From Awareness to Action: Combating Transnational Repression in the United Kingdom

Introduction

In the fall of 2022, it was reported that the Chinese government had set up three “unofficial police service stations” in the United Kingdom (UK) to harass individuals from China and even force them to return home.1 Around the same time, in October 2022, China’s consul general in Manchester, Zheng Xiyuan, dragged a Hong Kong prodemocracy protester onto the grounds of the Chinese consulate and viciously attacked him.2 After the British government increased pressure on Chinese officials to account for their extralegal actions, Beijing recalled Zheng and five other diplomats and quietly closed the three stations.

The two high-profile examples of transnational repression reignited intense debate in the UK about the government’s capacity to protect exiles and diasporas from the reach of authorities in their countries of origin. Freedom House has found that the regimes of seven countries—most recently China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—were responsible for 11 incidents of physical transnational repression in the UK from 2014 to 2024. These documented assaults, assassination attempts, and credible threats likely represent only a fraction of all the cases that occurred.

Since the release of Freedom House’s 2022 report on transnational repression in the UK,3 British authorities have demonstrated greater awareness, whether in policy papers or public statements, of how such “state threats” infringe on the country’s sovereignty and present safety risks to immigrant populations.4 The discovery of the Chinese police stations and the assault at the Manchester consulate provided an impetus for the UK government to announce the formation of a cross-agency task force that would tackle transnational repression as part of its remit. For its part, Parliament approved legislation designed to stiffen penalties for malicious activities on behalf of a foreign power.

Despite these positive steps, the overall response has been uneven. Officials have mainly treated transnational repression as a subcategory of foreign interference, as opposed to a rights violation in itself, often implicitly deeming it less important than disinformation or threats to the UK’s electoral infrastructure and governmental bodies. While policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and ministerial leaders acknowledge the phenomenon within this national security context and work proactively to protect vulnerable individuals, the relevant national bodies fail to meaningfully engage at the grassroots level with affected communities. Absent readily accessible resources, diaspora members still lack trust in the official responses to everyday harassment. Successive UK governments have also publicly framed state threats as actor-agnostic, suggesting that they will address extraterritorial interference no matter the source, but economic and geopolitical concerns seem to have impeded vigorous responses to transnational repression carried out by the governments of China, India, Rwanda, and various Middle Eastern governments. Similarly, repeated efforts to enact exclusionary migration legislation and send asylum seekers to Rwanda have undermined officials’ stated commitments to protect those fleeing oppressive regimes.

Security Policy

Transnational repression is framed as a national security concern in the United Kingdom. Authorities use the term “state threats” to encompass a wide range of foreign threats, including espionage, sabotage, and “physical threats to people.”5 The domestic counterintelligence and security agency MI5 manages a webpage on “countering state threats” and the tactics foreign aggressors use. Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies have offered proactive protection to high-profile individuals, and lawmakers have advanced legislation to counter foreign interference. The strategy of subsuming transnational repression into a category of external threats to UK national security has resulted in a degree of neglect toward the human rights implications for individuals who are targeted by perpetrator governments. Effectively addressing transnational repression requires careful attention to its impact on both security and human rights. More consistent engagement with diaspora populations would raise law enforcement and other agencies’ awareness of the everyday effects of transnational repression.

Cross-agency collaboration to tackle state threats

Over the last several years, multiple UK governments have adopted a cross-agency approach to addressing foreign threats. Under Prime Minister Boris Johnson in 2021, the government commissioned an integrated review of the UK’s national security and foreign policy, which acknowledged that state threats were “growing and diversifying.” The review identified the 2018 poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal by Russian agents as a prime example of this aggression.6 To more effectively shield the UK from such threats, the analysis stressed the need for a holistic, interagency response. A year later, after the revelation of the unofficial Chinese police stations, then–Prime Minister Rishi Sunak appointed Security Minister Tom Tugendhat to head a new cross-departmental Defending Democracy Taskforce intended to “protect the democratic integrity of the UK from threats of foreign interference.”7 Transnational repression is listed as part of the mandate of the task force, which brings together officials from the Cabinet Office, the Home Office, law enforcement bodies, the intelligence community, and members of Parliament, among others.8

Since its formation, however, most of the task force’s publicly disclosed work has pertained to other types of foreign interference: countering disinformation, bolstering physical and cybersecurity measures for politicians, and defending the electoral system.9 In 2024, the parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy (JCNSS) launched an inquiry on defending democracy and the task force’s activities, yet transnational repression did not feature prominently in its call for evidence.10 Security Minister Dan Jarvis told Parliament in May 2025 that the task force had completed its review of the UK’s approach to transnational repression, noting that the government manages a “robust system” in terms of legislative, foreign policy, and law enforcement tools to protect individuals.11 However, it is difficult to assess the initiative’s progress, as the full contents of the review were not made public. To its credit, the Home Office paired Jarvis’s announcement with the creation of a website outlining tactics of transnational repression and offering guidance to targeted individuals.12 In another positive step, an inquiry launched by the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights in January 2025 allowed witnesses to underline the fact that transnational repression involves rights violations against individuals and to explain its effects on entire communities.

Legislative and legal avenues of redress

To more directly address the rise in threats from foreign states, officials have introduced legislation related to foreign interference. The National Security Act, adopted in 2023, codifies a two-tiered foreign influence registration scheme (FIRS) as well as new offenses for foreign interference and assisting a foreign intelligence service. The act includes a novel “state threats aggravating power” to toughen penalties for hostile behavior “on behalf of or intended to benefit a foreign power.”13 Notably, the foreign interference offense criminalizes conduct that violates an individual’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. However, Jonathan Hall, who was named the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation following the act’s passage, observed that if carelessly implemented, such legislative measures could limit people’s freedoms of expression and association.14 Some diaspora groups and lawyers have warned, for example, that investigations may be opened against diaspora members who are themselves coerced by origin governments into intimidating other diaspora members.15 While this sort of intimidation should be investigated and may lead to the exposure of wider schemes of transnational repression, law enforcement agencies must recognize that an apparent perpetrator within the diaspora could also be a victim who requires support.

It is still early to assess the legislation’s impact, but the government has taken practical steps to implement its provisions. Matt Jukes, the head of counterterrorism policing, announced the creation of a new police unit that would exercise powers under the National Security Act and handle state threats emanating from China, Iran, and Russia.16 Since the law came into force in December 2023, at least nine individuals have been charged under its provisions, six of whom were accused of transnational repression. In May 2024, London’s Metropolitan Police charged three men—including two private security consultants—with surveilling Hong Kong prodemocracy activists.17 At the beginning of 2025, the Home Office released a guide for security professionals about the 2023 act, warning them that they may face prosecution if they gather information on political dissidents.18

British officials have also employed existing criminal penalties to punish those carrying out state threats. In December 2023, a London court sentenced a Chechen man to 3.5 years in prison for collecting information on the headquarters of the media outlet Iran International, possibly in preparation for a terrorist attack.19 In another case related to Iran International, British authorities in December 2024 secured the extradition of two Romanians to the UK, where they were detained for allegedly committing grievous bodily harm in connection with the stabbing of presenter Pouria Zeraati.20 Finally, the Metropolitan Police’s Counterterrorism Command announced in March 2025 that six Bulgarians were found guilty under the Criminal Law Act and Official Secrets Act of spying on journalists on Moscow’s behalf.21 Each of these cases reflects the government’s awareness of perpetrator states’ employment of proxies and criminal organizations to spy on diaspora media and activists.

As another form of recourse, targeted individuals are able to bring civil cases against perpetrator governments. In August 2022, a High Court judge cleared the way for Saudi satirist Ghanem al-Masarir’s lawsuit alleging that the Saudi government had hacked his phone and ordered an assault against him. The judge refused to dismiss the case under the State Immunity Act, as the Saudi operation caused personal injury to al-Masarir.22 In another case, a London Court of Appeal ruled in October 2024 that the Bahraini and Saudi governments could not claim state immunity in spyware lawsuits brought by Bahraini activists Saeed Shehabi and Moosa Mohammed and Saudi human rights defender Yahya Assiri, respectively.23 These decisions could present a useful accountability measure for future victims, especially in cases of digital transnational repression.

Grassroots support

While the UK has established cross-departmental and legislative initiatives to respond to transnational repression, it has made less progress in enhancing the resilience of communities that are vulnerable to everyday threats. On the one hand, British law enforcement agencies have provided threat-to-life warnings to high-profile targeted individuals, including Russian dissident Dmitriy Gudkov and two Iran International journalists.24 Since 2022, MI5 has responded to 20 Tehran-backed plots against UK-based individuals.25 On the other hand, officials often appear underprepared to meet the broader needs of affected communities.

For example, national and local police and municipal bodies largely fail to educate immigrant populations about their civil rights or establish mechanisms for individuals to report cases of intimidation.26 Proactive outreach to relevant communities is lagging relative to other host countries such as Canada and the United States. The lack of a systematic outreach program or a designated government point of contact means that individuals often do not know whom to consult. Prominent individuals with contacts in the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) or Home Office may notify them of concerns, but most must turn to police or the office of a local member of Parliament.27 In fact, leading security officials frequently tell victims to call police at 999 or 101, or to visit a police station. While this advice is the most effective option in life-threatening situations, relying primarily on emergency numbers may overshadow the value of regular engagement with communities to mitigate less severe forms of harassment.

Not all local officers know enough about transnational repression to understand why someone would be targeted, as one Hong Kong activist indicated in a conversation with Freedom House. Frontline responders are consequently not always able to adequately help vulnerable people. In a letter to Security Minister Jarvis, members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China voiced their concerns about the police’s lack of preparedness to support Hong Kong activists targeted by bounties issued by the Hong Kong government.28 Hong Kong diaspora figures and Iranian journalists have indicated that local police may not recognize incidents of transnational repression as such, and sometimes advise targeted individuals to censor themselves to avoid unwanted attention.29

Local law enforcement officers’ awareness of transnational repression could improve after Security Minister Jarvis told Parliament in March 2025 that counterterrorism specialists would train all 45 territorial police forces across the UK on state threats.30 Even if police are able to meet immediate needs in more urgent situations, however, they are poorly equipped to address the wide-ranging psychological impacts of transnational repression tactics and the ways in which sustained intimidation prevents individuals from enjoying their basic rights as residents of the UK.

Foreign Policy

Although the UK has participated in several bilateral and multilateral efforts to address transnational repression and has held certain states accountable, the country’s foreign and economic interests deter the government from treating all perpetrators alike.

British officials have contributed to a number of larger initiatives to combat physical and digital transnational repression. In September 2023, the UK’s National Cybersecurity Centre and the United States’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency held a Strategic Dialogue on Cybersecurity of Civil Society Under Threat of Transnational Repression. A year later, Home Office officials met with US Department of Justice national security experts to form a working group to review the threat of state-sponsored violence and repression.31 In addition, the UK and France lead the Pall Mall process, an initiative that aims to “tackle the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities.”32 On the multilateral level, the UK is a member of the Group of Seven Rapid Response Mechanism, which has a working group dedicated to countering transnational repression. The UK and its Five Eyes intelligence allies—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—also committed themselves to protecting their societies from transnational repression at the Five Country Ministerial meeting in June 2023.33

UK authorities have pursued accountability measures against adversarial governments. Iran and Russia, for example, are frequently mentioned in MI5 state threat updates and Home Office speeches. In 2025, the Home Office announced that the two countries would be the first on the enhanced tier of the aforementioned FIRS, requiring organizations and individuals representing Tehran’s and Moscow’s interests to register for a broad range of activities or face up to five years in prison.34 Moreover, the government expelled Russian diplomats after the Skripal poisoning, and as threats against Iran International and UK-based Iranian activists spiked in 2023, it created a new sanctions regime to apply in Tehran-backed incidents.35 Upon taking office in late 2023, then–Foreign Secretary David Cameron summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires in London to stress that plots against Iran International journalists would not be tolerated.36 A month later, the UK, in partnership with the United States, employed the recently instituted sanctions regime against several members of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Unit 840 for plotting to kill Iran International journalists, and against criminal gangs that had pursued Iranian dissidents across jurisdictions.37

The response to acts of transnational repression carried out by Beijing has been more limited, likely due to foreign policy and economic considerations. Over the last few years, UK ministers and lawmakers have publicly condemned the Chinese government’s opening of unofficial police stations and the imposition of bounties on UK-based Hong Kong activists, and the FCDO has raised these issues with Chinese diplomats. However, there is a gap between rhetoric and actions. A 2023 Foreign Affairs Committee analysis of the 2021 integrated review criticized the government for not swiftly declaring Zheng Xiyuan persona non grata for his role in the Manchester incident.38 In January 2025, under a new Labour Party government, Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Home Secretary Yvette Cooper expressed provisional support for a Chinese “super embassy” on the grounds of the former Royal Mint despite concerns among UK-based dissidents from China—some of whom had been targeted with the bounties issued by Hong Kong authorities—that the embassy could serve as a hub for transnational repression.39 Around the same time, Foreign Minister for the Indo-Pacific Catherine West cited economic reasons to defend the chancellor’s visit to China only weeks after Hong Kong police issued arrest warrants for four more UK-based individuals. According to West, the British economy was “fragile,” and the government had to “balance those [national security concerns] with being an outwardly facing and globally trading nation.”40

Similar geopolitical and economic concerns in the context of Britain’s exit from the European Union (EU) and political turnover in the UK have affected the government’s responses to transnational repression perpetrated by other partners, such as India and some Persian Gulf states.41 In January 2022, the UK launched negotiations on a free trade agreement with the Indian government, which has increasingly targeted Sikh nationalists abroad in recent years. British police have granted protection to at least six Sikh individuals who are allegedly on an Indian intelligence hit list, yet members of the Sikh community in the UK—including Labour member of Parliament Preet Kaur Gill—have said their concerns are not always taken seriously by police.42 While authorities expelled an Indian intelligence agent in the summer of 2023, officials never explained the reason, whereas their US and Canadian counterparts publicly announced accountability measures in response to extraterritorial assassination plots linked to the Indian government in those countries.43

Migration Policy

Both Conservative and Labour Party governments have promoted restrictive asylum policies in recent years, increasing the precarity of many potential targets of transnational repression. At the end of 2024, the asylum backlog stood at over 90,000 applications, with many asylum seekers originating in Pakistan, Turkey, and Eritrea—all state perpetrators of transnational repression.44 Without permanent legal status, asylum seekers remain dependent on their home countries for key documents and are thus exposed to pressure from those governments. Except for special UK visa schemes for Hong Kongers, Ukrainians, and Afghans, there are few efficient permanent resettlement pathways for individuals fleeing closed political systems or conflict. In addition, while there are safeguards against politically motivated extraditions, awareness of transnational repression within the migration system is lacking.45 Instead of addressing capacity concerns, policymakers have sought to criminalize “irregular” migrants and externalize asylum screening to Rwanda, a country whose regime has a track record of perpetrating transnational repression.

The Rwanda plan, though ultimately abandoned, exemplifies broader efforts by some democracies to offshore asylum processing to a “safe” third country. After leaving the EU, the UK had no agreements allowing it to send migrants back to European countries through which they had transited. In 2022, the Conservative government of Boris Johnson inked a memorandum of understanding with Rwandan officials, enabling the UK to send “irregular” migrants who arrived via “dangerous” routes—including by crossing the English Channel in small boats—to Rwanda. The 2022 Nationality and Border Act facilitated this arrangement, and the 2023 Illegal Migration Act (IMA) gave ministers discretion to disregard interim restrictions issued by the European Court of Human Rights.46 The UK Supreme Court deemed the plan unlawful due to Rwanda’s woeful human rights record, inadequate asylum system, and history of transnational repression directed at Rwandan nationals in the UK.47 Nonetheless, the Conservative government under Rishi Sunak passed the Safety of Rwanda Act in April 2024 to bar the Home Office from considering evidence that was critical of Rwanda’s record, and signed a treaty with Kigali to enhance safeguards in Rwanda’s migration system.48 These moves came despite the fact that the British government had granted refugee status to four Rwandans in 2023.49 After taking power in July 2024, the new Labour government scrapped the entire plan, and no asylum seekers were ever forcibly removed to Rwanda.

Rather than dedicating more resources to addressing the asylum backlog, however, the Labour government has focused on closing physical access to the UK. The government did signal its intent to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and reverse the duty to remove asylum seekers under the IMA by introducing the Border Security, Asylum, and Immigration Bill 2025. But as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees notes, the bill would retain a clause of the IMA that expands the number of countries deemed “safe” and from which asylum seekers would be inadmissible.50 The augmented list of safe countries would include India, a known state perpetrator of transnational repression.

Conclusion

Transnational repression is clearly on the radar of the UK government. Authorities have understood the issue through the prism of national security, introducing laws and sanctions to penalize egregious incidents carried out by foreign states against their current or former nationals. However, a comprehensive and effective response to the problem will require going beyond the criminalization of certain acts to both increase the resilience of diaspora communities and recognize the ways in which some migration policies can exacerbate transnational repression.

Recommendations for the UK government: 

• Establish a systematic outreach program for diaspora communities that are vulnerable to transnational repression. One option would be to organize deeper cooperation between the Defending Democracy Taskforce and local councils on informing individuals of their rights as UK residents. The government could also produce brochures in relevant languages about the various tactics of transnational repression and what to do when individuals suspect they are being targeted.
• Designate a lead office within the government to address transnational repression. This “point person,” who could operate within the Defending Democracy Taskforce, should streamline the formulation of responses, enhance transparency related to government efforts to hold perpetrators accountable, and develop resources for diaspora communities.
• Deepen collaboration with British civil society to document trends and identify priorities among diaspora communities. The UK hosts a plethora of human rights and diaspora organizations, including the recently formed Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group, which has driven progress on this issue and developed relationships with Parliament. Given the potential reticence of some immigrants to report incidents to police or Home Office officials, the government should increase funding for civil society initiatives and expand collaboration with this existing network to inform policy and enhance understanding of diaspora members’ everyday concerns. 
• Carefully implement training on state threats for local law enforcement agencies. Well-crafted programs will enable police and other local officials to recognize different forms of transnational repression, understand the political motivations of key perpetrators, and respond appropriately to victims’ requests for assistance.
• Consistently apply sanctions and diplomatic measures against perpetrators of transnational repression. Foreign policy preferences should not influence the designation of countries for the enhanced tier of the FIRS. 
• Refrain from summarily rejecting asylum seekers from countries with track records of transnational repression. The government should also avoid any revival of efforts to offshore the holding or screening of asylum seekers to countries whose governments have threatened their nationals in the UK, and dedicate more resources to reducing the asylum backlog through fair and efficient processing of applications.

• 1UK Parliament, “Update on Chinese ‘Overseas Police Service Stations,’” Statement made by Home Office Minister of State for Security Tom Tugendhat (UIN HCWS822), June 6, 2023, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/20….
• 2Josh Halliday and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Chinese Diplomat Involved in Violence at Manchester Consulate, MP Says,” The Guardian, October 19, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/oct/18/china-claims-hong-kong-….
• 3

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• 4UK Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (London: UK Government, March 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60644e4bd3bf7f0c91eababd….
• 5Home Office, “Legislation to Counter State Threats (Hostile State Activity), Government Consultation,” July 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo….
• 6UK Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (London: UK Government, March 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60644e4bd3bf7f0c91eababd….
• 7Home Office, Cabinet Office, and Tom Tugendhat, “Ministerial Taskforce Meets to Tackle State Threats to UK Democracy,” news release, November 28, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministerial-taskforce-meets-to-tackl….
• 8UK Parliament, “Defending Democracy Taskforce: Question for Home Office,” UIN 182673, April 25, 2023, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/202….
• 9UK Parliament Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, written evidence submitted by Defending Democracy Taskforce, Home Office, April 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/129622/html/.
• 10UK Parliament, “JCNSS Launches Inquiry on Defending Democracy with UK Election Expected This Year,” news release, February 1, 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/8131/defending-democracy/news/199….
• 11Jarvis highlighted that the review found transnational repression to be “targeted and specific,” as perpetrator governments set their sights on those who are “perceived as threats.” He identified the targeting of Iranian journalists, the imposition of bounties by Hong Kong authorities on UK-based Hong Kong activists, and the Skripal poisoning as examples of transnational repression. For more, see UK Parliament, “Transnational Repression Review,” Statement made by Home Office Minister of State for Security Dan Jarvis (UIN HCW632), May 14, 2025, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/20….
• 12Home Office, “What to Do If You Think You Are the Victim of Transnational Repression,” May 14, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transnational-repression/wha….
• 13Home Office, “A Guide to the National Security Act 2023 for Security Professionals (Accessible),” January 24, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/complying-with-the-national-….
• 14Jonathan Hall KC, “Transnational Repression: What Planet Are We On?,” May 29, 2024, https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uplo….
• 15The Rights Practice and FairSquare, “Addressing the Challenge of Transnational Human Rights Violations in the UK,” May 2024, https://www.rights-practice.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=4b44e89e-b8….
• 16Michael Holden, “UK Police to Counter Hostile State Threats with New Unit,” Reuters, January 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-police-counter-hostile-state-threat….
• 17Dan Sabbagh, “Three Men Accused of Aiding Hong Kong Intelligence Service Appear in London Court,” The Guardian, May 14, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/may/13/three-men-charg….
• 18Home Office, “A Guide to the National Security Act 2023 for Security Professionals (Accessible),” policy paper, January 24, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/complying-with-the-national-….
• 19“Suspect in Terror Plot Against Iran International Gets Jail Term,” Iran International, December 22, 2023, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202312227033.
• 20“Two Men Arrested in London over Attack on British-Iranian Journalist,” Reuters, December 17, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/two-men-arrested-london-over-attack-br….
• 21Daniel De Simone and Amy Walker, “Bulgarians Guilty of Spying for Russia in the UK,” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), March 7, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2gx52xqqpo.
• 22Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “British Judge Rules Dissident Can Sue Saudi Arabia for Pegasus Hacking,” The Guardian, August 20, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/19/british-judge-rules-dissi….
• 23Dania Akkad, “Saudi Activist Offers to Withdraw Spyware Case Against Kingdom in UK’s High Court,” Middle East Eye, October 23, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-activist-offers-withdraw-spywa….
• 24Will Vernon, “‘They’re Tightening the Screws,’” BBC, August 3, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cl4y0j47xe4o.
• 25Dan Jarvis, “Protecting National Security,” Home Office, March 5, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/protecting-national-security.
• 26David Tobin and Nyrola Elimä, “We Know You Better than You Know Yourself”: China’s Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora (Sheffield, UK: University of Sheffield, 2023), https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/seas/research/we-know-you-better-you-know-y….
• 27The Rights Practice and FairSquare, “Addressing the Challenge of Transnational Human Rights Violations in the UK,” May 2024, https://www.rights-practice.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=4b44e89e-b8….
• 28Alix Culbertson, “Ministers Urged to Act after Hong Kong Activists’ UK Neighbours ‘Bribed’ to Hand Them into Chinese Embassy,” Sky News, March 6, 2025, https://news.sky.com/story/ministers-urged-to-act-over-hong-kong-activi….
• 29Amnesty International UK Section, Hong Kong Democracy Council, and The Rights Practice, “Roundtable on Transnational Repression in the UK: Lived Experience and Recommendations from Hong Kong Diaspora Community Groups,” November 14, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2025-02/Roundtable%20Summary%20Report%…; Reporters Without Borders (RSF), “Watch Out Because We’re Coming for You”: Transnational Repression of Iranian Journalists in the UK (Paris: RSF, April 2024), https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/medias/file/2024/04/Rapport%20Iran%….
• 30Matt Dathan, “All Frontline Police Will Be Trained to Spot State-Backed Threats,” The Times, March 5, 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/all-frontline-police-will-….
• 31US Department of Justice, “Joint Statement of the US Department of Justice and the United Kingdom Home Office on a Multilateral Meeting to Address State-Sponsored High-Harm Physical Threats and Other Forms of Transnational Repression,” news release, October 30, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/joint-statement-us-department-j….
• 32Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, “The Pall Mall Process Declaration: Tackling Proliferation and Irresponsible Use of Commercial Cyber Intrusion Capabilities,” February 28, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-pall-mall-process-declar….
• 33US Department of Homeland Security, “Five Country Ministerial 2023 Communique,” news release, June 29, 2023, https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2023/06/29/five-country-ministerial-20….
• 34Dan Jarvis, “Foreign Influence Registration Scheme Implementation,” Home Office, April 1, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-influence-registration-s….
• 35Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office and James Cleverly, “UK Steps Up Action to Tackle Rising Threat Posed by Iran,” news release, July 6, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-steps-up-action-to-tackle-rising-….
• 36“UK Summons Iranian Envoy over Iran International Assassination Plot,” Iran International, December 24, 2023, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202312247944.
• 37Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, James Cleverly, and Lord Cameron, “UK and US Step Up Action to Tackle Domestic Threat from Iran,” news release, January 29, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-step-up-action-to-tackle-d….
• 38UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Tilting Horizons: The Integrated Review and the Indo-Pacific, Eighth Report of Session 2022–23, July 18, 2023, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41144/documents/204045/de….
• 39Mark Landler and Mara Hvistendahl, “In Giant Chinese Embassy in London, Opponents See Long Arm of Beijing,” The New York Times, February 20, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/world/europe/china-embassy-britain.h….
• 40Claudia Savage, “Minister: UK Must Balance National Security Concerns over China with Trade Aims,” The Independent, January 7, 2025, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/catherine-west-china-rachel-reeve….
• 41

  Yana Gorokhovskaia and Isabel Linzer, “Case Study: The United Kingdom,” in Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2022), https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/united-kingdom….

• 42Vanessa Pearce, “MPs to Meet Security Minister over Safety of Sikhs Living in Britain,” BBC, January 28, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-68121754.
• 43Peter Guest, “On British Soil, Foreign Autocrats Target Their Critics with Impunity,” Coda Story, December 19, 2023, https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/on-british-soil-foreign-au…; Sikh Federation UK, “Urgent MP Letter Campaign: Transnational Repression by the Indian Authorities and the Targeting of Sikh Activists in the UK,” https://www.sikhfeduk.com/campaigns/urgent-mp-letter-campaignr-transnat….
• 44Georgina Sturge, “Asylum Statistics,” UK House of Commons Library, March 4, 2025, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01403/SN01403….
• 45

  Yana Gorokhovskaia and Isabel Linzer, “Case Study: The United Kingdom,” in Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2022), https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/united-kingdom….

• 46The European Court of Human Rights issued such restrictions to block a flight that would have carried the first seven asylum seekers to Rwanda in June 2022. For more, see Alex Balch, “Nationality and Borders Act Becomes Law: Five Key Changes Explained,” The Conversation, April 29, 2022, https://theconversation.com/nationality-and-borders-act-becomes-law-fiv…; Alice Donald and Joelle Grogan, “Illegal Migration Act 2023,” UK in a Changing Europe, March 15, 2024, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/illegal-migration-act-2023/#:~:text=Fo….
• 47Emilie McDonnell, “UK Supreme Court Finds UK-Rwanda Asylum Scheme Unlawful,” Human Rights Watch, November 15, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/15/uk-supreme-court-finds-uk-rwanda-as….
• 48Peter William Walsh, “Q&A: The UK’s Former Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,” The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, July 25, 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/qa-the-uks….
• 49John Ungoed-Thomas and Anthony Barnett, “Revealed: UK Granted Asylum to Rwandan Refugees While Arguing Country Was Safe,” The Guardian, January 28, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/27/revealed-uk-granted-asylu….
• 50UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Observations on the Border Security, Asylum, and Immigration Bill,” March 5, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/media/observations-border-security-asylum-and-….