#FreeThemAll: Standing with Political Prisoners in the OSCE Region

Written Testimony by Annie Boyajian

Vice President for Policy and Advocacy

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Hearing: “Silenced Dissent: The Plight of Political Prisoners and Search for Accountability”

June 13, 2024

Introduction

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Cohen, and members of the Commission, it is an honor to testify before you today on a topic that warrants far more attention and, as we’ll discuss, action.

An Assault on Freedom and Democracy in the OSCE Region

I’d like to begin by underscoring the sobering fact that, according to Freedom House data, political rights and civil liberties have declined worldwide for the last 18 consecutive years. In the Eurasia region, we have documented 20 consecutive years of overall declines in democratic governance, driven by an ongoing assault on basic freedoms by autocracies and the deterioration of democratic institutions in non-autocracies.

In the OSCE region, we see a stark geopolitical reordering, with governments sorting themselves into two opposing blocs: those committed to a liberal, democratic order and those that violently reject it. The countries caught between the two orders are coming to terms with the fact that there is no third option. How these “hybrid regimes” cope with the inevitable choice—between the transatlantic community of democracies and the camp of entrenched autocrats—will help determine both their geopolitical and democratic trajectories.

In recent years, autocracies in the OSCE region have become more repressive – indeed, several have nearly “bottomed out” and cannot score any lower in our methodology (i.e., Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Belarus) – and we see them routinely cooperating to maintain their grip on power, even seeking to upend international norms in order to do so. These regimes have actively supported one another in evading sanctions, crushing domestic opposition, and blunting any accountability for military aggression and other violations of international law. In effect they are creating a new regional order that better suits their interests – and democracies have yet to muster an adequate response.Those who stand for the protection of human rights and dignity, freedom, and democracy in this region face acute risks. Just in the last few weeks, despite widespread domestic and international outcry, the government of Georgia pushed through its own version of a law that labels independent media outlets and civil society organizations as “foreign agents” – a move that will significantly undermine freedoms of association and expression and place many human rights defenders in danger ahead of the country’s pivotal October parliamentary elections.

Political Prisoners in the OSCE Region

The U.S. Department of State estimates that there are more than one million political prisoners worldwide. Those targeted may be held behind bars for prolonged periods of time without formal sentencing, preventing them from engaging in politics, journalism, and human rights work. Political prisoners worldwide are typically subjected to worse treatment than other prisoners and are routinely subjected to deplorable conditions and torture, such as physical abuse, insufficient food, psychological pressure, and extended periods of isolation. They are also frequently denied lawyer visits, contact with family, and access to adequate medical care. In addition to a physical toll, imprisonment also carries heavy psychological and financial costs that extend to prisoners’ families.

Azerbaijani human rights defender and anti-corruption activist Gubad Ibadoghlu’s routine denial of medical care in prison is one of many examples of gross mistreatment of political prisoners. Despite being released from pre-trial detention to his home, Mr. Ibadoghlu’s national ID card was confiscated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which prevents him from being transferred to a hospital as a patient. We reiterate our calls to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him. The Government of Turkey employs widespread use of political imprisonment against opponents and critics. Selahattin Demirtaş, the former cofounder of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), and Osman Kavala, a philanthropist and civic leader, have been jailed since 2016 and 2017 respectively. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that their detentions were politically motivated and that both should be immediately released. They remain in prison, with Kavala serving a life sentence and Demirtaş receiving a 42 year sentence in May of this year.

For many, the plight of political imprisonment does not end when an individual is released. As Freedom House noted in our recent report on political prisoners titled Visible and Invisible Bars, former prisoners are sometimes prohibited from traveling and often face difficulty securing work, housing, and education due to both legal barriers and social stigmatization. They may also experience difficulty accessing services—including medical care and psychosocial support, which may be necessary as a result of extended time in harsh and overcrowded prison conditions—because of stigma and discrimination associated with imprisonment. Furthermore, they can face smear campaigns by state and nonstate actors, intimidation from landlords and potential employers, surveillance, and the threat of rearrest, as well as imprisonment of their family members in an effort to silence them post-release.

It is difficult to know precisely how many political prisoners are in the OSCE region, in part because of gaps in reporting and because some do not want their loved ones or clients associated with international causes that may complicate their cases. Freedom House relies on independent media, in-country partners, and reputable regional human rights organizations, such as the Nobel Prize-winning Viasna in Belarus and Memorial in Russia, which maintain detailed databases of those unjustly detained. According to these organizations, there are currently 1,396 prisoners in Belarus and more than 720 political prisoners in Russia.

Sadly, too many of our friends and partners have been imprisoned unjustly for me to name them all in the time we have today, nor do I have time to speak to each country’s unique challenges. Instead, I will highlight four areas of concern we are monitoring then move on to specific actions the democratic community can take.

First, incommunicado detention, when prisoners are held for indefinite periods of time with no communication of information on their whereabouts or well-being, remains a widespread tactic throughout Eurasia but receives too little public attention. Incommunicado detention denies prisoners due access to legal representation and contact or correspondence with families. It is a punitive tactic designed to break prisoners by cutting off contact and thus suggesting the outside world has forgotten them. This deliberate isolation is intended to increase physical and emotional stress for the prisoners as well as their loved ones. It allows prison authorities to hide evidence of their mistreatment of political prisoners more readily – a grim reality that leaves many on the outside wondering if their loved ones are still alive.

Incommunicado detention violates U.S. and international law and a number of international treaties and can constitute a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

From Eritrea to Egypt, Russia to Saudi Arabia, there are many cases of political prisoners being held incommunicado or forcibly disappeared around the world. In the OSCE region, the phenomenon is particularly acute in Belarus, where according to United Nations experts, the Lukashenka regime increased its practice of holding Belarusian political prisoners incommunicado in 2023. At least eight individuals have been held without correspondence, access to lawyers and family, for an extended period of time—some for more than one year: Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Uladzimir Hundar, Mikalai Statkevich, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Maksim Znak, and Ihar Losik.

The second area of concern I wish to highlight is the targeting of lawyers who represent political prisoners, which is widespread in the region and globally. In Russia, for example, the Kremlin was not content to only arrest – and ultimately kill – opposition leader Alexey Navalny in prison; the Kremlin also targeted his lawyers. They detained three (Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, and Alexei Liptser) on charges of participating in an extremist group, and another (Olga Mikhailova) was charged in absentia with the same bogus charges.

Vadim Prokhorov, another Russian human rights lawyer, who represents Vladimir Kara-Murza, was forced into exile in 2023 with the understanding that he too faced criminal proceedings. Prokhorov is a powerful advocate not only for political prisoners, but for those who defend them; as he wrote recently, and I quote, “Lawyers of political prisoners help them maintain connections with the outside world, even from the middle of Siberia or above the Arctic Circle. It gives those defendants a chance to have their cases heard in court and brought to public attention… Without lawyers, political prisoners would suffer even more, and they would do so in obscurity.”

Thirdly, political imprisonment is not the only physical restriction deployed by regimes against their opponents. For every political prisoner behind bars, many more government opponents face subtler constraints. Our research has documented the targeting of dissidents and government critics with other forms of repression that prevent them from doing their work and participating normally in society—a condition some experts call “civil death.” Tactics include denying someone the ability to travel, physical monitoring, blacklisting from employment or government services, and seizure of assets. These measures can be attached to arrests, investigations, and conditions for release, or wielded on their own. They can be formally applied, with or without notice, or derive from social pressure. Closely connected to civil death is the constant reminder that prison is just one wrong move away. In Turkey, for example, those facing open investigations have been deemed “unfit” to have a passport, even before any verdict was handed down in their cases. Others, such as journalists, have been released under restrictive measures that include international travel bans. Controls on movement can have a deleterious effect not just on advocacy and other work, but also on employment and educational opportunities.

Fourth and finally, arresting those who advocate for human rights and democracy or express dissent is not just about instilling fear; it is about creating perverse incentives to seek concessions from the democratic community. We see this clearly in Russia, where the Kremlin has arrested several American nationals: Alsu Kurmasheva, Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Ksenia Karelina. Autocracies also routinely resort to what we call a “revolving door” of political imprisonment – releasing some but simultaneously arresting others through their ongoing, unchecked repression. This tactic complicates engagement with perpetrator governments and efforts to release those behind bars.

Recommendations

As is commonly said, a political prisoner’s worst fear is to be forgotten. For those detained on politically motivated grounds, international attention can mean the difference between life and death, as keeping a spotlight on those behind bars often makes it more difficult for regimes to hide their abuses. That said, consistent with do-no-harm principles, advocacy strategies for individual political prisoners should be tailored to the circumstances of each case and the wishes of family members and legal representatives.

Many detailed recommendations are available on Freedom House’s website, but I wish to highlight a few for consideration today:

• First, given the pervasive nature of political imprisonment, governments should consider establishing a dedicated office or team within the foreign affairs ministry specifically dedicated to political prisoner and hostage affairs. Appointing dedicated staff to work on the issue, both publicly and behind the scenes, will streamline existing efforts to free political prisoners and facilitate knowledge sharing and coordination with likeminded governments.
• Second, we urge government and non-government partners alike to keep political prisoners on the agenda at international forums and to routinely highlight individual cases by publicizing their stories, the circumstances of their detention, and their treatment in prison. As the Helsinki Commission does very well, press releases, statements, and social media posts can all have an impact. We also encourage partners to be creative: murals, letter-writing campaigns, and music are also effective ways to generate public awareness.
• Third, political prisoner advocacy should be included among the key duties of embassy personnel. Embassy personnel working in countries with political prisoners should attend and monitor trials and hearings of individuals facing politically motivated charges and of those already in detention or prison. They should also conduct visits to detention facilities to assess political prisoners’ health, inspect conditions, and determine needs. For those held incommunicado, embassy staff are a critical voice in demanding to know the whereabouts and condition of prisoners.
• Fourth, as a preventive measure, we encourage governments to support the relocation of human rights defenders, activists, and journalists at serious risk of political imprisonment or civil death. Relocation support may be needed for the short, medium, or long term, and includes individuals who may be subject to travel bans or have had their passports confiscated. Governments should provide humanitarian visas for those needing short- or medium-term relocation, and embassies in perpetrator countries should work to resolve politicized restrictions on travel. In the United States, the Human Rights Defenders (HRD) Protection Act currently pending in Congress would create a special nonimmigrant visa for HRDs would enable human rights defenders to temporarily continue their work in the United States until it becomes safe for them to return home – a powerful option that both supports HRDs and furthers efforts to counter authoritarianism.
• Fifth, targeted sanctions against officials involved in political imprisonment should be more vigorously deployed as part of a comprehensive approach to addressing the use of political imprisonment. Targeted sanctions should not be the sole foreign policy tool a government utilizes, but they can bring important accountability in countries with weak rule of law and high levels of impunity. The Global Magnitsky and Section 7031(c) sanctions programs both cover enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention. According to reporting from Human Rights First, from the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act’s initial implementation in 2017 through September of 2022, more than a third of all designations noted arbitrary detention as at least one of abuses that led to the imposition of sanctions. And, the Treasury Department’s 2023 sanctions on three Russian officials involved in the jailing of Russian opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza marked “the first instance in which a single person’s arbitrary detention was clearly the legal basis for Global Magnitsky sanctions.” But, even though sanctions for arbitrary detention are possible, it can be challenging to clearly determine whether a detention is so unfair as to be considered arbitrary.
• To make things clearer for officials involved in sanctions designations, we urge the White House to issue a proclamation that clearly states that arbitrary detention is considered a serious human rights abuse and gross violation of human rights for the purposes of Global Magnitsky and Section 7031(c) designations. This was done for conflict-related sexual violence, and has proven helpful in those cases.
• Finally, we recommend that donors continue to provide financial assistance to cover the legal expenses incurred by detained human rights defenders and their families, including attorney fees, defense expert fees, and costs related to legal disputes. Donors can also provide support by funding local civil society organizations that offer legal services and are often under-resourced. Donors should also be prepared to provide long-term funds to support appeals to higher courts following an unjust sentencing, as well as legal inquiries as to detention conditions and official complaints. In some cases, political prisoners are transferred deliberately to locations far from their communities; in such cases, donors should consider offering additional funding for travel and accommodation costs for lawyers to visit relocated clients.

Conclusion

Many of those experiencing political imprisonment today have been jailed precisely because they believe in and offer a brighter vision for their countries. Support for political prisoners today will continue to the democratic future of their countries tomorrow. And until the day comes when all people are free, we at Freedom House are tremendously honored to stand alongside all of you in this struggle. Thank you.