Policy Recommendations

After 20 consecutive years of deterioration, the struggle for global freedom has reached an ominous milestone. Erosion of democratic institutions in many countries over the past two decades has coincided with the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, which now possess both the confidence and the capacity to reshape the international order. Autocracies have clearly seized the initiative, increasing the broader threat to fundamental freedoms and the risk of instability and conflict if the democratic community fails to meet the challenge. 

In the era following World War II and especially after the end of the Cold War, Washington and its allies worked to advance the tenets of the UN Charter and international law, including the central principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination. They understood that when these rules of the international system are applied selectively or set aside altogether, the result is a more dangerous and chaotic world, in which various powers jockey endlessly for dominance and resources, preying on smaller nations when they are not clashing with one another. However, democratic leadership has weakened in recent decades, and democratic governments themselves have resorted to the use of force outside clear legal constraints, effectively participating in authoritarian efforts to break down international safeguards against aggression and conquest.

The waning of democracies’ traditional defense of the international order accelerated in 2025 under the second administration of US President Donald Trump, but no democracy is solely responsible. The democratic community as a whole has proven unwilling or unable to consistently uphold its values or act in a coordinated, sustained, and adequately scaled manner, as leaders prioritize short-term economic or security goals over principled and systematic engagement on freedom and democracy issues.

At the same time, multilateral institutions—most notably the United Nations—have faced mounting challenges in their efforts to prevent and manage conflict, as key bodies are increasingly distorted or obstructed by authoritarian powers such as China and Russia. The problem has been exacerbated by the US government’s withdrawal of funding and political backing for international democracy assistance, anticorruption projects, multilateral human rights mechanisms, and international organizations. The consequences have been significant, and Washington’s democratic allies have yet to fill the resulting leadership vacuum. Indeed, many have reduced their own spending on democracy and human rights programs as they divert resources to address urgent social and defense needs.

Although the postwar international order has always been imperfect, it set the conditions for an unusually long period of peace between great powers, enabling a large and growing share of humanity to live in security and prosperity. To uphold this framework and preserve hope that the benefits of democratic governance can reach an ever-greater number of people around the world, the democratic community must respond with urgency and resolve, and new champions of freedom must step forward.

If we fail to act, authoritarian models of governance will continue to gain traction, international institutions will continue to be hollowed out or repurposed to advance illiberal norms, and the use of military force and economic coercion will become increasingly common—transforming global politics, markets, and security conditions in ways that directly harm the interests and values of open societies.

As the democratic community adapts to the severe funding cuts and operational disruptions of 2025, this year’s Freedom in the World recommendations urge policymakers, practitioners, and partners to come together to strengthen democratic coordination and collective action in a contested global order, reimagine international democracy assistance, and prioritize engagement with younger generations.

Click on the boxes below to read the full recommendations.

Strengthen democratic coordination and collective action in a contested global order.

Democratic resilience will increasingly depend on stronger coordination among countries that share a commitment to freedom, the rule of law, and accountable governance. As authoritarian states deepen their own cooperation across security, economic, and information domains, democracies must improve their capacity to act collectively, support one another economically and militarily, and resist coercion.

• Democracies should exert greater collective leadership at the regional level and within international organizations to defend democratic norms and the rules-based international order. All democracies have a stake in sustaining respect for international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination, and democracies with smaller populations or shared borders with authoritarian powers are especially vulnerable when these rules are weakened or applied selectively. Democratic countries of all sizes should therefore engage actively in principled regional diplomacy, coalition building, and consistent bloc voting within international institutions. By coordinating their positions with like-minded partners; supporting the election of democratic states to leadership roles in relevant international and regional bodies; strengthening scrutiny of member-state compliance with charters and treaties; and jointly censuring coups, rigged elections, and violations of term limits, democratic governments can amplify their influence and reinforce both collaboration and credibility—not only within the multilateral and regional organizations in question, but also among their partners and allies in general. The experience of many countries demonstrates that democracy and national security are deeply intertwined, and that defending democratic norms is not an abstract moral stance, but rather a practical strategy for safeguarding stability, independence, and resilience in an increasingly hostile environment.
• Reduce strategic vulnerabilities created by economic dependence on authoritarian regimes. Democracies should take steps to reduce their reliance on technologies, natural resources, critical industrial inputs, and manufactured goods from authoritarian states that use economic leverage to coerce or undermine democratic decision-making, and that enforce exploitative and repressive labor practices to maintain unfair competitive advantages. Governments should encourage responsible supply-chain practices and align trade, investment, and procurement policies with democratic values and human rights standards, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Democracies should also work together to shape international standards for emerging sectors of global trade, technology, and commerce—such as artificial intelligence—so that authoritarian governments cannot set the rules in ways that erode freedom or distort open markets. Greater transparency and coordination can help limit authoritarian influence while protecting democratic resilience and economic security.
• Confront corruption and close financial pathways that sustain authoritarian rule. Democracies should work together to shut down the loopholes that allow authoritarian elites to launder stolen assets, hide wealth in opaque structures, or exploit democratic financial systems. The effort must include fortifying anticorruption institutions, strengthening financial regulations, investing in innovative enforcement tools, and supporting independent investigative journalists and civil society watchdogs. Democratic partners with the capacity to exert diplomatic pressure should help sustain political will for reforms in countries vulnerable to backsliding, while coordinated initiatives—such as joint task forces targeting international bribery and cross-border corruption—demonstrate the kind of collective action that is needed. The international community must expand domestic and transnational enforcement, root out illicit finance, and ensure that no jurisdiction becomes a haven for enablers of corruption.
• Withhold legitimacy from authoritarian leaders and undemocratic power grabs. Democratic governments should avoid actions that confer symbolic or political validation on repressive regimes, in part because treating authoritarian rulers as diplomatic equals alters their incentives and reduces pressure to reform. While engagement with undemocratic counterparts is sometimes necessary, it should not come with the honors or recognition afforded to freely elected officials. Democratic leaders should refrain from congratulating the “winners” of rigged elections and should work with partners and allies to swiftly denounce coups, fraudulent electoral processes, and violations of term limits—restricting foreign assistance where appropriate. Significant international sporting and cultural events should not be hosted by authoritarian regimes, and coordinated diplomatic responses can help ensure that such governments are not granted the legitimacy or adulation they seek.

Reimagine international democracy assistance to help reverse the global decline in freedom.

International support for democratic institutions, civil society, and independent media has been associated with modest but meaningful improvements in democratic governance, and it is far less costly than the military outlays necessitated by rising authoritarian aggression. Research indicates that targeted democracy assistance can contribute to incremental gains even if it cannot, on its own, counter broader authoritarian pressures. Freedom House’s emergency assistance programs, for example, have helped protect more than 14,000 human rights defenders over the past decade—an illustration of how vital such support can be. But assistance alone cannot succeed if democratic donor governments fail to uphold the same values in their diplomacy, or if they apply them inconsistently. Even before the defunding and dismantling of major democracy assistance mechanisms in 2025, global freedom had been in decline for nearly two decades, and existing international efforts were not sufficient to match the scale and coordination of today’s authoritarian challenge. Meeting this moment will require new ideas, sharper prioritization, and far greater flexibility in how democratic support is designed and delivered.

• Democracy assistance cannot survive on shrinking public budgets alone; it requires a broader, more diversified, and more coordinated financing ecosystem, including public-private partnerships that draw on governments, philanthropy, and the private sector. Public funding cuts in the United States and other democracies have exposed the dangers of relying on any single government or funding stream, especially as urgent defense needs and political skepticism toward foreign aid reshape official budgets. The private sector has a direct interest in the rule of law, transparency, and accountable governance, which underpin long-term stability and predictable markets; organized labor similarly has an interest in upholding freedom of association and related rights abroad, rather than attempting to compete with severely mistreated counterparts in authoritarian states. Philanthropy, meanwhile, remains an underutilized partner: Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development show that less than 1 percent of cross-border private giving goes to governance, human rights, and democracy work, despite growing recognition that democratic backsliding threatens many of the social and rights-based priorities that philanthropic foundations support. Existing models already demonstrate how a more distributed approach can function, including emergency assistance portfolios backed by multiple governments and complemented by philanthropic and private-sector contributions. To scale up these models, Freedom House has called for the creation of a Global Freedom Fund that would mobilize public, sovereign, institutional, and philanthropic capital in a sustained, strategic manner to strengthen democratic institutions, combat corruption, protect civic space, and support independent media. An investment in freedom is an investment in the operating system that enables security, prosperity, stability, and open markets. Different stakeholders will approach this work with different incentives, but the ultimate purpose of democracy assistance is to uphold human dignity, fundamental rights, and economic and national security.

  Among these stakeholders, the United States plays a uniquely powerful role. As the largest historical contributor to global democracy support, the country has an outsized influence on whether democratic institutions worldwide can withstand coordinated authoritarian pressure. Sustaining that leadership will require renewed bipartisan commitment, as well as deeper engagement from all the components of American society—including philanthropic foundations, the private sector, and organized labor—whose long‑term interests in stability, transparency, open markets, and fair competition align closely with continued US support for the health of global freedom. This is a moment when democratic norms are under strain, and those in the United States who value freedom, security, and prosperity have a critical part to play in reinforcing the broader global ecosystem that enables democratic institutions to succeed.

• In an era of constrained resources, stronger donor coordination and alignment on priority issues is essential, and each effort must be customized to the needs on the ground. Coordination is improving in some areas, but donors must do more to avoid duplication and establish complementary priorities that reflect where limited resources can most effectively counter democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. This requires more rigorous measurement of results, so that funding decisions are grounded in evidence about what works and where support can have the greatest impact. Amid myriad challenges to global freedom, our analysis of the last 20 years offers a clear indication of where collective action is urgently needed: media freedom, freedom of personal expression, and due process rights have suffered the steepest deterioration, and democracy assistance can play a critical role in helping to bolster these fundamental liberties. Freedom House has written extensively on such rights in previous reports, but greater attention should now be focused on the diverse tactics that governments from across the democracy–autocracy spectrum have adopted—including heavy-handed media regulation, overt censorship, digital surveillance, and politicized prosecution—to chip away at each of them. It is also important to emphasize that the pattern of attacks on fundamental freedoms has intensified pressure on the individuals and organizations working to defend them.
• Strengthen protection and long-term support for at-risk human rights defenders and embattled civil society organizations. Repression against journalists, activists, lawyers, and community leaders continues unabated in countries ruled by authoritarian governments, and international programs that historically helped protect and empower these rights defenders have been weakened by funding cuts. In the face of shrinking resources and escalating risk, donors and implementing partners should move toward more sustainable, locally grounded protection systems that reinforce the resilience of civil society and individual activists on the front lines of freedom. This should include supporting decentralized networks of local and regional partners, ensuring rapid and flexible access to emergency resources, and investing in longer-term capacity building so that rights defenders can withstand ongoing pressure without relying solely on external assistance. International actors should also strengthen partnerships that connect global reach with local legitimacy, reinforcing protection mechanisms that will endure even amid geopolitical and financial headwinds.

Prioritize engagement with younger generations in the digital spaces where civic identity is now formed.

Young people are increasingly dissatisfied with democracy—not because they reject its principles, but because they see institutions failing to deliver on them. Programmatic work should create clear pathways for meaningful political participation, from voting and policy engagement to community organizing and public leadership, so that young people can translate their expectations into agency. Investment in younger generations is an essential part of any long-term strategy to ensure that democratic norms remain relevant, resilient, and capable of renewal in the decades ahead.

At the same time, young people’s political identities and awareness are shaped primarily online, where they rely more on content creators and peer networks than on traditional information sources. Democracy assistance programs should respond by expanding digital civic education and media literacy campaigns that emphasize democratic values and rights. Support should include intergenerational initiatives that foster mentorship between experienced leaders and young people. It is critical to incorporate independent journalists, content creators, educators, and civil society actors who can engage young audiences authentically, as well as initiatives that strengthen open, safe, and rights-respecting digital ecosystems.

In particular, policymakers and donors should prioritize efforts to counter manipulation of the online environment, including state-backed influence operations and the use of fraudulent or fabricated content for deceptive purposes in electoral campaigns. Laws aimed at increasing platform responsibility, such as those that boost transparency, provide platform data to vetted researchers, and protect free expression, are needed to ensure that reliable information can flourish online. Governments should avoid mandating that platforms implement age-verification or age-assurance systems, which may unintentionally inhibit young people’s participation in political discussions.