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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Brazil

Partly Free
65
100
A Obstacles to Access 20 25
B Limits on Content 25 35
C Violations of User Rights 20 40
Last Year's Score & Status
64 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 - May 31, 2024

Internet freedom improved slightly in Brazil during this coverage period. However, complex challenges remain in the aftermath of the intensely contested 2022 presidential election between Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and then incumbent Jair Bolsonaro and the January 2023 riots in Brasília, in which thousands of Bolsonaro supporters stormed government buildings. Legislative efforts to regulate digital platforms have stalled, prompting the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to enact controversial electoral content regulations ahead of the October 2024 municipal elections. Outside the regulatory landscape, defamation lawsuits and violence in retaliation for online activities pose an ongoing threat to internet users.

  • Catastrophic flooding in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul that began in late April 2024 led to connectivity disruptions for some users, temporarily knocking out mobile service in at least 12 cities (see A1).
  • The federal government responded to the floods in Rio Grande do Sul by attempting to limit the spread of online disinformation. It sought to remove posts containing false claims about the disaster and the authorities’ emergency response, which the government said had been detrimental to recovery efforts (see B2, B3, B5, and B7).
  • In February 2024, the TSE adopted new rules ahead of municipal elections scheduled for October. The regulations, meant to address the spread of online electoral disinformation and regulate the use of artificial intelligence (AI) during the electoral period, generated controversy for their potential to upend Brazil’s intermediary liability regime, as well as accusations, primarily by right-wing commentators, that they would be used for censorship (see B3, B5, and B6).
  • Individuals, particularly journalists, continued to face civil and criminal legal actions in retaliation for their online activities—including one digital journalist who was sentenced to one year of house arrest and a fine of 400,000 reais ($81,300) in November 2023 (see C3).
  • In October 2023, the Federal Police (PF) began investigating allegations of a “parallel” structure at the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) under former president Bolsonaro, with evidence suggesting that surveillance technology may have been illegally deployed to monitor public officials and other opponents of Bolsonaro during his administration (see C5).

header2 Political Overview

Brazil is a democracy that holds competitive elections, and the political arena, though polarized, is characterized by vibrant public debate. However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack, political violence is high, and the government has struggled to address crime and disproportionate violence against and economic exclusion of minorities. Corruption is endemic at top levels, and governmental transparency has decreased in recent years, contributing to widespread disillusionment among the public. Societal discrimination and violence against LGBT+ people remain serious problems.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Internet penetration is high in Brazil and access has expanded in recent years. However, floods during the coverage period caused connectivity disruptions for some Brazilians.

According to data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), internet penetration in Brazil stood at 84 percent as of 2023.1 This rate is consistent with data from the Regional Center for Studies on the Development of the Information Society (Cetic.br) showing that 84 percent of households had access to the internet that year.2

Mobile penetration has grown significantly in recent years, and mobile broadband connections have quickly become many Brazilians’ primary means of accessing the internet. The ITU reported that Brazil had 97.5 active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in 2023.3 According to Cetic.br data for that year, the most recent available, some 58 percent of users accessed the internet exclusively via mobile phone.4

Brazil ranked 45th of 147 countries indexed by Speedtest for mobile speeds in May 2024, with median download speeds of 62.95 Megabits per second (Mbps) and median upload speeds of 13.24 Mbps. The country ranked 28th of 181 countries for fixed-line broadband speeds, with median download speeds of 166.24 Mbps and median upload speeds of 94.23 Mbps.5

Brazil’s federal government has implemented several internet expansion and improvement programs in recent years, often aimed at reducing the country’s digital divide (see A2). In December 2020, then president Bolsonaro signed Law No. 14.109/2020,6 which reforms the Fund for the Universalization of Telecommunications Services (FUST) law so that money collected can be used for the construction and improvement of broadband infrastructure.7 Bolsonaro vetoed provisions mandating the allocation of resources to geographical areas based on criteria such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the requirement to connect all Brazilian public schools with FUST resources.8 However, legislators overrode his veto in March 2021.9

In February 2021, the National Telecommunications Agency (Anatel) approved the rules for a spectrum auction for 5G technology.10 Following 5G spectrum auctions in November and December 2021,11 access to 5G first became available in July 2022 in the capital, Brasília. Access to 5G technology in all municipalities will be implemented gradually by the end of 2029.12 Prior to the auction, civil society organizations (CSOs) criticized the proposed implementation of 5G, saying it will deepen inequalities and compromise digital inclusion, among other things.13 According to Anatel, there were 20.5 million users of 5G in Brazil in 2023, representing 8 percent of all active mobile lines.14

From late April to May 2024, catastrophic flooding in southern Brazil caused significant damage to the electrical and telecommunications infrastructure in Rio Grande do Sul. On May 3, Anatel reported that mobile service was disrupted on at least one provider in 228 of Rio Grande do Sul’s 497 municipalities—and was completely unavailable in 12 cities.15 In response, mobile service providers made their networks available to subscribers of different companies free of charge,16 and the Ministry of Communications (MCom) announced that month that it would allocate funding through FUST to help affected providers recover.17 In addition, Rio Grande do Sul’s state government announced on May 12 that it had secured 1,000 satellite internet antennas from Starlink to restore connectivity at critical access points, such as law enforcement hubs, health centers, and schools.18 On May 16, Canaltech reported that mobile service had been restored on at least one provider in all municipalities of Rio Grande do Sul.19

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

Geographic and socioeconomic disparities in internet access persist in Brazil, though the divide between urban and rural users has been closing in recent years.1 According to Cetic.br, the percentage of households connected to the internet in rural areas increased from 68 percent in 20222 to 74 percent in 2023.3 Between 2022 and 2023, similar gains in internet access occurred among households in the North and Northeast regions (76 to 79 percent and 78 to 80 percent, respectively),4 as well as among lower-income populations (60 to 67 percent).5 Price remains a main barrier to access: In 2023, 25 percent of households that did not have internet access blamed the related cost.6

Limited mobile plans that include zero-rating agreements—which provide unlimited access to certain online platforms by exempting their use from a plan’s data cap—are common in Brazil. Sharing internet connections is also a common practice, particularly in lower-income neighborhoods. Higher data usage poses additional costs, and lower-income users tend to have connection plans with low data caps. According to Anatel, around 42 percent of mobile subscriptions in February 2024 were prepaid,7 typically with low data caps.

The government, private companies, and CSOs have launched initiatives, sometimes jointly, with the aim of lessening the digital divide. In December 2023, the MCom announced that it had renewed a contract with state-owned telecommunications company Telebras to provide 28,000 satellite internet connection points in underconnected areas and schools over five years.8 A number of equitable access projects have been impactful, including one civil society initiative to establish and expand community networks in Indigenous communities.9

In May 2023, the MCom said that it would disburse 1.2 billion reais ($243.9 million) through FUST-backed lines of credit for broadband connectivity projects.10 The first direct funds were disbursed from FUST in October 2023, allocating 30 million reais ($6.1 million) for two separate projects that will provide broadband internet connections to 40 public schools across 20 cities in the state of Minas Gerais and the Amazon region.11

In December 2021, the government created the Internet Brasil program with the aim of providing free mobile broadband connections to low-income public school students whose families are enrolled in the national registry of social programs.12 The government is expected to deliver and maintain for eligible students up to 700,000 eSIM-based connection chips with a package of 20 gigabytes (GBs) of data per month.13 The government began delivering an initial 6,250 chips to towns in the Northeast Region in late 2022,14 the start of an initial pilot phase to distribute 10,000 chips to nine municipalities across five states, including Bahia, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte.15 The government had aimed to deliver 100,000 chips to public school students by the end of 2023;16 however, that goal was postponed to the end of 2024.17

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government does not place limits on bandwidth, nor does it impose control over telecommunications infrastructure. There have been no reported instances of the government cutting off internet connectivity during protests or social unrest.

Private backbone infrastructure, such as that of Oi, Vivo, and Embratel, has expanded in Brazil since the privatization of the state-owned company Embratel, which had been responsible for building the internet backbone, in 1998.1

International undersea cables connect to Brazil from Africa, Europe, and North America. The first undersea fiber-optic cable linking Brazil to Europe, a joint effort by the governments of Brazil and Spain,2 began operating in June 2021.3

In 2004, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) launched the PTT Metro initiative to create internet exchange points (IXPs) across Brazil, and it has expanded ever since. Brazilian IXPs connect a growing number of participants, including internet service providers (ISPs); telecommunications operators; content providers; content delivery networks; academic networks; and research, government, and business customers.4

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 5.005 6.006

There continue to be no significant legal or economic barriers for companies competing in the ISP, mobile, or digital technology sectors. The broadband market has become increasingly competitive in recent years, spurred by the growth of regional ISPs. According to CGI.br, there were 11,630 fixed-line internet providers in 2022, though this was down from 12,826 in 2020.1 Concentration in the mobile market remains high.

In May 2024, three large private companies—Claro, Vivo (Telefônica Brasil), and Oi—represented 43.3 percent of the country’s fixed-line broadband market according to Anatel data,2 down from more than 70 percent in 2018.3 Despite some growth barriers, particularly high taxes, regional ISPs have grown at a fast rate and created more competition in the broadband sector.4 Moreover, regional providers have filled demand in small- and medium-sized cities as the licensing process has become easier.5 However, organizations supporting the development of community networks face challenges, particularly due to registration obstacles presented by excessive bureaucracy and the various spectrum-management policies in place.6

Concentration in the mobile market remains high and was further entrenched by the April 2022 closure of a deal on major mobile provider TIM’s acquisition of Oi’s mobile operations.7 As of May 2024, Vivo, Claro, and TIM remained the dominant mobile providers, holding 96.2 percent of the market.8

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 3.003 4.004

Two regulatory agencies oversee Brazilian information and communications technologies (ICTs): Anatel and the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), the country’s antitrust agency.1

Anatel is administratively and financially independent, and not hierarchically subordinate to any government agency. Its decisions are only subject to judicial review in national courts. From the MCom, Anatel has inherited the powers of granting, regulating, and supervising telecommunications in Brazil, as well as much of its technical expertise and other material assets. In addition to Anatel’s other regulatory responsibilities, the body pitched itself to be the competent regulator for the so-called fake news bill (see B3).2 While the fake news bill has since stalled in the National Congress, Anatel’s technical cooperation agreements with the TSE could give it an expanded role in regulating online content (see B3 and B5).3

Anatel has received some criticism for aligning with private interests.4 In recent years, however, the agency has made moves that counter that perception, simplifying licensing processes to allow for market competition by small, regional ISPs (see A4), and appointing the first-ever career civil servant to the role of agency president in 2018.5

The government also created, in 1995, the CGI.br, an independent, multistakeholder organization in charge of coordinating and integrating all internet service initiatives in Brazil, as well as promoting technical quality, innovation, and the dissemination of services. CGI.br’s members are government officials and representatives from the private sector, civil society, and the scientific and technological community.6 Provisions in the Civil Framework of the Internet (Marco Civil da Internet, or Marco Civil)—also known as the “Internet Constitution”—mandate that the government consult with CGI.br and, in various instances, directly involve the committee in policymaking and implementation of Marco Civil processes. However, a clear mechanism to do so has not yet been established. Different drafts of PL 2630/2020, commonly known as the fake news bill, have included roles for CGI.br; according to the April 2023 version of the bill, for instance, the committee was expected to conduct and publish research related to freedom and transparency on the internet, issue guidelines for combating online misinformation, and “validate” industry-prepared codes of conduct, among other responsibilities.7

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 4 to 5 because no platform blocks comparable to the April 2023 restrictions on Telegram were reported during the June 2023-May 2024 coverage period.

Social networks, communication applications, and video-sharing platforms, such as Facebook, X, YouTube, Vimeo, and Vevo, are for the most part freely accessible and widely used in Brazil. During the previous coverage period, an April 2023 court order to block Telegram temporarily restricted access to the communications platform for users across Brazil, though no comparable blocks were reported during the current coverage period.

In April 2023, at the request of the PF, Judge Wellington Lopes da Silva ordered ISPs to block access to Telegram nationwide, and for Google and Apple to remove Telegram from their app stores in Brazil;1 the order remained in effect for three days before it was lifted by another federal judge.2 The PF requested the block during an investigation of extremist violence in Brazilian schools after Telegram had failed to comply with an earlier court order to turn over the personal data of neo-Nazi users on the platform, including the users’ contact and financial information.3 In response to the court’s April 2023 decision to block the platform, Telegram head Pavel Durov claimed that it would be “technologically impossible” for the platform to comply with the authorities’ request for data (see C6).4

Data from the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) appeared to show that some ISPs began blocking Telegram on April 26, 2023, the day of the court order, while others did not comply until the following day, if at all. At least one network, Unifique Telecomunicações, did not appear to block Telegram at any point while the court order was in effect. According to OONI, such variation in how the block was implemented “suggests lack of coordination between providers, and that each ISP implemented the block autonomously.”5 On April 29, three days after the block was ordered, Judge Flávio Lucas partially overturned the decision, maintaining a daily fine imposed on Telegram but lifting the nationwide block. In his reversal, Lucas argued that an outright ban was neither reasonable nor proportionate.6 By April 30, 2023, Telegram appeared to again be widely available in Brazil.7

In August 2024, after the coverage period of this report, Supreme Court justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered the blocking of X in Brazil, citing the platform’s failure to appoint a legal representative.8 The order was a culmination of a months-long dispute over the platform’s refusal to restrict far-right accounts accused of spreading false and misleading information. Moraes’s order also included a provision threatening fines against those who use censorship circumvention tools, including virtual private networks (VPNs), to access X in Brazil. In October, the block was lifted after X's compliance with Moraes's demands.

Websites are often blocked due to violations of copyright law. In November 2023, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security announced that it had assisted with the blocking or suspension of 606 websites and 19 streaming applications, including 238 websites and applications originating in Brazil, due to copyright infringement.9 These actions were carried out as part of “Operation 404,” a multinational antipiracy initiative. More than 2,500 websites have reportedly been blocked as a result of Operation 404 since 2019.10

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Efforts to regulate online content, particularly related to the spread of electoral disinformation (see B5), have intensified in recent years. In the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2022 elections and the violent, pro-Bolsonaro January 2023 riots in Brasília, judicial authorities regularly issued orders to remove online content deemed to be false or undermine electoral integrity, and restricted the accounts of social media users who were found to spread such content. Many of these orders were issued or otherwise led by Moraes, who was then president of the TSE.1 Similar efforts to regulate the online information space have continued and expanded ahead of the October 2024 municipal elections (see B3).

During the 2022 electoral period, the TSE regularly exercised its authority to order the removal of false information. The TSE ordered such content to be deleted at the request of both the Lula and Bolsonaro campaigns. For example, the TSE ordered the removal of social media posts that falsely accused Lula and his political party of maintaining links with organized crime.2 On the other hand, the court ordered Lula’s campaign to remove a video implying that Bolsonaro was sympathetic to cannibalism, also preventing the campaign from disseminating such claims online or on television in the future.3

The TSE stiffened content regulations 10 days before the October 30, 2022, presidential runoff.4 Under the updated regulations, the TSE could more quickly order platforms to remove content and could impose an hourly fine for noncompliance, raising concerns about the transparency and proportionality of such measures. In February 2024, the TSE introduced stricter regulations ahead of the October municipal elections (see B3).

Justice Moraes also issued account-suspension and content-takedown orders in connection with the political violence on January 8, 2023. On that day, thousands of Bolsonaro supporters invaded and ransacked the buildings of the National Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidency. Moraes responded to the right-wing violence by actively ordering content takedowns and account suspensions. Many local observers praised Moraes’s actions as decisive in enabling a peaceful transition of power and helping to repel the attack on the capital; however, others have criticized him, saying he used overly broad interpretations of the law to assume outsized powers (see B3).5

An unspecified number of individuals had their accounts withheld under Moraes’s orders, including far-right congressman and prominent YouTuber Nikolas Ferreira, whose social media accounts were suspended on January 11, 2023, and reinstated on January 24.6 The social media accounts of another far-right member of the National Congress, Carla Zambelli, were suspended from November 2022 until February 2023 after she posted support for those seeking to forcibly overturn the results of the election.7

Orders to restrict social media accounts on these grounds continued during the current coverage period. In June 2023, Moraes ordered social networks, under a daily fine of 100,000 reais ($20,300) for noncompliance, to take down of the profiles of Bruno Monteiro Aiub, a digital influencer known as Monark, from X, Instagram, Rumble, Telegram and Discord.8 According to the decision,9 Aiub had used the accounts to spread false claims about the election process, including allegations that the TSE was “censoring people,” amounting to alleged hate speech and the encouragement of democratic breakdown. Moraes also ordered Aiub to stop publishing, promoting, and sharing disinformation, under the penalty of a daily fine of 10,000 reais ($2,000). This decision followed an earlier January 2023 order to remove Aiub’s accounts, which the influencer attempted to evade by creating several new social media profiles.10 In August 2023, Moraes issued a fine of 300,000 reais ($61,000) against the influencer after he was found to have violated the June order by continuing to spread false claims about the Supreme Court and TSE.11

In April 2024, judicial orders to restrict certain X accounts and content were at the center of a dispute between X owner Elon Musk and Justice Moraes. That month, Musk accused Brazilian authorities of engaging in unconstitutional censorship and said that X would not comply with court orders to restrict content. At least some of the orders were connected with the January 2023 riots and subsequent criminal investigations before the Supreme Court. In response, Moraes initiated a criminal investigation into whether Musk was obstructing justice and spreading false information about the Supreme Court.12 Amid the dispute, X representatives initially claimed to the court that they lacked the legal authority to comply with orders to restrict content on the US-based platform,13 despite having worked with the court up to that point. Later in April, X representatives again pledged that the platform would comply with Supreme Court and TSE orders.14 In mid-August 2024, after the coverage period, X announced that it would immediately halt its operations in Brazil, citing Moraes’s “censorship orders” and claiming that Moraes had threatened to arrest the platform’s legal representative in Brazil,15 after the court repeatedly failed to locate X representatives to serve process. Moraes ordered the blocking of X later that month (see B1).16 The controversy prompted allegations that the judiciary’s actions were politicized and lacked appropriate transparency (see B3).

During the previous coverage period, Moraes ordered the suspension of social media accounts as part of “fake news inquiries” by the Supreme Court, including the suspension of all social media accounts of the far-left Workers’ Cause Party (PCO). On June 1, 2022, the PCO posted a personal insult against Moraes while criticizing his avowal to disqualify candidates who “spread fake news,” and also called for the dissolution of the Supreme Court.17 The following day, Moraes issued a decision ordering platforms to block the PCO’s accounts.18 That November, after platforms appealed the suspensions, the full court upheld Moraes’s order.19 The suspension lasted through the elections and was only lifted in late February 2023; upon the accounts’ reinstatement, Moraes warned the PCO that failing to comply with an order prohibiting the party from publishing, promoting, and sharing information deemed false would result in a daily fine of 10,000 reais ($2,000).20

The 2022 electoral period also brought account restrictions for members of the judiciary. At least nine judges had their accounts suspended between October 2022 and January 2023 on orders from the National Council of Justice (CNJ), the national judicial oversight board.21 The CNJ, led by National Inspector of Justice Luis Felipe Salomão, directly ordered platforms to suspend the accounts and imposed a daily fine of 20,000 reais ($4,100) for noncompliance.22 According to the CNJ, some of those who had their accounts blocked endorsed candidates for office; others weighed into politics or called electoral integrity into question. In one case from December 2022, Salomão ordered Instagram and X to suspend the accounts of federal judge Maria do Carmo Cardoso after she expressed support on social media for pro-Bolsonaro demonstrators staged outside military installations.23

Lawsuits and legal threats have been frequently used, particularly by politicians and political authorities, to restrict the circulation of content criticizing them.24 In November 2023, the Supreme Court ruled that news companies can be held civilly liable if they publish interviews in which an interviewee falsely accuses someone else of committing a crime.25 According to the decision,26 a journalistic outlet can only be held liable if there was concrete evidence that the allegation was false at the time it was published and the company failed its duty-of-care obligation to verify the truthfulness of the facts. Courts are also empowered to order the removal of online content that is “insulting, defamatory, slanderous or false.”27 Some journalists and press organizations have criticized the Supreme Court’s decision for potentially placing overly broad restrictions on the dissemination of content (see B3).

In October 2023, news outlet Migalhas reported that the Supreme Court upheld a decision that found writer Saíle Bárbara Barreto liable for moral damages against Judge Rafael Rabaldo Bottan (see C3). As part of the ruling, Barreto was also ordered to remove critical posts about Bottan from her Facebook page “Diário de uma advogada estressada” (Diary of a Stressed Lawyer).28 Content-deletion orders are frequently issued as part of civil defamation decisions.

Authorities ordered the removal of online content connected with the April–May 2024 Rio Grande do Sul floods, part of wider government efforts to regulate the online information space after the catastrophe (see B3 and B5). In one incident from May 2024, a judge ordered Meta to remove a post by comedian and influencer Dilson Alves da Silva Neto, known as Nego Di. In the post, the influencer claimed that local authorities had prohibited operators of private boats and jet skis from conducting rescue operations in the state. The judge argued that the comments were damaging to rescue efforts, and ordered the comedian not to make any more posts containing disinformation, under the potential fine of 100,000 reais ($20,300).29

Between July and December 2023, Google received 656 government requests to remove content—down from 704 during the first half of 2023—including for defamation (253), privacy and security (114), and copyright matters (46).30 Google removed 41.7 percent of requested items for compliance with Brazilian laws, and an additional 12.3 percent for Google policy violations.

A Facebook transparency report noted that more than 4,400 pieces of content were restricted in Brazil between July and December 2023, the most recent update available, due to civil, criminal, and electoral court orders; another 5,800 items were restricted in response to reports by the Brazilian Health and Regulatory Agency; and approximately 2,800 were restricted due to apparent violations of Brazilian laws.31 An additional item was restricted globally due to an order from the State Court of Appeals, and as of November 2023, Meta’s appeals on these restrictions remain pending.32

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 2.002 4.004

The Marco Civil resolved questions about intermediary liability by establishing that ISPs are only held liable for third-party content if they fail to remove content after a specific court order.1 Exceptions were made for copyright infringement and the dissemination of nonconsensual sexual images or videos. In cases pertaining to the latter, the user’s notification alone is enough to make the intermediary liable, should it refuse to make the content unavailable within a short time period.2

Once celebrated as the welcome outcome of a multistakeholder consultation with civil society involvement, the Marco Civil’s future looks uncertain; calls for regulation with more accountability from technology companies have grown, and multiple members of the Supreme Court have suggested they might rule against the statute in a case concerning its constitutionality.3 In May 2023, the Supreme Court delayed a hearing on the constitutionality of the Marco Civil’s liability regime.4 The case remained pending at the end of the current coverage period.5

In recent years, efforts to amend the current intermediary liability system and implement content regulations have remained ongoing in the National Congress. In June 2020, after fast-tracked procedures, the Senate approved draft bill PL 2630/2020, commonly known as the fake news bill.6 CSOs sharply criticized lawmakers’ move to rush the bill through Senate procedures, as well as the bill itself for uprooting the Marco Civil’s provisions on intermediary liability and undermining encryption (see C4).7 Since the Chamber of Deputies began discussing the bill in July 2020, the draft bill has undergone significant changes, some of which were celebrated by civil society.8

The project has remained stalled in the Chamber of Deputies for several years. In April 2024, Chamber of Deputies speaker Arthur Lira announced that a working group would be formed to prepare a new draft, noting that the current text was “destined to go nowhere” due to a lack of political consensus.9 The working group, which formally began its mandate in June, was expected to complete its work by September.10 Some civil society actors criticized the formation of the working group, claiming that it threatened to derail urgently needed regulation.11

The April 2023 version of the bill, as presented by lawmaker Orlando Silva, would have created significant new obligations for social media, search engine, and instant messaging providers with over 10 million users in Brazil, with some exemptions.12 The draft would have significantly changed the intermediary liability regime in Brazil, but it will likely go unadopted. According to Article 6 for the April 2023 draft, providers would have been civilly liable for harms resulting from third-party advertisements and user-generated content when providers fail to abide by their duty-of-care obligations while a safety protocol is active. Those obligations would have required providers, under potential sanctions for repeated noncompliance, to “act diligently” to prevent the dissemination of content that may constitute a criminal offense falling under a list of categories, including crimes against the rule of law, terrorism, crimes against children and adolescents, and racial discrimination. Other categories include violence against women and violations of the public health law.13 Some digital rights organizations criticized these obligations for being poorly defined, noting that it is often unclear whether elements of the relevant criminal offenses are present in social media content.14 Others urged the National Congress to pass PL 2630/2020.15

Under the April 2023 draft, safety protocols could be implemented when an “imminent risk” was identified, or due to the negligence of providers to mitigate such risks. Such protocols would be valid for 30 days, with extensions possible.16 Providers would face sanctions for repeated noncompliance with their duty of care obligations.

The April 2023 draft maintained due process rights for users and transparency reporting requirements, which were added in a previous draft. Article 17 of the bill required that content moderation processes “be applied with equity, consistency and respect for the right of access to information, freedom of expression and free competition.” Additionally, providers would have been required to publish transparency reports that disclose information about content moderation actions, including the number of posts removed.17

The legislation did not name or create an agency to oversee its implementation and enforcement. A proposal that would have allowed the president to create an independent enforcement agency was criticized for its potential to create executive influence over enforcement of the regulations.18 There are ongoing discussions about this aspect of the bill, and proposals have been floated to designate Anatel as the oversight agency (see A5),19 or instead establish an interagency regulator comprising representatives from the judiciary, Congress, independent agencies, and the executive branch.20

Several platform operators, including Google and Meta, expressed intense public opposition to the bill, particularly against provisions that required platforms’ remuneration of media companies for journalistic content and the bill’s transparency requirements for ad targeting and content moderation (see B6).21 In response, Brazilian authorities accused technology companies of illegally attempting to influence public and legislative debate on the matter.22

In the absence of effective legislative action, Brazilian judicial authorities have taken aggressive measures in recent years to implement online content regulations. In February 2024, the TSE issued updated regulations ahead of the October municipal elections.23 The new regulations introduce stricter intermediary liability rules and other obligations for platforms, borrowing from the debates surrounding PL 2630/2020 and prior suggestions that Moraes had offered to the National Congress for the bill24 but had not been adopted.

Among the new rules, under the updated electoral regulations, application providers (including platforms and website operators) will be held “civilly and administratively” liable if, during the electoral period, they fail to immediately take down “content and accounts” that fall under “risk” categories introduced by the new rules, including: specified offenses under the penal code related to crimes against democracy and the rule of law; sharing stances about election integrity that are “notoriously false” or “seriously decontextualized”; threats or incitement of violence toward electoral officials and employees; hate speech due to protected characteristics and “any other type of discrimination”; and content generated by AI that is not properly labeled.25

Providers are also required to adopt measures to prevent or decrease the dissemination of “notoriously false” or “seriously decontextualized” content that is deemed to undermine election integrity, including by adjusting terms of use and content policies, as well as implementing changes to recommended content algorithms. They are also required to conduct risk assessments and adopt mitigation measures. Judicial authorities are empowered to require platforms to amplify fact-checks correcting sponsored content that conveys “notoriously false” or “seriously decontextualized” content. According to the regulations, application providers have a duty-of-care obligation to prevent individuals from using their platforms for “electoral offenses,” which could be interpreted to mean that providers should remove and demonetize offending content without a judicial order, though the language leaves room for interpretation.

Echoing concerns with PL 2630/2020, some digital rights analysts have argued that the duty-of-care obligations established by the February 2024 electoral regulations, potentially obliging platforms to remove certain content without a judicial order, are imprecise and violate Marco Civil provisions shielding platforms from intermediary liability.26 In a March 2024 statement, the Rights on the Net Coalition (CDR), a coalition of CSOs, expressed concern that platforms may be encouraged to remove legitimate political content as a result of the intermediary liability rules introduced by the regulations.27

The February 2024 regulations also specifically addressed the use of AI during the electoral period, requiring that campaign materials clearly disclose, watermark, or label when such content is generated by AI for audio recordings, videos, and text-based material. Chatbots are subject to the same disclosure requirements, and campaigns are banned from deploying chatbots that impersonate a real person, whether or not they are a candidate for office. The use of “deepfakes,” content created or manipulated via AI or other means to portray events that did not necessarily occur, is completely forbidden, whether to support or attack a candidate. A campaign’s use of synthetic content to disseminate “notoriously untrue” or “decontextualized” facts that undermine election integrity will result in the disqualification of the candidate or the revocation of their mandate.

In August 2024, after the coverage period, the TSE announced that nine platforms had signed memorandums of understanding, agreeing to cooperate with the newly formed Integrated Center for Combating Disinformation and Defending Democracy (CIEDDE) to regulate false content during the electoral period. The TSE’s current president, Supreme Court justice Cármen Lúcia, also said that the CIEDDE would operate a hotline for individuals to report information “they believe needs to be duly verified by the Electoral Court.”28

Brazilian judicial authorities also actively ordered the removal of content during the 2022 electoral period and in the aftermath of the January 2023 riots in Brasília (see B2). On October 20, 2022, days before the presidential runoff, the TSE issued regulations that allowed it to order platforms to take down content within two hours (or as little as one hour, for orders issued the day before the election and three days afterward) for content found to be knowingly false or decontextualized and that would “affect the integrity of the electoral process,” and impose an hourly fine for noncompliance.29 The 2022 regulations also gave Supreme Court justice Moraes, then the president of the TSE, the authority to act sua sponte—that is, of one’s own accord, without having been approached by any parties—to issue removal orders for any content that is identical to something previously ruled illegal by the full court, raising concerns about Moraes’s power to regulate content unilaterally.30 Moraes was also empowered to suspend platforms for up to 24 hours for repeated noncompliance with content removal orders, with the duration doubling for each new infraction.

TSE regulations issued in recent years, and judicial efforts to remove online disinformation more broadly, have provoked intense debate. Orders issued by Moraes directed social media platforms to remove thousands of posts and block the accounts of dozens of people, sometimes after they had posted a single piece of content, and often without a clear explanation of what the offense was.31

The lack of transparency on content takedown and account suspension orders issued under the TSE’s regulations has raised concerns. In April 2024, conservative US journalist Michael Shellenberger published the “Twitter Files Brazil,” purporting to show internal communications among X's legal team in Brazil between 2020 and 2022, which he claimed demonstrated an attempt by authorities to censor right-wing speech on the platform. The reporting was cited by Elon Musk amid his dispute with Moraes and was used to fuel Musk’s assertion that X would not comply with court orders to restrict content (see B2).32 In April 2024, independent fact-checking organization Aos Fatos reported that it was unable to verify the authenticity of the conversations released by Shellenberger.33 Others have said that the Twitter Files Brazil were used to spread disinformation about the Supreme Court and undermine efforts to regulate online content in Brazil more broadly (see B5).34

In recent years, the government has introduced other measures meant to mitigate certain online harms. In early 2023, Brazil experienced a series of school shootings.35 That April, the justice minister issued a resolution that increased pressure on “social media platforms”—a term not defined in the resolution—to restrict certain content and accounts, including that which “encourages attacks against school environments or supports and incites these crimes or their perpetrators.”36 The resolution authorizes certain government bodies to request information on companies’ compliance efforts, prepare reports on the assessment and mitigation of systemic risks, and, in “exceptional circumstances,” order the adoption of undefined “crisis protocols.” The regulation does not provide information on how such content is to be identified or on any oversight or auditing mechanism, and has been criticized by digital rights advocates as lacking a legal basis and giving the executive branch too much power over online content.37 Thus far, the government has not published any reporting on its enforcement of the regulation, and has otherwise denied access to information requests filed about the systemic risk-assessment reports and what sort of information the government directed companies to provide.38

The federal government responded to flooding in Rio Grande do Sul that began in April 2024 by adopting measures to restrict false online content about the catastrophe (see B2 and B5). In May 2024, the Attorney General’s Office (AGU) announced that it had signed an agreement with several platforms to “promote information integrity about the climate tragedy.”39 The AGU also led a “situation room” to respond to false information about the floods.40 The spread of false and misleading information reportedly generated distrust and severely undermined the government’s ability to respond to the incident (see B7).

In April 2024, the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CONANDA) published a resolution stating that companies providing digital services “must prioritize” measures to control illegal or harmful content directed at children or adolescents, including a requirement to make such content “unavailable as soon as its content is confirmed, regardless of a court order.”41 The resolution also mandates certain age verification measures, potentially undermining anonymity online (see C4).

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Threats and violence against online journalists and independent bloggers in certain areas of the country contribute to self-censorship.1 While journalists remain under threat from online harassment and other retaliatory actions—a problem that escalated under former president Bolsonaro—there are indications that they face a somewhat less restrictive environment under President Lula.

Bolsonaro and members of his family regularly intimidated and harassed journalists throughout his presidential term, which ended on January 1, 2023. In 2022, the nonprofit Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (Abraji) registered 557 attacks against the media, 41.6 percent of which came from Bolsonaro or his sons; according to the report, stigmatizing discourse was the most common type of attack, and more than 60 percent of all attacks were “seeded or fed” on the internet.2 In 2023, however, Abraji recorded 330 attacks, a 40.7 percent drop, noting that the change occurred “[a]fter a period of strategic campaigns to discredit journalists and journalism” that marked the Bolsonaro administration. The report emphasized that stigmatizing discourse remained the main form of attack and that 55.7 percent of attacks were perpetrated by state actors—underscoring how public officials continue to intimidate journalists and undermine their work.3

The threat of violence has led some outlets and online journalists to cease or alter their coverage of certain topics.4 A report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) published in September 2023 documented particular risks for journalists in the Amazon region. The report examined several “taboo topics” that create dangers for journalists who report on them, including Indigenous land rights and environmental degradation.5 Previously, in February 2022, the day after the murder of online journalist Givanildo Oliveira in the city of Fortaleza, the Portal de Fortaleza online outlet announced that it would stop covering crime and policing to “avoid becoming a target.”6

The potential for judicial harassment could also cause some online communicators, particularly journalists, to practice self-censorship. The threat of both criminal defamation lawsuits and civil actions has fostered a chilling environment for many journalists (see C3). RSF’s September 2023 report noted that the legal costs associated with defamation lawsuits can foster self-censorship, especially for smaller outlets with fewer resources.7

In April 2021, the Brazilian Press Association (ABI) brought a constitutional challenge claiming that criminal defamation and other crimes against honor have created a chilling effect for news reporting and asked the court to set a standard protecting journalists from being targeted by such legal threats when reporting on government officials and public figures. The case appeared to remain pending at the end of the coverage period.8

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because, while the manipulation of online content remains a significant issue, the Lula administration has not appeared to repeat the previous government’s tactics to disseminate false information online.

Manipulated content is common in the Brazilian online environment, with a notable proliferation of disinformation during the 2018 and 2022 election campaigns, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Concerns over the spread of false electoral information remain ongoing and have prompted controversial efforts in recent years to regulate the online information space, including ahead of the October 2024 municipal elections (see B3).

Disinformation, largely amplified by Bolsonaro and his allies in an effort to cast doubt on the integrity of the vote, flooded the online landscape ahead of the October 2022 general election. False or misleading information most frequently involved spreading distrust in the electoral system, including the role of the TSE, opinion polls, and electronic voting systems.1 According to the Carter Center’s election observation mission, the primary disinformation narrative shifted from unfounded vulnerabilities of electronic voting systems during the first round of the vote to false accusations of bias within the TSE during the second round.2

Bolsonaro and his allies served as a key source of such claims.3 Between Bolsonaro’s inauguration in January 2019 and December 2022, Aos Fatos found Bolsonaro to have made at least 6,685 false or misleading statements.4 These statements, including frequent remarks alleging that the election was vulnerable to fraud,5 were then reproduced and disseminated on official online channels and social media accounts, constituting an organized and well-financed disinformation machine that was reportedly capable of engaging between 10 and 20 percent of the population, according to reporting from April 2022.6 The Bolsonaro administration predominantly relied on WhatsApp, which had previously been a major vector of election disinformation in 2018,7 to spread its narratives, as well as Telegram, which it increasingly favored as other platforms clamped down on the spread of electoral disinformation.

In December 2021, federal police found Bolsonaro to have played a “direct and relevant” role in the proliferation of disinformation around electoral integrity during live streams on social media, calling the 2018 election rigged on claims that he should have been elected in the first round of voting, and casting doubt on the integrity of the 2022 election with insinuations that he would not accept the results unless the electronic voting system was changed. The PF alleged that Bolsonaro had a “clear purpose” of misleading the public about the election’s integrity.8 In January 2023, Supreme Court justice Moraes granted a request by prosecutors to formally investigate Bolsonaro—including for his role in the January 2023 riots in Brasília—citing the false information he spread about the country’s elections.9 In June 2023, the TSE ruled that Bolsonaro had abused his political power and misused communications media when, in July 2022, he made baseless allegations of election fraud and questioned the legitimacy of the 2022 vote while holding a meeting that was attended by foreign ambassadors and broadcast on social media and television. According to Moraes, Bolsonaro used social media during the event in an intentional effort to “bombard the electorate” with false claims about the electoral system.10 The court barred him from running for office again for eight years.11

False claims about the election, spread by Bolsonaro and his supporters, significantly undermined the reliability of the online information environment during the electoral period and in the weeks before the January 2023 riots (see B7). Two days after pro-Bolsonaro rioters stormed government buildings in the capital, Bolsonaro himself shared—and later deleted—a video in which someone falsely claimed that Lula was not legitimately elected but instead chosen by the courts.12 In January 2024, Supreme Court justice Moraes ordered Bolsonaro to surrender his passport as part of an ongoing criminal investigation; the order cites evidence that close Bolsonaro allies, including members of the armed forces, formed a “disinformation center” that amplified false claims about election fraud in an effort to create the conditions necessary for a coup d'état.13

Government institutions and private actors undertook various efforts to address disinformation in the run-up to the 2022 election and in the weeks after the vote, and such actions to regulate false online content have continued during the current coverage period (see B1, B2, and B3). Days after adopting new regulations for the 2024 municipal elections, the TSE also announced that it had established a new initiative, the CIEDDE, which includes representatives from the justice ministry, Anatel, the Brazilian Bar Association, and the AGU. The CIEDDE aims to “promote cooperation” between the judicial authorities, public institutions, and private companies to ensure compliance with electoral regulations.14

Aggressive efforts by the Brazilian courts to regulate false online information have often made the judiciary itself, including Supreme Court justices, the targets of online disinformation campaigns. In July 2023, Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, who served as president of the TSE from 2020 to 2022, was criticized after he made controversial remarks that “we’ve also defeated ‘bolsonarism’ to preserve democracy and free speech.” According to DFRLab, Barroso became the target of two online narratives in the days after his comments, including one campaign that labeled the Supreme Court as “criminals and dictatorial judges,” and another meant to prompt his impeachment; DFRLab reported that these campaigns displayed signs of inauthentic behavior.15 Barroso’s comments, and other allegations such as those contained in the Twitter Files Brazil (see B3),16 have been exploited online in support of a broader narrative that the courts defrauded Bolsonaro of victory in 2022.

In May 2024, the spread of false information online emerged as a significant concern amid devastating flooding in Rio Grande do Sul. Many false claims, such as the notion that the Lula administration planned to impose a “climate lockdown” in the state, were reportedly spread by Bolsonaro supporters in an intentional effort to undermine the government’s response—an issue that made it more difficult for affected individuals to access trustworthy information about the events (see B7).17 To counteract this, the government struck an agreement with platforms to restrict the spread of false information (see B3), and the Secretariat of Social Communication (SECOM) sent the justice minister a memorandum requesting an investigation into the narratives harming the “credibility” of the army and other government institutions involved in the emergency response.18 As evidence of these claims, the memorandum listed allegedly offending content, including a post on X that accused the state of “ineffectiveness and lack of will.”19 That month, the government also launched an apparently short-lived effort to recruit “digital information volunteers” to detect and report false online information about the disaster.20 The government’s efforts to restrict and investigate certain content led some commentators to claim that authorities sought to curb mere disapproval of their actions.21

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Economic constraints to publishing online content are relatively minor in Brazil.

Brazil lacks legislation around the use of public funds for state advertisement in media outlets, including online media. Discriminatory use of state advertisement for political control remains a concern at the federal and local levels in Brazil.1 The SECOM issued regulations regarding government spending on advertising in September 20232 and February 2024.3 The February 2024 regulation establishes rules for withholding federal government advertising on apps, platforms, and websites—including those that publish journalistic content—that violate criminal statutes or potentially create institutional image risks for government entities. Such violations include, among others, crimes against democracy and the rule of law; terrorism; international child trafficking and child sexual abuse material; copyright infringement; and electoral law infringement. Both judicial authorities and the head of the Secretariat for Digital Policies are empowered to determine whether online entities are ineligible for government advertising due to these criteria.

While recent administrations have increasingly shifted advertising funding to online platforms, much of the state advertising budget remains directed to television. In March 2024, ICL News cited data from the first year of the Lula administration that Grupo Globo received the highest amount public advertising funds in 2023. Globo’s television stations appeared to receive the largest shares of funding; of the total 118 million reais ($24 million) received by Grupo Globo, 36 million reais ($7.3 million) went to two of its television programs, Jornal Nacional and Fantástico.4 According to remarks made by SECOM minister Paulo Pimenta, television outlets receive 45 percent of all federal government advertising funds, while internet platforms receive 15 percent.5 Among social media platforms, Meta, TikTok, Google, and X received the largest share of funds, respectively.6

If adopted, PL 2630/2020 would compel major platforms to pay media companies for the use of their “journalistic content.” In April 2022, a coalition of free press and digital rights organizations—echoing criticisms made by digital platforms—warned against the proposed remuneration model’s potential to harm local and independent journalism and favor only large, traditional media outlets, as it could force platforms to choose which outlets to pay for.7 With PL 2630/2020 unlikely to pass in its existing form, the issue of journalist remuneration has since been considered in other legislation presented in the National Congress. In May 2024, the Chamber of Deputies’ Communications Committee approved PL 1354/2021, which would amend the Marco Civil to require that digital platforms with more than two million Brazilian users compensate media outlets for the distribution of their journalistic content.8 The bill must also be considered in the Committee on Constitution, Justice and on Citizenship.9

Some digital platforms have responded to the TSE’s 2024 electoral content regulations by restricting certain digital advertising. In April, Google announced that it would stop allowing political advertisements in Brazil via Google Ads in May, specifically citing the February regulations.10 X followed suit in early May.11 An early May article from the Folha de São Paulo newspaper raised concerns that companies that still allowed electoral ads on their platforms, such as Meta and Kwai, were not in full compliance with the TSE’s transparency obligations on advertising.12

Since the approval of the Marco Civil, net neutrality has been incorporated into Brazilian law. Enacted in May 2016, a decree regulating the Marco Civil solidified the rules that prohibit the discrimination or degradation of traffic for commercial purposes, while permitting it for public emergencies.13 Any notice of violation of said principle by companies may be investigated and sanctioned.14

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Brazil’s online sphere is vibrant, featuring many frequently updated websites and social media pages that examine contemporary issues from a variety of perspectives. However, many users have limited access to information beyond social media platforms given the widespread practice of zero-rating agreements for mobile plans (see A2),1 and some regions lack robust local coverage. The presence of false information has eroded the reliability of the online information landscape during recent critical national events, such as the 2022 election, the January 2023 riots in Brasília, and the April–May 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul.

The 2024 edition of the Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report found that 38 percent of Brazilian respondents used WhatsApp to access news. The same percentage said the same for YouTube. Instagram (36 percent), Facebook (29 percent), and certain news sites were other relatively popular sources of online news.2 The YouTube channel Spartakus, which focuses largely on pop culture, discusses topics like white privilege, meritocracy, and LGBT+ rights.3 Outlets such as AzMina, which was founded in 2015, provide reporting and content with a gender-based perspective, particularly for Black, Indigenous, transgender, and lesbian women.4

Some areas of the country have limited or no local news coverage, especially in the North and Northeast regions, which have comparably large Indigenous and Afro-Brazilian populations.5 While digital news initiatives have succeeded in slowly reducing the size of these news deserts in recent years, more than 13 percent of the population, or almost 27 million people, did not have access to local journalistic information, online or offline, in 2023.6 However, the Atlas da Notícia recorded 5,245 digital outlets in 2023, making online platforms the largest form of media in Brazil. Some organizations publish online content in Indigenous languages. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, Indigenous organization Namunkurá Associação Xavante started sharing news reports about the pandemic in the Xavante language.7

In recent years, online right-wing media outlets have emerged, including groups focused on “alternative information” like Folha Política or Mídia Sem Máscara (Media Without a Mask). Many of these outlets present themselves as credible journalistic outlets but have been described as “propaganda disguised as journalism.” This network of pro-Bolsonaro sites reportedly received 48.2 million visits in July 2022, a higher audience than some of the country’s prominent news outlets.8

False claims about the 2022 election, shared both online and offline, significantly undermined public trust in the vote and contributed to the January 2023 riots in Brasília. Many false claims about the election were shared by Bolsonaro and his allies in an intentional effort to influence the online information sphere (see B5). In many cases, false information that gained traction on social media in the aftermath of the election became central rallying cries for the pro-Bolsonaro rioters. For example, the false claim that the TSE had not published the source code for electronic voting machines, which circulated on WhatsApp in November and December 2022,9 featured prominently on the signs carried by participants in the attacks in Brasília.10 Additionally, several false claims circulated online about the riots, undermining credible reporting on the violence. In the days after the attack, false information that leftist “infiltrators” were responsible for the destruction were shared on WhatsApp and Telegram.11 Ahead of the October 2024 municipal elections, Meta reportedly cut funding for fact-checking agencies on WhatsApp by up to 30 percent,12 which could further degrade the online information sphere on one of Brazil’s largest platforms for false information.

In May 2024, several false and misleading claims spread online following flooding in Rio Grande do Sul, which prompted the government make efforts to restrict the dissemination of such content (see B3 and B5). Some of these false claims were found to have severe real-world consequences, such as discouraging people from volunteering in recovery efforts.13 One individual involved in rescue operations noted that unsubstantiated information spread on social media created “a state of alarm among people who are already vulnerable.”14 Additionally, the mayor of one city said that individuals had ignored government warnings due to social media posts that falsely characterized such notices as scare tactics.15

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Social media platforms such as Facebook and X—and, more recently, closed-messaging platforms such as WhatsApp—play a central role in civic activism in Brazil. However, the use of these platforms to mobilize around political causes is complicated by disinformation campaigns and the prevalence of false and misleading content (see B5 and B7).

Between October and December 2022, the most recent data available, think tank Instituto Igarapé identified 410 threats to civic space in Brazil; 229 of those were disinformation campaigns, the highest number on record, which mainly attacked Brazil’s electoral system.1

Citizens can engage with lawmakers online to express opinions and shape the design and implementation of legislation.2 Activists also use social media as a tool for political mobilization. Reporting from April 2022, for instance, outlined how Indigenous influencers uploaded videos to online channels to inform and mobilize users against a series of Bolsonaro’s policies that threatened the environment and Brazil’s Indigenous peoples.3

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 4.004 6.006

While the Brazilian constitution guarantees freedom of expression, the broader legal framework provides inadequate protection for that right. The groundbreaking Marco Civil, a framework for internet user rights signed into law in 2014,1 establishes the right to freedom of expression online, offers detailed privacy protections pertaining to personal data, guarantees net neutrality, and promises to uphold the participatory nature of the internet. However, constitutional protections and those in the Marco Civil are undermined by defamation penalties and other laws that can be misused to criminalize legitimate speech (see C2).2

Concerns remain that Brazilian law does not fully abide by standards for freedom of expression established by the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and international human rights law. In December 2021, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) admitted a petition against Brazil after the Brazilian courts rejected a challenge to the criminal offense of desacato (disrespect or contempt toward a public official).3 The IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has said that laws criminalizing contempt are inconsistent with Article 13 of the ACHR, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression.4 In recent years, legal analysts have noted that there is a lack of legislation or meaningful precedent establishing standards for freedom of expression in Brazil;5 that is inconsistent with international standards that legal freedom-of-expression limitations must be “formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.”6 Recent pushes for stricter speech limitations have not adequately addressed the lack of “sufficient precision” required under human rights law (see C2).

In recent years, multiple attempts have been made to change and weaken legal guarantees on freedom of expression, privacy, and access to the internet. To respond to and resist multiple draft bills, digital rights–focused civil society organizations created a coalition in 2016 that has been actively monitoring and engaging with the National Congress on these issues.7 Impunity for crimes against users, such as harassment, threats, and violence, persists (see C7).8

The judiciary is largely independent, and the Supreme Court has remained an autonomous counterweight to the executive. The court has illustrated its independence in rulings concerning online freedoms, as when it nullified new social media rules issued by then president Bolsonaro under provisional measure in September 2021.9 However, concerns remain that the judiciary’s recent efforts to regulate electoral disinformation could violate standards of free expression (see B3).

A potential positive development is a recent decision by the Supreme Court concerning judicial harassment, a pervasive issue in Brazil (see C3).10 In May 2024, the court decided in Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality 6792 and 7055 that filing separate, “excessively burdensome” lawsuits in multiple venues over the same issue constitutes judicial harassment, and that an individual may request all cases to be heard in their local jurisdiction. The court further held that establishing the liability of journalists and press outlets requires showing intent or gross negligence over the misrepresentation of facts. The Brazilian Bar Association characterized the decision as a “significant victory” for protecting freedom of the press and expression.11

Since entering into force in 2020, the General Data Protection Law (LGPD) had been used in recent years by federal agencies to systematically deny access-to-information requests.12 In February 2023, the Federal Comptroller General (CGU) issued a technical opinion stating that the LGPD does not override the Access to Information Law; additional guidelines with the aim of harmonizing both laws are expected.13 A coalition of CSOs raised concerns over the use of the LGPD to limit access to information with the National Data Protection Authority in August 2023.14

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Brazil maintains, and has recently strengthened, legislation that criminalizes online expression.

Defamation is punishable by three months to one year in prison and a fine under the penal code, with increased penalties in cases when public officials are defamed.1 In April 2021, the penal code was amended to triple sentences for criminal defamation “when the crime is committed or disseminated in any mode of social media.”2 The criminal code also punishes “contempt” against public officials with a penalty of six months to two years in prison, or a fine, which has been criticized for failing to meet international standards for freedom of expression (see C1).3 Earlier reforms to the electoral code in 2019 criminalized “slanderous denunciation” for electoral purposes, providing prison sentences between two and eight years for anyone making false accusations, through any means, about a political candidate for the purpose of affecting his or her candidacy.4

Although people are rarely charged or imprisoned for racist or discriminatory speech, Brazilian law establishes penalties ranging from two to five years in prison for practicing or inciting discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or religion in the media or other publications.5 The criminal code further outlines punishment for vilifying or mocking religion, with penalties ranging from one month to one year in prison, although whether these penalties have been applied to online speech is unclear.

Brazilian cybercrime law criminalizes breaches of digital privacy such as computer intrusion, the “installation of vulnerabilities,” and editing, obtaining, or deleting information—including credit card numbers—without authorization. The distribution, sale, production, or offer of programs or devices meant to facilitate these actions, or to interrupt ICT services, are also categorized as crimes.6

The National Security Act, a law enacted during the military dictatorship in 1964–85 that criminalized harming or endangering the heads of the branches of government, was increasingly used by the president, legislature, and judiciary to open investigations into critical online expression after Bolsonaro came to power in 2019.7 A law that repeals and replaces the National Security Act, Law 14,197 of 2021, was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in May 2021 and by the Senate in August 2021,8 to little enthusiasm from digital rights activists.9 As initially approved, the legislation was also seen as a threat to free expression, assembly, and association as it included vaguely worded provisions criminalizing “mass misleading communication,” though some whistleblower protections were ultimately included in the text.10 Bolsonaro vetoed the article criminalizing “mass misleading communication” in September 2021,11 which the National Congress finally voted not to override in May 2024.12

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Online journalists and bloggers reporting on corruption or controversial topics face a pattern of legal threats, including for alleged defamation. Instances of judicial harassment, through both criminal defamation suits and civil actions, continue to pose a threat to users. Public officials are known to pursue legal action in retaliation for online comments criticizing them.

The lack of freedom-of-expression standards (see C1) often means that individuals are exposed to civil liability for online content. Court records are frequently sealed, jeopardizing public debate, and limiting transparency about such decisions. Examples are sometimes reported by the media, however. In May 2024, the São Paulo Court of Justice ordered businesswoman Roberta Moreira Luchsinger to pay moral damages of 35,000 reais ($7,100) each to Senator Sergio Moro and federal deputy Rosângela Moro after she made critical comments about them on social media. Moreira Luchsinger reportedly made posts on X and Instagram that referred to the politicians as “scumbags,” “scoundrels,” “mediocre,” and “corrupt,” among other labels. The judge determined that the posts exceeded the threshold for insult and personal offense under free-expression standards. Moreira Luchsinger vowed to appeal.1

Reporters for online outlets face arrests, detention, and criminal charges in connection to defamation suits filed in retaliation for their digital activities. In April 2024, a criminal court judge in the state of Pernambuco issued an arrest warrant for journalist and blogger Ricardo Antunes, who had accused a prosecutor and judge of “lobbying the judiciary” and having “disreputable relations with businessmen,” after he allegedly refused to comply with an earlier order to remove the offending content.2 The order to arrest Antunes was quickly overturned by a separate judge, who argued that it “was decreed without any proper grounds.”3 Antunes was never arrested, since he was out of the country at the time, though legal proceedings in the case continued after the coverage period.4

In November 2023, a court in Florianópolis sentenced journalist Schirlei Alves, a reporter for the Intercept Brasil news site, under two criminal defamation convictions.5 In November 2020, Alves had reported on a controversial case involving allegations that businessman André de Camargo Aranha raped Mariana Ferrer in 2018. Alves’s report had exposed questioning by the defense attorney that many saw as revictimizing and humiliating to Ferrer. While Aranha was ultimately acquitted in the case, the National Congress passed a law in March 2022 designed to protect victims from such questioning,6 and the judge presiding over the case, Rudson Marcos, was reprimanded in November 2023 for failing to intervene in the defense’s questioning against Ferrer.7 However, Marcos and a prosecutor, Thiago Carriço de Oliveira, claimed that Alves’s report had misrepresented their actions during the trial.

The court found that Alves had criminally defamed Marcos and Carriço de Oliveira because her article had characterized the prosecution’s argument as “involuntary rape,” a term that was not used during the court proceedings by the judge or prosecutors.8 A clarification to the article had been published the same day it first appeared online, noting that the reference to “involuntary rape” was meant to render the facts more accessible to readers. The court sentenced Alves to two six-month terms of house arrest and awarded Marcos and Carriço de Oliveira 200,000 reais ($40,700) in damages each.

After the conviction, a group of CSOs, including Abraji and Article 19 Brazil and South America, condemned the court’s decision. The organizations called the ruling “incomprehensible” because Alves’s reporting was in the public interest, highlighting the gender-based violence faced by women journalists (see C7).9

In May 2023, Jackson Rangel Vieira, the owner of the Folha do ES news site, was sentenced to 10 months in prison for allegedly disseminating false information and electoral defamation during the 2020 elections.10 Rangel reportedly criticized the mayor of Cachoeiro de Itapemirim, then a candidate for reelection, in a series of posts that year; for example, in one Facebook post, Rangel accused the mayor of providing spoiled lunches to children.11 He was released in December 2023, meaning that he remained detained for several months during the coverage period.12 Rangel was originally arrested in December 2022 in connection with "anti-democratic acts" amid efforts to overturn Lula’s presidential election victory, reportedly for X posts that criticized the judiciary.13

In February 2023, during the previous coverage period, blogger Maria Aparecida de Oliveira, who reportedly spread false claims about several individuals on her Facebook page and YouTube channel, was sentenced—for the second time in two weeks—to more than four years in detention on criminal defamation charges. Her sentence was to be served under a “semi-open regime,” allowing for some autonomy.14 Aparecida de Oliveira has been the subject of multiple criminal complaints in recent years and was arrested again in July 2023 and placed in pretrial detention that month.15 She was released in August 2023, after the Supreme Court determined that alternative pretrial measures, such as a ban on using the internet, would be sufficient.16 In November 2023, Aparecida de Oliveira was again sentenced to five years of detention under a semi-open regime.17

In October 2023, two other individuals were found liable for civil defamation and ordered to pay compensation due to their online activities. That month, federal deputy Mário Frias was ordered to pay 30,000 reais ($6,100) in damages to comedian Marcelo Adnet. A judge determined that Frias damaged Adnet’s honor after calling Adnet, who had portrayed Frias in a parody, a “filthy creature” and “weak boy” on social media.18 In another case, the Supreme Court declined to modify a judgment against writer Saíle Bárbara Barreto, who was ordered to pay 50,000 reais ($10,200) in damages to Judge Rafael Rabaldo Bottan after she made critical comments about Bottan on social media and in a book. As part of the decision against her, Baretto was also ordered to remove critical posts about Bottan from her Facebook page (see B2). A criminal defamation lawsuit against Barreto remains ongoing.19

In March 2024, the São Paulo Court of Justice upheld an October 2023 decision ordering former congressman Jean Wyllys to pay 10,000 reais ($2,000) in damages to the right-wing Free Brazil Movement (MBL). Wyllys had made a post on X that associated the MBL with the “defenders of Nazism.” The appeals court ruled that it was defamatory for Wyllys to insinuate that all MBL members were responsible for defending Nazism.20

The looming threat of criminal charges, even when such claims are ultimately dismissed, may create lengthy and costly litigation that could have a chilling effect on some journalists (see B4). However, in May 2024, the Supreme Court responded to two constitutional challenges brought by Abraji and the ABI by recognizing the risk of judicial harassment arising from litigation brought in multiple jurisdictions. The decision was widely considered a positive development for freedom of expression (see C1).

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

The constitution explicitly forbids anonymity online.1 Although in practice anonymous speech online is common, some judges have occasionally referred to the constitution as a basis for limiting it. Other judges have upheld anonymous speech on the grounds that it is important for free expression and privacy, ruling that anonymous posts are protected so long as they can be technically traced through internet protocol (IP) addresses. The Superior Court of Justice (STJ) has held that identification through an IP address is a “reasonably effective means for identification” and corresponds to an “average diligence” expected from service providers.2

Several legal provisions also restrict online anonymity in Brazil. Real-name registration is required for individuals or legal entities in order to purchase mobile phones or to access private internet connections, although the use of pseudonyms in discussion forums across the web is common. Lawmakers have pushed for restrictions on anonymity regarding public internet access points, such as local area network (LAN) houses, in order to prevent cybercrimes. Legislation of this kind already exists in states such as São Paulo,3 while other proposals that seek to oblige users to identify themselves when accessing the internet or social media remain under consideration.4 In a June 2024 interview, Anatel’s president said that anonymity on social media is unconstitutional, arguing that it undermines online accountability.5

In April 2024, CONANDA published regulations meant to address online harms against children and adolescents (see B3). The resolution mandates that digital services make “[e]ffective age verification mechanisms” available to prevent children and adolescents from accessing illegal or harmful content.6 The full consequences of this measure for anonymous communication online remained unclear during the current coverage period.

During the coverage period, there were no restrictions on the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) and Tor browsers in Brazil. Previously, Supreme Court orders banning Telegram in March 2022 established a fine for those “using technological subterfuge” to continue communicating through the app, effectively barring the use of VPNs to circumvent the ban.7 This fine, like the broader blocking order, was ultimately not implemented. On May 10, 2023, days after the most recent block of Telegram was lifted (see B1), Justice Moraes issued another order to this effect, establishing an hourly fine of 100,000 reais ($20,300) for those who use technological subterfuge to circumvent a block of Telegram should another be implemented.8

However, similar restrictions were implemented in August 2024, after the coverage period. That month, Moraes’s order to block X (see B1) again prohibited the use of technological subterfuge to circumvent the ban, imposing a daily fine of 50,000 reais ($10,150) for those who access the platform using VPNs.9

Brazilian law does not currently place restrictions on encryption, though a pending case before the Supreme Court, ADPF 403, could impose them in the future.10 The LGPD strengthens the adoption of encryption policies,11 and some legal analysts have interpreted recent Supreme Court decisions in defense of privacy and data protection as suggestive of a judiciary favorable to protecting encryption.12 While the original version of PL 2630/2020 would have required private messaging services to store the traceability data of messages that went viral—defined as those forwarded by more than five users and that reached at least 1,000 accounts—for three months, later versions dropped the traceability mandate.13 Article 42 of the bill’s April 2023 draft would have required messaging platforms to comply with court orders to retain and provide “information sufficient to identify the first account reported by other users when the sending of illicit content is in question.”14

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Brazil has a history of improper surveillance of private communications, particularly targeting social movements and activists. CSOs routinely denounce the government’s lack of transparency surrounding its surveillance operations, which are frequently justified as tools to combat crime.1

Despite the existence of several safeguards in the telephone interception law (No. 9.296/1996), there are concerns regarding their judicial interpretation and implementation.2 Infiltration through online platforms and political monitoring of social networks by the government remain common practices.3

Brazil has no regulation on the use of malware for lawful surveillance practices. In a 2018 report by Citizen Lab, a Canadian internet watchdog, Brazil is listed as one of 45 countries worldwide in which devices were likely breached by Pegasus, targeted spyware developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli technology firm. Pegasus is known to be used by governments to spy on journalists, human rights defenders, and the political opposition, though whether the Brazilian government is a Pegasus client is unclear. In May 2021, media outlet UOL reported on interference from Rio de Janeiro councilman Carlos Bolsonaro, the former president’s son, in the government’s bidding process for Pegasus. UOL sources reported that the councilman sought to reduce the military’s intelligence powers by excluding relevant bodies from the negotiations, instead expanding the surveillance capabilities of the Ministry of Justice and the PF, over which he held significant influence.4

In March 2023, O Globo reported that under the Bolsonaro administration, the ABIN had used First Mile, software provided by the Israeli company Cognyte, to track the location of mobile phone users using information from cell tower transmissions.5 In October 2023, the PF began an investigation into the ABIN’s use of the software, which appeared to lack necessary judicial approval.6 Investigations remained ongoing as of January 2024, with the PF stating that it had found evidence of a “parallel structure” at the ABIN that conducted illegal surveillance.7 A Supreme Court document from January 2024 suggested that Carlos Bolsonaro formed part of a “political core” that coordinated to illicitly monitor political opponents and obtain information about ongoing investigations into the Bolsonaro family.8 Federal investigators suspected that the ABIN was used during the Bolsonaro administration to illegally monitor at least three Supreme Court justices and other political opponents of the former president.9 Investigations into the “parallel ABIN” operation remained ongoing after the end of the coverage period.10

In December 2023, the AGU filed a lawsuit asking the Supreme Court to require that agencies request judicial authorization before using these surveillance tools. The AGU also requested that the court create guidelines for the use of First Mile and other spyware.11 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Supreme Court held public hearings about the use of secret monitoring tools on personal devices, with representatives from civil society and communications providers taking part.12

In September 2022, the TSE contracted the private communications firm Partners Comunicação Integrada to provide social media monitoring services for one year as part of the court’s efforts to remove online electoral disinformation (see B2, B3, and B5). As part of the contract, the company was to provide analysis of social media activities in Brazil and advise the court with monthly strategic action plans.13 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Supreme Court announced that it would hire a firm to conduct social media monitoring to assess narratives about the court on digital platforms.14

An October 2019 presidential decree established a Citizen’s Basic Register (Cadastro Base do Cidadão), which consists of a centralized database of citizens’ data, ranging from health records to biometric information, held by federal bodies. Permission from Brazilians to share their data among various federal agencies is not required, nor are they able to track their information. No limits were imposed on the sharing of citizens’ health information, and the Central Data Governance Committee (CCGD), which regulates the register, initially lacked representatives from civil society, academia, and businesses. Critics have raised concerns that the register threatens privacy rights, in conjunction with existing surveillance technologies.15 In September 2022, the Supreme Court upheld the presidential decree but imposed certain data protection requirements on any sharing of personal data, in compliance with the LGPD.16 It remains to be seen whether such conditions will be effective. The court also required that the CCGD be restructured to include members from outside of government. In November 2022, a new presidential decree was enacted, adding two civil society representatives to the committee.17

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

The Marco Civil imposes obligations on internet connection providers to keep records of their users’ connection logs for 12 months, and for application providers to keep records of access for 6 months.1 In a landmark elevation of privacy rights, Brazilian lawmakers enshrined the protection of personal data in the constitution in February 2022.2

Regulations decreed in May 2016 clarified security measures to be taken by providers regarding log-keeping, including how authorities must request users’ data from intermediaries; the level of technical security said intermediaries must adopt to safeguard logs from being leaked; and other identification and security procedures to be undertaken by the professionals responsible for handling said data, such as the obligation for individual identification and the use of two-factor authentication.3

Beyond the Marco Civil, Law No. 12,850/2013 on organized crime obliges telecommunications companies to retain data regarding the origin and destination of phone calls for five years.4 Anatel resolutions also establish obligations on the retention of metadata by landline and mobile service providers.5

Digital-rights advocacy organizations have largely supported recent data protection legislation. The LGPD was approved by the National Congress in August 2020, after significant delay, though sanctions for noncompliance in the form of monetary fines up to 2 percent of a company’s revenue did not go into effect until August 2021.6 The ANPD, the body in charge of enforcing the law, was given independent status in June 2022, per a provisional measure.7 The National Congress enacted legislation codifying the provisional measure into law in October 2022.8

In response to the April 2023 nationwide block of Telegram (see B1), chief executive Pavel Durov claimed that it would be “technologically impossible” for the platform to comply with a court order to provide the personal data of certain neo-Nazi users to authorities.9

The April 2023 draft of PL 2630/2020, commonly known as the fake news bill, would expand data retention requirements. A December 2019 ruling of the STJ, while not binding, had decided that an internet application provider could be required to keep logical port data, which can be used to identify users, as long as this was technically feasible.10 The April 2023 draft, which will likely go unadopted, would amend the Marco Civil to include logical port data as part of the connection and access records that must be retained by providers.11 It would also expand data retention mandates, under which service providers would be required to keep content that has been removed or restricted, along with associated metadata, for six months.12 Article 45 would require providers to tell authorities whenever they have “knowledge of information that raises a suspicion that a life-threatening crime has or may occur.”

The TSE’s February 2024 electoral regulations oblige platforms to hand over certain data about users. As outlined in the regulations, the TSE established a repository containing its decisions to remove content with “notoriously untrue” or “seriously decontextualized” facts that affect election integrity. The removal orders, in turn, may require application providers to enter in the repository: the offending content itself; screenshots of comments available on the site hosting the content; and various metadata. While the metadata specifically related to engagement will be available for public consultation, the other information will be kept confidential and will only be accessible to electoral judges and other authorized officials. However, the confidential data may be shared at the request authorities for investigating criminal, administrative, or electoral law violations.13

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

Threats, intimidation, and violence against online journalists and bloggers constitute a major restriction on freedom of expression and human rights in Brazil. In recent years, hostility against journalists and the media has escalated amid deepening political polarization.1

Murders in potential retaliation for online speech, especially from journalists, are sometimes reported in Brazil. In December 2023, journalist and political candidate Thiago Rodrigues was murdered outside a party in the city of Guarujá. The Sustainability Network party, of which Rodrigues was a candidate, said that the murder may have been related to Rodrigues’s journalistic work.2 Rodrigues had used his Facebook blog to criticize municipal government and expose potential wrongdoing, and said he had received death threats in the past.3

In June 2022, during the previous coverage period, British journalist Dominic “Dom” Phillips and Indigenous activist Bruno Araújo Pereira were killed after having disappeared while reporting on Amazon deforestation.4 When they were murdered, Phillips and Pereira were conducting research for an upcoming book,5 though Phillips regularly contributed to online outlets, including The Intercept.6 As of June 2023, the police had arrested and charged five people—including Ruben Dario da Silva Villar, who allegedly headed an illegal fishing enterprise active on Indigenous lands—in connection with the two murders.7 Digital journalists who report on the Amazon region, including those who cover environmental issues and Indigenous rights, face considerable physical threats from criminal gangs and are particularly prone to self-censorship (see B4).8

Online journalists also commonly face other forms of physical violence in potential reprisal for their reporting. In June 2023, journalist Sandro Almeida de Araújo was physically attacked outside his home by four military police officers. Almeida is the director of the news site Jornal da Nova and speculated that the attack was due to his critical reporting on public security.9

At least 16 journalists, including those who work for online outlets, were physically attacked or harassed on January 8, 2023, when Bolsonaro supporters stormed government buildings in Brasília.10 Rafaela Felicciano, a photojournalist for the digital outlet Metrópoles, reported that she was physically assaulted, and had her mobile phone and memory card confiscated, by a group of Bolsonaro supporters as she attempted to cover the riots.11 Prior to the election, in late September 2022, Datafolha, a polling institute with a significant online presence, reported that its employees had been targeted with over 40 cases of harassment and violence that month alone.12

Previously, in July 2021, journalist and cofounder of news site Moju News Jackson Silva was shot multiple times by two unidentified men hiding outside his home. Silva, who hosts a weekly news program posted on his outlet’s Facebook and YouTube pages, survived the incident after undergoing multiple surgeries. On the day of the attack, Silva had covered local arrests and antidrug operations, among other topics, on his program.13 Arson attacks against the homes and cars of online journalists, potentially in reprisal for their reporting, have also been recorded in recent years.14

Bolsonaro and his supporters have used social media to harass journalists, which intensified during the 2022 election campaign. An April 2023 RSF report, which analyzed posts on X between August 15 and November 14, 2022, identified more than 3.3 million attacks against journalists on the platform during that period, amounting to one hostile post every three seconds.15

Women journalists and LGBT+ people in Brazil face heightened levels of online harassment and intimidation. A project by RSF and the Laboratory of Studies on Image and Cyberculture (Labic), a research center on the media at the Federal University of Espírito Santo, tracked content targeting female reporters during the 2022 elections. It found that during the week of October 10–16, when Lula and Bolsonaro debated on television, women reporters were particularly targeted on social media, often with gendered and sexualized insults.16 A report by Abraji found that overall attacks against journalists in 2023 fell by 40.7 percent in comparison with the previous year (see B4); it also noted that gender-based violence against journalists declined but continued to be “worrying.”17 Women and LGBT+ journalists continue to face continue to be targeted with misogynistic and homophobic insults on social media.

A study by the National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ) also found that the number of cases of violence against journalists decreased in 2023. It recorded 181 cases that year, a 51.9 percent decline from 2022. The FENAJ said that a decline in censorship and “discrediting of the press,” common occurrences under the Bolsonaro administration, accounted for the fall, but said that threats and intimidation, physical violence, and verbal or online attacks were the most common incidents observed in 2023.18

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because a cyberattack in September 2023 brought an independent outlet’s website offline for nine days.

Cyberattacks regularly occur, and often target government institutions, public utilities providers, and businesses. Websites belonging to news outlets and CSOs are sometimes disrupted by technical attacks. Brazil remained one of the Latin American countries most frequently targeted by cyberattacks in 2023.1

At least one digital outlet was targeted by a disruptive cyberattack during the coverage period. A late September 2023 cyberattack brought the website of Conquista Repórter, an independent outlet that reports from a human rights perspective, offline for nine days.2 Hackers successfully installed malware on the outlet’s servers and deleted data, necessitating a fundraising campaign to back up and repair damaged files.3

The websites of investigative news outlets and rights organizations have also suffered sustained distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in the recent past. In March and April 2021, online women’s rights news site Portal Catarinas suffered a series of DDoS attacks that rendered the site inaccessible for several hours a day over the course of a week. On the day the attacks began, Portal Catarinas had posted a critical article about proposed legislation in the Senate to offer rape survivors money to forego an abortion.4 The website of investigative news outlet and human rights organization Repórter Brasil was targeted by DDoS attacks from unidentified users for nearly a week in January 2021. The attacks forced the outlet offline multiple times, during which their general contact email also received two anonymous messages threatening continued attacks unless the outlet removed all reporting from 2003 to 2005. Their reporting from that time covered labor conditions, human trafficking, gold mining, and a hydroelectric plant.5

Government institutions have also experienced several cyberattacks in recent years. In February 2024, the Chamber of Deputies account on X was reportedly hacked. During the attack, the attacker made a post on the chamber’s official account calling Supreme Court justice Moraes a “dictator” who was “destroying democracy,” though the post was quickly deleted.6 According to data from the Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency of the Republic, cyberattacks against the federal executive branch reached a four-year monthly peak in January 2024. A total of 989 cases were recorded that month, with data leaks being the most common form of attack.7

In April 2022, the Rio de Janeiro finance department suffered a ransomware attack. A ransomware group known as LockBit claimed to have stolen about 420 GB of data and threatened to leak it if not given a payment.8 In December 2021, the website of the national health ministry was targeted with a cyberattack, during which hackers took down several online systems, causing the government to delay the implementation of new health requirements for travelers entering Brazil.9

Brazilian authorities have made some efforts to increase cybersecurity and invest more resources in overcoming current obstacles. Since 2008, Brazil has engaged in a multistakeholder debate to develop its cybersecurity agenda, which resulted in the opening of a National Cyber Defense Command and a National School for Cyber Defense, which prepares military personnel in the use of cybertools for the sake of national defense.10 In December 2023,11 President Lula published a decree establishing a National Cybersecurity Committee (CNCiber), which includes representatives from civil society, scientific institutions, the private sector, and government, to oversee the country’s cybersecurity strategy and policy. The committee met for the first time in March 2024.12

On Brazil

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Country Facts

  • Population

    215,300,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    72 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    65 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes