Engaging the Community: Combating Transnational Repression in Canada

Introduction

Transnational repression unexpectedly became an important issue in Canada’s 2025 federal election. During the campaign, candidates from two major parties, the Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada, left the race after journalists reported on their comments allegedly encouraging the intimidation of dissidents from China and India.1 Days before the election on April 28, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force issued a public warning about a transnational repression operation “targeting” the campaign, in which a candidate known for criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced a foreign-based smear effort. The announcement made the Canadian government the first in the world to acknowledge the danger posed to voters and candidates by extraterritorial intimidation.2

Threats emanating from the governments of China, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Rwanda, and Syria have taken a toll on individuals living in Canada. Although physical violence by agents of a foreign government against diaspora remains rare, surveillance, intimidation, denial of consular services, coercion by proxy, and harassment are commonplace.

Motivated into action by increasing media attention to the presence of Chinese overseas police stations in Canadian cities, reports of misinformation against political candidates critical of Beijing,3 as well as revelations about the role of the Indian government in the assassination of a Sikh activist, the Canadian government has begun to actively develop and implement domestic and foreign policies to counter extraterritorial violence and intimidation. Many of these policies focus on addressing foreign interference, but some recent grassroots work by government departments has also sought to increase diaspora resilience to everyday forms of transnational repression. These initiatives are still in the early stages of adoption, but it is clear that ensuring that foreign governments cannot harm people living in Canada has become a government priority.

Security Policy

Transnational repression has been an issue of concern for diaspora groups in Canada for many years. The Canadian Coalition for Human Rights in China alongside Amnesty International Canada, for example, began to raise alarms about the harassment of activists working on China-related human rights issues in early 2017.4 Although there had been some limited discussion of this threat in government reports on national security,5 the issue gained broad attention in 2023 due to revelations about the presence of “overseas police service centers” run by the government of the People’s Republic of China6 and mounting allegations, driven by leaked intelligence reports, that foreign governments had interfered in two previous federal elections. In response, the Canadian government organized a public inquiry into foreign interference and adopted new legislation addressing threats posed by foreign governments.

Throughout, the impact that transnational repression has on diaspora communities has been framed as a secondary concern to the threat posed by foreign governments to Canada’s democratic institutions, especially elections. While transnational repression can impact the exercise of political rights during elections, including through attempts to silence candidates or to persuade voters not to support politicians critical of a foreign regime, it is an everyday threat that impacts the exercise of rights outside of election periods. Viewing transnational repression as only or mostly part of election interference misses the full picture of the threat posed, limits the scope of government responses to protecting institutions, and leaves impacted individuals and communities vulnerable.

A long-awaited inquiry

In January 2025, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, known colloquially as the Hogue inquiry after Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue, released its findings after examining the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.7 The inquiry followed two previous government-led efforts to examine the extent and impact of foreign interference in elections: a report by Independent Special Rapporteur David Johnston, issued in June 2023; and a special report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), provided to parliament in March 2024.8 Neither satisfied public demands for transparency and accountability. Both reports were classified, and the redacted parts that were eventually released to the public amplified fears rather than assuaging them by suggesting that parliamentarians had been involved in aiding foreign interference during the elections. In addition, Johnston’s work was marred by perceptions of political bias given his close relationship to the family of then Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.9 In response to public calls for a new examination, the government established the Hogue inquiry.10

Although Hogue determined that transnational repression was beyond her mandate, she nevertheless included people targeted by transnational repression in hearings and wrote about the impact of transnational repression on Canadians. Members of diaspora communities from China, India, Iran, and Russia testified about their experiences being surveilled at protests and community events, having their families intimidated or prevented from traveling outside their origin country, experiencing punitive refusal of consular services, and receiving harassing phone calls and threats online.11 The inquiry also designated a coalition of human rights groups as official participants and took steps to address fears over access to sensitive information.12 Despite these efforts, some diaspora groups chose not to participate because of safety concerns.13

In her final report, Hogue called transnational repression “a scourge…[and] a form of foreign interference that the government must quickly address.”14 She also stated, “Transnational repression threatens individuals’ freedom to engage in legitimate democratic practices and threatens to undermine democratic society and the sovereignty of states.”15 The inquiry identified the governments of China, India, and Iran as being the top three sources of transnational repression efforts in Canada.

The inquiry’s recommendations

The Hogue inquiry and its findings helped raise awareness about the threat posed by transnational repression and draw attention to the many communities in Canada affected by it. However, the focus on foreign interference ultimately limited the inquiry’s ability to engage fully with transnational repression and, more importantly, to recommend comprehensive government responses.

Of the 51 recommendations issued by the inquiry, 4 were connected to addressing transnational repression: establish a single, highly visible and easily accessible point of contact or hotline to report foreign interference; develop a “Duty to Warn” policy for threats of serious harm; engage with foreign consulates in Canada to ensure that consulate staff understand the difference between diplomatic activity and foreign interference; and train members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) on recognizing and responding to transnational repression.

These recommendations were made in addition to actions that the inquiry noted were already being taken by the Canadian government, which included: creating an action plan on transnational repression run by the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator; establishing a national security hotline run by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); providing funding for digital literacy through Heritage Canada’s Digital Citizen Initiative; making voting guides available in different languages; cybersecurity work by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to mitigate transnational repression; and work with international partners, including through the Group of Seven (G7). Most of these recommendations and existing policies are promising. They are likely to help protect targeted individuals, mitigate threats, and promote accountability.

Other recommendations need to be properly resourced to be truly useful. As a report from the Montreal Institute for Global Security points out, the CSIS reporting hotline already exists, but it functions to collect information about potential national security threats. Whether the Canadian government considers transnational repression a threat to national security is unclear.16 What type of response callers reporting transnational repression to the hotline might expect is also unclear, although the inquiry’s recommendations require follow-up for those seeking support. Anecdotal evidence from Canadian national security experts suggests that many members of diaspora communities are unaware that the hotline exists, further limiting its utility.17

Experience with the hotline run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States suggests that diasporas tend to lose confidence in reporting mechanisms that do not include clear and public follow-up protocols.18 Moreover, for most people, the first point of contact when experiencing a threat is law enforcement. While the recommendations mention training for the RCMP—a federal police force in Canada—there is no mention of training for local police on how to recognize transnational repression.

More work to be done

One urgent need missed by the inquiry’s recommendations and from the work already undertaken by the Canadian government is direct financial support for diaspora communities. The only mention of such funding is for the government’s Department of Canadian Heritage, which promotes Canadian values and culture. There is no recommendation to fund documentation of transnational repression by human rights organizations and diaspora groups, build awareness of the phenomenon, or design methods to improve resiliency. Diasporas are extremely diverse, as are types of transnational repression tactics. These groups are better placed than the federal government to design systems of support that meet their own needs—but they require funding to do this work.

As researchers from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab have pointed out, the inquiry also did not make recommendations to address the social and psychological consequences of transnational repression, and especially, the toll that digital harassment has on individuals and communities by encouraging self-censorship and isolation.19 The climate of fear created by transnational repression has to be countered at the individual as well as institutional level. Here, again, resources for diaspora groups and groups providing services for immigrants and refugees would help to support those targeted by extraterritorial threats and violence.

A new law

In June 2024, Bill C-70, An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference, also known as the Countering Foreign Interference Act, was adopted. By amending existing legislation, the act made three important changes to Canadian law: it introduced criminal penalties for harassment, intimidation, or other acts done on behalf of a foreign entity; it mandated the establishment of, for the first time in Canada, a foreign influence registry; and it directed more information sharing with the public by security agencies.20 At the time of this report’s writing, the real-world impacts of these legislative changes are not yet clear.

Although the new law amended the Criminal Code and the Security of Information Act to establish new criminal offenses in connection with transnational repression, Canadian authorities already have the ability to pursue accountability through criminal prosecutions. Two RCMP officers were charged in recent years with using access to government systems in order to provide information on diaspora activists to the governments of China and Rwanda.21 Violent incidents of transnational repression have also been addressed through the criminal justice system: three Indian nationals were arrested in May 2024 in connection with the murder of a Sikh activist in British Columbia.22

Although the foreign influence registry has yet to be set up and was not operational during the 2025 federal election, the adoption of the Countering Foreign Interference Act means that Canada will soon join the ranks of countries that require the official registration of individuals who work on issues connected to the political process or policy development on behalf of a foreign government or foreign economic entity.23 Foreign agent registries, which also exist in the United States and in Australia, are measures primarily designed to facilitate transparency for political activities conducted on behalf of a foreign principle. Many people prosecuted in connection to incidents of transnational repression in the United States have been charged with acting as an illegal (or unregistered) foreign agent. It is important to note, however, that the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) is a registration requirement: it does not prohibit any influence activities. People or groups who register may still end up engaging in activities harmful to diaspora communities or individual activists.

This was the case with an American woman registered under FARA who collected information on the Rwandan dissident Paul Rusesabagina on behalf of Rwandan authorities, before he was abducted and returned to Rwanda to be put on trial.24 Moreover, criminal organizations, which have worked as proxies for some governments targeting exiled activists, are unlikely to register at all. A foreign registry is not a cure-all, and needs to be part of a larger strategy that also includes mitigation and accountability measures.

The third change introduced by the act was the expansion of the ability of CSIS to share information about security threats with parties outside the government for the purpose of building resilience against threats to the security of Canada. Information sharing, especially between government agencies but also with the public and institutions like universities, is extremely valuable in both tracking and preventing transnational repression. A lack of information sharing between intelligence agencies and law enforcement has often been highlighted as a weakness in existing responses to transnational repression in European countries.

It is not yet clear how information sharing with the public will take place under the new legislation. However, before the law’s adoption, some Canadian civil society groups raised concerns about a lack of safeguards for protecting individual privacy and ensuring verification of information before and after its release to the public, as well as the speed with which the law was considered by parliament.25 Information sharing about potential threats posed by foreign governments, while crucial for preventing transnational repression, should be done carefully in order to avoid stigmatizing diaspora communities and thereby discouraging them further from contacting law enforcement or engaging fully in the political process.26

Community outreach

The adoption of new legislation has spurred momentum behind increasing community engagement. Freedom House learned that in early 2025 Public Safety Canada, alongside the RCMP, the Canadian Department of Justice, and CSIS, began holding by-invitation meetings with diaspora groups in major Canadian cities.27 These meetings provide information to diaspora members about the new legislation, as well as information about mitigating digital threats and how and where to report transnational repression. In addition to building awareness among diaspora communities about resources available to them, these meetings also allow diaspora members an opportunity to provide important information to local law enforcement, who are the first point of contact for most targets of transnational repression, but often lack knowledge of the phenomenon.

Direct diaspora engagement is among the most important policy responses that a host government can implement to address transnational repression. Not only does this type of work effectively distribute much-needed practical information among communities and through trusted sources, it also builds important ties between people who may experience targeting and agencies of the government. As long as diaspora communities are comfortable with these meetings, inviting local law enforcement in for dialog is crucial for increasing awareness of transnational repression among officers, and for building trust between law enforcement and diaspora communities.

Foreign Policy

Canada has taken a prominent role in seeking accountability for and spreading global awareness about transnational repression. Canadian foreign policy responses have included actions against diplomats from China and India, public statements by leaders, and cooperation with like-minded democratic countries. This has been motivated by major domestic developments including the assassination of Canadian Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar and revelations about Chinese overseas police service stations, and by Canada assuming the chairmanship of the G7, which has added a focus on foreign interference to its purview in the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election. Leadership through the G7 and other multilateral forums will be important in preserving momentum around the issue of transnational repression in coming years, especially as the United States steps back from multilateral engagement.

Responding to the Nijjar assassination

In September 2023, then Prime Minister Trudeau told parliament that “Canadian security agencies have been actively pursuing credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the government of India and the killing of Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar.”28 Nijjar was fatally shot in June 2023 outside of a Sikh temple in British Columbia. Born in India before emigrating to Canada, where he gained citizenship, he was a prominent Sikh activist advocating for an independent Sikh homeland, Khalistan, in Punjab State and Punjabi-speaking areas of India. The Indian government considers many Sikh activists to be extremists and had labeled Nijjar a terrorist, offering a reward for information on him in 2020, and seeking an Interpol Red Notice.29 However, Nijjar was never charged with any crimes in Canada, and Indian authorities’ attempts to extradite him failed.30 At the time of his death, he was promoting a nonbinding independence referendum among the Sikh diaspora in Canada and abroad. A couple of months after Trudeau’s statement, the FBI unsealed a criminal indictment alleging an assassination plot against Nijjar’s one-time lawyer, another Sikh activist and American citizen, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. The indictment also pointed to the involvement of Indian authorities.31

Nijjar’s assassination shocked observers and represented a clear escalation in India’s transnational repression tactics. A series of diplomatic and security responses followed. Trudeau brought up the assassination directly with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the June 2024 summit of the Group of 20 and asked publicly for assistance from Indian intelligence services in the investigation.32 He also shared information about the assassination with other members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partnership, including the United Kingdom and the United States. Shortly after Trudeau made his public announcement, Ottawa expelled the head of the foreign intelligence wing of India’s embassy. Canada later expelled six more Indian diplomats, including the high commissioner of the Indian embassy, for refusing to cooperate in the Nijjar investigation. The RCMP took the unusual step of publicly disclosing that its investigations had revealed “a significant amount of information about the breadth and depth of criminal activity orchestrated by agents of the government of India, and consequential threats to the safety and security of Canadians and individuals living in Canada.”33 The RCMP also issued more than a dozen threat-to-life warnings to individuals in connection with these investigations.

The transparency with which the Canadian government pursued accountability in the aftermath of Nijjar’s assassination is very important for effectively countering transnational repression. Although democratic governments can protect vulnerable diasporas and individuals by increasing security measures at home, foreign governments will continue to attempt to use tactics of transnational repression to silence exiled dissidents unless they face serious repercussions. Foreign policy responses, including diplomatic expulsions and sanctions, play an important role in discouraging governments from using extraterritorial threats and violence because they impugn the reputation of perpetrators. These types of responses also help to reinforce national sovereignty and respect for fundamental human rights by making it clear that governments cannot use threats and violence to silence dissidents outside their territories and that individuals living in democratic countries are entitled to exercise their rights.

At the G7

When it comes to countering transnational repression through foreign policy responses, multilateral efforts can have a multiplier effect by publicly affirming mutual commitment to democratic norms and raising the costs of repression. In 2018, the leaders of the G7 established a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) to strengthen coordination between member states to respond to foreign threats to democracies. In 2023, the United States launched the RRM Transnational Repression Working Group as part of its agenda to coordinate actions to counter this threat.34 Since then, G7 member state interest in transnational repression has been steadily growing, and the issue has been included in several communications.35

Canada assumed the presidency of the G7 in January 2025 and has made transnational repression a priority. Beginning in late 2024, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, and other federal agencies hosted a series of meetings, briefings, and dialogues on transnational repression, including a two-day G7 Dialogue in Ottawa, that have brought together government officials from G7 member states, academic researchers, and civil society organizations, including Freedom House. Events such as these connect practitioner communities and are a good way to develop and disseminate best practices for addressing transnational repression. Continued Canadian leadership on this issue at the G7 and other forums, such as the United Nations, is crucial to ensure that international momentum for countering authoritarian reach is not lost. In June 2025, Canada will host the 51st G7 Summit. Many will be looking for substantive commitments from states for how to better coordinate action to protect those who are targeted, and constrain the actions of perpetrators.

Migration Policy

In Canada, as in most countries, changes to the migration system to address the threat posed by transnational repression have been difficult to assess, even as awareness of the threat has increased within and outside the government. Canadian authorities appear to have continued with many of the best practices highlighted in Freedom House’s 2022 report on transnational repression, including carefully vetting both Interpol Red Notices and extradition requests made by foreign governments to weed out those that are politically motivated.36 Canadian authorities also continued resettling between 250 and 500 individuals annually as special human rights defenders, through a Government-Assisted Refugee program created in 2021.37 Pathways to secure immigration status are an important protection for those facing extraterritorial threats and intimidation as a consequence of their activism. Less encouragingly, immigration officials seem not to have adopted any vetting mechanisms for criminal and terrorism accusations made by authoritarian governments when evaluating immigration cases.

In 2023, Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) flagged human rights defender Noura Aljizawi’s application for permanent residency as potentially being impacted by Section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The section creates grounds for inadmissibility based on accusations of espionage, terrorism, or subversion of a government. Aljizawi originally came to Canada as an international student in 2017 through a scholars-at-risk program after engaging in activism in her country of origin, Syria, where she had been arrested and tortured for protesting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. In Canada, Aljizawi became a prominent expert on digital transnational repression, writing reports on the topic and testifying at different forums. After a public outcry, Aljizawi was granted permanent residency, although her case, which under a typical timeline should have taken six months to review, ended up taking three years. Other prodemocracy activists living in exile in Canada have also reportedly had their immigration cases flagged for security concerns through Section 34.38 False accusations of criminal activity or terrorism that impede immigration and refugee cases are a common form of transnational repression and can result in unlawful deportation.

Conclusion

The problem of transnational repression has entered the mainstream of Canadian politics. The government has made promising strides in developing policy responses, engaging directly with affected communities, and leading international efforts to combat extraterritorial violence. In the coming years, attention to community needs, a sensible reporting mechanism, and continued multilateral action will be required.

Recommendations for the government of Canada: 

• Adopt an official government-wide definition of transnational repression that can be used across departments and agencies and in official communications. Freedom House defines transnational repression as a set of physical and nonphysical tactics used by foreign governments to harass, intimidate, silence, coerce, or harm members of diaspora or exile communities.
• Examine the feasibility of creating funding streams for civil society and diaspora groups to conduct research on transnational repression in Canada, and to design and implement measures that build resiliency among targeted communities. Some part of this funding should be devoted specifically to providing digital security support to diaspora members at risk of encountering digital transnational repression or spyware. 
• Continue to engage with diaspora communities directly, providing information on ways to report transnational repression and connecting communities with local law enforcement. Create mechanisms for community feedback about the efficacy of this type of outreach.
• Provide training to law enforcement of jurisdiction on tactics of transnational repression. Explore options for creating a centralized reporting mechanism, such as a tip line, for nonurgent transnational repression threats.
• Screen for vulnerability to transnational repression in immigration and asylum cases and ensure that authoritarian governments cannot misuse Section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act against applicants with a history of prodemocracy activism.
• Continue to explore efforts to advance commercial spyware accountability through sanctions, visa restrictions, export controls, and procurement authorities. Spyware is often used in the commission of transnational repression to surveil those who are targeted and gain information about their activities and whereabouts, sometimes leading to beatings, kidnappings, and even murder.
• Use the presidency of the G7 to ensure that the group makes a commitment to countering transnational repression. The G7 Summit in June is an opportunity to learn about and disseminate best practices for addressing transnational repression.

• 1“Conservatives drop 4th candidate, this time in Etobicoke North,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), April 2, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/conservative-party-candidate-dro…; Ashley Burke, “Liberal candidate Paul Chiang withdraws from race after suggesting people claim China’s bounty on Conservative,” CBC, April 1, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/paul-chiang-liberal-candidate-withdraw….
• 2“Update on Canada’s Actions to Protect the Generation Election 45,” Privy Council Office, April 21, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/news/2025/04/update-on-canadas-a….
• 3Researchers at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) drew attention to how the Chinese government had used WeChat to spread disinformation about Kenny Chiu, a vocal critic of China’s human rights record, and a conservative party MP running for re-election in British Columbia during the 2021 federal election. It became clear in early 2023, that Chiu was not the only target of the Chinese government. Kenton Thibaut, “China-linked WeChat accounts spread disinformation in advance of 2021 Canadian Election,” DFRLab, November 4, 2021, https://medium.com/dfrlab/china-linked-wechat-accounts-spread-disinform….
• 4Human Rights Watch. “Human rights defenders increasingly face threats, intimidation over China advocacy: report,” May 12, 2020, https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/human-rights-defenders-increasingl….
• 5National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2019, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019….
• 6Safeguard Defenders. Patrol and Persuade: A follow-up investigation to 110 Overseas, December 2022, https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Patrol%20and%20P…; Special Committee on the Canada-People’s Republic of China Relationship. Interim Report: The Chinese Communist Party’s Overseas Police Service Stations. November 2023, https://www.ourcommons.ca/documentviewer/en/44-1/CACN/report-4.
• 7Hogue concluded that while China, India, Russia and other foreign states had interfered in the 2019 and 2021 elections, this interference did not undermine the electoral system and had no impact on which party won, although she acknowledged that foreign interference may have had “bearing on the results of elections at the riding level.” Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. “Volume 4: The Government’s Capacity to Detect, Deter and Counter Foreign Interference (Facts and Analysis 2/2),” January 28, 2025, page 129, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/PIFI_-_Final_Report_….
• 8National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions. March 22, 2024, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreig…; First Report: The Right Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, May 23, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/di-id/documents/rpt/rapporteur/Indepe….
• 9David Major, “Johnston delivers classified final report on foreign interference, officially steps down,” CBC, June 26, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/david-johnston-delivers-final-report-s…; Sam Carbal, “Canadian MPs ‘wittingly’ aid foreign meddling – report,” BBC, June 3, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjee1qjvr4yo.
• 10Much of the public debate in Canada before and during the Hogue inquiry focused on whether interference by China or its proxies had impacted the outcome of the elections in favor of the governing Liberal Party of Canada. Despite the fact that officials did not issue any public warnings about foreign interference in either the 2019 or the 2021 federal elections, civil society reports emerged in 2022 indicating that some Conservative politicians who were critical of China had been the targets of misinformation campaigns. These public reports were reinforced by an assessment from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noting attempts by Chinese government to influence the outcome of the 2021, which was leaked to the media and reported on by the Globe and Mail. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS documents reveal Chinese strategy to influence Canada’s 2021 election,” The Globe and Mail, February 17, 2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-influence-2021-f…. Among those targeted was Conservative MP Michael Chong, who advocated for labeling China’s treatment of the Uyghur minority a genocide and was harassed by a Chinese diplomat in Canada and his family in Hong Kong was investigated. Leyland Cecco, “Canadian lawmaker says China targeted his family for harassment,” The Guardian, May 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/03/michael-chong-justin-trud….
• 11Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. Public Hearings, March 27, 2024, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/public-hearings/day-6-march-27; https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_P…; Marie Lamensch, “Foreign Interference is Targeting Diaspora Communities in Canada,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, July 25, 2024, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/foreign-interference-is-targeting-d….
• 12Catherine Tunney, “Who’s who at the foreign interference inquiry,” CBC, January 31, 2024, https://ici.radio-canada.ca/rci/en/news/2045975/foreign-interference-in…; Catherine Tunney, “Uyghur group withdraws from foreign interference inquiry, says victims won’t be protected,” CBC, January 31, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/foreign-interference-inquiry-fadden-1…; Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. “Statement by Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue,” February 22, 2024, https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/statement-by-commissioner-marie-j….
• 13Raffy Boudjikanian, “Foreign interference commissioner seeks to reassure diaspora groups anxious about inquiry,” CBC, February 22, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/hogue-foreign-interference-diaspora-1.7122473.
• 14Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. “Volume 1: Report Summary,” January 28, 2025, page 110, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/report_volume_1.pdf.
• 15Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. “Volume 1: Report Summary,” January 28, 2025, page 98, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/report_volume_1.pdf.
• 16Wesley Wark, “Navigating the World of Foreign Interference, Disinformation Harms to Our Democracy and Transnational Repression Effects: A playbook source for Canadians,” Montreal Institute for Global Security, https://migsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/migs-report-foreig….
• 17With gratitude to Professor Thomas Juneau for his review of this report.
• 18Yana Gorokhovskaia, Nate Schenkkan, and Grady Vaughan. “Four Years Later: Reflecting on Policy Responses to Transnational Repression,” Freedom House unpublished white paper, August 2024.
• 19Emile Dirks, Noura Aljizawi, Siena Anstis, and Ron Diebert, “The final Hogue report was a missed opportunity to tackle transnational repression,” The Globe and Mail, February 10, 2025, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-final-hogue-report-….
• 20Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. “Overview Report: Summary of Countering Foreign Interference Act (Bill C-70),” https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference….
• 21Steven Chase, Robert Fife, Colin Freeze, and Geoffrey York, “Alberta Mountie charged with accessing police records system to aid Rwandan agent,” The Globe and Mail, February 13, 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-alberta-mountie-charged-….
• 22Rhianna Schmunk, “What we know about the arrests and investigation into Hardeep Singh Nijjar’s killing,” CBC, May 3, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/hardeep-singh-nijjar-killing-arrests-m….
• 23Public Safety Canada. Canada’s Foreign Influence Transparency Registry. https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/05/canadas-fore….
• 24France 24, “Hotel Rwanda ‘hero’ refuses trial, star US witness takes stand,” March 24, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210324-hotel-rwanda-hero-refuse….
• 25

  International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group. “ICLMG’s Submission to the Foreign Interference Consultation,” February 9, 2024, https://iclmg.ca/foreign-interference-consultation/; Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council. “CMPAC’s Analysis of Bill C-70 (Countering Foreign Interference Act): Safeguarding Democracy Amidst Security Measures,” https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/CMPACs-Concerns…; Canadian Civil Liberties Association. “CCLA Reaction to the Introduction of Bill C-70,” May 14, 2024, https://ccla.org/criminal-justice/ccla-reaction-to-the-introduction-of-…; British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. “Joint Statement: Organizations Urge MPs to Extend Study of Bill C-70,” June 5, 2024, https://bccla.org/policy-submission/joint-statement-organizations-urge-….

• 26Lisa Xing, “Chinese Canadians worry foreign interference probe could stigmatize politicians, candidates,” March 29, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/foreign-interference-china-politicans-ha….
• 27Telephone interviews with Canadian bureaucrat, Interview, March 18, 2025, and March 27, 2025.
• 28John Paul Tasker, “Trudeau accuses India’s government of involvement in killing of Canadian Sikh leader,” CBC, September 18, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-indian-government-nijjar-1.697….
• 29Nadine Yousif and Neal Razzell, “Who was Canadian Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar?,” BBC, October 2, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66860510.
• 30Rahul Kalvapalle, “India could seek extradition of alleged Sikh militant based in Surrey, B.C.,” Global News, May 5, 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/4189882/hardeep-singh-nijjar-fir-india-canad….
• 31U.S. Department of Justice. “Justice Department Announces Charges in Connection with Foiled Plot to Assassinate U.S. Citizen in New York City,” November 29, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-ch….
• 32Justin Ling, “Trudeau Says India Likely behind Murder of Canadian Sikh Leader,” Foreign Policy, September 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/19/canada-india-trudeau-modi-hardeep-….
• 33Royal Canadian Mounted Police. “RCMP statement on violent criminal activity occurring in Canada with connections to agents of the Government of India,” October 14, 2024, https://rcmp.ca/en/news/2024/10/rcmp-statement-violent-criminal-activit….
• 34White House. “Fact Sheet: For Human Rights Day, Highlighting the Biden-Harris Administration Global Human Rights Accomplishments,” December 11, 2024, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/…
• 35Department of Homeland Security. “G7 Interior and Security Ministers’ Communiqué,” October 11, 2024, https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2024/10/11/g7-interior-and-security-mi…; U.S. Department of State. “G7 Foreign Minister’s Statement on the Margins of the Munich Security Conference,” February 15, 2025, https://www.state.gov/g7-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-margins-of-….
• 36

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• 37Government of Canada. Government-Assisted Refugees program. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refu…; Government of Canada. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada Implementation Plan for Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security – 2023 to 2029. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/women-peace-s…; Colin R. Singer, “Canada Doubles Resettlement Spaces for Human Rights Defenders,” Immigration.ca, July 27, 2023, https://immigration.ca/es/canada-doubles-resettlement-spaces-for-human-….
• 38Judy Trinh, “Syrian human rights defender becomes a permanent resident of Canada after being flagged as a security risk,” CTV News, July 9, 2023, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/syrian-human-rights-defender-beco….