The directly elected president serves as both head of state and head of government. Presidents and vice presidents can serve up to two five-year terms. Former general Prabowo Subianto of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) and his running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, son of outgoing President Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi), were elected in February 2024 and took office in October.

Election observers found the general election to be well-administrated and peaceful, although there were irregularities, including intimidation of poll workers, reported by the Election Oversight Agency (Bawaslu). Some voiced concerns that President Jokowi used his office, and particularly the distribution of social assistance during the campaign period, to support his son’s ticket. The Constitutional Court heard testimony from four ministers on social assistance distribution during the campaign period, but found no evidence of wrongdoing and did not overturn the election results.

The House of Representatives (DPR), the main parliamentary chamber, consists of 580 members. Members are elected in 84 multimember districts. The 152-member Regional Representative Council (DPD), which consists of four senators per province, is responsible for monitoring laws related to regional autonomy and may propose bills on the topic to the DPR. All legislators serve five-year terms with no term limits.

Legislative elections were held concurrently with the presidential election in February 2024, and in October senators and representatives were sworn in. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), led by former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, won 16.72 percent of the vote and 110 seats. Golkar, the party of former authoritarian president Suharto, won 102 seats with 15.28 percent of the vote, followed by President Prabowo’s party, Gerindra, with 86 seats and 13.22 percent. The National Democratic Party (NasDem) won 69 seats, while the Democratic Party (PD) of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won 44. Islamic parties—the National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) won 48, 68, and 53 seats, respectively.

The legal framework for elections is largely democratic, and electoral authorities are mostly seen as impartial. A 2016 revision to the law governing local elections requires Bawaslu and the General Elections Commission (KPU) to conduct a binding consultation with the parliament and the government before issuing any new regulations or decisions.

Under a 2012 law, the hereditary sultan of Yogyakarta is that province’s unelected governor.

In Papua, many tribal communities use a consensus voting system known as the noken system, where community leaders cast votes on behalf of the community.

The right to organize political parties is respected, and several major parties compete for power and form coalitions both preceding and following elections. Election eligibility requirements favor large parties. The 2017 General Elections Law (UU PU) requires new parties to undergo a “factual verification” process confirming the accuracy of submitted documents on parties’ management, membership, and operations. Parties must have branches in every province to contest elections.

Communist parties are banned. The promotion of communism is banned under the criminal code passed in 2022, which will take effect in 2026.

Indonesia has established a pattern of democratic power transfers between rival parties since 1999. In 2024 Indonesia held elections for the presidency, parliament, and executives at the provincial, city, and regional levels. It was the first time in Indonesian history that these elections were all held in the same year, aligning the offices’ terms. In order to align the terms of regional executives, the elections included officials whose terms ended between 2022 and 2025. Officials whose terms ended before November 2024 were replaced with government appointees—many of whom subsequently ran in the 2024 elections.

A 2016 law required parties or coalitions nominating candidates to hold 20 percent of the seats in a local legislature or 25 percent of the popular vote in the most recent election, effectively barring new or smaller parties from fielding candidates. The provision was struck down in August 2024 by the Constitutional Court, just before filing deadlines. The court lowered the threshold to between 6.5 and 10 percent of the popular vote, depending on the size of the constituency. The national legislature attempted to bypass the court’s ruling with a new electoral bill, but reneged after widespread protests.

Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court’s ruling came too late to significantly increase electoral competition in the 2024 cycle. Coalitions backing the same candidates meant far fewer choices for voters, and often resulted in a candidate supported by several parties running against a less popular or qualified independent candidate, or even running unopposed. Due to strict requirements for independent candidates and the PDI-P’s announcement it would support Prabowo’s agenda, in 41 of the 545 constituencies candidates for regional executive offices ran unopposed. This left an estimated 24 million people with only one registered candidate. The unopposed mayoral candidate for Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city, was backed by 18 parties. There are signs that this is a rising trend, with a 60 percent increase in candidates running unopposed in the 2024 elections compared to 2020, and a roughly 1300 percent increase when compared to 2015.

The UU PU previously prevented people under the age of 40 from running for president or vice president. In October 2023, the Constitutional Court allowed individuals who had already held an elected office to run for those posts even if they did not meet the age requirement. That exception allowed Gibran Rakabuming Raka, former President Jokowi’s son, to run for vice president alongside Defense Minister Prabowo.

There are growing concerns that the “big tent” politics of President Jokowi have weakened the opposition. This is coupled with a trend towards dynastic politics at the national and local levels—recent research linked 605 out of 1,551 candidate pairs in November’s regional elections to political dynasties.

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 due to a sharp rise in the number of unopposed candidates contesting the November regional elections.

While voters and candidates are generally free from undue interference, the military remains influential, with former commanders playing prominent roles in politics. Intimidation by nonstate actors—including Islamist groups—remains a problem, as is the growing use of online propaganda in political campaigns.

Political choices are also influenced by dynastic dynamics, with family members of Jokowi and other former presidents taking key political roles. Jokowi’s younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, was named chief of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) in 2023, two days after becoming a party member. Jokowi’s brother-in-law, Constitutional Court chief justice Anwar Usman, did not recuse himself from the 2023 petition that ultimately allowed his nephew, Gibran, to become Prabowo’s running mate.

Women enjoy full political rights, and political parties are subject to 30 percent gender quotas for steering committees and candidates. While women remain underrepresented in electoral politics, 22 percent of seats in the DPR were filled by women in the 2024 parliamentary elections, a record. Puan Maharani, daughter of former president Megawati and granddaughter of former president Sukarno, became the first female DPR speaker in 2019.

There are signs that ethnic Chinese Indonesians are steadily increasing their political participation. Two parties with ethnic Chinese ties, the PSI and United Indonesian Party (Perindo), contested the 2024 elections. While neither exceeded the 4-percent parliamentary threshold, both won seats in regional legislatures.

Some local governments have discriminated against religious minorities by restricting access to identification cards, birth certificates, marriage licenses, and other bureaucratic necessities, limiting their political rights and electoral opportunities.

LGBT+ people are poorly represented in electoral politics. While a transgender woman was a candidate in the regional elections held in 2024, transgender people often face difficulties obtaining identity cards, which are required to vote and run for office.

Elected officials generally determine government policies, though national authorities have faced difficulties in implementing their decisions due to local resistance. Observers have warned that the military is regaining influence over civilian governance and economic affairs.

Corruption remains endemic in the national and local legislatures, civil service, cabinet, judiciary, and police. The most common offenses are embezzlement, bribery, and extortion. Acrimony between rival agencies—particularly the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the National Police—has hindered anticorruption efforts, and civilian investigators have no jurisdiction over the military. In 2019, the parliament passed legislation weakening the KPK, requiring all employees to join the civil service and investigators to be from the National Police.

The KPK continues to act as a watchdog, and there are successful investigations and high-level prosecutions annually. Six of former President Jokowi’s ministers have been found guilty in corruption cases and received prison sentences. The KPK itself is also under scrutiny, as its head, Firli Bahuri, and KPK detention center employees are currently facing extortion investigations and charges.

Although civil society groups comment on and influence pending policies or legislation, government transparency is limited by broad exemptions in the freedom of information law and obstacles such as a 2011 law criminalizing leaking vaguely defined “state secrets” to the public.

Indonesia hosts a vibrant and diverse media environment, though legal and regulatory restrictions hamper press freedom. The 2008 Law on Electronic Information and Transactions (UU ITE) extended libel to online media. It also criminalized distribution or accessibility of information or documents “contrary to the moral norms of Indonesia,” or involving gambling, blackmail, or defamation. Journalists carrying out legitimate reporting have been arrested under the UU ITE. Journalists also face physical and digital attacks. In July 2024, a journalist and his family were killed when their home was destroyed in an arson attack following his reporting on military links to illegal gambling in North Sumatra.

Foreign journalists visiting Papua face bureaucratic obstacles and deportation. Internet blackouts during protests and self-censorship have inhibited press activity. Journalists covering sensitive subjects, including LGBT+ issues, organized crime, sexual assault, and corruption, face harassment, violence, and threats.

Indonesia officially recognizes Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Individuals may leave the “religion” section on their identity cards blank, but those who do—including adherents of unrecognized faiths—often face discrimination. Atheism is not accepted legally. The criminal code passed in 2022 and due to take effect in 2026 prohibits blasphemy; those who “incite” someone to convert or refrain from religious adherence would face imprisonment.

National and local governments often fail to protect religious minorities and exhibit bias in investigations and prosecutions. Building a new house of worship requires signatures of 90 congregation members and 60 local residents of different faiths. As of 2024, the government was considering revising the 2006 Joint Ministerial Decision on houses of worship, which has been cited as a driver of religious conflict.

Violence and intimidation against Ahmadi and Shiite communities persists.

Threats to academic freedom have increased in recent years. Hard-line groups and others are known to threaten discussions on LGBT+ matters, interfaith issues, Papua, police violence, and the 1965–66 anticommunist massacres. Academics have been charged with defamation and removed from their posts for criticism of public officials.

Public academic discussions regarding Papua have been canceled and organizers surveilled and threatened. Students, student union leaders, and others involved in Papua-related campus protests continue to face intimidation, arrest, and treason charges, with authorities linking protests to secessionist movements.

University rectors have reported pressure from the Ministry of Education to curb student protests. The education minister’s vote accounts for 35 percent of the total vote share in the election of university rectors, making selection dependent upon their relationship with the ministry. Rectors have been known to put pressure on academics who vocally disagree with government policies. In 2024, a dean of medical faculty was dismissed after he publicly espoused an opinion that countered government policy in his field.

A 2021 presidential regulation declared that Indonesia’s national philosophical ideology, Pancasila, would guide research and innovation policy. Academics fear authorities could use this decree to prohibit research deemed incompatible with Pancasila.

Laws against blasphemy, the criminalization of defamation, and certain other forms of speech inhibit expression of personal views on sensitive topics, especially online. Under the new criminal code those who insult government institutions verbally or in writing face imprisonment or fines. The code also prohibits public attacks on the “honor or dignity” of the president or vice president, including through technological means.

Amendments to the UU ITE, which also impacts online discourse in Indonesia, came into force in January 2024. The International Commission of Jurists criticized the amended law’s provisions on purportedly false information and criminal defamation, though the law also contains a public-interest exception for the latter offense. The amended UU ITE also prohibits expression that fosters “feelings of hatred or hostility” for protected individuals.

In 2020, the National Police issued instructions to surveil activists online and engage in creating progovernment counternarratives. The 2021 creation of the Virtual Police unit within the National Police has reportedly led to self-censorship.

Ministerial Regulation 5 (MR5) requires private digital services and platforms to register with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology or risk being blocked. Critics allege that MR5 poses privacy and freedom-of-speech risks and provides a tool for government to censor legitimate speech by placing undue burdens on platforms and services.

Civil servants are subject to restrictions on online activity. A government task force reviews “radical” social media comments from civil servants, including perceived insults or criticisms of Pancasila, the state motto, the constitution, or the government. Civil servants cannot join organizations deemed to insult the country’s governing principles.

The government is known to surveil and detain individuals who discuss separatism in Maluku or Papua or fly the Papuan Morning Star or the Republic of South Maluku flag. Such individuals continue to face charges of treason and lengthy prison sentences if found guilty.

Protests are common and freedom of assembly is generally upheld, but recent years have seen increasing use of protest-related internet disruptions and the use of force against protestors, particularly in Papua. Assemblies addressing sensitive political topics—such as the 1965–66 massacres or regional separatism—are regularly dispersed, with participants facing intimidation or violence from vigilantes or police.

A 2013 law requires nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register with the government and submit to regular reviews of their activities. The law targets NGOs that commit blasphemy or espouse ideas conflicting with Pancasila, such as atheism and communism. The government can dissolve noncompliant organizations without judicial oversight.

Authorities and influential Muslim organizations continue to intimidate and harass LGBT+ communities, organizations, and activists, hampering groups seeking to provide services to LGBT+ people.

Human rights and environmental activists continue to be investigated under the UU ITE and sentenced to prison for posts on social media.

Activists working to address human rights violations in Papua and expose endemic corruption are often targeted by authorities or progovernment supporters.

Workers can join unions, bargain collectively, and, with the exception of civil servants, stage strikes. Strikes can be unduly delayed by obligatory arbitration processes, and laws against anti-union discrimination and retaliation are poorly enforced. Under a memorandum of understanding signed in 2018, the military can assist police in dealing with strikes and demonstrations.

The 2020 omnibus law abolished sectoral minimum wages and limits unions’ negotiating power, with wages set by geography. The law, which was formulated without union consultation, extends outsourcing and reduces the number of statutory days off.

The judiciary has demonstrated its independence in some cases, particularly in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. However, the court system remains plagued by corruption and other weaknesses. Judicial decisions can be influenced by religious considerations.

Police reportedly engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions, particularly of protesters or activists suspected of separatism. Existing safeguards against coerced confessions are ineffective, and defendants are sometimes denied proper access to legal counsel, including in death penalty cases.

In 2021, the government began designating Papuan separatists as terrorists under the 2018 antiterrorism law; such individuals had previously faced treason charges under the criminal code. Activists criticized the move, warning it would allow the authorities to hold people without charge for long periods.

Aceh Province uses an interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) to guide punishments and regulations. A number of districts and provinces additionally have unconstitutional Sharia-based ordinances that contradict Indonesia’s international human rights commitments.

Deadly confrontations involving security forces remain common in the Papua region, and have increased in geographic scope, intensity, and frequency since 2018. Security forces have conducted torture and extrajudicial killings of suspected separatists and civilians, particularly in Papua. Civilians have also been caught in crossfire between the military and armed groups in Papua.

Military personnel accused of crimes against civilians are tried in military courts, which lack impartiality and often impose light punishments, even for serious human rights violations. Torture by law enforcement agencies is not explicitly criminalized. Prisons are overcrowded and corrupt, leading to riots, protests, fires, and jailbreaks.

Papuan separatists have targeted security forces and civilians. The West Papua Liberation Army (TPN-PB), the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), took Philip Mehrtens, a New Zealander pilot, hostage in February 2023 after destroying his plane; he was released to Indonesian authorities in September 2024 on humanitarian grounds.

Under Sharia-based regulations, Aceh provincial authorities may use caning as punishment for offenses related to gambling, alcohol consumption, and illicit sexual activity.

Papuans face racial discrimination, including from authorities and political parties.

Some national laws and numerous local ordinances discriminate against women either explicitly or in effect. LGBT+ people suffer from widespread discrimination, inflammatory and discriminatory rhetoric from authorities, and attacks by hardline Islamist groups. Ethnic Chinese, who make up approximately 1 percent of the population, are vulnerable to harassment.

Indonesia grants temporary protection to refugees and migrants but is not party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and does not accept refugees for asylum and resettlement. However, over 13,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers currently reside in Indonesia. Most are considered in transit to their ultimate destination and have no access to the formal labor market and limited health care, although they may have been in Indonesia for over a decade. While the Indonesian government recognizes the principle of nonrefoulement, these individuals are at risk of deportation in practice.

Freedom to travel and change one’s place of residence, employment, or higher education is generally respected. However, Indonesians engaging in these administrative processes are sometimes vulnerable to bribery. Papuans face restrictions on movement from security forces.

UN experts have expressed concern over ongoing violence and internal displacement in the Papua region. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre counted 55,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict at the end of 2023. IDPs often flee without their identity cards, leaving them without access to services, while aid groups have documented poor living conditions in camps.

Despite a robust private sector, corruption hampers business activity. Property rights are threatened by state appropriation and licensing of communally owned land to companies, particularly impacting Indigenous communities and others with unregistered or customary land rights. Women have relatively poor rights to marital property. Ethnic Chinese in Yogyakarta face restrictions on private property ownership under a 1975 decree contravening national laws.

The government and some companies have responded to agrarian and land conflicts across the country by targeting residents, including Indigenous peoples, with violence, intimidation, evictions, and criminal proceedings that carry steep fines and prison sentences. Over the past decade, at least 2,442 criminal cases have been brought against farmers, landowners, residents, and Indigenous people attempting to assert land rights.

Abortion is illegal except as life-saving treatment or in instances of rape. Adults over the age of 15 must have corroboration and witnesses to bring rape charges.

In 2022, the parliament passed a sexual violence bill, which criminalizes sexual harassment, forced contraception and sterilization, forced marriage, sexual torture, slavery and exploitation, online sexual violence, and marital rape. It also addresses sexual violence perpetrated against men and boys.

The criminal code approved in 2022, which comes into effect in 2026, prohibits cohabitation of unmarried people as well as consensual extramarital sex. Same-sex marriage is illegal in Indonesia and Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that millions of couples without marriage certificates would run afoul of the new code. The criminal code also prohibits disseminating information about contraception to minors.

The minimum age for marriage is set at 19. Marriages must be conducted under the supervision of a recognized religion, which obstructs interfaith marriages.

Local Sharia-based ordinances in many districts impose restrictions on dress, gambling, alcohol use, public displays of affection, and sexual activity; these ordinances are disproportionately enforced against women and LGBT+ people.

Authorities set working conditions and compensation standards, but enforcement is inconsistent. Indonesia is both a source and destination country for human trafficking, with trafficking in domestic service, the fishing industry, and increasingly, trafficking of Indonesians into online scam compounds in Myanmar. Rohingya individuals from Myanmar have been trafficked into Indonesia by sea and there is increasing evidence they are also being smuggled from Indonesia to third countries.