More Action Needed to Ensure Safety: Combating Transnational Repression in Australia

Introduction

“[You] will be targeted for death by my Cambodian third hand squad,” warned a letter that arrived at the office of the Cambodian-born Australian politician Meng Heang Tak after he criticized the Cambodian regime ahead of that country’s sham elections.1 Letters sent to the neighbors of a prominent Hong Kong prodemocracy activist living in Melbourne asked them to inform on this individual to police or the Chinese embassy in return for a bounty.2 Tina Kordrostami, an Iranian-born councilwoman from the northern Sydney region who routinely speaks out about repression in Iran, has experienced both online harassment and in-person stalking.3 Alongside these incidents, many Uyghur, Tibetan, Rwandan, Eritrean, Saudi, and Sikh people living in Australia have also been subjected to surveillance, intimidation, and digital threats.4

About half of Australia’s population is either foreign born or has a foreign-born parent,5 and the country is near several states—Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam—whose governments have track records of trying to silence and intimidate exiled dissidents and diasporas. The Australian government is highly attuned to the general threats posed by foreign interference activities, such as covert intelligence collection and illicit political influence, and is engaged with communities at risk of transnational repression specifically. However, Australian laws do not define transnational repression, and legislation aimed at deterring foreign interference requires further review to assess its efficacy in deterring extraterritorial threats.6 Activists have also noted a lack of responsiveness from authorities after reporting threats and incidents.7 In terms of foreign policy, the government has made commitments to combat transnational repression through multilateral action with like-minded states but has not pursued accountability for human rights violations through sanctions and visa bans. Although Australia is a multicultural country, its restrictive asylum policies risk putting people into situations where they are exposed to transnational repression in third countries or while awaiting permanent legal status.

Security Policy

For decades, the domestic intelligence agency, Australia Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), has identified clandestine and deceptive acts done by or on behalf of foreign governments as foreign interference.8 In the mid-2000s, ASIO began to explicitly acknowledge the extraterritorial targeting of exiled activists and diaspora critics as a distinct type of foreign interference.9 In 2017, reports of Chinese government efforts to control diaspora communities and student groups, silence dissidents, and alter electoral outcomes prompted Australian politicians to adopt legislation to address foreign interference10 and to establish structures within the Department of Home Affairs, ASIO, and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), among other agencies, to oversee a response.

Government resources

The Home Affairs Department leads “whole of government efforts to counter foreign interference” through its National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC), who leads the Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre (CFICC).11 Established as a new role in 2018, the NCFIC works to increase the resilience of Australians to foreign interference.12 The CFICC supports the NCFIC by implementing the government’s countering foreign interference (CFI) strategy and bolstering engagement with relevant groups. In addition to its domestic campaigns, the CFICC consults with partners in other governments.

Agencies of the federal government have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how transnational repression manifests in the country. The Home Affairs Department has produced publicly available documents that specify transnational repression tactics and acknowledge that malign foreign actions imperil Australia’s social cohesion.13 Importantly, the government has recognized a chilling effect and interference with democratic rights as impacts of “foreign interference in the community”—a term employed by officials that encompasses transnational repression.14 The AFP has created public material on foreign interference in diaspora communities; fact sheets in 41 languages—including Kinyarwanda, Mandarin, Punjabi, and Persian15—outline common tactics used by foreign governments against what the Australian government describes as culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities.16

In terms of enforcement, the Australian government established the Counter Foreign Interference Task Force (CFIT) in 2020. Run by the ASIO and AFP, the CFIT seeks to “identify, assess, investigate, disrupt and, where possible, prosecute acts of foreign interference.”17 CFIT members direct intelligence operations and regular policing and review legislation to determine whether certain acts qualify as criminal. In ASIO’s 2024 Annual Threat Briefing, Director-General Mike Burgess stated that, since its inception, the CFIT had conducted over 120 operations to address threats against communities and foreign interference, and that successful disruptions had increased by 265 percent since 2020.18 Foiled plots included instances of foreign governments trying to physically harm and disappear dissidents. At the time of writing this report, the CFIT was investigating bounty letters targeting Australia-based Hong Kong activist Kevin Yam and former Hong Kong politician Ted Hui.19

Although the Australian government has included communities in its response, framing transnational repression as a subset of foreign interference has some drawbacks. Firstly, as researchers Andrew Chubb and Kirsten Roberts Lyer have argued, situating responses to cross-border coercion alongside espionage risks painting immigrant communities as sources of threats to Australia’s sovereignty and institutions.20 Secondly, transnational repression negatively affects both societies and individuals. Consequently, potential remedies need to pay attention to the specific human rights harms that are produced among a group of people that share a connection to a foreign state and therefore a vulnerability.21 Focusing primarily on national security may overshadow the widespread effects on individuals and groups. Ramila Chanisheff, president of the Australian Uyghur Tangritagh Women’s Association, believes that while foreign interference is “government to government,” transnational repression is “government to people.”22

Community outreach

For prevention and monitoring, the Home Affairs Department instructs targeted individuals to report suspected foreign interference to the National Security Hotline or to call 000, Australia’s emergency number. Community leaders have flagged that few people use the hotline to report transnational repression incidents.23 The government does not publicize the number of reports of transnational repression and does not provide public updates on investigations for national security reasons. Some diaspora community members have been disappointed by the lack of information about government responses to cases reported to the hotline and by a lack of clarity about what to do about incidents, such as coercion of family members abroad, that may fall outside Australia’s legal jurisdiction.24

Direct engagement with diaspora groups is a core responsibility of the CFICC and Australian law enforcement. To complement its online awareness-raising efforts, Home Affairs employs its Community Liaison Officers Network and CFICC partnership teams across the country to reach out to local organizations and representatives of immigrant civil society associations.25 In July 2023, Home Affairs reported that it had met with several prominent communities targeted by foreign interference, including Cambodian, Chinese, Eritrean, Iranian, and Russian residents of Australia since February 2023 alone.26 The CFIT’s work through the AFP’s five community liaison teams, which are based in Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney, focuses on building the trust of Australia’s CALD communities in local police to assist with ongoing and future investigations related to transnational repression.27 One limitation on this form of outreach, however, is that counter–foreign interference liaisons must also interact with businesses, universities, and other sectors perceived to be exposed to external threats. This big-tent approach focused primarily on identifying national security threats consequently constrains the capacity of officers to regularly meet specifically with diaspora leaders in order to monitor authoritarian efforts to hinder freedom of expression.

A related gap in the government’s outreach efforts is the lack of follow-up for issues raised by CALD community representatives. Within Australia’s federal system, state and local law enforcement are less aware of the systematic nature of transnational repression.28 Training for police is insufficient to enable them to swiftly act upon reports they receive. A lack of awareness is especially problematic when individuals report the use of nonphysical tactics of transnational repression such as online surveillance or coercion by proxy. Additionally, when concerns are reported, it is often unclear how officials respond or whether they share information among themselves. For example, at a 2025 roundtable with the assistant immigration minister, several Iranian Australians voiced their frustrations that a suspected Iranian regime agent had been able to flee the country without facing consequences for harassing community members.29 Some Iranian diaspora members had reported their suspicions to appropriate agencies, but there appeared to have been little follow-up.

Legislative efforts

In 2018, following what then–Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull termed “disturbing reports of Chinese influence,” Parliament adopted the Espionage and Foreign Interference (EFI) Act and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) Act.30 The EFI Act introduced criminal penalties of up to 20 years in prison for intentionally or unintentionally “supporting a foreign intelligence agency”—an offense that includes spying on individuals in diasporas for other governments.31 Meanwhile, the FITS Act required individuals and businesses to register political activity carried out on behalf of foreign principals or face prosecution.32 Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee chair, Andrew Hastie, explained that these laws arose “to protect diaspora groups from coercion by foreign state actors.”33

However, the scope, language, and uneven implementation of these laws have limited their utility. The EFI Act outlaws foreign interference with an “Australian democratic political right or duty,” potentially limiting its application to Australian citizens and excluding many targets of transnational repression who do not have citizenship.34 An explanatory memorandum to the law underlines how it particularly applies to violations of the rights to protest and vote, effectively rendering it narrower in scope than the National Security Act of the United Kingdom (UK), which bans foreign interference contravening the broader collection of rights to expression and everyday political activities enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.35 Finally, vague language in the EFI Act related to the definition of national security as well as its failure to include a public interest defense led UN special rapporteurs and other human rights observers to express concerns about its impact on free speech and the potential for prosecutions of criticism directed at Australia’s foreign policy.36 The FITS Act has likewise come under criticism for its unclear definition of key terms such as “on behalf of” and “foreign principals.”37 For example, Confucius Institutes—identified by the US government as “an entity advancing Beijing’s global propaganda and malign influence campaigns”38—exploited the legislation’s ambiguity by failing to voluntarily register under FITS, only doing so after a ministerial order.39 A March 2024 parliamentary review of the foreign registry concluded that the FITS Act was in need of significant reform and that it had not blunted the transnational repression campaigns of foreign governments.40

Since its enactment, prosecutors have used the EFI Act to charge individuals in three foreign interference cases,41 only one of which concerns transnational repression. In August 2025, a Chinese Australian national was charged with one count of reckless foreign interference for allegedly gathering intelligence on a Buddhist association for China’s Public Security Bureau.42

Foreign Policy

Australia has signed on to a number of multilateral commitments to combat transnational repression but has not taken any unilateral measures to pursue accountability. While the government has advocated in specific transnational repression cases, diaspora communities have been frustrated by a lack of systematic responses to authoritarian targeting through foreign policy.

Multilateral commitments, but no sanctions

In 2023, the Australian government was one of just nine governments to endorse Freedom House’s Declaration of Principles to Combat Transnational Repression in the lead-up to the Summit for Democracy. The declaration acknowledged transnational repression as an issue in need of “urgent attention and response.”43 A year later, Australia was part of a group of 45 countries that made a joint statement on transnational repression at the United Nations Human Rights Council; the statement identified the threat posed by transnational repression to sovereignty, democracy, and human rights, and resolved to support targeted individuals and communities, as well as “increase the cost to and [hold] accountable those who engage in these acts.”44 More recently, Australia joined the UK and Canada as a partner in the Common Good Cyber Fund.45 The fund was established in June 2025 during the Group of Seven (G7) summit as part of a broader effort to counter transnational repression.46 It is designed to support civil society actors “at high risk” of state threats such as digital transnational repression and malicious cyber activity.47 This commitment reinforced an earlier one made by the Australian government to be among the countries that signed on to a US-led joint statement, introduced during the 2023 Summit for Democracy, on countering the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware.48 Digital transnational repression is a ubiquitous form of pressure applied to individuals and groups speaking out against authoritarian regimes. Freedom House’s research has shown that at least 19 countries of the 48 identified as perpetrators of transnational repression have used spyware to facilitate the collection of information on targeted individuals, and that at least 28 have been connected to digital threats.

Unlike the UK, the United States, the Council of Europe, and Canada, Australia has never used sanctions to respond to transnational repression, even in the face of similar threats. For example, the United States announced sanctions in March 2025 against Chinese and Hong Kong officials in response to the issuing of bounties on Hong Kong activists.49 Despite also being home to Hong Kong activists facing bounties, the Australian government has so far not followed suit. Australia’s autonomous sanctions regime, which was adopted in 2021 and complements sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, covers six areas, including serious violations or abuses of human rights.50 During a recent review of the legislation, Australian civil society groups noted that Australia’s application of unilateral sanctions “has been limited, delayed, overly-cautious and selective.”51 As of March 2025, Australia has imposed unilateral thematic sanctions on 19 entities and 109 individuals; the majority have been for serious violations or abuses of human rights, suggesting that there is a mechanism to address at least some forms of transnational repression.

The decision to sanction a person or entity is “primarily based on foreign policy considerations” and lies with the minister of foreign affairs, who must consult with the attorney-general.52 In interviews with Freedom House, diaspora activists and researchers said that the existing framework lacked meaningful ways for diaspora groups to formally suggest individuals or entities for sanctioning, and that requests made through existing channels (i.e., directly to the minister) were usually not responded to substantively.53 By contrast, in the United States, the so-called Khashoggi Visa Ban, named after the murdered Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi, is applied in coordination with a working group that accepts submissions from civil society groups.54 In Australia, a lack of clear communication and government responsiveness has left activists in the dark about how sanctioning decisions are made; this was a point emphasized by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade during a 2025 review. The committee recommended that detailed reasons for the designation accompany sanctions decisions in the future.55

Ad hoc responses and competing geopolitical considerations

In 2023, the government created the Counter Foreign Interference division at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). To date, it remains unclear whether this body has done active work on the issue of transnational repression. Public communication about its operation has focused on attempts by foreign governments to undermine Australia’s sovereignty and decision-making, rather than on the targeting of diaspora communities.56

Outside of sanctions, countries have a number of foreign policy tools at their disposal to address human rights violations, including diplomatic efforts to raise awareness about individual cases. The Australian government appears to have taken advantage of opportunities to engage directly with foreign governments on the issue of transnational repression, although in an ad hoc way. In early August 2025, for example, it was reported that the minister of foreign affairs, Penny Wong, raised the issue of bounties issued against prodemocracy Hong Kong activists living in Australia with her Chinese counterpart in a face-to-face meeting.57 In 2019, then–Minister of Foreign Affairs Marise Payne engaged directly with Thai authorities over the detention of Hakeem al-Araibi, a Bahraini football player who had sought and received asylum in Australia but was erroneously detained in Bangkok on a politically motivated Interpol notice while traveling for his honeymoon.58

Despite these efforts, diaspora activists interviewed expressed their perception that Australia’s foreign policy prioritizes trade and security over human rights issues. Specifically, they pointed to the growth of ties between Australia and countries that are known to employ tactics of transnational repression, including China59 (Australia’s largest two-way trading partner60), Vietnam,61 and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.62 Recent trade and travel agreements between Australia and these countries can create the impression that geopolitical considerations outweigh calls for accountability for tactics of authoritarian repression.

Migration Policy

Australia has long been a multicultural country, with a refugee resettlement program that dates back decades. Since the turn of the century, however, officials have adopted increasingly restrictive asylum processes, and the migration system contains significant protection gaps for those fleeing persecution.

Offshoring asylum

Since 2001, successive Australian governments have prevented migrants arriving by boat from reaching the country’s shores by sending them to Nauru or Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG).63 Offshoring asylum processing can expose migrants to the threat of transnational repression. In 2014, Prime Minister Tony Abbott signed an agreement with Cambodia to resettle asylum seekers from Nauru, despite Phnom Penh’s prior deportation of Montagnard and Uyghur individuals to Vietnam and China, respectively.64 Cambodian authorities have not only facilitated the cross-border campaigns of other governments, but have also carried out transnational repression against Australia-based Cambodians.65 Although only seven individuals were relocated to Cambodia over four years, such arrangements with known participants in acts of transnational repression heighten the precarity of asylum seekers.

Canberra closed the detention center in PNG in 2021 and announced the end of processing on Nauru in June 2023; nonetheless, there remained over 60 asylum seekers on Manus Island and around 100 on Nauru as of January 2025.66 Over the last twelve years, many of the roughly 3,200 people blocked from entering Australia were from Iran, Pakistan, and Vietnam—all perpetrators of transnational repression.67

Challenges to nonrefoulement

From 2014 to 2024, for individuals who arrived by boat without a valid visa, officials not only relied on offshore asylum processing but also applied “Fast Track” reviews to deny over 7,200 people permanent protection visas, a legal status that provides a pathway to eventual citizenship.68 Instead, these asylum seekers received short-term temporary protection visas. As research into transnational repression has shown,69 individuals without permanent legal status in a host country may feel less safe reporting incidents to law enforcement or may refrain from exercising their rights for fear of drawing the attention of authorities. The Fast Track policy left thousands of people, many of whom had fled from Iran, in limbo, unable to benefit from permanent protection and facing deportation. This policy ended in 2024, but around the same time, legislators passed new laws to reduce safeguards for asylum seekers and enable their removal.70

The country’s approach to extraditions and transnational legal cooperation has been uneven and has at times undermined the principle of nonrefoulement. On the one hand, the Extradition Act 1988 forbids extradition for politically motivated reasons or when someone is targeted based on their race, sexual orientation, religion, or nationality.71 Yet Canberra has signed extradition treaties with noteworthy transnational repression perpetrators such as Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.72 Australia continued to field mutual legal assistance requests—a tool of extraterritorial targeting—from China, even after suspending an extradition treaty with Hong Kong in 2020.73 Mutual legal assistance treaties, which enable countries to share information with one another during criminal investigations, have also been misused by transnational repression perpetrators: Chinese police have visited Australia to pressure residents to return to China under these agreements in the past.74

In principle, Australian law enforcement and immigration agencies mitigate the risk of Interpol abuse—a well-known tactic of transnational repression. Police officers are not allowed to use Interpol notices alone to arrest someone or to initiate extradition proceedings, and people with recognized refugee status are supposed to be removed from the Interpol system. But these safeguards have not always functioned well. In 2018, the Australian Border Force failed to alert the Interpol office in Canberra that al-Araibi, the football player who had fled political repression in Bahrain, had received a refugee visa and should be removed from the Red Notice system before his planned travel to Thailand. Instead of pursuing the cancellation of the Red Notice, Interpol’s Canberra office notified its counterparts in Bahrain and Thailand of al-Araibi’s itinerary in accordance with Australian law enforcement policy at the time. Thai police detained al-Araibi upon his landing in their country. The Red Notice was invalidated three days after his arrival, but Thai authorities held him for 77 days before dropping his extradition case and allowing his return to Australia.75 In 2021, al-Araibi sued the Australian government for “breach of duty of care” for not warning him of the Interpol notice ahead of his travel and for sharing information about him with Bahraini and Thai officials.76

Conclusion

Australia’s government is aware of the dangers of foreign interference broadly and of transnational repression specifically. It has adopted legislation and created different agencies to address the issue, although the focus has remained on national security and sovereignty rather than harms to fundamental rights. Existing community-level responses require more development, especially when it comes to reacting to reported threats domestically and through foreign policy. The migration system is also in need of shoring up in order to ensure that people fleeing persecution are not put at risk of transnational repression.

Recommendations for the government of Australia: 

• Continue to engage with diaspora communities directly and examine ways to enhance transparency by establishing follow-up protocols after receiving reports of transnational repression through the National Security Hotline or through other channels.
• Examine the feasibility of creating funding streams for civil society and diaspora groups to conduct research on transnational repression in Australia, and to design and implement measures that build resiliency. Some part of this funding should be devoted specifically to providing digital security support to diaspora members at risk of encountering digital transnational repression.
• Provide training to federal, state, and local law enforcement on tactics of transnational repression, including nonphysical forms of intimidation and harassment.
• Examine options to establish mechanisms for civil society groups to suggest individuals and entities that should be sanctioned by the Australian government for acts of transnational repression.
• Following the example of Canada and the UK, the government should examine whether a Senate inquiry into Australia’s current responses to transnational repression is warranted. Any such inquiry should strive to elevate the concerns of diaspora groups that are willing to participate.
• Ensure that immigration policies respect the right to seek asylum, do not externalize the processing of asylum requests, and take into account the threat of transnational repression in asylum and immigration cases. The government should also carefully scrutinize all mutual legal assistance and extradition requests from countries with a track record of transnational repression.

• 1“Australian MP ‘Targeted for Death’ by Cambodian Hit Squad,” The Post, July 21, 2023, https://www.thepost.co.nz/a/world-news/350039770/australian-mp-targeted….
• 2Henry Belot, “Melbourne Residents Receive Letter Offering $200k for Information on Hong Kong Pro-democracy Activist,” The Guardian, March 17, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/17/melbourne-residents-offer….
• 3Mohammad Alfares, “Revealed: Agents of Iran Regime Terrorizing Dissidents Down Under,” The Australian, July 30, 2025, https://todayspaper.theaustralian.com.au/infinity/article_popover_share….
• 4Ramila Chanisheff (president, Australian Uyghur Tangritagh Women’s Association), interview, August 7, 2025; Interview with exiled community leader, July 11, 2025; Dr. Kylie Moore-Gilbert (Macquarie University Research Fellow), interview, August 5, 2025; Zoe Bedford, “Even in Australia, Many Tibetans Do not Feel Free,” Australia Tibet Council, February 5, 2025, https://www.atc.org.au/tnrinausblog1/; Georgia Roberts and Gavin Coote, “Hong Kong Police Issue Arrest Warrants for Foreign Nationals Including Australian Citizen Feng Chongyi,” ABC News, July 26, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-07-26/australian-citizens-wanted-by-ho…; Avani Dias, “VIDEO: Sikhs, Spies and Murder: Investigating India’s Alleged Hit on Foreign Soil,” ABC News, March 21, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/sikhs,-spies-and-murder/103617122.
• 5Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Snapshot of Australia: Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Communities,” released June 28, 2022, https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/snapsho….
• 6Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, “Chapter 5: Foreign Interference,” Issues Paper: Review of Australia’s Espionage, Foreign Interference, Sabotage and Theft of Trade Secrets Offences, May 2025, https://www.inslm.gov.au/system/files/2025-05/issues-paper-review-of-au….
• 7Andrew Chubb was contracted by Freedom House to review available documents and conduct interviews in Australia.
• 8Andrew Chubb, “The Securitization of ‘Chinese Influence’ in Australia,” Journal of Contemporary China 32, no. 139 (2023): 23, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2022.2052437.
• 9Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO Report to Parliament 2006–07, September 18, 2007, https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2007/asio-annual-…; Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO Report to Parliament, 2007–08, October 13, 2008, https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2008/asio-annual-….
• 10The signature example of this heightened media attention to malign activities carried out by the Chinese government in Australia was the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Four Corners “Power and Influence” episode released in June 2017. Notably, this news investigation drew some criticism for its portrayal of the level of involvement of all Chinese Australians in Beijing’s influence campaigns. For more, see Nick McKenzie, Chris Uhlmann, Richard Baker, and Sashka Koloff, “Australian Sovereignty under Threat from Influence of China’s Communist Party,” ABC News, June 3, 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-04/australian-sovereignty-under-thr…; Abigail Young, Chinese Diaspora Politics in Australia: Transnational Repression and Social Governance (Routledge, 2025), 142.
• 11Department of Home Affairs, Countering Foreign Interference in Australia: Working Together Towards a More Secure Australia, 2024, 11, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/cfi-australia.pdf.
• 12Department of Home Affairs, “Countering Foreign Interference in Australia,” https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-securit….
• 13Department of Home Affairs, Countering Foreign Interference in Australia, 3, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/cfi-australia.pdf.
• 14Department of Home Affairs, Countering Foreign Interference in Australia, 3, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/cfi-australia.pdf.
• 15Australian Federal Police, “Espionage and Foreign Interference,” accessed July 15, 2025, https://www.afp.gov.au/crimes/espionage-and-foreign-interference#factsh….
• 16Australian Federal Police, “Foreign Interference in the Community (English), March 2023, https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-04/English-FIC-factshee….
• 17Department of Home Affairs, Countering Foreign Interference in Australia, 11, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/cfi-australia.pdf; Parliament of Australia, “Chapter 4 – Government: Current Practice,” Australian Senate Select Committee Inquiry on Foreign Interference through Social Media, August 1, 2023, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign….
• 18Mike Burgess, “Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2024,” Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, February 28, 2024, https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2024.
• 19Henry Belot and Geneva Abdul, “Hong Kong Democracy Campaigner Accuses UK Police of Asking Her to ‘Self-Censor’” The Guardian, July 31, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/31/hong-kong-democracy-campa….
• 20Andrew Chubb and Kirsten Roberts Lyer, “Transnational Human Rights Violations: Addressing the Evolution of Globalized Repression through National Human Rights Institutions,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 16, no. 3 (2024): 781, https://academic.oup.com/jhrp/article/16/3/770/7733070.
• 21Saipira Furstenberg, “The Challenges of Addressing Authoritarian Transnational Repression in Democracies,” The Foreign Policy Center, August 6, 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/the-challenges-of-addressing-authoritarian-transnati….
• 22Chanisheff, interview.
• 23Data gathered by Andrew Chubb, senior lecturer in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, for this report.
• 24Interview with exiled community leader.
• 25Department of Home Affairs, “Communities and Countering Foreign Interference,” accessed July 15, 2025, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-securit….
• 26Engagements also included Arab, Indian, Vietnamese, Kurdish, Rwandan, and Ukrainian communities. For more, see Senate Select Committee Inquiry on Foreign Interference through Social Media, “Community Outreach Program to Counter Foreign Interference, QoN Number 7,” asked by James Paterson, July 18, 2023, https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=b8cb720c-3c85-4fd8-b964-8f….
• 27Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Australian Government response to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee report: Inquiry into Australian support for Ukraine, Recommendation 9,” accessed July 15, 2025, https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/australian-government-response-to-inqu…; Australian Federal Police, “Community Liaison Officer Overview,” accessed July 15, 2025, https://www.afp.gov.au/jobs/roles/community-liaison-officer.
• 28Interview with exiled community leader.
• 29Moore-Gilbert interview.
• 30Henry Rebot, “Explainer: Here's What You Need to Know about the Government's Foreign Interference Laws,” ABC News, January 23, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-24/explainer-foreign-interference-l….
• 31Parliament of Australia, Section 92.7–92.8, National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018, accessed July 16, 2025, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6022_a…. For an example, see Parliament of Australia, “Explanatory Memorandum,” National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2018, paragraph 187, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=I….
• 32Attorney-General’s Department, “Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme,” accessed July 16, 2025, https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme#.
• 33Fergus Hunter, “A Student Attended a Protest at an Australian Uni. Days Later Chinese Officials Visited His Family,” The Sydney Morning Herald, August 7, 2019, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/this-student-attended-a-protest….
• 34The Crimes Act 1914 contained an offence for interference with “any political right or duty,” a broader approach that did not index violations to a victim’s status as an Australian. For more, see Parliament of Australia, “Explanatory Memorandum,” paragraph 92; Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Issues Paper: Review of Australia’s Espionage, Foreign Interference, Sabotage and Theft of Trade Secrets Offences, May 2025, 79–81, https://www.inslm.gov.au/system/files/2025-05/issues-paper-review-of-au….
• 35Parliament of Australia, “Explanatory Memorandum,” paragraph 8; Grady Vaughan and Yana Gorokhovskaia, “From Awareness to Action: Combating Transnational Repression in the United Kingdom,” (Freedom House, May 2025), https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/united-kingdom….
• 36Human Rights Watch, “Australia: Espionage Bill Threatens Democratic Values,” (Human Rights Watch, January 28, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/28/australia-espionage-bill-threatens-….
• 37Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018, March 27, 2024, https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2024-03/apo-nid32….
• 38Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Designation of the Confucius Institute U.S. Center as a Foreign Mission of the PRC,” press statement, US Department of State, August 13, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-confucius-institute-u-s-….
• 39Anthony Galloway, Fergus Hunter, and Paul Sakkal, “Foreign Influence Register Demands Answers from Confucius Institute,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 27, 2020, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/foreign-interference-register-d…; Daniel Hurst, “Australian Foreign Influence Register ‘Focused Almost Exclusively on China with Little Success,’ Committee Finds,” The Guardian, March 27, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/mar/27/australian-forei….
• 40Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review.
• 41In December 2023, Melbourne-based businessman Di Sahn “Sunny” Dong was sentenced to 33 months in jail for making a political donation to a hospital to curry favor for himself and Beijing with former federal minister Alan Tudge. Another individual, Alexander Csergo, has been accused of reckless foreign interference by relaying intelligence on Australia’s defense and national security to operatives allegedly working for the Chinese government. For more, see Kristian Silva, “Chinese-Australian Businessman Jailed over Attempt to Influence Federal MP,” ABC News, February 28, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-29/di-sanh-duong-jailed-foreign-int…; Jamie McKinnell and Sean Tarek Goodwin, “Sydney Businessman Accused of Reckless Foreign Interference Alexander Csergo Granted Bail after 14 Months in Jail,” ABC News, June 28, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-28/sydney-businessman-alexander-cse…; Young, Chinese Diaspora Politics in Australia, 147.
• 42Australian Federal Police and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Chinese National Charged with Foreign Interference Offence in Canberra,” media release, August 4, 2025, https://www.afp.gov.au/news-centre/media-release/chinese-national-charg….
• 43Freedom House, “Declaration of Principles to Combat Transnational Repression,” accessed August 7, 2025, https://freedomhouse.org/2023/summit-for-democracy-transnational-repres….
• 44US Ambassador to the UN Michèle Taylor, “Joint Statement on Transnational Repression,” delivered on behalf of a group of countries to the 56th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, June 26, 2024, posted by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/human-rights/hrc….
• 45“Australia Joins Common Good Cyber Fund as Partner,” Common Good Cyber, July 28, 2025, https://commongoodcyber.org/news/australia-joins-common-good-cyber-fund/.
• 46Government of the United Kingdom, “Joint Statement between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Canada,” June 15, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-between-the-prime-mi…; Group of Seven, “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression,” June 17, 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-tra….
• 47“Joint Statement between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Canada.”
• 48The White House, “Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware,” March 18, 2024, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/….
• 49Freedom House, “TNR Watch: Answering Chinese Bounties with US Sanctions,” April 24, 2025, https://freedomhouse.org/article/tnr-watch-answering-chinese-bounties-u….
• 50Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Australia’s Thematic Sanctions Framework: A Legislated Review of the Operation of the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and other Thematic Sanctions) Act 2021, March 2025, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_….
• 51Australia’s Thematic Sanctions Framework, 11.
• 52Australia’s Thematic Sanctions Framework, 8.
• 53Moore-Gilbert interview; Chanisheff interview.
• 54“Four Years Since Murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Accountability Advances in Legislation, Lawsuit, and Memorial,” DAWN, September 30, 2022, https://dawnmena.org/four-years-since-murder-of-jamal-khashoggi-account….
• 55Australia’s Thematic Sanctions Framework, 17.
• 56Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, accessed August 7, 2025, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/minisite/static/4ca0813c-58….
• 57Henry Belot, “Penny Wong Complained to China About Intimidation of Exiled Hong Kong Pro-democracy Campaigners,” The Guardian, August 6, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/aug/07/penny-wong-compl….
• 58Helen Davidson, “Hakeem al-Araibi: Marise Payne Lobbies Thailand to Release Refugee Footballer,” The Guardian, January 10, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jan/10/marise-payne-lob….
• 59Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, “Prime Minister’s Visit to China,” media release, July 18, 2025, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/prime-ministers-visit-china.
• 60Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “China Country Brief: Bilateral Relations,” accessed August 8, 2025, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief.
• 61Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, “Joint Statement on the Elevation to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Vietnam and Australia,” March 7, 2024, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-elevation-comprehensive-str….
• 62Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong, “Joint Statement on ASEAN and Australia’s Shared Future,” July 10, 2025, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/jo….
• 63Prime Minister Howard adopted this approach after a Norwegian ship carrying 433 asylum seekers who had been rescued from international waters urged the Australian government to accept these individuals. Howard called the migrants “queue jumpers” and initiated a policy of turning back people on boats. For more, see Helen Davidson, “Offshore Detention: Australia’s Recent Immigration History a ‘Human Rights Catastrophe,’” The Guardian, November 12, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/nov/13/offshore-detenti…; Refugee Council of Australia, “Australia’s Asylum Policies: Current Policies and Concerns,” March 27, 2024, https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/asylum-policies/4/.
• 64Madeline Gleeson, “The Australia-Cambodia Refugee Deal,” Research Brief (Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law at University of New South Wales Sydney, updated October 2019), 14, https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/fil….
• 65“Pro-democracy Cambodian Activists in Australia Fear for Their Safety,” SBS News, February 27, 2024, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/video/pro-democracy-cambodian-activists-in-…; Eleanor Whitehead, “Foreign Influence: How Cambodia’s Government is Recruiting Students in Australia,” ABC News, September 14, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-15/how-cambodias-government-is-recr….
• 66Amnesty International Australia, “Nauru Detention Centre Must Be Urgently Evacuated in Light of UN Ruling,” January 10, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org.au/nauru-detention-centre-must-be-urgently-evac…; Asylum Insight, “Papua New Guinea Arrangement,” updated March 3, 2025, https://www.asyluminsight.com/papua-new-guinea-arrangement#:~:text=At%2….
• 67Julia Morris, “As Nauru Shows, Asylum Outsourcing Has Unexpected Impacts on Host Communities,” Migration Policy Institute, August 29, 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nauru-outsource-asylum.
• 68This review process was applied to individuals who arrived in Australia between August 2012 and December 2013 and were not sent offshore. For more, see Amnesty International Australia, “Fast Track Explained: Australia Must Give Permanency to People Seeking Asylum,” April 1, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org.au/fast-track-explained/; “‘Fast Track’ Refugee Status Determination,” Research Brief (Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law at University of New South Wales Sydney, updated June 2022), https://www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/unsw-adobe-websites/kaldor-cen….
• 69Freedom House, “Unsafe in America: Transnational Repression in the United States,” (Freedom House, June 2022), https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/united-states.
• 70Amy Ridge, “The Precarious Position of Asylum Seekers in Australia,” Australian Human Rights Institute at University of New South Wales Sydney, accessed July 28, 2025, https://www.humanrights.unsw.edu.au/students/blogs/precarious-position-…; Human Rights Watch, “Submission by Human Rights Watch to [Australian] Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on Migration Amendment (Removals and Other Measures) Bill 2024,” April 15, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/04/240415%20HRW%20Su….
• 71Australian Government, Extradition Act 1988, accessed July 28, 2025, https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A03597/2012-04-20/text.
• 72Attorney-General’s Department, “Australia’s Bilateral Extradition Relationships,” October 2024, https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-10/australias-bilaterial….
• 73Daniel Hurst, “Australia and China Still Helping Each Other with Criminal Cases Despite Hong Kong Treaty Suspension,” The Guardian, September 7, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/08/australia-and-ch….
• 74Echo Hui and Dylan Welch, “AFP Stopped Allowing Chinese Police to Operate in Australia over Foreign Interference Concerns, Senate Hearing Told,” ABC News, June 2, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-03/afp-stopped-allowing-chinese-pol….
• 75Steve Cannane and Clare Blumer, “Missed Emails, Bureaucratic Bungles: How Home Affairs and the AFP Contributed to Hakeem al-Araibi’s Time in a Thai Jail,” ABC News, October 10, 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-11/bungles-that-led-to-hakeem-al-ar….
• 76Emma Kemp, “Footballer Hakeem al-Araibi Sues Australian Government over Thai Prison Detention,” The Guardian, June 29, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/jun/29/footballer-hakeem-al-arai….