STAY UP TO DATE: The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House
Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Nations in Transit 2024

Croatia

Semi-Consolidated Democracy
54
100
DEMOCRACY-PERCENTAGE Democracy Percentage 54.17 100
DEMOCRACY-SCORE Democracy Score 4.25 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
54 100 Semi-Consolidated Democracy
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
Croatia_hero

header1 Authors

  • Dario Čepo

header2 Changes in 2024

  • No score changes in 2024

header3 Executive Summary

In 2023, Croatian democracy continued to stagnate under the leadership of Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and his Christian Democratic Union (HDZ) party. Key issues included the continued misuse of public funds, corruption scandals linked to national and local HDZ officials, increased verbal attacks on the opposition, an opaque legislative process for a key electoral reform that failed to include election experts or opposition voices, the continuing abuse of independent institutions such as the public broadcaster, and the failure to significantly reform the judicial system due to its decades long structural weaknesses.

Prominent government officials (including the minister of the economy) and high-profile businesspeople were implicated in a corruption scandal involving HEP, a state-owned energy company. According to media reports, HEP bought gas from fellow state-owned oil and gas company INA when prices were high and then sold it back to INA or to other companies at drastically reduced prices.1 Plenković, who was politically vulnerable and hesitant to take an aggressive stance against members of his party connected to the scheme, failed to hold government officials implicated in the scandal, including the minister of the economy, accountable. Instead, the prime minister lashed out at journalists and watchdog agencies that uncovered the story.

A rare strike in the judiciary occurred in 2023. Both judges and administrative staff went on strike to demand pay raises and better working conditions.2 At first, the government seemed uninterested in meeting the demands of the strike leaders and deployed special police forces to defend officials from the strikers, who were largely middle-aged women.3 Nevertheless, the government reached an agreement with organizers after 52 days and the strike ended.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) conducted several corruption investigations in Croatia in 2023. Prime Minister Plenković insisted that he knew nothing about the corruption allegations the EPPO was investigating, or said that no scandal existed. Regarding the earthquake recovery funds disbursed by the MInistr yof Culture, he also said that the public funds in question were the Croatian government’s and not the EU’s, and therefore outside the EPPO’s jurisdiction. He continued to attack the media and accused journalists of sensationalizing stories and working against his government.

The government and its allies continued to attack critical civil society organizations (CSOs). Prime Minister Plenković and other government officials also harshly criticized independent media outlets, creating a hostile environment for journalists. The government made policy changes that financially benefited mainstream media outlets that consistently tow the government line.

Representatives of national minorities in the parliament continued to unequivocally support the government. The Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS), a junior coalition member, did not challenge some of the government’s most controversial decisions in 2023, including the flawed electoral district reform. The situation for other marginalized groups remained the same in 2023, although the government signaled its willingness to potentially add femicide to the Criminal Code.4

The introduction of the euro as the national currency in 2023 caused significant price increases that the Croatian National Bank and the government failed to meaningfully address. On foreign policy, the government continued to clash with President Zoran Milanović regarding assistance to Ukraine. The government called Milanović a Russian puppet who was working against Croatian interests due to his anti-Ukraine statements in 2023.5 Later in the year, Croatia voted against a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the UN General Assembly. The government shut the president out of the decision-making process that led to Croatia’s support for Israel, despite his constitutional right to help craft foreign policy.

header4 At-A-Glance

In Croatia, national governance is democratic, but the government continues to undermine independent institutions and the rule of law. Elections are free and fair, but critics said electoral district reforms passed in 2023 favored the ruling party ahead of the 2024 elections. CSOs are underfunded and endure burdensome regulations that siphon time and resources that would otherwise be used to implement projects. Independent media is in a precarious position. Public broadcasters are used as government mouthpieces, while independent media outlets and journalists face escalating verbal attacks by the prime minister and the government, as well as increased strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) meant to intimidate critical voices. Local democratic governance is fragmented, weak, and plagued by corrupt and nepotistic local elected officials. The judiciary is weak. According to public perceptions, the prosecutor’s office lacks independence. European prosecutors often pursue cases that should be handled by Croatian prosecutors. Corruption has continued unabated at both the national and local levels. The government focuses more on attacking whistleblowers and media outlets that report on corruption than investigating credible allegations, especially when the accused are prominent government officials.

National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 4.254 7.007
  • Opposition parties continued their attempts to destabilize the Plenković government, including through no-confidence votes. In 2023, Agriculture Minister Marija Vučković became the latest minister to survive a no-confidence vote1.
  • In March, the far-right Homeland Movement (DP) party, with the support of the other opposition parties in the parliament, brought forward a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Plenković. The opposition said the 2022 INA scandal, the so-called SMS affair from 2018 (in which Plenković was accused of playing a role in creating fake text messages in an elaborate scheme intended to exonerate political allies accused of corruption), and a number of other scandals and controversies disqualified him from office.2 Plenković easily survived the no-confidence vote with the unwavering support of his coalition. Nonetheless, the procedure was an important democratic practice that Plenković devalued by exiting the parliament building before the debate ended and the members of parliament voted.3
  • In October, the opposition brought another vote of no confidence against Foreign Minister Gordan Grlic-Radman, the wealthiest member of the government. The opposition brought the motion forward after Grlic-Radman failed to disclose more than €2 million in dividends he received from his private company.4
  • Several ministers were fired or forced to resign in 2023. In November, Plenković fired embattled Defense Minister Mario Banožić after he was involved in a fatal car accident while allegedly driving under influence.5 Plenković then nominated Ivan Anušić, his chief political rival in the HDZ,6 to be the next defense minister, which the parliament approved.7 Some observers believe that Anušić will lead the HDZ after Plenković departs.8 According to media reports, relations between the presidency and the Defense Ministry thawed following the change. Anušić and President Milanović attended events together9, a drastic change from the last several years of sporadic communication between the president and the Defense Ministry.
  • In 2023, Prime Minister Plenković frequently ignored the input of other government officials who should have a role in decision-making, especially the president.10 Plenković also exceeded his constitutional authority on several key issues and threatened the separation of powers.11 For example, when Croatia voted against the UNGA’s resolution on a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza in December, the government allegedly did so without consulting the president, who has the constitutional authority to jointly shape foreign policy with the government.12 In November, Plenković personally fired Banožić in defiance of the constitution, which states that the parliament is responsible for electing and dismissing ministers. Although the parliament did not formally complain about Banožić’s dismissal and approved his proposed replacement, Plenković’s actions violated the separation of powers principle, according to some media outlets and CSOs.13 Finally, in December, Plenković dismissed Minister of Economy Davor Filipovic and one of his advisers, both of whom had been accused of corruption.14 Previously, Plenković stood by Filipovic in the face of criticism from the opposition, which objected to Filipovic’s appointment because he had business interests that critics said created a conflict of interest.15 Filipovic was the 30th minister who had either been fired or resigned during Plenković's two terms, with some ministers only remaining in office for a few months. Only three ministers from the original government elected in 2016 were still in office at the end of the year: Veterans' Affairs Minister Medved, Culture Minister Obuljen Koržinek, and Infrastructure Minister Butković.
  • At the end of the year, farmers protested against the government’s decision to euthanize more than 25,000 pigs that had potentially been infected with the swine flu.16 Some local HDZ members cut up their party identification cards and joined the protesters in November.17 The protesters criticized Plenković for being a Brussels stooge and refused to meet with the minister of agriculture until all of their demands were met.18 Plenković and other members of the government responded by accusing the right-wing opposition of manipulating the protesters.19
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 5.005 7.007
  • There were no major elections or referenda in 2023. However, there were several snap elections for municipal and city councils. The results of these elections bucked trends seen in national polls, where the HDZ had double the support of the second-place Social Democratic Party (SDP). But the election results in the small northern city of Varaždin, where the SDP won 43 percent of the vote and will govern alone, revealed the limits to Plenković’s and the HDZ’s power.1 Varaždin marked the fourth consecutive loss for the HDZ in snap local elections in 2023.2
  • During 2023, Croatia prepared for the so-called “super election” in 2024, when national parliamentary elections, European Parliament elections, and the presidential election will take place.3
  • The Constitutional Court ruled in May that the electoral district map was unconstitutional because some districts were much larger than others, which made the votes of those in smaller districts more powerful than in larger districts.4 The Constitutional Court provided clear instructions for reforming the electoral map, but the government ignored almost all of them, which prompted calls from experts and the opposition for the court to order the government to begin a new reform process from scratch.5 However, with the 2024 elections quickly approaching and several Constitutional Court judges (including its president) seeking another term in office, many doubt whether the court is in a strong enough position to oppose the government. CSOs have also raised concerns about the judge who was chosen to lead the reform process. Previously, this judge twice upheld the unbalanced electoral map that the Constitutional Court repealed in May.6
  • The legislative process to pass the electoral reform law was unusual. The government kept the members of the working group tasked with drafting the law secret and did not include opposition parties or constitutional and electoral experts in the process. Observers noted that the lack of transparency and inclusivity in adopting such an important law was concerning and a departure from previous electoral reform processes that were more participatory. CSOs, including Gong, a major prodemocracy organization that doubted whether the working group even existed,7 demanded that the government provide the names of those in the working group.8 The government declined to divulge the names on various grounds, ibcluding the right to privacy and GDPR claims.9 Several NGOs and journalists then filed complaints with the information commissioner, who ordered the government to provide the names of the working group members. In October, the Justice and Public Administration Ministry finally provided the names of three of its employees who were members of the working group.10 However, many activists and opposition leaders were skeptical that these three individuals wrote the draft law.11 The skepticism grew by the end of the year when the parliamentary majority elected Anita Markić, one of the supposed working group members, as the new information commissioner, despite her inexperience with access to information issues.12 The other candidate for the post, who had previously served as deputy information commissioner, appeared more qualified. Some CSOs alleged that Markić was elected to reward her for covering up the government’s mistakes in the early stages of the reform process.13
  • The State Electoral Committee (SEC) faced criticism after Gong revealed in November that the majority of SEC members are former members of major political parties.14 The law prohibits current political party members from being appointed to the SEC, which is meant to be an independent, apolitical body that oversees elections. Gong has argued that the number of former party members in the SEC threatens the body’s independence.
  • Even after adopting the Law on Electoral Districts in November, the government continued accusing other parties of obstructing its work. For example, the government accused the president of attempting to delay signing the law in an effort to invalidate it. The president’s office,15 the opposition, and legal experts denied the government’s allegation and found that the president signed the law within the provided timeframe.16
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 5.255 7.007
  • Civil society faced funding shortfalls and the over-bureaucratization of CSO work, where red tape and administrative regulation, hamper and burden the work of overstretched workers within CSOs in 2023.
  • The government continued to ignore many established CSOs, especially prodemocracy organizations. The government did not include CSOs in working groups and did not take their recommendations into account when debating major legislation. For example, CSOs were excluded from the electoral district reform process.
  • At the local level, there are many areas with no active CSOs. Local activists are often accused of being partisan political actors attempting to undermine local governments or mayors, which damages CSOs’ credibility and delegitimizes their work.
  • Despite this precarious situation, many CSOs exposed serious political and social problems in 2023.
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 3.754 7.007
  • The European Commission’s Rule of Law Report published in July remarked that concerns about the political independence from the parliamentary majority of both the Council for Electronic Media and the public service broadcaster HRT persist.1 The report also criticized the continued lack of transparency in media advertising and the increase in strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) that are meant to silence journalists and activists. As of July, there were more than 940 active SLAPP lawsuits in Croatia.2 The government showed no interest in introducing strong anti-SLAPP legislation in 2023. 3 According to some observers, many government officials seemed more interested in defending the prime minister from self-described vicious media attacks than in protecting press freedom in 2023.4 Media organizations also criticized the government’s failure to thoroughly investigate the 2022 death of journalist Vladimir Matijanic.5 At the end of the year, authorities had still not determined Matijanic’s cause of death, 16 months after his body was found, but press freedom advocates argued that he was likely murdered in retaliation for his reporting.6
  • Plenković’s contempt for independent media has grown over the years,7 but it reached new levels in 2023 after some journalists criticized him for ignoring questions at press conferences and lecturing the media on what to report and how to report it. He rebuked these accusations by saying that he no longer follows Croatian media outlets due to their unprofessionalism and failure to report on his government’s accomplishments. Other government officials echoed Plenković’s attacks on the press in 2023. In November, the minister of culture falsely and tendentiously accused Telegram.hr investigative journalist Dora Kršul of spreading untruths.8 However, a detailed correspondence between Kršul and the Ministry of Culture showed that the journalist had repeatedly attempted to gather information that the ministry is obliged to provide, while being stonewalled and obstructed on every step with ministry giving partial and insufficient information only after months of insistence by the journalist.9
  • Starting in February, Prime Minister Plenković pushed for changes to the Criminal Code that would criminalize leaking the details of government investigations to the media, that according to some experts would allow the government to prosecute those who are publishing such information. The draft law was dubbed “Lex AP” after “AP”— the initials of the prime minister—appeared in leaked text messages and emails between officials accused of corruption that strongly insinuated he knew about at least some of corrupt practices. Activists, journalists, and legal scholars argued that the draft law would make it more difficult for journalists to inform the public and threatened the public’s right to access information.10 Some Supreme Court justices also expressed concerns that the draft law does not explicitly make journalists who publish illegally leaked information immune from prosecution, which could have a chilling effect on the media.11 They argued that if the government wants to reassure the public that the draft law is not intended to intimidate journalists, it should introduce language that clearly exempts them from prosecution.12 The government refused to add such language. President Milanović also strongly opposed the draft law.13
  • The European Center for Press and Media Freedom, the Croatian Journalists’ Association, and the International Federation of Journalists expressed serious concerns about a draft media law proposed in July that would increase editorial control over media content, impose new regulations for state funding of news portals, and introduce looser advertising restrictions, among other provisions.14 These watchdogs argued that the draft law would threaten press freedom, compromise the protection of journalist’s sources, and reduce the overall independence of the media.15
  • Independent media outlets have struggled to remain financially sustainable in recent years. The financial position of local media outlets is particularly dire. In September, some outlets reported that a small private company linked to prominent HDZ member Vladimir Šeks had expressed interest in buying local newspapers before the 2024 elections, potentially to skew local coverage in the HDZ’s favor.16
  • HRT, the government-controlled public broadcaster, faced another scandal in November when media reports revealed that it hired a new editor-in-chief of its web portal who did not fulfill all of the required qualifications for the role.17 The scandal surfaced after three students complained that they were not paid for their part-time work.18 HRT’s management took no action to protect the fired students but increased the salary of the scandal-prone editor-in-chief.19 In July, HRT renewed the contract of Information Media Service (an important division of HRT) editor Katarina Periša Čakarun, a journalist with close links to the HDZ, for another five years.20 Čakarun retained her position despite HRT research that showed public trust in the Information Media Service had declined during her tenure.21
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 4.505 7.007
  • Corruption, misappropriation of public funds, nepotism, and clientelism continued to undermine local government in 2023. Local media outlets, which depend on local government funds for their survival, largely failed to cover these issues.
  • The HDZ has abused nominally independent institutions to punish municipalities where the opposition is in power.1 For example, after a small liberal party gained power in Split in 2021, the State Inspector’s Office levied large fines against both the city and the mayor himself in March, for documentation errors made when the HDZ was in power.2 The move effectively held the mayor personally responsible for violations that occurred before he was in office.3 The State Inspector’s Office had previously discovered the documentation errors when the HDZ controlled Split and refrained from fining any HDZ officials or the city.
  • In May, the government abolished the surtax, which was a major revenue source for localities that local governments levied. The central government said the move would ease the tax burden on citizens,4 but critics saw it as an attempt to make it more difficult for opposition parties leading major cities like Zagreb and Split to govern.5 Critics also argued that the legislation was meant to force local governments to increase other taxes, which would be an unpopular decision that could harm their prospects in the upcoming elections.6 This was yet another policy decision that seemed designed to improve Prime Minister Plenković’s re-election prospects. Despite the new funding shortfall caused by abolishing the surtax, all HDZ-controlled local governments decided not to increase other taxes, which observers saw as a sign that local HDZ politicians were more concerned about helping the national party than ensuring that their cities functioned effectively.7
  • Local government is highly fragmented, with many small and unviable municipalities created for political reasons, which creates many opportunities for graft and corruption. The former HDZ head of Seget Donji, a small Adriatic municipality, was indicted in December for squandering public funds on lavish dinners for himself and members of his party (see Corruption).8 Local municipalities, particularly in coastal areas, have grappled with real estate fraud that has contributed to environmental problems,9 illegal construction projects, corrupt practices, and suspicious investments by controversial entrepreneurs.10
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 3.504 7.007
  • Several strikes organized by both judges and administrative staff affected the judiciary in 2023. Strikers demanded a steep pay raise and improved working conditions. After several weeks of negotiations with the government, the judges secured a large salary increase and other bonuses, while administrative staff agreed to a much lower pay raise.1
  • The weakness of the judiciary was on display when no candidates to be the new head of the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) emerged in the spring. The lack of candidates revealed deep skepticism that the nominally independent institution has enough power to resist political pressure from the government and the HDZ.2 The pressure faced by the USKOK was shown in media reports from October that asserted that the agency hid evidence from the State’s Attorney Office because it feared that the office would leak it to the government and those under investigation.3 The conflict between the two bodies became even more pronounced after the attorney general, who is widely viewed as soft on corruption,4 forced the head of the USKOK to resign in April based on bogus evidence of a traffic accident,5 leaving an important institution without leadership a year before major elections.6
  • Plenković continued to attack institutions that pursued corruption cases involving ministers from his party, including the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO).7 Plenković accused the EPPO of wrongfully investigating the minister of culture for alleged mismanagement of EU funds intended for relief and recovery efforts following the powerful 2020 earthquake. The EPPO declined to comment on Plenković’s attacks.8
  • Courts made a number of rulings in 2023 that eroded the public’s belief in the independence of the judiciary. For example, a controversial November decision by the High Administrative Court held that former minister of finance Zdravko Marić did not commit a crime when he received heavily discounted rates for his stay at a hotel during a vacation in 2019. 9 The hotel had received public funds from the government-owned Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development.10
  • Even when the courts render a popular verdict, the authorities’ behavior has sometimes undermined the public’s trust that justice will be enforced. For example, after former member of parliament Branimir Glavaš was found guilty in October11 of war crimes against Serb civilians in Croatia, he was allowed to leave the country.12 Glavaš relocated to Bosnia and Herzegovina without serving a day in prison, which elicited little reaction from Croatian authorities.13
  • The State’s Attorney Office often fails to prosecute even unknown local politicians. For example, after HDZ county head Damir Dekanić was arrested for driving under the influence in May 2022, prosecutors and the police collected evidence for almost a year, despite the fact that it was a straightforward case. The lengthy delay ensured that local elections would occur before Dekanić could be prosecuted. An earlier prosecution could have damaged the HDZ’s prospects in the local elections and harmed the national party.14
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 3.504 7.007
  • Corruption remained a major issue in 2023. In July, Eurobarometer 534 found that 96 percent of respondents thought that corruption was widespread in Croatia, far higher than the EU average of 70 percent.1
  • Prime Minister Plenković continued to take a soft stance on government officials or businessmen accused of corruption. He insisted on due process and thorough investigations before he would fire allegedly corrupt government officials, which also allowed him to delay making controversial decisions.2 After Frano Barbaric, the powerful head of the state-owned energy company HEP, faced serious corruption allegations over the summer, Plenković allowed him to keep his job.3 Instead, the government dismissed the head of the oversight agency that first exposed HEP’s corrupt activities.4 The government then installed a Plenković ally to head the agency, severely undermining its independence.5
  • The EPPO continued to open investigations into cases that the State Prosecutor’s Office either failed to investigate or deemed unproblematic and refused to open criminal investigations and further proceedings. In one case that the EPPO is scrutinizing, several professors at the University of Zagreb’s Faculty of Geodesy were allegedly overpaid using EU funds by the Ministry of Culture, for work that was contracted without a legitimate public procurement process in 2020.6 The minister of culture attacked the media outlets that reported on the scandal and defended the professors, insisting that the work they were contracted for was necessary.7
  • Another close Plenković ally, former Zadar University chancellor Dijana Vican, was arrested for corruption in November.8 Vican’s arrest was part of an ongoing corruption scandal involving the former HDZ mayor of Knin, a former government official, and prominent HDZ member Josipa Rimac. The scandal implicated several other local and national HDZ members. Reports also hinted at Plenković’s potential involvement, as evidenced by the repeated mention of a powerful politician with the initials “AP” (the prime minister’s initials) in text message exchanges between the suspects. However, Plenković’s name was never explicitly stated in the messages.9
  • The government gutted the authority of the parliament’s Conflict of Interest Committee in 2023. The parliament elected a new committee head who was less critical of Plenković in February and hampered the committee’s work with burdensome new obligations that were not accompanied by additional financial or personnel support.10 At the same time, the government refused to cooperate with the committee’s investigations into government officials. For example, the committee was met with resistance during its investigation of government spokesperson Marko Milić, who potentially broke conflict of interest laws.11 Despite ample evidence brought forward this year, Milić has still faced no repercussions for leaning on a state-owned company to hire his friend in 2019.12
  • Local corruption remained prevalent in 2023, particularly in tourist areas along the Adriatic coast, where local public officials, controversial entrepreneurs, and celebrities continued to build real estate illegally.13 Mayors and heads of small municipalities throughout the country were also accused of corruption, including the right-wing head of a small municipality near Zagreb, who was caught securing jobs and opportunities for her daughter and illegally giving her public funds.14 HDZ mayors sometimes used public resources for personal reasons, such as an HDZ mayor in a small island town who used a city-owned car for private purposes,15 and another HDZ mayor who rejected calls16 to help to a local family while spending the public funds of his impoverished municipality on lavish gifts.17 All of these officials remained in office and none of them were investigated over these allegations as of the end of the year.

Author: Dario Čepo is an Associate Professor at the University of Zagreb's Faculty of Law. He teaches introductory courses in sociology and political science. He got his PhD in comparative politics in 2010 at the University of Zagreb’s Faculty of Political Science. In 2013-2014 he was a Fulbright visiting scholar at Columbia University in New York City. In 2022 he was a visiting fellow at the University of Salzburg, as a recipient of the Austrian Academy of Sciences’ Joint Excellence in Science and Humanities scholarship. His major research interests are political institutions, democratic backsliding, fundamental values, and the political system of the European Union. He is the author of several scientific articles, two handbooks – Introduction to Political Science (co-authored with Slaven Ravlić) and General Sociology with the Introduction to the Sociology of Law (co-authored) – as well as one book, Political Institutions of the European Union.

On Croatia

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Population

    3,856,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    82 100 free