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Freedom on the Net 2024

Australia

Free
76
100
A Obstacles to Access 23 25
B Limits on Content 28 35
C Violations of User Rights 25 40
Last Year's Score & Status
76 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Australia remained relatively robust. The country’s information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure is well developed and access is affordable and widely available. The government does not restrict internet or mobile connectivity and does not block political or social content online. However, recent proposed legislation has sought to increase online surveillance and limit the security of encrypted communications.

  • In April 2024, the eSafety commissioner sought to compel X to remove a post worldwide, but withdrew the order after a court found that that the Online Safety Act did not empower the commissioner to issue orders with a global scope (see B2).
  • In March 2024, Meta announced that it would not renew or make any new deals with Australian media outlets to pay them for content that appears on its platforms, as mandated by the News Media and Bargaining Code, setting up a likely confrontation with regulators over the code’s enforcement (see B6 and B7).
  • The government considered proposed reforms on privacy, misinformation, and doxing (see B7, C2, and C5).
  • In October 2023, voters rejected a constitutional referendum to establish a representative body for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, in part due to rampant online misinformation and disinformation about the proposal (see B7).

header2 Political Overview

Australia has a strong record of advancing and protecting political rights and civil liberties. Challenges to these freedoms include the threat of foreign political influence, harsh policies toward asylum seekers, discrimination against LGBT+ people, legal constraints on the press, and ongoing difficulties in ensuring the equal rights of First Nations Australians.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

There are few infrastructural limitations on internet access or speed. The internet penetration rate is high: 93 percent of Australian adults had a fixed-line or wireless home internet connection and 5 percent connected through 4G or 5G mobile networks as of June 2023, according to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA).1 Eighty-one percent of Australians are connected to the internet via the National Broadband Network (NBN), which became operational in late 2020.2

After numerous delays and complaints, the NBN was completed in December 2023.3 Overall, the NBN has delivered faster connections to more residents at lower costs.4 However, many Australian homes do not have full fiber-optic cable connections to the NBN, relying on partial connections and a patchwork of other infrastructure technologies that provide less reliable connectivity.5 The NBN Company, the state-owned infrastructure provider, said it was on track to provide access to fiber-optic connections for 90 percent of households by the end of 2025.6 By March 2024, 12.4 million premises were ready to connect to the NBN access network and around 8.6 million premises had already been activated.7

In 2023, almost three-quarters of NBN fixed-line broadband services operated on wholesale speed tiers of at least 50 megabits per second (Mbps).8 According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, as of March 2024, the median mobile and broadband download speeds stood at 82.88 Mbps and 54.69 Mbps, respectively.9

In November 2023, 10 million people lost internet and phone service for half a day due to a service disruption from Optus, the country’s second-largest telecommunications provider,10 which led to widespread disruption of health, transport, and other key government services. The network outage sparked a federal senate inquiry.11

Most Australians are now covered by 4G mobile networks and major providers planned to shut down 3G networks by the end of 2024.12 The Australian Competition and Consumer Corporation (ACCC) has noted that some people will face coverage difficulties unless the gaps created by the shutdown of 3G networks are addressed.13 All three national mobile network operators continued to invest in 5G coverage, according to the ACCC 2023 report, including in rural areas.14 Telstra has the widest 5G network.15

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Internet access is affordable for most Australians. The gradual shift to NBN services across the country led to greater competition among internet service providers (ISPs), higher-quality connections, and improved speeds.1 However, the ACCC reported that NBN prices remained steady or increased in 2023, which represents a continued trend from 2021 and 2022.2

According to the Australian Digital Inclusion Index, equity in access to and use of digital technologies generally improved in 2023, as did overall affordability, compared to the year prior.3 Cost remains a point of concern, though there have been significant improvements. As of 2023, around 4 percent of Australians spent more than 10 percent of their household income to receive a reliable connection, a significant drop from 14 percent in 2021; around 28 percent of Australians spent more than 5 percent of household income on internet connections in 2023.4

A marked digital divide between urban and nonurban areas persists. For example, around 83 percent of people living in metropolitan areas have access to the NBN, compared to only 75 percent of people living in regional areas.5 Regional fixed-line NBN download speeds also lag behind urban connections.6 Certain segments of the population, including mobile-only users and people who rent from public housing authorities, continue to face challenges to access and affordability.7 Other groups have seen increased access, such as Australians older than 75, though their digital inclusion still lags behind other age groups.8

First Nations Australians, particularly those living in remote areas, are some of the most digitally excluded people in the country. A 2023 study from the Australian Digital Inclusion Index found that First Nations communities, especially those in remote areas, trail other Australians in internet access and affordability.9

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government does not impose restrictions on internet connectivity or mobile networks. Australia is connected to the international internet through undersea cables that are not controlled by the government.1 Domestically, internet traffic flows through either commercial or nonprofit internet exchange points (IXPs) located in most major cities.2

Under the iCode, a set of voluntary cybersecurity guidelines for ISPs, internet connectivity may be temporarily restricted for users whose devices have become part of a botnet or are at high risk of being infected with malicious software. ISPs can temporarily throttle these connections or quarantine users until they reach out to their ISP and restore security.3

The 1997 Telecommunications Act requires providers to assist authorities in certain circumstances, including restrictions on services during emergencies.4

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 5.005 6.006

There are no major legal, regulatory, and economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers. However, Telstra has consistently held the largest share of the mobile and fixed-line broadband markets.

The ISP market is competitive, with at least 150 NBN providers as of March 2024.1 Telstra commands over 40 percent of the wholesale broadband market, TPG holds 21 percent, Optus holds 12.7 percent, and Vocus holds 8.4 percent.2 All four leading ISPs sell NBN connections. As of 2023, the top three mobile network operators (Telstra, Optus, and TPG) accounted for 89 percent of Australia’s mobile services.3

There are several smaller ISPs that act as “virtual” providers, maintaining only a retail presence and offering end users access through the network facilities of other companies. These “carriage service providers” do not need to obtain a license.4 The ACMA issues operating licenses, which larger ISPs that own telecommunications infrastructure, or “carriers,” are required to obtain (see A5). Carriers must go through the independent Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) dispute-resolution process to resolve complaints from customers.5

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4.004 4.004

The ACMA is the primary regulator for the broadcasting, internet, and telecommunications sectors.1 Its oversight is generally viewed as fair and independent. ACMA members are formally appointed by the governor-general of Australia for five-year terms.2

Australian ISPs are coregulated under the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) of 1992, which combines regulation by the ACMA with self-regulation by the telecommunications industry.3 The industry is responsible for developing industry standards and codes of practice.4 There are more than 30 self-regulatory codes that govern the ICT sector. The ACMA approves self-regulatory codes produced by the Communications Alliance, Australia’s main telecommunications industry body.5

Small businesses and residential customers may file complaints about internet, telephone, and mobile phone service with the TIO,6 which operates a free and independent dispute resolution mechanism.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Political and social content is rarely subject to blocking. Communications and social media applications are freely available. However, popular websites that frequently host copyright-infringing material are blocked with some regularity.

Owners of copyrighted material periodically obtain orders from the Federal Court of Australia blocking copyright-infringing websites.1 For example, in February 2022, the Federal Court ordered 48 Australian carriers to block 34 pirated streaming websites.2

In November 2019, the government introduced a website blocking scheme that permits the ACMA to request ISPs to block illegal gambling websites under Section 313(3) of the 1997 Telecommunications Act.3 As of June 2023, the ACMA had asked ISPs to block 785 illegal gambling and affiliate websites.4

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Online content protected under international human rights standards is generally free from interference by state and nonstate actors. However, the courts sometimes seek to block defamatory material that appears on major social media platforms and search engines.

The Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material Act empowers authorities to request the removal of content deemed “abhorrent violent material” (see B3). The eSafety commissioner's office reported that in 2022 and 2023, it issued three notices under this law to content hosts.1 In the same period, the eSafety commissioner referred identified 14,975 URLs to be referred to global partners for removal, 99 percent of which hosted content that met the definition of child sexual abuse imagery.2

In April 2024, the Federal Court issued an interim injunction to compel X to hide a video of a violent attack at a Sydney church, which the eSafety commissioner had ordered removed.3 The eSafety commissioner argued that X’s decision to geoblock the content within Australia was insufficient because Australians could use circumvention tools to bypass the restriction. The commissioner therefore sought the worldwide restriction of the content. The Federal Court ruled in X’s favor in May, finding that that the Online Safety Act did not empower the eSafety commissioner to issue orders with a global scope.4 In June, after the coverage period, the eSafety Commissioner dropped the case to enforce the removal notice in Federal Court.5

In its most recent transparency report, covering July 2022 to June 2023, Facebook disclosed that it had restricted access to 731 items in response to reports from government agencies, as well as 675 items reported by users and legal counsel for defamation.6 During the same period, Google received content removal requests for 6,734 items (up from 1,743 the previous year), 4,732 of which were taken down.7

The June 2021 passage of the Online Safety Act, which sparked civil society concern about its potentially disproportionate effect on content from marginalized groups, has led to the removal of online content.8 In February 2022, a sex work positive social media platform known as Switter announced that it would shut down due to legal concerns over its ability to protect users and comply effectively and ethically with various online safety and defamation laws.9

Recent court cases involving Google’s search results and autocomplete predictions have sought to clarify how Australia’s defamation laws are applied to online content restrictions. In August 2022, the High Court of Australia ruled that Google is not considered a “publisher” of websites it links to in search results.10 The decision found that the company cannot be held liable for defamatory content accessed via its search engine.11

A 2021 High Court decision ruled that Australians who maintain a social media page may be exposed to defamation liability for posts others make on their page, even if they are not aware of the posts.12 In response to this decision, lawmakers attempted to pass the Social Media (Anti-Trolling) Bill 2022 (see C4). A proposal to introduce limited defamation liability protections for internet intermediaries was approved by the Standing Council of Attorneys-General in December 2022.13 The protections went into effect in the Capital Territory and New South Wales in July 2024, after the coverage period.14

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 2.002 4.004

Restrictions on internet content remain limited but have increased in recent years. The legal and technical mechanisms ISPs use to filter illegal material have raised some concerns. In 2018, amendments to the criminal code introduced an expansive new category of online content that social media companies must remove, while an amendment to the 1968 Copyright Act opened more avenues for blocking or removing copyright-infringing material.

The Online Safety Act came into force in January 2022.1 While the act aims to improve online safety by, for example, introduced protections against threats such as cyberbullying and child exploitation, it expanded the government’s ability to block and request the removal of certain online content. Civil society groups, tech companies, and other commentators raised concerns about the law before its passage, citing its speedy takedown requirements and its potentially disproportionate effect on marginalized groups, such as sex workers, sex educators, LGBT+ people, and artists (see B2).2

Content targeted under the Online Safety Act includes cyberbullying material directed at children, intimate images shared without consent, and cyberabuse material.3 Under the law, users can make formal complaints about online content and the eSafety commissioner can investigate those complaints and issue removal notices. Providers—which include social media platforms, “relevant electronic services,” “designated internet services,” hosting services, and any end user that posts the material—must remove content sanctioned by the commissioner within 24 hours of receiving a takedown notice. Failure to comply can result in a penalty of up to AU$555,000 (US$396,000) for companies and AU$111,000 (US$79,100) for individuals.4 The law also empowers the commissioner to issue app removal notices that require providers to block users from downloading apps that facilitate the posting of certain material.

In April 2024, X announced plans to file a legal challenge against the eSafety commissioner over takedown notices for posts harassing a transgender community health expert.5 In May, X successfully litigated a separate matter around the eSafety commissioner’s authority to issue global takedown orders (see B2).

The eSafety commissioner can also order ISPs to block access to sites hosting “abhorrent violent material” for up to three months. After the three months have expired, the commissioner can renew the block indefinitely. The act does not require the commissioner to justify the removal notices and provides no opportunity for users to respond to complaints.6

Protections against “abhorrent violent material” were added to the criminal code in 2019. The amendments required ISPs, content providers, and hosting services to “expeditiously” remove any “abhorrent violent material,” defined as content depicting attempted murder, terrorism, torture, rape, or kidnapping.7 The eSafety commissioner may alert companies to “abhorrent violent material” on their services; if the companies fail to “expeditiously” remove it, they could be fined AU$10.5 million (US$7.5 million) or 10 percent of their annual revenue. Individuals may be fined AU$2.1 million (US$1.5 million) or imprisoned for up to three years. The law also penalizes companies that fail to notify the Australian Federal Police (AFP) of such content produced in Australia within a reasonable timeframe. These penalties are subject to appeal. Critics have expressed concern that the legislation could unreasonably hold companies responsible for content posted by users.8

In 2018, the Copyright Act was amended to broaden its provisions by, for example, allowing courts to issue blocking injunctions to search engine providers, which must take reasonable steps to block search results for copyright-infringing content.9 The amendment also allows existing blocking injunctions to be extended to “new domain names associated with the blocked online location” without a new court order.10

Section 313(3) of the 1997 Telecommunications Act allows government agencies to block illegal online services. In 2017, the Department of Communications and the Arts published “good practice measures” for agencies on the use of Section 313(3), which includes obtaining approval from the agency head prior to blocking online services, disrupting online services only in response to serious offenses or national security threats, informing the public about the law’s uses, and ensuring that the agency possesses appropriate technical expertise.11

Copyright holders may apply to the Federal Court to request that ISPs block copyright-infringing websites and services located overseas under Section 115A of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Act of 2015.12 The court must take into consideration whether the overseas site primarily exists to facilitate copyright infringement, whether the response is proportionate, and whether blocking the content is in the public interest. However, there is no appointed party to represent the public interest in these cases.13

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Fear of defamation lawsuits has driven some self-censorship among both the media and ordinary internet users (see C2).

Legal defenses against defamation, such as the public interest defense, are difficult to claim in practice, effectively inhibiting the publication of public interest journalism given the risk of defamation accusations.1 According to a survey of journalists published in 2022 by the Australian Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, 87 percent of respondents reported that defamation laws made their jobs more difficult, with over a quarter saying they had written stories that were never published due to legal concerns.2 Recent defamation rulings targeting anonymity online have raised additional concerns about self-censorship. In June 2022, a court ordered Twitter to provide identifying information of a popular, anonymous pro–Labor Party account, “PRGuy17,” as part of a defamation lawsuit.3

Separately, the media often interprets narrowly written orders to suppress coverage of ongoing legal proceedings in an overly broad fashion to avoid contempt of court charges.4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 3.003 4.004

The government does not control or manipulate online sources of information to advance any political interest.

The online portal of the publicly funded Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) is a major source of news for Australians. Some members of the former governing coalition have called for the privatization of the ABC or funding cuts to the outlet;1 commentators have characterized these proposals as a response to the outlet’s perceived left-leaning bias. The persistent political pressure on the ABC has raised concerns about its editorial independence.2 News Corp Australia, a media conglomerate controlled by Rupert Murdoch until September 2023 and one of the leading players in Australia’s concentrated media market, is regarded by some observers as biased in favor of the conservative Liberal Party and the National Party.3

To address increasing online misinformation, the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI), a nonprofit association that advocates for the interests of the tech industry in Australia, published a voluntary Australian Code of Practice on Misinformation and Disinformation in 2021. Developed with the assistance of the ACMA, the code outlines practices to label, demote, or remove certain categories of false information; to prioritize credible content, including through fact-checking programs; and to enhance transparency reporting. The code also includes practices for platforms to enhance transparency around political advertising. Twitter, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Redbubble, and TikTok are among the platforms that have adopted the code and began removing offending content.4

In January 2023, the government announced that it would pursue a bill to give the ACMA new powers to fight misinformation and disinformation, including by strengthening and extending the DIGI code to apply to nonsignatories.5 The proposed legislation would not provide the ACMA with content removal powers, though it does empower the body to develop codes for the industry in the absence of self-regulatory efforts. The draft legislation was met with significant public pushback around freedom of expression concerns, some of which was fueled by misleading comments from political leaders and other commentators that framed the bill as empowering the government to conduct censorship.6 During a public consultation, the bill received 23,000 responses, including 3,000 submissions, some of which were part of a coordinated campaign using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate feedback.7 As a result of the criticism, the government committed to revising the bill.8 In September 2024, after the coverage period, the government announced plans to reintroduce the legislation.9

Misinformation surged ahead of an October 2023 constitutional referendum to establish a representative body for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, which did not pass. Politicians promoted some misinformation narratives online,10 most of which supported the “No” campaign.11 The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) created a register listing 14 prominent pieces of disinformation about the referendum.12

Recent major crises have spurred misinformation campaigns13 and political parties have spread disinformation during election campaigns.14 Ahead of the 2022 federal elections, the AEC voiced concerns about several minor party candidates who suggested on Facebook that electoral fraud would occur. False claims that First Nations people had been silently wiped from the electoral roll also spread during the campaign.15

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 3.003 3.003

Users are generally free to publish content online without economic or regulatory constraints.

The principle of net neutrality is not enshrined in any law or regulation. There are no limits on the amount of bandwidth that ISPs can supply, though ISPs are free to adopt internal market practices for traffic shaping, in which connectivity for less critical applications is slowed to release bandwidth for other applications. Some Australian ISPs and mobile service providers practice traffic shaping as part of their fair-use policies: if a customer uses peer-to-peer file-sharing software, internet connectivity for those activities will be slowed in order to release bandwidth for other applications.1

In February 2021, the government passed the News Media and Digital Platforms Bargaining Code, which established a mandatory arbitration regime for digital platforms—including social media companies, search engines, and content aggregators—to negotiate with and pay news outlets for their content.2 The minister of communications has the power to categorize services as digital platforms and, in making such a determination, must ensure there is a “significant bargaining power imbalance” between the news companies and the platforms.3 In November 2022, the Department of the Treasury reported that Google and Meta had reached over 30 agreements with news businesses.4

Critics have said that the code allows major news corporations to profit from the “systematic data collection and exploitation models” that digital platforms promote, which could reduce media diversity.5 The threshold of AU$150,000 (US$107,000) in annual revenue for a corporation to qualify as a valid “news business,” and therefore receive bargaining rights under the code, has also been criticized for potentially disadvantaging smaller and regional outlets.6 Broad nondisclosure provisions have also shut some eligible news outlets out of negotiations with platforms without justification.7 Despite these criticisms, some have noted that the added revenue could enable media outlets to invest in their newsrooms, potentially improving the quality and diversity of the journalism landscape in Australia.8 Notably, in the November 2022 review of the code, the government stated that its objective was not to improve competition or media diversity, and that it was not designed to redistribute resources across the news sector.9

In early 2023, a coalition of mainstream media corporations, some of which may benefit from data-extractive business models, publicly rejected proposals to reform the Australian Privacy Act.10 The proposed reforms would have made news outlets legally liable for privacy invasion.11

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 4.004 4.004

The online landscape is diverse, and Australians have access to a broad selection of online news sources that convey uncensored political and social viewpoints. Although Australia has one of the world’s most consolidated newspaper industries, the online news sector is slightly more diverse.1

However, online news media is influenced by ownership concentration in the print media industry. News Corp Australia accounts for more than half of newspaper circulation in Australia, while Nine (Fairfax Media) also holds a sizeable share.2 News Corp’s News.com.au is, according to some studies, the country’s most-viewed news site, and the digital versions of News Corp newspapers, such as the Australian, are also popular.3 Concerns about ownership concentration arose when News Corp’s 2019 election coverage was criticized for being excessively one-sided in favor of conservative parties.4 News Corp outlets have also been assailed for publishing allegedly racist and xenophobic content.5

In January 2024, polling by Essential Research showed that 24 percent of Australians had no trust in traditional media, while 59 percent had “a little” trust.6

In March 2024, Meta announced that it would not renew or make any new deals with Australian publishers under the News Media and Bargaining Code (see B6), and that it would deprecate Facebook News, a news content feed previously available in the United States and Australia.7 Under the code, Australian authorities may require a digital company to engage in arbitration with media outlets for news content if it is available to the platform’s users. Meta told policymakers in June 2024 that it would consider blocking news content on Facebook for Australia-based users to avoid paying the fees.8

Facebook previously blocked news content for Australia-based users for a week in 2021, after the code was passed. Non-news content was also restricted, including content from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, civil society organizations, and public health groups. In May 2022, reports emerged that Facebook had intentionally created a broad takedown process that would impact non-news content as a negotiating tactic.9 The social media platform reversed the block only after the Australian government agreed to amend the law to give platforms more time to negotiate deals with news outlets and provide a notice period for designated platforms, among other changes.10

Nevertheless, traditional and digital news outlets provide a diversity of viewpoints to the public, as do other digital media, such as blogs and social media pages.11 The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), a publicly funded television and radio broadcaster, features high-quality news programs in multiple languages, available offline and online, to reflect Australia’s diversity.12

Over the course of the Israel-Hamas war and the ensuing humanitarian crisis, Australia’s dominant media outlets were criticized for perceived anti-Palestinian bias in their coverage, including by hundreds of Australian journalists. 13 For example, analysis by the Islamophobia Register found a pro-Israel bias in Instagram posts by Australia’s most followed news outlets.14

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Australians use social media to petition the government and mobilize public protests without restrictions. For example, campaigns and online petitions launched by GetUp!, an independent nonprofit advocacy group that campaigns on issues aligned with the political left, garner significant engagement online.1 Australians also regularly use the parliament's e-petition tool to deliver petitions directly to the House of Representatives.2

While the ability to organize and assemble online remains unimpeded, civil society leaders argue that the recent increase in legislation targeting online anonymity could make people less willing to mobilize with digital technology (see C4 and C5).3 Additionally, recent antiprotest laws passed by state governments,4 along with broad surveillance powers awarded to law enforcement and intelligence agencies,5 have raised concerns about the safety of online activism, organizing, and campaign work.

For example, in early 2024, six activists faced raids by Queensland counter-terrorism police following a protest at Boeing offices. The protesters were ordered to surrender their phone passcodes under threat of imprisonment.6 In August 2022, several climate activists were arrested for holding an unauthorized protest. They were released under bail conditions banning them from using encrypted apps (including WhatsApp) and requiring them to provide the police with password access to their devices upon demand.7

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 5.005 6.006

Freedom of expression is not an explicitly protected constitutional or statutory right; Australia does not have a federal bill of rights.1 The High Court has held that there is an implied freedom of political communication in the constitution, but this extends only to communications around the facilitation of representative democracy and communication with public officials.2 Australians’ rights to access online content and freely engage in online discussions are based less in law than on a shared understanding of the prerequisites for a fair and free society. The public benefits greatly from a culture that values freedom of expression and freedom of information and an independent judiciary that safeguards these freedoms.

Whistleblower laws, defamation laws, and suppression orders can inhibit journalists’ ability to report on important public issues.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Online activities that are protected under international human rights standards are sometimes subject to criminal penalties, primarily through the country’s defamation laws. The Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material Act adopted in April 2019 introduced criminal code provisions that could also be applied to online speech (see B3).

Observers have said Australia’s defamation law has been interpreted to favor plaintiffs and is governed by uniform state-level legislation as well as common law principles.1 However, there are several legal defenses against defamation claims, including truth, fair reporting on proceedings of public concern, and honest opinion. Three states—New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia—implemented reformed defamation laws in July 2021,2 which included the addition of a public interest defense, a single publication rule, and a serious harm threshold.3 Efforts to standardize defamation reforms across the country had stalled as of September 2023.4

A person may sue for defamation based on online material posted by someone in another country, provided that the material is accessible in Australia and that the allegedly defamed person enjoys a reputation in Australia. This allows for the possibility of “libel tourism,” in which noncitizens file defamation cases in Australia against others based outside the country to take advantage of its favorable legal environment for plaintiffs. In some cases, the courts may grant a permanent injunction to prevent the publication of defamatory material, though this remedy is limited to cases with a high risk of continued defamation.5

The government said in February 2024 that it would introduce new laws to combat doxing, after the contact information for members of a WhatsApp group chat that critics said was used to silence pro-Palestinian advocates was leaked online, leading to the harassment of the group’s members, many of whom were Jewish.6 Legal experts raised concerns that the legislation could be abused to silence journalists and whistleblowers.7 In September 2024, after the coverage period, the government introduced legislation that would impose up to six years’ imprisonment for publishing private details with the intent to cause harm; penalties could extend to seven years when a person is targeted for their identity.8

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 5 to 6 because disproportionate civil penalties in defamation cases were not issued during the coverage period, in contrast to previous years.

Several high-profile defamation lawsuits in recent years resulted in civil penalties for online content,1 though none were reported during the coverage period. High-profile defamation lawsuits against print and television outlets throughout the coverage period, including Bruce Lehrmann’s unsuccessful suit against Network 102 and Lachlan Murdoch’s proceedings against Private Media (which he later dropped),3 contributed to ongoing concerns that defamation suits could be used to silence public commentary, including online.

In June 2023, a court ruled in favor of three news outlets in a landmark defamation case brought by decorated soldier Ben Roberts-Smith.4 Roberts-Smith had sued the Age, the Sydney Morning Herald, and the Canberra Times (all of which have online versions) for publishing stories in 2018 that claimed Roberts-Smith committed war crimes in Afghanistan. The case was a high-stakes deliberation of reporting on matters of public interest, particularly regarding the military.5

High-profile politicians, including senior cabinet members in the former governing coalition, have sued journalists and activists for publishing unfavorable stories or posting critical commentary online.6 In May 2021, John Barilaro, then the deputy premier of New South Wales, sued YouTuber Jordan Shanks, who runs the popular YouTube channel Friendlyjordies, for defamation.7 His suit also targeted Google for failing to remove Shanks’s videos.8 The suit was settled when Shanks agreed to pay Barilaro AU$100,000 (US$71,300) in legal costs.9 In June 2022, during the previous coverage period, Google was ordered to pay Barilaro AU$515,000 (US$367,000) for the two allegedly defamatory videos.10

In a precedent-setting decision, a New South Wales Supreme Court judge ruled in June 2019 that media companies are liable for defamatory comments posted by third parties on their social media pages.11 This finding was preliminary in nature but left the legal position of publishers, including media outlets and social media companies, unclear.12

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

Individuals do not need to register to use the internet and there are no restrictions on anonymous communications. However, verified identification information is required to purchase any prepaid mobile service.1 Additional personal information must be submitted to a mobile service provider before a phone can be activated, and law enforcement and emergency agencies can access this information with a valid warrant.2

The 2018 Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act allows intelligence and security agencies to send a mandatory notice or a voluntary request to ”communications providers” to change or break their encryption technology to facilitate access to user data (see C6).3 The law prohibits assistance that would undermine encryption or security for users at large, but critics have noted that, in practice, enabling authorities’ access to one user’s data without creating exploitable vulnerabilities that could affect others is difficult (and in some cases impossible).4 The law also undermines the “journalist information warrant” (see C5), which is the limited protection that requires law enforcement to file a warrant when accessing a journalist’s metadata; under the 2018 law, authorities could feasibly install spyware on a journalist’s phone to access their metadata.

In 2021, the government passed the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill, which poses a threat to encryption by allowing authorities to take over an individual’s social media accounts (see C5).5

In February 2022, the government introduced the Social Media (Anti-Trolling) Bill in Parliament.6 The bill sought to restrict anonymity online by requiring platforms to provide the names, email addresses, and phone numbers of users accused of defamation using an anonymous account. Platforms that did not comply would be held liable for the allegedly defamatory comments.7 The bill was not passed before the May 2022 federal election and the newly elected government reportedly had no intention of retabling it.8

In December 2023, the eSafety commissioner produced draft Industry Standards under the Online Safety Act, which were set to be implemented in December 2024. The standards would apply to a broad range of services including email, messaging, and personal file storage, and would require companies to proactively detect, remove, disrupt and deter illegal content. Civil society organizations raised concerns that the standards would force encrypted services to implement proactive scanning measures and called for the protection of encryption,9 while the encrypted email service Proton said it would take legal action if it was forced to weaken encryption under the proposed standards.10

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

The government has expanded its surveillance and data-gathering capabilities in recent years. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the country’s domestic intelligence service, has also expanded its powers under the Assistance and Access Act (see C6).

While the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) grants some privacy protections, it does not provide individuals with a judicial remedy for privacy breaches, regardless of whether state or nonstate actors were responsible.1 However, individuals can file a complaint to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), the country’s privacy regulator, which can provide them with compensation if their privacy was violated.2 In 2017, the Federal Court clarified that metadata is not personal information and therefore not subject to statutory protections, further narrowing the scope of the Privacy Act.3 A review of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is ongoing, and several amendments have been proposed.4 In September 2024, after the coverage period, the government introduced a package of Privacy Act reforms;5 the package includes a statutory tort for privacy violations, including a public interest journalism defense, and a provision that would criminalize doxing (see C2).

Law enforcement agencies do not require a warrant to access metadata under the 2015 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act (see C6), except when accessing the metadata of journalists, for which they must file a journalist information warrant.6 In February 2023, the government accepted almost all the recommendations from a parliamentary review, which closed some significant loopholes, and said it planned to implement the reforms.7 The 2014 National Security Legislation potentially allowed intelligence agents to monitor entire networks of people with a single warrant.8

The Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 20209 sets out a legal framework to access overseas communication data for law enforcement and national security purposes, facilitating access to encrypted communications provided by non-Australian companies.10

The Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill passed in August 2021 allows the AFP and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) to request new types of warrants to investigate and disrupt “serious” crime (see C4).11 Data disruption warrants, network activity warrants, and takeover warrants are issued by an eligible judge or nominated Administrative Appeal Tribunal (AAT) member. The OAIC raised concerns about the law, noting that it lacks important safeguards and grants agencies wide-ranging and coercive powers that may affect individuals not suspected of criminal activity.12

Takeover warrants would give the AFP and ACIC the power to take control of and lock the warrant’s subject out of an online account for the purpose of gathering evidence. To take over “an account that an electronic service has for an end user,” law enforcement agencies can use an individual’s account credentials, including passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs), and biometric forms of identification; alter account credentials; and remove two-factor authentication requirements. The law also permits law enforcement to object to the public disclosure of the information gathered if “the information… could reasonably be expected to reveal details of account takeover technologies or methods,” raising concerns about authorities’ ability to access accounts on encrypted messaging services.13

In April 2022, the Data Availability and Transparency Bill came into effect, which expanded the government’s powers to share individuals’ personal data among its agencies and accredited parties for three limited purposes: the delivery of government services, informing government policy and programs, and research and development.14 While negotiating the bill, the government made some privacy-enhancing amendments, such as restricting private access to public data.15 Though it does contain some privacy safeguards, such as requiring an individual’s consent before gathering their personal information unless it is “impractical” or “unreasonable,” the OAIC has warned that the legislation could reduce Australians’ privacy protections and lead to the mishandling of personal information.16

The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australia’s cyberintelligence agency, confirmed that it had spied on Australian citizens in 2019. While the ASD typically conducts surveillance of targets outside Australia, the agency confirmed that it had, in an unspecified number of “rare circumstances,” obtained ministerial approval to conduct domestic surveillance.17

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Technology companies have become more involved in state surveillance in recent years, thanks largely to the Assistance and Access Act (adopted in 2018), which gives intelligence and security agencies the power to compel “communications providers” to undermine their own encryption technology to obtain user data (see C4).1

The assistance-and-access law allows intelligence agencies to request encrypted data under a broad set of circumstances, including to safeguard national security, foreign relations, or economic well-being, as well as to enforce criminal law. “Technical assistance requests” are voluntary requests for companies to use existing capabilities to help agencies access user information. The law allows relevant agencies to compel technology companies to comply, including with requests to build capabilities into products to facilitate access.2

According to a 2022–23 annual report from the attorney general, the powers in the Assistance and Access Act were used 66 times, up from 30 in the 2021–22 period.3 No requests were issued for “terrorism offences” for the fifth year in a row, despite the fact that the threat of terrorism was used to justify the law’s passage in 2018.4

Rights groups have criticized the Assistance and Access Act’s broad reach, relative lack of oversight, and harsh penalties. Opponents have also raised concerns that it could stifle the country’s technology sector, as local companies could be forced to create products that are less secure than those of their foreign competitors.5 Companies that fail to cooperate could face fines of up to AU$10 million (US$7.1 million), while individuals could face prison time. All requests for assistance are overseen by various Commonwealth bodies, depending on the requesting agency. Organizations subject to a request for assistance have the right to complain or appeal to the relevant oversight body for the requesting agency.6 Technical capability notices—which require the recipient to change or break their own encryption technology—must be issued by the attorney general and approved by the minister for communications.7

Law enforcement agencies with a warrant may search and seize computers. They may also compel ISPs to intercept and store data from individuals suspected of committing a crime, as governed by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIAA). ISPs and similar entities cannot monitor and disclose the content of communications without the customer’s consent.8 Unlawful collection of a communication and disclosure of its content can draw both civil and criminal sanctions.9 The TIAA and the Telecommunications Act explicitly authorize a range of disclosures, including to specified law enforcement and tax agencies. ISPs can monitor their networks without a warrant for “network protection duties,” such as curtailing malicious software and spam.10

The TIAA’s 2015 amendment added extra privacy protections for journalists, requiring security agencies to obtain a warrant before accessing journalists’ metadata. However, incidents of unauthorized access and loopholes in the Assistance and Access Act have undermined faith in these safeguards (see C4).11

Under the Online Safety Act 2021 (see B3), the eSafety commissioner can “obtain information about the identity of an end-user and the contact details of an end-user from a social media service, relevant electronic service or designated internet service.” The commissioner can exercise these powers under broad and vaguely defined conditions, where the information sought is “relevant to the operation of the Act.”12

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 requires telecommunications companies to store two years' worth of customer metadata (see C5).13 The government’s 2023–30 cybersecurity strategy includes a planned review of laws requiring companies to retain data, including the mandatory metadata retention scheme, to mitigate cybersecurity risk (see C8).14

The Department of Home Affairs reports on authorizations granted to access retained subscriber data, as well as warrants that are issued to law enforcement agencies for stored communications under the TIAA.15

The Commonwealth ombudsman issued a report in March 2023 on the oversight of stored communication and telecommunications data powers under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. The report noted that several Australian agencies improved their compliance culture in 2022, but found that serious issues around the government’s power to access data remained. For example, the ombudsman found 451 prospective authorizations made by the Victoria police department for offenses that did not meet the offense thresholds.16

The data collection practices of technology firms have also come under scrutiny.17 In August 2022, the Federal Court of Australia fined Google AU$60 million (US$42.8 million) for misleading Android users about their tools for limiting the company’s ability to obtain, retain, and use personal location data.18 In March 2023, after significant procedural delays, the High Court allowed the OAIC to proceed in a case against Facebook over user privacy.19

As of April 2022, the Department of Home Affairs proposed an explicit approach to data localization in a discussion paper on the National Data Security Action Plan.20

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 to reflect reports of gender-based online harassment.

Violence against online commentators is rare in Australia. Controversial figures occasionally face intimidation and death threats. In 2019, the AFP obtained warrants and raided the homes of two journalists.1

According to its 2022–23 annual report, the eSafety commissioner's office received 2,644 cyberabuse complaints from adults. The complaints resulted in three removal notices, as well as 601 information notifications, with material removed in 71 percent of cases. Most complainants were women.2 In the same period, the eSafety commissioner received 9,060 reports of image-based abuse, which includes the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, more than double the number of such complaints from the 2021–22 reporting period.3

People experience online harassment based on their identity. For example, research published in January 2024 found that 9 in 10 sportswomen in Australia have experienced some form of online harm.4 Hateful online messages and incidents directed at transgender people, including misgendering, stalking, death threats, and incitement to die by suicide, also increased since 2020, according to an August 2023 report by the Trans Justice Project.5

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Cyberattacks and hacking are common concerns, though they have not been widely used to censor online speech or punish government critics.

In July 2024, after the coverage period, Australian authorities disclosed that a Chinese state-linked hacking group had targeted entities in the country, breaching two organizations and exfiltrating data.1 In June 2022, during the previous coverage period, Chinese-language platform Media Today experienced a cyberattack against its registration system, presumably to obtain user information and steal accounts. Media Today said no user information was leaked and that the attack, which occurred on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, came from internet protocol (IP) addresses located in the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong.2

Several large Australian public businesses have been the targets of cyberattacks in recent years. In early 2023, Latitude Financial suffered a data breach that revealed 14 million customer records, including driver license numbers, passport numbers, and financial statements.3

On Australia

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Country Facts

  • Population

    26,010,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    95 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    75 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No