Justice in Shackles: The Global Persecution of Judges and Lawyers

In January 2025, a Russian court sentenced Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, and Aleksey Lipster to prison terms ranging from three and a half to five years.1 Officially accused of extremism, their real transgression was serving as legal counsel to the late political opposition leader and anticorruption activist Aleksey Navalny. The three lawyers, by attempting to provide a check on executive power and ensure due process rights for victims of repression, became targets for repression themselves.

There are countless people around the world for whom a lawyer or independent judge may be the last line of defense against political imprisonment. But according to Freedom House research,2 these crucial pillars of the rule of law are under attack in dozens of countries, threatening the basic legal order required for peace, security, and economic growth.

Navalny’s lawyers are representative of the many legal and judicial professionals around the globe who have faced retaliation from authoritarian governments for attempting to uphold due process and judicial independence. Such retribution may take the form of arbitrary dismissals, transfers to far-flung jurisdictions, reassignments to less prestigious prosecutorial departments, disbarment, or even political imprisonment. All of these tactics and individual cases feed into broader campaigns designed to weaken the rule of law and compel the justice system to serve the interests of autocratic rulers.3 The judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers who remain have a strong incentive to align themselves with the leadership, making conditions ripe for increased political imprisonment across the wider population.

Freedom House data show that judges, prosecutors, or lawyers in at least 78 countries—ranging from dictatorships to democracies—faced politicized detention, prosecution, or imprisonment between 2014 and 2024. Lawyers are most often affected, experiencing this type of persecution in at least 75 countries during the same period.

In countries where these groups are targeted on a large scale, the repression tends to coincide with two key political contexts: periods when the government’s grip on power is threatened by significant resistance, or when a new regime or leader has recently emerged.

Persecution to defend the status quo

Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers often encounter large-scale persecution during episodes of major resistance against the government, such as mass antigovernment demonstrations, attempts by autonomous state institutions to hold political leaders accountable, or armed insurgencies.

In Iran, at least 44 defense lawyers were arrested amid the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom movement, a series of protests sparked by the death of Jina Mahsa Amini while she was held in custody by the morality police for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly. Many of the lawyers who were arrested had represented detained protesters or expressed support for them.4 Following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar and the massive prodemocracy movement that erupted in response, dozens of lawyers were rounded up for representing anticoup protesters or for perceived opposition to the military junta. As of March 5, 2025, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners had documented the arrests of 68 legal representatives since the coup.5 The conversion of defense attorneys into political prisoners, combined with broader intimidation tactics against the legal profession, has caused the number of working lawyers in Myanmar to sharply decrease.6

Institutional efforts to hold high-level officials to account for corruption or human rights violations can coincide with criminal retribution against judges and lawyers, which further weakens accountability mechanisms. In 2019, the Guatemalan government under President Jimmy Morales, who was himself under investigation at the time, shuttered the United Nations–backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Independent Guatemalan prosecutors and judges had already been facing significant pressure from the attorney general—including dismissals, transfers, and arbitrary prosecutions—but the retaliation intensified after CICIG’s closure.7 A 2023 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that over 90 “justice operators” had been subjected to “criminalization, imprisonment, or forced exile” since 2018.8 For example, anticorruption prosecutor Rudy Herrera fled the country with his family after being warned that his arrest was imminent.9

Internal armed conflict can bring additional risks for legal professionals. In Sudan, lawyers played a key role in reconciliation and reform efforts following the military’s 2019 ouster of longtime President Omar al-Bashir, and they were working to strengthen accountability measures as part of a transition to civilian rule in the country. Partly for this reason, they have been targeted in the context of a brutal civil war between the regular Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces that began in 2023. Against a backdrop of ethnic violence and other massacres, both sides in the conflict have killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured, detained, and imprisoned numerous lawyers.10

Persecution to consolidate a new regime

There is a common correlation between the emergence of a new regime or leader and widespread persecution of legal and judicial professionals. After Xi Jinping came to power as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2012 and state president the following year, arrests of human rights lawyers spiked. In 2015, in what became known as the “709 crackdown,” hundreds of rights lawyers, legal assistants, and activists across the country were arrested, detained, or summoned for interrogation. Many were accused of subversion of state power; their clients included dissidents, journalists, and other defendants involved in human rights–related or politically motivated cases.11

The crackdown kickstarted a new era of sustained criminal repression against lawyers.12 In 2023, for example, three human rights lawyers were sentenced to prison after participating in a private meeting about Chinese civil society, while another was detained en route to a meeting with European Union diplomats in China.13 The repression has extended to Hong Kong, where in recent years human rights lawyers have been prosecuted under a draconian national security law imposed by Beijing.14 This comes amid a general deterioration in Hong Kong’s rule of law, which has hamstrung judges’ ability to act independently.15

In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s efforts to purge the state of perceived rivals resulted in a years-long persecution of lawyers. Although the repression began in 2014, it greatly intensified after a failed coup attempt two years later, which effectively transformed the nature of governance in the country; over 1,600 lawyers—many of them perceived as sharing their clients’ political views—were arrested and prosecuted for alleged terrorism-related offenses in the five years following the unsuccessful putsch of 2016. Nearly 500 were sentenced to prison during the same period.16

Even the justice officials responsible for persecuting regime critics can run afoul of the leadership. After Mohammed bin Salman became crown prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia in 2017, he embarked on massive purges of perceived rivals within the state apparatus. In 2023, for example, 10 judges were detained and charged with “high treason.” While their prosecution was allegedly linked to their “leniency,” they had handed down long prison sentences to human rights defenders and in one case sentenced a minor to death.17

Recommendations

The repression of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers through the legal system has significant consequences for broader freedoms. It leaves civil society actors, journalists, and prodemocracy politicians more vulnerable to both legal and extralegal repression, and impunity for official corruption and rights violations becomes the norm. Such weaknesses in the rule of law undercut business activity and cause enduring economic harms, while peace and stability grow more precarious. Protecting the freedom and independence of legal and judicial professionals is therefore vital, not just for upholding the rights and liberties of other citizens, but also for ensuring a country’s security and prosperity.

Supporters of democracy should guard against and condemn the early signs of erosion at institutions that provide checks on executive overreach, including the judiciary, independent media, and anticorruption authorities, as these are the precursors to harsher acts of repression like political imprisonment. Democracy’s supporters should also prioritize the following actions, recognizing that foreign assistance on these issues will ultimately serve donor countries’ shared interests in promoting the rule of law:

• Strengthen judicial independence in countries receiving foreign assistance by encouraging judicial review and oversight, increased transparency of judicial decisions, and adherence to judicial codes of ethics. Any reform of the judiciary should be carried out in line with international obligations and best practices, and in a manner that ensures the judiciary’s future strength and autonomy. In addition, the appointment of judges should be based on merit and qualifications, not political affiliation. Judicial salaries should be adequate and should not be reduced as a means of political pressure or augmented with excessive gifts and other forms of bribery. Clear and enforceable codes of ethical conduct should be established to guide judicial behavior and mitigate conflicts of interest. To supplement these measures, civil society and independent media, with support from donors when feasible, should work to educate the public on the importance of judicial independence for preserving the rule of law.
• Support the improvement of prosecutorial independence by ensuring that prosecutors are provided with sufficient funding and rigorous ethical training. Independent bodies that can investigate potential prosecutorial misconduct should be established or reinforced, as should legal protections from political retaliation against or harassment of prosecutors.
• Publicly and privately denounce retaliation against judges who make independent decisions and refuse to sustain politically motivated charges. The international community should also condemn governments that punish prosecutors for their independence and defense lawyers for representing clients who face political persecution.
• Support independent judges’ associations in which members are encouraged to take an active role in discussing and advocating for judicial and legal reform, in consultation with civil society. Independent bar associations advocating for lawyers’ rights should also be supported.
• Increase assistance for human rights lawyers working in restrictive environments or representing clients who face political persecution. Such lawyers are a critical lifeline for political prisoners and other independent voices subjected to legal harassment by the state. Donors should continue to support these brave individuals with networking opportunities, opportunities for respite when needed, funds for legal assistance of their own, security training, and resources that will enable them to continue to take on politically sensitive cases.
• Ensure that regional and international justice mechanisms have adequate resources and can serve as a backstop to national courts. In countries where due process and fair-trial rights are limited, defendants in politically motivated cases should be able to seek remedies outside the domestic legal system. However, many of these regional and international venues, such as the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, face significant backlogs. Donors should increase their support to these bodies to help mitigate bottlenecks.

Methodology

For this policy brief, Freedom House examined all countries rated Not Free and Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2024 to identify those where authorities had detained, prosecuted, or imprisoned at least one judge, prosecutor, or lawyer in a politicized manner between 2014 and October 2024.

• 1Memorial, “Aleksey Navalny’s Lawyers Are Political Prisoners,” November 1, 2023, https://memopzk.org/en/news/aleksey-navalnys-lawyers-are-politicalpriso…; “3 Lawyers for the Late Kremlin Foe Alexei Navalny Are Convicted and Sentenced to Prison,” Associated Press, January 17, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/russia-opposition-leader-navalny-lawyers-jai….
• 2Yana Gorokhovskaia and Cathryn Grothe, Freedom in the World 2025: The Uphill Battle to Safeguard Rights (Washington, DC: Freedom House, February 2025), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2025/uphill-battle-to-saf….
• 3Amy Slipowitz and Mina Loldj, Visible and Invisible Bars: Political Imprisonment, Civil Death, and the Consequences of Democratic Erosion (Washington, DC: Freedom House, January 2024), https://freedomhouse.org/report/free-them-all/2024/visible-and-invisibl….
• 4Center for Human Rights in Iran, “Iran Protests: At Least 44 Defense Attorneys Arrested Since September,” January 10, 2023, https://iranhumanrights.org/2023/01/iran-protests-at-least-44-defense-a…; United Nations Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/WG.6/48/IRN/2 (November 11, 2024).
• 5Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), “Data Explorer,” accessed March 5, 2025, https://coup.aappb.org/data-explorer.
• 6Human Rights Watch, “Our Numbers Are Dwindling”: Myanmar’s Post-Coup Crackdown on Lawyers (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2023), https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/06/08/our-numbers-are-dwindling/myanmar….
• 7Above the Law: The Public Prosecutor’s Office in Guatemala (New York and Stanford, CA: Rule of Law Impact Lab at Stanford Law School and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice, October 2024), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Report_English.pdf; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “Guatemala,” in IACHR Annual Report 2023 (Washington, DC: IACHR, 2024), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2023/chapters/IA2023_Cap_4B_Gu…; Human Rights Watch, “Guatemala,” in World Report 2024 (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2024), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/guatemala; Human Rights Watch, “Guatemala: Attorney General Arbitrarily Fires Prosecutors,” July 14, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/14/guatemala-attorney-general-arbitrar…; Human Rights Watch, “Guatemala: Attorney General’s Reappointment Threatens Rights,” May 19, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/19/guatemala-attorney-generals-reappoi…; Human Rights Watch, “Guatemala: Attorney General Pursues Political Prosecutions,” December 18, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/18/guatemala-attorney-general-pursues-….
• 8Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “Guatemala,” in IACHR Annual Report 2023 (Washington, DC: IACHR, 2024), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2023/chapters/IA2023_Cap_4B_Gu….
• 9Jonathan Blitzer, “The Exile of Guatemala’s Anti-Corruption Efforts,” The New Yorker, April 29, 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-exile-of-guatemalas-anti-co….
• 10International Service for Human Rights, “Sudan: Protect Civilians’ Lives, End Mass Arrests, Targeting of Lawyers, Doctors, Activists,” July 26, 2024, https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/sudan-end-killing-mass-arrests-and-targe…; International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute, “Joint Statement for Arrested and Detained Sudanese Lawyer Montaser Abdullah,” October 29, 2024, https://www.ibanet.org/document?id=IBAHRI-joint-statement-Sudan-lawyer-….
• 11Lawyers for Lawyers, “Statement on the 9th Anniversary of the 709 Crackdown,” July 9, 2024, https://www.lawyersforlawyers.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Statement-…; Amnesty International, “China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers,” July 7, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/07/one-year-since-chin…; United Nations Human Rights Council, Special Procedures Communication, CHN 6/2015 (July 15, 2015).
• 12Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Shock at Continued Crackdown on Human Rights Defenders and Lawyers—UN Expert,” December 16, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/12/china-shock-continued-c….
• 13International Federation for Human Rights, “China: ‘709 Crackdown 2.0’ Global Call Against China’s Renewed Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers,” July 10, 2023, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/china/china-709-crackdown-2-0-globa….
• 14Lawyers for Lawyers, “The 709-Crackdown, the Alarming State of Lawyers’ Rights in China and Hong Kong, and a New Wave of Repression,” July 9, 2023, https://www.lawyersforlawyers.org/the-709-crackdown-the-alarming-state-….
• 15Jonathan Sumption, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong Is in Grave Danger,” Financial Times, June 10, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/60c825be-b70a-4152-895f-f6127974570a.
• 16Arrested Lawyers Initiative, The Crackdown: Systematic Arbitrary Imprisonment of Lawyers in Turkey (2016-2022) (Brussels: Arrested Lawyers Initiative, December 2021), https://arrestedlawyers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/the-crackdown.pdf.
• 17DAWN, “Saudi Arabia: Saudi Prosecutor Seeks Death Penalty Against 10 Former Judges For ‘High Treason,’” February 27, 2023, https://dawnmena.org/saudi-arabia-saudi-prosecutor-seeks-death-penalty-….