Transitional or Hybrid Regime
DEMOCRACY-PERCENTAGE Democracy Percentage 45.83 100
DEMOCRACY-SCORE Democracy Score 3.75 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
47 100 Transitional or Hybrid Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.

header1 Score changes in 2021

  • Civil society rating declined from 5.00 to 4.75 due to violence between protestors and security services in May, during the contentious demolition of the National Theater in Tirana, and in December, after a citizen was fatally shot by police for violating a COVID-19 curfew order.
  • Independent Media rating declined from 3.75 to 3.50, reflecting the legal and rhetorical harassment of independent journalists by politicians and powers brokers, as well as intimidation and prosecution of journalists for allegedly spreading panic.

As a result, Albania’s Democracy Score declined from 3.82 to 3.75.

header2 Executive Summary

By Gjergji Vurmo

Albanian democracy struggled during 2020, with attacks on civil society institutions and independent media. The government moved forward with the vetting of judges and prosecutors, nominated the first judges of the Supreme Court, elected another three members of the Constitutional Court, and appointed the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) director and a functional Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK). On March 25, the European Union (EU) Council decided to greenlight the opening of accession negotiations with Albania, conditional upon fulfilment of 15 conditions. However, the first intergovernmental conference did not take place in 2020 as many hoped, as the government did not meet conditions laid out by the EU, such as aligning media law amendments with the Venice Commission’s recommendations.

The political climate in Albania was tense in 2020. After the opposition Democratic Party (DP) and Socialist Movement for Integration (SMI) boycotted the parliament in February 2019, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political actors (representatives of the boycotting parties)1 worked together to build consensus on electoral reform. Such consensus was reached on June 5, 2020 and further materialized with the legal amendments to the electoral code on July 23. However, the ruling Socialist Party (SP) further amended the constitution on July 30 and the electoral code on October 5—without consensus from the opposition Democratic Party (DP) and Socialist Movement for Integration (SMI)— though they did not fully open party candidate-lists for parliamentary elections, a change that was supported by over 70 percent of the population.2 A joint report from the Venice Commission and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that the SP’s amendments and electoral reforms were adopted hastily, and that “the constitutional amendments went against the most basic rules of democratic law-making.”3

President Ilir Meta became a more active political agent in 2020. His actions were unusual for the head of state, who constitutionally represents “the unity of the people.” In March, President Meta organized an antigovernment rally and accused Prime Minister Edi Rama of attempting a putsch through the justice system, links with international organized crime, and attacks on the constitution.4 Later, in view of the opinion of the Venice Commission, the Parliament dropped impeachment charges against the President.5

The Albanian economy suffered a sharp recession due to the impact of the November 2019 earthquake in the districts of Durres, Tirana, and Kruja, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, for which a state-of-emergency and national lockdown were declared.

The government took advantage of the pandemic to suppress civil society actions, restrict civil liberties,6 and pursue questionable legal initiatives that affected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), without consulting civil society.7 The government showed a generally hostile attitude towards citizens’ activism, witnessed in the raids and demolition of the National Theater building in Tirana8 and the excessive use of force against protesters on several occasions. Restrictions related to the coronavirus seriously curtailed the general civic space and citizens’ rights, including the right to protest.9 Citizens and civil society activists faced hefty fines of up to 5 million Albanian lek ($44,770) for participating in public demonstrations that violated COVID-19 restrictions.10 The year ended with a wave of protests against police brutality that led to the resignation of the Minister of the Interior.11 12

The government did not make progress in fostering a supportive environment for civil society. They ignored calls to improve the legal framework of public consultation and its meaningful enactment, and they persistently discouraged activism and participatory decision-making processes.13

Media independence declined in 2020, as the public choice for reliable independent media outlets was further restricted. A few economically and politically powerfully individuals control the media industry. Journalists routinely experience threats, intimidation, and attacks,14 and have thus been unable to provide counterweight to the shrinking civic space and declining democratic institutions. Defamation legislation and the government’s contracting of a private company (Acromax Media GmbH) to remove journalistic content online15 have further restricted the space for independent reporting.

Concerns over accountability, transparency and the capacity of local governing bodies to deliver quality services remained pressing matters in 2020. While the COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted municipalities’ budgets, their spending and procurement procedures raised even more serious concerns of misuse and clientelism.16

Justice reform progressed smoothly albeit at a snail’s pace, as in previous years. The Appeal Chamber has unified the practices of the judicial vetting process, which has reviewed 286 dossiers out of nearly 800 prosecutors and judges in the Albanian judicial system. Three new judges were appointed to Supreme Court, and the parliament and president appointed another three members to the Constitutional Court, filling seven out of the nine total seats. However, the new institutions of the justice system missed an opportunity to show that high-profile politicians and officials will no longer enjoy impunity for wrongdoing. The SPAK transferred prominent cases of electoral fraud in the Durres 2017 election and the Dibra 2016 elections to local prosecutor offices, which have neither the resources nor the backing to bring to court high-profile political representatives. The Appeal Chamber of the SPAK returned the case of former minister of the interior Saimir Tahiri to the Court of First Instance for retrial.17 Additionally, the Court of First Instance in Tirana dismissed the case against the elected mayor of Shkodra, Valdrin Pjetri,18 who resigned after his criminal past was exposed a few days after his election.19

Worrisome trends were observed in relation to corruption. There is an alarmingly high level of state capture and business pressure on the government.20 Evidence from independent reporters suggests that lawmakers have tailored legislation to serve private interests of powerful individuals, and that laws are implemented in a biased manner. These challenges require deep structural changes and a reset of the anticorruption and integrity-building strategies in Albania.

On April 25, 2021, Albania will hold general elections that are significant for a number of reasons. The conduct of the elections will likely be crucial for Albania’s accession negotiations with the EU, while they will finally put an end to the opposition’s two-year boycott. However, the general elections will occur after the SP government’s introduction of unilateral changes to the constitution and electoral code. Furthermore, court cases against the SP’s 2017 electoral manipulation and SP officials’ cooperation with organized crime groups have not advanced in proceedings, which could suggest that wrongdoing will repeat in the 2021 elections.

National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 3.253 7.007
  • A highly polarized political discourse again dominated Albania’s political climate in 2020. Unlike in 2019, when the opposition took to the streets and abandoned the state’s institutions, efforts were made to restore institutionalized dialogue. The Political Council was established on January 14, 2020, gathering representatives of the ruling SP, the parliamentary opposition, and the extra-parliamentary opposition—representatives of the DP and the SMI who had boycotted the parliament.1 The main goal of the Council was to further the discussion on electoral reform through broad consensus among political parties and to shape agreements between parties to amend the electoral code.
  • Following several rounds of negotiations, and with the support and mediation of international partners including the EU, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the Political Council reached an agreement on electoral reform on June 5.2 On July 23, the parliament voted to confirm the agreed upon amendments, which included changes to the regulation of the electronic identification of voters, the structure of the Central Elections Committee (CEC), the electoral college and appeal process, and other vote-process management and counting issues.3 However, on July 30, the SP majority in the parliament unilaterally adopted further amendments that were not agreed upon through the Political Council. International actors expressed disappointment that they altered the electoral rules without consensus, but emphasized that the June 5 agreement had not been breached.4
  • A 2019 impeachment procedure against President Meta initiated by the SP concluded in July 2020. In line with Venice Commission’s opinion,5 the parliament found that the president’s alleged malfeasance did not necessarily warrant an impeachment.6 In March, President Meta accused the government of attempting a putsch and organized a rally to protest the SP’s actions.7 Harsh accusations were exchanged between President Meta and Prime Minister Rama throughout the year.8
  • Accountability of the central government and the parliament remained weak, due to the lack of a functional Constitutional Court and a true parliamentary opposition. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic was followed by swift executive decrees, which were later confirmed by the parliament. In 2020, the government adopted the most decrees of any year on record. While most of them related to the emergencies brought on by the 2019 earthquake and COVID-19, the government pushed forward other policies, about which civil society actors voiced serious concerns.9
  • Albanian authorities notified a derogation from the obligations under the Convention for the Protection of Human and Fundamental Freedoms when they instituted COVID-19 emergency measures that restricted civil liberties.10 However, even after they withdrew the derogation, the right to protest and assemble continued to be curtailed throughout the year.11 Civil society groups claimed that the government used the pandemic-induced state-of-emergency as an excuse to introduce unnecessary restrictions while circumventing the parliament.12 The Institute for Democracy and Mediation’s (IDM) report, “Audit of political engagement in Albania 2020,” found that while Albanians are highly critical of the parliament’s overall performance, they remain divided on its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.13
  • In March, the Council of the European Union agreed to open membership negotiations with Albania, conditional upon fulfilment of a number of institutional changes related to electoral, judicial, and public administration reform, as well as improvements in fighting corruption and organized crime, and the strength of the country’s independent media environment.14
  • Albania’s economy experienced two crises within a short time frame: the late 2019 earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted an economic decline of 7.5 percent and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) foresaw a real GDP growth of -9 percent decline.15
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 4.254 7.007
  • In 2020, Albania addressed part of the OSCE’s recommendations for improving elections. The passage of electoral reform, while partly positive, also included amendments that were added without the agreement of the opposition. Conclusions from the March EU Council meeting stipulate that prior to the first intergovernmental conference opening negotiations between Albania and the EU, “Albania should adopt electoral reform fully in accordance with OSCE/ODHIR recommendations, ensuring transparent financing of political parties and electoral campaigns.” Additionally, the negotiation framework, which had to be adopted by the Council, has to reflect that Albania has implemented the agreed-upon electoral reform and that the Constitutional Court has issued a final decision on the lawfulness of the June 2019 local elections.1 The Constitutional Court became functional in December 2020, after judges were appointed to fill seven out of the nine seats.
  • On June 5, representatives on the Political Council2 reached an agreement to reform parts of the electoral code, which included: altering the CEC’s structure to include a regulatory group and appeals group, as well as a commissioner and deputy commissioner; creating a database for the electronic identification of voters, coordinated by the newly installed deputy commissioner; appointing vote-counting teams comprising two nonpolitical officers, monitored by political representatives; installing judges who have passed the vetting process in the Electoral College; depoliticizing election administration, to start after the 2021 general elections; adopting legal amendments in Parliament after the Political Council’s confirmation; and planning for the Political Council to address additional elements of the OSCE’s recommendations. Two addendums to the agreement stipulated that the request for a caretaker government and caretaker police chief would not condition the approval of the agreement, and that the parties did not agree on changing the electoral system.3
  • The above points were translated into legal amendments, as per the terms of the agreement, and were finally adopted by Parliament on July 23.4 However, on July 30, the parliament adopted constitutional amendments that would seemingly allow for open lists of candidates, a widely popular proposal5 for which the social movement Nisma Thurje and part of the parliamentary opposition advocated.6 Although the extra-parliamentary opposition did not support this change initially,7 in September, the DP and SMI bloc unexpectedly proposed an amendment to fully open party candidate-lists. On October 5, the ruling SP amended the electoral code and in so doing, banned pre-election coalitions, lowered the threshold to enter the parliament from 3 to 1 percent, and allowed for a preferential vote on candidates while preserving the party-ranking of candidates as the primary criteria for being elected.8
  • President Meta, returned the legislation to the parliament for reconsideration on October 23 and announced that he had submitted an urgent request to the Venice Commission to prepare an opinion about the changes to the electoral code.9 The SP majority, however, voted down the President’s decree on October 29, ignoring calls to wait for Venice Commission’s opinion in December, which eventually declared that the procedure for adopting the amendments to the electoral code had been extremely hasty.10 11 Furthermore, the Venice Commission’s opinion underlined that “the constitutional amendments went against the most basic rules of democratic law-making.”12
  • In line with the Political Council’s June agreement, the parliament elected on October 5 the new CEC commissioner from a list of candidates provided by the SP, and a deputy Commissioner from a list of candidates agreed upon by the opposition.13
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 4.755 7.007
  • Legal initiatives diminishing the independence of civil society, measures restricting the right to assembly, and the government’s exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic sharply weakened civil society and depleted civic space. Between March and July, over 100 citizens and activists were criminally charged for organizing or participating in illegal protests.1 Individuals were fined at times up to 5 million Albanian lek ($44,770),2 over 100 times the average salary in Albania.3 Police often used disproportionate violence when suppressing other civil society actions.4 These restrictions and penalties, the government’s control of media reporting, and a lack of accountability mechanisms on government action during the pandemic have discouraged the public from criticizing the government.5
  • The government ignored most of civil society’s advocacy and policy recommendations and exploited the pandemic to strengthen its control of civic space. Because the pandemic more severely affected marginalized groups such as LGBTI+ people, civil society’s aid for those who were significantly impacted was vital.6 The government’s COVID-19 policies, however, granted police disproportionately stronger competencies which were abused on several occasions.
  • Following more than two years of public support to protect the National Theater building in Tirana, at 4.30 a.m. on May 17, a large police force raided the building, dragging away two dozen actors and activists protecting the site. Before dawn, the building was demolished, sparking day-long protests in the city.7 Images of disproportionate and unnecessary violence8 by the police not only against artists, citizens, and protesters, but also against reporters covering the protest,9 prompted widespread criticism. The government ignored the criticism10 and even denied the veracity of events that had been reported.11 The national Ombudsman issued a detailed report of the illegal actions the police committed during and after the demolition of the National Theater, as well as a series of recommendations to prevent such incidents in the future.12
  • On December 8, a police officer of the “Shqiponja” unit—a special unit of the Albanian State Police—killed Klodian Rasha (25) while attempting to stop him for violating coronavirus curfew.13 Public anger over Rasha’s death and other instances of police brutality resulted in numerous protests, which turned violent.14 15 The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights called on the Albanian government to prevent further police violence and uphold the right to peacefully assemble.16
  • The government lacks the political will to create genuine consultation processes and improve cooperation between state institutions and civil society.17 NGOs have identified their noninvolvement in policy-making as a main challenge to their work, alongside financial sustainability and concerns over the legal and fiscal framework for their operations.18 Cooperation with local and central government was rated as problematic, with 52% of surveyed CSOs declaring that they rarely cooperate, and another 27% that they have no cooperation at all with the central government. For the local government these figures stand at 44% and 13% respectively..
  • According to the Tirana Court of First Instance, a total of 11,739 NGOs were registered by the end of 2019. The number of NGOs registered with tax authorities was 4,767 NGOs.19 However, some estimates claim that the number of active NGOs operating in Albania is much lower.
  • The National Council for Civil Society has produced no meaningful actions to improve the environment for civil society actors. Authorities have increased control over NGOs’ operations through the adoption of antiterrorism and money-laundering legislation.20
  • A group of NGOs raised serious concerns21 over the threat to their independence posed by draft legislation that would create a “central register of bank accounts,” as well as a proposed bill called the “Law on the registration of NGOs.”22 The Ministry of Justice consulted the group while writing the law, however, upon submitting the bill to the parliament, they ultimately ignored all of the organizations’ comments and recommendations. A broader group of NGOs requested that the parliamentary review of the draft include a public hearing, so that their recommendations could be heard.23
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 3.504 7.007
  • Following several years of incremental decline, media independence was further limited in 2020.1 Reporters Without Borders’s (RSF) Press Freedom Index and the media freedom assessment by Article 19—both press freedom watchdogs—marked deteriorations in the country’s media landscape, which the government has increasingly sought to control.2 3 Political and economic elites and power brokers have captured the media industry and misused it for their own narrow interests.4 Smear campaigns,5 physical attacks on journalists,6 intimidation,7 and self-censorship occurred throughout the year.8 Threats, derogatory language against journalists persisted, and past attacks against journalists saw no convictions, according to the European Commission’s “Albania 2020 Report”.9 10 Politicians and powerful businessmen11 filed lawsuits against journalists on various grounds, including defamation.12 13 14 These cases are known as “SLAPP suits,” or strategic lawsuits against public participation, and are wielded by powerful individuals to intimidate reporters and push them to self-censor.
  • New antidefamation legislation was partially implemented in 2020. An amendment to the law on electronic communications entered into force in February,15 after Parliament rejected President Meta’s alterations to the bill.16 The Venice Commission subsequently prepared an opinion on the amendment to the law on audiovisual media, a part of the same legislative package,17 and declared that the law was not ready for adoption and would likely suppress free discussion and political speech online.18 Despite claiming openness to the Commission’s recommendations, the government did not withdraw the amendments to the law on audiovisual media, as requested by local civil society organizations, journalists, and international journalist associations. Draft amendments to the penal code from December would blur the definition of defamation and fine those convicted up to 4.5 million Albanian lek ($40,290).19
  • In September, 16 Albanian media outlets created a self-regulatory body on media ethics based on the recommendations of the Venice Commission’s opinion on the law of audiovisual media.20
  • The government took advantage of the coronavirus pandemic to crack down on media freedoms, warning citizens21 22 to “beware of the media.” The police submitted four court cases against journalists and media outlets for “spreading panic,” and the ministers of a parliamentary commission submitted a fifth.23 The pandemic’s economic toll also impacted the media sector: over 40 percent of reporters experienced salary cuts and 47 journalists lost their jobs, according to Aleksander Cipa, chair of the Union of Albanian Journalists.24
  • In May, the government fined and proposed closure of the television channel Ora News TV.25 A few months later, the special prosecutor seized the premises of Ora News TV and Ora TV, alleging that the owner Ylli Ndroqi (alias Xhemail Pasmaciu) had profited from the drug trade.26 Lawyers of Ndroqi claimed the seizure was politically motivated. Despite the ongoing court case, both channels continued to critique the government throughout the year.
  • The European Commission’s report recommended the government “ensure a policy of zero tolerance for intimidation and attacks against journalists, as well as for threats against the media, including in political discourse,” and strengthen “the protection of journalists’ labor and social rights.”27
  • Journalists voiced concerns over the government’s illegitimate removal of audiovisual and journalistic content through Acromax Media, a private German company that claims to operate “digital rights management” and has ties to SP officials.28 RSF called the action an attempt to suppress independent journalism.29
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 4.505 7.007
  • Following the opposition’s boycott of the 2019 local elections, good governance and accountability within local governments remained under serious threat. In all 61 municipal governments, 95 percent of council members and 60 of 61 mayors are members of the SP. The lack of political opposition in municipal councils and civil society in many small- and medium-sized municipalities to monitor local government institutions has thrown into question their capacity to act based on public interest.1
  • Although all 61 municipalities have appointed coordinators for citizens to access public information, the implementation of the law on public consultations remains unsatisfactory.2 Under the framework of UN Development Program’s STAR 2 initiative, six municipalities have piloted integrity plans with measures to combat corruption at the local level.3
  • The European Commission’s “Albania 2020 Report” noted that local governments lack sufficient funds and capacities to make decisions and implement effective policy. The implementation of the civil service law remains incomplete at the local level, and municipalities lack the capacity to deliver public services.4 Despite some improvement in recent years, municipalities’ collection of tax revenue dropped 16 percent from 2019, as local governments bore the brunt of the coronavirus’s economic fallout. Court rulings on the illegal dismissal of municipal staff further increased local government debt.5 According to the Commission’s report, municipalities’ fiscal autonomy has been further weakened because their resources largely come from the national budget.6
  • The lack of political opposition within local governments and the weakness of civil society have brought on a decline of local transparency and accountability and deteriorated the integrity of local budgetary spending and public procurement. According to the Albanian Institute of Science (AIS), an organization promoting transparency and accountability through open data, local governments commit the most abuse of public contract tenders. The AIS’s map of clients of Albanian municipalities shows those who receive public tenders and contracts through nontransparent tendering procedures, such as direct negotiation or negotiation without notice. Some companies have won between 70 and 95 percent of public contracts in municipalities including Gjirokastra, Mirdita, Vlora, Pogradec, and Durres.7
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 3.253 7.007
  • Despite progress with judicial reform, new judicial institutions—most notably, the Special Court against Corruption (SPAK)—have not yet restored public trust in the judiciary. While SPAK’s decisive work in prosecuting organized crime in cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies and its progress in prosecuting low- and middle-level officials are steps in the right direction, judicial independence is yet to be tested in grand corruption cases. SPAK has published charges against former prosecutor general Adriatic Llalla1 and has started investigating allegations of corruption in the high-profile waste-incinerators case2 and the opposition’s accusations that SP parliamentarian Ervin Bushati has hidden his assets.3
  • Two cases of electoral fraud—one involving a criminal group in Durres who cooperated with SP representatives to buy votes in the 2017 general elections, and another centered on several senior SP officials in Dibra who manipulated election results in 20164 —noted disappointing developments. The SPAK declared non-competence on the Dibra case thus transferring it to the local prosecution in Dibra who eventually raised charges only against four former low-profile officials. Although their investigation had confirmed that other defendants had participated in the electoral fraud, the local prosecution dropped the charges against them because the three-year deadline for prosecution had already passed.5 In the Durres case, the SPAK issued arrest orders for 22 low-profile polling-station commissioners (including two who were deceased). The Special Court subsequently declared non-competence and transferred the case to the local prosecutor and the Court of First Instance in Durres.6
  • The Constitutional Court and Supreme Court remained blocked throughout 2020. The European Commission’s “Albania 2020 Report” noted that the Constitutional Court’s lack of a quorum, which prevented the issuance of rulings, diminished the legitimacy of the legal system and exacerbated the tensions between the government and the president.7
  • The Constitutional Court filled seven of its nine seats in late December,8 and has decided on the admissibility of certain cases. The Court’s first rulings are expected in 2021. President Meta also appointed the three nonmagistrate members of the Supreme Court on March 11,9 empowering another chamber of the court system.
  • The COVID-19 lockdown and restrictions affected the speed of the judicial vetting process. The “Albania 2020 Report” noted that a total of 286 dossiers have been reviewed by vetting bodies since the start of the program.10 The Independent Qualification Commission’s controversial confirmation Donika Prela as prosecutor in 2019 was overruled by the Appeal Chamber, dismissing Prela and silencing concerns about the integrity of the vetting process.11 A member of the Appeal Chamber, Luan Daci, was found guilty of forgery of documents and sentenced to six months in prison by SPAK. Daci’s sentence was later converted to a year’s probation.12
  • Judicial institutions are yet to prove their independence in cases involving high-profile politicians and officials. The Appeal Chamber of SPAK returned the case of former minister of the interior Saimir Tahiri to the Court of First Instance for retrial.13 The Court of First Instance in Tirana dismissed the case against the elected mayor of Shkodra, Valdrin Pjetri,14 who resigned after his criminal past was exposed a few days after his election.15 The “Albania 2020 Report” recorded a high number of low- to mid-ranking officials charged for corruption, but no convictions of high-ranking officials. For Albanians at large, the lack of prosecution and conviction of high-profile politicians showed that corrupt politicians still operate with impunity.
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 2.753 7.007
  • Serious corruption concerns persisted in 2020, with further evidence of state capture coming to light. Corrupt actors often go unpunished, as judicial institutions failed to successfully prosecute any high-level official or high-profile politicians. Critics voiced concerns about the government’s concealing of more than a dozen COVID-19-related public tenders worth millions of Euros.1
  • Independent reports revealed evidence of state capture; lawmakers may have tailored legislation for private interests.2 3 The government and ruling SP majority in the parliament pushed forward laws that protect the interests of private individuals and their networks on several occasions.4 Officials who enable state capture and businesses that pressure public officials operate with alarming effectiveness in Albania as compared to other Western Balkan countries, according to an assessment by the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI).
  • With high levels of monopolization in the country, antimonopoly legislation remains largely ineffective.5 The American Chamber of Commerce’s annual Business Climate Index gave the Albanian business environment the lowest rating ever, due to the tense political climate, powerful monopolies, widespread corruption, and illegal trade.6
  • The European Commission’s Albania 2020 Report noted that Albanian authorities progressed in combatting corruption, although corruption remains serious and pervasive.7 Some EU member states urged authorities to more decisively punish corruption at all levels.8
  • Another prosecutor joined the SPAK in 2020, thus filling 13 out of 15 prosecutorial positions.9 The High Prosecutorial Council also appointed the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).10 The procedures to appoint NBI officers were launched immediately and are expected to conclude in early 2021.
  • The Ministry of Justice—the national anticorruption coordinator—reported a relatively successful implementation of the anticorruption action plan during the first half of 2020, with 19 measures fully and 37 partially implemented (12 measures were not implemented).11 The dismissal rate of judges and prosecutors in the vetting process reached 62 percent. However, none of the dismissed magistrates were sentenced in 2020.12 A monitoring report by the Albanian Helsinki Committee underlined the Appeal Chamber’s positive role in unifying the practices of the vetting process, but called for greater transparency within the Independent Qualification Commission.13
  • The Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) concluded that Albania has satisfactorily dealt with nine of the ten recommendations contained in the “Fourth Round Evaluation Report.” The remaining recommendation—related to transparency in the selection and appointment of members of the High Court of Justice and the timely evaluation of professional and ethical performance of judges—was partially implemented.14

Author: Gjergji Vurmo is Program Director and Senior Researcher on governance and EU integration at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in Tirana, and a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). He has over 20 years of experience with civil society networks and think tanks in the Western Balkans region working on good governance, EU enlargement, civic space, and security matters. Vurmo is author of several research studies and has reported on Albania for global reports, such as the Open Government Partnership (2013–18), USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index (2010–13), and Open Parliaments 2012 report. He has served as a steering board member of various networks of research institutes in the Southeastern Europe region (PASOS, BCSDN) and is a contributor on the Western Balkans region for various think tanks.

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  • Global Freedom Score

    67 100 partly free