In October 2021, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the SAF, staged a coup, declared a state of emergency, and dissolved the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC) and transitional government that had been in place since the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019. The SAF detained several civilian government leaders, including Prime Minister Abdulla Hamdok. That November, al-Burhan reconstituted the Sovereign Council with himself as chair; Hamdok was subsequently reinstated as prime minister after signing an agreement with al-Burhan that provided for the release of political detainees, a new technocratic government, and the restructuring of the Empowerment Removal Committee (ERC). However, it also retained the Sovereign Council’s “oversight” role and excluded the civilian political coalition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) from participation in the Sovereign Council. These provisions allowed the military and al-Burhan to maintain significant control over the transitional government.

In January 2022, Prime Minister Hamdok resigned following weeks of protests by the FFC, the Umma Party, and Sudanese people across the country demanding a fully civilian government. In December 2022, the military signed a framework agreement to enable cooperation with civilian groups on forming a new transitional government.

In early 2023, however, the signing of a transition deal was postponed twice due to disagreements between the SAF and the RSF over security reforms. In April, disputes between al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—better known as Hemedti—over the integration of the RSF into the SAF sparked armed clashes in Khartoum as the two commanders vied for control. The fighting spread across Sudan over the course of the year and was still ongoing in 2024.

The former parliament was dissolved as part of the 2019 revolution. That year’s interim constitution called for a 300-seat Transitional Legislative Council (TLC), which was to hold office until elections could be organized. However, protracted disputes over the formation of a civilian-led government delayed the TLC’s creation, as did the outbreak of civil war in 2023. The legislative council had yet to be established at the end of 2024.

In September 2021, the Ministry of Justice presented and held public consultations on a draft electoral commission law. However, the draft law was not enacted, and an electoral commission was not created prior to the October 2021 coup. The civil war that broke out in April 2023 put a halt to legislative processes, and it appeared unlikely that an electoral commission would be created while hostilities continued.

The 2019 interim constitution guaranteed the right to form political parties, subject to legal regulation. Security forces arrested leaders and members of political parties, civilian resistance committees, and the FFC following the October 2021 coup, including the heads of the Sudanese Congress Party and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, as well as a leader in the Umma Party. The detained politicians were held incommunicado and allegedly tortured before being gradually released, with the last leaving prison in 2022.

Since the April 2023 breakdown in transition negotiations and the subsequent onset of civil war, civilian political parties have effectively been unable to operate in Sudan. Although some have called for the formation of broad antiwar coalitions, the formation of such coalitions was stymied by military interference, as well as significant fragmentation among the parties and an overall lack of coordination that has undermined their influence.

Sudan has not held elections since the end of al-Bashir’s 30-year rule in 2019; changes in leadership have been the result of political negotiations or military intervention. General al-Burhan dissolved the TSC and transitional government as part of the October 2021 coup, and security forces detained more than 100 government ministers and advisers along with the leaders of political parties, civilian resistance committees, and the FFC. He later reconstituted the Sovereign Council with himself as chairman and extended its oversight authority. In April and May 2022, the military government released civilian leaders and ended the state of emergency.

Plans to hold elections have stalled repeatedly in recent years, most recently with the failure of transition negotiations and the outbreak of civil conflict in 2023. It is unlikely that any elections will be held in the context of the ongoing war.

The country has a long history of military interventions in political affairs. The October 2021 coup was led by the SAF and supported by the RSF and leaders of armed rebel movements that had signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). It followed a coup attempt that September, when soldiers loyal to the former regime tried to seize control of the state media building.

Tensions between the SAF and RSF emerged in 2022 and gradually intensified in early 2023 as both sides took part in negotiations over a transition to civilian leadership. Armed clashes broke out in April, and fighting escalated and continued throughout the year as the rival groups fought to assert political and military control across the country. In 2024, the RSF used the growing risk of famine and depleted resources in Sudan to coerce recruitment into their ranks. The SAF and RSF have each received support from external actors, including Egypt and the UAE, respectively.

Sudan’s political system has traditionally favored the predominantly Arab and Muslim ethnic groups concentrated around Khartoum, and marginalized other groups, particularly those in Darfur and the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The 2019 interim constitution committed Sudan to a decentralized system in which citizens would be free to exercise their rights without discrimination based on race, religion, gender, regional affiliation, or other such grounds. A new constitution proposed by the Sudan Bar Association in 2022 kept the same provisions.

Women played an influential role in the 2019 protest movement and have since demanded greater representation at all levels of government and in peace negotiations. Although two women were named to the TSC in 2019, one resigned in 2021 to protest the military’s dominance of the council.

LGBT+ people are politically marginalized and face serious deterrents to open participation, including a criminal ban on same-sex sexual relations.

After the fighting between the SAF and RSF began in April 2023, civilians’ ability to participate in Sudanese politics was severely curtailed, and the little political power held by women and members of other marginalized groups was effectively eliminated.

The country lacks any elected executive or legislative body. In October 2021, General al-Burhan staged a coup, dissolved the TSC and transitional government, and detained Prime Minister Hamdok and several government ministers and advisers. Following the coup, local and regional government officials were removed and replaced, and al-Burhan reconstituted the Sovereign Council with himself as chair. Although Prime Minister Hamdok was later reinstated and attempted to replace officials appointed by the coup leaders, he ultimately resigned in January 2022 following widespread protests against his acceptance of the military’s de facto dominance. In May of that year, al-Burhan lifted the state of emergency that had been in place since the coup. That December, the military signed a framework agreement to enable cooperation with civilian groups on forming a new transitional government.

The conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the RSF and the SAF effectively terminated the government-formation process, and administrative functions across the country became fractured as the two sides sought to assert control over the territories they occupied.

There are no effective anticorruption laws or institutions in Sudan, which is a signatory to but has not ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention against Corruption and the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.

Following the October 2021 coup, General al-Burhan suspended the ERC, which was created by transitional authorities to investigate financial crimes by former regime officials in 2019. A new anticorruption commission called for under a law approved by the TSC in April 2021 has yet to be established.

The interim constitution required members of the TSC and TLC, the cabinet, and state governors to file disclosures about their personal assets, but there are no clear mechanisms for enforcement, and compliance is reportedly poor in practice.

Important military and government figures, including RSF leader Hemedti, are often accused of amassing wealth through the illicit exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources, but state institutions lack the capacity and power to document or punish malfeasance.

After the civil war broke out in April 2023, both the RSF and the SAF were accused of attempting to curtail journalists’ work, prompting condemnation from the Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN). Media workers have faced harassment, arrest, and in some cases death. The Sudanese army is alleged to be behind the murder of Khalid Balal in El Fasher in March 2024. In June, RSF soldiers reportedly killed journalist Abdel Razek and three of his family members in his home in Khartoum. The next day, journalist Makawi Mohamed Ahmed was assassinated in El Gezira. Almost two years into the war, media outlets and journalists in Sudan are unable to carry out their work independently and safely, and media outlets have been shuttered or destroyed.

The 2018 Law on Combating Cybercrimes, which increased prison sentences for crimes such as disseminating false information, remains in effect.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because belligerents have continued to kill and harass journalists, prompting some media workers to flee their homes, and because domestic media outlets have closed in the course of the country’s civil war.

Sudan’s population is mostly Muslim, with a small Christian minority. The 2019 interim constitution guarantees freedom of worship and does not give Islam an official status. The TSC that year pledged to issue clear guidelines for those seeking permission to build new churches, and Christians welcomed the appointment of a Coptic Christian judge to one of the TSC’s civilian seats.

In 2020, the transitional government adopted the Miscellaneous Amendments Act, which repealed the criminalization of apostasy, abolished corporal punishment for blasphemy, and permitted non-Muslims to trade and consume alcohol, among other provisions.

Prior to 2019, the university system was dominated by NCP-affiliated officials, and these were replaced with more independent figures after al-Bashir’s ouster. Following the 2021 coup, authorities arrested deans and professors at Al-Gezira University who had criticized the military takeover. In addition, security forces attacked student protesters on university campuses. In November of that year, several universities closed their campuses and suspended classes, citing political instability.

Many more of the country’s schools and universities closed in April 2023 due to the military conflict. The war has disrupted learning across different levels of education, and according to the United Nations approximately 90 percent of school-age children do not have access to formal education. The displacement crisis in Sudan means that millions of people have either left their homes or are using schools as shelters, disrupting access to schooling.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the country’s ongoing civil war has led to widespread physical destruction of educational facilities and the disruption of access to schooling for most students.

The 2019 interim constitution affirmed the right to freedom of expression and privacy, including citizens’ right to engage in private correspondence without interference. Restrictive laws remained in place, however, and by 2020 transitional authorities were arresting and harassing individuals for critical speech. After the October 2021 coup, General al-Burhan issued a decree expanding security forces’ and intelligence agencies’ powers to conduct home raids, surveil citizens, and detain suspects. Neighborhood resistance committees and human rights groups argued that the decree violated citizens’ rights to privacy and due process. Widespread violence associated with the civil conflict that erupted in April 2023 further deterred unfettered discussion and criticism of the RSF and SAF among ordinary citizens.

The TSC reaffirmed the right to assemble in the 2019 interim constitution, and citizens regularly participated in demonstrations in the subsequent years, calling for more rapid democratic reforms and the advancement of women’s rights, among other demands. However, security personnel routinely responded to acts of protest with violence and excessive force.

In 2022, for example, security forces repeatedly used tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to break up demonstrations calling for civilian rule. Over 120 protesters died between the 2021 coup and the end of 2022. Women protesters reported being raped by security officers, who also blocked demonstrators’ access to medical care, including by arresting doctors and patients, shooting tear gas into hospitals, and blocking access to ambulances and hospitals. To prevent demonstrations in the wake of the coup, the military shut down the internet, blocked bridges and roads in Khartoum, arrested organizers, and banned trade unions.

Large protests held in early 2023 included prodemocracy demonstrations in February and April, during which participants blocked roads and marched through cities across the country to voice opposition to military rule. However, most demonstrations ceased after the civil conflict began in April 2023, as activists and organizers fled the fighting.

After the 2019 ouster of al-Bashir, the transitional government loosened the restrictions and impediments that had been placed on civil society organizations. Conditions, however, deteriorated after the outbreak of the civil war in April 2023. That September, the Humanitarian Aid Commission acknowledged that the country’s security crisis had created obstacles for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to renew their registrations, and issued a decree that extended the validity of expired registrations of national and international NGOs until March 2024. With many organizations struggling to work in Sudan, millions of displaced people have had to rely on local community groups for health, food and safety services.

Meanwhile, aid workers and NGO employees continue to be subjected to violent attacks, including sexual assault; at least three World Food Program employees were killed in Darfur soon after the fighting began. Sudan is one of the areas where the greatest number of humanitarian workers lost their lives in 2024, alongside Gaza. Many other workers were forced to flee, and numerous organizations were compelled to relocate or suspend operations in the country due to the ongoing violence. Although mediation and pressure from international actors has helped humanitarians gain access to some areas of Sudan, increasing needs and the protracted conflict continue to make NGOs’ work difficult.

Independent trade unions were largely absent under al-Bashir; his government banned them after taking power in 1989, and instead co-opted the Sudan Workers’ Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF). The independent Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), founded in late 2016, was instrumental in the protest movement that led to al-Bashir’s ouster, and it later played a role in the transitional government.

The 2019 interim constitution affirmed workers’ right to form and join trade unions. As part of the transitional government’s efforts to dismantle the former ruling party and affiliated institutions, it controversially dissolved the SWTUF and the Sudan Journalists Union in late 2019. The Trade Unions Law of 2021 laid the groundwork for union organizing. However, in February 2021, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) condemned the government’s arrest and detention of union leaders and the creation of government-appointed steering committees to oversee union affairs.

Following the October 2021 coup, General al-Burhan dissolved all trade unions and professional associations to limit their organizing capabilities. Multiple union and association leaders were detained and assaulted during the anticoup protests that continued into 2023.

The interim constitution envisaged the establishment of an independent judiciary to replace the politically influenced judiciary of the al-Bashir era. In 2021, the TSC removed Chief Justice Nemat Abdullah Khair and accepted the resignation of Attorney General Taj al-Ser Ali al-Hebr, who expressed concern about a lack of independence. That month, the Empowerment Removal Committee (ERC) removed more than 20 public prosecutors from office.

Following the 2021 coup, General al-Burhan replaced the acting public prosecutor and chief justice with former NCP officials. Al-Burhan’s replacement head judge, Chief Justice Abdulaziz Fath al-Rahman Abdeen, issued a directive that December ordering the reinstatement of all judges dismissed by the ERC.

In October 2024, Chief Justice Abdelaziz Abdeen formed a three-judge committee to reconsider appeals of ERC decisions against Bashir-era officials.

Although the interim constitution enshrined the right to due process, it also contained a provision allowing the government to invoke emergency powers and suspend some due process rights. In practice, security forces have continued to engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions since the October 2021 coup and related protests. Political detainees, activists, and journalists have been held incommunicado without access to legal representation and have likely been subject to torture and inhumane treatment.

In 2020, the transitional government formally banned forced confessions and the “infliction of torture” on suspects, and abolished the penalty of public flogging for some criminal offenses. However, demonstrators protesting the 2021 coup faced lethal violence and mistreatment by security forces. Political detainees who were subsequently released reported experiencing torture or inhumane treatment while in custody.

In 2023, rising tensions between al-Burhan and Hemedti over security reforms—namely, plans to integrate Hemedti’s RSF into al-Burhan’s SAF—triggered military clashes between the two groups. Fighting quickly escalated and spread across the country as al-Burhan and Hemedti battled for control over Sudanese territory and resources. Attempts by international and regional partners to secure a ceasefire have repeatedly failed. In January 2024, RSF and SAF leaders held talks in Manama in the presence of representatives from the UAE, Egypt, and the United States, but the talks did not lead to a breakthrough. Talks held in Switzerland in August failed because the SAF refused to participate.

Tens of thousands of people have died since war broke out in April 2023. Over 11 million people have fled the war and are currently displaced within the country, while another 3 million have sought refuge outside of the country. Reports of rights violations have consistently increased.

Fighting resurged at the end of the seasonal rains in October 2024, and hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed by RSF and SAF bombings. By mid-October, SAF regained some of the territory it had lost to the RSF in Khartoum and El Gezira. The RSF killed many in El Gezira in retaliation, targeting specific communities and increasing fears that the war will spark further ethnic mass violence.

In Darfur, civilians have experienced extreme violence at the hands of the RSF as the group has sought to push non-Arab ethnic populations out of certain areas, reminiscent of the mass violence perpetrated on civilians in the region by the Janjaweed militia and the Sudanese army in the early 2000s. NGOs have also reported high incidences of sexual assaults against women and girls across the country, and especially in Darfur. In 2024 the situation in Darfur remained extremely dire, with the Famine Review Committee confirming the outbreak of famine in the Zamzam camp.

The 2019 interim constitution commits the transitional government to upholding the human rights of all citizens without discrimination and ensuring their equal treatment under the law. The charter also calls for accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of human rights. However, extreme violence based on racial or ethnic identity remains common, particularly in Darfur after the outbreak of the new civil conflict.

Despite the guarantees of equal treatment in the interim constitution and some legal improvements adopted in 2020, women continue to face disadvantages in many areas of the law, and perpetrators of widespread crimes against women—including during armed conflicts—have generally enjoyed impunity.

Same-sex relations are illegal in Sudan, though 2020 reforms eliminated flogging and execution as potential punishments under an antisodomy law that is used to target LGBT+ people. Discrimination and violence against LGBT+ people remain common.

The 2019 interim constitution affirms freedom of movement and the right to travel—including overseas—for all citizens. These rights are still impeded in practice by state security forces and other armed groups across the country. In 2022, the government began to limit the movement of people in some of the states affected by intercommunal conflicts. Several reports indicated that the decision mostly affected already vulnerable and marginalized communities.

The outbreak of the war in 2023 has severely limited individuals’ movement. Although many have been able to flee combat zones, their movement, and the areas to which they have fled, are mostly driven by insecurity and involuntary. Over 11 million people have fled the war and are currently displaced within the country. Another 3 million have sought refuge outside of the country.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the ongoing civil war has caused mass displacement and made internal travel increasingly dangerous.

Weak land rights have been a chronic driver of conflict in Sudan. In a succession of opaque deals, al-Bashir’s regime leased large parcels of arable land to foreign countries for export crop production. In some cases, local populations were forced from their land or had their water supplies depleted.

The 2019 interim constitution guarantees the right to own property and protects citizens from expropriation by the state without compensation Many civilians who fled Khartoum after fighting broke out there in 2023 said that the RSF and SAF had occupied or taken over their properties. Soldiers from both sides have been accused of looting civilian properties, sometimes doing so as a form of retaliation after taking control of areas previously controlled by their opponents. Although property destruction and theft are not uniform across the country, reports indicate large-scale destruction in Khartoum and other major civilian centers. Public properties, including museums and libraries, have also been looted or destroyed.

Women are denied equal rights to property and inheritance under laws based on Sharia (Islamic law) and through discriminatory customary practices.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because property rights have been extensively violated as a consequence of the civil war, with belligerents and other actors seizing, destroying, and looting property on a large scale.

Although the transitional government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in April 2021, it failed to endorse provisions recognizing equality in marriage, divorce, and parenting, which would conflict with the country’s Sharia-based laws. Among other restrictions, a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man. In 2022, a court sentenced a woman to death by stoning for committing adultery, though the sentence was overturned on procedural grounds, and she was then retried and sentenced to prison.

Sexual violence against women remains a major problem. Although female genital mutilation (FGM) was criminalized in 2020, the practice is still widespread. A UN report released in August 2021 claimed that there were high numbers of incidents of domestic and sexual violence in households, as well as sexual violence against women in informal jobs, displaced and refugee women outside of camps, children in Quranic schools, and people with disabilities. The report also noted high rates of forced, arranged, and child marriages.

Economic mismanagement and corruption under al-Bashir’s regime led to mass unemployment and high prices for basic goods, which left residents more vulnerable to exploitation. Such bleak economic conditions were among the root causes of the 2019 revolution. Prime Minister Hamdok’s government voiced a commitment to reversing these trends. Though the country officially met the requirements to receive debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) in June 2021, international financial institutions paused assistance to the Sudanese government after the October 2021 coup, including $500 million from the World Bank and $150 million from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain especially vulnerable to sexual and labor exploitation, including by criminal networks engaged in human trafficking. Some armed groups in the country have allegedly recruited children as fighters.