jaruzelski notified parliament that he would step down as president even though his term was not due to expire until 1993. Presidential elections were set for 25 November, with a 9 December runoff if no candidate got over 50 percent of the vote. Parliamentary elections were tentatively scheduled for spring 1991.

In October, Prime Minister Mazowiecki announced his candidacy for the presidency, setting up the first popularly contested race for president in Polish history. The contest boiled down largely to style over substance, pitting the voluble and charismatic populist leader against the intellectual, dour prime minister. Walesa said he wanted faster dismissal of Communists and a revised constitution to give the country a stronger president with the power to issue decrees and make laws.

A clear surprise in the campaign was the emergence of Stanislaw Tyminski, a Polish-born Emigre businessman from Canada, as a dark-horse contender. Mr. Tyminski's sudden surge out of nowhere reflected a campaign characterized by the politics of personality and a pervasive distrust of organized parties. The Peasant Party candidate, Roman Bartoszcze, trailed with 5 to 10 percent in opinion polls.

The campaign itself was marked by personal attacks, not debates on issues. Walesa was accused of dictatorial leanings, Mr. Tyminski called the prime minister a traitor, and newspapers and both Solidarity factions publicly questioned Mr. Tyminski's sanity and the acknowledged presence of former secret policemen on his campaign staff.

On 25 November, Walesa won 40 percent of the vote, Mr. Tyminski 23 percent, Prime Minster Mazowiecki 19.9 percent. The following day, the prime minister resigned along with his government. In the 9 December runoff, Walesa scored a landslide victory over Mr. Tyminski, getting an overwhelming 75 percent of the vote.

Although Walesa's margin was impressive, there were heavy costs in the campaign. He alienated many of the intellectuals who were once his compatriots and partners, offended by his statements that he would be willing to rule by fiat. At the end of the year, the extent of his powers as president remained unclear as a new constitution is not due to be ratified until May 1991.

The austerity package that went into effect 1 January allowed prices to rise on a monthly basis, and after the first two months prices skyrocketed by 78 percent. Wages were restrained by heavy taxes, resulting in a drop of living standards. Hyperinflation was stopped, stores filled up with goods, and the private sector eventually boosted its share of GDP to 35 percent. But production fell by nearly 25 percent, the combined effect of a slump in trade with the Soviet Union and decline in real income. Unemployment rose to 5.5 percent, a figure that is expected to go higher when the privatization phase is further implemented. The hard-currency debt stands at $46 billion.
While several strikes during the year signalled some discontent with the ramifications of the austerity plan, opinion polls throughout the year reflected overall public support for a conversion to a market economy.

In other issues, on 8 November German leaders promised to sign a treaty that would formally establish the Oder and Neisse Rivers as the permanent border between the two countries. Reunification of Germany had raised concerns among many Poles about the revival of German claims to German lands granted to Poland after World War II, partly in compensation to eastern territories lost to the Soviets.

Abortion became an important social issue in 1990. Under heavy pressure from the Catholic church, the Polish legislature in November moved toward banning abortion, a major means of birth control in overwhelmingly Catholic Poland. Opinion surveys showed that a majority of Poles opposed the ban.

Poles have the means to change their government democratically and elected a president for the first time in the nation's history. Completely open parliamentary elections are yet to be held, and 35 percent of parliament is still set aside for the former Communist party and its allies under the 1989 roundtable agreement. In 1990, some ministries awarded to Communists were turned over to non-Communists. Reforms were introduced to guarantee an independent judiciary. A 22 March 1990 Law of the Prosecutors Office emphasized safeguarding the rule of law and ensuring that crimes were duly prosecuted. The Prosecutor-General’s Office was dissolved and its prerogatives taken over by the justice minister. A National Judiciary Council was created to “protect the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the courts.” It elected a new Supreme Court, headed by a chairman elected by parliament. The second stage of legal reform, changing the body of law and penal legislation and procedure, remains to be implemented. In October, two secret-police generals were arrested in connection with the 1984 slaying of the Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko, a charismatic pro-Solidarity priest. Three other generals were arrested on corruption charges.

Poles are free to express their views openly. There is a free press, but many so-called “independent” newspapers are affiliated with parties or associations whose views they reflect. On 6 June censorship of publishing, broadcasting and entertainment was abrogated. In October, the government approved detailed plans for the sale of Eastern Europe’s largest newspaper, publishing and distribution concern, confiscated from the defunct Communist party. Several Western concerns expressed interest in buying the titles.

Restrictions on freedom of association and assembly have been loosened, and freedom of religion is respected. Domestic and foreign travel is unrestricted. The Solidarity union represents some 2.2 million workers. The former official National Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) claims a membership of 6 million. Several strikes were held throughout the year.
Portugal

Overview:

The Portuguese economy expanded and improved in 1990, and received substantial economic aid from the European Community. However, the country still has a relatively low per capita income by European standards, and suffers from inflation and underemployment.

Located on the Atlantic coast of the Iberian peninsula, Portugal was a monarchy until a republic was declared in 1910. Antonio Salazar headed a fascist dictatorship from 1932 to 1968. His successor, Marcello Caetano, held power until 1974, when the leftist Armed Forces Movement overthrew the regime. The military had become exhausted and disenchanted by fighting to retain Portuguese colonies in Africa. The transition to democracy began with the election of a constituent assembly in 1975, which adopted a democratic socialist constitution. There has been a series of governments since then, some led by the Socialists, others led by the more centrist Social Democrats.

The president is elected directly for a five-year term. The incumbent is the Socialist ex-Prime Minister, Mario Soares, who won election in 1986. The president appoints a prime minister from the largest party or coalition in the 250-member Assembly of the Republic, the unicameral parliament. Social Democrat Anibal Cavaco Silva heads the current government. The Assembly members are elected by proportional representation for a maximum term of four years. In the April 1987 parliamentary election, the Social Democrats won 149 seats, giving them an absolute majority. A general election is due in 1991. The other parties represented in the parliament include the Socialists, the left-wing Democratic Renewal, the right-of-center Social Democratic Center Party, and the Communist-oriented Unified Democratic Coalition. In early 1990, the Communists expelled a leading reformer for advocating perestroika. The Social Democrats continued to privatize many state-owned companies in 1990, including beer, banking, and shipping companies. The government aims to create a more productive, private enterprise economy.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The Portuguese have the right to change their government by democratic means. The voters choose both the president and the parliament through direct competitive elections.

The print media are owned by the government, political parties, and private publishers. They are generally free and competitive. Until 1990, television and radio were state-owned, with the exception of a Catholic radio station. The Social Democratic government introduced legislation to establish two private television channels to supplement the public ones. The government offered the Catholic church two hours of daily broadcast time on television, but the church refused the deal, so the government established a new system for all religious denominations to share the two hours instead. There was a backbench rebellion against the new broadcast system, and seventy of the government's own MPs signed a letter opposing the law.

There are a few minor restrictions on freedom of expression. One may be
arrested for insulting the government or the armed forces, but the state has not acted recently on these provisions. Political organization is free except for fascist organizations. Although Catholicism is prevalent, religion is free. Trade unionism is free. There are competing Communist and non-Communist labor federations. Public sector workers have gone on strike to protest the government’s economic policies. Freedom of assembly is permitted. Protest organizers need to give the government one day’s notice before a march or an assembly. Permission is normally granted. The economy is becoming more private as the government sells state companies, but there are some limits on non-Portuguese ownership. The number of Communist-oriented co-operative farms is declining. Many parts of the country remain economically backward.

Qatar

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Overview:

In 1990, this small, wealthy sheikdom in the Persian Gulf, ruled by Khalifa ibn Hamad al Thani since 1972, joined other Gulf Arab states in making its military installations available to multinational forces after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August.

Hamad al Thani is head of state and the prime minister. A provisional constitution provides for a Council of Ministers and an Advisory Council of thirty members, twenty-seven of whom were to be elected. These elections have never taken place. There was no evidence in 1990, as in years past, of domestic discontent.

Expatriate laborers, mainly from South Asia, outnumber Qataris four to one, and this disparity has been a cause of concern for local authorities. The regime has beefed up its internal security forces and offered jobs only to native Qataris in certain government-owned industries.

A government reshuffling this year, however, introduced some young reformers into cabinet posts. Because of this, expatriate workers had an easier time switching jobs and Qatari men have been allowed to bring foreign wives, previously excluded, into the country.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Under the absolute rule of the emir, Qataris have no possibility of changing their government through peaceful means. The constitution provides that an emir be selected from adult males of the Al Thani family. There are no elections and political parties are banned. The thirty-member Advisory Council, appointed by the emir, is powerless. The emir rules by decree, but governs within limits set by the royal family. The judiciary is not truly independent. The rights of the accused or detained in security cases are not respected. Non-Muslims may not bring suit, and only Muslims may ask for a change of forum to a traditional court. The government owns both radio and television and prohibits public criticism as well as political demonstrations. Private associations, though permitted, are carefully watched. Non-Muslims may not worship in public and cannot proselytize. Workers are not allowed to join unions, but may associate based on professional or private interests.
Overview:

In 1990, Romania experienced serious problems in establishing political stability after last year’s violent revolution toppled the thirty-four-year hard-line regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, who was executed along with his wife on Christmas Day 1989. Elections in May followed months of protests against the provisional Council of the National Salvation Front (NSF), led by former senior Communist officials, many with close ties to Ceausescu. The NSF’s overwhelming victory at the polls, and its use of force to quell protest, led to further violence that hampered the regime’s ability to address the country’s pressing social, ethnic and economic problems.

Early in the year, it became apparent that Ceausescu’s fall—seemingly brought on by a spontaneous popular uprising—was partly a "palace coup" by party insiders who formed the nucleus of the NSF interim government led by Ion Iliescu, chairman of the NSF Council’s executive committee.

The question of who was responsible for overthrowing Ceausescu involved the legitimacy of the provisional government NSF opponents maintained that the group had "stolen" the people’s revolution. The 150-member Council included such former Communist stalwarts as Dumitru Mazilu and Silivu Brucan, an editor of Scientea, the Communist party paper, under Ceausescu’s predecessor. Prime Minister Petre Roman, a political novice, was not a member of the executive committee, suggesting that he was largely a figurehead. No dissidents were on the executive committee, but the full council included Andrei Plesu, a philosopher, Mircea Dinescu, a poet whom Ceausescu had jailed; Doina Cornea, a writer. The former dissidents organized into a the Group for Social Dialogue, and called themselves the "conscience of the council."

In January, the NSF announced several reforms. The government stopped the export of foodstuffs and oil, which had led to massive shortages under Ceausescu, and scrapped the hated "systematization" plan, a forced resettlement program that had led to the destruction of whole villages. President Iliescu also announced the abolition of the death penalty and the dissolution of the dreaded Securitate, Ceausescu’s secret police. Farmers were allowed to own small plots as long as they worked them themselves and sold a certain amount of produce to the state.

A legal commission was established to draft a new constitution. The Front also promised to legalize nascent political parties. These included several major pre-war parties, among them the agrarian-based National Peasant Party (NPP), which was forcibly dissolved in 1947, and the National Liberal Party (NLP), which governed in the 1920s. Other major parties included a Green Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Hungarian Democratic Union (HDU), which represented the substantial Hungarian minority in Transylvania and other areas.

The NSF faced mounting protests because of its links to the former regime and the Communist party. On 13 January the government restricted political demonstrations after 5,000 protesters demanded the resignations of...
Mr. Iliescu and Prime Minister Roman. Crowds also demanded the restoration of the death penalty and the banning of the Communist party. *Romania Libera*, the largest, independent newspaper, demanded the resignation of Mr. Mazilu, formerly a secret-police colonel.

In mid-January the government announced that it was confiscating all property and assets of the Communist party, including twenty-one palaces used by Ceausescu.

On 25 January hundreds of demonstrators defied a government ban and besieged NSF headquarters in protest against the Front's decision to field candidates in the May election instead of standing down as promised. The NSF struck back on 28 January. In a show of strength, about 20,000 well-organized demonstrators poured into Bucharest and laid siege to the headquarters of the opposition parties. NPP President Corneliu Coposu, who spent seventeen years in jail for his democratic views, had to be spirited out of the building in an armored personnel carrier to guarantee his safety. Pro-government workers ransacked the offices of the NPP and the NLP.

Bowing to pressure from the opposition, the NSF Council agreed to give up its monopoly on power and join with thirty-seven other political parties in a coalition that was to rule the country until the elections. Under the arrangement, the existing council was replaced by a Provisional Council of National Unity (CNU). The CNU, established as a caretaker parliament, was still dominated by the NSF. Radu Campeanu, president of the NLP, warned that the opposition would withdraw from the new power-sharing government if the NSF continued to "sabotage free discussion."

On 15 February more than 1,000 angry demonstrators, including scores of uniformed officers, gathered for a fourth day of protests outside the headquarters of the interim government despite an official promise of an investigation into the role their new commanders played in the last days of the Ceausescu regime. The protesters demanded the resignation of President Iliescu and other members of the NSF. The government responded to the escalating protests by again calling in progovernment miners. On 19 February, some 5,000 miners arrived in Bucharest by train from the Jiu Valley in western Romania and set up a cordon around the government buildings in Victory Square, saying the anti-government demonstrations were perpetrated by "hoodlums and unemployed gypsies." President Iliescu was shown on television with the miners, who pledged to defend the government. The continuing protests appeared to undermine both the NSF and opposition parties.

There was also an explosion of ethnic violence, as army tanks and troops were used to separate rival mobs of Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in the Transylvanian town of Tîrgu Mureș. In several days, six people were killed and hundreds injured. The violence occurred after a weeklong strike by 280 Hungarian students at the town's medical institute who demanded to be taught in Hungarian and equal representation for Hungarians in the national senate. On 20 March, about 2,000 Romanians armed with scythes and clubs attacked 5,000 ethnic Hungarian protesters, killing two and injuring hundreds. Transylvania has been disputed by both Hungary and Romania for centuries.

In the month before the elections for the president and the 190-member senate and 387-member lower house, there were increased reports of intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and candidates by the NSF and its supporters. The United States announced that it was recalling its ambassador because of concerns that the elections would not be wholly free and fair. Throughout the campaign, the NSF reassured its supporters that the social
costs of economic reforms would be minimized by a Front government. The NPP and the NLP ran on broadly outlined platforms that called for the swift implementation of market reforms and greater democracy.

On 20 May in the country's first free national elections in more than fifty years, President Iliescu and the NSF scored a huge victory at the polls. The president won over 80 percent of the vote. The NSF won two-thirds of parliamentary seats with 66 percent of the votes. The NPP did worse than the Green Party and Hungarian Democratic Union which, by winning 41 seats in the 506-member parliament, the second largest bloc of seats after the NSF's 354, became the official opposition. Shortly after the election, the HDU decided to stay out of a coalition with the NSF. The NLP won an average of 6.7 percent for both houses. While some Western observers called the vote "generally" free and fair, a French observer called the results "the logical consequence of an unfair electoral campaign."

The NSF's victory was greeted with despair and anger. In June police in Bucharest shot demonstrators outside the Interior Ministry after protesters raided state television offices and burned down the police headquarters. The state radio reported that four people were killed and ninety-three hospitalized. The violence was touched off by a police raid before dawn that ended a fifty-three-day anti-Communist protest in University Square; the police clubbed and dragged away protesters. The following day, responding to an emergency appeal by President Iliescu, thousands of miners from northern Romania descended on the capital with clubs and rubber truncheons and sought revenge for anti-government rioting. Miners and workers destroyed the offices of the NPP, the NLP and the Group for Social Dialogue. Pro-government workers surrounded the apartments of prominent government opponents and halted the publication of Romanis Libera. The violence led the European Community to delay approval of a trade and economic cooperation pact with Romania.

As demonstrations subsided in the fall, the government announced a radical economic reform program to restructure what had been the most highly centralized economy in Eastern Europe. A July report on industrial production had shown consistent falls in output and exports through the first half of the year. Production fell by more than 18 percent, imports consisting mostly of crude oil and food rose 46 percent in the first six months of 1990, while exports fell 43 percent.

In October, Prime Minister Roman, saying only shock therapy could save Romania, introduced to parliament a package of laws intended to speed the country's transition to a market economy. He said the government would push ahead with privatizing state-owned companies and allow market prices for most goods. The package of land, banking and tax proposals also included social security measures intended to protect retirees and housewives from the effects of price liberalization. Prices of energy, fuel and rent would be subsidized for another year and the government would control prices for basic foods and services.

As price increases went into effect 1 November, thousands of workers demonstrated in southwest Romania, and riot police dispersed protesters in the capital. Trade unions held street meetings offering alternative economic programs and threatened to strike.

A badly faltering economy was not the only domestic concern. There was a chronic shortage of housing, with many families, no matter the size, forced to live in one tiny room. The government also made only halting strides in its fight against AIDS, which has hit hardest among infants. Of 478 diagnosed
Country reports

cases of Romanians with AIDS, all but 50 are under thirteen years old, and of those 242 are under four years old. A government report said that 302 children, or 65.9 percent of the pediatric cases, were from orphanages or special hospitals run for sick or malnourished children. The large number of abandoned children in Romania is at least in part due to the strict prohibition on abortion and contraception enforced by the Ceausescu government. The spread of AIDS was due to archaic medical practices, which included multiple transfusions for infants, as well as infected blood supplies and unsterilized needles.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Romanians went to the polls in May presidential and parliamentary elections that were considered "generally" free and fair after a campaign that was marked by intimidation and violence against the opposition by the NSF, which emerged an overwhelming winner. The judiciary is not free from NSF influence. Police and army troops were routinely used to break up peaceful demonstrations, and arbitrary arrest and detention were common. Laws placed restrictions on freedom of assembly and association. The government acknowledged in October that it was using "a few thousand" members of the former secret police to help maintain public order. There were allegations that the Securitate operates within the military under a new name, Siguranta.

State-run television and newspapers sought to be more balanced in their coverage, but generally reflect official positions. The independent press and party newspapers have been subject to closure and intimidation, and the government has withheld access to newsprint and held up distribution. Diplomats and politicians have maintained that telephone taps have resumed. Despite changes in the law, literature is still confiscated at the border. The government continues to exercise control over religious activities and churches, the largest being the Romanian Orthodox Church. Domestic and foreign travel restrictions have been eased substantially, and all Romanians now have passports allowing them to travel if they have the money. Workers have organized independent trade unions and have challenged the Provisional National Committee for Organizing Free Trade Unions, the new name of the communist UGSR federation that existed under Ceausescu. The Provisional Committee is closely affiliated with the ruling NSF, and the miners who attacked protesters in June are members. The new federation of independent unions, FRATIA, includes nineteen unions from all over the country.

Rwanda

Polity: One-party (military dominated)  Political Rights: 6
Economy: Mixed statist  Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 7,300,000  Status: Not Free
HDI: 0.304 (low)
Life Expectancy: 45 male, 48 female
Ethnic groups: Hutus (90 percent), Tutsis (9 percent), Twapygmies (1 percent)

Overview:

Independent since 1962, this poor, landlocked country has the highest population density in all of Africa. In 1990 it was invaded by a force of Rwandan refugees led by an Ugandan officer of the persecuted minority Tutsi tribe. The crisis posed a serious challenge to Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana, head of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), who had seized power in a 1973 bloodless coup.

On 2 October, while President Habyarimana was in Washington, a force of
5,000 to 10,000 Rwandan refugees under Ugandan Maj. Gen. Fred Rwigyema invaded the country from neighboring Uganda. The refugees were from the minority Tutsi tribe, which in the past dominated Rwanda, but was overthrown by the majority Hutu tribe in 1959 when the region was still a Belgian colony.

After several days of fighting, government forces announced that they had blocked the rebel advance on Kigali, the nation’s capital. France announced it was sending a company of 150 legionnaires to the capital to protect the embassy and French expatriates. The Belgian government announced it was sending 600 paratroopers at the request of President Habyarimana. As fighting intensified in the north, Zaire sent 5,000-strong Rwandan army. There were reports that government troops and Hutu tribesmen in the north were massacring villagers accused of supporting the rebels.

The rebels, calling themselves the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), said they wanted to oust the corrupt government, and allow for the return of the estimated 250,000 to 1 million Rwandan refugees. As the three-nation foreign force took up positions in Kigali, the government banned meetings of more than two people. On 9 October, the government announced it was making headway against the invaders, and life began returning to normal in the capital. Meanwhile, reports of atrocities against Tutsi civilians persisted. According to eyewitnesses, soldiers shot peasants and burned down huts while Hutus hacked women and children with machetes in attacks on at least nine settlements. More than 1,500 suspected rebel sympathizers were arrested in Kigali.

On 16 October, the leaders of Rwanda, Uganda and Belgium met to try and settle the crisis. President Habyarimana announced that he had accepted a Belgian plan calling for neutral troops to supervise a ceasefire, but fighting continued. In November, in a major break with past polices, President Habyarimana said he would permit a multiparty system in 1991 and abolish tribal names on identity cards. Meanwhile, a durable ceasefire had not been worked out. The rebel invasion strained relations between Rwanda and Uganda, which was charged with allowing the rebels to launch their attack from its soil.

At the outset of 1990, the government continued its repressive policies against all forms of dissent. It is believed that in all at least twenty people were sentenced in March and April for exercising their right to freedom of expression and association. In July, two journalists were put on trial for subversion, one for "plotting against state security," and the other for "subversion." The prosecution demanded terms of twenty and ten years.

In May, the government reached an agreement with Tanzania regarding refugees. All those who arrived after January 1986 were to be identified and repatriated back to Rwanda.

Like neighboring Burundi, the country faced severe economic problems due to low coffee prices, an underdeveloped transportation system, land erosion, overpopulation of arable land, and mining problems. The spread of AIDS was also a continuing problem in this densely populated country.

Rwanda remains a repressive military-dominated one-party state which effectively prohibits citizens from democratically changing their national and local governments in openly contested elections. The unicameral National Development Council consists of members nominated by the MRND and elected every five years. Membership in the MRND is compulsory.

Security laws allow for the preventive detention of persons suspected of undermining national interests and public safety, and the security apparatus is pervasive and intrusive. There are three court systems for security, military
and criminal (civil) cases. After the October invasion by rebel forces, there were persistent reports of atrocities and murders committed against civilians by government troops and Hutu tribesmen. Thousands of suspected rebel sympathizers, virtually all of them Tutsis, were arrested. Rwanda is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa where citizens must carry identity cards stating their ethnicity, although the president said he would abolish the law next year.

Freedom of association is curtailed, and in 1990 some twenty people were sentenced for overtly political reasons. The government controls the radio (there is no television) and magazines. The independent press is frequently repressed, as evinced by the trial of two journalists in midyear. Private associations must register with the government, and freedom of assembly is severely restricted. Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed in this predominantly Christian country (some 30 percent of the people practice traditional African religions and 1 percent are Muslims), but the government continued its harassment of some Protestant sects, particularly Jehovah's Witness. Rwandans must belong to the MRND and hold national identity and resident cards as well as work permits, and travel is restricted. The Central Union of Rwandan Workers is controlled by the ruling party, and all worker associations must belong to it. Strikes must be approved by the government-controlled executive committee.

St. Christopher-
Nevis

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 40,000

**HDI:** 0.801 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 66 male, 70 female

**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous

**Status:** Free

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Political Rights:** 1

**Overview:**

St. Kitts and Nevis struggled to recover from the damage inflicted by Hurricane Hugo in September 1989. Political debate centered around environmental issues, the need for a strategy to address a mounting drug problem, and the adverse economic impact of increased oil prices stemming from the Persian Gulf crisis.

The island nation, consisting of the Caribbean islands of St. Kitts and Nevis, became an independent state with a federal constitution within the British Commonwealth in 1983. The British monarch is represented by a governor-general who appoints as prime minister an individual commanding a parliamentary majority. The governor-general also appoints a deputy governor-general for Nevis.

There is a unicameral National Assembly, whose members are directly elected for five years from single-member constituencies, eight on St. Kitts and three on Nevis. Senators, not to exceed two-thirds of the elected members, are appointed, with one senator appointed by the leader of the parliamentary opposition for every two appointed by the governor-general.

Nevis is provided with an island Assembly currently consisting of five elected and three appointed members. The governor-general appoints a premier and two other members of the Nevis Assembly to serve as a Nevis Island Administration. Nevis has also been accorded the right of secession from St. Kitts if approved by two-thirds of the elected legislators and endorsed by two-thirds of those voting on the matter in an island referendum. In October 1990,
the premier of Nevis, Simeon Daniel, urged that Nevis move toward secession by the next local elections, constitutionally due by December 1992.

The current People’s Action Movement (PAM) government of Prime Minister Kennedy Simmons came to power in the parliamentary election of 1980 with the support of the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) and led the country to independence in 1983. The center-right PAM/NRP coalition increased its majority in early elections in 1984, the PAM winning six of eight seats on St. Kitts and the NRP taking all three on Nevis. The Labour Party (LP), a left-leaning party that once dominated the political scene, lost all but two of its seats, including that of opposition leader Lee Moore.

Simmons was sworn in for a third term in 1989 after the PAM retained its six seats in the March general elections. Coalition partner NRP retained two seats, losing one to the Concerned Citizens’ Movement (CCM). The opposition LP retained its two seats. Lee Moore failed to regain the seat he lost in 1984 and resigned as LP leader. Denzil Douglas, a parliamentary newcomer, was elected new party leader at the subsequent LP convention and became the parliamentary opposition leader. The next general elections are due by 1994.

Constitutional guarantees regarding the right to free expression, the free exercise of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are respected. The major labor union, the St. Kitts Trades and Labour Union, is associated with the opposition LP. The right to strike, while not specified by law, is fully recognized and respected in practice.

Television and radio on St. Kitts are owned by the government but offer differing points of view. There is no daily newspaper but each of the major political parties publishes a weekly or biweekly newspaper. The opposition publications are free to criticize the government and do so vigorously. There is a religious television station and a privately owned radio station on Nevis.

Rule of law, based on the 1983 constitution, is respected. The judiciary is independent and the highest court is the West Indies Supreme Court (based in St. Lucia) which includes a Court of Appeal and a High Court. In certain circumstances, there is right of appeal to the Privy Council in London.

St. Lucia

- **Polity:** Parliamentary democracy
- **Political Rights:** 1
- **Economy:** Capitalist
- **Civil Liberties:** 2
- **Population:** 200,000
- **Status:** Free
- **HDI:** 0.789 (high)
- **Life Expectancy:** 67 male, 75 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous

**Overview:**

St. Lucia, a member of the British Commonwealth, became internally self-governing in 1967 and achieved independence in 1979. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general whose emergency powers are subject to legislative review. Under the 1979 constitution, there is a bicameral parliament consisting of a seventeen-member House of Assembly elected for five years, and an eleven-member Senate, with six senators appointed by the prime minister, three by the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and two by consultation with civic and religious organizations. The prime minister must be a member of the House and command a majority therein.

The leftist St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) won a landslide victory in the
1979 elections, but factional disputes between SLP radicals and moderates led to new elections in 1982. The radical faction led by George Odium broke off to form the Progressive Labour Party (PLP). The 1982 elections saw the return to power of the United Workers’ Party (UWP) led by Prime Minister John Compton.

In the 1987 elections, the UWP won a narrow nine to eight victory over the SLP which had declared a social democratic orientation under the new leadership of Julian Hunte. The SLP refused unity proposals from the PLP which in the end won no seats. Prime Minister Compton, hoping to increase the UWP majority, called new elections a few weeks later, but there was no change in the distribution of seats. However, an SLP representative crossed the aisle later in the year, giving the UWP a ten to seven majority. New general elections are due by 1992.

Since 1985, the island has been divided into eight regions, each with its own elected council and administrative services.

In 1990, political debate centered around the economy and the national budget, with the SLP criticizing the government’s plan to enhance the tourist industry by allowing casino gambling. The SLP also charged the government with ignoring the unemployment issue and exerting undue control over the important banana industry.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic groups are respected as is the free exercise of religion. Newspapers are mostly private or sponsored by political parties. Television is privately owned; radio is both public and private.

Civic organizations are well organized and politically active. The labor unions, which represent a majority of wage earners, are free to strike. The competition among political parties and allied civic groups is heated, particularly during campaign periods when there is occasional violence and mutual charges of harassment.

The judicial system is independent and includes a High Court under the West Indies Supreme Court (based in St. Lucia), with ultimate appeal under certain circumstances to the Privy Council at London. Personal security is generally respected under the rule of law, although travel to Libya has been restricted.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 100,000

**HDI:** 0.775 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 58 male, 60 female

**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous

**Political Rights:** 1

**Civil Liberties:** 2

**Status:** Free

Overview:

St. Vincent and the Grenadines have the status of "special member" of the British Commonwealth, with the British monarchy represented by a governor-general. St. Vincent became internally self-governing in 1967 and achieved independence in 1979, with jurisdiction over the northern Grenadine islets of Bega, Canouan, Mayreau, Mustique, Prune Island, Petit St. Vincent and Union Island.

At the time of independence the constitution provided for a unicameral
House of Assembly with thirteen members directly elected for five years. Six senators are appointed, four by the government and two by the leader of the opposition. The prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition commanding a majority in the House. In the 1979 elections, Robert Milton Cato's moderate socialist St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP) took eleven of thirteen seats, James Mitchell's centrist New Democratic Party (NDP) taking the remaining two. In the 1984 elections, Mitchell replaced Cato as prime minister as the NDP took nine seats and the SVLP the other four.

In 1986 the House approved a constitutional amendment raising the number of elected members to fifteen. In the May 1989 elections Mitchell's NDP swept all fifteen seats. There were three competing opposition parties, the SVLP, the leftist United People's Movement (UPM), and Ralph Gonsalves' leftist Movement for National Unity (MNU). Despite the failure to win any seats in the "first past the post" system, the opposition garnered over 30 percent of the vote.

In 1990, political debate was centered on economic issues as the government confronted the adverse impact of increasing oil prices stemming from the Persian Gulf crisis. St. Vincent remains one of the poorer countries in the Caribbean and unemployment is a continuing problem. The next general elections are due by 1994.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Constitutional guarantees regarding the right to free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are respected. Labor unions are active, politically involved, and permitted to strike. Political campaigns are hotly contested, with occasional charges from all quarters of harassment and violence including police brutality. In 1990, the government admitted during United Nations Human Rights Committee hearings that prison conditions were poor but denied allegations of prisoner beatings.

The press is independent and uncensored, with one privately owned independent weekly, *The Vincentian*, and two weeklies and a fortnightly run by political parties. *The Vincentian* has been charged with government favoritism by the opposition. In early 1989, its editor was fired by the owner for publishing an electoral endorsement of the NDP "without authorization." The Caribbean Association of Media Workers, supporters of the endorsement, criticized the dismissal as damaging to free expression.

Radio and television are government owned. Differing points of view are presented, but since 1987 there has been evidence of government interference in radio programming. The broadcast of opposition releases has been subject to occasional restriction and in 1988 a radio call-in program was ordered off the air after it had become a popular forum for opposition voices. However, the government approved a reinstatement of the program in late 1989.

The judicial system is independent. The highest court is the West Indies Supreme Court (based in St. Lucia), which includes a Court of Appeal and a High Court, one of whose judges is resident on St. Vincent.
In 1990 Sao Tome and Principe took the first steps toward multipartyism and a mixed economy.

Located in the Gulf of Guinea some 130 miles off the coast of Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe consists of two main islands (after which it is named) and several smaller islets. It gained independence from Portugal in 1975, and was a one-party state until 1990. During those fifteen years, Manuel Pinto da Costa served as both the president of the republic and leader of the sole legal party, the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP). The forty-member, unicameral National Popular Assembly confirmed him as president in 1985, appointing him for a five-year term under the terms of the 1982 constitution. Until the government scheduled direct multiparty legislative elections for 1991, district assemblies elected members of the Assembly, who had to belong to the MLSTP.

At the national MLSTP conference in early December of 1989 and the Central Committee Meeting some two weeks later, both the Party and the government pledged to take rapid action to transform the state from a leftist, single-party political structure into an open, pluralistic democracy. As a result of the 1989 meeting, a commission consisting both of members of the government and of the opposition focused on provisions for multiparty elections, elimination of the express recognition of the MLSTP as the "guiding force in the state and society," and limitation of the duration of the president’s term of office to two terms.

Opposition leader Afonso Dos Santos, sentenced to a long prison term after having been convicted of leading a coup attempt against President da Costa in 1988, won amnesty in April 1990 along with those who also participated in this attempt. Dos Santos sought the lifting of a ban against his Sao Tome National Resistance Front opposition party so that it could organize in advance of any multiparty elections. Former prime minister and MLSTP leader Miguel dos Anjos Trovoada returned from exile in order to run as the candidate of the Democratic Opposition Coalition (CODO), while former Defence Minister Guadalupe de Ceita announced his decision to seek election as an independent. The MLSTP is to rename itself the Social Democratic Party and have as its own candidate for the presidency current President da Costa himself.

A leading producer of cacao, the country has faced an economic crisis since the price of the commodity began to drop in 1980. This has led to hiring freezes and moves toward cuts in the number of employees in the public sector, as well as reduced public spending. Abandoning vaguely Marxist-Leninist principles, the government has denationalized some businesses, encouraged foreign investment, and privatized government-run cacao plantations. Little progress has occurred toward either greater economic diversification in the areas of non-cacao/non-subsistence agriculture, off-shore banks and financial institutions, tourism, small industry, and fishing, or the development of a domestic business sector. Meanwhile, imports exceed...
exports by a considerable margin. The government has sought agreement in order to obtain further financing from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

For the first time since independence in 1975, new constitutional provisions may permit citizens to change their government by democratic means. In August 1990 an overwhelming majority of voters approved a new constitution which calls for a multiparty system, a mixed economy, freedom of expression, and the right to strike. The government scheduled multiparty legislative elections for January 1991 and a competitive presidential election for March 1991. Radio, television, and a periodic newspaper are government-controlled, but now there may be more latitude than previously to criticize the system and government policies in the media. Although the new constitution recognizes labor rights, there is doubt as to how a government-controlled trade union which exists mainly on paper could exercise such rights. The government circumscribed rights of assembly and association seriously in the past, but is allowing political organizing by the opposition. Until quite recently, the judiciary has not been fully independent from executive interference, particularly in security and political cases, and it is not known how or when this will change as a part of the political transition process.

**Saudi Arabia**

- **Polity:** Traditional monarchy
- **Political Rights:** 7
- **Economy:** Capitalist-statist
- **Civil Liberties:** 6
- **Population:** 15,000,000
- **Status:** Not Free
- **HDI:** 0.702 (medium)
- **Life Expectancy:** 59 male, 63 female
- **Ethnic groups:**

**Overview:**

As Saddam Hussein threatened to expand his 2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait southward into this oil-rich kingdom, Saudi leaders agreed to accept a buildup of multinational troops on its soil to deter Iraqi forces. By year's end, Saudi Arabia was host to approximately 625,000 foreign troops, mostly American, poised to launch a military strike against Iraq if it failed to withdraw its forces by the U.N. 15 January deadline.

The Gulf crisis and its potential domestic impact overshadowed one of the year's main news stories: On 2 July, 1,426 pilgrims were asphyxiated or stampeded in a pedestrian tunnel during the *hajj* (annual pilgrimage) to Mecca. Saudi authorities attributed the disaster to a failed ventilator in the tunnel, which caused temperatures to soar and people to panic. The government's explanations, however, were believed to be suspect, and King Fahd's remark that the deaths were "God's will" struck many as high-handed. The tunnel capacity was 1,000, but as many as 50,000 may have been inside.

The tragedy strained relations with Saudi Arabia’s allies and exacerbated old enmities, especially with Iran, which objects to Saudi’s custodianship over Mecca. In 1987, Saudi police killed 400 mostly Iranian pilgrims in riots, and since then no Iranians have gone to the *hajj*. Saudi Arabia and Iran are rivals for Islamic leadership.

With the first airlift of American troops in August, the Saudis were concerned about how the presence of western troops would affect its conservative Islamic society. As the conflict wore on, the Saudi ruling family
became eager for decisive action against Iraq and nervous that a prolonged non-Muslim troop presence would spark popular resentment or have a westernizing impact on Saudi society. Saudi religious leaders reluctantly acknowledged and justified the presence of "Christian and atheist" soldiers.

Within the country itself there had not been a massive war mobilization, and Saudi leaders aimed to preserve the business-as-usual atmosphere in the face of the Iraqi threat. But as the crisis wore on, the Saudi leadership ordered the tightening of internal security and stepped up its civil-defense effort.

Saudis were shocked at the sight of exiled Kuwaiti women driving automobiles—driving is off limits to Saudi women—and American servicewomen performing traditionally male tasks. The foreign presence may have been responsible for emboldening Saudi women who embarked on a "drive out" in November to defy the Saudi rule against women driving. Leaflets passed out at mosques shortly afterward accused the women of undermining Saudi morality and exhibiting "American secularism." Many of the women received threatening phone calls, as their names, phone numbers and addresses were also printed and distributed. Saudi Arabia’s liberal minority hoped that the incident would encourage the Saudi leadership to put women’s rights on the agenda of the Saudi social contract.

The severely repressive Saudi regime has been opposed by the poor, students, intellectuals and forces in the military. The kingdom’s poor 400,000 Shiites have been the most serious source of opposition to the monarchy. Living mostly in the eastern oil-producing province, Shiites object to the regime on economic and political grounds, and view the royal family rule as corrupt and un-Islamic, even as the regime premises its own legitimacy on its strict interpretation of Islam. Incidents of dissent have been sporadic since 1979, the year of the Iranian revolution and the year when fundamentalist Shiites seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Saudi citizens do not enjoy the right to choose or change their government, and cannot participate in politics. The royal family, led by King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdalah, rules the country almost exclusively. In November, King Fahd promised to establish consultative councils (shuras) on the central and provincial level, yet the councils would have little power. There are no elections, no written constitution, no political parties, and no public demonstrations. A formal system of consultation exists, whereby government officials, including the King, hold outdoor meetings to help settle grievances brought by citizens.

Public criticism of Islam or the Saudi regime is not tolerated. There is a private press, but it follows 1982 government press guidelines. The regime may dismiss newspaper editors. All foreign printed matter believed to be unfavorable is censored or simply turned away. Television and radio are government owned and operated. Freedom of thought and artistic expression is severely limited; the study of Freud, Marx, philosophy and music, for example, is forbidden. Nonpolitical organizations may form with government permission, but education and cultural institutions are strictly regulated by the government. Professional groups are discouraged from maintaining contact with their international counterparts.

Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state. Non-Muslim religions are not recognized; converts from Islam to another religion may be sentenced to death; and all Saudi citizens must be Muslim. The majority of the population, including the ruling family, is Sunni Muslim. Shiite public processions during
the holy month of Muharram are usually prohibited, and celebrations are
restricted to certain areas. Saudi custody over the Grand Mosque and its
quotas for nationals for the annual pilgrimage irritate Iranian authorities.

Saudi Arabian law, based on shari’a, codified Islamic law, prescribes a
variety of punishments considered cruel, unusual or disproportionate by
international standards. For the crimes of murder, apostasy, adultery, and
narcotics smuggling the death penalty, usually by beheading or stoning, is
applied. Other penalties for lesser crimes include flogging and ampu-
tations.

According to various human rights monitors torture by the General
Directorate of Investigations (GDI) continues to be practiced in order to
extract confessions. The GDI regularly holds suspects incommunicado and
without charge for lengthy periods. According to Amnesty International,
Shiite fundamentalists have been tortured, held without charge or trial for
months and years. There is no habeas corpus in Saudi Arabia.

Beating and whipping of suspects are reportedly carried out by the
sometimes undisciplined religious police force who enforce Muslim precepts
regarding food, dress, and alcohol. The religious police may detain suspects
for up to twenty-four hours. The discretion of governmental authorities,
including the religious police, to search private residences is more limited,
however. The Saudi judiciary is generally regarded as independent in com-
mon civil and criminal trials. All trials, however, are closed and counsel is
permitted before but not during proceedings.

Discrimination in Saudi society is pervasive. Women may not marry non-
Saudi; they cannot travel alone or without the permission of a male relative;
they cannot drive a car or ride a bicycle; they must wear the black chador;
and they must study separately from men. Under Islamic law, widowed or
divorced women do not retain custody of children older than seven. Men
may divorce women by repudiation, but not vice-versa. Non-Saudi female
domestics have been subject to widespread sexual abuse by their patrons.
Royal family members occupy most important government posts and can
often evade legal regulations. Social mobility for Shiites is limited. The large
number of expatriate workers, with some exceptions, cannot be accompanied
or easily visited by family.

Because of Yemen’s support for Iraq, Yemenis had their privileges of
owning shops and residing retracted. Over 100,000 of the 2 million Yemenis
living in Saudi Arabia reportedly left the country in October.

Labor unions and strikes are prohibited. Health and safety standards for
workers proved difficult to enforce.

**Senegal**

- **Polity:** Dominant party
- **Political Rights:** 4
- **Economy:** Mixed capitalist
- **Civil Liberties:** 3
- **Population:** 7,400,000
- **Status:** Partly Free
- **HDI:** 0.274 (low)
- **Life Expectancy:** 42 male, 45 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Wolof, Fulani, Serer, Tukulor, Diola, Malinke

**Overview:**

The leading Senegalese news stories of 1990 involved opposition complaints
about the electoral process, a separatist rebellion, and disputes with
Mauritania. The west African republic of Senegal, independent of France
since 1960, has one of the continent's liveliest multiparty systems and is firmly under civilian control. Leopold Senghor, the country's renowned poet and first president, led Senegal until his retirement in 1980. The broad-based Socialist Party (PS) that he established continues to dominate politics, with strong intra-party factionalism. Various officially recognized parties usually compete, though there have been strong protests against alleged electoral irregularities and domination of the political process by the PS. These parties include the liberal democratic Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), currently the leading opposition party; the once-banned African Independence Party (PAI); the center-right Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS); the once-banned National Democratic Rally (RND); and a host of leftist parties made legal in 1981 under Abdou Diouf, the current president and head of the PS. Presidential and legislative elections are held every five years. They have consistently given the PS large majorities, but these same elections have historically sparked opposition charges of fraud, episodes of unrest, and high voting abstention rates. This was particularly the case in the 1988 elections.

Despite new electoral laws passed in 1989, undemocratic electoral practices persist which fuel the charges of fraud. Examples of such practices include the lack of a national electoral commission to oversee elections and impartially process complaints, the lack of private polling booths and the requirement that voters provide identification at polling places, a voting age of twenty-one when the adult penal age is eighteen, and the frequency of repeat voting in certain rural areas. A committee of nine opposition parties decided to boycott the 27 November municipal elections as a response to perceived PS hegemony and the government's refusal to contemplate further electoral reforms.

Senegalese politics remained unsettled in 1990, as the opposition continued to challenge the validity of the 1988 elections. In February 1990, Abdoulaye Wade's return to Senegal after months abroad provided a stimulus for demonstrations. Wade, who had claimed to be the legitimate winner in presidential elections, called upon President Diouf to resign in favor of a transitional government that would hold new elections. However, new elections appear unlikely as the president reportedly feels that the opposition is trying to exploit the economic hardships and disaffection Senegalese are experiencing under an IMF-stabilization program for partisan advantage.

A separatist rebellion in the southern Casamance province greatly intensified in 1990. Armed attacks by the Casamance Democratic Forces Movement (MFDC) on units of the military and security forces have led in turn to a more high-profile counter-insurgency campaign by the government. Thousands of citizens from the region have reportedly fled to the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the face of military repression that has included torture, extrajudicial executions, beatings, and indefinite detentions. In August, forty suspected guerrillas were arrested along with their leader, a sixty-two-year-old Catholic priest, and charged with treason. The MFDC, thought now to number some 300, was formed in 1982 after a Christmas confrontation with police in which the Senegalese flag was burned.

Other groups are also believed to be involved in guerrilla activity, since many of the attacks this year have been against civilians, which is not characteristic of the MFDC. The MFDC itself is largely made up of members of the Diola tribe, which forms a majority in the region. The Diolas are mostly Catholic, although Catholics make up only five percent of the Senegalese population. The Diola are said to resent the dominance in national life of the northern Wolof elite, who are generally Muslim.
Senegalese officials have charged Mauritania with supporting the rebellion. Senegal and Mauritania have fought sporadic border skirmishes since April 1989 and Mauritania has expelled both native-born non-Moorish Mauritanians and resident Senegalese. Mauritania has demanded $1 billion in compensation from Senegal for last year's pogroms against Mauritanian merchants and their families resident in Senegal. The OAU's Commission of Mediation found itself unable to resolve the parties' differences in the face of pre-conditions that both countries place on the resumption of diplomatic relations and a settlement. Nonetheless, negotiations between Dakar and Nouakchott are allegedly being conducted under French auspices.

The Senegalese have a competitive, multi-party system, but they have never removed the dominant PS by democratic means. The PS and the opposition dispute the extent to which elections are fair. The press is diverse and free. In a trial that ended in January 1990, the manager of Sopi (Change), a PDS weekly, was sentenced to a year in prison for defamation, publishing "false" election figures, and discrediting national political institutions. Two other defendants received a three-month sentence and the fourth a six-month sentence. One of the defendants was later rearrested.

Radio and television, government-controlled, tend to favor the ruling PS in their coverage and underreport the opposition. Journalists have been occasionally arrested. Allegedly pornographic films displaying nudity are screened and regulated by a national commission for censorship. Though public demonstrations require public authorization, freedom of assembly is respected unless conditions of unrest prevail, as in the Casamance or with regard to the political opposition demands concerning new elections. Unionized workers, a small percentage of the work force, are politically important. Strikes in 1990 have been frequent. The largest labor organization, the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS), is considered to coordinate with government policy.

Criminal suspects have been reportedly abused by the police in the past and there have been confirmed reports of army torture and extrajudicial executions of suspected separatists in Casamance. Repression is growing in that region as the military authorities have apparently been given carte blanche by civilian authorities in Dakar to stamp out the insurgency as soon as possible. Arbitrary arrest or detention is prohibited by law. The judiciary is considered independent despite allegations of sensitivity to government pressure.

Senegalese have complete freedom of religion; Islamic law does not apply except by consent, and discrimination based on religion does not occur. Citizens are largely free to travel within and outside the country and are free to emigrate. Women are active politically but by and large they play traditional roles in the large rural sector.

Seychelles

**Polity:** One-party  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Population:** 100,000  
**HDI:** 0.817 (high)  
**Life Expectancy:** 66 male, 73 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Mixed Asian, Africa, European

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

- **Political Rights:** 6  
- **Civil Liberties:** 6  
- **Status:** Not Free
Overview:

While other African nations grappled with issues of greater democracy, this archipelago of some 115 islands situated in the Indian Ocean northeast of Madagascar, remained in 1990 a one-party state dominated by the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) led by President France Albert Rend. Installed after a 1977 coup, President Rend was last elected by popular suffrage in June 1989. The legislature consists of a twenty-five member unicameral National Assembly elected for a four-year term. Thirty-six SPPF-approved candidates ran in the 1987 elections.

In 1990, SPPF deputy general-secretary James Michel did on several occasions discuss the possibility of some structural reforms within the ruling party, but there is no political opposition to the SPPF. Expatriate businessmen in Victoria, the capital, reported increasingly heavy-handed state interference. Until recently, state control was limited to Seychellois-owned enterprises.

President Rend has promised that he will step down when his third presidential term expires in 1992 but may remain in politics as an "elder." The two left-wing rivals in the SPPF hoping to succeed him are Mr. Michel, who is the finance minister and chief of the armed forces, and Jacques Hodoul, who is tourism minister and the SPPF's secretary for "political education."

The lack of political freedom notwithstanding, the president has managed to provide good government services. There is free health care and education and a public housing program. There is little poverty, and imported food is subsidized by income from the sale of offshore fishing rights to Spanish and South Korean fleets. Income per head exceeds $2,000 a year. Tourism is a major industry, and the U.S. maintains a satellite tracking station on the islands. In 1989, nearly 90,000 visitors came to the islands. The government has sought to preserve the natural beauty of the islands by limiting tourists to no more than 100,000. In addition, with the help of the United Nations and the World Bank, the government has drawn up a $600 million environmental management plan which it hopes donor countries will finance. The World Bank and the U.N. are organizing a conference on behalf of the Seychelles in Paris in February 1991 where donors will be asked to make pledges.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The country is a one-party state in which citizens cannot change their government by democratic means. Civil and criminal cases are adjudicated expeditiously and fairly, but the executive has judicial powers in political and security cases. Under security provisions, persons can be detained indefinitely without charge or trial. The government-SPPF apparatus controls all media, and security laws discourage public criticism of the government or its policies. Nonpolitical groups can exist, but must be registered with the government. The rights of assembly and association are curtailed for political purposes. All fifteen-year-olds must go to camps of the National Youth Service for two years. These are supposed to promote civic virtues but they also teach President Rene's leftist ideology through "political education." Freedom of religion is respected for various faiths, and there are no restrictions on internal travel but some on travelers going abroad. The National Workers' Union (NWU) is the only union authorized by the government and is controlled by the state-party apparatus. Strikes are permitted by law, but other regulations inhibit workers from exercising that right.
Sierra Leone

Overview:

Located in central-west Africa, the Republic of Sierra Leone in 1990 experienced increased debate within government, academic and social circles about the need to introduce a multiparty system. The debate in the country, led by President Maj. Gen. Joseph Momoh who is also secretary-general of the sole legal party, the All People's Congress (APC), came amid increased reports of voter-registration irregularities for the 1991 elections to the 127-member unicameral House of Representatives.

The debate was openly launched in April after a lecturer was detained by authorities while collecting a petition favoring a multiparty system of government. The issue was taken up by the country's vocal independent press. The Senior Staff Association (SSA) of the University of Sierra Leone expressed great concern over the state of affairs in the country and noted that world political thinking was swinging towards an accommodation of views best facilitated through pluralism. The SSA called for the beginning of a serious dialogue with the purpose of reverting to a multiparty system before the general elections scheduled for 1991. Similar recommendations were made by the Sierra Leone Bar Association (SLBA).

The multiparty debate reflects growing dissatisfaction with the APC, which is rife with graft, violence and corruption, and the deteriorating state of the economy. The devaluation of the leone led to skyrocketing prices for rice and other staples, as well as fuel and transportation.

The government response to calls for greater pluralism fluctuated from lukewarm to hostile. The APC Governing Council rejected a multiparty system and in June ten high-level party stalwarts, including party affairs minister E.T. Kamara, began touring the country, vigorously campaigning for the retention of the one-party system. Earlier, Musa Gendemeh, the deputy agricultural minister, created a furor by telling the BBC that he "won't give up my present privileged position for the sake of a multiparty system nor would one expect a policeman or soldier to give up his one bag of rice at the end of every month for the same."

President Momoh made it clear that he opposed a multiparty system, noting that "multipartyism at this point of our social and economic development will only spell doom for us." However, the president conceded that "as an initial step...it is essential that some political reforms are carried out immediately."

Many bottlenecks in the electoral rules were abrogated and the president initiated moves to make the APC more responsive to public needs. He ordered the immediate scrapping of the law relating to the residency limitation placed on candidates seeking entry to parliament. The president also named a Constitutional Review Committee to overhaul the much-criticized 1978 constitution.

In other issues, the government launched a campaign to reform a bloated and inefficient civil service sector, leading to the retirement or dismissal of
several officials. A five-year ban on student unions was lifted. In May, teachers went on strike to protest poor working conditions. The National Teachers Resolution Committee, a breakaway group from the Sierra Leone Teachers’ Union (SLTU), led the strike, which claimed four lives in the capital of Freetown. The dispute led to the resignation of SLTU general secretary Emmanuel K. Fatoma. In October, truck drivers went on strike to protest gasoline shortages and rationing. On 16 October, 3,000 market women marched in the capital to support the drivers.

In 1990 Sierra Leone also absorbed the influx of some 20,000 refugees fleeing the civil war in neighboring Liberia. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) allocated emergency funds to the government for food and refugee camps.

Sierra Leone remains a one-party state in which citizens cannot change their government democratically. The judiciary is generally free from executive interference, and local chiefs administer customary law. Numerous independent newspapers and journals print diverse views, but are subject to government restrictions and harassment. In April, police in Freetown launched a wave of arrests and house searches of journalists after several local papers covered stories which allegedly embarrassed the government. On 29 March, the office of New Shaft editor, Franklin Bunting-Davies, was raided by police for "subversive documents." The editor was taken away for questioning and later released. An editor of the Chronicle was questioned over a story that alleged government money was misspent to host a German delegation, and a deputy editor, who was sentenced to a two-year term for contempt in December 1989, was amnestied in late summer. In August, Mr. Bunting-Davies praised the president’s efforts to reform the political system, and President Momoh assured journalists that freedom of the press would remain unfettered, but warned that journalists must practice "responsible" journalism devoid of sensationalism and dramatization.

Public meetings need government approval. The government did lift a ban on student unions. Freedom of religion is respected. There are some restrictions on domestic travel, but foreign travel is generally permitted. Trade unionism is an integral part of society, and workers have the right to strike and exercise it freely. Most unions belong to the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC). In May, a splinter group from the teachers union staged a strike demanding wages and better conditions.

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prosperity. In September 1988, the PAP captured sixty-two percent of the popular vote in an election contested by the largest number of opposition candidates in twenty-two years. There are some twenty officially registered parties, including the opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) and the Socialist Front (BS), but they are closely monitored by the government.

Lee was succeeded by First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, who stressed in a June address to parliament that his government would strive for "a more refined, more compassionate, kinder and gentler" society. Under Lee, the government frequently cracked down on human rights and religious activists and was viewed by critics as authoritarian. An active and powerful Internal Security Department (ISD) enforces the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial.

The major political issue in 1990 was the proposed establishment of a presidential system that would give the presidency, long a largely ceremonial post, far greater power. So sweeping were the proposed powers for the new office that opposition parties claimed that it would in effect lead to the end of the British-style parliamentary system.

Under a bill introduced in late August, the elected president would have extensive veto powers on budgets and borrowings, a role in security detentions and bannings, the right to demand any information available to the Cabinet, and the final say on appointments to key posts in most government departments, state-owned companies, statutory boards, the judiciary, the police and defense forces.

The bill, which was passed by parliament in early October, also gave Lee a technical escape from his 1988 campaign promise that he would not be Singapore's first elected president If current President Wee Kim Wee, who is not well, should resign before his term expires in 1993, an election must be held within six months, leaving the door open for Lee to run. Under the bill, anyone wishing to run for president must have held one of the top government offices or run a company with paid-up capital of at least $100 million for the same time. Prime Minister-designate Goh said that there was no chance for a public referendum on the issue, claiming that the last election result was effectively a plebiscite on the presidency issue.

The government also drafted legislation aimed at controlling proselytization and practice of religion in the country, thus extending legislative control over the last major organizations free to propagate ideas and determine their own internal affairs without government control.

Citizens nominally have the right to change their government democratically, but the Lee regime has used its extensive powers to inhibit the chances of any effective opposition. The ISA curtails basic legal rights, and constitutional amendments have eliminated any judicial review in ISA cases. In June, the government released Vincent Chen and Teo Soh Lung, the last of twenty-two young professionals and lay Catholic workers arrested in 1987 and charged with being Communist conspirators. The two had been detained without charge for two years. The constitution permits restrictions on free expression, and newspapers are published by concerns with close ties to the government Self-censorship is a common practice. Restrictions are frequently placed on foreign publications. A new press law proposed that any foreign publication selling more than 300 copies in Singapore that makes "any remarks, observations or comments, pertaining to the politics and current affairs of any country in Southeast Asia" will have to get a government
permit before it can circulate in Singapore. As a result of the law, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* announced on 16 October that it was halting its circulation in the country. TV and radio are government controlled. Assemblies of more than five people, including political rallies, need police permission, but the government did not interfere with several huge rallies during the 1988 elections. New laws place severe restrictions on religion. Labor unions cannot engage in acts determined to be a threat to national security and public order. There are some eighty trade unions, most affiliated with the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), which includes PAP activists. Workers have the right to strike, but strikes are rare.

Solomon Islands

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 300,000  
**HDI:** 0.349 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 66 combined  
**Ethnic groups:** Melanesian (93 percent), small Micronesian, Polynesian and European minorities

**Overview:**

The country, a former British protectorate comprising an archipelago of six large islands and many smaller ones east of New Guinea, gained full independence in July 1978. Although titular power is in the hands of a governor general representing the British crown, executive power is vested in a prime minister elected by a thirty-eight member unicameral Legislative Assembly from among its members, who are elected every four years. Parties in this multiparty system include the Solomon Island Unity Party (Siupa), My Land (SAS), People's Alliance Party (PAP), and the Solomon Islands Liberal Party (SILP).

On 22 February 1989 the PAP won twenty-one parliamentary seats, the first absolute majority by a single party since independence. Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, whose government ratified the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, replaced Ezekiel Aleuba of the Siupa. The Opposition Coalition is led by Andrew Nori.

In 1990, the government announced plans to introduce constitutional reforms to gradually turn the Solomon Islands into federalism. The opposition expressed fear that highly autonomous states under a federal system in this culturally and ethnically diverse state would lead to people identifying themselves more with their individual island groups or states rather than with the nation.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Elections are freely contested in a vibrant multiparty system. The judicial system, is based on the British model and is free from government interference. There are two private weekly newspapers, and several government publications. The state-owned radio airs views of opposition political figures. Although demonstrations need a permit, the right of association is included in the Constitution and there are no instances where permits have been denied on political grounds. There are no restrictions on the practice of religion, and citizens are free to move inside and outside of the country. Unions are active in both the private and public sector, but only the former are allowed to strike, a right they exercise.
Somalia

Overview:

Faced with growing international condemnation and a widening internal opposition bent on his overthrow, Somalia’s autocratic President Mohamed Siad Barre held out in early 1990 the promise of political reform and reconciliation. Few Somalis or other observers are confident those promises will be fulfilled.

The president, now in his eighties, ran unopposed for the presidency in 1986 and was elected to a seven-year term. He was initially popular when he came to power in a bloodless coup in 1969, but his rule has devolved into a repressive and dynastic form of crypto-Marxism that alienated majority clans and fueled several insurgencies. Today, the authority of the government is said not to extend much beyond the capital of Mogadishu. Low army morale and defection continue to be major problems. Fearful of being overthrown, Siad Barre has blocked all news of the fall of his close military supplier, Romania’s Nicolai Ceaucescu.

Siad Barre’s own highly favored clan, Marehan, constitutes about 10 to 15 percent of the Somali people. Siad Barre’s son, Masleh Mohammed Siad Barre, heads the armed forces, although he is ten years younger than most senior military officers. His half-brother serves as foreign minister, and his son-in-law was the interior minister. The president’s wife, Khadija, is influential. Siad Barre dismissed all cabinet ministers in January 1990, largely for show, but he was unable at the time to appoint a prime minister from another clan. In the fall, he dismissed the eight-month old government and replaced the prime minister with an Issak, apparently hoping to somewhat mollify the insurgent Issaks with the appointment.

In the fall of 1989 Barre announced the creation of a semi-independent commission charged with drafting a revised constitution and held out the prospect of multiparty elections. By early 1990, without the benefit of any public discussion or consultation, the commission recommended revisions allowing for a multiparty system and economic liberalization. At present, all candidates for the People’s Assembly are of the government party, consistent with its status as the sole legal party. A proposed draft of the constitution was approved by the Council of Ministers and then went before the People’s Assembly, where it also was approved. The government has moved to repeal all statutes incompatible with the proposed permanent constitution.

Legislative elections were scheduled for 1 February 1991, to be preceded by a referendum initially scheduled for the end of October to determine whether the majority of Somalis in fact supported clauses providing for multiparty elections, improved protection for human rights, and the other provisions of the proposed constitution. However, the insurgents were not inclined to cooperate in carrying out such an election in the regions under their control, but preferred to work toward the current regime’s overthrow.

The constitutional referendum and the planned legislative elections were subsequently postponed by the government until the time a ceasefire might be reached between it and the insurgent movements. In the meantime, the
propose constitution was put into effect on an interim basis pending its approval in the proposed referendum.

In May 1990, in an unusually risky act, 115 prominent Somalis signed a manifesto calling for Siad Barre’s resignation and free multiparty elections. In addition, the document demanded an end to human rights abuses, corruption, and economic mismanagement. Almost half of these people were arrested on charges of treason and sedition but, in a surprise move, soon released.

Three rebel movements are currently operating against the Barre regime, all clan-based. Operating in the north is the Somali National Movement (SNM), composed mainly of Issaks, which formed in 1981 but intensified its efforts in 1988. Operating in the south since 1989 is the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), largely composed of Ogadenis. The United Somali Congress (USC), also formed in 1989, finds support among the Hawayi clan. Divisions and a leadership struggle within the USC have also been reported. All three groups appear to be united only in their opposition to Siad Barre’s rule.

By early December, there were reports that the situation in the capital had turned virtually anarchic, with law enforcement officials unable to maintain control over a situation that saw rebel groups on the outskirts of the city and sporadic gunfire within due to the breakdown of law and order. The U.N. ordered its personnel to leave the country after a U.N. official was shot, and American nonessential personnel and dependents were advised to leave by U.S. authorities.

Somalis are not able to change their government by democratic means, Criticism or dissent is not tolerated in Somalia, and groups independent of the government or government participation are not allowed to organize. Membership in an opposition group may be punished by death. Since fighting broke out in 1988 between the government and the northern Somali National Movement, approximately 12,000 Somali civilians have been killed by security forces and over 25,000 have been killed in government shelling and strafing. The military police carry on reprisals for guerrilla actions by rounding up noncombatants at random and executing them extrajudicially in public. The notorious National Security Service, responsible for the deaths of many, has recently been abolished, but there are other security agencies that can perform the same repressive functions.

In 1990, dozens of Issaks in Mogadishu were detained incommunicado. Torture of those detained by the authorities is apparently common. Relatives of exiles are in danger of deadly reprisal from the government. It is estimated that over 400,000 Somalis have gone abroad in order to flee persecution or the fighting and another 400,000 have been internally displaced.

Those demonstrators, opponents, and even suspected guerrilla sympathizers who escape extra-judicial execution prior or subsequent to arrest may be held in prison indefinitely without charge or trial. Until mid-October, such trials were before a national security court founded to deal with ”subversion.” The law which established the national security court has been repealed and all cases before it have been transferred to the ordinary courts. However, the ordinary judiciary lacks independence from executive manipulation and has been used to condemn to death or to periods of long imprisonment those who have been accused of even nonviolent organizing or participating in public manifestations of government opposition. There is no right of appeal upon conviction. Moreover, although the government has announced that all political prisoners would be released, and did release some detainees who
had not been formally charged with any crime, it refused to characterize those remaining in custody as political prisoners.

The SNM has been accused of killing refugees from Ethiopia's Ogaden region, populated by ethnic Somalis.

Non-Islamic groups may practice their religion; but may not proselytize. The government controls and owns all media; material inconsistent with the governmental position is censored. Foreign publications are severely restricted from circulating. Independent unions are not permitted, nor are strikes, which are legally punishable by death. Issaks in particular face growing social and economic discrimination.

In 1990, the South African government continued its policy of dismantling apartheid and negotiating with the black opposition to build a nonracial society. The National Party government of President F.W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), imprisoned for twenty-eight years; unbanned the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and other anti-apartheid groups; launched power-sharing talks as part of a constitutional reform process; abolished some "petty apartheid" segregation laws; opened the National Party to black members; and promised to dissolve the so-called tribal homelands by 1991.

The year also saw an escalation of black-on-black violence. Initially, the conflict was limited to Natal and pitted supporters of the ANC and the umbrella United Democratic Front (UDF) against the Zulu-based Inkatha movement led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. By mid-year, the violence had spread to townships around the country and had taken on a tribal dimension, with Zulus, the largest black tribe, battling with Xhosas. Black-on-black violence had led to over 5,000 dead in the last four years. The ANC alleged that the South African Police and security forces were abetting Inkatha, a charge the government denied. Extremist white Afrikaners, angered by what they saw as the government's capitulation to the ANC, were involved in scores of bombings and other violence against blacks.

Early in 1990, the ANC appeared split on how to respond to the government's new flexibility. It also faced the prospect of reduced funding from the USSR and Eastern Europe, where Marxist-Leninst regimes toppled in 1989. Older ANC leaders allowed to return from exile were confronted by younger, more radical members who rejected any accommodation with Pretoria.

The February release of Mandela held out hope for mediation between ANC factions and a constructive dialogue with the government. Soon after his release, Mandela reiterated the ANC's position that a precondition for any concessions included the lifting of the state of emergency and an amnesty for all politically motivated crimes. He also sought to appease militant ANC
factions by not renouncing armed struggle and calling for continued eco-
nomic sanctions. He insisted further, that democratic elections based on one-
man-one vote be held for delegates who would draft a constitution, a position
rejected by the government.

In March, thousands of exiled ANC and Communist leaders returned to
South Africa. The ANC elected Mandela deputy leader, in deference to ailing
exiled ANC President Oliver Tambo. Meanwhile, the black nationalist Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC), which opposed talks with the government,
rejected Mandela's call to join in future power-sharing negotiations with
Pretoria. In the middle of the month, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker
met Mandela, and urged him to abandon his commitment to nationalize the
country's mines and major industries. He also announced that the U.S. would
funnel aid to the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups.

Mandela's control over ANC factions in the townships came into ques-
tion, as renewed waves of violence in black areas claimed more lives. The
violence was mainly between young ANC and UDF activists, known as
"comrades," and members of Inkatha, which, though against apartheid,
supports ethnically based local governments and a national parliament, and
opposes nationalization. Police violence left several anti-apartheid protesters
dead. In response, Mandela canceled the first round of formal talks between
the government and the ANC scheduled for 11 April. President de Klerk said
he was sending additional troops to Natal to curb the violence, and agreed to
appoint a judicial commission to investigate the killings by police.

The talks between the ANC delegation, which included the SACP, and
the government began on 1 May, with Mandela assuring whites that they had
little to fear from the ANC. The government continued to insist that the
ANC and its military wing, Spear of the Nation, renounce the use of vio-
ence. After the first round of talks, Mandela urged the government to
abandon its insistence on guarantees for the country's white minority. The
government continued to maintain that guarantees had to be built into any
new constitution to insure that whites would not be dominated by blacks.

At the end of May, in a significant retreat from apartheid, the government
announced that it was opening South Africa's segregated public hospitals to
all races and said it was ready to consider alternatives to the racially segre-
gated municipalities, acknowledging that black local authorities in the black
townships had lost credibility.

In June, the government also faced its first electoral test since the 1989
elections. In a by-election near Durban, voters returned the National Party
candidate by a slim margin over a Conservative opponent opposed to
President de Klerk's reforms. In November, in a by-election in Randburg, a
white suburb of Johannesburg, the National Party obliterated a right-wing
challenge and won a parliamentary seat that had been surrendered by the
liberal Democratic Party.

In June, President de Klerk announced that national state-of-emergency
regulations in effect for three years would be lifted in all but one of South
Africa's four provinces: Transvaal, Cape Province and the Orange Free State.
The decree remained in force in Natal, where factional fighting continued to
intensify. Parliament voted overwhelmingly to scrap the Separate Amenities
Act, which had been in force since 1953. The president also promised that in
1991 he would introduce legislation to repeal the Group Areas Act, which
segregates neighborhoods by race, and the Land Acts, which reserves most
property for whites. In response to the government's actions, two right-wing
groups, the Boer Resistance Movement and the Boer State Party, signed a cooperation agreement. Resistance to the government’s decision continued throughout the year, and in November twelve white vigilantes were arrested in connection with an attack on several hundred black children who were holding a picnic in a newly desegregated park.

The president urged Mandela to exclude the leader of the SACP, Joseph Slovo, from negotiations on the country’s future. Mandela appeared to distance himself from the SACP, saying that the ANC is not a Communist party and had no mandate “to espouse Marxist ideology.”

On 7 August after a marathon fifteen-hour negotiating session with the government, the ANC announced that it had ordered an immediate suspension of the guerrilla campaign begun three decades earlier. The concession opened the way for continued negotiations. The ANC declared that it would keep up its pressure on the government by protest marches, civil disobedience and boycotts.

At the end of August the ANC and Inkatha discussed the possibility of high-level talks to end the violence, which continued into September. Prospects for reconciliation between the ANC and Inkatha faded in the first week of October when Buthelezi announced he would not attend a meeting of black homeland leaders at Mandela’s house in Soweto. On 18 October, President de Klerk met a key ANC demand by lifting the four-year-old state of emergency in Natal. Several days later, Mandela announced that he would meet Buthelezi on equal terms, enhancing the chief’s claim to take part as a full partner, along with the ANC, in constitutional talks with the government. New factional fighting broke out at the end of the month.

In November, leaders representing most of the spectrum of black politics in South Africa met under the auspices of Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu to try to promote mutual tolerance and end factional strife. However, Buthelezi refused to attend, claiming that the ANC was not serious about making peace with Inkatha. In early December, factional fighting resumed with renewed ferocity, forcing the police to impose new curfews in four black townships near Johannesburg.

On 16 December, the ANC, winding down its first legal conference in more than thirty years, warned that it would consider suspending talks with the government unless the government released all political prisoners, allowed the return of all exiles, ended political trials and repealed repressive security laws by 30 April 1991. The ANC vowed to press civil disobedience protests, although there were signs that it was having trouble registering new members and making the transition from a liberation movement to a political party.

While negotiations bogged down, the government continued to seek a framework for a new constitution. Under the current system, the government consists of a president and a tricameral parliament comprising a 178-member House of Assembly (White), a 85-member House of Representatives (Colored) and a 45 member House of Delegates (Indian). Each chamber is empowered to legislate in regard to its "own" affairs, while the assent of all is needed in "general" affairs. Under the system, blacks are excluded from national politics. On a local level, the four provinces are administered by a provincial administrator in conjunction with eight multi-racial regional service councils. The homelands are nominally governed by an executive council headed by a chief minister designated by the Legislative Assembly.

In October, the government indicated that it was preparing a constitutional plan similar to the U.S. Constitution. The constitution would also scrap black
tribal homelands. Devolution of central government power to strong, autonomous regions would form an integral part of the new system. The disposition of the four nominally "independent" homelands—Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana—would be determined through negotiations. The government said final proposals would be submitted at negotiations in early 1991.

In other issues, the government announced the creation of a superfund of $900 million to overcome historic disadvantages suffered by blacks under apartheid. The government also increased spending on health, black education, housing and pensions, while slashing the military budget. Nevertheless, black social problems continued to mushroom and huge black-white inequalities remained. There were 7 million squatters in South Africa, and shanty towns continued to spring up around the country's large cities, despite periodic government campaigns to bulldoze them. White schools got four times as much funding as black schools, and inequalities existed in health care, housing, salaries, pensions and other areas.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Only the minority white South Africans have the power to democratically change the system of government. In 1990, the government legalized the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups, and began negotiations aimed at drafting a new constitution and power-sharing for a future, nonracial society. Even with the lifting of the state of emergency, the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1982 allows the police to detain suspects for an indefinite time without formal charge. On 10 October, the government released twenty-one political prisoners, and on 2 November the government adopted an agreement reached with the ANC on a phased release of political prisoners and the return of political exiles. But as of 21 November, 247 people were still being detained in South Africa and its ethnic homelands.

In February, the defense minister told parliament that he had ordered the suspension of all activities by the covert Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), a military unit reported to have assassinated opponents of apartheid. A government commission of inquiry was established and the CCB was disbanded. In November, after a six-month investigation, the commission said it could not prove that the CCB had systematically murdered and terrorized anti-apartheid activists. The report was labelled a cover-up by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the ANC. The government implemented measures to reform the police force, including a directive prohibiting police membership in political parties after signs that far-right groups like the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) had infiltrated the police. The government's instructions that police focus on fighting crime rather than on anti-apartheid actions led many white policemen to resign. Several white vigilantes were arrested for attacks against blacks. The ANC and its allies accused police and security forces of aiding the Zulu-based Inkatha movement in black-on-black fighting, and there was independent confirmation to substantiate the charges in some cases. The judiciary is independent of the executive, and most civil and criminal cases are handled fairly.

While some restrictive laws on the press remained in force, the government's unbanning of the ANC provided the media with an opportunity to report extensively on the activities of the black opposition. Yet 350 persons remained "restricted" under the ISA and could not be quoted. With the lifting of the state of emergency, direct censorship ended, as did regulations restricting reporting of clashes between security forces and black protesters. However, new "unrest regulations" gave police powers to bar
reporters from covering unrest, and some journalists were arrested. In July, a bomb exploded at offices of an Afrikaans-language newspaper that reported the existence of a right-wing plot to kill President de Klerk. Black journalists working for the dozens of independent black publications faced severe intimidation by militants from the ANC and Inkatha. In December, South Africa granted an independent television company permission to broadcast news, ending a fifteen-year monopoly of the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation.

The government has recognized the right of peaceful protest, but restrictions on assembly were periodically imposed in the form of curfews in several violence-plagued black townships. Freedom of religion is generally respected, and black churches and their leaders play an important role in apartheid activities.

The government still controls the movement of blacks and other non-whites. The scrapping of the Separate Amenities Act allowed blacks access to previously segregated public facilities, parks and beaches. But the Group Areas Act is still in force, designating areas of residence for the races. The Lands Act, which grants whites most property, is still in effect. Although the government has promised to abolish the tribal homelands, blacks were still encouraged to live there in 1990. Residence in segregated urban townships is restricted. Foreign travel for whites is generally unrestricted, but blacks, particularly from the "homelands," face legal constraints.

Legalized in 1979, black trade unions play an increasingly important role in political, social and economic life. A three-month strike by the South African Railway and Harbor Workers Union (SARWHU), at time marred by violence and deaths, ended when the South African Transport Services (SATS) agreed to recognize the union and bargain in good faith. The two main black labor federations are the pro-ANC COSATU and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). In August, the police raided COSATU headquarters in Johannesburg and arrested several senior leaders after union members reportedly abducted a black undercover agent. The leaders were released on bail. Other labor actions included a strike by 5,000 members of the powerful National Union of Mineworkers. In September, the government accepted recommendations involving big changes in the labor laws in an attempt to improve industrial relations.

Spain

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 39,400,000

**HDI:** 0.965 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 71 male, 78 female

**Ethnic groups:** Spanish (various regional cultures) and Basques

**Overview:**

Allegations of government corruption tarnished the image of Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in 1990. The most serious charge involved Juan Guerra, a representative of the central government in Seville, who is also the brother of Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra. The Seville functionary allegedly became a millionaire by peddling his influence as an intermediary for government contractors and other favor-seekers. Gonzalez stood by his deputy, and threatened to resign if Alfonso Guerra were forced out by his brother's problems.
Nationally, the Socialists have been in power since 1982, having won re-election in 1986 and 1989. In the general election on 29 October 1989, the Socialists won 176 of the 350 seats in the lower house of parliament, just enough for an absolute majority. The Communist-led United Left won 17 seats, a gain of 10, while the right-wing Popular Party garnered 106 seats, a gain of one. The balance of the lower house is held by various centrist, regional, and nationalist parties. The government has a four-year mandate. The less powerful upper house, the Senate, has 208 directly elected members who serve for four-year terms. Each province sends four members. Outlying territories send from one to three members each.

Unemployment stood at about 15 percent in 1990, but African and Latin American immigrants were taking many menial jobs which Spaniards would refuse. Spanish-speaking Latin Americans can blend in easily in Spain, and several have stayed illegally. Illegal aliens demonstrated for amnesty in 1990, and many claimed that they were victims of racial discrimination. The labor movement has grown increasingly dissatisfied with the government since 1989, due to the uneven distribution of the benefits of economic growth and modernization. Because of worker discontent the General Union of Workers (UGT), the long-time partner of the Socialists, made no endorsement in the 1989 election.

Spanish voters have the right to change their government democratically. Under democratic rule since 1977, Spain has switched from governments of the center-right to the center-left. King Juan Carlos, the largely ceremonial head of state, used his personal prestige to support the transition from Francisco Franco’s right-wing dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s and to fend off attempted military coups.

Regional cultures have significant autonomy, but Basque separatist terrorism remained a problem in 1990. Basque prisoners have charged the government with mistreatment. In 1989, the government stopped their medical treatment by nonprison doctors and banned prisoner education courses by Basque teachers.

The government announced plans for financial compensation to political prisoners from the Franco era, but the aging anti-fascists complained in 1990 that the proposed amount was not enough.

The printed media are free and competitive, but the opposition has charged that state television has a progovernment bias. There are two competing labor federations, one traditionally Socialist, the other Communist. They co-operated in a general strike in 1988. Enterprise is increasingly free and modern as Spain becomes more closely linked with the more advanced countries of the European Community.

Religion is free under the 1978 constitution. Roman Catholicism is the majority faith, but there is no state religion. In a major break with the Spanish past, the government signed an accord in 1990 which put Protestantism and Judaism on par with Roman Catholicism. The agreement recognizes the legitimacy of Protestant and Jewish weddings, allows for Jewish and Protestant religious education in the schools, and mandates the armed forces to respect the rights of these minority faiths to observe their holy days. The Roman Catholic Church still benefits from contributions designated on tax returns, but Jewish and Protestant institutions do not have this financial assistance. However, as the government’s liberal proposals on abortion indicate, the influence of Catholicism on the state has declined sharply since Franco’s death.
In 1990, this small, island nation off the southern tip of India continued to be torn by internecine civil and sectarian violence as Tamil (Hindu) separatists ended a thirteen-month ceasefire in June with a series of bloody attacks against government forces and civilians. Another front threatened to open early in the year, as violence mounted between Tamils and Muslims in the ethnically mixed eastern part of Sri Lanka that had been provisionally merged with the Tamil-dominated northern province into a single administrative unit.

The start of 1990 held some promise for an end to a civil war launched in the northern and eastern provinces in 1983 by the separatist Hindu Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The government of Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa of the Socialist United National Party (UNP), elected in December 1988, had been negotiating with the LTTE since May 1989. The government had also managed to effectively suppress the anti-Tamil and anti-government Janatha Vimukhtiki Peramuna (JVP), a radical group of Sinhalese (Buddhist) nationalists. The latter had waged a bloody terrorist campaign in the south after the Sri Lanka-India peace accord of 1987 allowed 80,000 Indian troops to act as a peacekeeping force (IPKF). India had agreed to withdraw the IPKF, which had been implicated in massacring Tamil civilians and had lost some 1,200 men in battles against the separatists. The Indian-supported Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)—which had dominated the provincial council in the temporarily merged northern and eastern provinces—all but disintegrated, along with its military wing, the Tamil National Army (TNA).

With the departure of remaining Indian forces in March, the LTTE began consolidating control of the vacated eastern and northern provinces and established a political wing—the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT)—to prepare for the formal takeover of the northeastern province following anticipated provincial council elections. It had boycotted the 1989 council elections. On 1 March, the EPRLF-controlled council voted to change the name to the National Assembly of the Eelam Democratic Republic and announced that the decision was a unilateral first step toward independence, but with the final removal of the IPKF at the end of the month, many of the council members, fearing LTTE retaliation, fled on Indian troop ships and the council ceased to function.

In June, the government enacted “urgent legislation” to dissolve the provincial council in the northeast and hold fresh elections as a step toward limited Tamil autonomy, and it appeared that thirteen months of talks with the LTTE might bring a political resolution of the seventeen-year conflict. But on 11 June, Tamil rebels unexpectedly broke the ceasefire, kidnapped 600 officers after overrunning ten police stations in the east, and then reportedly executed over 100 men. In the first three days of fighting, 140
people were reportedly killed in the north and the east. The Tamil offensive came as a surprise, but some officials attributed the new fighting to government foot-dragging on implementing the dissolution of the council and its reluctance to allow for a wholly independent Tamil state.

By the end of June, about 1,000 people had been killed in the fighting, and the government declared that it was launching an all-out war to crush the LTTE guerrillas. More than 70,000 people had fled the fighting, which escalated in July. The violence took on broader significance in August when Tamil gunmen rampaged through five fishing villages killing Muslims in the street with machine-gun fire and machetes.

The Muslims, who are descendants of Arab traders, make up about 35 percent of the 1.2 million population in the east, but do not favor an independent Tamil state. Traditionally they made up a nonpolitical, prosperous business community and had not been involved in Sri Lanka’s ethnic politics. Muslims and Tamils had always lived side-by-side in the eastern parts of the island. The fighting seemed to foreshadow greater Muslim militancy, as some leaders called for a "holy war" against the Hindu Tamils.

By year’s end, there appeared to be no solution on the horizon. The new fighting inflicted a sudden jolt to the Sri Lankan economy, which had been slowly recovering from years of war. The return of tourists, growth in the textile industry and a welcome rise in international tea prices had given the economy a boost. Inquiries from abroad about investment opportunities had been on the increase before fighting broke out in June.

Despite ongoing violence, citizens of Sri Lanka have the power to change their government through democratic means. In 1990, political killings, assassinations, disappearances and renewed violence continued to be a fact of life. In September, Amnesty International charged Sri Lankan security forces with "widespread murder" of civilians in the northeastern war zone. Shadowy death squads answer to senior politicians. Sri Lankan security services employed terror, particularly the elite Special Task Force (STF). Under the state of emergency, citizens rights against arbitrary arrest and detention and freedom of assembly have been seriously curtailed. The government issued a shoot-on-sight order to police in the south in response to fears of a renewal of subversive activity by the JVP. The government controls radio, television and the largest newspaper chain, and has refused to carry politically sensitive advertisements. Curb are put on the independent press. In February, Richard Zoysa, a radio and television journalist who also wrote on human rights for the foreign press, was kidnapped and murdered, by what his family charged were members of the security forces. The distribution of "anti-government" literature is forbidden. Buddhism is the state religion, but the government is pledged to protect the rights of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. In 1990, there was increased violence against Muslims in Tamil-held areas. Travel inside and outside the country is unrestricted, except in the embattled northern and eastern provinces. Workers are free to join trade unions, though the government reserves the right to ban strikes in what it considers "essential" enterprises.
Overview:

Sudan is embroiled in a civil war between the predominant and Arabic Muslim north and a Christian and animist south. A rebel movement in the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Col. John Garang, has been fighting since 1983 to establish greater autonomy and abolish the application of shari'a, or Islamic law, to non-Muslims and Muslims alike. A separatist insurgency previously operated in the south from 1956 to 1972. Non-Muslims in particular object to shari'a-prescribed punishments, including stoning to death for adultery, flogging for consuming alcohol, and amputation for theft. Although suspended in 1985 by the previous democratic regime, the shari'a laws remain on the books, and Islamic law is the primary source of legislation as noted in the constitution.

General Jaafar Numeiri was deposed in 1985 by a military coup, and a year later army-organized elections brought the country to civilian rule under Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party. In February 1989, the military issued a letter to the prime minister demanding that peace talks with the rebels be held or, alternatively, that the army receive greater support in its prosecution of the war. After the military's ultimatum, Sadiq tentatively accepted the peace framework and began negotiations with the SPLA. However, in an atmosphere of growing governmental corruption and inefficiency as well as economic breakdown, a junta headed by Brig. General Omar el Bashir overthrew Sadiq on 30 June 1989. Sadiq and scores of other civilian officials were arrested on corruption charges, and several human rights activists were detained without charge. The three-year return to democracy in Sudan was over.

Since coming to power, Bashir has suspended the Constitution, dissolved parliament, banned all political parties, trade unions, and professional associations, closed down all newspapers except the Army's and certain selective publications controlled by Muslim fundamentalists and periodically declared curfews under a continuous state of emergency which gives the regime extraordinary powers to stifle dissent. Bashir has asserted that the cause of the 1989 coup was the increasing movement by the Sadiq government toward the "slaughter of the shari'a and destruction of "Sudan's Arab, Islamic cultural identity" to appease the SPLA.

The military junta has cracked down several times in 1990 under what is widely suspected as a pretense of foiling coup plots, and its links to the National Islamic Front (NIF), a Muslim fundamentalist party espousing the imposition of Islamic law for the whole country, became transparent. Nine members of the formally governing Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) are affiliated with the NIF, and Bashir, who serves as council chairman and prime minister, is also believed to be a secret NIF member. The RCC's security committee has purged the army and civil service of most non-fundamentalist Muslims and non-Muslims to install NIF loyalists, accusing nonloyalists of being Communists.

In March in Cairo, representatives of labor unions, professional associa-
tions, and banned political parties in a "National Democratic Alliance" met to plan future strategies of opposition. SPLA agreed there to join in a common effort to create a new regime and constitution providing for a secular, democratic, and nondiscriminatory Sudan.

Approximately 400 well-known political dissidents are in jail, but it is believed that there are perhaps several times that number in unknown detention centers. Under the current state of emergency, arrest without a warrant as well as indefinite detention without charge or trial are permissible. There is no habeas corpus, and defendants at politically motivated trials are typically denied legal representation. Special revolutionary courts bring death sentences against those who have engaged in strikes, currency violations, black-marketing, and those charged with incitement to opposition against the regime. No appeal of a death sentence is allowed. Bashir and his associates in power are trying to transform the secular court system into an Islamic judiciary which will enforce the shari'a in conformity with an 1989 government proclamation. A former Supreme Court justice was arrested on the first anniversary of the coup. The former prime minister and his deputy remain under house arrest, and it is reported that Sadiq has been denied adequate medical attention.

Sudan's civil war, now running since 1983, pits the government armed forces and semi-official tribal militias of the Arab north and certain African tribes against the SPLA, which draws the bulk of its support from the Christian and animist South. The conflict resumed in December 1989 after a lull and two sets of fruitless peace talks earlier in August and November. In March 1990, the SPLA shelled the government-controlled southern city of Juba, killing numerous civilians. Although civilians had sought to flee the city after having been warned by the SPLA, the government held them back as a shield against a manned SPLA attack by planting mines around the city and executing males who tried to flee. Meanwhile, government planes have indiscriminately bombed sites in SPLA-held towns.

The military government, like preceding regimes, has taken advantage of traditional rivalries between Arab and non-Arab tribes by "deputizing" Arab raiding parties as "popular defense forces." The raiders continue to descend on villages suspected of being sympathetic to the SPLA, massacring the inhabitants and driving the survivors into the wild. The guerrilla movement's potential grassroots support is thus extirpated while militia members gain booty and slaves. Meanwhile, there have been murderous SPLA attacks on Southern Sudanese tribespeople not in sympathy with their movement, as well as detention, torture and execution of dissident SPLA members. Captured government troops have been summarily executed after they surrendered. The SPLA has been reported to confiscate relief aid destined for famine-striken civilians.

International relief agencies have called attention to an advancing drought which may result in the death of up to one million people, the third famine in six years in the Sudan. Both sides in the conflict have occasionally shot down relief planes carrying donations of food and medicine. More recently, the government demanded that 85 percent of the relief supplies go to government-held areas even though those at greatest risk of famine are in SPLA territory. Most famine victims have been driven off their lands in fear of SPLA or government attacks on civilian targets.

Another little-noted war has intensified in the vast west-central region of Darfur, where Arab militia encouraged by the government and by Libya have
staged raids against the Fur, farmers who make up the bulk of the population in the area. It seems clear that Sudan and Libya, who have signed off on a variety of integration measures, are attempting to Arabize the region.

Khartoum’s foreign policy has been recently characterized by close relations with Libya and Iraq. Most Western nations and traditionally generous Arab states had cut off economic and military assistance to Sudan by the end of 1990. Former sources of oil no longer are accessible as a consequence of the Sudanese government’s publicly expressed solidarity with the Iraqi regime during the Gulf crisis.

The Sudanese do not have the power to change their government by democratic means. The military government has curtailed political parties by force. Both the SPLA and the government have interfered with food shipments to the south by relief agencies, and both have been accused of killing noncombatant civilians. Government-supported tribal militias in particular have been implicated in various massacres. Officials responsible for grave human rights abuses continue to go unpunished by Sudanese authorities. Police and military torture of detainees is also frequently reported, as are abuses by a recently formed Islamic security agency. Under the state of emergency law, officials may detain individuals suspected as rebel collaborators or sympathizers or merely for investigation as subversives, and may do so without charge and indefinitely. Detainees are not allowed to judicially challenge the legal grounds for their detention, and may be held incommunicado. Some prominent detainees have been freed, particularly after international campaigns pressing for their release. Since the June 1989 coup, all press freedoms have been curbed. State-owned television and radio report favorably about the government and dismiss foreign press reports of abuse.

Trade union activists have been detained by authorities and those who call for strikes in response to government policies are subject to a sentence of death. Demonstrating strikers have been fired upon and killed by security forces. Reports indicate that slavery is practiced in parts of Sudan. Though Christianity is recognized as a religion, prejudice against Christians is strong, and some physical assaults upon churches and worshippers have been reported. The civil war has displaced over 2 million persons, most now crowded in shantytowns in the area around Khartoum along with refugees from Ethiopia, Chad, and Uganda. An exit visa requirement severely curtails the right to leave the country, and the mobility of aid workers within the country is constrained by internal travel permits difficult to acquire.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

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**Suriname**

**Polity:** Military
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist
**Population:** 400,000
**HDI:** 0.788 (medium)
**Life Expectancy:** 66 male, 71 female
**Ethnic groups:** East Indian (approximately 40 percent), Creole (approximately 30 percent), followed by Javanese, Bush Negroes, Amerindians, Chinese and various European minorities

**Political Rights:** 4
**Civil Liberties:** 3
**Status:** Partly Free
At the end of 1990, in a bloodless Christmas Eve coup, the military toppled President Ramsewak Shankar and his three-year-old democratically elected government. Five days later, an interim government was installed, the military stating that new elections would be organized within 100 days.

The Republic of Suriname achieved independence from the Netherlands in 1975 and functioned as a parliamentary democracy until a military coup in 1980. The coup was led by Commander Desi D. Bouterse, who emerged as the strongman of the ruling National Military Council that brutally suppressed all civic and political opposition. In 1985, under international pressure, the military regime announced a two-year program for a "return to democracy," appointing an assembly to draft a new constitution and lifting the ban on political parties.

The 1987 constitution provides for a system of parliamentary democracy but does not clearly define the distribution of power, particularly regarding the military's role under civilian rule. A fifty-one-member National Assembly, elected for a five-year term, selects the nation's president. The president chairs the State Council and the Security Council. Both councils, strongly influenced by the presence of military representatives, are nonelective bodies and are empowered by vaguely written articles that dilute the power of the presidency. While the president is nominally the head of the armed forces, civilian authority is further eroded by a revamped Military Council that is given a tutelary role as the "vanguard of the people" in the transition to democracy. Amending the constitution requires a two-thirds majority of the Assembly.

The Front for Democracy and Development, a coalition of three leading opposition parties, won a landslide victory in the November 1987 general elections, taking forty of fifty-one seats in the Assembly. Bouterse's National Democratic Front (NDF), the army's political front, won only three. Ramsewak Shankar was elected president by the Assembly. Bouterse remained commander in chief of the army, however, and continued to exercise decisive political influence through the Military Council and the Council of State.

In 1989, civil-military tensions heightened as progress was made toward a negotiated peace between the government and the Bush Negro-based Jungle Commando led by Ronny Brunswijk. The Kourou agreement was signed in neighboring French Guiana in July and called for an end to hostilities; a lifting of the state of emergency in the three national districts where it was in place; the repatriation of 14,000 Bush Negro refugees from French Guiana; and a government commission to study Bush Negro grievances. The agreement was ratified overwhelmingly by the Assembly in August 1989. It was supported by nearly every sector of society except the army, which has been fighting the insurgency for three years.

Bouterse denounced the agreement as "a declaration of war against the people of Suriname," and warned that his men would begin "raising pitbulls" to use against the army's opponents. On 6 December 1989 Stanley Rensch, the country's leading human rights advocate, was driven into exile when a military hit squad attacked his home. Two days later, on the seventh anniversary of the execution of fifteen of the country's top civic leaders, the national courthouse was burned down. Most of the country's legal records were destroyed, including documents pertaining to human rights violations committed by the army and the army's involvement in cocaine trafficking.

In August 1990 Herman Gooding, the country's chief police inspector, was murdered. Gooding had been instrumental in building a more profes-
sional police force and was the lead investigator of the military's involvement in the drug trade. Four months earlier, the civilian government had eliminated the military's authority over the police. After Gooding's murder, the police force went on strike indefinitely; by October, the military was assuming control of police functions.

In 1990 the army also continued to block efforts to implement the 1989 Kourou peace accord. The government's attempts to restart the peace process were undermined by the army's unauthorized military offensives against the guerrillas, and its demand for the unconditional disarmament of Brunswijk's forces. There was also increasing evidence that the Amerindian-based Tucayana Amazonica, which initiated hostilities against the Jungle Commando in September 1989, was supported by the army as an instrument to further undermine the peace accords.

In October 1990 President Shankar announced that a commission for constitutional revision had been formed to examine the laws on civil-military relations. It appeared that after three years, the government was readying to draw the line on military influence. In response, Bouterse made threatening statements. Then, on 22 December, he announced his resignation as commander-in-chief. Two days later, Commander Ivan Graanoogst, Bouterse's apparent successor, announced on state-run radio that the military had seized control of the government. However, despite Graanoogst's denials, few in Suriname doubted that Bouterse was the mastermind of the coup.

The 1987 constitution, while unclear on civil-military relations, does guarantee the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions. Aside from the three parties in the government coalition, there are at least a half dozen other parties, including a number of labor-based organizations. Labor unions are well-organized and permitted to strike.

The constitution also guarantees the right of free expression. Radio is both public and private, with a number of small commercial radio stations competing with the government-owned radio and television broadcasting system. All broadcast in the various local languages and offer varying points of view. There are a number of independent newspapers, but after years of being shut down under military rule and because of the country's economic straits they are struggling.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary but the court system's effectiveness has been hindered by a mounting climate of intimidation and insecurity and the army's refusal to recognize its authority. Stanley Rensch, leader of the Suriname human rights organization, Mooiwana '86, was arrested by the military in December 1988 and driven into exile a year later. After returning to Suriname in October 1990, he was again the target of intimidation and death threats. Reverend Rudy Polanen, another influential human rights activist, remains subject to similar treatment.

Although the military did not formally suspend constitutional guarantees, an atmosphere of uncertainty and latent intimidation led to a reduction in political activity and expression in the wake of the December coup.
Swaziland

**Polity:** Traditional monarchy  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 800,000  
**HDI:** 0.392 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 47 male, 40 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Swazi, European, Zulu

**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

A small, land-locked monarchy tucked into the northeast corner of South Africa, Swaziland in 1990 saw a crackdown on illegal political activity and calls by twenty-three-year-old King Mswati III for a national dialogue on modifications in the political system.

The king’s call was a response to growing dissatisfaction voiced in public and the parliament concerning aspects of the *tinkhundla* system, which was introduced by the king’s late father King Sobhuza II in 1978, five years after he dissolved the inherited Westminster-style constitution. Under the system, the government is based on tribal councils. Two members of each tribal council form an 80-member electoral college, which designates 40 of 50 members of the House of Assembly (the other 10 named by the king), who then select 10 members of the Senate, with another 10 named by the king. This bicameral parliament passes legislation that is then submitted to the king, who may accept or reject it.

The most controversial aspect of the system is the election of the electoral college, which is composed of members elected by a head count in a public vote but from candidates arbitrarily identified and put up for voting by chiefs’ committees. The electoral college, in secret session, nominates and elects members of parliament on behalf of the people, but without the people having a direct say in the election.

In May, security forces launched a nationwide campaign against prodemocracy advocates, union leaders and members of the underground movement PUDEMO (Peoples United Democratic Movement). Among those detained by special branch officers were Dan Mango, secretary-general of the Swaziland Union of Commercial and Allied Workers (SCAWU), and persons connected with the Swaziland branch of the Mandela Reception Committee, which was formed in March to raise funds for a gift to the freed leader of the African National Congress.

In July, Prime Minister Obed Dlamini confirmed that the government had received a correspondence from a group calling itself the Swaziland United Congress (SUC) that purportedly called for greater democracy and the release of the twelve PUDEMO members in police custody. On 18 July, the twelve were committed by a magistrate to the high court on thirteen counts of treason.

During the 2 October trial, SCAWU leader Mango testified that he had attended a January 1990 barbecue at which PUDEMO leaders criticized the *tinkhundla* system and called for a more pluralistic society. He told the court that he had heard such topics discussed many times, and that he did not consider them as serious or important. The trial continued into the late fall.

On 16 October, the king met with chiefs, members of the royal family and leading citizens, and called for sixteen men to be named to a committee responsible for discussing ways to reform the political system. The king later met with the prime minister and other government officials to discuss the work of the committee; names of the sixteen nominated for the body were kept secret.
Citizens of Swaziland cannot change their government through democratic mechanisms. The judiciary encompasses a High Court, a Court of Appeal, and district courts, as well as seventeen Swazi courts for tribal and customary issues. Police can hold prisoners without charge for a renewable period of sixty days under a 1978 detention law. The modern court system functions without government interference, and criminal and civil trials are generally fair. Special tribunals hear cases dealing with offenses against the king. The government media and private newspapers practice self-censorship, but occasionally the private press presents diverse views on controversial issues. The police must sanction all demonstrations; however, all but anti-government gatherings are allowed. Professional and business associations function openly, freedom of religion is guaranteed and respected, and the right to travel is generally unrestricted. Several unions belong to the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, which is independent and free of government interference. Workers have the right to strike, although there are restrictions. In October, workers struck the Havelock Asbestos Mine over increasing the daily ration allowance.

Sweden

**Overview:** Sweden is a constitutional monarchy governed by a parliamentary democracy. Its economy has a well-developed private sector, and heavy taxes support a sophisticated social welfare system. The public sector employs one-third of the workforce. Swedes built their prosperity on forestry, mining, and metals, but recent international economic trends are undermining such traditional economic sectors.

The head of state is King Carl XVI Gustaf. Executive power is invested in the prime minister, who heads the majority party or ruling coalition in a unicameral, 349-member parliament (Riksdag). Voters elect 310 parliamentarians directly, and 39 seats are distributed among parties that receive at least 4 percent of the nationwide vote.

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson heads the ruling Social Democrats. He came to power after the 1986 assassination of Prime Minister Olaf Palme and was re-elected in 1988. Other parties are the conservative Moderates, the Liberals, the Centrists, the Greens, the Christian Democrats, and the Communist Left Party. Since the Social Democrats have only 156 seats in parliament, they must rely on the Communist Left or the Liberals to pass major legislation.

In 1989, the Social Democrats instituted a major reform of the income tax. Faced with low economic growth, the government cut the top national income tax rate from 72 to 50 percent, reduced the number of tax brackets from twenty-one to two by 1991, and exempted low-income households from the tax. Due to heavy taxation by other levels of government, the national income tax reform may not have a major impact. About 56 percent of the gross domestic product goes to taxes.
Sweden was in an economic crisis by early 1990. During the previous two years, salaries rose by 28 percent, but production grew by only 2 percent. The results were inflation and a collapse of previously good labor relations. Bank managers locked out their employees, depositors could not get cash, and the economy was at a standstill. The Social Democratic government responded to the economic crisis by proposing a two-year wage-price freeze and a two-year restriction on strikes, which would have been enforced with fines. When these proposals failed to pass in the Riksdag, the government resigned on 15 February. However, the Social Democrats regrouped, and formed a new government. Their revised program called for dampening down demand, freezing increases in local government spending, and postponing social reforms.

In March 1990, the government proposed forming a state holding company for its public enterprises. The company would help to restructure the economy, and would sell a portion of its shares to private investors. Public enterprise represents only a small fraction of the economy. Over 90 percent of businesses are under private ownership.

The Social Democrats’ previously announced Blueprint for the 1990s includes commitments to environmental protection, free trade, financial deregulation, and tax reform. The document reflects a synthesis of market mechanisms and welfare state policies. The party is attempting to reform its program in the face of declining voter support, especially among young people, urbanites, and salaried, white-collar employees.

Sweden is likely to apply to join the European Community in 1991. The labor movement fears that Community membership would undermine the country’s commitment to full employment. Other upcoming economic developments include the gradual abandonment of nuclear power plants by 2010.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Swedes enjoy the means to change their government by democratic means. Parliamentary elections take place at least once every three years. Aliens resident for three years have the right to participate in local elections.

The judiciary is independent. The rights of the accused are generally well respected. Some suspected Kurdish terrorists have not been deported, because they would be executed back in the Middle East. They are confined to their local municipalities in Sweden. With a few minor exceptions, freedom of expression is guaranteed, and the press is free. The government subsidizes daily newspapers regardless of their politics. Publications or videotapes which contain excessive violence or national security information are subject to censorship. Freedom of assembly and association are guaranteed and respected in practice. Lutheranism is the state religion, and the church gets public funding. However, other religions are free to practice.

Emigration and domestic and foreign travel are unrestricted. As in previous years, Sweden was generous in granting asylum in 1989, when it accepted 24,879 applicants and 5,430 close relatives. Aliens granted asylum are eligible for benefits equal to those for Swedes. This generosity has taxed the country’s ability to process and house asylum applicants. In 1990, there were reports of harassment and violence against foreigners. The government attempted to place some limits on asylum in 1990, and actually turned down some Soviet Jewish applicants.

Workers have the right to form and join trade unions and to strike. Although the government proposed some restrictions on the right to strike in 1990, the measures lost in parliament. The labor movement has been traditionally strong and well-organized.
Switzerland

Overview:

In 1989 and 1990, Switzerland had to reconsider the meaning of its neutrality in the light of the Cold War's end. On 26 November 1989, the Swiss held a national referendum on abolishing the armed forces. Although the voters defeated the measure, 35.6 percent of them approved it. Defense Minister Kaspar Villiger had warned before the vote that "it would be a catastrophe" if more than one-third of the public backed the referendum. He appointed a commission to study the results and make recommendations. The Social Democratic Party was the only major party not to oppose the referendum. The Social Democrats and the anti-army movement would like the country to play a more active role in promoting peace through international negotiations.

This landlocked, mountainous country began as a small confederation in the Middle Ages. Internationally recognized as a neutral country since 1815, Switzerland combines twenty-three territories called cantons. There are twenty full cantons and six half-cantons. Each canton has its own political system, customs, and dominant ethnic group. Swiss Germans predominate, but French, Romansch and Italian groups are concentrated in some areas.

Prosperous Switzerland is the home base of numerous international organizations, and resorts that have attracted people from all over the world. The country is very careful about granting Swiss citizenship and political asylum. One granted asylum was Dr. Kazem Rajavi, an exiled member of the Iranian opposition, whom agents of the Iranian government assassinated near Geneva on 24 April 1990. On 22 June 1990, the Swiss police concluded that Iranian agents had planned and carried out Rajavi's murder.

The Federal Assembly is bicameral. The voters elect the 200-member lower house, the National Council, to four-year terms by proportional representation. Using various local methods, the cantons elect two members each to the forty-six member Council of States, the upper house. The executive branch is called the Federal Council, whose members function as a cabinet. Drawn from the Federal Assembly, these seven executives choose one of themselves as president each year.

The governing coalition consists of the liberal Radical Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic People's Party, and the moderate Swiss People's Party, which won a combined total of 159 seats at the 1987 National Council elections. The 41 opposition members of the lower house belong to the liberal Independents' Alliance, the Liberal Party, the anti-immigrant National Action for People and Homeland, the conservative Protestant Evangelical People's Party, the Communist Workers' Party, the leftist Progressive Organizations of Switzerland, the Green Party, the Communist-oriented autonomous Socialist Party, and the pro-automobile Car Party. There is also one opposition independent.

The Swiss have the right to change their government by democratic means. However, the Swiss system produces coalition governments which mitigate the chances for radical changes in policy. The voters have substantial powers

Polity: Parliamentary democracy  Political Rights: 1
Economy: Capitalist  Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 6,700,000  Status: Free
HDI: 0.986 (high)
Life Expectancy: 73 male, 80 female
Ethnic groups: German, French, Italian and Romansch

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:
of initiative and referendum, which allow them to change policies directly. The political parties have the right to organize freely, and they cover the entire political spectrum. The cantonal system allows considerable local autonomy, which helps to preserve the linguistic and cultural heritage of the localities. However, the Italian and Romansch communities believe that their linguistic and cultural resources are underfunded. The government's postal ministry operates radio and television, which are linguistically and politically pluralistic. Switzerland has freedoms of discussion, assembly, demonstration, and religion. However, the country has a history of prosecuting conscientious objectors who disagree with universal military service for males. Women's rights improved gradually in the 1980s, but a few local government assemblies still exclude women. The high court may order them to change, in accordance with the constitutional equal rights provisions.

**Syria**

**Polity:** Dominant party (military-dominated)  
**Political Rights:** 7  
**Civil Liberties:** 7  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Status:** Not Free  
**Population:** 12,600,000  
**HDI:** 0.691 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 61 male, 64 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Arab (90 percent) Kurdish, Armenian and others (10 percent)

**Overview:**

In 1990, Syrian dictator Hafez Assad, a former airforce commander who came to power in a 1963 coup, sent several thousand army units to Saudi Arabia to join the international force against Iraq. While Assad favored the possible destruction of his long-time Baath Party rival Saddam Hussein, he risked paying a political price at home for his anti-Iraqi stance.

Prior to Iraq's August invasion of Kuwait, Syria had been facing decreased political and economic support from the world community. The World Bank halted lending, and the Soviet Union announced it was reducing military sales and demanded repayment on past purchases, totaling $15 billion. In addition, the Soviet Union withdrew approximately 2,000 Soviet advisors from Syria in February. In 1990, Syria's external debt was $60 billion, and inflation was over 50 percent. Syria's August participation in the multinational force against Iraq was in part spurred by the possibility of receiving badly needed aid from the U.S. and the Gulf states. Furthermore, Syrian officials let it be known that they sought greater U.S. pressure on Israel on the question of the Israeli-occupied territories.

Assad faced grassroots opposition to his anti-Iraq policy from Syria's Sunni Muslim majority and its large Palestinian community, which share Hussein's anti-Israeli and anti-U.S. positions and his resentment of the wealthy Gulf states. In late August, pro-Iraqi Syrians and Palestinians in villages around Damascus and near the Iraqi border demonstrated against Assad's decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia. Syrian army units put down the protests, and reportedly killed dozens of demonstrators. Syrian authorities did not acknowledge the reports of the uprising. Some sources said that the violence was the most severe since security forces killed 20,000 people in a crackdown on a 1982 uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood. Syria's Islamic fundamentalist opposition movement. To help ward off further popular discontent with the troop deployment, Assad said he sent the troops to act as
an interposing Arab force against the U.S. presence. He also argued that failing to oppose Iraq's occupation of Kuwait would weaken his own position against Israeli control over the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

Syria's participation in the anti-Iraqi front came amid a broader effort to end its isolation brought on by its harboring of international terrorists. U.S.-Syrian relations had soured over Syrian support for Ahmed Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the group believed responsible for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, but in 1990 improved markedly as Assad aided the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. In July Assad visited Egypt for the first time in thirteen years to express his support for Egypt's efforts at negotiating a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1989, Assad restored diplomatic relations with Egypt which had ruptured after the Camp David accords in 1979.

The feud between Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad is the deepest in the Arab world. Both head rival branches of the Arab Baath Party and vie for Arab leadership, and both have tried to eliminate each other. The Syrian army is second to Iraqi forces as the strongest in Arab world.

On other issues, Syria has continued to maintain troops in Lebanon since 1975, and in 1990 Syria controlled 70 percent of Lebanon's territory. In October, the Syrian army helped Lebanese troops overrun the forces of hardline Christian General Michel Aoun, making way for the new Syrian-approved Lebanese government of President Elias Hrawi.

Syrian's right to elect their leaders is extremely limited. Syria is ruled almost exclusively by President Assad and his Baath Party, which espouses a secular pan-Arab socialism. While there was speculation in 1990 that Assad would tolerate some loyal opposition, reduce martial law restrictions, and broaden the National Progressive Front, his dictatorship has shown few signs of weakening or easing. Opposition elements not tolerated in Syria, including Nasserists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a former Syrian president, and pro-Iraqi Baathists, formed The Patriotic Front for National Salvation in exile in Iraq.

Elections to a 250-member Parliament were held in late May. The number of seats were increased from 195. The role of the parliament is mainly to formally approve legislation and the state budget; parliament never opposes the president's will. Two thirds of the seats were reserved for the Progressive National Front a government-controlled seven-party alliance composed mostly of ruling Baath party members; ninety-one seats went to independent candidates.

According to Middle East Watch, under the emergency laws in effect since 1963, citizens are routinely arrested without charge, tortured during interrogation and imprisoned without trial for political reasons. The human rights group further asserts that there are 7,500 political prisoners held without due process, and that 1,000-2,000 people have been subject to torture by the Syrian Army and security forces every year since 1984. Two Jewish prisoners continue to be held without charge; they are reportedly in Adra Civil prison and will be tried after further investigation. Three out of ten Jews who were held for leaving the country were reportedly tortured. Defendants in State Security Court may not choose their own lawyer.

Freedom of expression and speech are not respected. Television, radio, and all publishing houses are government or Baath-party operated. Criticism is limited to the incompetence of low-ranking bureaucrats. Domestic news and foreign publications and films are subject to censorship.

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Political Rights and Civil Liberties:
Few private associations exist and any organization must be sanctioned by the government. There are no independent unions. The Syrian General Federation of Trade Unions is a government-controlled umbrella to which all unions must belong. Most schools are government-operated; private schools must follow government-sponsored curricula. All schools have compulsory "patriotic time." Society is penetrated by a vast domestic security network.

The majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims. Assad belongs to the privileged Alawite minority sect, which controls Syria's political institutions and the military. Baath party members or friends of members are favored in employment.

Non-Muslims are allowed to practice their faiths, but proselytizing by foreigners is banned and religious training and fundraising are curtailed. The 4,000-member Jewish community may not emigrate, must post bond to travel abroad, and may not travel to Israel. However, Jews found it easier to obtain visas in 1990. Palestinians are not allowed to obtain Syrian passports, and they cannot vote or serve in Parliament.

Taiwan

Polity: Dominant party
Economy: Capitalist-statist
Population: 20,200,000
HDI: NA
Life Expectancy: 69 male, 74 female
Ethnic groups: Predominantly Chinese

Overview:

In 1990, President Lee Teng-hui, the country's first native Taiwanese president, continued attempts at implementing broad policies of democratizing political processes and institutions and forging ties with mainland China amid staunch resistance from conservatives in the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and pressure to quicken reforms from students and the fledgling opposition.

An important mandate for change was manifest in elections held in December 1989. While the ruling KMT held off the challenge of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) and some fifteen other opposition groups, the elections, characterized by U.S. observer Rep. Stephen Solarz as the "freest and fairest" in the nation's history, saw the DPP make significant gains in the Legislative branch (yuan), and in various city council and mayoral races. The KMT captured 58 percent of the popular vote, and the DPP 38 percent, capturing 22 seats in the Legislative yuan, enabling it to initiate bills.

While the results seemed to indicate the gradual emergence of a two-party system, the government faced resistance from KMT hardliners, oppositionists demanding speedier changes, and from the National Assembly. Of the 870 members in the National Assembly, 786 are aging mainland Chinese elected in 1947 whose terms are indefinite. Under the current system the National Assembly chooses the president and vice-president.

Since assuming office in 1988 following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, the dynastic heir to Chiang Kai-shek, President Lee oversaw reforms to make the island republic less authoritarian. In 1989, two laws—the Civic Organization Law governing registration of political parties and social groups, and the Electoral Law setting out rules for elections and election campaigns—created an institutional framework within which the de facto parties and other opposition groups could coexist legally and compete with the KMT. A third
law called for the voluntary retirement of some 1,100 old-guard KMT deputies, who represent mainland constituencies in the island’s Assembly, the Legislative and Control yuans.

Prior to presidential elections in March, prodemocracy demonstrators frequently clashed with police. The KMT old-guard hinted that it would oppose the nomination of Lee, and there were hints that Chiang Wei-kuo, the last surviving son of Chiang Kai-shek, would seek the office. On 18 March, three days before the election, 20,000 protesters rallied in the capital of Taipei and called for swifter democratic reforms and the purge of party veterans. Yet Lee managed to rebuff the conservatives and was nominated. He was easily re-elected on 21 March to a six-year term. Before the election, the National Assembly, which is also the electoral college, moved to upgrade itself from a rubber-stamp organization that convenes to elect the president every six years to a powerful legislative body that meets annually.

In a move to make parliament more democratic, Taiwan’s highest court ruled in 1990 that those aging legislators, who had not faced elections in over forty years, must resign by the end of 1991.

In his inauguration, Lee signalled the government’s intent to end the formal state of war that has existed with the Communist government in Beijing. He said Taiwan wanted to establish direct "channels of communication" with the mainland, calling to "completely open up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific and technological exchange." In domestic terms, this meant an end to the government’s reliance on emergency powers that took precedence over Taiwan’s constitution. The president said that he would revoke within a year the government’s forty-year-old declaration of "Communist rebellion." He also restored civil rights for dissidents. In May, in a move aimed at appeasing conservatives, President Lee named Hau Pei-tsu, the country’s hardline, conservative defense secretary, as prime minister.

To diffuse the mounting divisions, Lee called for a National Affairs Conference (NAC) to consider changes in the nation’s political system. The 150 members of the NAC, which had no statutory power, consisted of recently released dissidents, ex-martial law administrators and opposition political figures. On 4 July, after five strenuous days of debate, the NAC concluded its deliberations and, although many of its recommendations—reflecting the diverse viewpoints—were general, agreed to a relaxation of curbs on contacts with the mainland, and a call for popular presidential elections.

Most of the proposed changes would require altering Taiwan’s constitution, and by year’s end there was still no consensus on how to revise it. The opposition demanded that the government scrap the constitution and write a new one. Under the current constitution, amendments can only be made through the Legislative yuan and the National Assembly, both still dominated by senior representatives who will not be forced to retire until the end of next year. All central representatives will be directly elected by the electorate in Taiwan in 1992.

As the result of rulings in 1990, the political system is less authoritarian and Taiwanese nominally have more power to change their system and will be able to directly exercise that power by 1992. But a dominant party and undemocratic political institutions dating from the formation of the republic as the legitimate representative of the mainland Chinese nation still dominate political life, though there appears to be a genuine commitment to liberaliza-

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:...
tion and greater pluralism. The judiciary, based on European and Japanese models, is not fully independent and is susceptible to political pressure. In March, President Lee restored civil rights for dissidents and pledged to disband within a year the General Mobilization Period under which Taiwan justifies some of its sweeping presidential and legislative powers. Martial law was lifted in 1987. However, sedition statutes still exist and can be used for political purposes. In April, Leo Yi-sheh, a prominent member of Canada's Taiwanese community, went on trial on "sedition" charges for speaking out in favor of a free, democratic and independent Taiwan. Television and radio stations are still run by the government or the KMT, but in 1990 the government was tolerant of open debate. The press is subject to restrictions, but private newspapers are relatively free and often critical of government policies.

Under law, it is seditious for citizens to challenge the regime's policy of anti-communism or its claim of representing the Chinese mainland. After martial law was lifted in 1987, peaceful freedom of assembly was allowed with permission of the government and with the proviso that organizers are responsible for the behavior of participants. The DPP and students have carried out numerous demonstrations under the law. Freedom of religion is generally observed in practice. In May, Taiwan parliamentary committees voted to abolish exit and entry permit requirements for citizens travelling off the island. The law went into effect 1 July. Trade union rights are seriously limited by a number of laws and regulations. Organizers must seek the approval of authorities to establish unions. Unions may be dissolved if they are deemed to disrupt the public order. Civil servants, teachers, and defense industry workers are barred from joining unions. Most of the country's over 3,000 unions are controlled by the KMT. The Chinese Federation of Labor is the only legal confederation in Taiwan and is closely associated with the KMT. There are laws against strikes, but they have occurred.

### Tanzania

**Polity:** One-party  
**Economy:** Statist  
**Population:** 26,000,000  
**HDI:** 0.413 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 49 male, 53 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Primarily African (Bantu), with significant Arab and Asian minorities

### Overview:

Like other African nations, the United Republic of Tanzania—formed in 1964 with the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar—in 1990 reacted to the ramifications of the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe with considerable consternation and public pronouncements promising a serious reevaluation of the one-party, state-socialist system. But toward year's end, the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM) remained the sole party and a single-candidate presidential election on 28 October gave President Ali Hassan Mwinyi a second five-year term.

A significant political development occurred on 17 August, when Julius Nyerere, who led the country after independence in 1965 until 1985 and is considered one of Africa's leading elder statesmen, stepped down as chairman of the CCM. He was succeeded by President Mwinyi, who assumed the leadership of the country when Nyerere declined to run in 1985. Nyerere was
the architect of *ujamaa*, the country's cooperative-socialist system which was launched in 1967 under the Arusha Declaration. Under the system, which stressed self-reliance and socialism, Tanzania nationalized banks, commerce and industry, established communal villages, created state-owned marketing boards and set up vast import-substitution industries. The country, never rich, grew increasingly poorer as the system became mired in inefficiency, bureaucratic mismanagement and rampant corruption. By 1988, average income per capita was only $160 a year and the country had become dependent on foreign aid, which totalled some $10 billion since 1970.

In early 1990, after regimes in Eastern Europe had toppled, Nyerere made several statements criticizing the CCM's stagnation and corruption and suggesting that the one-party state was not sacrosanct. In July, however, he reaffirmed his commitment to the Arusha Declaration, and on 16 August, before stepping down as chairman, he urged the continuation of a one-party system at the opening of the CCM congress. During a meeting with European Economic Community officials, Mwinyi criticized the West for linking the adoption of a multiparty system with economic assistance, and said that the demand for multipartyism amounted to political and economic blackmail of the poor.

But since 1986, Mwinyi's tenure has been marked by a departure from Nyerere's strictly statist economic policies and the implementation of free-market mechanisms encouraged by the International Monetary Fund. Between 1975 and 1986, Tanzania recorded negative gross domestic product rates of growth, and the country remained one of the poorest in Africa. Under Mwinyi, the currency has been devalued, price controls on some 400 items have been abolished, producer prices are rising and farmer cooperatives have been given more freedom from government controls. Nevertheless, in 1990 the economy remained fragile. Collapsing infrastructures meant that farmers could not move tea, coffee and maize to market because two-thirds of the country's roads are impassable. Despite a modest real growth of 4 percent a year since 1986 and an increase in the production of cotton and grain, the budget deficit is 9 percent of GDP, inflation is 30 percent and the balance of payments is worsening.

Although some observers have remained skeptical about Mwinyi's commitment to reform, some diplomats said after the October election that he would use his new mandate to weed hard-liners out of the CCM and that there is wide public support for his policies.

Other concerns for the government were the continued spread of AIDS in rural areas and the presence of some 266,000 refugees, mainly from Burundi, Rwanda and Mozambique.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Tanzania in 1990 remained a one-party state dominated by the CCM, and citizens cannot change their government democratically. Zanzibar enjoys a measure of political autonomy, with a directly elected president and House of Representatives. Tanzania's legal system is based on the British model, with changes to accommodate Islamic and customary law. The judiciary is generally free from government interference, but security provisions under the Preventive Detention Decree allow for indefinite detention without bail for persons considered a threat to national security and public order. In August, several persons were arrested in Zanzibar, where there was an opposition campaign to boycott registration for the electoral roll for the 28 October election. From mid-July to August, at least sixty others were detained, often
for brief periods, in an attempt to discourage boycott activities. Those who refused to register faced other reprisals: civil servants were fired or suspended; shopkeepers and students had their trading licenses or scholarships withdrawn. In August, Remi Gahutu, a Burundian exile and president of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, died under suspicious circumstances while in Tanzanian custody.

The government controls the media, and restrictive laws have made it difficult to establish private publications, though several papers have appeared in the last few years, among them Business Times, Family Mirror and Fahari. During a 19 July meeting with representatives of the Tanzanian Journalists' Association, Prime Minister Joseph Warioba said that journalists had a duty to reflect official policy. A month earlier, the minister of information cautioned journalists "against abuse of press freedom." State newspapers intentionally misreport events and fail to publish controversial stories or review books dealing with elements critical of the government. Self-censorship is part of what one participant called "a conspiracy of silence."

Freedom of association and assembly is limited, but non-political organizations are allowed to function. Freedom of religion for the country's mostly Muslim and Christian citizens is respected. Travel is generally unrestricted, but in an effort to prevent mass migration to the cities there are residency and employment requirements. Independent unions are not allowed, and unions must belong to Juwata, the government-controlled labor federation. Workers have and use the right to strike.

### Thailand

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy (military influenced)  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 55,700,000  
**HDI:** 0.783 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 61 male, 65 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Thai (84 percent), Chinese (12 percent), Malaysian, Indian, Khmer, Vietnamese minorities

**Overview:**

With the world's fastest growing economy over the last two years, the Kingdom of Thailand in 1990 saw a potential political crisis diffused by continued economic success and the political skills of seventy-year-old Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, whose Thai Nation (Chart Thai) Party leads a six-party coalition government supported by about three-fifths of the 357-member House of Representatives. The confluence of these factors also resulted in a diminished influence—both in economic and political affairs—of the Thai military, which saw its traditional dominance attenuated by an increasingly secure and self-confident democratic government.

A potential challenge to the government was presented by Gen. Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh, an ambitious and often controversial figure widely believed to covet the prime minister's post. On 27 March, he resigned as both acting commander and acting supreme commander, and accepted the prime minister's offer to become his fourth deputy prime minister and take over the post of defense minister. He joined the Cabinet as its only nonelected member and does not belong to any of the twenty or so political parties. Shortly after assuming the Cabinet post, Chaowalit faced the prospect of a
parliamentary grilling on alleged corruption in the military. The issue was compounded by his appointment as supervisor of the Counter Corruption Commission (CCC). Several ministers in the government coalition questioned the general's own record on corruption.

Gen. Chaophraya resigned from the government on 11 June, the eve of the prime minister's scheduled visit to Washington. The resignation touched off rumors of a possible military coup, as some 1,000 Thai soldiers staged marches to demonstrate their support. But the crisis was deftly diffused by Prime Minister Chatichai.

Significantly, on the day of the resignation, the Thai stock market plummeted 42 points, losing 4.08 percent of its value. In the past, an army officer's best hope of getting rich was to be appointed to the board of a state-owned enterprise. Today, many dabble in the booming stock market, a fact which makes the prospect of destabilizing military coups less attractive to many in the military. Chaophraya was made the prime minister's personal adviser for national security and foreign affairs, but refused the job of advising on narcotics.

In June, the government faced a parliamentary censure debate, as the prime minister announced an imminent Cabinet reshuffling. The censure debate challenged some ten ministers with allegations of corruption and inefficiency. But in a country where there is a lack of ideological differences between its some twenty political parties (which places the political focus on personalities, personal loyalties and vested interests), and in which the six-party coalition holds 229 of the 357 parliamentary seats, the government was in no real danger. The censure was defeated by 220 to 38 votes, with some opposition parties voting with the ruling coalition. Seventeen members of the opposition Puangchon Chao Thai voted against the nonconfidence motion. Some members of the Prachakorn Thai Party, while joining the walk-out, took part in the vote. Both parties were considered by the prime minister as possible candidates to join his coalition. Much of this political musical chairs is due to an economic boom under Chatichai.

The government's position was also enhanced when the House of Representatives in July overwhelmingly passed a social security bill that had previously been thrown out by the Senate. Many of those serving in the Senate are retired or active military officers and the vote indicated the growing confidence of the elected lower house that they were effectively prepared to ignore the wishes of the army.

In late August, the prime minister reshuffled the Cabinet in an attempt to deflect allegations of corruption and provide an air of greater competence in the face of economic uncertainties posed by the crisis in the Gulf. Nine ministers resigned, including the long-time foreign minister. Seven new ministers, five deputy prime ministers and eight deputy ministers were brought into the government. The key to the changes was the introduction of three nonelected technocrats to the Cabinet, all of whom had an unquestioned reputation for personal integrity.

By September, however, the prime minister faced increased disgruntlement in the ranks of his own factionalized party, and there was speculation that he could face a challenge to his leadership in the near future.

On 8 December, Prime Minister Chaitachi resigned in a tactical maneuver to give himself a freer hand in changing his cabinet whose members had been criticized by the military.

Despite relative political stability and overall economic vibrancy, the country did face nagging social and economic problems. Even with the
Country reports

unquestioned prosperity of Bangkok and other major cities, most Thais who live in the northeast of the country are dirt poor. The army continued to run its own development projects in the poorer areas. In the south, the government faced nascent separatist sentiment in Muslim regions that reflect political, economic and employment inequalities. Of the 2 million or so Thai Muslims, 75 percent live in the south. They were increasingly frustrated by being controlled by an indifferent government more than 700 km away, and by growing economic difficulties posed by falling rubber prices and the rising cost of staple food prices. Growing Shia Muslim activism was also a concern. In June, security authorities ordered the arrest of a Muslim leader and the closure of a mosque after an anti-government rally in the south.

Other issues facing the government in 1990 were labor unrest, the repatriation of Burmese refugees along its border, and the continued spread of AIDS, which has an an impact on the booming tourist trade to Bangkok's famous red-light zone. Thailand accounted for half the reported cases in all of Asia, and the government continued its education-propaganda efforts among Bangkok's "bar girls." In March, Thai and Burmese authorities made coordinated moves to repatriate more than 400 Burmese who had fled the violence and political repression in their country. In June, Thai Border Patrol Police and army units rounded up more than 1,500 Burmese and forced them back into Burmese Army-controlled territory. There are believed to be tens of thousands Burmese asylum-seekers in Thailand.

Elections are open, with the 1988 vote attracting a record number of parties and candidates. Both military and civilian courts provide defendants with a broad range of legal rights. The judiciary is patterned on European models. There are some restrictions on the vibrant, independent press, particularly in writing about the royal family. Television and radio are licensed by the government and operated both by the government as a private, commercial ventures. The media express various viewpoints and are free to criticize government policies. Radio stations are required to carry a government-produced news cast four times daily, but are free to originate other news and commentary. Freedom of association is guaranteed, though all groups must register with the government Human rights groups are active, and private property is secure. Though there are no significant formal restrictions on religion, the government has taken steps against nonconformist Buddhist sects and militant Muslim groups. There is freedom to emigrate and travel, although some restrictions apply to Chinese and Vietnamese aliens. There are four independent labor umbrella organizations, but restrictions exist. Civil servant workers cannot unionize but can form associations, state-enterprise workers cannot legally strike and there are some constraints on the rights of private sector workers to strike. Nevertheless, in May thousands of state enterprise workers held mass protests demanding back pay raises, threatening serious dislocation of essential services such as communication and water and electricity supplies. However, a last-minute decision by union leaders representing the 200,000 state-enterprise workers to accept a government compromise led to a return to work. Earlier in the year, Bangkok port workers carried out a four-day strike in protest against government plans to bring in selective privatization.
Togo

**Overview:**

This narrow, poor country in the Gulf of Guinea between Ghana and Benin gained independence in 1960, and has been governed since 1967 by Gen. Gnassingbe (originally Etienne) Eyadema as a one-party state under the Rally of the Togolese People (RPT), which controls nominations to the popularly elected unicameral National Assembly.

At the start of 1990, the government felt compelled to address the demands for greater democracy sweeping through West Africa, though Togo had not as yet experienced the social and labor unrest of some of its regional neighbors. In January, five commissions were established to sound out popular opinion on the future political course of the country. On 21 May, the government announced that the people had given "a firm and unanimous 'no' to a multiparty system." Some 50,000 people, most members of RPT affiliated organizations, marched in Lome, the nation's capital, in support of the president. However, Togolese told foreign journalists that the fact-finding government teams did little more than lecture people on the virtues of one-party rule and the perils of a multiparty system, and then asked citizens—many of whom depend on government assistance or jobs—if they were happy with the president Togo's state-run television also broadcast scenes of strikes and violence in nearby Ivory Coast and Gabon, two states with ongoing debates on multiparty democracy.

On 5 October, government troops opened fire on some 6,000 demonstrators who had gathered before the courthouse in Lome. Seventeen people were killed and thirty-four injured. The government claimed the violence began after demonstrators attacked police stations and seized arms and ammunition, and claimed the protest was part of an elaborate plot to overthrow the government. On 8 October, the Togolese Bar Association announced a seventy-two-hour strike by attorneys to protest the killings, and ridiculed the government's assertion that the violence was staged by "foreign terrorists." Following the disturbances, the president pardoned two jailed students, and announced that there would be no legal action taken against those arrested during the 5 October incident. The same government communique, however, labelled protesters "unemployed rascals, drug addicts, and idle."

On 30 October, President Eyadema proposed that the nation's constitution be revised to allow for a multiparty system. He asked a constitutional commission to propose "a text which corresponds to the profound aspirations of the people...Today, we believe that our apprenticeship in democracy is advanced enough." A constitutional referendum was planned for December 1991.

During the year, the country continued to face serious economic problems. Though economic reforms in recent years, encouraged by the World Bank, have brought some economic growth, such factors as a drop in the price of cocoa, the country's chief commodity export, continued to plague the economy. In June, the country was about to negotiate its fourth adjustment loan from the World Bank. It has privatized state companies and launched an export-processing zone to attract foreign capital and develop nontraditional

**Polity:** One-party (military dominated) **Political Rights:** 6

**Economy:** Mixed statist **Civil Liberties:** 6

**Population:** 3,700,000 **Status:** Not Free

**HDI:** 0.337 (low)

**Life Expectancy:** 49 male, 52 female

**Ethnic groups:** Ewe, Kabye, Mina

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**Freedom in the World—1990-1991**
Exports. Yet income per capita declined in the 1980s. And while Togo's plush state-owned hotels are brimming with tourists, there is stark poverty in the countryside where 80 percent of the people live. Part of the problem is the result of the governments reliance in the 1970s on the then-lucrative phosphate exports, which led to the establishment of some 73 state-owned companies. The country does have plentiful cheap labor, a sound infrastructure, the region's best port, and modern banking and telecommunications. But an overvalued currency and other factors have worked against an export breakthrough.

During an August visit to the United States, President Eyadema told President George Bush that the West should set up "a real Marshall Plan" to boost Africa's economy, hurt by a dip in export income because of falling prices for raw materials.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Citizens of Togo cannot democratically change their government. Voting is compulsory by law, and citizens can only vote "yes" or "no" for one candidate. Freedom of expression is curtailed for fear of reprisals. In October, government forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing seventeen. The judiciary is not independent of the RTP, those accused of political crimes may be held indefinitely without charge, and torture of suspected government opponents is a serious problem. In October, two men were sentenced to five years' imprisonment for distributing anti-government pamphlets. Their confessions were allegedly extracted under torture. All sectors of the media are in government hands. Freedom of religion is sharply curtailed; only a handful of churches is recognized by the government. Freedom of assembly is tightly controlled. A human rights commission was set up in 1987, but it is careful not to criticize the government and abuses continue. Hundreds of citizens were detained for nonpayment of loans due a state bank, even though nonpayment of debt is a civil, not a criminal offense. In early 1990, the government condemned an attorney who spoke out in favor of multiparty democracy and an independent judiciary. Also, the government forcibly expelled several thousand villagers from their homes to clear the area for use as a game farm. Restrictions apply on travel abroad in order to make it more difficult for skilled and educated Togolese to leave. The umbrella National Confederation of Workers of Togo is controlled by the RTP; strikes are allowed but rarely called.

Tonga

**Polity:** Monarch and partly elected legislature

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 100,000

**HDI:** NA

**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 61 female

**Ethnic groups:** Mainly Polynesian with a Melasian mixture

Overview:

This South Pacific Kingdom of 200 islands (45 inhabited) gained independence within the Commonwealth on 4 June 1970. It has been ruled since 1965 by King Taufa'ahau Tupu IV, a seventy-one-year-old monarch, who succeeded his mother. The constitution grants the king broad political powers independent of the unicameral Legislative Assembly; he selects the Privy Council, which makes major policy decisions, as well as the prime minister and cabinet.
ministers. The thirty-member Legislative Assembly consists of nine nobles selected by the thirty-three hereditary nobles of Tonga, nine people's representatives elected by universal suffrage, as well as twelve cabinet ministers.

Tongan elections are usually low-key because they do not result in a new government or new Cabinet. But on 15 February 1990, they were the most vigorously contested in the island kingdom's history. Fifty-five candidates contested nine people's seats, and 23 nobles contested the thirty-three seats reserved for them. Those who sought accountability from royally appointed ministers and conservative MPs chosen by the country's major feudal families won, opening the possibility of the formation of an organized opposition in a kingdom that until now has had no political parties. There has been some talk of restructuring the Assembly along the British model that would accommodate political parties.

In 1990, Tonga also became embroiled in a serious debate over its claim of sixteen space "slots" for orbiting telecommunications satellites. Under international law, any government has the right to reserve any unused slots for satellites it plans to launch, simply by registering its intention with the Geneva-based International Frequency Registration Board. Since Tonga does not have the financial resources to launch satellites, it is widely believed that the government plans to lease the slots at $2 million a year for each slot.

Tonga's citizens cannot freely elect their government. The judiciary is modelled on the British court system, and the ultimate appeal is to the king, who appoints all judges. The government owns the only radio station and the largest circulation newspaper, but there are private media, including the newly founded independent newspaper Tonga Times. There is no censorship. There are no significant restrictions on freedom of assembly or travel. Freedom of religion is guaranteed and practiced. Workers have the right to form unions, though none exists.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Tonga's citizens cannot freely elect their government. The judiciary is modelled on the British court system, and the ultimate appeal is to the king, who appoints all judges. The government owns the only radio station and the largest circulation newspaper, but there are private media, including the newly founded independent newspaper Tonga Times. There is no censorship. There are no significant restrictions on freedom of assembly or travel. Freedom of religion is guaranteed and practiced. Workers have the right to form unions, though none exists.

**Trinidad and Tobago**

- **Polity:** Parliamentary democracy
- **Political Rights:** 1
- **Civil Liberties:** 1
- **Economy:** Capitalist-statist
- **Population:** 1,300,000
- **HDI:** 0.885 (high)
- **Life Expectancy:** 66 male, 71 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Complex, black (41 percent), East Indian descent (41 percent), mixed (16 percent), white (1 percent)

**Overview:**

The two-island Caribbean nation, considered one of the more stable democracies in the region, was rocked at the end of July 1990 by a bloody coup attempt in which a small band of Moslem extremists stormed the national parliament. The government, including the prime minister, was held hostage for five days before the insurgents finally surrendered. The incident further weakened the administration of Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson, whose economic austerity policies were already costing it support.

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the British Commonwealth, achieved independence in 1962. The state is composed of two islands, with Trinidad accounting for nearly 95 percent of the country's area and population. Under the 1976 constitution, Trinidad and Tobago became a republic with a president, elected by a majority of both houses in parliament,
replacing the former governor-general. Executive authority, however, remains invested in the prime minister.

The political system is a parliamentary democracy. The bicameral parliament consists of a thirty-six-member House of Representatives elected for five years, and a thirty-one-member Senate, with twenty-five senators appointed by the prime minister and six by the leader of the parliamentary opposition. The prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition commanding a majority in the House. Local government (counties and major municipalities) is elected.

In the December 1986 general elections, the opposition National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), led by A.N.R. Robinson, decisively defeated the black-based People's National Movement (PNM), which had ruled for thirty years. The NAR took thirty-three seats in the House. The PNM, led by outgoing Prime Minister George Chambers, took only three, primarily because of its failure to halt four years of steady economic decline. Robinson was credited with forging the first solid opposition coalition, including both black and East Indian elements, against the PNM. The NAR was composed of Robinson's Democratic Action Congress (DAC), the East Indian-based United Labour Front (ULF) led by Basdeo Panday, Karl Hudson-Phillip's Organization for National Reconstruction (ONR), and the Tapia House Movement.

In 1980 the House approved a bill establishing a fifteen-member House of Assembly for Tobago, with twelve members directly elected for four years and three named by the majority party. In January 1987, Tobago was granted full internal self-government. In elections held in November 1988, the NAR retained eleven of its twelve seats.

Since assuming office in 1986, Prime Minister Robinson has contended with key defections from his ruling coalition. By 1988 the Tapia House Movement had withdrawn and Panday, the NAR deputy leader, and three other NAR members of parliament had been expelled. Panday formed a new East Indian-based party, the United National Congress (UNC) in 1989, becoming the official opposition leader in 1990. Robinson has also encountered a series of labor strikes as powerful unions protested the government's economic austerity program and the declining standard of living.

By mid-1990, polls showed a sharp decline in support for the government. The main complaint was unemployment, followed by the high cost of living, and increasing crime. In polls that asked about the general elections due by March 1992, over half the population said the NAR government should be voted out.

On 27 July the radical Moslem group Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, led by Yasin Abu Bakr and numbering less than 300 members, seized the nation's parliament and the state-run television facility and announced it had taken over the government. Neither the military nor the public rallied to support Bakr, however, resulting in a five-day standoff marked by rampant looting in the capital of Port of Spain. The siege, which left approximately 23 people dead and more than 300 wounded according to official sources, finally ended when the government tricked Bakr into believing the insurgents would receive amnesty if they surrendered.

In the aftermath, Bakr and 112 others were arrested and charged with treason, murder, and kidnapping, among other charges. During initial hearings in the fall, defense lawyers challenged the validity of the charges, claiming that Bakr had given up the rebellion in exchange for a formal pardon. The prospect was for a drawn-out legal exercise and a trial lasting well into 1991.
The coup attempt delivered a shock to the country’s already ailing economy, causing tens of millions of dollars in damages and setting back an anticipated tourist boom the government had hoped would soften the effects of its austerity program. It also left the Robinson government struggling to restore confidence amid increasing animosity between the roughly equal black and East Indian communities. Panday’s East Indian-based UNC was highly critical of the government’s performance during the crisis and loomed as the strongest challenger in the general elections due by March 1992. Because of the crisis, the government was also forced to postpone at least until 1991 the local elections that had been scheduled for September 1990.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Constitutional guarantees regarding the right to free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions are respected. However, the state of emergency declared during the coup attempt was extended to mid-November by the government after it had secured the necessary approval of the House of Representatives. The proclamation allowed for a curfew and gave security forces unrestricted rights of search and arrest.

There are a number of human rights organizations. Traditionally active in addressing allegations of police brutality, in 1989 they criticized government anti-narcotics initiatives that would give power to the police to conduct searches without a warrant. Following the 1990 coup attempt, these groups reported a number of allegations of harassment by security forces against the Muslim community, which makes up 6 percent of the nation’s population.

Labor unions are well organized, powerful and politically active. They have the right to strike and have done so frequently in recent years. Since 1988 organized labor has spearheaded a campaign against the government’s austerity programs. An independent industrial court plays a key role in arbitrating labor disputes.

Newspapers are privately owned, uncensored and influential. There are independent dailies as well party publications. Radio is both public and private. Commercial television is provided by the Trinidad and Tobago Television Company.

An independent judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, which consists of a High Court and a Court of Appeal, with district courts operating on the local level. Under the constitution, there is a right of ultimate appeal to the Privy Council of the United Kingdom.

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**Tunisia**

- **Polity:** Dominant party
- **Economy:** Mixed capitalist
- **Population:** 8,100,000
- **HDI:** 0.657 (medium)
- **Life Expectancy:** 60 male, 61 female
- **Ethnic groups:** Arab

**Political Rights:** 5  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

Despite a political opening begun in 1987 by President Ben Ali, the boycott of local elections in June 1990 underscored the opposition’s deep dissatisfaction with the pace of democratization and the continued dominance of the ruling party.

Ben Ali continues to ban Tunisia’s strongest opposition group, the
Islamic Al-Nahda or Renaissance Party. In a concession early in 1990, Ben Ali allowed the Renaissance party to start its own paper, Dawn, but otherwise the government has taken a hard line. It banned a special election week issue of the paper in June and threatened its editor. The government has also reportedly dismissed some seventy imams (Islamic clergy) for their political affiliation or teachings, and dismissed state employees believed sympathetic to the Renaissance party.

In February, students belonging to the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGTE) held strikes and sit-ins to protest the stationing of police on university campuses. The government dispersed the demonstrations with tear gas and water cannon. Over six hundred students were arrested, two thirds of whom lost their exemption from obligatory military service and were sent directly into the armed forces. The Islamic opposition had supported the students' demands and denounced the government's use of conscription as a form of punishment.

All opposition parties called for a boycott of the June local elections. President Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) ran uncontested in 237 out of 246 local councils, winning 98 percent of the vote and taking a majority in all but one local council. The official voter turnout figure of 80 percent was considered suspect.

Following opposition complaints of fraud and unfair election conditions, the government established "The Higher Council of the National Pact" to explore the issue of further democratization and a system of proportional representation on a local level. Skeptical of government control, however, the Renaissance party, the Communists, and the Social Democratic Movement (MDS) did not participate. They charged that a proportional system would have little effect since the government controls the media and has access to large shares of state funding, and RCD strongmen dominate local governments.

Dissatisfied with the reformulation of the electoral law, the opposition mounted pressure to postpone the national elections. The new regulations provided that the winning party would receive 50 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. The remaining parties, in addition to the winning party, would then be given an amount of seats according to the vote percentage gained.

Tunisia's central political problem has been unrest involving Islamic fundamentalists, who are politically concerned with religious issues in formally secular Tunisia, economic hardship, and restrictions on political expression of groups other than the ruling RCD. Throughout the year, demonstrations by Islamic fundamentalists were forcibly dispersed by police, resulting in numerous arrests.

On Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the government took a neutral stance, condemning the aggression but refusing to join the growing anti-Iraqi camp led by Egypt and the Gulf states. Like many other moderate Arab governments in the Maghreb, Tunisia felt the U.S. military presence and a possible military conflict would bolster Saddam Hussein's image and undermine its own position vis-a-vis the radical masses. As a result of Tunisia's position, Egypt tried to transfer the Arab League headquarters from Tunis to Cairo before the previously scheduled September 1991 date.

Though Tunisia is constitutionally a parliamentary democracy, in practice the right of Tunisians to choose or change their government is limited. The ruling RCD still holds a monopoly on power and has been reluctant to
detach itself from state institutions. Tunisia's parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, for the most part reaffirms policy made by the president. Political parties other than the RCD have been allowed to form, but the leading opposition movement is still denied recognition. According to MDS sources, police have sought to deplete the party's funds by confiscating press equipment and then charging exorbitant sums to have them returned. Elections in June sparked complaints of fraud and unfairness.

All political parties require government authorization. Only groups which are authorized may be allowed to hold public meetings, which call for further government approval. No political party can claim to represent a "religion, race, sex, or region." Unrecognized groups cannot meet in public, and are therefore in the position of breaking the law each time they assemble. The government has violently suppressed even peaceful Islamic demonstrations.

Islamic fundamentalists are subject to government harassment, delays in passport renewal, phone taps, mail opening, searches without warrant, arbitrary arrest and detention, physical abuse by unidentified plainclothesmen, and general surveillance. Several civil servants have been fired and transferred on the basis of their enthusiasm for Islam. The government has maintained a heavy police presence in universities to oversee student demonstration and Islamic groups. The government also runs the mosques and may appoint and dismiss all imams.

Cases of torture against political dissidents, mainly Islamic fundamentalists, were reported in 1990. Under the law, suspects may be held incommunicado for four to ten days before being brought before a judge. According to Amnesty International, incommunicado detention often exceeds the statutory time limits.

Tunisian law permits arrests and searches without a warrant. Ben Ali publicly endorsed an independent judiciary, but the executive wields influence over judges by having the authority to grant them tenure and by assigning them to different districts. Special security courts were abolished in 1988.

The Tunisian press is both privately and publicly owned. All recognized parties as well as the unrecognized Renaissance party have their own newspaper. Though a variety of opinion is presented, the press is subject to a strict code. All written material must have prior authorization to be published. Criticism of the state is highly circumscribed. All publications are subject to government review and censorship, and the Interior Ministry often confiscates single issues which are believed to "threaten public order." Writers, editors, and publishers are often arrested, imprisoned or fined on charges of defamation. Television and radio are state-owned and operated.

Islam is the state religion. The Baha'i may not worship. The small Christian and Jewish communities are free to practice. Though de jure equal, Tunisian women occupy an inferior position in a patriarchal society.

Twenty percent of workers are unionized, almost all belonging to the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), which has become increasingly independent. The right to strike is circumscribed by various government regulations. Sixty percent of the work force is entitled by law to receive a minimum wage.

Tunisians are relatively free to travel within and outside the country, but the Tunisian Human Rights League is concerned with the withholding of passports.
Turkey

**Polity:** Presidential-parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 56,700,000

**HDI:** 0.751 (medium)

**Life Expectancy:** 60 male, 63 female

**Ethnic groups:** Turks, Kurds

**Political Rights:** 2

**Civil Liberties:** 4

**Status:** Partly Free

Overview:

The national response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the major issue in Turkey during 1990. Other important international matters included Turkish concern over developments in Soviet Azerbaijan and disputes among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the flow of the Euphrates River. Domestically, major news stories included local elections, the Islamic revival, and political and ethnic violence.

As a country bordering Iraq, Turkey played a leading role in implementing the U.N. land and sea embargo against its neighbor in 1990. The Gulf crisis also brought renewed attention to Turkey's strategic role just when Turkish leaders had begun to doubt it was appreciated.

Those doubts were magnified earlier in the spring, when the European Community (EC) postponed a decision on Turkey's bid for full Community membership until 1992. A European Commission report cited Turkey's relative economic backwardness and its failure to satisfy Community human rights and trade union standards. Despite European doubts about Turkey's international maturity, the country effectively shut down the twin Iraqi pipelines that carried more than half of Iraq's oil exports through its territory.

By shutting down the pipelines Turkey cut itself off from 40 percent of its expected 1990 oil imports. In addition, Turkey lost $3 billion in lost trade, pipeline fees and remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq, and canceled contracts and loan payments. Kuwait apparently agreed to compensate Turkey for the losses, and Saudi oil made up for Turkey's oil shortfall.

Turkey put its military forces on alert and transferred ground and air forces to the Turkish-Iraqi border. NATO member countries committed themselves to defending Turkey against any Iraqi attack or reprisals. On 3 December 1990 the chief of the armed forces resigned, apparently because he objected to President Turgut Ozal's plan for a strong Turkish military role against Iraq.

Linking southeastern Europe with western Asia, Turkey has a system of government combining an increasingly strong presidency and a parliamentary system. Usually held by a nonpartisan military figure, the Turkish presidency is not intended to be the most powerful political position, but President Ozal has attempted to expand its executive powers since 1989. Chosen by the parliament, where his center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) has a majority, Ozal moved from the premiership to the presidency. He named Yildirim Akbulut as the new prime minister. The presidential term runs for seven years. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place by 1992.

One of the first issues that Ozal faced as president was the Soviet crackdown in Azerbaijan, a Turkic republic, in January 1990. Some pan-Turkic nationalists called for the Turkish government to support their ethnic brethren in the Soviet Union. Concerned Turks held a rally for the Azeri
cause near Mt. Ararat but the Turkish government adopted a low-key response.

For thirty days in spring 1990 Turkey impounded the flow of the Euphrates River, which runs from Turkey to Syria and Iraq. The Turks did this to help construct dams, hydroelectric plants, and irrigation projects. These public works programs will allegedly allow for economic development in southeastern Turkey, where the Kurdish ethnic minority is fighting the government.

In municipal elections in June, the ruling Motherland Party (ANAP) won 36 percent of the vote. The Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) finished second with 24 percent, and the True Path party (TPP) finished third with 20 percent. The Islamic Welfare party and Nationalist Labor party finished fourth and fifth, respectively. The results marked a significant gain for ANAP. It finished third in local elections in 1989 and its popularity dropped to as low as 8 percent in the spring of 1990. Moreover, the cabinet seemed to be disintegrating as the finance minister and foreign minister stepped down. Given the June results and subsequent ANAP victories in August's local elections, the opposition stopped its calls for early national legislative elections and some of the ill-will engendered by President Ozal's accession to the presidency in 1989 subsided.

ANAP scheduled a convention in February 1991 to choose the next party chairman. The ANAP chairman is elected by a caucus of parliamentary deputies and provincial party chiefs.

Polarization continued in 1990 between Islamic fundamentalists seeking protection for their right to wear religious clothing, and secularists fearful that the fundamentalists intend to introduce Islamic law. In addition, fundamentalists apparently gained a foothold in the Education and Culture ministries and in the security forces. The army purged 150 noncommissioned officers for their fundamentalist sympathies in 1990 and investigated another 150.

1990 also saw a rise in fundamentalist- and leftist-inspired violence. Fundamentalists belonging to "Islamic Revenge Movement," possibly backed by Iran, killed Professor Muarrcm Aksoy, a leading advocate of secularism and a constitutional legal authority. Cetin Emec, another leading secularist and the editor of a major daily, was also assassinated this year, and leftist militants ambushed a police car in Istanbul. All the killings have sparked fears of a return to the pre-1980 anarchy that led to a military coup.

Turkey does not recognize its 10 million Kurds as a minority. In the southeast, where most Kurds reside, the battle between government forces and the separatist guerrillas of the Marxist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), entered its sixth year. Approximately 100,000 government troops and 24,000 civilian militiamen are now based in the southeast provinces. The PKK numbers 8,000-strong. Five thousand people have died in fighting since 1984. Fighting raged throughout the southeast provinces for most of 1990.

Killings during March and April 1990 led President Ozal to hold an extraordinary meeting with the prime minister and the major party chiefs. At a cabinet meeting on 9 April, the government issued Decree 413, which gave special powers to the governor of Diyarbaakir and the national government to limit human rights. In July 1990, in a major break in the Turkish debate on the Kurds, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) supported the Kurds' right to express their identities openly. The SHP demanded an end to emergency rule in most of the nineteen southeastern provinces, an end to arbitrary arrest and harassment, and elimination of the Village Guards militia.
President Ozal insists that he wants the borders in the region to remain intact, and opposes carving a Kurdistan out of Iraq or Turkey.

Turks have the right to change their government democratically, but the country has a history of military intervention that has limited the scope of democratic politics. The leading political parties that predated the 1980 coup remain banned, as do Communist and religious parties. A group of Communists applied for legal status in 1990. In March 1990 Bedrettin Dalan, former Mayor of Istanbul, applied to register the new Democratic Center Party. In August 1990 the security forces arrested fifty-three activists at a meeting of the Union Party of Socialists, which was applying for legal status.

Decree 413 enables the southeast regional governor to censor the press, impose exile as a punishment, remove judges and prosecutors, suspend labor rights, evacuate villages without notice, and fine people for insulting politicians and state institutions. The decree had the effect of restricting press coverage of the Kurdish insurgency, closing down at least two publications indefinitely, and intimidating printing plants from publishing left-wing newspapers.

The Turkish government took other actions that limited press freedom and cultural expression. Security forces confiscated books and publications for political reasons, including those advocating separatism and insulting Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. Supporting the Kurdish cause can lead to imprisonment For example, sociologist Ismail Besikci, has spent eleven of the last twenty years in prison, charged with "separatist propaganda" for his pro-Kurdish writings. The government banned various concerts, cassettes, and films, and arrested Kurds for speaking their own language.

There are some limits on freedom of assembly. For example, May Day demonstrations have been illegal since 1980. Some Turks attempted to demonstrate on May Day 1990, but the police shot at crowds and arrested more than 3,400 demonstrators. Generally, the government allows assemblies to take place, but only in approved locations.

The security forces have carried out many serious abuses. Amnesty International reported the systematic torture of prisoners, including beatings, hosing with ice water, and electric shocks. Some Kurdish prisoners have endured prolonged solitary confinement and illness without medical treatment. The prison system had one doctor barred from medical practice for six months after he admitted that detainees were beaten. Security force atrocities in the Kurdish areas have included shootings, beatings, and death threats. Amnesty International also reports that Turkey has used food deprivation and visits by Iraqi officials to pressure Kurds of Iraqi origin to leave the country.

Turkey allows Christians and Jews to practice their religions, but there are some police restrictions on Christian missionaries. The official secularism of the regime restricts the religious expression of Islamic fundamentalists, but Islamic religious instruction is compulsory in the schools. Unauthorized religious schools are illegal.

There are competing trade union federations in Turkey, the largest of which is Turk-Is. There is an Islamic fundamentalist labor federation. The government placed several restrictions on organized labor in the 1980s. Trade unions are not allowed to organize many categories of salaried employees such as 450,000 teachers and 1.25 million civil servants. The government ruled that some strike activity and other industrial actions in the Kurdish areas are not permitted. Trade unions and other private associations have no
legal right to back political parties. Increasing inflation in 1989 increased trade union militancy, and declining family purchasing power increased child labor for higher family incomes. Turkey has a mixture of private and government enterprise. There has been some loosening of economic regulation in recent years.

Tuvalu

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy
**Economy:** Capitalist
**Population:** 9,000
**HDI:** NA
**Life Expectancy:** 60 male, 63 female
**Ethnic groups:** Predominantly Polynesian

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Elections are freely contested, and the judiciary is free from government interference. The constitution guarantees freedom of religion and assembly. The biweekly newspaper and radio are government controlled.

Uganda

**Polity:** Military
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist
**Population:** 18,000,000
**HDI:** 0.345 (low)
**Life Expectancy:** 47 male, 51 female
**Ethnic groups:** Ganda, Nkole, Gisu, Soga, Turkana, Chiga, Lango, Acholi

**Overview:**

In 1990, this large, land-locked East African nation continued to be plagued by rebel violence and atrocities, human rights abuses by government forces, a stagnating economy and the rampant spread of AIDS. Hopes for a transition to democracy, raised last year by the military regime's announced plans to hold elections in 1990, were dashed when President Yoweri Museveni—citing continued political instability—extended his term and the term of the interim government until 1995 and continued the suspension of political parties.

Tribal warfare, insurrection, intermittent coups, and brutal dictatorships have been a sad fact of life in Uganda virtually since its independence in 1962, and have led to the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Ugandans. After
the ouster of strongman Idi Amin in 1979, the country was ruled by former President Milton Obote, whose regime was marked by military atrocities, further economic disintegration, corruption and civil strife. In July 1985, Obote was deposed by Lt. Gen. Tito Okello, who six months later was himself overthrown by Museveni, a leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA). In February 1986, President Museveni announced the formation of a National Resistance Council (NRC) as an interim government.

Since taking control, President Museveni has become one of the most powerful leaders in Uganda's history, acting as commander-in-chief of the NRA, chancellor of Makerere University, Minister of Defense, chairman of the National Executive Committee (NEC), chairman of the NRC, and current chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Under his leadership, the NRA has grown from 5,000 men in 1986 to a minimum of 75,000 men (and possibly twice that number). He has worked to undermine Uganda’s traditional parties, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), which allegedly won the last multiparty elections in 1980, and the Democratic Party (DP). (It is widely believed that the UPC stole the elections to prevent a DP victory.)

The president has given key jobs in government, the army and the security apparatus to western Ugandans like himself, creating animosity among other tribal groups. Many leading government figures are Tutsis (the same tribe as the president) from neighboring Rwanda, where thousands of Ugandans fled in the 1960s. Trusted Army veterans provide a crucial bloc of support in the 278-member NRC, or national assembly, and its key body, the NEC.

In 1990, the government faced continued insurgencies in the northern and eastern districts of Gulu, Soroti and Karamoja. The main rebel groups are the Ugandan People's Army (UPA), many former members of President Obote’s UPC; remnants of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA); and the Ugandan Democratic People's Army (UDPM), composed of former UNLA members. In July, the government announced that it had reached a peace agreement with the UDPM, led by chairman Otima Allimadi, at a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, in August, a UDPM spokesman in the north charged that government forces had murdered twenty-seven civilians in four districts: Lira, Kapwach, Kitgum and Gulu.

Throughout the year, the government came under fire, both abroad and at home, for allegedly using brutal tactics in its war against the rebels. In February, for example, some 200,000 Ugandan civilians were rounded up by the military and put in guarded, overcrowded camps in eastern and western Uganda in an attempt to isolate rebel forces, according to an Ugandan government paper. International and Ugandan officials acknowledged that conditions in the camps were poor, and that young children and elderly had died from disease and lack of adequate food. During the year, several rebel leaders were either killed or captured.

On 1 October, a force of several thousand Rwandan refugees, led by one of Uganda’s top army officers, the Rwandan-born Maj. Gen. Fred Rwigemana, invaded Rwanda. There were indications that the Ugandan government had been aware of the action of Rwandans in the NRA and of the massing of forces on Rwanda’s border.

In domestic developments, the government continued its campaign against independent political activity. The president declared all parties to be suspended, but fell short of banning them completely. President Museveni’s...
strategy to destroy political opposition has also included co-opting leading politicians from the UPC and the DP. Democratic leader Paul Ssemogerere was named First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Such action has caused a split in the DP, provoking the creation of a DP Mobilizers’ Group, which regards some of its leaders as having sold out. The UPC has been in disarray as a result of infighting. Some leaders have joined the government, and others have been intimidated.

While President Museveni has attempted to weed out corruption in the NRA, he has yet to take similar measures against civilian officials in spite of scandals regularly turned up by the press or by the Inspector-General of the government.

In economic affairs, the country continued to feel the effects of debt servicing, a drastic fall in coffee prices, slow capital inflow, a crumbling transportation and distribution infrastructure, rising oil prices, unemployment and inflation. In July, the government dismissed over 50 percent of workers in the public service to reduce expenditures on wages. The impoverished government said that it could only pay half of the usual wage bills from August. Nevertheless, there were no plans to reduce military spending, which accounted for nearly 30 percent of the budget.

In 1990, some 7,000 commercial, residential and agricultural properties seized from Asian owners by Idi Amin and estimated to be worth $1 billion remained in government hands. The government has been urged by the World Bank and other donors to sell off the properties, which include virtually all of downtown Kampala, as well as high-grade farms and tea plantations. Plans to privatize the properties have been slowed, partly because both the government and Ugandans are ambivalent about selling the properties to foreigners, particularly Asians. Some in the government have argued that Asians should be encouraged to come back, and a handful have returned from Britain, Canada and Australia.

Another serious crisis facing the regime is the rapid spread of AIDS, which has devastated areas of the country, particularly in the south. Factors contributing to the epidemic include a scarcity of condoms, inadequate education and such social practices as polygamy.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Anticipated elections were not held in 1990, and Uganda remains essentially a one-party state ruled by the NRM; the people cannot change their government through democratic processes. Political parties are suspended, though not banned, and they face government intimidation and harassment. In August, several members of the UPC were arrested, and at least two were formally charged with treason. The government maintains the right to detain suspected insurgents without trial or charge, and there have been numerous instances of army atrocities against civilians in rebel areas. In February, government troops forcibly resetted some 200,000 villagers from rebel areas into overcrowded, squalid camps, where thousands reportedly died of disease and malnutrition. Rebel groups, particularly the UPC, have also been responsible for slaughtering civilians, including women and children.

The judicial system is based on the British model, and defendants in most civil and criminal trials enjoy fundamental legal rights. Freedom of assembly is curtailed for political groups, and during the year government forces broke up several UPC meetings. The independent and government press covers a broad range of topics, including guerrilla fighting, human rights abuses by the army and other politically sensitive issues. Journalists do face harassment,
however. In February, three journalists were arrested for asking visiting Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda tough questions at a 29 January press conference. The three were Festo Ebongu of the government paper *New Vision*; Hussein Abdi Hassan, a stringer for the British Broadcasting Corporation; and Alfred Okware of *Newsdesk*. All were subsequently released on bail.

Nonpolitical associations and independent human rights groups must register with the government. Among these groups, which are often critical of government policy, are the Uganda Law Society, the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers, and the Uganda Human Rights Activists, which issues reports and publications. While members of these groups are often subject to official intimidation, they are generally free to express their views. The government does not interfere with religious practice, and religious publications with an anti-government slant are tolerated. Rebel activities have put certain restrictions on domestic travel, but Ugandans are free to emigrate. Workers are organized under the National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), and have the right to strike. Skilled civil service workers, however, are barred from joining unions.

### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity</th>
<th>Political Rights: 5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>291,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.920 (high/d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>67 male, 75 female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Byelorussian, Armenian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and various Asiatic and Turkic peoples</td>
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**Overview:**

In 1990, this huge, geographically diverse country experienced a deepening political crisis. President Mikhail Gorbachev accumulated greater presidential powers in a desperate attempt to hold the federation together as he faced demands for greater autonomy by all fifteen constituent republics, a divided and increasingly powerless Communist party (CPSU), a collapse of central authority, and economic chaos. By year’s end, chronic food shortages, ethnic unrest and a prevailing sense that social order had all but disintegrated, helped fuel fears of impending anarchy and raised concerns that Gorbachev would abuse his new powers to regain control of a country that seemed to be tearing itself apart.

In mid-December, the 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies approved Gorbachev's sweeping government reorganization plan, giving him wide powers to exercise control over the constituent republics and the economy. The approval followed weeks of political turmoil: Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, a long-time Gorbachev stalwart, resigned, saying the Soviet president was assuming "dictatorial" authority and, in an ominous speech, KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov warned that Western intelligence services were using the new economic openness to destabilize the country and gain access to state secrets. Gorbachev announced that Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, disliked by conservatives and liberal reformers for his handling of the economy, had suffered a heart attack the very day parliament voted to eliminate the Council of Ministers he headed and replace it with a
new cabinet under Gorbachev's direct control. Parliament also approved Gorbachev's nomination for the new post of vice-president, Gennady Yanayev, but only after rejecting him in a first-round vote.

Gorbachev's plan included strengthening the Federation Council, created in March, by including representatives of the fifteen republics who would determine the basic direction of national internal and foreign policies and coordinate actions by the republics; forming an Inter-Republican Committee, a permanent working body of the Federation Council made up of experts from the republics; creating a national Security Council, made up of representatives of the KGB, the Interior Ministry, Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry; and establishing a Cabinet of Ministers, a group of government ministers subordinate to the Federation Council that would not have the power to make decisions but would implement them. The Council of Ministers and the Presidential Council, an advisory body established in March, were eliminated.

While approving most of Gorbachev's plan, the Congress defeated a proposal to create a Supreme State Inspectorate to oversee implementation of presidential decrees, which many observers believed was a setback for Gorbachev since throughout the year many republics simply ignored his edicts. Boris Yeltsin, the popular President of the Russian Republic, opposed the reorganization scheme. On 27 December a serious political crisis arose when the Russian republic, which contributed over half of the federal budget, voted to slash its payments by more than 90 percent.

Also in December, the Congress of People's Deputies endorsed Gorbachev's new All-Union Treaty to loosen the Soviet federation but rejected dropping the word "socialist" from the country's name. The treaty would give more economic power to the republics, while retaining Kremlin control over the military, foreign policy, and key industries. The proposal called for a national referendum in 1991 on the issues of national unity and private ownership of property. But the treaty faced ratification by all fifteen republics in 1991, and most republics already had declared they would not sign without major changes to spell out their rights. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia and Moldavia declared they would not sign any union treaty. In varying degrees, the three Baltic republics were working, against warnings, for independence.

The flurry of political activity in December capped a year of intense political, economic, ethnic and social upheaval that saw a frustrated Gorbachev improvise from crisis to crisis as the central government's control over national events gradually weakened.

In February, a deeply divided CPSU Central Committee met in Moscow amid massive prodemocracy demonstrations calling for the elimination of Article 6 of the constitution, which enshrined the leading role of the CPSU. After a raucous debate pitting reformers against hard-liners led by Yegor Ligachev, the Gorbachev faction pushed through its plan to drop the Party's monopoly of power, thus formalizing a process of multipartyism that had been initiated by the proliferation of various opposition groups throughout the country. The Central Committee also granted Gorbachev greater presidential powers without forcing him to undergo a popular election. Gorbachev had argued that he needed expanded powers in the face of renewed ethnic violence in Azerbaijan (11,000 Soviet troops were sent to the republic in January 1990), the continued demands for sovereignty in the Baltics, the sluggishness of parliament in implementing political and economic re-
forms, and the paralysis caused by the widening ideological rift in the Politburo.

On 13 March, the Congress of People's Deputies cancelled Article 6 and endorsed Gorbachev's presidential plan, which transferred power in the country from the Party to an elected head of state. But to ensure the two-thirds majority needed to pass the constitutional changes, Gorbachev had to make several concessions. As president, he would be able to veto legislation, but could be overruled by a two-thirds vote in each chamber of the bicameral Supreme Soviet. On declaring a state of emergency, the president could do so with the consent of the republic or republics affected. Gorbachev agreed that presidential rule by decree could only be done on the basis of existing laws. Gorbachev faced stiff opposition from the conservative Soyuz (Union) and the liberal interregional groups parliamentary block.

On 16 March, the Congress of People's Deputies elected Gorbachev president with 59 percent of the vote, a low margin by traditional Soviet standards. In other reforms, the Soviet parliament on 30 May took up a draft law aimed at setting guidelines for the registration of non-Communist political parties. But in a clause clearly directed at secessionist republics, the law banned political parties from seeking forcibly to change the constitutional system, disrupt the territorial integrity of the USSR or foment social, ethnic, or religious strife.

In July, the 28th Congress of the CPSU saw an intensification of the split in the party and the resignation of key figures. On the eve of the congress, the Russian republic's party, which represented the largest bloc at the congress, elected a hard-line Leninist, Ivan Polozkov, as leader. Conservatives and liberals attacked Gorbachev, who asked the 4,700 delegates to maintain party unity. Meanwhile, a wide range of elected officials, Communist insurgents, independent worker committees and rival political groups demanded that the Party give up its influential network of party cells in the army, police, the work place and the courts, a campaign that met fierce resistance from top military leaders.

At the Congress itself, Gorbachev was re-elected party leader, the first time a party leader was directly elected by the entire congress, and oversaw the defeat of a hard-line candidate for deputy leader put forth by conservatives. Moreover, a new Party plan removed most top government leaders from the Central Committee and Politburo, making them answerable to the president and parliament. Gorbachev also replaced the old twelve-member Politburo with an enlarged body dominated by the party heads of the fifteen republics, who are generally more independent of the central party. Gorbachev's strategy was to dilute the traditional power of the apparatchiks in the Central Committee. Gorbachev's apparent successes were undermined by the resignation from the party of Yeltsin and other popular figures, and throughout the year the party membership plummeted and its power was eroded. In July, the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad quit the CPSU, as did Moscow's deputy mayor and six other members of parliament.

During the year, Communist parties in Georgia and other Soviet republics and regions gave up power to national movements and liberal insurgents who pushed for economic change and greater democracy. At the end of October, the national parliament tried to reassert its authority by declaring that its laws superseded measures adopted by the legislatures of the fifteen republics. Within hours, the parliaments of the Russian republic and the Ukraine—the two largest republics—responded by announcing their own laws were
supreme. Meanwhile, other republics, including the Baltics and Byelorussia, generally continued to ignore directives from Moscow, jeopardizing Gorbachev’s reform initiatives. The impending constitutional crisis threatened the unity of the country and undermined Moscow’s authority.

Throughout 1990, the most serious challenges to Gorbachev’s ability to rule were the rise of nationalism and demands by the republics for greater autonomy and local decision-making. Inter-ethnic conflict and/or nationalist separatism spread from the Baltics to Uzbekistan.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The people of the Soviet Union have only limited rights to change their central government by democratic means. The Communist party and affiliated organizations retain 750 reserved seats in the Congress of People’s Deputies. Elections for other seats are partly free and sometimes competitive. Gorbachev has not had to face a popular election for the presidency. Significant power remains in the hands of unelected, authoritarian structures such as the military and the KGB. At the level of individual republics, many nationalities replaced Communist Party governments or limited their control through elections in 1990. Non-Communist parties grew at both the Union and republican levels.

The Communists gave up their monopoly on control of the major media in 1990. There is now some decentralized control of radio and television. Censorship was officially abolished in June 1990 by legislation. Now private individuals have the right to found mass media, but these media must register with the state. Disputes over newspaper ownership arose in 1990 as reformist administrations battled party bureaucrats for control. Diverse organizations and political groups publish their own newspapers, but there is still harassment from the state. In some areas, the opposition must rely on the fickle good will of the Communist party presses to get anything published.

Soviet citizens were freer to discuss more topics openly in 1990 than they were previously, but there were also new restrictions on freedom of expression. Following anti-Gorbachev demonstrations on May Day, the Soviet parliament passed legislation making “insults” against the chief executive crimes punishable by a prison term if the accused had expressed the alleged insult in an “indecent way.” The law could shut newspapers that use “insulting” material more than once. The law could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, especially since it does not define “insult.”

There was increasing freedom of religion in 1990. The government allowed more denominations, such as the Ukrainian Catholic Church, to apply for legal status and repossession of religious property. Several former church buildings, which the Communists had converted to other uses, held religious services again. The KGB still infiltrates the Orthodox Church and other religious institutions.

The security forces use beatings, administrative arrest, and detention to harass opposition activists. According to Soviet and Western human rights activists, there are still political prisoners.

In June and October 1990 Soviet coal miners held their all-union congresses in Donetsk and created their own Independent Union of Miners, which is independent of the government-controlled All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The official trade union organization held its own congress in Moscow in October during which it assumed a new name and reconstituted itself as a so-called voluntary federation, but in essence it remained the same. Late in 1989 the Supreme Soviet passed a law allowing for the right
to strike except in so-called essential industries. Private cooperatives, political discussion clubs, cultural and historical groups, language preservation societies, and other citizens' organizations are flourishing.

Under Gorbachev's economic reforms and those of several republics, there are limited and uneven rights to own and operate private businesses and farm plots. Protection racketeers and other elements of organized crime have reduced the freedom of newly free, legitimate business.

Freedom of movement improved in 1990 and more than 200,000 Jews left the Soviet Union, mostly en route to Israel. Although emigration was not completely free, most people with close relatives overseas were allowed to leave for visits. The Soviet Union denied entry visas to Vladimir Bukovsky and other human rights activists who had applied to attend the Second International Human Rights Conference in Leningrad.

Widespread government and personal corruption and economic decline limited the chances for equality of opportunity.

United Arab Emirates

| Polity: | Federation of traditional monarchies |
| Economy: | Capitalist-statist |
| Population: | 1,600,000 |
| HDI: | 0.782 (medium) |
| Life Expectancy: | male, female |
| Ethnic groups: | South Asian, native Emirian, other Arab |

Overview:

An independent state since 1971, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven sheikdoms, each of which retains control over mineral rights, taxation, and security. Each constituent state is a monarchy, dominated by a ruling family with powerful economic interests. The current head of state is Sheik Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahiyan.

In 1990, the key issue for the country was the Gulf crisis precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August. Late in the month, the oil-rich UAE announced it would welcome troops from Arab nations and other countries to help in its national defense. The announcement came after a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

Together, the seven rulers constitute the Supreme Assembly seated in Abu Dhabi. The Council elects a president and vice-president for the federation. The president, in turn, appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. The seven rulers also appoint members to a forty-member Federal National Council that gives advice on legislation. No political parties are permitted, although some groups operate clandestinely. There are no elections.

Three quarters of the population are noncitizens who play little or no political role. Most indigenous citizens are Sunni Muslims. Based on oil reserves, the country’s per capita income is one of the highest in the world.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Citizens cannot change their government democratically. The judicial system, divided into lay and clerical (shari'a) courts, is considered fair and independent. Trials for the most part are public. There are limits on freedom of expression. The media practice self-censorship, with most private newspapers receiving subsidies from the government. The government monitors and

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: Not Free
screens all imported media. Private associations are free to organize, but public assembly requires government permission. Politics is usually discussed at private assemblies. Non-Muslims are free to worship but not to proselytize. Freedom of travel is respected. Noncitizen laborers are taken advantage of by employers. Opportunities for women have expanded. By law, unions and the right to strike are prohibited.

**United Kingdom**

**Overview:**

The replacement of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with John Major was the most significant development in British politics in 1990. In office since 1979, Thatcher won re-election in 1983 and 1987. Her Conservative policies included privatization of state companies and public housing, and reduction of trade union power. These measures were generally popular, but the public turned against legislation that replaced property tax rates with head taxes to finance local government. There were numerous, sometimes violent demonstrations against the head tax (also called the poll tax or community charge) throughout the country in 1990, but Thatcher refused to change the program.

As the Conservatives lost popularity, M.P.s worried about their chances for reelection. Following the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Howe over Thatcher's go-slow policy on European integration, former Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine challenged Thatcher for the party leadership in November 1990. She did not win enough support from Conservative M.P.s to win on the first round of balloting and decided to resign as party leader and prime minister, pending the election of her replacement. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Chancellor of the Exchequer John Major opposed Heseltine on the second ballot. Since Major fell just two votes short of obtaining outright victory, his two opponents dropped out, and Major became Prime Minister.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland combines two formerly separate kingdoms (England and Scotland), an ancient principality (Wales), and six counties of the Irish province of Ulster. By the nineteenth century, the U.K. was a constitutional monarchy with established rights for its citizens, but only a limited elite male electorate. Reform legislation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries extended the franchise gradually to universal adult suffrage.

Parliament has two houses: an elected House of Commons with 650 members chosen by plurality vote from single-member districts, and a House of Lords with over 1,000 hereditary and appointed members. The Lords have little power except for a suspensive veto, under which the Lords can merely delay a piece of legislation for six months. If the House of Commons backs the legislation again, it becomes law. In 1990, the Lords defeated a Commons bill to allow the prosecution of alleged Nazi war criminals living in
Country reports

Britain. If the lower house re-passes the measure, it would take effect in 1991. A section of the House of Lords serves as a supreme court. Parliament has a maximum term of five years.

The main opposition party, Labour, led by Neil Kinnock, has moderated its socialist policies since losing its third consecutive general election in 1987. That year the Conservatives won 376 Commons seats to 229 for Labour and 22 for the centrist Alliance of Liberals and Social Democrats. Regional and nationalist parties from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland won the remaining seats. Since 1987, the political center has regrouped. Most Liberals and Social Democrats merged into the Liberal Democratic Party in 1988. Its leader is Paddy Ashdown. A rump faction of Social Democrats, headed by Dr. David Owen, persisted as a separate party after 1987, but Owen announced in 1990 that the party would cease contesting national elections. With Labour's growing moderation, the opportunities for small centrist and center-left parties have probably declined for the next general election, but the Liberal Democrats did well at by-elections in 1990.

Britain sent forces to the Middle East to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In late 1990, Thatcher decided that Britain would join the European Monetary System. By linking the British pound more closely with other European currencies, the government hoped to reduce inflationary pressures. European leaders hoped that Major would be more pro-European than Thatcher was.

Political rights and civil liberties are well-established in Britain's largely unwritten constitution. The people have the right to change their government by democratic means. The electorate is registered to vote by a government survey. Irish citizens resident in Britain have the right to vote in British elections. Residents of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland do not have their own regional legislatures, but they elect members to the House of Commons. The British and Irish governments held discussions in 1990 about changing the governing arrangements in Northern Ireland.

Britain has problems in some aspects of civil liberties stemming from the conflict in Northern Ireland. The traditional British right to trial by jury does not exist for suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland. Under the 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act, suspected terrorists can be arrested without a warrant or prohibited from entering Britain from Northern Ireland or vice versa. Although the U.K. has freedom of association, it prohibits membership in certain terrorist organizations, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.). The government also requires candidates for local councils to denounce violence. However, the Provisionals' political arm, Sinn Fein, contests elections freely in Northern Ireland. In 1989, there were allegations that the security forces in Northern Ireland had co-operated with extremist Protestant military groups. The Provisional I.R.A. was involved in several episodes of terrorism in 1990, both in Northern Ireland and in England. The most notable one was the murder of Conservative MP Ian Gow, an outspoken critic of the terrorists. In 1989 and 1990, some cases came to light involving police use of forced confessions and faked evidence to obtain convictions in terrorist incidents.

Overcrowding, alleged brutality, and poor food and sanitary conditions in Manchester's Strangeways prison provoked a violent twenty-five-day rebellion. One prisoner died and at least fifty suffered injuries.

The press is generally free, lively, and competitive, but tough libel laws
may have a chilling effect on some kinds of reporting and entertainment. For example, in 1990 the British Board of Film Classification denied certification of the home video release of *International Guerrillas*, a Pakistani-produced, fictional adventure film about the author, Salman Rushdie. The board believed that the film constituted criminal libel against Rushdie. Following an appeal from Rushdie in favor of releasing the film, the Video Appeals Committee overturned the earlier ruling.

The royal family was involved in a move to censor a former employee in 1990. Malcolm J. Barker, a former staffer at Buckingham Palace, wrote a memoir about his royal employment, thereby violating an agreement of confidentiality which he had signed. The Queen moved successfully in court to block publication of his book both in Britain and worldwide. International enforcement of this kind of order is nearly impossible. Although the work had already been serialized in the U.S., British magazine importers removed excerpts of the book from two issues of *Paris Match*.

The Official Secrets Act provides the government with a tool to attempt halting publication of intelligence activities and other official matters. The media can deal with this restraint through appeals in the courts and publication overseas.

The political press covers a broad range of views. For example, *News Line*, a publication of the Trotskyites, published articles supporting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and urging the British working class to rise up against "U.S. and British imperialism." Sir Nicholas Fairbairn, a Conservative M.P., called for the removal of the newspaper from the stores, but no such action was likely.

The BBC is run as an autonomous public corporation. On occasion, it responds to government pressure not to broadcast certain controversial items such as those on terrorism. However, the BBC offers pluralistic points of view, and televises political programs of both government and opposition parties. There are two broadcast channels for private television corporations.

With a few exceptions involving Northern Ireland, there is freedom of movement. Britain admitted the Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi, and announced plans to offer residency status to 50,000 successful Hong Kong families. That British colony reverts to Chinese control in 1997. Although Hong Kong residents are British subjects, they have a grade of citizenship which does not ordinarily entitle them to British residence.

Britain has free religious expression, but the Church of England and the Church of Scotland are established. The Queen is head of the Church of England. There is some possibility for political interference in religion, because the Queen appoints Anglican bishops from a church commission's shortlist on the advice of the prime minister.

Trade unions and business groups are powerful and active on political issues, but the unions have declined in size and influence in the Thatcher era. As of 31 December 1989, the Trades Union Congress affiliates had a total of 8,404,827 members, a drop of 247,491 from the previous year.
Overview:

The U.S. experienced significant change in both domestic and foreign affairs in 1990. As the economy moved into recession, President George Bush and Congressional leaders spent months negotiating over the 1991 federal budget. Breaking his campaign pledge of "no new taxes," Bush agreed in principle to a combination of tax increases and spending cuts to reduce the budget deficit. However, he could not agree on details with the Democrats in Congress and put pressure on negotiations by shutting the government down in October. Eventually, the executive and legislative branches came to an agreement shortly before the 1990 Congressional election.

The major international story for the U.S. in 1990 was its decision to send American troops to defend Saudi Arabia following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August. President Bush ordered more than 400,000 troops to the Middle East by the end of the year. Bush negotiated with several countries to build a multilateral force to prevent the spread of Iraqi power. The crisis and the possibility of war came as a shock to the American public, which had believed in early 1990 that the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had made war unlikely.

Founded in 1776 during a revolution against British colonial rule, the USA began the modern movement for freedom and self-government in the world. The current system of government began functioning in 1789, following the adoption of the constitution. Since the founders of the U.S. distrusted concentrations of centralized government power, they set up a system in which the federal government has three competing centers of power (executive, legislative, and judicial branches), and left many powers with the state governments and the citizenry.

The electoral college, an eighteenth-century instrument, is the technical de jure method for electing the president and vice-president. The voters in each state vote for slates of electors who usually cast their votes in the electoral college for the candidates with the most support in that state. On rare occasions, individual electors from some states have voted for someone other than the candidate to whom they were pledged.

The U.S. Congress has two houses. There are 435 voting members of the House of Representatives, not counting nonvoting delegates from Washington, D.C. and U.S. related territories. Each state is guaranteed at least one representative. The rest are apportioned on the basis of population. The 100-seat Senate has two members from each state regardless of population. In 1990, Washington, D.C. elected a so-called shadow senator to lobby for statehood for the nation's capital city.

The federal courts interpret the laws. The Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of government actions. On occasion, the federal courts have ruled against the decisions of both other branches of the federal government.
The U.S. population is racially mixed. The American aboriginal population, known popularly as American Indians or Native Americans, lost most of its land to European settlers and their descendants. During the colonial period and the early years of American independence, the whites imported slaves from black Africa, mostly to do agricultural work. A civil war in the 1860s between the slave-holding, agricultural southern states and the more industrial northern states ended slavery and opened the way for American expansionism and modern industrial development.

Millions of European and Asian immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries diversified the U.S. population and helped build the country into an international economic power. These immigrants came to America seeking political rights, civil liberties and economic opportunities that they did not have in their often oppressive native countries. Since the Second World War, most immigrants to the U.S. have come from developing countries for a combination of economic and political reasons.

Women won the vote in 1920 as a result of social and economic changes during World War I. As a result of civil rights struggles in the 1950s and 1960s, blacks won federal voting rights in 1965. (In theory, black men had won the vote with the promulgation of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1870, but its effectiveness lapsed in the southern states when white supremacist governments took over after 1877.)

President Bush, a Republican, won election in 1988 with 426 of the 538 electoral votes and 54 percent of the popular vote. Bush took office in January 1989. The Republican Party, the more conservative of the two major parties, has won seven out of the last ten presidential elections. The Democratic Party, which is more liberal, has controlled both Houses of Congress for most years since the 1930s. In the 1990 Congressional elections, Democrats made modest gains: one seat in the Senate and eight in the House. As a result of the mid-term elections, the Senate has 56 Democrats and 44 Republicans, the House of Representatives 267 Democrats, 167 Republicans, and one independent socialist.

There were important political issues in 1990 in addition to the budget talks, the economy, and the Middle East crisis. Voters felt a sense of growing frustration with all levels of government. One manifestation of this frustration was the growing national movement to limit terms of office for public officials. Abortion remained a significant controversy, as some state legislatures passed laws to regulate and limit the practice. The Savings and Loan scandal continued to spread in 1990. Five U.S. Senators had to face charges of having rendered excessive assistance to Charles Keating, the head of a major failed Savings and Loan who had made large campaign contributions.

Americans have the right to change their government by democratic means. The electoral system allows Americans to change presidents every four years, the House of Representatives every two years, and one-third of the Senate every two years. However, scarcely 50 percent of the voting age population takes part in presidential elections. The figure is even lower for midterm Congressional elections and some local contests. For example, only an estimated 36 percent of the voting age population turned out for the 1990 general elections. The party system is competitive, but 96 percent of members of Congress seeking reelection won in 1990. In order to ward off potential opponents, members spend an increasing amount of their time raising funds from wealthy individuals and special interest groups. This
undermines the quality of representation and reduces the chances for the opposition to increase its support.

In presidential election years, an ideologically unrepresentative minority chooses Democratic and Republican presidential nominees through a chaotic, complicated, and debilitating series of primary elections and local party meetings called caucuses. Due to states' rights, the political parties seem powerless to stop the first caucus and primary states, Iowa and New Hampshire, from playing a disproportionately powerful role in reducing the field of presidential contenders. Voters in the states that hold later primaries and caucuses often have little influence in deciding the outcome of the nomination process, even if their populations are larger or more representative of the nation as a whole. If California goes ahead with its plans to hold an early primary in 1992, then that state's interest groups and media will exert a powerful influence on the outcome of the nomination process.

Since the 1960s, the major parties have lost most of their traditional organizing functions. Most voters now get their political information from the news media and from political advertising designed by political consultants. These political managers specialize in negative campaigning, which is designed to reduce voter turnout among the opposing campaign's potential supporters.

Several minor parties function, but the electoral system encourages pre-election coalitions within two parties rather than post-election coalitions among several parties, as happens in many European countries. Several states have daunting petitioning hurdles that make it difficult for small parties or major party insurgents to receive a place on the ballot. New York State has extremely complicated petitioning procedures. Its governor, Mario Cuomo, announced plans in 1990 to reform the state's election laws in 1991. Cumbersome voter registration laws in many states help keep down participation.

Many states allow the voters the rights of initiative and referendum. These devices allow citizens to collect petitions to place a public issue on the ballot and to decide the question directly, sometimes overturning the decisions of their elected representatives. California is especially noted for a high number of referenda each year. Its voters defeated "Big Green," a major environmental question, in 1990.

The American media are very free and competitive. However, there are some worrisome trends towards monopolization. As literacy rates fall, most Americans get their news from television. Broadcast news is highly superficial and is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from entertainment. In November 1990, federal judges enjoined Cable News Network from broadcasting tapes of conversations between former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and his lawyer. The court ordered the network to turn over the tapes so that a judge could decide what was fit for television. There were several cases in 1990 involving the allegedly obscene content of musical recordings, most notably those of 2 Live Crew, a rap group which was found not guilty.

Public and private discussion are very open in America. However, a trend in universities to ban allegedly racist and sexist language is subject to broad interpretation, and may have a chilling effect on academic freedom. There was also a growing recognition in 1990 that a tendency towards left-wing conformism among faculties resulted in a pressure on independent thinkers to mouth "politically correct" (p.c.) views. Certain large corporations may have a chilling effect on free speech when they hit their activist opponents with
lawsuits, which are known as SLAPP suits (strategic litigation against public participation).

In 1989 and 1990, the constitutionality of burning the U.S. flag was a major debating topic. Following a 1989 Supreme Court ruling which protected flag-burning as a form of political speech, Congress passed legislation to curtail the practice. However, a federal court ruled in 1990 that the legislation was unconstitutional. The debate on the issue continued to receive great publicity until the economy and the Middle East replaced it as serious public concerns.

Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has had an increasing tendency to rule against cases brought by workers, minorities, and prisoners. This trend reverses the pattern of more liberal decisions in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Court is ideologically divided, and often makes decisions by 5-4 votes. That was a major reason for the national attention given Judge Souter when President Bush nominated him to be a Supreme Court justice.

Court systems at all levels of government suffer from a severe backlog of cases, delaying the course of justice in countless criminal and civil cases. In January 1990, the nation’s longest criminal trial ended after two and a half years of testimony involving alleged child molestation in 1983. The high crime rate and growing public demand to punish criminals have led to severe overcrowding in American prisons. There are more than 54,000 federal prisoners out of a total national prison population of over 600,000. In March 1990, the Supreme Court limited the ability of death row inmates to base their appeals on rulings issued in other cases before appeals became final.

The federal government’s anti-drug measures have included seizing boats with trace elements of illegal drugs and random drug-testing of transport workers and civil servants. Public opinion supports additional measures to combat drugs, some of which would endanger the constitutional protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The most noted drug case of 1990 involved Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, a reputed drug user, who was arrested by government agents after a girlfriend lured him into using cocaine in a hotel room sting operation.

The U.S. has freedom of association and thousands of clubs and associations of all kinds. Farm organizations and trade unions are free, but the labor movement is declining as its traditionally strong manufacturing base shrinks. U.S. trade unions have fewer legal protections than their counterparts in Western Europe. Due to management’s increasing use of replacement workers during strikes, the strike has become a less effective weapon for discontented workers. In March 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that union members who sue their union for damages for failing to represent them have the right to a jury trial.

The country has a regulated, largely free market economy, with a growing number of service jobs and declining manufacturing employment. The entrepreneurial spirit remains strong. Most job growth takes place in small enterprises in the private sector.

The U.S. has many free religious institutions. Due to the constitutional separation of church and state, the Supreme Court has issued rulings limiting religious holiday displays on public property and prohibiting organized prayer in the public schools. In January 1990, the Supreme Court upheld the right of states to tax sales of religious goods.

The degree of personal social freedoms is very high, but the choice of education and housing depends to a great extent on personal wealth.
federal government made some major decisions on freedom of movement in 1990. In February the U.S. renewed border detentions for those seeking political asylum. Congress passed significant immigration reform legislation, which will allow more skilled worker immigrants, asylum for more illegal immigrants, and reform of Cold War immigration restrictions. President Bush vetoed legislation which would have extended the stays of Chinese students, but he claimed that he would take administrative means to accomplish the same end.

Equality of opportunity is good but declining. During the 1980s, the gap between the rich and the poor grew. Most poor people in the U.S. are white, but there is a large, disproportionately black underclass that exists outside the economic mainstream. Characterized by seemingly permanent unemployment, the underclass lives to a great extent on welfare payments. Heavy drug use, high crime rates, female-headed households, and large numbers of poorly fed, badly educated, illegitimate children characterize underclass neighborhoods. One report in 1990 suggested that men in Bangladesh have a better chance than men in Harlem in New York City for living past age forty. The quality of life in America's older cities is in decline.

Despite the 1954 Supreme Court ruling against school segregation, some American school districts experimented with deliberately all-black or all-black male schools with special black curricular emphases. These were desperate attempts to motivate black youngsters who had poor skills and low self-esteem. There is also a growing black middle class, which has made significant gains in housing, education, and employment since the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.

Under the terms of the 1986 immigration reform legislation, employers who hire illegal aliens face penalties. Studies in 1990 showed that employers took the possibility of sanctions so seriously that they discriminated against legal immigrants, especially Hispanics. In March 1990, the U.S. Department of Labor made a three-day sweep of workplaces across the country and found widespread violation of the child labor laws.

Environmentally, many parts of the U.S. have serious problems. Unacceptably high levels of air, water, and ground pollution threaten inhabitants with higher disease rates and may lead to reductions in personal freedoms in the 1990s, such as restrictions on the use of automobiles and water supplies.

The U.S. government seems largely indifferent to the plight of the American Indians. Most descendants of the first Americans live in poverty. Several tribes have cases in court against the federal government, charging violation of treaty provisions relating to control over land and resources.

In comparison with many other countries, the U.S. has a relatively low rate of government corruption, but a relatively strong tendency to prosecute corrupt public officials. The federal government and many states have tightened their standards of ethics since the mid-1970s, and are likely to become more stringent following the Savings and Loan scandal.
President Luis Alberto Lacalle took office on 1 March 1990 with a promise to jump-start a stagnant economy by reducing the role of the state in Uruguay's traditionally statist society. He secured the support of the opposition Colorado party for his free-market proposals, but his efforts were undercut by Uruguay's powerful Communist-led trade unions, which carried out four general strikes during his first six months in office.

After achieving independence from Spain in 1825, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay was established in 1830. The Colorado Party dominated the relatively democratic political system with few interruptions until it was finally ousted in the 1958 elections. It returned to power in 1966, the same year voters approved a constitutional amendment returning the political system to a one-man presidency. A sustained economic crisis, student and worker unrest, and the mounting activities of the Tupamaro urban guerrilla movement eventually led to a military takeover of the government in 1973.

The government was returned to civilian hands in 1985 following three years of protracted negotiations between the right-wing military regime of Gen. Gregorio Alvarez and civilian politicians joined in the so-called Multipartidaria. Jose Sanguinetti of the Colorado party won the competitive presidential election in November 1984 and took office, along with a newly elected congress, in March 1985.

The current political system is modeled after that of the democratic 1967 constitution. Both the president and a bicameral Congress consisting of a ninety-nine-member Chamber of Deputies and a thirty-one-member Senate are elected for five years through a complicated system of electoral lists that allows parties to run multiple candidates. The leading presidential candidate of the party receiving the most votes overall is the winner, in essence, party primaries are conducted simultaneously with the general election. Congressional seats are allocated on the basis of each party's share of the total vote, but each party usually has various lists of candidates, among whom prior agreements have been made to unify or transfer votes. Municipal and regional governments are also elected.

A major issue since the return to democratic rule has been civil-military relations. In the negotiated transition, the military backed down from demands for a permanent say in national security matters; its defense actions and the declaration of a state of siege are now subject to congressional approval. However, the nation divided in 1986 when the Sanguinetti government pushed through Congress an amnesty for officers accused of human rights violations during military rule. The constitution permits a referendum on laws passed by the legislature, provided that 25 percent of the electorate sign a petition requesting it. A sustained effort by predominantly leftist opponents of the amnesty led to the collection of enough signatures, and a plebiscite was held on 16 April 1989. Uruguayans voted, 57 percent to 43, to confirm the amnesty law.
After the plebiscite, the campaign for the 26 November 1989 general and municipal elections began, with economic stagnation and social issues dominating. By the end of September, there were eleven candidates from seven parties and coalitions seeking to succeed President Sanguinetti. The ruling right-of-center Colorado party had three candidates. The centrist National (Blanco) party, the other traditional party, also had three. The predominantly Marxist Broad Front coalition had one.

The leading Blanco candidate was Luis Alberto Lacalle and the leading Colorado candidate was Jorge Batlle. The Broad Front candidate was Liber Seregni. In the 26 November vote, Lacalle was elected president as the National Party obtained 37.4 percent of the vote against 28.8 percent for the Colorados. Although the Broad Front obtained only 8 percent of the national vote, in municipal voting it captured Montevideo, the nation's capital and home to nearly half the country's population. In congressional races, the Blancos won 51 of 129 seats, with the Colorados taking 39, the Broad Front 29, and the remaining 10 going to smaller, predominantly social democratic parties.

To overcome the lack of a parliamentary majority, Lacalle secured a co-governing agreement with the Colorados by offering them three cabinet positions. After the 1 March 1990 inauguration, he began to push legislation on privatizing inefficient state enterprises and attracting foreign investment. However, his program encountered strong opposition from the powerful, Communist-led Interunion Workers Plenum-National Convention of Workers (PIT-CNT), which carried out a series of paralyzing general strikes with the support of the Broad Front municipal administration in Montevideo. In the fall of 1990, with union leaders warning of a "social explosion" if the government continued to move on economic reform, Lacalle was struggling to keep his proposals from being diluted. He got a boost at the end of October when the Colorado party voted to maintain the co-governing agreement.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression, freedom of religion and the right to organize political parties, labor unions and civic organizations are respected. Elections and referendums are overseen by an independent electoral commission.

With the return to civilian rule in 1985, legal status was restored to all proscribed political organizations including the Communist party (PCU), as well as the country's trade union confederations. The Tupamaros renounced violence and registered as a political party, the National Liberation Movement, which formed a coalition with the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (PST) and other radical organizations. After the 1985 inauguration, the Sanguinetti government released all political prisoners, including former Tupamaro guerrillas, and permitted the return of an estimated 20,000 exiles.

Political expression is occasionally restricted by violence associated with hotly contested political campaigns and government-labor disputes. Labor is well organized, politically powerful, and has frequently used its right to strike. Since 1985, there have been more than a dozen general strikes and numerous smaller stoppages over wages, government austerity policies, and the reinstatement of social welfare programs eliminated by the former military government.

The judiciary is independent and headed by a Supreme Court. The system includes courts of appeal, regional courts and justices of the peace.

A long tradition of intellectual and press freedom, severely curtailed

during the years of military rule, was restored with the return of civilian government. The press is privately owned, and broadcasting is both commercial and public. There is no censorship. There are seven daily newspapers, many associated with political parties, and a number of weeklies, including the influential Busqueda. Television has become an increasingly important part of the political landscape; the 1989 election campaign featured a series of presidential debates and news coverage was extensive.

Vanuatu

Polity: Parliamentary democracy
Economy: Capitalist-statist
Population: 200,000
HDI: 0.521 (medium)
Life Expectancy: 63 combined
Ethnic groups: Indigenous Melanisian (90 percent); French, English, Vietnamese, Chinese, and other Pacific islanders

Overview:

An archipelago of some eighty islands north of New Caledonia, Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) in 1990 saw continued tensions between the government of Prime Minister Father Walter Lini, head of Party of Our Land (VP), who was re-elected in 1987, and the opposition led by former ally and ex-VP general-secretary Barak Sope. In 1989, Sope’s uncle, then-president George Sokomanu, the titular head of state, attempted to dissolve parliament and install Sope as prime minister. The two men were subsequently sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on sedition and mutiny charges, but the country’s Appeals Court overturned the convictions.

In March, four months before the country was to mark the tenth anniversary of its independence after more than seventy years of British-French rule, the Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP) led by Sope demanded the amnesty of long-time political prisoner Jimmy Moli Stevens as part of the anniversary celebrations. Stevens had been sentenced to fourteen years and six months in 1980 for his part in leading an insurrection. He was sentenced to an extra two years and three months in 1982 when he and other prisoners broke jail and attempted to leave the country.

Other MPP resolutions called for a tougher campaign to topple the Lini government and the VP in general elections expected in November 1991. For its part, the government said that the MPP’s position on Stevens jeopardized the seventy-one-year-old prisoner’s release.

In August, President Lini assessed ten years of independence as a period of steady growth and achievement, and indicated that he planned to review the country’s constitution, drafted at the time of independence, to reflect changes in Vanuatu society. One area of review would be the customary authority of chiefs in the villages which, according to the president often comes into conflict with the current constitution and the legal system. According to President Lini, clarifying the role of the chiefs is important because they form a unique and integral part of a democratic system and reflect the specific traditions of the people.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The people of Vanuatu have the power to change their government through democratic means. The judiciary, a blend of British, French and customary models, is independent and fair. The government-run national newspaper and
radio offer diverse views, although the government has at times restricted the opposition's access to the media. There are no restrictions on freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion is protected by law. There are no domestic or foreign travel restrictions. Workers have the right to organize and strike, and some twenty unions belong to the Vanuatu Trade Union Congress.

Venezuela

**Polity:** Presidential-legislative democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 19,600,000

**HDI:** 0.861 (high)

**Life Expectancy:** 66 male, 72 female

**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous

**Political Rights:** 1

**Civil Liberties:** 3

**Status:** Free

Overview:

Venezuela, one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, is showing strains. The municipal and gubernatorial elections held in December 1989 were marked by an abstention rate of nearly 70 percent, and public opinion polls reveal broad disillusionment with the country's traditional political parties. Also, popular discontent continued to mount in 1990 in response to the tough economic austerity measures taken by the social democratic government of President Carlos Andres Perez.

The Republic of Venezuela was established in 1830, nine years after achieving independence from Spain. A history of political instability and long periods of military dictatorships culminated with the overthrow of the Gen. Marcos Perez Jimenez regime by a popular democratic movement in 1958. The election of President Romulo Betancourt and the promulgation of a new constitution in 1961 established a system of democratic governance which has been in place ever since.

The 1961 constitution established a federal system consisting of twenty states and a federal district (Caracas). The president and a bicameral Congress consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies are directly elected for five years. The Senate has at least two members from each of the states and from the federal district. All former presidents are life members of the Senate and additional seats are awarded to minority parties. There are currently 201 seats in the Chamber, including some seats awarded to minority parties. State legislatures and municipal councils are elected.

Since 1958, the Venezuelan democracy has been dominated by two political parties, the social democratic Democratic Action (AD) party and the Christian Democratic Christian Social Party (COPEI). The AD has won the last two national elections, including those in December 1988 when former President Carlos Andres Perez (1974-79) defeated COPEI's Eduardo Fernandez. However, AD lost its congressional majorities, taking only 23 of 49 elective seats in the Senate and 97 of 201 seats in the Chamber. The left-wing Movement to Socialism (MAS) showed increased popularity, taking 3 seats in the Senate and 18 in the Chamber. COPEI has held the presidency twice since 1958, most recently under President Luis Herrera Campins (1979-84).

Less than a month after Perez's 2 February 1989 inauguration, the capital city of Caracas was torn by three days of violent street protests. The explosion of discontent was in response to deteriorating living standards and the government's austerity program intended to stabilize the debt-strapped
economy. Under national emergency provisions of the constitution, the
government declared martial law which lasted for ten days. The riots left
over 300 people dead according to official sources. In May, a one-day
general strike, the first since the return to civilian rule, called by the power-
ful Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) marked an unprecedented
split in the traditional alliance between AD and the nation’s labor unions.

The decline in popular support for the Perez government was further
evident in the 3 December 1989 gubernatorial and municipal elections. AD
lost in over half the country’s 20 states and in over half the 269 municipal
districts. Three governorships went to left-wing parties which had camp-
paigned on strong anti-corruption platforms. What was most striking, how-
ever, was the overwhelming voter abstention, nearly 70 percent, despite the
first-ever opportunity to elect governors and mayors directly. Previously,
governors were appointed by the nation’s president, and mayors chosen
indirectly in their municipalities.

As the government tried to move ahead in 1990 with economic re-
structuring, it confronted periodic rioting and labor protests. In mid-1990, a
major program to privatize the 400-odd inefficient state-run enterprises
appeared to bog down amid fears of a repeat of the 1990 social explosion, a
sharp increase in crime, and continuing corruption scandals involving high-
level AD officials. In August, a public opinion poll showed only 60 percent
of the respondents strongly favoring the country’s democratic system, with 20
percent openly favoring a return, after thirty-two years, to military rule.

The Perez government nonetheless stated that it would stick to its eco-
nomic reform program. Venezuela is a leading oil producer, and the govern-
ment was hoping that the sharp rise in oil prices resulting from the Persian
Gulf crisis would provide a cushion until the restructuring process, which had
pushed unemployment to 20 percent by mid-1990, began to pay off.

Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:

Constitutional guarantees regarding free expression, freedom of religion and
the right to organize political parties, civic organizations and labor unions are
generally respected. Political parties occupy the spectrum from right to left
and labor unions are strong and well organized. Venezuelan laws also meet
international human rights standards. However, the rule of law is often slow
to be implemented and human rights abuses, while not systematic, have been
on the rise in recent years.

There are a number of independent human rights organizations. Following
the February 1989 riots, these groups fielded numerous complaints of abuses
by police security forces, including allegations of torture and arbitrary shoot-
tings. An investigation by a government commission led to the release of ali
detainees, but no response on the charges of abuse. There are no political pris-
oners, but there are continuing reports of deaths at the hands of security forces.

The judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court whose members are elected
by a joint session of Congress. Although independent, the judicial system
grinds slowly and often ineffectively; less than a third of a prison population
that totals about 30,000 has been convicted of a crime. Also, military courts
investigating abuses by members of the armed forces are slow to cooperate
with the civil court system.

The press is privately owned. There are nearly a dozen independent daily
newspapers. Radio and television are mostly private, supervised by an
association of broadcasters under the government communications ministry.
Censorship of the press and broadcasting media, however, occurs during
states of emergency, most recently in February 1989. A number of journalists have been warned or arrested, and programs suspended for failure to comply with emergency restrictions.

Vietnam

**Polity:** Communist one-party  
**Political Rights:** 7
**Economy:** Statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 7
**Population:** 70,200,000  
**Status:** Not Free
**HDI:** 0.608 (medium/d)  
**Life Expectancy:** 57 male, 61 female
**Ethnic groups:** Predominantly Vietnamese, with Chinese, Khmer and other minorities

Overview:

Among the world’s poorest nations, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (proclaimed in 1976, a year after Communist North Vietnamese forces defeated South Vietnam), in 1990 continued to bemoan the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It also resisted calls for political liberalization from reform-minded members of the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the “only leading force leading the state and society” under the existing constitution. An umbrella Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) includes the VCP, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, as well as official trade unions, peasant, women, youth and other organizations.

Seventy-five-year-old VCP General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh, who has led the country since 1986, is the architect of an economic reform initiative launched in 1987. Known as *doi moi* ("renovation"), it aimed at reducing bureaucracy, instituting monetary reform, restructuring the collective agricultural system, and stimulating foreign investment. The reforms caused a rift in the VCP Politburo between orthodox hardliners and reformers.

On 28 March, at the end of a stormy fifteen-day central committee plenum, the party announced the expulsion of Tran Xuan Bach, the Politburo member responsible for ideology and a leading advocate of greater political reform who, many believed, was being groomed as Linh’s successor. A month earlier, in a broadcast speech, Bach had warned cadres that Asian Communists were not immune to the tumultuous changes taking place in Eastern Europe. A VCP communique said Bach was dismissed “for his grave violations of party, organizational and disciplinary principles, which have caused many bad consequences.”

There were other signals that the VCP was wary of any deviation from a totalitarian, one-party system. At least a dozen Vietnamese were detained or had their movements curtailed, allegedly to prevent them from instigating anti-government activities. Among them were two Roman Catholic priests.

In July, in a major policy shift, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker announced in Paris that the U.S. would open a dialogue with Vietnam about Cambodia. The U.S. has had virtually no high-level contact with Vietnam since 1975. The move was seen as opening the door to eventual normalization of relations between the two countries. To date, the U.S. has blocked any further aid to Vietnam by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Western loans and investment are desperately needed by Vietnam’s collapsing economy, particularly in the face of rapidly declining aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

However, despite Vietnam assurances that all of its troops were removed
from Cambodia in September 1989, there were persistent reports, particularly early in the year, that Vietnam had sent several thousand troops to Cambodia to support the regime of Hun Sen, which it installed in 1979.

On the economic front, there were marginal signs of improvement. Inflation was cut from around 700 percent a year to around 25 percent. Peasants can own land and most subsidies for consumer goods were abolished. In 1988, the country was a net importer of rice, but by 1990—with the end of a drought and the introduction of free-market forces for farmers—it was the world's third largest exporter. In mid-summer, Vietnam amended its foreign investment laws to allow private groups to participate with foreign organizations in investment projects. Previously, only state organizations had been allowed to make contacts. Some areas remained closed to private ventures, such as the defense industry and economic and technological sectors of strategic importance. The law was aimed at encouraging more foreign investment. But problems persisted, partly because of the end of Soviet aid and the U.S. embargo. Unemployment was another problem, particularly after tens of thousands of troops returned from Cambodia and had to be absorbed into the economy.

During its ninth plenary in late August, the central committee warned that corruption, incompetent managers and a cumbersome bureaucracy threaten the modest economic gains of recent years.

The plight of the "boat people," who continue to leave the country, remains an international issue. In May, Britain and six Southeast Asian nations attempted to persuade the Bush administration and the Vietnamese government to agree to the forced return of thousands of boat people deemed to be economic migrants and not political refugees.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Vietnam is a one-party state in which citizens do not have the right to change their system of government democratically. The judiciary is not independent, political crimes remain on the books and the legal system is a shambles. The criminal code, adopted in 1985, regulates only the state and cooperative economic sectors, and has not kept pace with economic reforms. Because of years of war, "the problem of civil law was neglected," the Justice Minister said in 1990. "We only have decrees against spies, invaders and traitors. It is too hard to gather the National Assembly to pass laws."

The rule of law remains an elusive goal, and there is a shortage of trained lawyers and jurists. Compulsory labor and detention without charge or trial persist in re-education camps. The government controls all media, and freedom of speech is restricted, as is freedom of assembly. Religious groups continue to be monitored and repressed, and all Party members must be atheists. Travel abroad is severely restricted and identity cards are necessary for internal travel. It is easier for Vietnamese from abroad to visit families in Vietnam, and the government has encouraged such visits to bolster the economy. Some 30,000 visited Vietnam to celebrate Tet, the lunar new year, and many visitors are investing in new businesses, mostly in what was South Vietnam. Unions are controlled by the Party and strikes are forbidden.
Overview:

Key issues facing the government of Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana in 1990 revolved around political and economic reforms in Western Samoa, which consists of two main islands and several islets in the Pacific and which gained independence from New Zealand in 1962.

The political system is a blend of British-style parliamentary democracy and traditional Samoan social-cultural structure based on extended family groupings. The position of head of state, recruited from the four main island chiefs, has been held by Susuga Malietoa Tanumafili II since the death in 1963 of Tupua Tamasese, with whom he shared the post. Although Tanumafili is designated for life, future heads of state will be elected to five-year terms by the unicameral, forty-five member Legislative Assembly, all but two of whose members are elected by the some 20,000 family heads, or matai. The head of state appoints the prime minister and the members of the cabinet, who are drawn from the Legislative Assembly. The matai consult with their extended families before selecting candidates for the Legislative Assembly. Matai not meeting their responsibilities can be removed. Local government is mainly carried out by the matai, who have legal ownership of land, and the village fono, or council. Prime Minister Alesana was named following elections in February 1988, in which his party, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), the country’s first constituted political group formed in 1982, won a bare majority of twenty-four seats. An opposition Samoan National Development Party (SNDP) was formed following the 1988 elections, succeeding the previous Christian Democratic Party. Party function, however, is secondary to traditional personal and social relationships in the political process.

In June the cabinet paved the way for greater democracy in Western Samoa by calling for a referendum to determine whether universal suffrage should be established. The proposed referendum, the first since May 1961, asked the public whether the right to vote should be extended to all people age twenty-one and over, although only the matai would be allowed to run as candidates. The referendum also asked whether the single-chamber Legislative Assembly should be enlarged to a bicameral body. In economic reform, the government proposed a capital gains tax, a drop in income taxes, the reduction of many import tariffs and the abolition of import duties on agriculture-related material and export taxes on farm products. The government planned to provide villages with interest-free loans for school building programs, the establishment of a Housing Corporation to provide housing finance and a means-tested benefit for people over sixty-five.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Citizens have democratic means to change their government. The judiciary is independent of government interference, but matai decisions on customary law are not subject to judicial review. The government oversees radio broadcasting; TV broadcasts are received from American Samoa, and there is an independent press along with a government fortnightly. There have been instances of
of implicit censorship and contempt citations against journalists. In January, a reporter for the *Samoa Times* was arrested and fined for contempt by a judge he criticized in a commentary. There are no restrictions on association and assembly, and religious freedom is guaranteed and respected. There are no restrictions regarding internal movement or resettlement, and foreign travel is unrestricted. Workers have the right to form and join unions, although none has emerged in the private sector. A public service association represents government workers, and the Supreme Court has upheld their right to strike under certain restrictions regarding public safety.

**Yemen**

**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

In May 1990, the leaders of North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or PDRY) formed a new republic. The formally unified country, with its capital in Sana, is now the most populous state on the Arabian peninsula.

Unity is really more an absorption by North Yemen of the South. The latter's economy had been in a shambles, despite supposedly vast oil reserves. Because it billed itself as a Marxist-Leninist state, the tide of revolution and reform in the Communist world undermined the PDRY.

The idea of unity had been on and off the agenda between the two Yemens since the 1960s. The larger and more prosperous, pro-Western North had pushed for unity, but the PDRY’s Marxist-Leninist orientation prevented the possibility of merger until the past year.

In 1989, facing economic bankruptcy without Soviet backing, the PDRY leadership cleared the way by renouncing Marxism-Leninism, admitted its past errors regarding Arab and Islamic identity, promised to help build and fund mosques, and encouraged private enterprise. In January 1990, the southern government released all political prisoners, including supporters of former President Ali Nasr Muhammad, and allowed political parties to form. The PDRY dismantled the secret police in March 1990.

Allegedly, Saudi Arabia tried preventing Yemeni unity by bribing northern tribes to undermine the government of North Yemen. There were also reports that the Saudis attempted to bribe South Yemen to back out of the merger.

Upon their dissolution in May, parliaments from both countries elected a new governing council, headed by President and General Ali Abdulla Saleh, formerly the leader of North Yemen, and Vice President Ali Salme al-Baidh, the secretary-general of the ruling southern Socialist Party. The former PDRY president is now prime minister, and there is a thirty-nine-member cabinet.

Deputies from both parliaments will remain in office until 1992, serving in a joint parliament of more than 300 members. The government has promised new elections after that. The majority of constituencies will be in the former North Yemen. Meanwhile, the government will merge the ministries and
agencies of the two countries. The two armies are already united, and the
government has formed a joint state oil company and shared some utilities.

Twenty members of the joint parliament are supporters of former PDRY
President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, who had lived in exile in the North
since losing a civil war in 1986. In that war, 10,000 people died, and the
Soviets began withdrawing from the country.

Real reconciliation between the two Yemens will face some resistance
from northern fundamentalists, who were apparently responsible for various
protest bombings in Sana in early 1990, and from Saudi-backed tribesmen.
Both groups object to the secular, liberal way of life in the South, including
the availability of alcohol. In the North, 25 of 159 MPs voted against
unification. The vote of the PDRY’s Supreme People’s Council was allegedly
unanimous, but some orthodox Stalinists reportedly objected.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Yemen said it would abide by
the international embargo against Iraq, but it sympathized with Iraq. President
Saleh described his position as “non-aligned,” but against the presence of
foreign troops on the Arabian peninsula, and in favor of an “Arab solution”
to the crisis. During the Iran-Iraq war, Yemeni troops were the only ones
organized to fight alongside Iraqi units, while Iraqi advisers have trained
Yemeni police and given technical advice. In late August 1990, there was a
pro-Iraqi demonstration of 30,000 people.

In September 1990, Saudi Arabia expressed its disapproval of Yemen’s
foreign policy by withdrawing the work permits for Yemenis employed in
that kingdom. As a result, 500,000 Yemenis had to leave Saudi Arabia. The
expellees charged that the Saudis were holding them up at the border and
confiscating their possessions.

Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:

Yemenis do not have the right to change their government by democratic
means, but could possibly be able to do that within two years. In the merged
government, a transitional civilian-military council has the effective power,
but thirty-one political parties are allowed to function. It is not clear what
role the parties will play.

At the end of 1989, South Yemen abandoned Marxism-Leninism, legalized
political parties, and lifted press restrictions. North Yemen had had a semi-
competitive system previously. Adopted in November 1990, the new constitu-
tion calls for elections by secret ballot and for an Islamic role in legislation. In
pre-merger North Yemen, the government applied a "good Muslim" test to
prospective assembly candidates, which was meant to discourage leftists.

Both states had secret services which violated personal freedoms. In North
Yemen, there were "disappearances" of people, poor prison conditions,
political prisoners, and no fair public trials in security courts. In South
Yemen, torture and incommunicado detention were common. The PDRY also
had political executions. In pre-merger North and South Yemen, the govern-
ments owned most media, and they practiced censorship. However, South
Yemen had an alleged loosening of its press restrictions before the merger.

Both North and South Yemen had government-controlled labor federa-
tions. There were religious restrictions in both systems. The North allowed
Jews and Christians to worship in private, and did not permit the construction
of churches and synagogues. The South attempted to regulate the content of
sermons. The extent to which the merged country permits political rights and
civil liberties will become more clear in 1991 following the adoption of a
constitution in November 1990.
Yugoslavia

Overview:

In 1990, this ethnically and religiously diverse loose confederation was threatened with disintegration as all six constituent republics held elections, separatist sentiment increased in Slovenia and Croatia, and ethnic violence flared up in several regions. These factors, plus a deteriorating economy, further strained a weakened and fragmented federal government headed by Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

The country was forged in 1918 from the remnants of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. From the outset, cultural and economic differences separated the Roman Catholic, pro-European north (Slovenia and Croatia) from the poorer Eastern Orthodox and Muslim south. After World War II, Communist partisan leader Jozip Broz (Tito) won a power struggle, and proclaimed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on 19 November 1945. Tito, a Croat, sought to unify the country's diverse ethnic groups concentrated largely in national territories with long histories of hostility. Although a Communist, he adopted a neutral, nonaligned policy and the country was expelled from the Soviet bloc in 1948.

Under Tito, Yugoslavia became a one-party state with political power concentrated in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). To placate nationalist feelings, the federal republics were accorded national status and substantial self-government. Each republic had its own party and governmental apparatus, with an indirectly elected assembly, an executive and judiciary. State power was vested in a bicameral Federal Assembly, elected through a complex process to make its as representative as possible. After Tito's death in 1980, the duties of head of state were vested in a collective presidency to rotate annually. Ante Markovic was elected president of the Federal Executive Council and prime minister in March 1989.

Nineteen-ninety began amid deep divisions and heightened ethnic tensions. Late in 1989, Slovenia, economically the most prosperous republic, took steps toward greater economic reform, democratization and political autonomy. With the approval of Milan Kucan, the reform-minded leader of Slovenia's Communist Party, the parliament overwhelmingly approved a set of constitutional amendments that strengthened its right to secede from the federation. Meanwhile, Serbia, under hardline conservative Slobodan Milosevic, gained control over the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, home to 70 percent of the country's Albanians and the scene of ethnic violence. Milosevic's popularity among Serbs aroused fears of Serbian revanchism, particularly in increasingly reformist Croatia, which accused Serbia's leader of stirring up nationalism among Serbs in Croatia. Bosnia-Herzegovinia and Macedonia also aligned against Serbia.

On 22 January, a bitterly divided LCY voted to give up its forty-five-year monopoly on power and to permit a new political system in which other parties could compete. But the party threatened to become irrelevant when
the Slovenian delegation walked out. Amid the political turmoil new violence erupted in Kosovo, with scores of people killed in the worst unrest since 1981. The violence, a reaction to Serbia's administration of the region, intensified in February, and the army stepped up its presence in an attempt to restore order. Yugoslav President Janez Drnovsek appealed for dialogue in the name of the collective eight-man state presidency. After months of unrest, Serbia lifted the state of emergency in Kosovo in mid-April, but tensions continued to simmer throughout the year. On 3 July, more than 100 ethnic Albanian parliamentary deputies, locked out of the parliament building by pro-Serbian authorities, declared Kosovo independent from Serbia. Two days later, Serbia dissolved the Kosovo assembly and executive council, and several weeks later announced it would press criminal charges against the deputies. In late August, riot police fired tear gas to disperse thousands of ethnic Albanians waiting to tell a visiting U.S. congressional delegation about human rights abuses. At a secret meeting on 7 September, ethnic Albanian deputies of the outlawed Kosovo parliament declared secession from Serbia.

The ethnic unrest further polarized the country. Croatia's Communist organization suspended its dealings with the LCY. Calls for separatism intensified in the republic and in Slovenia.

In April, elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia. In the first multiparty elections since 1938, the opposition coalition, DEMOS, won an absolute majority in Slovenia. The broad-based coalition, composed of the Liberal Democrats, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, the Peasant Party, the Greens and others, campaigned for independence within a year, and won 55 percent of the votes for the new parliament. The former Communists, the Party for Democratic Renewal (LCS-PDR), came in second with 17.3 percent, and Milan Kucan, the popular LCS-PDR presidential candidate, won in a runoff.

On 22 April, some thirty-four parties took part in elections in Croatia. The two main coalitions were the center-right Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Gen. Franjo Trudjman, a military historian, and the Coalition of National Understanding, which included Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and others. The CDU, with an estimated 600,000 members, took 104 of the 131 seats decided by majority vote in the first round for the 356-member Republic Assembly. The Communists, renamed the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes (LCC-PDC), came in second. After a third and final round in May, the CDU held 206 seats, with the Communists gaining 73. The parliament elected Gen. Trudjman president of the republic. The CDU ran on a nationalist platform, calling for the eventual creation of a separate state. Gen. Trudjman's election alarmed Croatia's Serbs. In August, hundreds of Serbs armed with rifles and pistols sealed off towns in Croatia, and held an autonomy referendum. Croatia charged that the trouble had been instigated by Serbia. On 1 October, in an atmosphere of rising ethnic tensions, Serbs in Croatia, after a two-month referendum process, declared the republic's predominantly Serbian-populated counties to be autonomous.

After the democratic elections in Croatia and Serbia, Prime Minister Markovic called for the creation of a new political party in an effort to undercut the power of Milosevic and form a progovernment power base. Meanwhile, in Serbia itself, battle lines were being drawn between reformers calling for free and democratic elections and supporters of Milosevic, who became head of the republic in November 1989 in what were widely be-
lieved to be fraudulent elections. Despite anti-Milosevic demonstrations in June and some signs that his power was weakening, Milosevic remained popular in Serbia (and among Serbs in other republics) and continued to pose a formidable challenge to economic reform.

By midsummer, Prime Minister Markovic continued both his economic reform policies and attempts to hold the country together. In a July poll, he received 72 percent support as the most popular and trusted politician in Yugoslavia. The same month, he announced that he would form "an Alliance of Reformist Forces to build a new and prosperous Yugoslavia." Despite his popularity, the government continued to be plagued by intensifying conflicts in the country's republics and calls for greater decentralization.

In November, Macedonians went to the polls in the first round of elections for the republic's 120-seat parliament. The race was contested by the Alliance of Reformist Forces (ARF) of Prime Minister Markovic, the reconstituted Communist Party (LCM-PDT), the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity, and the nationalist All-Macedonian Movement and the more radical Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) which supported unification with Macedonians living in Greece and Bulgaria. After the first round, IMRO trailed the LCM-PDT, but election officials declared the vote null and void in 54 precincts because of irregularities. IMRO did surprisingly well in the 25 November second round. The final results of the 9 December third round showed IMRO with 37 seats; LCM-PDT, 31; the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity, 25; and the ARF, 19. The rest went to smaller parties. By late December, the parties had yet to reach an agreement on a government (under the law they had thirty days to do so), and new elections could take place on 9 March 1991.

On 18 November, the first multiparty elections in fifty years were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a diverse population that includes Muslim Slavs (39 percent), Serbs (32 percent), Croats (18.5 percent), and others (10 percent). Among the ethnic parties were the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action (PDA), the Croatian Democratic Community (CDC), and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP). Other parties included the Communists, renamed the League of Communists-Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina (LCS-SDP) and Prime Minister Markovic's ARF, which cut across ethnic lines. Early results of the first round showed that the nationalist parties were heading for a landslide victory. Leaders of the three nationalist parties said they would form a coalition in the 240-seat parliament. The Communists and the ARF trailed badly. After the 2 December second round, the PDA won 86 seats; the SDP, 70; and the CDC, 45.

In mid-November, Prime Minister Markovic warned that continued moves by the country's restive republics to block political and economic reforms would lead to the disintegration of the country. Yet, Slovenia and Croatia continued to resist strengthening the federal government. Serbia, while supporting a strong federation, balked at the federal government's proposals for property reform, agricultural policies and stiff measures aimed at forcing large, money-losing enterprises to operate profitably or go bankrupt.

On 9 December, 41 parties contested elections for Serbia's president and 250-member parliament. Milosevic won a resounding victory over Vuk Draskovic, leader of the nationalist Serbian Renewal Movement. The Socialists (the renamed Communists) won 43 percent of the vote for parliament. On 25 December, following a second-round, official results showed that the Milosevic's Socialists won 194 seats in the new parliament. In Kosovo, the
Albanian majority boycotted the elections. In Montenegro, the smallest republic, 10 parties contested 125 seats in parliament. Momir Bulatovic, president of the League of Communists of Montenegro (LCM), won 42 percent in the first round of the presidential vote, and won the 10 December second round. The LCM won overwhelmingly in the elections for the 125-member National Assembly.

In another strike to Yugoslav unity, on 23 December Slovenes voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence in a referendum. The vote did not mean an automatic break from the federation, but the plebiscite endorsed a six-month plan by the republic to take gradual control of military, foreign and monetary policies now in the hands of the federal government. Two days earlier, Croatia's parliament approved a new constitution that provided for secession.

The political disintegration of the country made it difficult for the prime minister to implement economic restructuring. The reforms, launched in January, called for full convertibility of the dinar, and by mid-year had reduced inflation from 1,250 percent in 1989 to some 13 percent. By July, 1,200 joint ventures had been started. But unemployment began to rise to over 15 percent and industrial production declined. By October, battered by ethnic unrest and political divisions, the economy continued to slide. Retail prices had doubled since the start of the year and industrial production had fallen 10 percent from the previous year. Living standards had declined 18 percent in a year, and retail sales were down 23 percent. The trade deficit stood at $2.2 billion. In a further blow, Serbia heightened a dispute with non-Communist Serbia and Croatia in October by slapping new taxes on imports from the two northern republics to protect its own economy.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Despite generally fair, multiparty elections in all six constituent republics, and the formation of a Alliance of Reformist Forces by the prime minister and the LCY's abandonment of its leading role, Yugoslavs did not have the means through federal elections to change their government. Each republic has its own judiciary and criminal code. Ordinary criminal and civil cases are usually open and fair. The ethnic unrest in Kosovo led to scores of deaths and charges of human rights abuses. In 1990, eleven prison guards went on trial for repeatedly beating thirty-six persons in administrative detention, mostly ethnic Albanians. Several Albanian activists and political figures were arrested for political activity. Free speech is circumscribed, but the degree varies by republic. Slovenia has a lively independent press, and the government-controlled Yugoslav national press has printed a diverse range of social and political issues. There were charges in 1990 that the Serbian press had abandoned objectivity for an openly partisan and nationalist version of current events. The paper Politička, which had an international reputation as one of the most credible newspapers in the Communist world, in 1990 became a mouthpiece for officially sanctioned Serbian nationalism as advocated by President Milosevic. On 5 July, police forces arrested broadcast and print journalists in Kosovo, and several Albanian-language newspapers were closed in August. Public political gatherings are generally allowed, but there are restrictions, which vary by republic.

Religious freedom in this diverse country is guaranteed, but regulations and restrictions exist, particularly on activities deemed political or nationalist. This was particularly true in Kosovo. Domestic and foreign travel is generally unrestricted. Workers can join trade unions, and some independent
unions have been organized. At the federal level, the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (SSJ) has generally supported the government, but there were signs of growing discontent with the government's economic reforms. In 1989, workers gained the right to strike. In 1990, there were far fewer strikes than the 1,000 and more reported in 1989.

**Zaire**

**Polity:** One-party (transitional)

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 36,600,000

**HDI:** 0.294 (low)

**Life Expectancy:** 48 male, 52 female

**Ethnic groups:** Over 200 ethnic tribes

**Political Rights:** 6

**Civil Liberties:** 6

**Status:** Not Free

Overview:

President Mobutu Sese Seko, faced with the worst civic unrest of his twenty-five-year dictatorial rule and growing disillusionment with his oppressive and corrupt regime by the United States and the World Bank, announced a series of political changes in 1990 ostensibly meant to introduce a multi-party system in this vast, central African nation.

Formerly the Belgian Congo, the country has been ruled since 1965 by Mobutu as a one-party state dominated by the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR). In 1980, an opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDSP) was formed to foster multi-party rule, but its leadership was arrested, then released. The unicameral National Legislative Council, made up of elected MPR-approved members, is subservient to the MPR's Political Bureau, all of whose thirty-eight members are appointed by the president. Council elections are multi-candidate though single-party. In 1984, President Mobutu ran unopposed and was reelected to his third seven-year term.

The president's decision to announce political reforms stemmed from several factors. For decades, the Mobutu regime received U.S. support as a bulwark against communism in the region. But with the settlement of the Namibia conflict, improved U.S.-Soviet relations auguring an end to the Angola conflict, and the dramatic collapse of Communist-totalitarian systems in Eastern Europe, Mobutu came under increased pressure to liberalize what had become one of the most openly corrupt and oppressive regimes in Africa. During a visit to Zaire in March, Secretary of State James Baker told Mobutu that he could no longer automatically rely on U.S. assistance and had to democratize the political process. On the economic front, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, disturbed by financial mismanagement, widespread graft and paltry spending on education and social programs, blocked a $100 million loan on 12 April. Moreover, domestic opposition intensified. During a nationwide tour in January, Mobutu was confronted by calls for democracy and reform.

In an effort to dampen criticism at home and abroad, Mobutu announced on 24 April that he was turning over the reins of government to a prime minister and introducing a multiparty system for next year's elections. Several days later, Lunda Bululu, secretary-general of the Economic Community of Central African States and former legal advisor to the president, was named prime minister to oversee the transition to a multiparty democracy. However, Mobutu said because "people want me to continue to oversee the destiny of the country" he was not stepping down as president.
Less than a week after the president's pledge, government forces killed at least two people in an attack on members of the UDSP attending a meeting at the home of Tshisekedi Wa Mulamba, a former justice minister and interior minister and a leading UDSP official. Over a dozen people were arrested.

In May, the president's announcement that political parties would not be legal until 1991 sparked protests. At the University of Lubumbashi, the second largest city, electricity was shut off and bayonet-wielding security forces invaded the darkened campus and murdered students hiding in their rooms or running away. Casualty estimates range from 30 to 250 killed. The killings sparked international outrage and led to an open rift with Belgium, which called for an international inquiry into the attack on the students. Mobutu responded by threatening to expel all 700 Belgian aid workers. Belgium announced a freeze on credits to Zaire in the wake of the massacre.

During an address marking the thirtieth anniversary of independence, the president announced that only three political parties would be allowed to compete for national power; the three would be determined in local primary elections organized by the MPR in January 1991. The move was seen as an attempt to undermine the opposition, which had mushroomed to some 60 parties, among them the UDSP, the Democratic and Social Christian Party (PDSC), the Independent Republicans, and the Joint Nationalist Front (FCN).

On 14 July, the National Assembly adopted a law governing the operation and organization of political parties, which further impeded freedom of association in blatant violation of the constitution. By the fall, the political situation remained murky. The UDSP, rent by internal disputes, announced that, contrary to its earlier position, it was joining the transition government. Tshisekedi Wa Mulamba and Marcel Lihau requested the defense and interior portfolios for the party. Both had previously declared that the UDSP would never join such a government and had demanded Mobutu's resignation.

Throughout the year, Zaire was plagued by labor unrest. On 9 July, civil servants went on what would be a twelve-week strike after the government refused demands for a 500 percent raise; the government offer was 100 percent. Nurses struck in September, as did taxi and minibus drivers who accused the police of extortion.

On 7 October, President Mobutu, under pressure from the opposition, reversed his earlier decision to allow only three parties to contest national elections next year. He cancelled the January 1991 primary and said that an unlimited number of parties would be allowed to compete. He also said that all parties, which had swelled to eighty, would be permitted access to the state media, and that a new constitution would be submitted to a referendum in 1991. But less than a month later, on 5 November, dozens of people were wounded and hundreds arrested by the army in Kinshasa before a meeting of the UDSP.

A serious setback to Mobutu occurred earlier in the month when the U.S. Congress voted to cut all military and economic aid to Zaire. Congress denied the Bush administration's request for $4 million in military aid and stipulated that $40 million in economic aid be funnelled through humanitarian agencies not affiliated with the Zairian government.

In 1990, Zaire's economy continued to deteriorate. Although the country is rich with cobalt, gold, oil, and copper and has fertile farmland as well as a good system of inland waterways, its per capita income is among the lowest in Africa. A major factor is the rampant corruption and theft from the treas-
ury and government-controlled enterprises. Sources have estimated President Mobutu’s personal wealth at $5 billion, which critics claim was misappropriated. In 1989, figures submitted to the IMF by the Zairian Central Bank indicated that the government spent more money on Mobutu’s “presidency” than for hospitals, schools, road building and all other services combined.

Citizens of Zaire cannot change their government through democratic procedures. Political parties were legalized in 1990, and some eighty associations had registered by year’s end. The judiciary remains firmly in the hands of the state and the MPR. Arbitrary arrest and detention are commonplace, and corruption and abuse are rife in the security and police forces. Dozens of opposition leaders and political activists were arrested and detained in 1990. In May, security forces attacked and murdered university students in Shaba province. Several UDSP rallies and meetings were broken up violently by security forces. Radio and television are government owned and reflect official positions, although at the end of the year the president promised political parties access to the state media. Private newspapers occasionally criticized the government in 1990, but without legal safeguards. Self-censorship continues to be common practice. Nonpolitical associations must register with the government, and freedom of assembly is circumscribed. Churches need government permission to operate. Travel is often restricted for security reasons and citizens must carry identification cards. The umbrella National Union of Zairian Workers (UNTZA) is controlled by the MPR, and membership is compulsory for state employees. In 1990, civil servants went on strike for twelve weeks; other strikes involved teachers, nurses and taxi drivers. There were indications that workers were attempting to organize independent unions in 1990.

**Zambia**

**Polity:** One-party (transitional)  
**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Population:** 8,100,000  
**HDI:** 0.481 (low)  
**Life Expectancy:** 50 male, 53 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Various Bantu tribes (major being Bemba and Lozi), whites, South Asians, mixed-race  

**Political Rights:** 6  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Partly Free  

**Overview:**

Formerly Northern Rhodesia, the Republic of Zambia proclaimed independence in 1964. Four years later, President Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), declared a "one-party participatory democracy," a move institutionalized in the 1972 constitution. Previously, multiple parties had been constitutionally permitted. All candidates for the unicameral, 136-member National Assembly have had to be UNIP members. President Kenneth Kaunda was reelected in October, 1988 to another five-year term.

As the Zambian economy continued to deteriorate in 1990, the concomitant deterioration in the condition of life in the country fueled public restiveness. For example, as public sanitation and water systems broke down with increasing frequency, cholera epidemics hit the shantytowns and townships of the highly urbanized nation; one apparent response by the government to this crisis was to ban public meetings. As the purchasing power of the Zambian
kwacha declined, voices were raised in support of price controls, particularly with regard to food staples and public transportation. A foreign debt of some U.S. $7 billion has given Zambia, with its population of only eight million, one of the highest debts per population ratios in the world. The program of austerity, currency devaluation, and price decontrol agreed to by the government and the IMF meant that use of funds from foreign lenders to keep the cost of living down among the formerly heavily subsidized urban population seemed no longer in the cards.

In late December 1989, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Chairman Frederick Chiluba called for multipartyism in Zambia in view of the fall of one-party systems throughout Eastern Europe. In response, the UNIP-owned Times of Zambia has indicated that the Zambian one-party system had been popularly endorsed in a "referendum to end all referenda" in the early seventies, and asserted that trade union officials had taken a "reactionary stand" contrary to workers' interests by advocating a multi-party system. Various UNIP spokespeople have stated that moving to multipartyism would be regressive for all of Africa, since some countries such as Zambia had early experience with violent clashes between the partisans of tribally-based political parties. In March, President Kaunda said that the recent political changes in Eastern Europe had no application to Zambia, declaring that multipartyism was "Stone Age barbarism."

In March, the leaders of the powerful Mineworkers Union of Zambia, who had been appointed to the UNIP Central Committee some two years earlier, lost in union elections to those with close links to the leadership of the ZCTU. This was seen in some quarters as a defeat in the UNIP's efforts to co-opt the trade union leadership, much of which has publicly advocated multipartyism.

In April, backbench members of parliament managed to defeat a proposed amendment to the constitution by denying the executive, which proposed the change, a needed two-thirds legislative majority. The bill, among its many provisions, would have limited aspirants to the nation's presidency to that individual who had been elected UNIP president at the Party's congress.

In May, Kaunda announced that a referendum would be held on the introduction of multi-party democracy, but he gave no polling date. In June, the price of maize flour was doubled, and the worst rioting in Zambian history broke out in Lusaka and other cities. Looting and stone-throwing by demonstrators met with a forceful official response over the three days of the disturbances. Although certain observers speculated that the government's economic reform program might be jeopardized by political considerations as the date of the referendum approached, the president maintained that the price hike for meal was unalterable.

President Kaunda announced a referendum date of 17 October soon after the riots were put down, blaming the disturbances on the advocates of a multiparty system. The National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy Referendum protested that the October referendum date would not allow for sufficient time to register new voters, and the President then stated that the polling date would be postponed until August 1991. Opposition rallies apparently began to attract enough attendees that UNIP officials warned the media to avoid "inflating" attendance figures.

In September, President Kaunda said that the referendum would be canceled in favor of participation of all legalized political parties in parliamentary and presidential elections in 1991. Multiple parties could be formed once the constitution was amended, and more than one candidate could run

for the presidency. Yet there was no substantive movement by officials to amend the constitution as the next few months passed, and so the UNIP remained the only legal party in accordance with Article Four. A proposed convention by the (renamed) multi-ethnic Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was opposed by police, who denied the organization approval of the necessary permit, citing security concerns. Partisans on both sides traded warnings and charges of harassment and attempted intimidation. MMD leaders were arrested and charged with membership in an illegal political organization and with unlawful assembly. Supporters of the defendants were dispersed by paramilitary riot police outside of the courthouse where the multi-party advocates were being tried.

Nonetheless, one-party rule was officially ended in December when the President signed amendments to the constitution which make opposition political parties legal. The MMD afterward stated that it would register as a political party so as to be able to contest elections scheduled for the fall of 1991.

Zambians have not been able to democratically change their government to date. The first multiparty elections since independence have been scheduled for mid-1991. The ongoing economic crisis was used by the government as a rationale for promulgating laws allowing security forces broad, extraordinary powers of arrest, seizure, and detention without trial under a twenty-five-year-old declared state of emergency provided for by Article 26 of the constitution. This measure has been defended by authorities as having sustained national peace virtually since independence. The judiciary is independent of executive interference, except in political cases, where due process has been violated. However, political prisoners and convicted coup-plotters were recently freed at the order of the president. Free expression has increased under the circumstances of the promised multiparty elections, and this has so far included public criticism of the president and the current one-party political system. Parliamentary sessions are marked by free and open debate. The state owns two national dailies and radio and television. The independent press, though frequently publishing diverse and anti-government views, may still be subject to censorship. Police permits for demonstrations and rallies are needed, but were usually granted in the past. However, freedom of assembly seems to be subject to greater government constraint recently. There are many cultural and professional associations and groups. Freedom of religion is respected. There are some restrictions on travel and movement. Zambia has a strong industrial trade union tradition. All large unions belong to the independent and democratic ZCTU, the only legal confederation. Workers are allowed to strike only after all other legal recourse has been exhausted, but mass walkouts and sporadic wildcat strikes for higher pay have occurred as the kwacha slipped in value and inflation continued apace.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Nonetheless, one-party rule was officially ended in December when the President signed amendments to the constitution which make opposition political parties legal. The MMD afterward stated that it would register as a political party so as to be able to contest elections scheduled for the fall of 1991.
Zimbabwe

**Polity:** One party  
**Political Rights:** 6  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 4  
**Population:** 9,700,000  
**Status:** Partly Free  
**HDI:** 0.576 (medium)  
**Life Expectancy:** 54 male, 58 female  
**Ethnic groups:** Shona (71 percent, with subgroups), Ndebele (16 percent), white (1 percent)

**Overview:**

The year 1990 saw a continuation of President Robert Mugabe's sometimes lonely quest to have one-party rule institutionalized in Zimbabwe. At a joint party congress nine days before the end of 1989, the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led by Mugabe formally merged to form a single party, ZANU-PF. The leaders of the dissolved parties then were selected to form the central committee and politburo of the new party. The new ZANU-PF constitution referred to the goal of establishing a "socialist" society, indicating that its guiding ideology was Marxism-Leninism. This was in line with the principles of the president, who said that the failure of Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe was because it was imposed from the top rather than naturally springing from the grassroots, and that the Party in these states was a limited membership vanguard party rather than a mass party.

The Republic of Zimbabwe, formerly white-ruled Rhodesia, was established on 18 April 1980, after years of guerrilla activity and diplomatic negotiations forced Prime Minister Ian Smith to accept black majority rule. Following parliamentary elections in February 1980, Mugabe, leader of the original ZANU-PF, one of two main guerrilla groups making up the rebel Patriotic Front (PF), was asked to form a government to replace the short-lived government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa (which was elected in 1979 but not recognized by the U.N., the U.S. and the Patriotic Front as legitimate).

After independence, fighting broke out between ZANU armed forces and those of ZAPU, the other main group in the Patriotic Front. The conflict was partly rooted in traditional tribal rivalry between the northern Shona group represented in ZANU and the minority but traditionally dominant Ndebele people from Matabeleland in the south, who made up most of Nkomo's forces. In 1981, violent conflict between the two movements subsided, guerrilla organizations were merged with security forces to form a national army, and Nkomo became a member of the cabinet. Personal animosity between Mugabe and Nkomo and the discovery of arms in a ZAPU stronghold led to the latter's dismissal from the cabinet, and by 1984 there was renewed fighting in Matabeleland. In 1987, merger talks resulted in Nkomo becoming one of two vice-presidents. With the approval of the ZANU-dominated Assembly, Mugabe became president of the country and the post of prime minister was dropped.

Parliament now consists of the 150-member single-chamber House of Assembly, 30 seats being reserved for chiefs and nominated members. Although the White Roll (guaranteed white seats), a product of pre-independence negotiations, has now been abolished, some whites have been appointed to non-elective seats by the President. Three parties are represented in the legislature.

In mid-January, the minister of Home Affairs gave notice in parliament
that the government sought renewal of the twenty-five-year-old state of emergency. The declared emergency allowed detention without trial in the "interests of preserving the security of the state." These measures had been used in asserted response to incursions by RENAMO guerrillas into eastern Zimbabwe from Mozambique, destabilization attempts and attacks on ANC redoubts within Zimbabwe by South Africa, and post-independence unrest in Matebeleland. Within days of the minister's latest request, the House of Assembly voted to extend the state of emergency, and the president then formally proclaimed the extension. However, the following July the government announced that a state of emergency was no longer necessary and the extension was allowed to lapse, a measure hailed by many within the country.

In February, the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) announced that its leader, Edgar Tekere, was to run for president during elections the following month. Tekere was a former secretary-general of ZANU and a minister of manpower, planning, and development early in the Mugabe administration. He lost both positions under the cloud of having been accused of murder, though he was ultimately acquitted on a technicality.

The ZUM election manifesto declared that it stood for a multi-party democracy; withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from service in Mozambique; substantial cuts in public expenditures; privatization of the press and a mixed economy; reductions in income, corporate, and sales tax; abolition of such government ministries as that of Political Affairs and Youth; study of the land redistribution issue; and abolition of the state of emergency.

During the campaign, Tekere condemned ZANU for its adherence to Marxism-Leninism, its goal of establishing a one-party state, and the corruption which he stated was rife throughout the political system. He asserted before the voting that the election would be rigged. His message seems to have been less than adequately disseminated by the media, much of which is government-owned.

It was widely believed that the election would be the last one with a choice of candidates from more than one party, as Mugabe sought a popular mandate to create a one-party state through a convincing victory. The ZANU manifesto contained no mention of this issue, however. The tone of the campaign on both sides was aggressively negative: ZUM was attacked on TV as a scourge in the category of AIDS and allegedly planning a coup if it lost the election, while Tekere said that Mugabe would "end up the same way" as "his friend Nicolae Ceausescu." Gangs of young militants associated with ZANU and ZUM were involved in acts of intimidation and violent confrontation, though ZANU partisans seemed to get the best of such tactics as nine ZUM candidates withdrew from their respective races on the eve of the polling. Tekere charged that ZUM polling agents were chased from vote tabulation points and that the government victory was a reflection of vote-counting irregularities in the absence of oversight.

When election results were tabulated, it was found that only fifty-four percent of those registered had voted, though of these seventy-eight percent had voted for Mugabe. Condemning the foreign press for its emphasis on the low voter turnout as well as its preoccupation with campaign violence, the president said that he had received the mandate to create a one-party state that he had sought. Nevertheless, there was some indication of dissent within the Party on this point even before election results were received. Some officials had stated that the establishment of a one-party state would first
require a referendum whose results would have to ratify such a move.

Zimbabwe has suffered from chronic bottlenecks in transportation, a shortage in foreign exchange, a burgeoning population that produces growing landlessness among the peasantry and many secondary school graduates annually competing for too few new jobs. However, the growth of annual GDP has averaged some four percent over the past decade, relatively good compared to most of Africa. The bulk of the nation’s best farmland is owned and productively cultivated by 4,400 white families. If black farm laborers and tenants are granted land—which they strongly desire—production may well decline, unless the land is accompanied by widespread agricultural extension services.

Although Zimbabwe is effectively a one-party state, citizens freely elect parliamentary representatives and local officials, and there are a number of minor parties. The judicial system is free of government control. The state of emergency was not renewed, and hence extraordinary but legal power for the authorities to curtail the right of assembly or to indefinitely detain without trial does not exist at present. There are reportedly no political prisoners, though there are allegations that some individuals have been convicted as South African spies after confessions were extracted by torture. The major print media are state-run by the Mass Media Trust, and television and radio are government-owned. All tend to reflect a ZANU point of view in their coverage and presentation of the news. Small, private print media are allowed to operate, but the press generally practices self-censorship. Political and nonpolitical organizations are permitted (though the former has faced some restrictions). Political meetings and rallies require police permits, which were not uncommonly denied to the opposition during the March 1990 election on "security" grounds under the terms of the then-extant state of emergency. Business, professional, and social organizations are free from government interference. Freedom of religion is respected, and there are no restrictions on travel. Unions belong to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), but there are some restrictions on the right to strike "essential" services and industries. With the expiration of the ten-year old British-brokered Lancaster House constitution in April, the House of Assembly is empowered to overturn by a two-thirds majority any clause in the bill of rights. Private human rights groups are permitted to operate in the country.
Australia
Christmas Island (Kirimati)

Overview:

Located in the Indian Ocean, Christmas Island is the home of a disappearing phosphate industry, which is owned by the Australian government's Australian Phosphate Corporation. Under Australian administration since 1958, Christmas Island has a government run by an administrator who is appointed by the Governor General, Queen Elizabeth's representative in Australia. Australia classifies the island as an external territory, but residents have the right to opt for Australian citizenship or residency status. Due to the near exhaustion of phosphate, the chief source of employment, many islanders have moved to Western Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The lack of major economic opportunities limits freedom. The Australian government proposed laying off 150 phosphate miners in 1986. This caused labor and ethnic strife. The government decided to reduce the mine labor force gradually during 1986-89.

To reinvigorate the economy, Australia approved construction of a gambling resort complex. Pacific Consultants International of Japan suggested in 1989 that the island needed a new resort hotel, recreational and marine facilities, harbor facilities, and a better airport. A Melbourne-based consulting firm began studying the airport and tourism issues in 1990.

Two weeks after the 1987 election, the Australian government dismissed Christmas Island's democratically elected nine-member assembly, citing fiscal mismanagement. However, the islanders retain the right to vote in Australian national elections as part of the mainland's Northern Territory.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

Overview:

The Cocos Islands lie in the Indian Ocean. Discovered by Captain William Keeling in 1609, the islands were a personal fiefdom of the Clunies-Ross family until 1978. An Australian-appointed administrator is the chief executive. A local council began functioning in 1978. In a 1984 referendum, the inhabitants voted to integrate with Australia. They are now part of Australia's Northern Territory, which elects members of the Australian Parliament. The population is mostly Malay.

Norfolk Island

Overview:

The Norfolk Island Act of 1912 established the island as a self-governing British colony, with an elected council and a representative nominated by the British government. The island became an Australian external territory in 1986. The population is mostly Bounty families, Australian, and New Zealander.
Overview:
Located in the South Pacific, Norfolk Island is home to many descendants of *Bounty* mutineers. An Australian-appointed administrator is the chief executive, but there has been a freely elected, nine-member assembly since Australia's passage of the Norfolk Island Act in 1979. This legislation provided for substantial self-government. The assembly executive committee acts like a cabinet on the island.

**Chile**

**Rapanui (Easter Island)**

**Polity:** Appointed governor and elected local government  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 2,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Spanish-speaking Polynesian natives and Chilean settlers

Overview:
Located in the Pacific Ocean, 2,360 miles from Chile, Rapanui (Easter Island) is the home of an ancient Polynesian culture. Under Chilean ownership since 1888, the island is isolated from the world with the exception of twice-weekly airline flights and twice-yearly cargo ships. There are no newspapers, but there is a local radio station. Tourism is the main source of income. Visitors come to see the island's hundreds of giant, long-faced statues. However, these attractions are crumbling. Islanders hope to save them with foreign funding.

Formerly run by the Chilean navy, the island became a Chilean municipality with voting rights in 1966. The territory has had fairly open discussion and elected local government. It was more free than the Chilean mainland during the Pinochet regime. Islanders have many social rights and economic advantages. Every family has the right to a house and five hectares of land. The government subsidizes energy and utility costs. Island students are eligible for government university scholarships in Chile. However, the natives' Council of Elders favors more autonomy for the island. Mainlander immigrants make up 30 percent of the population, and have caused local concern that Easter Island is losing its own ways. Chilean authorities (the forestry commission and the farm administrator) control 80 percent of the land, but the elders would prefer communal ownership and native control.

**China**

**Tibet**

**Polity:** Communist one-party  
**Economy:** Statist  
**Population:** 3,000,000*  
**Ethnic groups:** Tibetans, Han Chinese,  
(* 3,000,000 Tibetans live under Chinese control, including 1,900,000 in the Tibetan Autonomous Region)

Overview:
Despite the *de jure* end of martial law in April 1990, serious human rights concerns persist in Tibet. Chinese efforts to eradicate Tibetan nationalism, however peacefully manifested, underlie virtually all human rights abuses in the territory.

Tibet is a large but sparsely populated territory located high in the Himalayas, along China's western border. The extent of Chinese control over
Tibet varied traditionally with the strength of the Chinese Empire. China lost much influence there to Britain during the nineteenth century and Tibet was largely independent during China’s Republican period (1911-1949). Mao Zedong wanted to re-assert control over territories lost by earlier, weaker Chinese governments, so People’s Liberation Army troops invaded Tibet in 1950. The Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual (and political) leader, agreed in 1951 to submit to Chinese rule provided that Tibet could retain its traditional theocratic, feudalistic order. Beijing honored the agreement but pressured the local government to adopt socialist reforms.

Tibetans, motivated in part by the increasingly radical reforms of the Great Leap Forward, revolted in 1958-59. Chinese troops squashed the rebellion in March 1959. The Dalai Lama fled with thousands of supporters to India, where he established a government in exile in Dharmasala. China ended feudalism in Tibet, rapidly enacted socialist reforms and strove to incorporate and modernize Tibet. China has since alternated between policies emphasizing assimilation or accommodation. In 1965, Beijing created the Xizang Autonomous Region, which occupies roughly the one third of traditional Tibet where ethnic Tibetans are concentrated. Tibetans claim that one million people have died as a direct result of the Chinese occupation, from either repression or the famine that followed China’s imposed, misguided agricultural policies.

Tibetans have never accepted China’s annexation of their homeland, but they have steadfastly obeyed the Dalai Lama’s injunction against violent resistance. The Chinese nevertheless condemn Tibetan nationalism as counter-revolutionary and attempt to suppress peaceful demonstrations. Pro-independence protests in March 1988 spread beyond the Xizang Autonomous Region when ethnic Tibetans in neighboring Qinghai Province joined in. On 7 February 1989 several youths raised a Tibetan flag over a Buddhist temple, provoking Chinese retaliation. Several demonstrations followed in early March. The U.S. State Department accuses the police of using “indiscriminate and excessive force in suppressing demonstrations in Lhasa,” Tibet’s traditional capital, on 5-7 March 1989. Beijing admits that 16 Tibetans died during the clash; Tibetans claim 450 deaths. Estimates of injuries and arrests likewise vary widely.

China imposed martial law in Lhasa effective 8 March. The military orders banned public assembly, required all citizens to carry identification to be presented to security on demand, and authorized the police “to take necessary and strong measures to put [pro-independence activities] down at once.” China tightened these controls as part of the nation-wide crackdown following the Tiananmen massacre. Beijing lifted martial law on 30 April 1990, probably intending to placate Congressional opposition to renewing China’s “most favored nation” trade status with the United States. Few, if any, material changes followed the legal announcement. Tibetans first challenged the supposed restoration of their freedom of assembly by peacefully demonstrating on 8 June; foreigners in Lhasa reported hearing gunfire in the streets and witnessing at least nine arrests. The Tibetan government in exile claims that China began “population screening” on 2 June, that is, searching for Tibetan nationalists.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

China strictly prohibits any assembly or speech opposing Chinese rule. Movement is restricted to allow the authorities to better track nationalists. Tibetans who wish to travel abroad must pledge to speak highly of Chinese rule before the government will grant the requisite permission. Emigration is
illegal. Tibetans caught fleeing through the Himalayas are imprisoned and often tortured.

Torture is common in Tibetan prisons. Since the authorities routinely deny diplomats access to Tibetan jails, the primary source of information on prison conditions are former inmates now living in exile, many of whom bear the scars of torture. Reports indicate that guards use a variety of methods to inflict pain, including beatings, death threats, attack dogs, and electric catde prods. Former inmates generally hold that guards treat Buddhist nuns worse than other prisoners. Interrogation, aimed at identifying other Tibetans who support independence and/or the Dalai Lama, is frequently accompanied by torture. Inmates are often held incommunicado and are regularly denied adequate food and medical care. Prison stays tend to be short for political prisoners, but "reform through labor" and economic sanctions often follow. Sanctions can include firing, docking pay for time spent in jail, and billing for food eaten in prison. The authorities charge families substantial fees before they can recover the body of an inmate killed in jail.

One cannot estimate how many political prisoners occupy Tibet’s jails. China regularly charges pro-independence demonstrators with ordinary crimes. The Dalai Lama claims that the Chinese, anticipating the first anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, sentenced thirty-six political activists on a variety of political and ordinary charges in early June. A former Tibetan judge reports that defendants’ class and ethnicity affect their sentences. Inmates’ political views frequently affect the length and conditions of their stay, even for ordinary criminals.

In a positive development, in November the Chinese authorities allowed Western diplomats to visit Drapchi (Lhasa Number 1) Prison, where they met Yulo Dawa Tsering, a prominent dissident now serving a second ten-year term. The chief administrator of the prison told the diplomats that Drapchi is Tibet’s only center for convicted political prisoners and it houses fifty-six of them. The authorities indicated a willingness to consider the request from the diplomats that political and ordinary prisoners be kept separate.

Buddhism remains the heart of Tibetan culture. Just as Beijing regulates all religions in China, the state trains Buddhist monks and approves their prayer books. During the Cultural Revolution, the authorities banned all religious practice. The Chinese oppose all aspects of Buddhism which favor Tibetan independence; they have attempted to downplay the significance of the Dalai Lama. The government closely watches monks and nuns in Lhasa, because they often lead nationalist movements. Tibetan exiles report that more than seventy monks were arrested in April 1990 alone. Tibetans frequently celebrate religious holidays by tossing tsampa, roasted barley, but the Chinese banned this practice after discovering that in this way many locals honored the Dalai Lama’s winning the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1989. The Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second-ranked spiritual leader, died in 1989. While he had generally cooperated with Beijing in the 1980s, he sharply criticized several policies immediately before his sudden death, giving rise to some Tibetan suspicions of foul play. Beijing has set several rules regarding the search for his reincarnation: allowing monks to search for his successor only in the People’s Republic, including Tibet but excluding Tibetan exiles; requiring that Beijing approve the selection (there is some tradition for state involvement in selecting the Panchen Lama); and restricting the Dalai Lama to a minimal role in the process.

Observers have documented many human rights abuses that have arisen
from China’s efforts to slow the growth of its burgeoning population. The government allows families living in Tibetan towns to have two children, three if the first two are of the same sex. Families who exceed the limit face severe penalties. Tibetan exiles claim that abuses occur even before the second child. Alleged abuses include mandatory pregnancy tests, forced sterilizations and forced abortions. The government allegedly provides a financial incentive for the medical teams to perform as many sterilizations as possible. The PRC’s official New China News Agency, Xinhua, reported that sterilization is the most commonly used birth control method in Tibet and asserted that 18,000 women had voluntarily undergone this surgery. Tibetan exiles question its voluntary nature.

Beijing has encouraged Han Chinese to move to Tibet and other oudding regions. The 1982 census shows that Tibetans still represent 95 percent of the Xizang Autonomous Region’s civilian population, but Tibetans are now an ethnic minority within many parts, and perhaps all, of their traditional homeland. During his Nobel acceptance speech, the Dalai Lama denounced the population transfer as "a form of genocide."

The Tibetan government in exile moved towards democracy this year. Three-hundred-and-sixty-nine representatives met in Dharmsala during May and voted for a new cabinet. While some officials, disappointed that the representatives selected only three ministers, argued against continuing Dharmsala’s democratic experiment, the Dalai Lama declared himself pleased with the results. He pledged to work with the cabinet to write a new constitution. Tibetan exiles worldwide voted in primaries on 24 August for elections to be held in February 1991. The Dalai Lama also promised to exclude himself from politics once the exile government is restored to Lhasa.

Denmark
Faeroe Islands

Overview:
The Faeroe Islands are located in the North Atlantic, and have a very high degree of autonomy. The Faeroese government has responsibility for communications, culture, and industry. It shares responsibility with Denmark for education, health, and social services, but the Faeroese administer these areas locally. Denmark retains authority over foreign affairs, defence, finance and justice. A high commissioner represents Denmark. Voters elect an assembly, which chooses the administration. The assembly has twenty-seven members chosen by proportional representation in seven constituencies, plus up to an additional five members. Islanders also have the right to choose two members of the Danish parliament and to opt out of the European Community to which Denmark belongs. There are fifty local authorities.

The Faeroese have a full range of civil liberties and political groups. Eight newspapers publish freely. Although the established Lutheran Church represents 80-90 percent of the population, worship is free, and there are several independent churches. There are public radio and television stations. The political parties range from right to left, and from pro-independence to pro-union with Denmark. The parties are: (right-of-center) the People's Party and the Unionist Party; (left-of-center) the Social Democratic Party and the
Greenland

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Mixed-capitalist  
**Population:** 56,000  
**Ethnic Groups:** Inuit (Eskimo), native whites, Danish

**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

Located in the North Atlantic, Greenland has had substantial autonomy from Denmark since 1979. The island's legislature consists of twenty-three members chosen by proportional representation and up to an additional four members for parties failing to win seats in districts. Greenland withdrew from the European Community in 1985. The EC and the role of U.S. bases have been major issues since the island won autonomy. One opposition group, the Communist Inuit Brotherhood Party, advocates shutting the bases. The Polar Party represents business interests, and supports privatization. The conservative Feeling of Community (or Solidarity) Party calls for close links with Denmark and Europe. Feeling of Community is the junior partner in a coalition government with the social democratic Forward Party. The Forward prime minister is Jonathan Motzfeldt, who was reelected in 1987. The next election is due in 1991. The territory has full freedoms of expression and association. Greenland elects two members of the Danish parliament.

France

**French Guiana**

**Polity:** Appointed commissioner and elected assembly and council  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 98,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Complex, black (66 percent), Caucasian (French) (12 percent), East Indian, Chinese and Amerindian (12 percent), and other (10 percent)

**Political rights:** 2  
**Civil liberties:** 2  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

The Department of French Guiana is one of four French Overseas Departments. As such, French law applies and the administrative establishment is headed by a commissioner of the Republic who is appointed by the French Ministry of the Interior. Representatives to the French parliament are elected. A nineteen-member General Council is elected for six years, with councilors representing individual districts. Since 1982, the Council has been given increased powers, particularly in financial matters.

The department was given regional status in 1974 and a Regional Assembly was set up, distinct from the General Council, with limited control over the economy. This control was expanded under the Mitterand reforms of 1982-83. The first direct elections to the Regional Assembly, on the basis of proportional representation, were held in February 1983. Mayors and municipal councils are also directly elected. The two main political parties are the right-wing Rally for the Republic (RPR), which supports the status quo, and the Guianese Socialist Party (PSG), which currently advocates autonomous rule as the first step toward full independence. The smaller Guianan Unity (UG) advocates immediate independence. At the most recent General Council
elections in fall 1988, the PSG retained control by taking twelve seats against seven for the RPR and other right-wing parties.

Pluralistic points of view are presented in the media including two major newspapers and several radio and television stations.

French Polynesia

**Polity:** Elected assembly

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 200,000

**Ethnic groups:** Polynesian (83 percent), French and other European (11 percent), and Chinese and other Asian (6 percent)

**Overview:**

Anti-nuclear demonstrations, a visit by French President Mitterrand, and economic recession were the most important developments in 1990.

French nuclear tests have been a source of controversy in the territory for years. Polynesian anti-nuclear activists held a week of protests in March 1990 as part of an international campaign against nuclear testing. Although the nuclear industry is a major employer, the natives resent the French indifference to their environmental concerns. Faced with high unemployment and heavy economic dependence on France, Polynesian protesters added their fear of the European Community's forthcoming single market to the nuclear issue in this year's demonstrations. Polynesians are concerned that the lifting of economic barriers between European countries will cause Europeans to emigrate to their territory and set up competitive businesses. The territory is already dealing with declining tourism, a huge trade deficit, and big debts.

French Polynesia consists of 120 South Pacific Islands, the most populous of which is Tahiti. A High Commissioner represents the French government. The Polynesian Territorial Assembly consists of forty-one members elected for a maximum term of five years. The Assembly elects the President, who selects the ministers with the Assembly's approval. The current leader is President Alexandre Leontieff. In the 1986 election, the Popular Union Party, the Polynesian affiliate of the French Gaullist Rally for the Republic, won twenty-four of the forty-one seats. This party favors internal autonomy, not independence. Some pro-autonomy parties are more left-wing, while other leftist groups support complete independence. Among the pro-independence leaders is Oscar Temaru, Mayor of Faaa and head of the Polynesian Liberation Front, which was in the vanguard of the 1990 demonstrations. The next election is set for March 1991.

French President Francois Mitterrand visited in May 1990 and opened a major new hotel. This marked the hundredth anniversary of Papeete, the capital city. Polynesians elect a member of the French Senate and two National Assembly deputies.

Peaceful advocates of independence have freedom of expression and association. The islanders are largely Christian. There are three daily newspapers and a public broadcasting service. The Chinese minority prospers in business, and enjoys much greater acceptance than the Chinese communities on other Pacific islands.
French Southern and Antarctic Territories

**Overview:**

The French Southern and Antarctic Territories consist of the Indian Ocean islands of St. Paul, Amsterdam, the Kerguelen and Crozet archipelagos, and the French-claimed sector of Antarctica. Due to the small population and scattered locations of these territories, the French administrator is based in Paris, where the consultative council meets twice annually. The administrator also appoints heads of the territories’ four districts. Kerguelen's 100 inhabitants comprise the largest population of the territories. The chief activities are scientific research and fishing. Since 1977 Port-aux-Francais (Kerguelen) has served as a registry point for supply ships and bulk cargo ships. This registry allows French shippers to use non-French seafarers to sail under the French flag.

Guadeloupe

**Overview:**

The Department of Guadeloupe is one of four French Overseas Departments. As such, French law applies and the administrative establishment is headed by a commissioner of the Republic who is appointed by the French Ministry of the Interior. In the wake of Hurricane Hugo, which ravaged Guadeloupe, the interior ministry appointed a new commissioner, Jean-Pierre Truce. Representatives to the French parliament are elected.

A thirty-six-member General Council is directly elected to a five-year term, with each member elected to represent individual districts. Since 1982, the Council has been given increased powers, particularly in financial matters.

The department was given regional status in 1974 and a Regional Assembly was set up, parallel to the General Council, with limited control over the economy. This control was expanded under the Mitterand reforms of 1982-83. The first direct elections to the Regional Assembly, on the basis of proportional representation, were held in February 1983. Mayors and municipal councils are also directly elected.

The two main political parties are the Socialist Party (PS) and the right-wing Rally for the Republic (RPR). In the 1988 General Council elections, the PS increased its majority by one seat, defeating opponents twenty-six to sixteen. The Communist Party of Guadeloupe (PCG), which normally secures a quarter of the vote, is pro-independence but non-violent. Since the late 1960s, there have been a number of militant pro-independence groups. Those that resorted to armed tactics were outlawed. Since 1985, however, violent activity has nearly died out. The semi-clandestine Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG), as well as other remaining radical groups, have boycotted recent elections. Labor unions are legal and there are two main labor federations.
There is one daily newspaper and a handful of radio and television transmitters. International news agencies maintain local offices.

**Martinique**

**Polity:** Appointed commissioner and elected assembly and council  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 300,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Predominantly black with French minority

**Overview:**

The Department of Martinique is one of four French Overseas Departments. As such, French law applies and the administrative establishment is headed by a commissioner of the Republic appointed by the French Ministry of the Interior. Representatives to the French parliament are elected.

A forty-four-member General Council is directly elected to a five-year term, with each member elected to represent individual districts. Since 1982, the Council has been given increased powers, particularly in financial matters.

The department was given regional status in 1974 and a Regional Assembly was set up, parallel to the General Council, with limited control over the economy. This control was expanded under the 1982-83 Mitterand reforms. The first direct elections to the Regional Assembly on the basis of proportional representation were held in February 1983. Mayors and municipal councils were directly elected.

The main political parties are the right-wing Rally for the Republic (RPR), the Martinique Progressive Party (PPM), the Socialist Federation of Martinique (FSM), and the Martinique Communist Party (PCM). In recent years, the last three have formed an electoral alliance, the Left Union (UG). Both the PCM and PPM advocate autonomy for the island as the first step toward independence. The UG obtained a one-seat margin in the 1988 General Council elections. A number of militant separatist groups resorted to violence in the mid-1980s and were banned. Separatist violence has nearly disappeared in recent years. Labor unions are legal and permitted to strike. There are two main labor confederations.

The media are varied and reflect pluralistic points of view. There are several radio and television stations. There are one daily and several weekly newspapers.

**Mayotte (Mahore)**

**Polity:** Appointed commissioner and elected council  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 79,000  
**Ethnic Groups:**

**Overview:**

Part of the Comoro archipelago, Mayotte (Mahore) is located in the Indian Ocean east of Mozambique and northwest of Madagascar. In two referenda, the largely Catholic population has rejected joining the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros. The French government appoints a commissioner, and the residents elect a seventeen-member council. The economy is based largely on primary products and tourism. The political parties are the Mahoran Popular...
Movement, which wants the island made a French department; the Party for the Mahoran Democratic Rally, which supports merger with the Comoros; and the Gaullist Mahoran Rally for the Republic. The island sends one member to the French Senate and elects one to the National Assembly. The government-owned radio station broadcasts in French and Mahorais.

**Monaco**

**Polity:** Prince and elected council  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 28,000  
**Ethnic Groups:** French, Monegasque, Italian, and others

**Overview:**  
The Principality of Monaco is located on the French Mediterranean coast. Prince Rainier is the hereditary chief of state, but the French government nominates the minister of state (the prime minister) and has the right to veto the heir to the throne. Monaco has a customs union with France, which controls the principality's foreign relations. However, Monaco belongs to several U.N. agencies and intergovernmental organizations. The voters elect an eighteen-member National Council for a five-year term. In the 1988 election, the National and Democratic Union won all eighteen seats. The Monaco Socialist Party has contested elections unsuccessfully. Other parties include the Communist Democratic Union Movement and the liberal Monaco Action. There is also an elected fifteen-member municipal council, headed by a mayor and assistants appointed by the council.

Newspapers in nearby Nice print Monaco editions, which they distribute freely in the principality. Radio and television are government-operated. Trans World Radio broadcasts religious programs. The French government has a controlling interest in Radio Monte Carlo. A tax haven, Monaco is the home of gambling casinos and light industry. Roman Catholicism is the state religion, but the constitution guarantees religious freedom.

**New Caledonia**

**Polity:** Appointed commissioner and elected congress and assemblies  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 200,000  
**Ethnic Groups:** Melanesians (Kanaks), French, Wallisian-Futunians, Vietnamese, other Asian and Pacific groups

**Overview:**  
There were two important developments in New Caledonia in 1990. The pro-independence Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) chose a new leader, Paul Tyaou Neaoutyne, in March 1990. The other major change was economic. Jacques Lafleur, a French loyalist leader, sold his two nickel mines to the Kanak-run government of the North Province.

Until Neaoutinye's election, the Kanak movement had been without a president since the assassination of Jean-Marie Tjibaou in 1989. A Kanak militant killed Tjibaou after the nationalist leader had made a compromise agreement with the French which postponed the question of independence to 1998, and granted increased autonomy to both the Kanaks and the local
French. The plan also called for a more fair distribution of the wealth. The FLNKS and the pro-French Rally for Caledonia in the Republic (RPCR) back the agreement. Under the Kanak-French arrangement, there are three regional assemblies and a combined congress of the three. The Kanaks dominate two assemblies, while the French control one.

In the elections held in June 1989, the FLNKS won a majority in the North and Islands assemblies, and the RPCR captured the South assembly. Of the fifty-four seats in the combined congress, the RPCR holds twenty-seven seats and the FLNKS has nineteen. The French government plans to spread development assistance more evenly across the territory during the 1990s in order to improve living conditions in the largely Kanak areas. Melanesians form only 43 percent of the population. In order to gain independence, the FLNKS plans to campaign among the other Pacific ethnic groups in the territory. Paris appoints a high commissioner to represent French interests. New Caledonia elects two National Assembly deputies and sends one senator to the French Parliament.

### Reunion

**Polity:** Appointed commissioner and elected assembly and council  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 580,000  
**Ethnic Groups:** French, African, Malagasy, Malay, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and Annamite

**Overview:**

Located in the Indian Ocean east of Madagascar, Reunion has been in French hands since the seventeenth century. The population is multi-racial and largely Catholic. Sugar cane is the most important crop. A French commissioner carries out executive functions. There is a competitive, multi-party system, which ranges from pro-independence Communists to pro-French moderates. Reunion has a bicameral legislature, consisting of an elected thirty-six-member General Council and an elected forty-five-member Regional Assembly. The territory elects three National Assembly deputies and one Senator to the French Parliament. There are three daily newspapers. There is a government radio and television system. Three-fourths of the radio programs are locally produced.

### St. Pierre and Miquelon

**Polity:** Appointed commissioner and elected council  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 6,500  
**Ethnic Groups:** French

**Overview:**

Located south of Newfoundland in the North Atlantic, the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are the only remaining French possessions in North America. Fishing is the mainstay of the economy. During American Prohibition, the islanders smuggled liquor to the U.S. The French government appoints a commissioner, and local residents elect a fourteen-member council for a six-year term. The islands elect a National Assembly deputy and a senator to the French Parliament. The Socialist Party and the center-right Union for
French Democracy, are the active political parties. There is freedom of association. The unionized workers belong to Force Ouvriere (Workers’ Force). The only newspaper is a bulletin of government announcements. There is a medium-wave radio transmitter and a government radio and television station.

**Wallis and Futuna Islands**

**Overview:**
Located in the South Pacific, Wallis and Futuna Islands have almost completely Polynesian populations. The islands voted to become a French territory in 1959. There is a French-appointed administrator and a locally elected twenty-member council. Three traditional chiefs are council members. The local affiliates of the French center-right parties predominate. The territory elects a National Assembly deputy and a senator to the French Parliament. The only radio station broadcasts in both French and Wallisian.

**Polity:** Appointed administrator and elected council  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 17,000  
**Ethnic Groups:** Polynesian  
**Political Rights:** 3  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Status:** Free

**France-Spain Condominium Andorra**

**Overview:**
Andorra took a major step towards political reform on 18 June 1990 when its legislature, the General Council, decided unanimously to draft the territory’s first constitution. Located in the Pyrenees Mountains between France and Spain, Andorra has been a joint territory of the French government and the Bishop of Urgel, Spain since 1278. Before 1981, there was no clear power structure to rule the country. As Co-Princes, the French president and the Spanish Bishop had representatives there, but Andorra had no locally chosen head of government. The Co-Princes’ representatives (vicars) still play a role, especially in the court system. Since 1981, there has been a head of government (cap del govern). The 28 members of the elected General Council serve four-year terms and choose one of their number as head. In 1982, Andorran voters approved a system of proportional representation in a referendum, but the French and Spanish sides have not enacted this reform, due to 48 percent voter abstention. Women have had the franchise since 1970. There are some limitations on voting rights for young, first-generation Andorrans. Otherwise, there is universal suffrage at age eighteen and over. Technically, there are no political parties, but there are factions and associations which have effective party functions. The French have generally handled Andorra’s foreign relations. There are two competing, private weekly newspapers. There is a local public radio and television service. French and Spanish media are easily available.

**Polity:** Co-princes and elected parliament  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 47,000  
**Ethnic Groups:** Andorran, Spanish, French, other European  
**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free
Overview:

In 1990 the Indian-administered portion of the Kashmir region endured violent clashes between Indian security forces and Kashmiris. Approximately 1,000 deaths resulted from these confrontations.

Until 1947 all of Kashmir belonged to the British-ruled Indian territories. Headed by a Hindu ruler, the Maharajah of Kashmir, the area had a Muslim majority which did not wish to join India after the British decided to partition their holdings into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu-dominated India. Caught in the subsequent fighting between India and Pakistan, the Maharajah decided his domain should join India. The Indian government announced that it would hold a referendum to settle the territory's fate. That plebiscite has never taken place. India also included a provision in its constitution, Article 370, which limited the Indian parliament's power to make laws for Kashmir. Following the first Indo-Pakistani war, the United Nations divided Kashmir into Indian- and Pakistani-administered areas in 1949. In 1957 India made its portion of Kashmir an official part of its territory as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Following Chinese-Indian clashes in 1962, India ceded a portion of Kashmir to China. India and Pakistan warred over Kashmir again in 1965 and 1971-72. The two countries agreed in principle in the Simla agreement (1972) that they would respect the truce line in Kashmir as a de facto border between their areas of control.

The Kashmiris in the Indian-held areas have become increasingly anti-Indian since the late 1980s. Their grievances include their political status, unemployment, and underdevelopment. There were numerous riots and demonstrations in Kashmir during 1990. India blamed Pakistan for having trained local Muslim militants. Security forces responded to their activities by shooting at Muslim separatist crowds on several occasions. For their part, Islamic fundamentalist militants forced the closing of cinemas, beauty parlors, and liquor stores for being "un-Islamic." They also demanded successfully that farmers growing hops switch to rice, since hops are ingredients in alcoholic drinks. Indian troops rounded up hundreds of alleged militants and detained them.

India's central government appointed a new Kashmiri government in January 1990, and the elected government of Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah resigned. Abdullah had headed the National Conference coalition which included the Indian Congress Party. Most Kashmiris believed that the most recent elections, held in 1987, had been rigged. The Indian government replaced Abdullah with Governor Jagmohan, who had held that post before. He released most of the militants whom the troops had captured. The Indian army took greater control of the area on 25 January 1990 after the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front shot five Indian air force men.

International tensions increased on 5 February 1990 when Pakistani demonstrators crossed the truce line. Indian troops shot and wounded at least ten of them. There was some hope for a new election for the state when the Indian government dissolved Kashmir's legislature on 19 February. However, the Indian government never set an election date. Violent confrontations continued into the spring. Indian forces began a major offensive and con-
continued to round up and arrest separatists. The central government caused the dismissal of allegedly pro-separatist civil servants. Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh held out some possibility for negotiated solutions. He appointed George Fernandes as Minister for Kashmiri Affairs and gave him the responsibility to deal with local grievances. Singh also approved discussions with Pakistan to try preventing another war over the disputed area.

Events in May 1990 undermined chances for reconciliation. Three young men assassinated the senior Muslim religious leader, Maulvi Mohammed Farooq, on 21 May. As 100,000 mourners marched through the streets, Indian troops opened fire, killing as many as 100 and wounding 200. Pakistan accused the Indian government of direct responsibility for the killings. Farooq had been a man of comparative moderation. He had urged Kashmiris not to equate their regional identity with Islam, and had argued that fleeing Hindus should move back to their homes. Following the violence after Farooq's death, the Indian government replaced Jagmohan with Girish Saxena, the former head of India's external intelligence agency. On 18 July India imposed direct central government rule. Local officials in Kashmir went on strike in July to protest the violence by Indian security forces.

In August 1990 Indian and Pakistani troops clashed along the truce line in Kashmir, but their fighting petered out.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Kashmiris do not have the right to change their government by democratic means. India imposed direct rule over the territory in 1990, and has no intention of allowing Kashmir's independence or merger with Pakistan. Political parties are allowed, but the Indian government outlawed several militant organizations in 1990.

The Indian army’s domination of the territory and central government rule have wiped out most civil liberties. In January 1990 the government stopped foreign journalists from covering news beyond their hotels. India expelled six foreign journalists for "compromising state security," which apparently meant that Kashmiri nationalists had invited them to witness a declaration of independence. The government closed down the news unit of Srinigar television after the staff had protested the censoring of items about separatists. Thereafter, India beamed broadcasts of Kashmir's local news from New Delhi. The Indians also shut down three "subversive" newspapers. In June 1990 Indian troops arrested a journalist for the BBC and Reuters and moved him from base to base, questioning him about the activities of a colleague. Then they released him, and gave him $3.00.

Some local police went on strike in January 1990 to oppose what they considered the Indian troops' disrespect for them. They marched on police headquarters and demanded a trade union. Local civil servants staged an apparently successful strike in July 1990. Despite Indian government warnings, as many as 80 percent of these public officials stayed away from work.

Oppositionists charged Indian security forces with torture, arrest of children, gang rapes, and feeding prisoners food and drink laced with dust and fuel. The Indians detained thousands without trial. Investigations by two Indian human rights groups found clear evidence of human rights violations in Kashmir. Minister Fernandes called one group's report "honest," but said it overlooked the stresses on security forces in the absence of strong civil authority.

India limited freedom of movement in Kashmir throughout 1990 with curfews and troop patrols. Officially, no non-Kashmiri can buy land in the
territory and Kashmiri laws are not subject to appeal in Indian courts. However, India has often watered down the effectiveness of these rights.

Indonesia

East Timor

**Polity:** Dominant party (military-dominated)

**Political Rights:** 7

**Civil Liberties:** 6

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Status:** Not Free

**Population:** 700,000

**Ethnic groups:** Timorese, Javanese, other

**Overview:**

Portugal, which ruled this half of the island of Timor for 400 years, called in 1974 for Timorese self-determination. The Timorese People's Association (Apodeti) advocated an autonomous status within Indonesia, while the Democratic Union of Timor (UDT) campaigned for independence. In August 1975 the UDT and the leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) launched separate revolts. Fretilin declared an independent republic in late November. Indonesia invaded nine days later and annexed East Timor in July 1976. Estimates of those who died during 1975-79 as Indonesia strove to crush Fretilin resistance vary from 100,000 to 200,000. Many of the casualties starved to death during a serious famine, allegedly exacerbated by Indonesia deliberately destroying croplands. Periodic skirmishes continue.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Indonesia declared East Timor to be an open province as of 1 January 1989, lifting travel restrictions, allowing foreign investment, and demilitarizing the local government. Some barriers to travel remain, however, and East Timorese who study elsewhere in Indonesia are watched when they return home. Foreign visitors are also watched and residents generally feel uncomfortable speaking to foreigners in public. The military remains prominent. Allegations of serious human rights abuses continue, including reports of unfair trials, torture, political killings, and "disappearances." The authorities permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit Timorese political prisoners held in both East Timor and Jakarta and occasionally honored ICRC requests to move those held in Jakarta home where their families can visit them.

The government allows East Timorese to practice Catholicism, the dominant religion, freely and the Pope visited the territory in October 1989. During the year demonstrations against government policies were broken up by the military, causing serious injuries. The provincial governor—an East Timorese civilian appointed by Jakarta—blames splits within the military for some of the beatings, claiming that some officers would like to provoke a return to earlier, harsher policies. The governor claims that in February, for the first time during the occupation, the military tried a soldier for mistreating East Timorese, with about one trial per month occurring since.

The occupation has been harsh in many ways, enough so that the East Timorese find it hard even to appreciate its accomplishments in improving education and development. Ethnic tensions escalated in 1990, including reports of ethnically motivated attacks and vandalism, as the East Timorese react to the non-Timorese residents they regard as occupiers. A U.N.-funded program meanwhile enabled 104 East Timorese—former colonial civil servants and their relatives—to emigrate to Portugal in 1989.
Irian Jaya

**Overview:**

When the Dutch government recognized Indonesia's independence in 1949, it retained control over the Netherlands New Guinea which occupies the western half of the island of New Guinea. The Dutch later surrendered control over the territory to the United Nations on the understanding that Indonesia would administer Irian Jaya from 1963 until a referendum could be held on its future status, by 1969. The mainly Papuan population seemed to favor independence, but Jakarta, rather than hold an open referendum, convened 8 regional assemblies during the summer of 1969. All eight voted for incorporation into Indonesia. Opposition to Indonesian rule coalesced in 1971 when insurgents formed the Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua New Guinea. In 1984, the Indonesian army launched an offensive against the Free Papua Organization (OPM), causing hundreds of refugees to flee across the border into Papua New Guinea. Irian intellectual Arnold Ap was killed in prison. Another offensive followed in 1989; it stopped following reports that it had successfully destroyed OPM’s effectiveness. Since 1985, ethnic tensions have escalated as the Papuans have reacted to an influx of Javanese settlers.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Reports continue to emerge from Irian Jaya of mistreatment—including "disappearances"—of those the military believes to have ties to or sympathies for the OPM. The rebels, for their part, also harass civilians occasionally. The government continues to restrict both access to and movement within Irian Jaya for both Indonesians and foreigners, on the grounds of providing security and protecting local cultures from outside influences. The government nevertheless allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross to open an office (consisting of one observer and one nurse) in Irian Jaya during 1989 with the twin missions of helping refugees return from Papua New Guinea and monitoring prison conditions. A visiting ICRC team interviewed ninety-one imprisoned OPM members (including seven held outside Irian Jaya) in late 1989 and continued the process during 1990. The government also allowed the team to provide food, toiletries and other goods to the prisoners. In October 1990, twenty refugees entered the French Embassy in Port Moresby, but the French denied them asylum.

Israel Occupied Territories

**Overview:**

The most important developments in the Israeli-occupied territories were the Palestinian support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, numerous incidents of violent Arab-Israeli confrontations, growing U.N. interest in the Palestinian
situation, and the effect of Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel on the Palestinians.

Following Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam Hussein linked demands for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait with the Palestinians' demands for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. This linkage, coupled with Saddam Hussein's defiance of the West, made the Iraqi leader very popular with the Palestinian masses.

The West Bank and Gaza were part of the Arab state envisioned in the United Nations 1947 partition plan for the lands of the British-occupied Palestine Mandate. After Israel's victory over the Arabs in its 1948-49 war of independence, Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip, and Jordan took over the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel captured East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 war. It also gained the strategically important Golan Heights from Syria. Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Golan Heights in 1981.

The Israeli Defense Ministry runs the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis sponsored the most recent local elections there in 1976. Only a few of the elected officials remain. After the Palestinian uprising (intifada) began in 1987, King Hussein of Jordan cut legal and administrative ties to the West Bank, so West Bank Palestinians have no representation in Jordan's parliament. During the intifada, more than 700 Palestinians have been killed, more than 250 of them by fellow Palestinians. In 1990 as in previous years, international human rights organizations charged that many violent deaths were avoidable, and that Israeli troops had abused the open-fire rules. These guidelines allow for force in life-threatening situations and the apprehension of suspects in serious crimes. The Israeli Supreme Court has found these practices to be legal.

The Palestinians themselves have killed those suspected of collaborating with Israel. In 1990 there were also violent disputes between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the radical Islamic movement. The two groups put aside some of their rivalry over representing the Palestinians and agreed to cooperate in backing Saddam Hussein.

Israel charged that Iraq instigated the Palestinians into staging an incident in East Jerusalem on 8 October 1990. Palestinians from East Jerusalem and the West Bank threw stones at Jewish worshippers at the Wailing Wall. Israeli security forces responded by shooting the Arabs, killing as many as 21 and wounding at least 140 at the A1 Aksa Mosque. The United Nations voted to send a delegation to investigate the incident. Israel's cabinet immigration committee responded to the U.N. by backing more Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem. A Palestinian named Abu Sirhan retaliated for the Israeli killings by murdering three Jews. Reacting to the Jewish deaths, on 22 October 1990 Israel closed off Jerusalem and Israel to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.

Many Israelis demanded a total ban on workers from the occupied territories in Israel. About 120,000 Arabs from those areas work in Israel, especially in agriculture and construction. According to some estimates, an Israeli ban on these workers could raise unemployment in the territories from 20-25 percent to more than 50 percent. After the Abu Sirhan murders, a prominent right-wing politician, Israeli Agriculture Minister Rafael Eitan, stated, "Anyone who is employing Arabs from the territories is employing potential murderers. We should replace them with new Jewish immigrants. And whoever is caught in an attack like yesterday's, we should expel his
whole family and destroy his home." Despite the growing Israeli support for these views, the country readmitted workers from the territories on 28 October 1990, but barred Palestinians with criminal records or histories of anti-Israel activities from entering. More than 10,000 Palestinians have been in jail since the beginning of the uprising.

As a result of the human rights situation in the territories, U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar proposed on 1 November 1990 that the U.N. Security Council should involve itself in protecting Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Israel rejected the idea. Israel is a signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention on the rights of civilians in military-occupied areas, but says that the agreement does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza since Jordan and Egypt had no legal claim to those areas when they ruled them before the 1967 war. Israel turned down a U.N. call for a meeting of the signatory countries to the Geneva Convention, and alleged that it complies with humanitarian conditions in the occupied areas.

1990 ended with new rounds of violence and retaliation. On 12 December the Israeli army began deploying hidden snipers, who had authorization to use regular ammunition to shoot Palestinians caught throwing stones at Israeli cars. In late December 1990 the Palestinian resistance called a general strike that shut down Bethlehem at Christmas. On 29 December four Arabs died and 125 were wounded in Palestinian-Israeli clashes in Gaza.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have no right to change their government by democratic means. Israel allows them no political parties. Both Arab and Israeli residents of annexed areas have the right to vote in Israeli elections, but few Arabs do so. In the West Bank and Gaza, only Jewish settlers have Israeli voting rights.

Israel places strict limits on press freedom and cultural expression. The occupying forces allow only limited criticism. The Israelis censor and ban local Arab and foreign publications, declare certain towns closed to journalists, and detain uncooperative journalists.

In 1990 Amnesty International’s Italian section accused Israel of torturing Palestinians with cigarette burns, deprivation of sleep, and hooding prisoners before striking them. The human rights group also reported that Israel detained prisoners for long periods without trial, and that prisoners often had no knowledge of the charges against them. Over 1,000 Palestinians are believed held in administrative detention, under which the suspect may be held without charge or trial for a one-year renewable period. The practice is controversial, since some of the detainees have not participated in violence and the detainee has the burden of proof to show his innocence, with the evidence by which he could do so often inadmissible on security grounds.

Several soldiers court-martialed for using excessive force have claimed that they received orders from former Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin to break the bones of subdued Palestinian rioters. In July 1990 two members of the Israeli parliament proposed setting up a special commission to investigate the allegations, but the parliament rejected the idea. Rabin has denied having given any such orders to use excessive force. Palestinian and Israeli sources disagree over whether at least four Arab prisoners have been beaten to death in the Gaza central military prison. On 2 November 1990 a prisoner either committed suicide or was killed during interrogation. As news of his death spread, Arabs rioted and clashed with Israeli soldiers, resulting in one death and at least sixty-one injuries.
There is not equal justice for Arabs and Israelis. While Israel punishes Palestinians severely for alleged criminal activities, it lets Israelis convicted of violence get off lightly. On 31 October 1990 an Israeli soldier received only two months in jail and three others received suspended sentences for beating a Palestinian who died thereafter. On 26 December Israel freed three West Bank Jewish settlers who had killed and maimed Palestinians in car bombings. Fellow settlers greeted them as heroes.

The Israelis respect freedom of religion for Arab Moslems and Christians, and for Jewish settlers. However, there is tight security around mosques, which are occasional gathering places for stone-throwers. Israel permits trade union activity in the territories, but it tries to discourage it. Nonetheless, several trade unions and competing labor federations function. Authorities have registered no new trade union since 1979, but some function illicitly. Only one-third of Palestinian workers have job permits for Israel. They are ineligible for most benefits, but they must pay social security tax. Israel refuses most attempts at Palestinian economic development in the territories, so many Palestinians must work in Israel.

There are several abuses of freedom of movement. In July 1990 Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens approved a new policy of "conditional deportation," under which uprising leaders would be exiled in the territories away from their home towns. This policy sidestepped the more extreme measure of exile outside the territories. Israel has deported more than 60 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza since 1987. Israel renewed this policy in December 1990.

Although Palestinians are free to emigrate, various restrictions have complicated their travel abroad. They must endure long waits for travel permits. The Israelis often deny them after people have waited for hours.

Israel punishes Palestinians by bulldozing or blowing up their homes. This tactic worsens the Palestinian housing shortage. According to B'Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), Israel allows Palestinians almost no building licenses for the West Bank. B'Tselem terms the licensing process for Arabs one marred by "secrecy, arbitrariness, disorganization, and endless delays." By contrast, the process for Jewish settlers is "efficient," and the authorities overlook their unlicensed construction.

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**Italy**

**San Marino**

**Overview:**

According to tradition, a Christian stonemason named Marinus founded San Marino in 301 A.D. Surrounded entirely by Italian territory, San Marino is the world’s oldest republic. The country signed the first of several friendship treaties with Italy in 1862. Italy handles many of San Marino’s foreign and security affairs. In 1979, they upgraded their relations to the ambassadorial level. The tiny republic has a lively multi-party system, similar to Italy’s. In recent years, Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, and Social Democrats have participated in coalition governments. Cabinets have changed frequently, due to a lack of consensus on policy. In the May 1988
election, the Christian Democrats and Communists won enough seats to continue their coalition government. Since 1600, San Marino's Grand and General Council has served as the legislature. Its sixty members serve for a maximum term of five years. The Council chooses the State Congress, which functions as a cabinet. Chosen by the Council for six-month terms, two Captains Regent supervise the State Congress. One Captain Regent represents the city of San Marino, and the other stands for the surrounding area. The media are free, and Italian newspapers and broadcasts are freely available.

Morocco
Western Sahara

Overview:

The Western Sahara, formerly Spanish Sahara until Spain pulled out in 1975, remains disputed territory. Both Morocco and the guerrilla Polisario Front, representing the indigenous Sahrawi people, have made exclusive claims to and fought for the area for fourteen years. Today, Morocco, which annexed the area in 1976, occupies and administers most of the Western Sahara, a 1,200 mile wall of sand and barbed wire enclosing over 80 percent of the territory. Major Western powers have refrained from recognizing Moroccan title to the territory and over seventy, largely African nations, have recognized Polisario's government in exile, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SADR). Algeria has been the main sponsor of the guerrilla group, believed to number 7,000-8,000, providing sanctuary for them at the border town of Tindouf. However, there are signs that Algeria has backed off its commitment to the Polisario and is recognizing some form of integration with Morocco as a fait accompli. Morocco has won over much of the area by providing much-needed infrastructure and free education and health care, as well as holding out the promise of increased regional autonomy. The wall has cut off most of the population from the guerrillas and new highways and TV hookups link the area closely to Morocco. Still, the rebels continue to retain popularity among the Sahrawis.

In August 1988, both parties to the conflict accepted in principle that a U.N.-supervised referendum should be held, asking the native inhabitants whether they desire integration with Morocco or independence. The Polisario continues to demand that Moroccan troops and administrators get out of the area prior to a referendum, charging that such a withdrawal is key to a fair process. An estimated 150,000 troops man the 1,200-mile wall and other posts in the territory. Until recently Morocco has explicitly refused the demand for troop withdrawal. Polisario also demands public face-to-face talks with Morocco. Another sticking point has been who should be eligible to vote. Both sides agree that a Spanish 1974 census of the area forms the basis of eligible voters, but problems remain. The Polisario wants its refugee population in Tindouf counted as eligible, whereas Morocco disputes whether these individuals are actually Sahrawi refugees. Meanwhile, independent estimates place the cost of war at some $2 million a day for Rabat.

In March 1990, the two sides accepted a temporary truce that was to last until July. Later, United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar asked
the parties to extend the truce in order to go ahead with a U.N.-backed peace plan that has been on the negotiating table over a year.

Under that plan, a U.N. team would determine voter eligibility among Western Sahara's residents and exiles (for a referendum), and would monitor the polling. Following a permanent ceasefire, U.N. peacekeeping troops would be sent into the area. Moroccan troops would be given three months in which to evacuate the territory completely or leave up to one-third of its number confined to barracks. In the meantime, Polisario would curb its armed forces. Registration of voters would follow and Polisario rebels wishing to vote would have to disarm. The referendum would be held six weeks afterward.

In late August 1990, both Morocco and Polisario agreed in principle to accept the U.N. peace plan. However, the two sides did not hold direct talks about implementing the plan in 1990. Two factors delayed the talks; first, the written report of the secretary-general's special representative for Western Sahara did not reach the Security Council in 1990. Second, the Gulf crisis slowed down diplomatic initiatives elsewhere in the Arab world. The Security Council may deal with the peace-plan in 1991.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties:

The portion of the population that Morocco administers has generally the same civil liberties as those in Morocco proper (see Morocco). However, Moroccan authorities monitor Saharans for their political beliefs and possible Polisario support. The territory has ten parliamentary seats in the Moroccan parliament. Those elected are native Saharans. King Hassan appoints natives to govern the four provinces of the region. Politically suspect Saharans are subject to police abuse.

Netherlands Aruba

**Polity:** Appointed governor and parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Mixed-capitalist

**Population:** 60,000

**Ethnic groups:** Black majority with Carib Indian and European minorities

**Overview:**

Aruba was part of the Netherland Antilles from 1954 until 1986 when it achieved formal parity with the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles under the Dutch crown. Under the assumption of domestic autonomy, Aruba agreed to retain economic and political links to the Netherland Antilles until the achievement of full independence in 1996.

The Netherlands is represented in Aruba by an appointed governor. However, the island is largely self-governing. Domestic affairs are the responsibility of the prime minister appointed by the freely elected unicameral Staten (legislature). Full freedom of party organization and expression is respected. The Council of Ministers at the Hague remains responsible for foreign affairs and defense.

The twenty-one-member Staten is directly elected for four-year terms. The People's Electoral Movement (MEP) won the 7 January 1989 election, taking ten seats against the incumbent, center-right Aruba People's Party (AVP), which obtained eight. Three smaller parties obtained one seat each. Following the election, a three-party government was formed, headed by the MEP's Nelson Oduber.
The MEP has traditionally been the major force for independence. In 1989, however, Prime Minister Oduber appeared to be shifting in favor of commonwealth status to ensure a full defense commitment from the Netherlands against the threat of the Colombian cocaine cartels, and to guarantee certain forms of financial assistance. During discussions in July 1990, Oduber and the Dutch government agreed that a new constitutional relationship, to be negotiated in the future, would not involve transition to full independence in 1996.

The press, radio and television are private, free and varied. Three daily newspapers are published, one in Dutch, one in English, and one in the local Papiamento. There are five privately run radio stations and one commercial television station.

### Netherland Antilles

#### Polity:
- Appointed governor and parliamentary democracy

#### Political Rights: 1

#### Civil Liberties: 1

#### Economy:
- Mixed capitalist

#### Status: Free

#### Population: 200,000

#### Ethnic Groups: Black majority with Carib Indian and European minorities

**Overview:**

In 1954 the Netherlands Antilles was granted constitutional equality with the Netherlands and Suriname (which became independent in 1975). In 1986, Aruba split off and was given formal parity with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles currently consists of two groups of two and three islands each, the southern (Leeward) islands of Curacao and Bonaire and the northern (Windward) islands of St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba.

Although the Netherlands is represented by an appointed governor, the Netherlands Antilles is largely self-governing. Domestic affairs are the responsibility of the prime minister appointed by the unicameral Staten (legislature) of twenty-two deputies (fourteen from Curacao, three each from Bonaire and St. Maarten, and one each from St. Eustatius and Saba) elected for four years. Full freedom of party organization and expression is respected. Foreign affairs and defense remain the responsibility of the Council of Ministers at the Hague.

Coalition governments have been highly unstable given the geographical range of the islands and island-based political differences, particularly over the issue of island independence. There have been seven governments since 1977 as eight different political parties have entered in and out of a variety of coalitions. The two main parties are the center-right National People's Party (NPP), which formed the government in 1988 under Maria Liberia-Peters, and the social democratic New Antilles Movement (MAN) headed by former prime minister Dom Martina.

The Liberia-Peters government retained office in new elections held on 16 May 1990. The PNP increased its representation to seven seats, and its coalition partner, the Workers Liberation Front (FOL), won three seats. With ten out of fourteen seats on Curacao, the PNP also had the support of the Democratic Party (St. Eustatious) and the Windward Islands Patriotic Movement (Saba), both of which retained their seats, and the Bonaire Patriotic Union, which took all three seats on Bonaire. Claude Wathey, the leader of
the Democratic Party (St Maarten) and powerbroker of most federation governments over the last three decades, lost his seat.

In 1990, the Netherlands appeared to shift on its long-held policy of encouraging full independence. In May, the Dutch government announced plans for drawing up a new constitution governing relations between the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. The Liberia-Peters government responded by announcing in June that it hoped to hold by 1992 a round-table conference in which all three would discuss the basis for future relations. In the Netherlands Antilles, there continued to be great differences of opinion, between political parties and islands alike, over the issue.

The press, radio and television are private, free and varied. The islands are serviced by six daily newspapers, two in Dutch and four in the local Papiamento. Privately owned radio stations operate on all islands except St. Eustatius. There is a television station on Curacao.

**New Zealand**

**Cook Islands**

**Polity:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 3,300,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Polynesian majority, European and mixed race minorities

**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

The major change in the Cook Islands in 1990 was television. Cook Islands Broadcasting Corporation began broadcasting on 25 December 1989. Located in the South Pacific, the Cook Islands are in free association with New Zealand. The territory has the right to independence at any time. The population is almost entirely Polynesian and has New Zealand citizenship rights. Aside from defense and foreign affairs, the islands are largely self-governing. The governor general of New Zealand appoints a Queen's Representative who appoints the prime minister. There is a twenty-four-seat parliament which has a maximum term of five years. There is also an advisory council of chiefs. Dr. Pupuke Robati led a coalition government for five years until January 1989. His administration presided over a declining health system and other deteriorating government services. His cabinet got in trouble with the voters for inflating their travel expenses. The Robati government banned political issues from the media in late 1988. This ban allowed no political references in songs, advertisements, letters to the editor or the news. In previous elections, there were other abuses. For example, the Cook Islands Party flew in nonresidents to vote in the 1978 election, which the High Court invalidated. Albert Henry, cousin of the current prime minister, pleaded guilty in that case. The territory has one newspaper and two radio stations. The coalition lifted the ban on 4 January 1989 in time for the 19 January election. The Cook Islands Party, led by Geoffrey Henry, won twelve of the twenty-four parliamentary seats. The coalition won only nine seats, and the Democratic Tumu secured two. An independent won the remaining seat.
New Zealand
Niue

**Overview:**

The most important development in Niue in 1990 was a struggle for political leadership between Prime Minister Sir Robert Rex and several other politicians.

Niue is located northeast of New Zealand in the South Pacific. The island is in free association with New Zealand, which gives full citizenship rights to Niueans. The small population is more than 90 percent Polynesian. The island has a very poor economy, and endures such natural disasters as long droughts and cyclones. Lavish subsidies from New Zealand sustain the relatively large local government and the declining population. More than half the Niuean labor force works in the public sector. Over the years about 10,000 Niueans have moved to New Zealand. In a last-ditch effort to save the island, the larger country is pouring in funds to develop local business. This may be cut off, due to poor economic performance.

The island's politics are characterized by shifting alliances of personalities and family squabbles. The twenty-member Assembly is elected every three years. While fourteen win election from village constituencies, six stand for office at-large. Sir Robert Rex has been the political leader since the 1950s. Many islanders grew tired of his longevity, and elected six new members of the Assembly in the spring 1990 election. Many candidates on both sides were members or inlaws of the Rex family. The only formal party, People's Action, and its sympathizers won the most votes in the election. On election night People's Action leader Young Vivian thought he would have a 12-8 majority in the Assembly. However, splits developed on the People's Action side, and Sir Robert took advantage of them. He managed to switch enough Assembly members to give himself a 12-8 majority. Both Young Vivian and the voters were stunned.

After a few months in office Rex dumped two of his ministers, charging that they "stabbed me in the back." The pair had sought to replace Sir Robert. Then the leader named two new ministers including his electoral opponent, Young Vivian.

There is only one newspaper. Most islanders belong to the Christian Council of World Missions, but other groups have freedom of worship.

Tokelau

**Overview:**

Tokelau is a collection of islands in the South Pacific. The population is Polynesian. New Zealand appoints the territorial administrator. Each village elects a Faipule, who represents the village and presides over the council of elders, and a Pulenuku, who is responsible for village administration. Elections are every three years. There are no newspapers or broadcast media.
There is freedom of worship. Islanders belong to various Christian groups. New Zealand subsidizes the local economy. Many residents move to New Zealand.

**Portugal Azores**

**Overview:**

The Azores are three groups of islands located 800 miles west of Portugal in the Atlantic Ocean. After the 1974 revolution in Portugal, separatist sentiment increased. Subsequently, the Lisbon government surrendered administration of the island to local political leaders. It had been run by Portuguese-appointed governors. A multi-party, forty-three-seat Assembly was established in 1976, and a regional government formed under the leadership of the Popular Democratic Party, the former name of the Social Democratic Party. In 1980, the Social Democrats obtained a majority in the Assembly, and have maintained it since then. The islands have elected representatives in the Portuguese parliament. Azoreans have the same civil liberties as Portuguese mainlanders.

**Polity:** Elected assembly  
**Political Rights:** 1  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 2  
**Population:** 260,000  
**Status:** Free  
**Ethnic groups:** Portuguese

**Macao**

**Overview:**

Founded in 1557 as the first Western trading post on the Chinese coast, Macao's importance dwindled with Portuguese power, and neighboring Hong Kong has long since replaced it as the region's primary entrepot. Indeed, the fate of this territory (which consists of two islands, a peninsula, a bridge and a causeway) is substantially linked with Hong Kong's.

During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese radicals stormed both territories, but Hong Kong's economic strength bought it a quicker reprieve. Intimidated by the revolts, Portugal accommodated its policies to Beijing's demands. In 1974, Lisbon offered to return Macao; probably with an eye on Hong Kong's stability, Beijing declined. Macao's 1976 constitution, the Organic Law, calls Macao a "collective entity." Since they established diplomatic relations in 1979, both China and Portugal regard Macao as "Chinese territory under Portuguese administration." Following the Sino-British Joint Agreement in 1984, China initiated negotiations over Macao. A 1987 treaty arranged for China to resume control on 20 December 1999. Modelled after the Hong Kong agreement, the Sino-Portuguese treaty guarantees Macao's semi-democratic, capitalist system for fifty years.

The Macao legislature, preparing for Chinese control over the Macao Special Administrative Region, approved in March an amendment to the Organic Law to increase local autonomy. On 17 April, the Portuguese
Parliament ratified the amendment, which will increase the powers of both the governor and legislature. Lisbon intends the reforms “to allow the growth of political abilities in the transition period.” Other preparations for 1999 continue, though at a slower pace than Beijing desires, including: localizing the civil service, translating laws from Portuguese, and promulgating Chinese as the official language. To facilitate these changes, China has sent five lawyers to Macao and Macao has sent 40 Mecanese (descendants of Portuguese and ethnic Chinese) to Beijing to study Mandarin.

A recent boom in gambling and tourism—Macao’s leading industries—has provided extra government revenues, with which Governor Carlos Melancia has implemented an ambitious infrastructure development program. This program landed Melancia in trouble, however, when allegations emerged that he had accepted a bribe of 2.8 million Patacas (U.S. $359,000) from a German contractor. Still protesting his innocence, Melancia resigned on 28 September and will face trial in Portugal. Deputy Governor Francisco Murteira Nabo will save as interim governor until the winner of Portugal’s Presidential election on 13 January 1991 appoints a successor.

Melancia’s resignation—the third in five years—has raised doubts about Portugal’s ability to ensure a smooth transition to Chinese rule. A majority of Portuguese now believe that the Prime Minister should be given increased influence over Macao policy.

Macao residents generally enjoy all the civil liberties guaranteed by the Portuguese constitution. Approximately 100,000 residents hold Portuguese passports and it appears that Portugal will allow immigration for those who want to leave. Portugal also grants the same rights to the descendants of those who stay past 1999, though China views passports only as travel documents and refuses to allow consular protection.

Macao’s Legislative Assembly consists of 17 members. The government appoints five, six are elected indirectly through various economic and social groups, and six are elected directly by universal suffrage over eighteen. Public representatives also serve on the Consultative Council which advises the governor. Macao government follows a tradition of consulting business and social leaders when shaping policy. This system, in which ethnic Chinese enjoy full electoral equality with the ruling Portuguese, only dates back to 1984 when the then governor forced reforms past an unwilling legislature. Increased Chinese representation has led to more development, more social services, and the territory’s first labor laws.

Since 1982, Macao has towed arriving Vietnamese refugees into Hong Kong waters. An incident occurred in July 1989 when a boat being towed started to break up. The Macao authorities abandoned the 39 refugees, without food, water or other necessities, on a nearby island. All 39 later reached Hong Kong safely.
The Madeira Islands are located in the Atlantic 500 miles southwest of Portugal. On 29 August 1975, the Madeira Archipelago Liberation Front (FLAMA) announced a provisional government. In October 1976, a regional Assembly was established, dominated by the Social Democratic Center Party. Since then, the Social Democratic Center has controlled the legislature. Madeira has representatives in the Portuguese parliament. Civil liberties are the same as on the mainland.

**South Africa Bophutatswana**

- **Polity:** Dominant party
- **Economy:** Capitalist-statist
- **Population:** 2,170,000
- **Ethnic groups:** Tswana majority, Pedis, Shangaans, Xhosas, South Sothos, and Swazis

**Overview:**

The major issue facing Bophutatswana in 1990 was how it would relate to political change in South Africa. The territory declared an emergency in early 1990 due to an uprising against the South African apartheid system. During a protest in March, soldiers opened fire, killing eleven and injuring hundreds. President Lucas Mangope charged in August that the African National Congress (ANC) was trying to overthrow him. The opposition National Seoposengwe Party declared itself in alliance with the ANC. Since the ANC favors the dissolution of Bophutatswana and the other so-called independent homelands in South Africa, the territory could cease to exist in 1991.

Located in north-central South Africa, Bophutatswana consists of six noncontiguous territories. It borders Botswana, which shares the same Tswana ethnic group. South Africa granted the territory nominal independence in 1977. No country outside South Africa has recognized this status. Mangope has been the chief executive since 1977. He won reelection unopposed in 1984. He holds most executive power, and has the right to run government departments himself. The National Assembly consists of 108 members. Mangope's dominant Democratic Party held all but six seats after the 1987 elections. The remaining seats were held by the opposition Progressive People's Party (PPP). In February 1988, the army attempted to force Mangope from power and give the presidency to the leader of the PPP, but within a few hours, South African troops put down the rebellion and restored Mangope to power. Later the government banned the PPP.

Bophutatswana has some economic strength, derived from platinum mines and the Sun City resort and entertainment complex. However, it depends heavily on South African patronage.

As of late 1990, merger with South Africa appeared to be the most likely outcome of discussions among the South African government, the ANC, and homeland leaders. Some in Bophutatswana called for merger with Botswana. However, the territory's population outnumbers their ethnic brethren in the neighboring country by three to one.
Ciskei

**Overview:**

The most important local event in Ciskei in 1990 was Brigadier Oupa Josh Gqozo's successful coup against the government of President Lennox Sebe. There were spontaneous, mass celebrations to mark Sebe's overthrow, but the demonstrations turned to chaos, resulting in deaths and injuries. The military government declared a state of emergency. The United Democratic Front, an affiliate of the African National Congress (ANC), announced its support for the coup. Gqozo released some political prisoners.

Located in southeastern South Africa, Ciskei has been a nominally independent black homeland since 1981. Sebe had been the country's only president until the coup. Technically, the National Assembly was supposed to appoint presidents for five-year terms, but Sebe became president-for-life in 1983. By the late 1980s, Ciskei functioned with a one-party system. South Africa declared some of its villages as part of Ciskei in 1988. This touched off a confrontation between residents and the Ciskei police, who demolished homes and beat and arrested the villagers. In November 1990 Gqozo said he favored a federal South Africa as the method for solving the homelands' question. The choice between the dissolution of Ciskei or its federation with South Africa will depend on the outcome of discussions among the ANC, the South African government, and the homelands.

Transkei

**Overview:**

In 1990 Transkei's military government projected a militantly pro-ANC stance. Ruled by General Bantubonke Holomisa, the territory provided a haven for Chris Hani, the ANC's military chief of staff. However, the government denied reports that Hani's troops were joining Holomisa's army. Hani threatened to seize power in South Africa in the event of failed negotiations between the South African government and its opponents. Black and white rebel troops attempted a coup against Holomisa in November 1990. Seventeen people died in the unsuccessful putsch.

Located in southeastern South Africa, Transkei is a nominally independent black homeland consisting of three noncontiguous territories. The army seized power from the civilian government in 1987. In August 1990 the former President, Paramount Chief Matanzima called for a general election to make constitutional changes. He was concerned that Holomisa would make such changes himself.
Venda

**Polity:** Military  
**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Population:** 625,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Venda majority, Sangaan and Pedi minorities

**Political Rights:** 7  
**Civil Liberties:** 5  
**Status:** Not Free

The most important news stories in Venda in 1990 were the protests against the government early in the year and the subsequent military coup. After demonstrations against the civilian regime, the government declared a state of emergency. The National Assembly met in March 1990 for a special session, when President Frank Ravele gave in to demands for a competitive party system and for an end to the territory's nominally independent status. Colonel Gabriel Ramushwana overthrew the government in April 1990. His ruling military council does not permit public employee strikes or unauthorized demonstrations. It also opposes the burning of alleged witches.

Situated in northeastern South Africa, Venda has had alleged independence since 1979. Under its original form of government, the territory had an assembly with a combination of elected and appointed members. In 1989 the government charged over 150 people with participation in boycotts and other protests against police handling of ritual murders, the celebration of Venda's "independence," and subsequent arrests and detentions. Many prisoners went on hunger strikes. The government released most of those arrested after dropping charges or letting them out on bail.

The new military government has declared its support for a united South Africa. It lifted the state of emergency on 5 June 1990. Like the other nominally independent homelands, it could rejoin South Africa during 1991.

Spain

Canary Islands

**Polity:** Regional legislature  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 25,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Mostly Hispanic

**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

The Canary Islands, located off the northwest coats of Africa, are administered as two provinces by Spain. Although the people are largely Hispanic, they are of diverse origins and maintain pre-Spanish customs. There have been periodic separatist movements, but the development of internal self-determination has helped to diffuse such sentiments. In terms of civil liberties, the population enjoys the same rights and guarantees as citizens of Spain.
Ceuta

**Polity:** Municipal administration

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 80,000

**Ethnic groups:** Moroccan, Spanish

**Political Rights:** 2

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

Ceuta and Melilla, located off the coast of Morocco, are governed as municipalities of Cadiz and Malaga, respectively. Both areas have Muslim populations with Moroccan roots who have lived on the islands for generations. In 1986 the government created a commission to examine how to integrate the Muslims into Spanish society. After demonstrations in Lclila in 1986, the Spanish government made a move to give most Muslims citizenship over time.

Melilla

**Polity:** Municipal administration

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 65,000

**Ethnic groups:** Moroccan, Spanish

**Political Rights:** 2

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

Overview:

Switzerland

**Polity:** Prince and parliamentary democracy

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist

**Population:** 28,000

**Ethnic groups:** Alemmanic German, Italian, other Europeans

**Political Rights:** 1

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

The Principality of Liechtenstein was created in the eighteenth century. Most Liechtensteiners are descended from the Germanic Alemanni tribe. The head of state is Prince Hans Adam, whose Austrian ancestors purchased this country's land. Hans Adam succeeded his father, Franz Josef, who died in November 1989 after a fifty-one-year reign. The prince had carried out his father's executive duties since 1984. The prince appoints a prime minister from the majority party or coalition in the fifteen-member Landtag, whose members serve for four-year terms. Called "hallowed and sacrosanct" by the constitution, the monarch has the right to veto legislation. Franz Josef used this right only once, when he disapproved of a hunting law. "It was a silly law," he said. "It would have turned every garden into a shooting ground." Parties with at least 8 percent of the vote receive proportional representation in the Landtag. The leading parties are the moderately liberal Fatherland's Union, the conservative Progressive Citizens' Party, the Christian Social Party, and the liberal, Green-oriented Free Voters' List. The major issue in the March 1989 elections was whether or not to build a new museum. Liechtenstein uses Swiss currency, and has a customs union with its larger neighbor. The Swiss handle Liechtenstein's defense and foreign affairs. In 1990 Lichtenstein applied for membership in the United Nations.

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties:**

Liechtensteiners can change their government by democratic means. Control has shifted back and forth between parties. The principality allows voters the right to decide issues directly through referenda. Despite the dependence on Switzerland, Liechtenstein retains its own traditions and power over local...
concerns. Women have had the right to vote nationally since 1984. Franz Josef had pressed for women’s suffrage since the 1950s. The leading political parties publish newspapers five times each week. Residents receive radio and television freely from other countries. Liechtenstein has no broadcast media. The country is too small to have numerous organizations, but association is free. The highly prosperous economy is a combination of private and state enterprises. Per capita GDP is over $26,000.

**United Kingdom**

**Anguilla**

**Polity:** Appointed governor and elected assembly  
**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Economy:** Mixed capitalist  
**Status:** Free

**Population:** 7,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Relatively homogeneous, black majority

**Overview:**

Following the establishment of the Associated State of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Anguillans rejected governmental authority from St. Kitts and in 1969 a British commissioner was appointed. A separate constitution was provided in 1976 giving the commissioner (now governor) authority over foreign affairs, defense, civil service and internal security. In January 1990, the governor also assumed responsibility for international financial affairs. All other governmental responsibilities are carried out by a freely elected seven-member House of Assembly. The first House elections were held in 1976. In December 1980, the dependent status of the territory was formally confirmed.  

In the 27 February 1989 elections, the incumbent Anguilla National Alliance (ANA) headed by Chief Minister Emile Gumbs retained control of the House over the opposition Anguilla United Party (AUP).  

Anguillans enjoy all civil rights common to the homeland. The press is government owned and operated. Radio is both government owned and private. There is no television.

**Bermuda**

**Polity:** Appointed governor and parliamentary democracy  
**Political Rights:** 1  
**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Economy:** Mixed capitalist  
**Status:** Free

**Population:** 56,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Black (approximately 60 percent), large British minority

**Overview:**

Under a constitution approved in 1967, Bermuda was granted the right of internal self-government in 1968. A Crown-appointed governor exercises responsibility for external affairs, defense, internal security and police. A premier is appointed by the governor but is responsible to a freely elected forty-member House of Assembly for all internal matters.  

In the 9 February 1989 general election, the incumbent center-right, multiracial United Bermuda Party (UBP) of Premier John Swan retained control of the House over the left-wing, predominantly black Progressive Labour Party (PLP). The UBP obtained twenty-three seats, the PLP fifteen, and the National Liberal Party (NLP) and an independent environmentalist,
one each. Poverty, race and immigration were the main issues; the question of independence has diminished in importance as most of the electorate has demonstrated its support for the status quo.

A non-binding referendum on the future of capital punishment, held on 28 August 1990, produced a 78.4 percent vote for its retention, on a turnout of less than a third of the 33,330 registered voters. The turnout at general elections is usually around 70 percent. The decision to hold the referendum was taken by the House of Assembly in 1989, after a tied vote on a motion to abolish the death penalty. The last executions were in December 1977. Capital punishment is limited to cases of premeditated murder.

Beimudians enjoy all civil rights common to the homeland. There are several newspapers, all privately owned. There are over half a dozen radio stations and two television stations. Labor unions, the largest being the 6,000-member Bermuda Industrial Union, are well organized. The right to strike is recognized by law and in practice.

**British Virgin Islands**

**Polity:** Appointed governor and elected council  
**Political Rights:** 2

**Economy:** Mixed statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Population:** 13,000  
**Status:** Free

**Ethnic Groups:** Relatively homogeneous with black majority

**Overview:**

The 1977 constitution granted greater responsibility over internal affairs. A Crown-appointed governor retains responsibility for external affairs, civil service, defense and internal security. On other matters the governor acts on the advice of the Executive Council whose members are the governor, the chief minister, four members of the legislature and the Attorney General. The chief minister, representing the majority party in the freely elected nine-member Legislative Council, is appointed by the governor.

The 1986 Legislative Council elections were won by the Virgin Islands Party (VIP) headed by the current chief minister H. Lavity Stoutt. The VIP took five of nine seats, ousting the administration of independent member Cyril B. Romney. The British Virgin Islands were lashed by Hurricane Hugo in September 1989. Although there were no reports of looting, Stoutt instituted a month-long state of emergency in order to requisition private assets in the relief effort.

In October 1990 the legislature was dissolved and campaigning began for the general election called for 12 November. A total of thirty-six candidates from the ruling VIP, the People's Progressive Democratic Party, and the British Virgin Islands United Party, as well as independents, were expected to contest for the nine Council seats.

Residents enjoy all civil liberties common to the homeland. There is one weekly newspaper, one radio and one television station.
Cayman Islands

**Polity:** Appointed governor and mostly elected assembly

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 25,000

**Ethnic Groups:** Mixed (40 percent), Caucasian (20 percent), black (20 percent), various ethnic groups (20 percent)

**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**
Previously governed from Jamaica, the Cayman Islands were placed under a British administration in 1962. A Crown-appointed governor is assisted by an Executive Council and a largely elected Legislative Assembly, over which he presides. The Assembly consists of three members appointed by the governor and twelve elected members, with a new Assembly elected every four years. There are no formal political parties.

In September 1990, the United Kingdom agreed to a request by the Legislative Assembly for a review of the 1972 constitution. In July, following a dispute over the enlarging of the Assembly's finance committee to include unelected members, the assembly had voted eight to seven for the establishment of a commission to evaluate public opinion on the islands concerning possible constitutional changes. The review was expected to begin in early 1991.

Residents enjoy all civil liberties common to the homeland. There is one daily newspaper and at least one weekly publication. There is at least one radio and one television station.

Channel Islands

**Polity:** Appointed executives and legislatures (varies by island)

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 137,000

**Ethnic groups:** British, Norman French

**Political Rights:** 2  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free

**Overview:**
The Channel Islands are located in the English Channel. The territories included are the islands of Jersey and Guernsey and their dependencies. Surviving fragments of the medieval Duchy of Normandy, the islands are Crown fiefdoms. They are connected to Britain through the person of the monarch. The Queen appoints her representatives, who are called lieutenant governors and commanders-in-chief. British laws do not apply unless the parliamentary legislation specifies that they do or unless the British Privy Council extends coverage of the laws to the islands. In Jersey and Guernsey the appointed bailiffs preside over the royal courts and legislatures. Jersey’s legislature, the States, is elected directly by universal suffrage. Guernsey’s legislature, the States of Deliberation, has a mixture of directly and indirectly elected members. Two of Guernsey’s dependencies, Aldemey and Sark, have local legislatures, the States of Alderney and the Chief Pleas of Sark. Sark also has a hereditary head. There are two representatives of Alderney in the States of Guernsey. Residents speak either English, French, or Norman French. Farming and tourism are major industries.
Falkland Islands

**Overview:**

In February 1990, the United Kingdom and Argentina reached an agreement to resume diplomatic relations and to relax tensions around the Falkland Islands. Since the Falkland war in 1982, Britain had maintained a 150-mile zone around the islands, which barred Argentina's vessels. Effective 31 March 1990, the agreement ended the exclusion zone and also stipulated that both countries would have to give prior notice before carrying out military maneuvers. The two sides also agreed to allow Argentinians to visit the graves of their close relatives on the islands.

Englishmen landed on these islands for the first time in 1610. Spain and Britain clashed over ownership of the Falklands in the eighteenth century. Argentina claimed the territory in 1820, but Britain rejected that. Britain and Argentina negotiated over the Falklands' status in the 1960s and 1970s, but never reached agreement. In 1982, Argentina's military government decided to invade and seize control of the islands. Britain defeated Argentina after several weeks of fighting.

Britain appoints a governor to represent the Queen. A chief executive assists in administering the islands. The Legislative Council consists of six members elected by the people, the chief executive, and the financial secretary. The latter two officials, nominees of the governor, and two nominees of the Legislative council form an Executive Council. There are two newspapers, one of them government-published. The public Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service operates two radio stations. Sheep and marine life provide the bases of the local economy.

Gibraltar

**Overview:**

Located at the southern tip of the Iberian peninsula, Gibraltar came under British control in 1704 after the War of the Spanish Succession. Due to its strategic location between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Gibraltar has served as a key British naval base. Spain still claims sovereignty over the territory, but Britain and Spain have reached agreements to ease their earlier tensions over the area. In February 1990, the two countries announced that closer cooperation in civil aviation would be of great benefit, and agreed to extend a 1985 extradition treaty and a 1989 anti-drug agreement.

The two governments began negotiating in 1982, but postponed talks as a result of the Falklands War. They normalized relations in 1984. Spain lifted the land link embargo in 1984.

Britain appoints a governor of the territory. A Gibraltar Council of Ministers advises him. The Council consists of four ex officio members and five elected members of the colony’s legislature. The House of Assembly performs legislative functions. It consists of fifteen directly elected members, two ex officio members, and an appointed speaker. The House has been responsible for most domestic affairs since 1969. Britain is responsible for defense and foreign affairs. In the legislative election of 1988, the Socialist Labour Party, led by Joe Bossano, won eight seats. The Gibraltar Labour Party/Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights, led by Adolfo Canepa, won seven seats. One member elected with the latter, Peter Montegrillo, has formed a separate Gibraltar Social Democratic Party since the election. Bossano backs complete independence for Gibraltar. He fears that British troop reductions in Gibraltar may lead eventually to Spanish sovereignty. There is freedom of association. There are seven newspapers and a public broadcasting corporation.

Hong Kong

**Polity:** Colonial appointed governor
and partly elected legislature

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 5,800,000

**HDI:** 0.936 (high)

**Ethnic groups:** Mainly Chinese (98 percent)

**Political Rights:** 4

**Civil Liberties:** 3

**Status:** Partly Free

**Overview:**

An exciting year for Hong Kong politics, 1990 featured: China’s ratification of the territory’s post-1997 constitution, movement towards a Bill of Rights, formation of the colony’s first political parties, and debates over the nature of and preparations for its first legislative elections in September 1991. Far from enjoying the excitement, however, Hong Kong’s 5.8 million residents worried about the developments. Psychologists estimate that Hong Kong ranks third, following only Beirut and Belfast, among the world’s most stressful cities. Emigration spelled relief for 62,000 residents this year. Their departure only caused more worries for those remaining.

In 1842, following the first Opium War, China ceded Hong Kong island on its southeast coast to Britain “in perpetuity” for the better operation of the opium trade. As Hong Kong’s importance as a trading center and military base flourished during the nineteenth century, it grew in size. Britain won Kowloon, also “in perpetuity,” in 1860 and extracted a 99 year lease on the New Territories in 1898. The lease expires on 30 June 1997. London, viewing the colony as an indivisible whole, promised in 1984 to return all Hong Kong to China come 1997. Based on Deng Xiaoping’s brainchild “one country, two systems,” the Sino-British Joint Agreement establishes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing promised to allow Hong Kong Chinese to retain the rights they now enjoy—including their capitalist system—for at least fifty years. Many colonial residents doubted the sincerity of Hong Kong’s once and future sovereign from the beginning. Pessimists found their proof—much to their own sorrow—in the bloodshed at Tiananmen Square. Seeing their own future
repression mirrored in the Beijing events of May-June 1989, the normally apolitical Hong Kong Chinese unmistakably demonstrated their empathy. Over one million people marched in the largest such protest. Over 100,000 commemorated the massacre's first anniversary this June.

The post-Tiananmen uncertainty has fueled an exodus among those Hong Kong Chinese who can afford to leave. While 45,000 left in 1988 (a record high) and 42,000 in 1989, 62,000 residents moved this year, significantly more than the government’s predicted 55,000 Emigres. Indeed, it is not loyalty to the territory which prevented even more from leaving. Polls consistently show that very high percentages, particularly among the young, would leave if they could. The “if” is frequently insurmountable. Many Western countries have strict immigration quotas. Other countries allow so-called investor-immigrants, but this option requires substantial savings before one can buy a passport. As it becomes apparent that neither Britain, the European Community, the United States, Canada nor the Commonwealth plans to allow mass immigration from Hong Kong, residents scramble for passports elsewhere. The rush has created conditions for scandal, including one case where several Hong Kong Chinese bought passports for a fictional Pacific state.

In an effort to stem the exodus, on 19 April 1990 Britain passed amendments to the British Nationality Act of 1981, which provide for the potential immigration of 50,000 top civil servants and professionals and their families—up to a maximum of 225,000 in total. Britain envisages this legislation as the back-up plan needed to restore the territory’s confidence. In the end the bill passed handily, 313-216, but it did so only after the government fought off attacks from Labour (who denounced it as elitist) and the Tory Right (who objected to mass immigration, particularly by nonwhites). The chair of the Council of Hong Kong Indian Associations blames British racism for the plight of the territory’s 6,000 ethnic Indians who will become stateless in 1997.

Because the connection between money and emigration limits the exodus to those with high paying jobs, observers have dubbed it the brain drain. Many worry that this loss of talent threatens Hong Kong’s economy. Civil servants are demanding 17 percent pay raises, because they fear that China will not honor their pensions. Police morale is low: fewer cadets apply and more drop out. Law school applicants dropped suddenly, substantially, perhaps reflecting doubts among students about the future of the rule of law. Corruption and bribery, Hong Kong’s traditional banes, seem likely to skyrocket as public morale sinks. Organized crime seems to be getting bolder.

All these factors contribute to a public perception of the British as a lame duck administration. Hong Kong Chinese have always paid attention to Beijing’s concerns, as expressed through China’s de facto embassy in the territory, the Xinhua News Agency office. But Xinhua’s messages gained weight when Hong Kong learned that China would resume control in 1997 and appeared more ominous after Tiananmen signalled the re-emergence of hardliners in Beijing. Changes in Beijing were reflected locally when China replaced the former head of Xinhua (now living in the U.S., perhaps as a defector) with a hardliner. Xinhua’s new head called in April for Britain to consult China in administering Hong Kong until 1997. He was only stating what had already been happening: Hong Kong has hesitated in enacting needed legislation (including social security) and in starting needed development projects (including a new airport), because of Beijing’s economic
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concerns; and the authorities refused to allow the Goddess of Democracy statue to remain on public display. As a measure of the extent to which such policies make Britain unpopular among local subjects, a recent poll indicated that 90 percent of top colonial civil servants trust neither London nor Beijing.

Under Chinese pressure, Britain abandoned its promise to institute a "firmly based, democratic administration" in Hong Kong before 1997. More limited change will instead come slower. Hong Kong's government now consists of a governor appointed by London; an Executive Council (Exco) which includes the governor, four ex officio members, and twelve nominated unofficial members; and the Legislative Council (Legco) which includes the governor, ten ex officio members, twenty appointed unofficial members, fourteen members representing "functional constituencies" (interest groups, mostly businesses), and twelve members elected indirectly by suffrage over twenty-one by an electorate of 71,000. Members of the Urban Council, Regional Council and District Boards—none of which has any significant political functions—are elected by universal suffrage over twenty-one. Current reform plans—negotiated between Britain and China—envision a sixty person Legco to which eighteen members will be elected from nine constituencies by universal suffrage over twenty-one in September 1991. The number of elected representatives will increase to twenty in 1995, twenty-four in 1999, and thirty in 2003. Throughout there will be thirty representatives of functional constituencies—e.g. stockbrokers, insurers, developers, and the tourist industry. For now the government and, after 1995, a Sino-British "grand electoral college" will select the remainder. Hong Kong's first political parties organized in 1990 in order to contest next year's elections: the liberal United Democrats of Hong Kong (first and largest); the also liberal Hong Kong Democratic Foundation; and the pro-business Liberal Democratic Foundation.

On 4 April, the National People's Congress in Beijing ratified the Basic Law, which will become Hong Kong's constitution come 1997. Given the nature of Chinese government, this ratification was but a formality. Its finality nevertheless chilled many Hong Kong Chinese. Just three hours after the NPC vote, Legco voted 20-6 calling for amendments to the Basic Law. Beijing has declared its refusal, however, to consider any amendments before 1997.

Hong Kong moved in 1990 towards enacting a Bill of Rights. The colony, like Britain, does not have a written constitution, but residents wish to codify the rights they currently enjoy as British subjects. China accepts the codification, but insists that the Basic Law—and not the Bill of Rights—will be the supreme law of post-1997 Hong Kong. The Bill, which implements international human rights conventions which China has not ratified, will be persuasive, but not authoritative. The draft legislation accordingly calls for the territory's Attorney General to certify whether future laws comply with the Bill of Rights. Exco approved a draft bill in March, which conservatives diluted during the summer. While the original allowed two years for all colonial laws to comply with the Bill, the modifications enable Legco to delay compliance indefinitely.

Censorship and self-censorship are both rising in Hong Kong, as the government and media grapple with approaching Chinese rule. While Hong Kong has traditionally practiced censorship, there are indications that it will heighten its efforts in order to avoid provoking a highly sensitive, post-
Tiananmen China. Self-censorship proved a disturbing trend in 1990 as the media followed the government's lead. Local pro-Communist newspapers, such as Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao, which had supported the students during spring 1989, firmly upheld Beijing's positions this year. Hong Kong's two television stations refused to broadcast an American music video which supported the Chinese democracy movement. Fear of Chinese sticks (such as withdrawing advertisements) and desire for Chinese carrots (such as visas to send reporters to the mainland) fuel media self-censorship.

It is sadly ironic that as Hong Kong struggles to cope with the problems of mass emigration, some of its biggest human rights abuses arise from mass immigration. Many Vietnamese refugees land in Hong Kong and, as resettlement efforts stall, their numbers mount. There are now some 56,000 Vietnamese in Hong Kong, over 40,000 of whom are kept at overcrowded, squalid refugee camps which international observers have termed "inhuman" and "the worst in the world." At least two Vietnamese men attempted suicide in a Hong Kong camp in January 1990 in protest of the possibility of their forced return. An international legal team sued on behalf of nine refugees, arguing that the inadequacy of the screening and appeals processes requires a halt to forced repatriations. A Hong Kong judge ruled in November that 111 "boat people," who had been detained illegally for over a year, be freed; in a move the judge denounced as "a challenge to the judiciary" the police immediately re-arrested the freed plaintiffs on the grounds that they had been released under the Immigration Ordinance and were subsequently arrested for being in Hong Kong illegally.

Vibrant commerce continues in Hong Kong. While the Chinese Communist Party dominates the Federation of Trade Unions, independent, non-Communist trade unions exist. Except for the fact that unions are banned from making political contributions, Hong Kong workers generally enjoy the same rights as their British counterparts.

**Isle of Man**

**Polity:** Appointed executive and elected legislature  
**Political Rights:** 2  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Civil Liberties:** 1  
**Status:** Free  
**Population:** 63,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Mostly Manx (of mixed Celtic and Scandinavian descent)

**Overview:**

The Isle of Man is located west of Britain in the Irish Sea. Like the Channel Islands, it is a crown fiefdom, tied to Britain through the monarch. The Queen appoints an executive, the lieutenant governor. The Court of Tynwald is the bicameral legislature. Claiming to be the world's oldest functioning legislature, it consists of a twelve-member Legislative Council, of which the lieutenant governor is a member, and an elected twenty-four-member House of Keys. For most matters, the two houses sit in joint session. Two members of the Legislative Council and five members of the House form an executive council. The Isle has its own laws. Acts of the British Parliament apply to Man only if they state so specifically.

The major issue in 1990 was the government's proposal to legalize homosexual acts. Britain's acceptance of the European Human Rights Convention on behalf of its territories put the island in breach of continental rights standards on this issue. The island is the only European territory of the
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U.K. where people do not have the right of individual petition to the convention. Some supporters of Manx autonomy opposed the homosexual reform measure, because they feared it would jeopardize the territory's special legal status. The Isle of Man owes its success as a tax haven to its freedom from British tax laws. Manx economic interests feared that the homosexual reform would set a precedent that would undermine the island's ability to write its own tax laws.

Montserrat

**Polity:** Appointed governor and partly elected council

**Economy:** Capitalist

**Population:** 12,000

**Ethnic Groups:** Mostly black with European minority

**Political Rights:** 2

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Status:** Free

**Overview:**

In Montserrat, a small island in the Caribbean, a crown-appointed governor presides over an appointed Executive Council. Local legislative matters are the responsibility of a largely elected, eleven-member Legislative Council. Of the eleven members, who serve five-year terms, seven are directly elected, two are official members, and two are nominated. The chief minister is the leader of the majority party in the Council.

In the 25 August 1987 Council elections, the People's Liberation Movement (PLM) headed by incumbent chief minister John Osborne held its four-seat majority.

David Brandt, a founder of the National Development Party (NDP), which holds two seats in the Council, resigned in early September 1989 after accusations of involvement in the 1989 offshore banking scandal. The scandal also caused friction between chief minister Osborne and governor Christopher Turner. Osborne accused Turner of overstepping legal bounds by ordering police to raid one of the banks involved.

In December 1989, negotiations in London between Osborne and the British government led to an agreement on a new constitution. The new constitution, which was instituted on 13 February 1990, consolidates the provisions of the Montserrat Letters Patent of 1959 and other legislation, and adds a statement on the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. On disputed matters, Osborne agreed that the chief minister would relinquish to the governor responsibility for international financial affairs, as proposed by the British government in the wake of the banking scandal. In exchange, the British government agreed to add a provision recognizing Montserrat's right to self-determination, and to eliminate the governor's power to overrule the Legislative Council on certain types of legislation.

In April 1990, Turner ended his three-year term as governor and was replaced by David George Pendleton Taylor.

Residents enjoy all civil liberties common to the homeland. There are at least two newspapers, including the opposition *Montserrat Reporter*, several radio stations and one television station. Labor unions are well organized and the right to strike is recognized by law and in practice.
Pitcairn Islands

**Polity:** Appointed governor and council  
**Political Rights:** 2

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Population:** 59  
**Status:** Free

**Ethnic groups:** Bounty families (Mixed Anglo-Tahitian)

**Overview:**

Located in the South Pacific, the territory consists of Pitcairn and three uninhabited islands. The inhabitants are descended from the Bounty mutineers and Tahitian women. In 1790 mutiny leader Fletcher Christian and his fellow mutineers settled there with a dozen Tahitian women. In 1990 the island observed the bicentennial of the community's founding.

The island's major news story in 1990 was the withdrawal of Japan Tuna's trawlers from the colony's waters after a three-year trial. The island had hoped to profit from selling fishing licenses, but the Japanese found the local catch insufficient to justify continuing fishing there. Aside from fishing, the local economy is based on plant life, postage stamp sales, and crafts. Islanders make money by carving ornaments to sell to passing ships. In 1989, the island's gross income was 958,733 Pitcairn dollars, but the outgo was 923,355 Pitcairn dollars, leaving a surplus of 35,378 Pitcairn dollars.

The appointed governor is the British High Commissioner in New Zealand. Ten residents serve on the Pitcairn Island Council. They include the elected magistrate, Brian Young, and three other elected members; the island secretary; one member appointed by the governor; two members appointed by the elected members; one nonvoting member appointed by the governor, and one non-voting member named by the council. Magistrate Young and his wife visited London in July 1990 and met with Queen Elizabeth at a Buckingham Palace garden party. "We pay no taxes but we all do some form of public works," Young said. Among other tasks, the island's twelve able-bodied men maintain seventeen-and-a-half miles of mud roads.

St. Helena and Dependencies

**Polity:** Appointed governor and elected council  
**Political Rights:** 2

**Economy:** Capitalist-statist  
**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Population:** 7,000  
**Status:** Free

**Ethnic groups:** British, Asian Africa

**Overview:**

St. Helena, Ascension Island, and the Tristan da Cunha island group are scattered across the South Atlantic between Africa and South America. The British governor administers the islands with an executive council of two ex officio members and the chairmen of the council committees. Residents elect a twelve-member Legislative Council for a four-year term. The Legislative council started in 1967. Political parties are legal, and took part in earlier elections, but have become inactive. Tristan da Cunha and Ascension have appointed administrators who are responsible to the governor of St. Helena. Advisory councils assist them. The Ascension advisory council includes representatives of the BBC, South Atlantic Cable Company, Cable Wireless Ltd., the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the U.S. Air Force, all of which have facilities there. Ascension has no native population. In 1981 the governor appointed a constitutional commission to deter-
mine desired constitutional changes, but the commission found too little interest among the population to draw any conclusions. The island economies are dominated by British and American bases. There are also local fishing, timber, craft, and agricultural industries. The colony has a government-run broadcasting service and a weekly newspaper. The trade union is the St. Helena General Workers Union.

Turks and Caicos

| Polity: Appointed governor and mostly elected council | Polity: Elected governor and legislature |
| Economy: Capitalist | Economic Rights: 1 |
| Population: 10,000 | Status: Free |
| Ethnic groups: Relatively homogeneous with black majority |

Overview: Previously governed from Jamaica, the islands were placed under a British administration in 1962. A constitution adopted in 1976 provides for a governor, an eight-member Executive Council, and Legislative Council of eleven elected, four ex-officio, and three nominated members. The chief minister is the leader of the majority party in the Legislative Council.

In 1985, chief minister Norman Saunders of the conservative Progressive National Party (PNP) was arrested in Miami on drug trafficking charges and forced to resign. He was replaced by deputy chief minister Nathaniel Francis, who was forced to resign in 1986 on corruption and patronage charges. The British government then imposed direct rule under the governor and established a commission for making constitutional reforms designed to inhibit corruption. The 3 March 1988 elections marked the return to constitutional rule. In the balloting, the People's Democratic Movement, formerly in opposition, took nine of eleven seats and Oswald Skippings became chief minister.

Residents enjoy all the civil liberties common to the homeland. There are at least one weekly newspaper and several radio stations.

United States of America

American Samoa

| Polity: Elected governor and legislature | Political Rights: 1 |
| Economy: Capitalist | Civil Liberties: 1 |
| Population: 38,000 | Status: Free |
| Ethnic groups: Samoan (Polynesian) |

Overview: American Samoa is located in the South Pacific. The U.S. had ruled the territory through an appointed governor for most of this century, but Samoans have elected their own governor since 1977. The bicameral legislature is called the Fono. It consists of a twenty-member House of Representatives and an eighteen-member Senate. The House is elected by popular vote for two-year terms. The mātāi, the chiefs of extended Samoan families, elect senators from among themselves for four-year terms. There are local affiliates of the U.S. Democratic and Republican parties. The territory sends a non-voting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. Tourism, fishing, and agriculture are major industries. There are free and competing newspapers. There is a private radio station and a government-owned television station.
Guam

**Overview:**

The leading issues on Guam in 1990 were anti-abortion legislation and the territory's political status. The suicide of former Governor Ricardo Bordallo was another major incident.

In March 1990 Governor Joseph Ada signed legislation that would have prohibited abortion, even in cases involving rape, incest, and fetal abnormality. The only exceptions to the abortion ban would have been situations involving medically certified threats to the mother's life or health. The legislation made abortion and its advocacy prosecutable offenses. A lawyer from the American Civil Liberties Union made a test case of the law by advocating abortion. However, Guam dropped charges against her. In August an American federal court struck down the legislation and confirmed the continuing authority of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision on abortion.

An unincorporated territory of the U.S., Guam lobbied Washington in 1990 for commonwealth status. In 1982 the voters chose commonwealth in a referendum, but the U.S. has not passed the required enabling legislation. Located west of Hawaii, Guam became American territory as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Guam has a twenty-one member, unicameral legislature elected for two-year terms. Since 1970 the territory has had an elected governor who serves a four-year term. Former two-term, Democratic Governor Ricardo Bordallo, who was found guilty of corruption, killed himself in January 1990.

Guam has a nonvoting representative to the U.S. Congress. American bases and U.S. subsidies contribute significantly to the local economy. There are free and competitive print and broadcast media.

Marshall Islands

**Overview:**

The major political development affecting the Marshall Islands in 1990 was the U.N. Security Council's decision to dissolve the American trusteeship over several Pacific islands. The international body acted in December after the Soviets dropped their objection to the islands' continuing links with the U.S. As recently as 1987, the Soviets had allegedly infiltrated the territory to steal the flight data recorder from a U.S. missile. The U.N. vote ended a long-running dispute over whether the trusteeship had been terminated. The U.S. had informed the U.N. in 1986 that the trusteeship was over, and that the Marshall Islands had implemented a Compact of Free Association with the U.S.

Under the Compact, the Marshalls have self-government in domestic affairs but still depend on American defense. The U.S. carried out extensive
related territories reports

nuclear testing in the territory from 1946-58. America had to settle numerous lawsuits with residents in the mid-1980s before the transition to free association status. The Marshalls have a parliamentary system. Voters choose the thirty-three member Nitijela (parliament) from twenty-four election districts. Elections are competitive, but involve individuals, tendencies and factions, not formal parties. The legislators elect a president and cabinet who are responsible to them. The members serve four-year terms. There is also an advisory body of twelve traditional Micronesian chiefs. The economy depends heavily on U.S. expenditures and foreign assistance from other countries. The cabinet can deport aliens engaging in island politics, but it has never done so. The Marshalls have one newspaper, one radio station, and cable television on Majuro island.

Micronesia

**Polity:** Federal parliamentary democracy

**Political Rights:** 1

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Status:** Free

**Population:** 99,000

**Ethnic groups:** Micronesian

**Overview:**

Located in the North Pacific, the Federated States of Micronesia is a former U.S. trust territory. In 1990 the U.N. Security Council voted to recognize the end of American trusteeship. In 1982 the U.S. and Micronesia signed the Compact of Free Association, under which the U.S. retains responsibility for defense and foreign affairs and Micronesia has domestic autonomy. The unicameral legislature consists of one senator from each island state elected for a four-year term, and ten senators elected on the basis of island populations for two-year terms. The senators elect the country’s president for a two-year term. Agriculture, tourism, forestry, and fishing are major industries. U.S. economic aid and public sector employment are substantial. There are two newspapers. Land is not sold or transferred to non-Micronesians.

Northern Marianas

**Polity:** Elected governor and legislature

**Political Rights:** 1

**Civil Liberties:** 1

**Status:** Free

**Population:** 22,000

**Ethnic Groups:** Highly diversified populations of Pacific Islanders, Asians, Europeans, and Americans

**Overview:**

In 1990 the Northern Marianas had a hard-fought election campaign, both for political offices and over a gambling referendum. The territorial Republican Party won the governorship and the Senate, while the Democrats won the House of Representatives. Islanders had a major dispute with each other over legalized gambling. The directly elected governor serves for four years. The nine members of the Senate have four-year terms, those of the House two-year terms. Several times throughout the year, a referendum on gambling went off the ballot, then on again. In the general election, Tinian Island voted for the measure, while the rest of the territory voted to ban gambling, but not by the two-thirds margin required to make rejection effective.

Situated west of Hawaii in the Pacific, the Northern Marianas formed part
Palau (Belau)

**Polity:** Elected president and legislature  
**Economy:** Capitalist  
**Population:** 17,000  
**Ethnic groups:** Palauan (a mixture of Micronesian, Malayan, and Melanesian) and mixed Palauan-European-Asian

**Overview:**

Palau (Belau) became part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific after World War II, and it is the only remaining trust territory. The territory took the name Republic of Palau in 1978. It has tried on several occasions to pass a referendum on a compact of free association with the U.S., but they have all failed to pass with the constitutionally required 75 percent. In the most recent referendum, held in February 1990, only 60.5 percent approved a proposed deal with the U.S. Many residents objected to U.S. nuclear storage rights on the islands. The U.S. part of the plan included proposed independence and economic aid. Critics complained that the Pentagon would have controlled too much land if the referendum had passed. Palauans have discussed solving the constitutional impasse though initiative and referendum.

During the unsuccessful attempts to settle its constitutional arrangements, two of Palau's presidents have died, and the territory has experienced some political violence. President Remelii was assassinated in 1985, and President Salii killed himself in 1988, apparently over a bribery scandal involving a power company. A U.S. High Commissioner is technically still in charge of administration, but the directly elected President exercises effective power. In 1990 the U.S. General Accounting Office charged the Palauan government with corruption and lax financial practices.

Palau is very clannish and traditional. Social rank depends on the family's standing in the home village. Non-Palauan citizens and firms may not own land, but leases are available. Tourism, fishing, and agriculture are the major industries. The only newspaper is government-owned.
Following approval by plebiscite, Puerto Rico acquired the status of a commonwealth in free association with the U.S. in 1952. Under its terms, Puerto Rico exercises approximately the same control over its internal affairs as do the fifty U.S. states. Residents, though U.S. citizens, do not vote in presidential election and are represented in the U.S. Congress only by a delegate to the House of Representatives who can vote in committee but not on the floor.

The Commonwealth constitution, modeled on that of the U.S., provides for a governor and a bicameral Legislature, consisting of a twenty-seven-member Senate and a fifty-member House of Representatives, directly elected for four-year terms. An appointed Supreme Court heads an independent judiciary; the legal system is based on U.S. law.

The fundamental issue of the island's politics remains Puerto Rico's relationship with the U.S. In a 1967 plebiscite, 60.4 percent opted for continued commonwealth status, 39 percent for statehood, and 0.6 percent for independence. The Popular Democratic party (PDP) led by current governor Rafael Hernandez Colon supports continued commonwealth status. The New Progressive party (PNP) led by former governor Carlos Romero Barcelo is pro-statehood. The social democratic Puerto Rican Independence party (PIP) led by Ruben Berrios is pro-independence, as is the Marxist Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP). The armed activities of two far-left separatist groups, the Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN) and the Boricua Popular Army (also known as the Macheteros), have diminished substantially in recent years.

At the request of the PDP, the PNP, and the PEP, both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in 1989 began working on bills for a new status vote tentatively scheduled for 1991, the year before the next scheduled general elections. By mid-1990, the Senate had chosen a one-step process, drafting a detailed plan that would become self-executing after the voters speak. The House, however, decided for a two-step process that would give Congress a second chance to review the issue and spell out details of whatever option, broadly defined, the voters select.

In September, a poll of 1,000 registered voters published by the Puerto Rican newspaper *El Mundo* showed 48 percent supporting statehood, 44 percent supporting commonwealth status, and 7 percent backing independence.

In October, the House passed its bill, which included allowing Puerto Ricans living on the U.S. mainland to vote in the referendum. However, because of substantial differences between the House and Senate bills, and limited time to reconcile the two versions before the end of the Congressional session, a House-Senate conference on the issue was postponed until early 1991. The new timetable called for a definitive Congressional decision by 4 July 1991, with the plebiscite expected to be held by early 1992.

As U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans enjoy all civil liberties granted in the U.S. The press and broadcast media are well developed, highly varied, uncensored and critical.
United States Virgin Islands

Overview:

The U.S. Virgin Islands, consisting of St. Croix, St. Thomas, St. John and some four dozen smaller islands, are governed as an unincorporated territory of the U.S. The inhabitants were made U.S. citizens in 1927 and granted a considerable measure of self-government in 1954. Since 1970, executive authority has resided in a governor and lieutenant governor directly elected for a four-year term. There is also a unicameral fifteen-member Senate, with terms of two years, with each of the three main islands proportionately represented. Since 1973 the territory has sent one nonvoting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives.

In September 1989, the islands were ravaged by Hurricane Hugo, with St. Croix the hardest hit. After looting broke out, President Bush ordered U.S. troops and federal marshals onto St. Croix for twenty days to keep order. Gov. Alexander Farrelly of the Democratic Party was criticized in some quarters for his handling of the crisis. However, in November 1990, he won a landslide victory over Juan Luis of the Independent Citizens’ Movement to secure a second term.

As U.S. citizens, island residents enjoy all civil liberties granted in the U.S. There are at least two newspapers and several radio and television stations.
Tables and Ratings
### Table of Independent Countries

#### Comparative Measures of Freedom

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* Arrows up or down indicate a general trend in freedom. PR and CL stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties. 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free category.

▲▼ Triangles up or down indicate a change in Political Rights or Civil Liberties caused by real world events since the last survey. The Freedom Rating is an overall judgment based on Survey results. See the "Methodological Essay" for more details. The table does not indicate changes made for purely methodological reasons since last year.

* Indicates merger.
## Table of Related Territories
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** Indicates territories added to this year's survey.
# Table of Social and Economic Comparisons

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP ($)</th>
<th>Life expectancy male/female</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP ($)</th>
<th>Life expectancy male/female</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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Notes: Freedom House obtained the Human Development Index from *Human Development Report 1990* (Oxford University Press, 1990) which the United Nations Development Program published following a study of economic and social data. The Index is computed from a formula based on a country’s degree of deprivation of life expectancy, literacy and real GDP per capita. The U.N. divided countries into low, medium, and high categories of human development. For cases in which Freedom House has doubts about the reliability of data, the chart shows /d. The Figures for per capita GNP also come from the U.N. Report, with the exception of cases for which it had no figure listed. For countries marked with *, the GNP statistic comes from the Rand McNally *World Maps and Facts (1990 edition)*. For countries marked with (GDP), Rand McNally lists no GNP figure. Life expectancy figures for males and females come from Rand McNally, except in cases where no figure is listed. The chart includes a few cases of a combined life expectancy figure which come from the U.N. Countries excluded from the U.N. Report have the notation “not in study.”
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Per Capita GNP ($)</th>
<th>Life expectancy male/female</th>
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<td>34 37</td>
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*Estimated values.*
# Table of Social and Economic Comparisons

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<th>Per Capita GNP ($)</th>
<th>Life expectancy male/female</th>
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# Combined Average Ratings—Independent Countries

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**Freeze**
# Combined Average Ratings—Related Territories

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### Freedom in the World—1990-1991

#### The Nineteen-Year Record of the Survey of Freedom

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* Brackets indicate country to which territory is related.

* From 1976-89 Brunei was listed as a related territory of the U.K.
# The Nineteen-Year Record of the Survey of Freedom

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* From 1976-89 Namibia was listed as Southwest Africa, a related territory of South Africa.
# The Nineteen-Year Record of the Survey of Freedom

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### National Elections and Referenda

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<tr>
<th>Country/Date</th>
<th>Type of Elections</th>
<th>Results and Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The ruling Labor Party won reelection with a reduced margin over the Liberal-Country Party coalition.</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The Socialist Party, the senior partner in the governing coalition, won 81 seats in the lower house, a gain of one. The conservative People’s Party, the junior partner in the government, lost 17 seats. The far-right Freedom Party received 33 seats, a gain of 15. The Greens also gained one seat.</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>constitutional referendum</td>
<td>Beninese voted on adopting the draft for a new, democratic form of government. Expatriates had the right to participate in the referendum. It won 80 percent approval.</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>legislative (first round)</td>
<td>Voters began the process of choosing federal representatives and 31 of its 81 senators. Results were delayed by the remote location of many constituencies and the widespread use of paper ballots.</td>
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<td>legislative (run-off)</td>
<td>An assortment of conservative parties won a majority of seats.</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>In the first round of legislative elections, the Socialist (formerly Communist) Party won 47 percent of the vote and 172 seats. With 36 percent and 107 seats, the Union of Democratic Forces was the largest opposition bloc. The Agrarian Party, a former ally of the Communists, won 8 percent. With 5.7 percent, the ethnic Turkish candidates of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms also won seats. There were reports that some opposition ballots disappeared and there were episodes of violence and intimidation during the campaign. Opposition demonstrators charged manipulation by the ruling party.</td>
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<td>run-off</td>
<td>Run-offs took place in 81 districts. International observers noted that uniformed officers and local mayors canvassed outside polling stations. There was no secret ballot in some polling booths. There were reports that pro-opposition soldiers were sent on training sessions to prevent them from voting. Diplomats mentioned allegations of bribery and intimidation of Gypsy voters. 162 candidates ran. The combined results of round one and the run-off were: Socialists, 211 seats; Union of Democratic Forces, 144 seats; Movement for Rights and Freedoms, 23 seats; Agrarian Party, 16 seats; and others, 6 seats.</td>
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<td>Burma</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The military cracked down on the opposition and allowed almost no civil liberties. The government forced residents of opposition strongholds to relocate to rural areas. The opposition National League for Democracy won roughly two-thirds of the vote, but the military government prevented it from taking power.</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>For the first time in Chadian history, there was some choice in legislative elections, but political parties were prohibited from supporting candidates. However, candidates were allowed to belong to the ruling party.</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>congressional</td>
<td>In the Senate, Liberals gained but Social Conservatives and the leftist Patriotic Union lost ground. In the House of Representatives, the</td>
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# National Elections and Referenda

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May presidential</td>
<td>Liberals formed the largest party, ahead of the Social Conservatives, the Patriotic Union, and M-19, the former guerrilla movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November constitutional convention (election of delegates)</td>
<td>The former guerrilla movement, M-19, finished first, followed by the new conservative movement, National Salvation. The traditional major parties, the Liberals and Social Conservatives, finished a distant third and fourth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros presidential (aborted)</td>
<td>Eight candidates competed, but election day chaos and fraud broke up the voting. The elections were re-scheduled.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March presidential</td>
<td>In the first round, the interim leader, Said Djohar (Unity Party) and Mohamed Taki (National Union for Democracy) earned places in the run-off.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March</td>
<td>In round two, Djohar defeated Taki 55.08 percent to 44.92 percent. Taki alleged that Djohar won through fraud in at least 15 major polling stations covering 30,000 voters. The Supreme Court upheld the results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica presidential</td>
<td>Social Christian Rafael Calderon, Jr. was elected president with 51 percent of the vote, defeating Carlos Castillo, the social democratic Liberation candidate, who garnered 47 percent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia general</td>
<td>The Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Public Against Violence won control of the bicameral parliament and of the regional legislatures for the Czech lands and Slovakia. The Civic Forum/Public Against Violence coalition won 170 of 300 seats in the federal assembly. The Communists won 47 seats and the Christian Democrats’ coalition 40 seats. Various ethnic parties won a minor share of seats.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (T) presidential</td>
<td>President Denktash resigned, and forced an election in which he ran as an independent. He won re-election over two opponents with 67 percent of the vote.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica general</td>
<td>Denktash’s National Unity Party won 34 of the 50 seats. The opposition parties’ coalition, Democratic Struggle, won the other 16 seats, which were divided among two left-wing parties, Communal Liberation and the Republican Turkish Party, 7 seats each, and 2 seats for New Dawn, a Turkish immigrants’ party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica general</td>
<td>Prime Minister Eugenia Charles’ centrist Dominica Freedom Party won 11 of 21 parliamentary seats. The new opposition group headed by Edison James, the United Workers Party, won 6 seats. The older opposition party, the Dominica Labour Party, lost popularity and won only 4 seats. Its leader, Michael &quot;Rosie&quot; Douglas, was defeated.</td>
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## National Elections and Referenda

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>President Joaquin Balaguer (Social Christian Party) was re-elected with 35.7 percent of the vote. Former President Juan Bosch (Dominican Liberation Party) came in second with 34.4 percent. He charged Balaguer with vote fraud. Jose Francisco Pena Gomez (Dominican Revolutionary Party) placed third. He lost votes to former President Jacobo Majluda, who finished fourth. The election board suspended its vote count and reviewed local tally sheets on the recommendation of international observers. The board found some tally errors. The opposition forces won a legislative majority. A record 40.8 percent of voters abstained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>The governing Democratic Left party lost its majority, and parties of the Center-Right and extreme Left made gains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>Voters approved a national referendum to dissolve parliament following a court ruling which invalidated the election law under which the body was elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, East</td>
<td>legislative (round one)</td>
<td>Violence, rigging, and other irregularities marred this transition to a multi-party system. In constituencies where no candidate won a majority or results were invalid, there were new rounds of elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>legislative (re-scheduled contests)</td>
<td>Following the run-offs, the ruling Democratic Party had 62 seats, plus the support of 3 independents, and the opposition forces had a combined total of 55 seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>legislative (run-offs)</td>
<td>Christian Democratic-conservative coalition won 193 seats, the largest number. Social Democrats finished second with 87 seats. Party of Democratic Socialism (the Communists) placed third. Liberals/Free Democrats came in fourth. Multi-party, &quot;grand coalition&quot; government formed to negotiate German unification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian partner, the Christian Social Union, topped the poll with a combined 43.8 percent, and won 313 seats in the Bundestag. The Social Democrats came in second with 33.5 percent and 239 seats. The liberal Free Democrats came in third with 11 percent and 79 seats. They formed a coalition government with the Christian Democrats. Running in conjunction with other leftists, the Party of Democratic Socialism, formerly the East German Communists, took 2.4 percent nationally and 17 seats in the former East Germany. The Greens lost all their seats in the West, and won only 3.9 percent nationally and 8 seats in the East. Under German law, parties with at least 5 percent of the vote were entitled to proportional representation from party lists. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the 5 percent hurdle would apply separately to the former West and East Germany. This was the first free, all-German election since 1932.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The conservative New Democracy party made gains, winning 150 of 300 seats. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) took 123 seats. A Communist-leftist alliance won 19 seats. The remaining seats went to 4 candidates sponsored jointly by Communists and Socialists, 1 independent conservative, 1 Green, and 2 Turkish Muslims. New Democracy formed the government with the independent conservative's support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>Nicholas Brathwaite's National Democratic Congress won 34.6 percent of the vote and 7 of the 15 seats in the House of Representatives. Sir Eric Gairy's Grenada United Labor Party (GULP) took 28.3 percent of the vote and 4 seats. Defeated Prime Minister Ben Jones' National Party held 17.4 percent and 2 seats. Keith Mitchell's New National Party received 17.2 percent and 2 seats. Brathwaite formed the government after one GULP member defected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>Assassinations, disappearances, and death threats marred the elections. A constitutional provision against former dictators forced former President Rios Montt out of the contest. The top three candidates were conservatives, Alvaro Arzu, Jorge Serrano, and Jorge Carpio. Christian Democrat Alfonso Cabrera, the ruling party's candidate, finished fourth. Carpio and Serrano won about 25 percent of the vote each. A presidential run-off was scheduled for 6 January 1991. In legislative races, five parties of the right and center won roughly equal numbers of seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>constitutional referendum</td>
<td>Guinea scheduled a referendum to approve a newly reformed constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a left-wing priest, won the presidency with 70 percent of the vote. Conservatives and Aristide supporters split legislative seats in round one. Legislative run-offs in January 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>general-first round</td>
<td>Democratic Forum led with 24.7 percent. Free Democrats placed second with 21.4 percent. The Independent Smallholders came third with 11.8 percent. The reformist Communists, now called Socialists, received only 10.9 percent. The Young Democrats (8.9 percent) and Christian Democrats (6.5 percent) were the only other parties to pass the 4 percent hurdle required for seats by proportional representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>run-off</td>
<td>The Democratic Forum and other center-right parties won a clear victory. The Forum formed a coalition government with the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Free Democrats became the leading opposition party. The National Electoral Committee reported some minor irregularities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>Voters decided whether the Hungarian president should be chosen by parliament or by popular election. Although 86 percent of those voting supported popular election, voter turnout was too low to validate the referendum. Turnout was under 15 percent, far below the 50 percent required for a valid vote.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran 8 October</td>
<td>Assembly of Experts</td>
<td>Turnout was extremely low for the election of this constitutional body which chooses and monitors the spiritual leader, and passes on the constitutionality of legislation. The government allowed only nine radical candidates to run for the 83-seat assembly against 100 pro-government candidates. Most prospective radical candidates failed a rigged government exam on Islamic credentials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 7 November</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>Brian Lenihan (Fianna Fail), Austin Currie (Fine Gael), and Mary Robinson (Labour Party and Workers Party) ran for this largely ceremonial office. Voters cast both first and second preferences. In first preferences, Lenihan had 44.1 percent, Robinson 38.9 percent, and Currie 17.0 percent. After Currie's votes were redistributed according to his voters' second choices, Robinson defeated Lenihan 52.8 percent to 47.2 percent, she became Ireland's first woman head of state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 3-4 June</td>
<td>referenda</td>
<td>Greens backed two anti-hunting initiatives and one to repeal the current law on pesticides. All three measures passed with at least 92 percent of the vote. However, only 43 percent of the voters participated. The law requires a 50 percent turnout for referenda to take effect. Farming and hunting interests waged successful abstention campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast 28 October</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>President Houphouet-Boigny won with 81.67 percent, defeating opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo. There were widespread reports of destroyed ballot boxes, ballot box stuffing, and irregular and unpublished locations of voting stations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>In an election characterized by fraud, intimidation, and low turnout, the ruling Democratic Party won 163 seats. Pro-government independents won 2 seats. The main opposition, the Popular Front, won 9 seats, and the Workers Party won 1 seat. There were uncontested elections for 45 government candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 18 February</td>
<td>legislative (lower house)</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats retained control of government with 275 of 512 seats; Socialists increased from 83 to 136 seats at expense of other opposition parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, North 22 April</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>In an unfree election, dictator Kim II Sung, his son, Kim Jong II, and other Communist candidates won their seats in the Supreme People's Assembly with an alleged 100 percent of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait 10 June</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>Voters chose 50 members of aparatly elected transitional parliament. Most opposition politicians boycotted the contest. Other candidates competed, and advertised their candidacies in the newspapers. Government supporters won all the seats. The government was scheduled to appoint 25 additional members. About 55 percent of the voters participated. (The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put these results on hold.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia 21 October</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The ruling Front of Mahathir Mohamed overcame an opposition coalition to win more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament. The Front has dominated Malaysian politics since independence.</td>
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# National Elections and Referenda

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<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>general (first round)</td>
<td>This was the first multi-party, competitive election in Mongolian history. The Communists and five opposition parties ran a total of 2,400 (2,100 Communists and 300 opposition) candidates for the 430-seat Great Hural. Competing Communist and opposition candidates also stood for election to the smaller parliamentary house, the 53-seat Small Hural. Communists won the overwhelming number of places in the run-off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July</td>
<td>run-off</td>
<td>Communists won more than 70 percent of the seats in the Great Hural, but only about 60 percent of the seats in the Small Hural. Voter turnout exceeded 90 percent. In a minority of districts, legal errors and spoiled ballots prevented some run-offs from producing valid results. While the election was generally free and fair, some voters were so unfamiliar with multi-party elections that they voted for both run-off candidates, thereby nullifying their votes. The opposition claims it had too little time for effective campaigning in rural areas and that some election supervisors bullied voters. Repeat elections took place in 34 districts on 26 August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The conservative National Party won 49 percent of the vote and 68 out of 97 seats. The governing Labour Party was ousted, and held only 28 seats and 35 percent of the vote. The left-wing New Labour Party won 1 seat and 6 percent. The Greens won 6 percent and no seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>Violetta Chamorro, candidate of UNO opposition coalition defeated Sandinista Daniel Ortega by 55 percent to 41 percent. UNO captured assembly majority. The Sandinistas remained the single largest party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Pakistani People’s Party government of Benazir Bhutto, granted himself emergency powers, and called for the election. There were armed attacks on election officials and party workers. There were irregularities involving ballot boxes and polling locations. The Islamic Democratic Alliance won 105 seats. Bhutto’s People’s Party won 45 seats. One race was postponed. The other 65 seats went to small parties and independents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>Conservative novelist Mario Vargas Llosa (Democratic Front) and Alberto Fujimori (Change ‘90) topped a multi-candidate presidential field, earning places in the run-off. Luis Alva Castro, candidate of the governing Aprista Party, finished a distant third. The election was marred by terrorist incidents, a transportation stoppage (which left voters stranded and unable to vote), and alleged ballot tampering. The Democratic Front and Change ‘90 each won a minority of Congressional seats. Aprista won the balance of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>presidential run-off</td>
<td>Fujimori defeated Vargas Llosa by 57 percent to 43 percent. Fujimori had the support of the Apristas in round two.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>Solidarity leader Lech Walesa finished first with 40 percent of the vote. Canadian-Peruvian businessman Stanislaw Tyminski finished second. Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki placed third.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>presidential run-off</td>
<td>Defeating Tyminski, Walesa won with 75 percent of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The campaign ended with rallies marred by fistfights and scuffles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign observers reported that the National Salvation Front pre-stamped ballots for their candidates, accompanied elderly voters into polling booths, and allowed unregistered voters to vote and some voters to cast multiple ballots. Interim President Ion Diescu won office with well over 80 percent. The Front received over two-thirds of the votes cast for the bicameral parliament. The Hungarian Democratic Union received 7.3 percent, the Liberals 6.3 percent, the Ecological Movement 2.4 percent, and the Peasants Party 2.2 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe August</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>More than 90 percent of the voters approved a new constitution which calls for a multi-party system, a mixed economy, freedom of expression, and the right to strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 22 May</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>The government expanded the size of the parliament from 195 to 250 seats. Two-thirds of the seats were reserved for the governing front parties. One-third were open to non-party independents. Effective power remained in the hands of President Assad. His Ba'athist Party has the majority of seats allocated to the seven-party front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 28 October</td>
<td>presidential</td>
<td>Resisting the demands for a multi-party system, Tanzania's ruling Revolutionary Party held a one-party election. Oppositionists boycotted the electoral registration. The state arrested more than 60 people to intimidate activists into stopping the boycott. Citizens refusing voter registration lost government jobs, scholarships, and business licences. With no opponent, President Mweni won re-election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo 4 March</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>The military government allowed limited competition for the 77-member assembly. All candidates were pro-government, but did not have to be endorsed by the military party. Eight districts had run-offs on 18 March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR 1) Armenia</td>
<td>republican Supreme Soviets</td>
<td>In May, the Communists won 42 seats; the democratic umbrella group, the Armenian National Movement, 32; and independents, 15. There were many irregularities. Repeat elections and run-offs produced 30 Communist victories, 30 for the ANM, and 4 for independents in June. The ANM won 43 of the 65 seats in the July run-off and repeat elections. Due to insufficient turnout and other factors, several districts postponed elections until 1991. The National Movement split into groups favoring and opposing immediate independence. Many elected members went into hiding.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Azerbaijan</td>
<td>30 September</td>
<td>The election took place during a state of emergency. Undemocratic election laws, military intimidation, and other irregularities helped produce a Communist victory. The democratic opposition won a minority of seats. Authorities prevented many international observers from entering the country. Repeat elections and run-offs took place later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Byelorussia</td>
<td>4 March</td>
<td>Communists blocked many pro-democracy candidates from registering, but Byelorussian Popular Front won some seats. Some Front candidates lost due to Communist smear campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Estonia</td>
<td>18 March</td>
<td>This election was a victory for the pro-independence forces. Various parties and other groups nominated and endorsed candidates. The 105 winners belonged to the major blocs: the pro-independence Popular Front and associated groups, 99; Communist bloc, 29; and anti-independence ethnic minorities, 29. The Estonia Supreme Soviet began moving toward independence in cooperation with the Estonian Congress, which was elected outside the Soviet system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Georgia</td>
<td>28 October</td>
<td>This was the first genuinely multi-party election in the Soviet Union. Party designations appeared on the ballot. A coalition of non-Communist parties won over 60 percent of the vote and about half the 250 seats. The Communists won 30 percent of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Kazakhstan</td>
<td>25 March</td>
<td>Due to the large number of candidates, only 131 deputies won outright in the 270 districts. This necessitated runoffs in 126 districts. New elections were necessary in 13 districts. There were also 81 deputies elected separately to seats reserved for “public organizations,” but 9 remained unfilled. Several Communist Party functionaries lost their seats in the first round.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Kirgizia</td>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>In most constituencies, no candidates won in first round; run-offs took place on 4 March. One-sixth of the seats were uncontested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Latvia</td>
<td>18 March</td>
<td>Candidates endorsed by the Popular Front of Latvia won a majority of the 201 seats. 60 percent of the candidates were Letts (Lithuanians), while 26.5 percent were Russians. In 48 districts, candidates ran unopposed. Following run-offs in April, the Front had two-thirds support in the legislature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Lithuania</td>
<td>24 February</td>
<td>Sajudis-endorsed candidates won 72 of 90 seats in first round; in run-off on 4 March Sajudis won most seats. The nationalist victory led to declaration of independence and confrontation with Mos-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Moldavia</td>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>Moldavian Popular Front won most of the 380 seats, and claimed 60 percent of first round vote. Communists won 115 seats. Oppo-</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.) Russia</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>Sitution forces charged that the Communists benefitted from media favoritism and political pressure from collective farm managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communist and non-Communist reformers made significant gains; run-offs took place later in March. Elected body chose Boris Yeltsin as president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.) Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>In 112 seats out of 230, no candidate won in first round. Voting took place under curfew and state of emergency. Run-offs were held in March. All Communist leaders of the republic who were candidates won seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.) Turkmenia</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>526 candidates, 70 percent of them Communists, contested 175 seats. The Communists won most seats, but the voters rejected one-third of the Communist candidates. With the conclusion of run-off elections in March, Communists had won 88.6 percent of seats. The CP leader was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet and appointed the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.) Ukraine</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>Communists prevented many independents and Popular Front candidates from registering. Noncommunists made gains. Several former political prisoners were elected. One-third of the 450 members elected to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were members or sympathizers of Rukh, the Ukrainian Popular Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15.) Uzbekistan</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>Ballots offered little choice. Independent groups boycotted the election. One-third of the seats were uncontested. Many voters cast spoiled ballots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 February</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>legislative</td>
<td>Democrats gained one Senate seat and eight seats in the House of Representatives. The Democrats now outnumber the Republicans 56 to 44 in the Senate and 267 to 167 in the House. An independent socialist won the remaining House seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>Family heads (matai) voted on instituting universal adult suffrage and on changing the parliament from unicameral to bicameral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>Voters approved a constitution for the unified government of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>multi-party republic elections</td>
<td>Twenty political parties competed in the republic's first multi-party elections since World War II. Most of the parties are ethnically based in the Serbian, Croatian, or Moslem communities. After run-offs on 2 December, the Muslim-based Party of Democratic Action held 86 seats; the Serbian Democratic Party, 70; and the Croatian Democratic Community, 45. The Communists and Alliance of Reformists trailed badly.</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>won 11 seats. With the conclusion of the run-off election in May, the Croatian Democratic Union won 205 of the 356 seats in the houses of parliament. The (Communist) Democratic Reform Party held 73 seats after the run-off, while eight other parties shared the remaining 78 seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November-December</td>
<td></td>
<td>Due to irregularities in early November, results in 54 precincts were null and void. There was a new vote 25 November and a run-off on 9 December. The radical nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization won 37 seats; the Communists, 31; the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity, 25; and the Democratic Reform Party, 19. The other eight seats went to smaller parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>The Communists won the assembly overwhelmingly. The Communist presidential candidate, Mumir Bulatovic, won the presidency in the run-off on 10 December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December</td>
<td></td>
<td>Voters approved delaying multi-party elections until after the adoption of a new constitution. About 75 percent of the voters turned out, and 98.6 percent voted for the delay. Opposition parties demanded that elections be held first. They urged supporters to boycott the referendum. Following the vote, Serbia eliminated the separate parliament for the largely Albanian Kosovo region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>Hardline Communist nationalist Slobodan Milosovic won the presidency, defeating anti-Communist nationalist Vuk Draskovic. After the run-off on 23 December, the Communists held 194 of 250 seats; the opposition, 48; and independents, 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Demos (Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia), a five-party, Center-Right coalition, won 55 percent of the vote and a majority of seats in the main chamber of the parliament. The Democratic Reform Party (the formerly the Communists) gained 17 percent of the vote and formed the single largest party in the 80-seat Assembly. In the race for chairman of the collective presidency. Communist Milan Kucan won 44.4 percent, and was forced into a run-off with Demos candidate Joze Pucnik, who won 26.6 percent in round one. Ivan Kramberger, an independent, won 18.9 percent, and Liberal Marko Demsar took 10.5 percent. Elections also took place to the less powerful Chamber of Municipalities and to the Chamber of Associated Labor. The latter had non-partisan elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>Kucan defeated Pucnik for the presidency, and the remaining seats were filled in the second and third parliamentary chambers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 April</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 December</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Press Freedom: Struggle and Toll —1990

These statistics are inclusive through 31 December. Additional cases for 1990 are likely to be reported throughout March 1991. These record only the physical and psychological harassment of journalists and the media. The figures do not reflect other forms of official and unofficial editorial censorship, and diverse methods of economic and political pressuring of the mass media. The statistics are a clue, however, to those visible attacks which generate self-censorship by journalists.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journalists killed</td>
<td>43a</td>
<td>73b</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 in 7 countries; 23 in 8 countries; 41(9)</td>
<td>28 in 7 countries; 23 in 8 countries; 41(9)</td>
<td>28 in 7 countries; 23 in 8 countries; 41(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 in 6 countries; 16 in 3 countries; 16(9)</td>
<td>40 in 6 countries; 16 in 3 countries; 16(9)</td>
<td>40 in 6 countries; 16 in 3 countries; 16(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 in 12 countries; 91 in 18 countries; 82 (25)</td>
<td>50 in 12 countries; 91 in 18 countries; 82 (25)</td>
<td>50 in 12 countries; 91 in 18 countries; 82 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 in 9 countries; 52 in 13 countries; 50 (22)</td>
<td>43 in 9 countries; 52 in 13 countries; 50 (22)</td>
<td>43 in 9 countries; 52 in 13 countries; 50 (22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 in 8 countries; 12 in 8 countries; 3(1)</td>
<td>12 in 8 countries; 12 in 8 countries; 3(1)</td>
<td>12 in 8 countries; 12 in 8 countries; 3(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>48 in 6 countries; 23 in 7 countries; 23 (10)</td>
<td>48 in 6 countries; 23 in 7 countries; 23 (10)</td>
<td>48 in 6 countries; 23 in 7 countries; 23 (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>82 in 13 countries; 41 in 15 countries; 43 (23)</td>
<td>82 in 13 countries; 41 in 15 countries; 43 (23)</td>
<td>82 in 13 countries; 41 in 15 countries; 43 (23)</td>
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Other Statistics:

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<tr>
<td>16 in 8 countries; 32 in 9 countries; 43 (17)</td>
<td>16 in 8 countries; 32 in 9 countries; 43 (17)</td>
<td>16 in 8 countries; 32 in 9 countries; 43 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 in 10 countries; 189 in 23 countries; 170 (60)</td>
<td>46 in 10 countries; 189 in 23 countries; 170 (60)</td>
<td>46 in 10 countries; 189 in 23 countries; 170 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 in 12 countries; 38 in 11 countries; 50 (16)</td>
<td>40 in 12 countries; 38 in 11 countries; 50 (16)</td>
<td>40 in 12 countries; 38 in 11 countries; 50 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 in 10 countries; 88 in 23 countries; 37(12)</td>
<td>31 in 10 countries; 88 in 23 countries; 37(12)</td>
<td>31 in 10 countries; 88 in 23 countries; 37(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 in 9 countries; 22 in 5 countries; 12 (11)</td>
<td>9 in 9 countries; 22 in 5 countries; 12 (11)</td>
<td>9 in 9 countries; 22 in 5 countries; 12 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 in 4 countries; 10 in 7 countries ; 30 (20)</td>
<td>7 in 4 countries; 10 in 7 countries ; 30 (20)</td>
<td>7 in 4 countries; 10 in 7 countries ; 30 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989: 1,164 in 84 countries</td>
<td>1989: 1,164 in 84 countries</td>
<td>1989: 1,164 in 84 countries</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This year, as before, the figures inevitably underestimate both the number of cases and the individuals involved. Some single cases here involving the closing of media facilities affect scores of journalists. Many cases are not reported, though journalists are increasingly aware that maltreatment of the messenger by governments and others is aimed primarily at all citizens. The fate of journalists, therefore, should be considered of interest and importance to everyone, everywhere. Sources: Freedom House correspondents, Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Sans Frontieres.

a. Killed in 19 countries: Chile, 2; Colombia, 6; Guatemala, 1; Haiti, 1; India, 2; Iraq, 1; Jamaica, 1; Lebanon, 2; Mexico, 4; Pakistan, 4; Peru, 3; Philippines, 7; Poland, 1; Romania, 1; Rwanda, 1; South Africa, 2; Sri Lanka, 1; Turkey, 2; United States, 1.

b. Corrected from last year’s table with later information. Killed in 24 countries: Belgium, 1; Brazil, 4; China, 1; Colombia, 20; Ecuador, 1; El Salvador, 9; Ethiopia, 1; Greece, 1; Indonesia, 3; Iran, 5; Japan, 1; South Korea, 1; Lebanon, 1; Mexico, 2; Panama, 1; Peru, 7; Philippines, 1; Romania, 3; Soviet Union, 2; Spain, 1; Sri Lanka, 5; Turkey, 1; Union of Myanmar (Burma), 1; Zambia, 1.

—Data compiled by Jessie Miller and Leonard R. Sussman
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   FBIS China
   FBIS East Europe
   FBIS Latin America
   FBIS Near East & South Asia
   FBIS East Asia
   FBIS Soviet Union
   FBIS Sub-Saharan Africa
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Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation
Cuban Committee for Human Rights
Group for Mutual Support (Guatemala)
Guyana Human Rights Association
Haitian Center for Human Rights
Helsinki Watch
Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
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Institute on Religion and Democracy
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International League for Human Rights
Jamaica Council for Human Rights
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
Middle East Watch
National Coalition for Haitian Refugees
National Coordinating Office for Human Rights (Peru)
Of Human Rights
Panamanian Committee for Human Rights
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (Nicaragua)
Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (Colombia)
Puebla Institute
Runejel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities (Guatemala)
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Uruguay
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Estonia
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Latvia
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