Freedom on the Net Research Methodology

What We Measure

The Freedom on the Net index measures each country’s level of internet freedom based on a set of methodology questions. The methodology is developed in consultation with international experts to capture the vast array of relevant issues to human rights online (see “Checklist of Questions”).

Freedom on the Net’s core values are grounded in international human rights standards, particularly Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The project particularly focuses on the free flow of information; the protection of free expression, access to information, and privacy rights; and freedom from both legal and extralegal repercussions arising from online activities. The project also evaluates to what extent a rights-enabling online environment is fostered in a particular country.

The index acknowledges that certain rights may be legitimately restricted. The standard of such restrictions within the methodology and scoring aligns with international human rights principles of necessity and proportionality, the rule of law, and other democratic safeguards. Censorship and surveillance policies and procedures should be transparent, minimal, and include avenues for appeal available to those affected, among other safeguards. 

The project rates the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals within each country. While internet freedom may be primarily affected by state behavior, actions by nonstate actors, including technology companies, are also considered. Thus, the index ratings generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental. Over the years, Freedom on the Net has been continuously adapted to capture technological advances, shifting tactics of repression, and emerging threats to internet freedom.

The Research and Scoring Process

The methodology includes 21 questions and nearly 100 subquestions, divided into three categories:

A. Obstacles to Access details infrastructural, economic, and political barriers to access; government decisions to shut off connectivity or block specific applications or technologies;  legal, regulatory, and ownership control over internet service providers; and the independence of regulatory bodies;

B. Limits on Content analyzes legal regulations on content; technical filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy and diversity of online information space; and the use of digital tools for civic mobilization;

C. Violations of User Rights tackles legal protections and restrictions on free expression; surveillance and privacy; and legal and extralegal repercussions for online speech and activities, such as imprisonment, cyberattacks, or extralegal harassment and physical violence.

Each question is scored on a varying range of points. The subquestions guide researchers regarding factors they should consider while evaluating and assigning points, though not all apply to every country. Under each question, a higher number of points is allotted for a freer situation, while a lower number of points is allotted for a less free environment. Points add up to produce a score for each of the subcategories, and a country’s total points for all three represent its final score (0-100). Based on the score, Freedom House assigns the following internet freedom ratings:

• Scores 100-70 = Free
• Scores 69-40 = Partly Free
• Scores 39-0 = Not Free

Freedom House staff invite at least one researcher or organization to serve as the report author for each country, training them to assess internet freedom developments according to the project’s comprehensive research methodology. Researchers submit draft country reports and attend a ratings review meeting focused on their region. During the meetings, participants review, critique, and adjust the draft scores—based on set coding guidelines—through careful consideration of events, laws, and practices relevant to each item. After completing the regional and country consultations, Freedom House staff edit and fact-check all country reports and perform a final review of all scores to ensure their comparative reliability and integrity. Freedom House staff also conduct robust qualitative analysis on every country to determine each year’s key global findings and emerging trends. 

Freedom on the Net scores were inverted in the 2019 edition to align with scores for Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s flagship report on political rights and civil liberties.

Checklist of Questions

A. Obstacles to Access (0–25 points)

1. Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? (0–6 points)
   • Do individuals have access to high-speed internet services at their home, place of work, internet cafés, libraries, schools, and other venues, as well as on mobile devices?
   • Does poor infrastructure (including unreliable electricity) or catastrophic damage to infrastructure (caused by events such as natural disasters or armed conflicts) limit residents’ ability to access the internet?
2. Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? (0–3 points)
   • Do financial constraints—such as high prices for internet services, excessive taxes imposed on such services, or state manipulation of the relevant markets—make internet access prohibitively expensive for large segments of the population?
   • Are there significant differences in internet penetration and access based on geographical area, or for certain ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?
   • Do pricing practices, such as zero-rating plans, by service providers and digital platforms contribute to a digital divide in terms of what types of content individuals with different financial means can access? 
3. Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? (0–6 points)
   • Does the government restrict, or compel service providers to restrict, internet connectivity by slowing or shutting down internet connections during specific events (such as protests or elections), either locally or nationally?
   • Does the government centralize internet infrastructure in a manner that could facilitate restrictions on connectivity?
   • Does the government block, or compel service providers to block, social media platforms and communication apps that serve in practice as major conduits for online information?
   • Does the government block, or compel service providers to block, certain protocols, ports, and functionalities within such platforms and apps (e.g., Voice-over-Internet-Protocol or VoIP, video streaming, multimedia messaging, Secure Sockets Layer or SSL), either permanently or during specific events?
   • Do restrictions on connectivity disproportionately affect marginalized communities, such as inhabitants of certain regions or those belonging to different ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?
4. Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? (0–6 points)
   • Is there a legal or de facto monopoly on the provision of fixed-line, mobile, and public internet access? 
   • Does the state place extensive legal, regulatory, or economic requirements on the establishment or operation of service providers?
   • Do licensing requirements, such as retaining customer data or preventing access to certain content, place an onerous financial burden on service providers?
5. Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? (0–4 points)
   • Are there explicit legal guarantees that protect the independence and autonomy of any regulatory body overseeing the internet (exclusively or as part of a broader mandate) from political or commercial interference?
   • Is the process for appointing members of regulatory bodies transparent and representative of different stakeholders’ legitimate interests?
   • Are decisions taken by regulatory bodies relating to the internet, seen to be fair and to take meaningful notice of comments from stakeholders in society? 
   • Are decisions taken by regulatory bodies seen to be apolitical and independent from changes in government? 
   • Are decisions taken by regulatory bodies seen to be protecting internet freedom, including by ensuring service providers, digital platforms, and other content hosts behave fairly?  

B. Limits on Content (0–35 points)

1. Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? (0–6 points)
   • Does the state use, or compel service providers to use, technical means to restrict freedom of opinion and expression, for example by blocking or filtering websites and online content featuring journalism, discussion of human rights, educational materials, or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression?
   • Does the state use, or compel service providers to use, technical means to block or filter access to websites that may be socially or legally problematic (e.g., those related to gambling, pornography, copyright violations, illegal drugs) in lieu of more effective remedies, or in a manner that inflicts collateral damage on content and activities that are protected under international human rights standards?
   • Does the state block or order the blocking of entire social media platforms, communication apps, blog-hosting platforms, discussion forums, and other web domains for the purpose of censoring the content that appears on them?
   • Is there blocking of tools that enable users to bypass censorship?
   • Does the state procure, or compel services providers to procure, advanced technology to automate censorship or increase its scope?
2. Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? (0–4 points)
   • Are administrative, judicial, or extralegal measures used to order the deletion of content from the internet, particularly journalism, discussion of human rights, educational materials, or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression, either prior to or after its publication? 
   • Do digital platforms and content hosts arbitrarily remove such content due to informal or formal pressure from government officials or other powerful political actors? 
   • Are access providers, content hosts, and third parties free from excessive or improper legal responsibility for opinions expressed by third parties transmitted via the technology they supply?
3. Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? (0–4 points)
   • Are there national laws, independent oversight bodies, and other democratically accountable procedures in place to ensure that decisions to restrict access to certain content are proportional to their stated aim?
   • Are those that restrict content—including state authorities, ISPs, content hosts, digital platforms, and other intermediaries—transparent about what content is blocked or deleted, including to the public and directly to the impacted user? 
   • Are rules for the restriction of content clearly defined, openly available for users to view, and implemented in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner?   
   • Do efficient and timely avenues of appeal exist for those who find content they produced to have been subjected to censorship? 
   • Are self-regulatory mechanisms and oversight bodies effective at ensuring content protected under international human rights standards is not removed? 
4. Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? (0–4 points)
   • Do internet users in the country engage in self-censorship on important political, social, or religious issues, including on public forums and in private communications?
   • Does fear of retribution, censorship, state surveillance, or data collection practices have a chilling effect on online speech or cause users to avoid certain online activities of a civic nature? 
   • Where widespread self-censorship exists, do some journalists, commentators, or ordinary users continue to test the boundaries, despite the potential repercussions? 
5. Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? (0–4 points)
   • Do political leaders, government agencies, political parties, or other powerful actors directly manipulate information via state-owned news outlets, official social media accounts/groups, or other formal channels? 
   • Do government officials or other actors surreptitiously employ or encourage individuals or automated systems to artificially amplify political narratives or smear campaigns on social media? 
   • Do government officials or other powerful actors pressure or coerce online news outlets, journalists, or bloggers to follow a particular editorial direction in their reporting and commentary? 
   • Do authorities issue official guidelines or directives on coverage to online media outlets, including instructions to downplay or amplify certain comments or topics for discussion? 
   • Do government officials or other actors bribe or use close economic ties with online journalists, bloggers, or website owners in order to influence the content they produce or host? 
   • Does disinformation, coordinated by foreign or domestic actors for political purposes, have a significant impact on public debate? 
6. Are there economic, regulatory, or other constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? (0–3 points)
   • Are favorable informal connections with government officials necessary for online media outlets, content hosts, or digital platforms (e.g., search engines, email applications, blog-hosting platforms) to be economically viable? 
   • Does the state limit the ability of online media to accept advertising or investment, particularly from foreign sources, or does it discourage advertisers from conducting business with disfavored online media or service providers? 
   • Do onerous taxes, regulations, or licensing fees present an obstacle to participation in, establishment of, or management of digital platforms, news outlets, blogs, or social media groups/channels? 
   • Do ISPs manage network traffic and bandwidth availability in a manner that is transparent, is evenly applied, and does not discriminate against users or producers of content based on the nature or source of the content itself (i.e., do they respect “net neutrality” with regard to content)? 
7. Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? (0–4 points)
   • Are people able to access a range of local, regional, and international news sources that convey independent, balanced views in the main languages spoken in the country? 
   • Do online media outlets, social media pages, blogs, and websites represent diverse interests, experiences, and languages within society, for example by providing content produced by different ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups? 
   • Does a lack of competition among content hosts and digital platforms undermine the diversity of information to which people have access? 
   • Does the presence of misinformation undermine users’ ability to access independent, credible, and diverse sources of information? 
   • Does false or misleading content online significantly contribute to offline harms, such as harassment, property destruction, physical violence, or death? 
   • If there is extensive censorship, do users employ virtual private networks (VPNs) and other circumvention tools to access a broader array of information sources? 
8. Do conditions impede users’ ability to form communities, mobilize, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? (0–6 points) 
   • Can people freely join online communities based around their political, social, or cultural identities, including without fear of retribution? 
   • Do civil society organizations, activists, and online communities organize online on political, social, cultural, and economic issues, including during electoral campaigns and nonviolent protests, including without fear of retribution? 
   • Do state or other actors limit access to online tools and websites (e.g., social media platforms, messaging groups, petition websites) for the purpose of restricting free assembly and association online? 
   • Does the state place legal or other restrictions (e.g. criminal provisions, detentions, surveillance) for the purpose of restricting free assembly and association online? 

C. Violations of User Rights (0–40 points)

1. Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? (0–6 points) 
   • Does the constitution contain language that provides for freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom generally? 
   • Are there laws or binding legal decisions that specifically protect online modes of expression? 
   • Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with these legal decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced? 
   • Are online journalists and bloggers accorded strong rights and protections to perform their work? 
   • Is the judiciary independent, and do senior judicial bodies and officials support free expression, access to information, and press freedom online? 
2. Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? (0–4 points)
   • Do specific laws—including penal codes and those related to the media, defamation, cybercrime, cybersecurity, and terrorism—criminalize online expression and activities that are protected under international human rights standards (e.g., journalism, discussion of human rights, educational materials, or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression)?
   • Are restrictions on internet freedom defined by law, narrowly circumscribed, and both necessary and proportionate to address a legitimate aim?
3. Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? (0–6 points)
   • Are writers, commentators, bloggers, or social media users subject to civil liability, imprisonment, arbitrary detention, police raids, or other legal sanction for publishing, sharing, or accessing material on the internet in contravention of international human rights standards?
   • Are penalties for defamation; spreading false information or “fake news”; cybersecurity, national security, terrorism, and extremism; blasphemy; insulting state institutions and officials; or harming foreign relations applied unnecessarily and disproportionately? 
4. Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? (0–4 points)
   • Are website owners, bloggers, or users in general required to register with the government?
   • Does the government require that individuals use their real names or register with the authorities when posting comments or purchasing electronic devices, such as mobile phones?
   • Are users prohibited from using encryption services to protect their communications?
   • Do specific  laws or binding legal decisions undermine strong encryption protocols, such as traceability mandates or requirements that decryption keys be turned over to the government? 
5. Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? (0–6 points)
   • Does the constitution, specific laws, or binding legal decisions protect against government intrusion into private lives? 
   • Do state authorities engage in the blanket collection of communications metadata and/or content transmitted within the country?
   • Are there legal guidelines and independent oversight on the collection, retention, and inspection of surveillance data by state security agencies, and if so, do those guidelines adhere to international human rights standards regarding transparency, necessity, and proportionality?
   • Do state authorities monitor publicly available information posted online (including on websites, blogs, social media, and other digital platforms), particularly for the purpose of deterring independent journalism or political, social, cultural, religious, and artistic expression?
   • Do authorities have the technical capacity to regularly monitor or intercept the content of private communications, such as email and other private messages, including through spyware and extraction technology?
   • Do local authorities such as police departments surveil residents (including through International Mobile Subscriber Identity-Catchers or IMSI catcher technology), and if so, are such practices subject to rigorous guidelines and judicial oversight? 
   • Do state actors use artificial intelligence and other advanced technology for the purposes of online surveillance without appropriate oversight?
   • Do government surveillance measures target or disproportionately affect dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, or certain ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant, and other relevant groups?
6. Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? (0–6 points)
   • Do specific laws or binding legal decisions enshrine the rights of users over personal data, including biometric information, generated, collected, or processed by public or private entities?  
   • Do regulatory bodies, such as a data protection agency, effectively protect user privacy, including through investigating companies’ mismanagement of data and enforcing relevant laws or legal decisions? 
   • Can the government obtain user information from companies (e.g., service providers, providers of public access, internet cafés, social media platforms, email providers, device manufacturers) without a legal process? 
   • Are these companies required to collect and retain data about their users?
   • Are these companies required to store users’ data on servers located in the country, particularly data related to online activities and expression that are protected under international human rights standards (i.e., are there “data localization” requirements)?
   • Do these companies monitor users and supply information about their digital activities to the government or other powerful actors (either through technical interception, data sharing, or other means)?
   • Does the state attempt to impose similar requirements on these companies through less formal methods, such as codes of conduct, threats of censorship, or other economic or political consequences?
   • Are government requests for user data from these companies transparent, and do companies have a realistic avenue for appeal, for example via independent courts?
7. Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? (0–5 points)
   • Are individuals subject to physical violence—such as murder, assault, torture, sexual violence, or enforced disappearance—in relation to their online activities, including membership in certain online communities?
   • Are individuals subject to other intimidation and harassment—such as verbal threats, travel restrictions, nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, doxing, or property destruction or confiscation—in relation to their online activities?
   • Are individuals subject to online intimidation and harassment specifically because they belong to a certain ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT+, migrant or other relevant group?
   • Have online journalists, bloggers, or others fled the country or gone into hiding to avoid such consequences?
   • Have the online activities of dissidents, journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, or other users based outside the country led to repercussions for their family members or associates based in the country?
8. Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? (0–3 points)
   • Have websites belonging to opposition, news outlets, or civil society groups in the country been temporarily or permanently disabled due to cyberattacks, particularly at politically sensitive times?
   • Are websites or blogs subject to targeted technical attacks as retribution for posting certain content, for example on political and social topics?
   • Are financial, commercial, and governmental entities subject to significant and targeted cyberattacks meant to steal data or disable normal operations, including attacks that originate outside the country? 
   • Are laws and policies in place to prevent and protect against cyberattacks (including systematic attacks by domestic nonstate actors), and are they enforced?

Evaluating Internet Freedom in Ukraine amid Moscow's War of Aggression

The Russian regime is responsible for this year’s decline in internet freedom in Ukraine.

Freedom House provides consistent analysis on the state of freedom and democracy around the world, including during times of armed conflict. Our research informs the development of policy recommendations and drives global action to advance human rights and hold perpetrators accountable for violations. As part of this work, the Freedom on the Net (FOTN) report, which covers 70 countries and 89 percent of global internet users, has analyzed internet freedom in Ukraine annually since 2012.

The latest edition of FOTN, covering the period from June 2021 to May 2022, encompassed the first several months of the unprovoked, full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022. The report found that Russian military actions—including damage to internet infrastructure, efforts to restrict internet access, and attacks on users and journalists—drove a three-point decline in Ukraine’s internet freedom score, from 62 to 59 on a 100-point scale.

Because of the possibility that the Russian government itself or Kremlin-linked actors could distort the meaning of our research and the score decline, we want to be clear and unequivocal in our conclusion that Russian forces and their actions are to blame for the deterioration, and provide readers with a deeper explanation of how we evaluated conditions for internet freedom in Ukraine.

FOTN uses a 21-question methodology that measures how residents of a given country experience human rights online. The Ukraine report, like all FOTN country reports, focuses on conditions for people living within a specific geographical area. Those conditions, and the resulting scores, can be affected by the national government or any number of other actors, including local authorities, militias, tech companies, foreign states, and transnational hackers. Our methodology consequently allowed us to take account of the consequences of the Russian invasion on internet freedom in Ukraine. More details on the three individual score declines can be found in the Ukraine country report here.

This year’s events also prompted us to reflect on the report’s geographical unit of analysis for Ukraine. Freedom House research products sometimes evaluate occupied territories separately from the rest of a country based on the guidelines of Freedom in the World, our flagship analysis of political rights and civil liberties. Thus our reports on Ukraine have excluded conditions in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory of Crimea and the consistently Russian-occupied portions of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk Regions since 2015 and 2020, respectively. In this year’s FOTN Ukraine report, we continued to exclude those areas from our analysis.

We held extensive internal discussions about whether to exclude conditions in any other parts of Ukraine that have been newly occupied by Russian forces since February. However, we determined that such areas did not meet the criteria laid out in our guidelines, particularly on the question of “whether the territory’s boundaries are sufficiently stable to allow an assessment of conditions for the year under review, and whether they can be expected to remain stable in future years so that year-on-year comparisons are possible.” The front lines shifted dramatically in the first months of the invasion, and since the end of the FOTN 2022 coverage period in May, Ukrainian forces have recovered even more of the territory that Russian troops had initially occupied.

More information on Freedom House’s work to support democracy and human rights in Ukraine is available here.

Yearly Editions' Methodologies

• Freedom on the Net 2022 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2021 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2020 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2019 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2018 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2017 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2016 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2015 — Download PDF
• Freedom on the Net 2014 — Download PDF