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Freedom on the Net 2024

Bahrain

Not Free
28
100
A Obstacles to Access 15 25
B Limits on Content 6 35
C Violations of User Rights 7 40
Last Year's Score & Status
28 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Bahrain is heavily restricted. While social media and messaging apps remain the main source of news, the targeting of online users for their peaceful expression fosters a culture of self-censorship among Bahrainis. Authorities often block websites, particularly those that criticize the government, and surveil activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

  • Self-censorship continued to be pervasive in the country, with several journalists deleting their online content for fear of retaliation (see B4).
  • Social media users were arrested due to their political or religious speech, including prominent activist Ebrahim Sharif and historian Jassim Hussein al-Abbas (see C3).
  • Authorities continued to rely on sophisticated spyware tools. Several human rights defenders received notices that their devices may have been targeted by spyware such as Pegasus (see C5).

header2 Political Overview

Bahrain’s Sunni-led monarchy dominates state institutions, and elections for the lower house of parliament are neither competitive nor inclusive. Since violently crushing a popular prodemocracy protest movement in 2011, the authorities have systematically eliminated a broad range of political rights and civil liberties, dismantled the political opposition, and cracked down on persistent dissent concentrated among the Shiite population.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

There are no infrastructural limitations affecting the speed and quality of internet connections, and access is widespread in Bahrain. By early 2024, there were 1.48 million internet users in Bahrain and the internet penetration rate was 99 percent. There were 2.34 million cellular mobile connections, which constitutes 156.6 percent of the country’s population.1

Internet speeds have increased in recent years. As of February 2024, the median mobile download speed was 120.11 megabits per second (Mbps) and the median upload speed was 17.3 Mbps. The median broadband download speed was 82.44 Mbps, while the median upload speed was 20.75 Mbps.2

Batelco, a state-controlled internet service provider (ISP), began offering “superfast” 500 Mbps speeds to residential subscribers in 2016,3 and fiber-optic broadband internet became available from providers STC and Zain after the centralization of wholesale services under Bahrain Network (BNET) in October 2019 (see A3 and A4).4 Meanwhile, 4G long term evolution (LTE) mobile subscriptions have been available since 2013. By January 2021, Bahrain achieved full national 5G network coverage with average speeds of 440 Mbps from three providers (Batelco, STC, and Zain).5 In April 2022, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) licensed Starlink to start offering satellite and internet services in Bahrain.6

Internet access is widely available in schools, universities, and shopping malls, as well as in coffee shops, which often provide complimentary Wi-Fi.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Internet access is affordable for most of the population.

Prices for mobile broadband are among the lowest in the region.1 Batelco offers a monthly 200 gigabyte (GB) mobile package starting at 9.90 Bahraini dinars ($26.10),2 and a monthly unlimited broadband package starting at around 17.60 Bahraini dinars ($46.40) for 100 Mbps.3 With more companies providing services like fiber-optic broadband (see A1), competitive packages have become readily available.4 According to a 2020 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) report on price trends, median prices for mobile and fixed broadband services accounted for less than 2 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita.5

Packages with fewer calls and data—for example, one costing 7.5 Bahraini dinars ($19.80) for 9 GB per month—are affordable for Bahrain’s many low-wage migrant workers.6 While these packages have no content limitations, more expensive options offer higher speeds.

Given the country’s small geographical size, there is not a noticeable gap in access between rural and urban areas. The government has made efforts to promote access among women, migrant workers, and other demographics.7

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 4.004 6.006

While Bahrain had no centralized internet backbone until 2019, all ISPs are indirectly controlled by the government through orders from the TRA (see A5). Service providers connect to numerous international cables and gateways provided by Tata, Flag, Saudi Telecom, and Etisalat, among others, making the country less prone to unintentional internet outages.1

In 2003, the Bahrain Internet Exchange (BIX) was established as a central point for all internet traffic coming in and out of Bahrain.2 The national board governing the BIX is appointed by the prime minister with the objective of improving connectivity in Bahrain.3 The BIX and other government bodies such as the Ministry of Information (MOI) reportedly have access to all service providers, giving authorities the ability to filter and monitor internet activity while also forcing ISPs to install or update censorship and surveillance software.4

In October 2019, the state-controlled ISP Batelco launched BNET, which manages the single fiber-optic broadband network in Bahrain.5 This development means that the country’s entire fiber-optic broadband network can be restricted or shut down using one switch. Major ISPs connect directly to the international internet infrastructure or work with other internet exchange providers.6

Bahraini authorities do not restrict or block social media websites or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Telegram, and other platforms were accessible in Bahrain as of the end of the reporting period.7 Telegram was blocked in 2016, but had become largely accessible by June 2021, although users have reported intermittent issues accessing the service without the use of a virtual private network (VPN).8

No cases of deliberate connectivity restrictions were observed during the coverage period. The most recent restriction lasted for over a year, from June 2016 to July 2017, when authorities implemented an “internet curfew” in Diraz after security forces besieged the town following a sit-in around the house of Shiite cleric Isa Qassim.9

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 3.003 6.006

There are some obstacles for service providers seeking to enter the market, related primarily to acquiring the approval of various government bodies, as well as the installation of the required systems that facilitate government content control and monitoring. The online system to apply for mobile provider licenses was seemingly suspended by the TRA during the previous coverage, and remained suspended at the end of this coverage period.1

Batelco, Zain, and STC are the country’s three major mobile network operators and also serve as the main ISPs.2 In total, around 19 ISPs were operating as of June 2024.3 The government has a controlling stake in the largest ISP, Batelco,4 while other ISPs are owned by investors from the private sector, some of whom have ties to the royal family.5

The requirements for establishing a new ISP are published by the TRA and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MoIC) on their websites. New ISPs must submit a “lawful access implementation plan” that would allow security personnel to access subscribers’ data (see C6). The initial registration fee is relatively inexpensive, though operators also need to purchase the filtering system mandated by the TRA (see B1). Furthermore, both the ISP’s infrastructure and its employees must be located in Bahrain,6 and companies must obtain approval from the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Forensic Evidence.7

With the launch of BNET, all ISPs are able to provide fiber-optic internet services as resellers, whereas previously only a single provider offered these services. As a result, prices for users have decreased.8 In November 2021, BNET began allowing users to transfer their broadband account from one ISP to another with minimal service disruption.9

In April 2022, the TRA issued pricing regulations for Batelco’s international connectivity services. Batelco controls three of the four submarine cables connecting Bahrain to the global internet. The regulations aim to level the playing field for other service providers that rely on Batelco’s services and promote competitive prices for international connectivity.10

In November 2022, TRA granted digital infrastructure service provider Alliance Networks a license to operate as a public telecommunication network, in accordance with Article 24 of the telecommunications law.11

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

Bahraini national regulatory bodies are effectively controlled by the monarchy. They have revoked licenses of operators that failed to install monitoring and filtering systems required by government authorities and are indifferent to user complaints about internet controls. However, international organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) have recently credited Bahrain for improvements to the regulatory regime and the competition framework.1 In 2022, the TRA announced that they were elected as a member of the ITU.2

Mobile service providers and ISPs are regulated by the TRA under the 2002 Telecommunications Law. The TRA is responsible for licensing telecommunication providers and for developing “a competition-led market for the provision of innovative communications services.”3 The TRA works with the government to set up and implement the national telecommunication plan, which is updated every three years and then approved by the cabinet and made available to the public.4

Although the TRA is theoretically independent, its members are appointed by the king and are subject to cabinet approval.5 As of March 2024, one board member and three members of the agency’s executive management team were members of the royal family.6

In the past, the TRA has revoked the licenses of small mobile and fixed-line providers, including 2Connect7 and Bahrain Broadband, for failing to comply with several TRA regulations (see B3).8 2Connect’s license was revoked a week after the arrest of its owner, who was an opposition leader in the 2011 prodemocracy movement, seemingly as retribution for his participation in the protests.9

Despite its lack of independence, the TRA has successfully contributed to improved internet access, quality, and affordability in recent years (see A1 and A2).10

TRA’s 2022 annual report showed that it had participated in more international activities, either by hosting meetings and conferences or attending them internationally.11

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 6.006

Authorities ramped up censorship after the 2011 prodemocracy protests, in which online media played an important role, and heavy-handed censorship has persisted since. While YouTube, Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and international blog-hosting services are freely available, authorities have blocked a number of international news websites and websites hosting political content.1

Once blocked, websites rarely get unblocked. Some mobile livestreaming services that were popular in 2011, including Ustream and Bambuser, remained blocked during the coverage period, as did certain VPNs.2 Though some of these websites have rebranded, their URLs still remain on the government’s list of blocked sites (see B3).3 Many Bahraini sites that were blocked in 2017 no longer have a web presence, and some websites, such as the Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, moved exclusively to social media.4 The website of independent Bahraini news outlet Awal Online has been blocked since December 2018, when it was blocked for its critical reporting on a government minister.5

Qatari websites, including Qatari outlets Al-Arab, Al-Raya, and Al-Jazeera, have been blocked since May 2017, when Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Qatar.6 Some became briefly accessible in 2021 amid talks to restore ties with Qatar, but by April 2024 they had once again become inaccessible on multiple ISPs.7 Other blocked websites include the website of Alualua TV,8 which had its new URL blocked in September 2021.9 A popular news site, Bahrain Mirror, has been blocked repeatedly in recent years.10 Despite efforts to circumvent the blocking by changing its URL, Bahrain Mirror’s website was again blocked in November 2020, and remained blocked at the end of the coverage period.11

Websites belonging to political opposition parties are inaccessible, as are some Iranian news sites. The website for the February 14 coalition, one of the leading political groups during the 2011 uprisings, remained blocked during the coverage period.12

At times, some blocked websites have been unblocked. In late January 2021, the website of Al-Quds al-Arabi, a London-based newspaper that had been blocked since 2011, became available on at least one ISP; though users still report issues accessing the platform.13 The Bahrain Center for Human Rights website, which had been previously blocked, seemed to be available as of June 2023.14

According to Article 72 of the draft Press, Printing, and Publishing Law, which had not been passed by the end of the coverage period, a court could order the blocking of a news site if its chief editor is convicted of a crime committed through the website (see B6 and C2). Under Article 78, the court could also order that a website be blocked for publishing content that is considered criminal or for threatening the public order. Under another portion of the law, Article 85, the court could order the blocking of a news site if the website “serves the interests of a foreign state or body” with policies that compromise Bahrain’s national interest, or if it has obtained aid from any foreign country or entity without permission from the Ministry of Information Affairs (MIA).15

In August 2016, the TRA ordered all telecommunications companies to employ a centralized, TRA-managed system for blocking websites.16 The order was related to a $1.2 million contract awarded that year to Canadian company Netsweeper to provide a “national website filtering solution.”17 That September, Citizen Lab, a Canadian internet watchdog based in the University of Toronto, reported that Netsweeper was identified on the services of at least nine ISPs and filtered political content on at least one.18 Websites hosted overseas are less vulnerable to being blocked at the behest of the government and remain accessible to Bahrainis who use censorship-circumvention tools.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004

Content deemed critical of the government is regularly removed from websites, and authorities intimidate, interrogate, and arrest users to force the removal of content. In December 2022, a social media user was reportedly forced to remove an Instagram post about protests against the normalization of diplomatic ties with Israel.1 Content is removed from government social media accounts when it is deemed controversial or triggers unwanted criticism.

In September 2022, Bahrain was one of six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries that issued a joint statement demanding that Netflix remove content they claimed “violates Islamic and societal values and principles.” The countries reportedly threatened legal action if Netflix failed to comply.2 Though the content in question was not specified, local media and officials in the six countries have criticized Netflix for content showing same-sex relationships and content which they said portrayed children in a sexualized manner.

Users exploit platforms’ reporting mechanisms to remove comments that criticize authorities and to suspend accounts operated by activists and independent journalists (see B5).3 In May 2019, following calls from the MOI to avoid interacting with “malicious” accounts, the president of Social Media Club Bahrain called on social media users to block and report malicious accounts, stating it was a “national duty.”4 The MOI called on the public to join a WhatsApp group owned by the Department of Electronic and Financial Crimes to be educated about new methods used by scammers.5

Government ministries arbitrarily order content removals. In August 2023, six Instagram accounts were referred to the General Department of Anticorruption and Economic and Electronic Security by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce for selling products online without a license,6 despite this being a common practice in the country. While it is unclear why the Instagram accounts were targeted, other famous sellers urged the government to apply the law equally to everyone.7

In January 2020, several users were summoned to the Cybercrime Directorate for their posts on Twitter about the assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, some of which had sympathized with Soleimani or been critical of the assassination. They were released only after deleting the posts.8 The MOI claimed that the deleted material could “harm the general order” and issued a statement warning of legal action against those who use social media to violate “public order” (see B5).9

At times, authorities request that social media platforms remove certain pieces of content. According to Meta’s transparency report, Facebook did not receive any content removal requests from Bahraini authorities in the first half of 2023.10 According to Snapchat’s transparency report, in the first half of 2023 there were over 42,000 content removal requests across 40 different types of content for violating site guidelines.11

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 0.000 4.004

The decision-making process and government policies behind the blocking of websites are not transparent, and there is no avenue to appeal website blocking orders.

Multiple state organizations, including the MIA and MOI, can order the blocking of a website without a court order. The MIA blocks websites that violate Articles 19 and 20 of the Press Rules and Regulations, which prohibit material found to be “instigating hatred of the political regime, encroaching on the state's official religion, breaching ethics, encroaching on religions and jeopardizing public peace.”1

Authorities send lists of blocked websites to ISPs, which are instructed to “prohibit any means that allow access to sites blocked.”2 Licenses of ISPs may be revoked by the TRA for failing to cooperate with the MIA’s blocking orders (see A5).3 The government’s list of blocked websites is not available to the public, and site administrators do not receive notifications or explanations when their websites are banned.

There are no official regulations outlining an appeals process for content restriction and, in the absence of official publications of blocking orders, it is difficult to appeal through the court system. A 2009 MIA blocking order stated that no site could be unblocked without an order from the information minister.4 Appealing a website blocking is not possible for users. Although any blocked page includes a link where user can submit a request to unblock the site, the link was inaccessible during the coverage period.5

Website administrators can be held legally responsible for content posted on their platforms, including alleged libel.6 In February 2016, the MOI stated that WhatsApp group administrators may be held liable for spreading false news if they fail to report incidents that occur within their groups.7

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 0.000 4.004

Internet users exercise a high degree of self-censorship. Most people use pseudonyms on social media for fear of being targeted by the authorities.1 Even opposition news sites based outside Bahrain rarely publish the names of their editors.2

Intimidation tactics, surveillance, and investigations of users’ online activities have increased self-censorship.3 The Bahrain Press Association (BPA) observed that internet users who have “independent or dissenting opinions” must exercise caution when posting in order to avoid online algorithms that the Cybercrime Directorate uses to “identify its targets” (see C5).4 In a Twitter survey conducted in June 2020, 73 percent of participants said they fear legal repercussions if they comment on local issues.5 Users commonly warn each other about posts that could draw negative attention from the authorities.6

Self-censorship on social media has become acute, with users expressing increasing fear of facing prosecution for discussing anything beyond sports, lifestyle topics, and political views that align with those of the regime.7 In September 2023, the MOI, through an article published in local newspapers, stated that disseminating “false information and inciting comments“ online would be punishable by up to two years imprisonment or a fine of up to 200 dinars ($530).8 After being detained or interrogated activists often stop posting online or avoid controversial subjects, such as direct criticism of the king (see B5).9

During the coverage period, several journalists and online users removed articles and posts from their personal pages. In July 2023, an article criticizing the MOI was removed from its author’s Instagram page. In August 2023, an article that discussed a petition regarding political prisoners was removed from the poster’s account. Both articles were removed by the individual poster out of fear for their safety.

Progovernment accounts have run campaigns against activists, encouraging the authorities to arrest them or intimidate the user into self-censoring.10

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 0.000 4.004

Government authorities and progovernment trolls work effectively to manipulate the online information landscape in Bahrain.

Authorities issue official statements warning against the discussion of certain subjects and the “misuse” of social media.1 In October 2021, following the Israeli foreign minister’s visit to Bahrain, the MOI renewed its calls for citizens to avoid interacting with or reposting comments that could “provoke sedition” or threaten national unity.2 In August 2020, the MOI warned users about interacting with social media accounts run by Bahraini political groups operating abroad, specifically naming the Al-Wefaq Society and Al-Wafa Movement.3

Organized progovernment trolls have become increasingly present on social media platforms since 2011, when hundreds of accounts suddenly emerged to collectively harass and intimidate online activists.4 In November 2020, a group of progovernment users announced the establishment of a “Bahrain Electronic Army,” an organized group of users aiming at “defending Bahrain.”5 These accounts promote hate speech against human rights activists and spread disinformation about their activities.6 The government took no action to disband the group, and though the @BahrainCyber account was suspended for violating Twitter rules in February 2021. It was later reactivated, but had been resuspended as of April 2024.7 Activists believe this “army” is sponsored by Bahraini authorities.8

Online campaigns about human rights issues have been disrupted by progovernment trolls. In late 2021, suspicious Twitter accounts posted defamatory messages against Abduljalil al-Singace, a prisoner of conscience and opposition leader.9 As hashtags that called attention to al-Singace’s hunger strike in a Bahrain prison began trending, trolls sought to manipulate hashtags to drown out the trend.10 In December 2021, another group of Twitter trolls spread defamatory messages during a Twitter campaign that called for freedom for Shaikh Ali Salman, the leader of the Al-Wefaq political society.11 Many of these posts amplified identical messages.

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Regulatory restrictions limit the ability of users to publish online content, and government censorship creates indirect economic constraints that leave many outlets dependent on personal funding. Websites run by people within Bahrain must register with the MOI.1

Under Decree 68/2016, newspapers must obtain licenses from the mass media directorate to disseminate content on websites or social media.2 Outlets must provide a list of their social media accounts and website addresses, as well as the names of those who oversee them, as part of their license application, exposing employees to possible monitoring and coercion. Furthermore, newspapers may not post online videos over two minutes in length and are forbidden from streaming live videos. The law also stipulates that electronic media must publish the same content as their printed counterparts, thus limiting multimedia content. Under the existing press law, those publishing without a license face six months’ imprisonment, a fine of 5,000 Bahraini dinars ($13,200), or both.

In August 2019, the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) suspended the license of Manama Voice, a news site operated by Bahraini journalist Hani al-Fardan, without a clear reason.3 Al-Fardan continues to report using his Instagram account, as publishing on social media does not currently require an IAA license.4

Under Article 44 of the draft Press, Publishing, and Printing Law, which had not been passed by the end of the coverage period,5 affected sites would need to register with and obtain MIA approval to operate.6 Site moderators would need to be Bahraini citizens without a previous conviction, potentially excluding thousands who were convicted in political and conscience cases over the past decade. Website owners could lose their licenses for failing to update websites for at least two months or violating the law’s personal eligibility criteria under Article 67. Under Article 85, websites receiving support from a foreign state or entity or serving foreign interests in a way deemed inconsistent with government aims could lose their licenses. Under Article 57, operating an unlicensed news site would be punishable by a fine of between 3,000 and 10,000 Bahraini dinar ($7,900 to $26,400), website blocking, and the confiscation of the equipment used to operate the site.7

There are some government restrictions on online advertising. While it is difficult for blocked websites to secure advertising, some popular blocked sites, such as Bahrain Mirror, operate with limited resources. These websites are often self-funded.

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1.001 4.004

The internet remains the main source of information, and many people get their news from social media platforms and instant messaging apps.1 Social media offers space to discuss issues not typically covered in traditional media, such as local affairs, religion, gender issues, and migrant workers. Only outlets that operate outside Bahrain can report on local politics freely, and many independent foreign-based sites are subject to blocking (see B1).

Online content restrictions are disproportionate and inconsistent, leading to a lack of diversity in online content. For example, in May 2020, authorities banned discussions criticizing the normalization of relations with Israel,2 yet did not place any restrictions on content promoting the deal (see B5). According to Bahrain Mirror, high levels of self-censorship and the proliferation of progovernment media have shrunk the space for divisive content online.3

The government’s stringent information controls, coupled with attacks on social media, have forced some news sites, like Awal Online, to cease operations entirely (see B1 and B2). However, some blocked opposition websites and Bahraini news outlets based outside the country continue to receive traffic from users within Bahrain using proxy services, dynamic IP addresses, and VPN applications. The government used to block access to Google Translate and Google cached pages, which could be used as circumvention tools, but both were accessible as of June 2024.4

Certain topics are not covered by local media outlets. For example, the suspected use of spyware by the Bahraini government against citizens was largely omitted from mainstream media in Bahrain despite widespread reporting in international media (see C5).

Certain ethnic or religious groups are not able to contribute to the official media or are subjected harassment if they do so. For example, online content about the country’s Persian minority is nonexistent, and media outlets are prohibited from using the Persian language or discussing Persian culture. The Shia religious community, which makes up almost 50 percent of the population, often complains about the lack of representation in the traditional media space, both online and offline.5

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 3.003 6.006

Activists rely heavily on digital tools, particularly social media, to draw attention to protests and human rights violations. However, due to systemic online surveillance and the threat of arrest, prosecution, and other consequences for their online activity, many users are wary of participating in political discussions over social media1 and often use pseudonyms (see B4). In the past, authorities have blocked some tools used to mobilize or campaign, such as Telegram (see A3).

In February 2022, reports emerged that Bahraini activists, many of whom organized human rights campaigns online, were targeted with spyware, likely by the government. Research from Citizen Lab confirmed that the targets, many of whom had their phones infected with Pegasus spyware, included three activists (see C5).2 The crackdown on dissent via the use of invasive surveillance technology has further shrunk the already limited space for online mobilization and has encouraged self-censorship. Social media is one of the only spaces left for this kind of civic dissent in Bahrain.3

Even as its users increasingly self-censor, X, previously known as Twitter, remains a key platform for mobilization. Users often use it to report on the status and conditions of detained activists and to call for their release.4 However, progovernment trolls frequently attempt to disrupt these campaigns (see B5). In February 2022, Twitter was a vital space for Bahrainis to voice their objections to the normalization of ties with Israel.5 Social media has become the primary way to document the many demonstrations against the Israel-Hamas war. Reports indicate that the Bahraini government has been monitoring social media platforms and arresting individuals for participating in protests.6

In recent years, feminist activism has been more noticeable in online discussions and on social media. Internet users have taken to social media to raise awareness of gender-based violence and to promote women’s rights.7 In August 2021, people took to social media to campaign for the right of Bahraini women to pass down Bahraini citizenship to their children.8 Additionally, in September 2021, Twitter users brought attention to the challenges women who wish to get divorced face because of the strict nature of the Sharia courts.9

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 0.000 6.006

A variety of laws place restrictions on free speech, and the compromised judiciary does not uphold protections that do exist.

Article 23 of the constitution guarantees freedom of expression “provided that the fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people is not prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism is not aroused.”1 Article 26 states that all written, telephonic, and electronic communications will not be censored except in cases specified by law.2 The 2002 Press and Publications Law promises free access to information. Bahraini journalists have argued that qualifying statements and loosely worded clauses allow for arbitrary interpretation and, in practice, the negation of the rights the provisions claim to uphold.3

The Bahraini judicial system is neither independent nor fair.4 Serious crimes have been committed against internet users, including torture (see C7), and impunity for these offenses prevails.5

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004

Multiple laws, including the penal code and terrorism laws, criminalize free speech and online activities.

Criminal penalties for online speech are currently enforced under the 2002 Press and Publications Law,1 which does not specifically mention online activities but has been applied to digital media. The law allows for prison sentences ranging from six months to five years for publishing material that criticizes Islam, its followers, or the king, as well as material that instigates violent crimes or the overthrow of the government.2 Article 70 of the law penalizes certain types of content, including “false news” that undermines public security and criticism of presidents or states with which Bahrain has diplomatic ties.3 In addition, the 2002 Telecommunications Law contains penalties for several online activities, such as the transmission of messages that are offensive to public policy or morals.4

Those tried under the penal code or antiterrorism laws can face longer sentences than those prosecuted under the 2002 Press and Publications Law—especially for social media activity, for which the press law is not applied.5 Article 290 of the penal code stipulates that “intentional misuse of telecommunication mediums” is punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and a 50 Bahraini dinar ($130) fine, but it is regularly combined with other articles for more severe punishments. Under the penal code, any user who deliberately spreads false information that may damage national security or public order can face up to two years’ imprisonment.6 Under Article 309, insults to religion or ridicule of religious rituals may be punished by a fine of 100 Bahraini dinars ($260) or a prison term of up to one year. In February 2014, the king ratified an amendment to the penal code that includes a prison sentence of up to seven years and a fine of up to 10,000 Bahraini dinars ($26,000) for those who insult the king.7

In May 2019, the king ratified an amendment to Article 11 of the terrorism law that criminalizes propagating, glorifying, justifying, favoring, or encouraging acts that constitute terrorist activities, with a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment and a 2,000 to 5,000 Bahraini dinar fine ($5,300 to $13,200).8 Activists and lawyers warned social media users that commenting, retweeting, liking, or forwarding content could fall afoul of the amendment.9

Under the draft Press, Publishing, and Printing Law, which had not been passed by the end of the coverage period, online news reporters could be fined for publishing content that is deemed to fall into a list of vaguely worded categories, including “false news, insulting the monarchy, subjecting it to criticism, or imposing responsibility on it for the actions of the government, undermining the regime, [or] news that will affect the value of the national currency.”10 In a positive development, the law would abolish the jailing of journalists, though they can still be penalized under the penal code.11

In June 2019, the MOI posted on Twitter that anyone who follows exiled opposition members could face criminal charges and imprisonment. Twitter later issued a statement saying the MOI’s tweet violated freedom of expression.12

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 6.006

Individuals are frequently detained and prosecuted for online activities, and those who are convicted typically receive prison sentences.

In 2023, the BPA’s semiannual report documented 14 instances in which journalists, media workers, and online activists were interrogated or arrested, and 8 instances in which legal proceedings were initiated against them.1 In 2022, BPA recorded at least 17 cases in which people were arrested or detained for their online or social media activity, and the most common charges brought against those investigated were “insulting a statutory body, spreading false information, insulting religious symbols, and insulting and defaming.”2

Several people were arrested for their online activities during the coverage period. In December 2023, Ebrahim Sharif, a well-known opposition leader and former secretary general of the Wa’ad Society, was summoned and detained for one week after he posted on X expressing his support for the Palestinian people and criticizing the Bahraini government for joining a US-led coalition aiming to maintain trade in the Red Sea during the Israel-Hamas war.3 Ebrahim was arrested again in March 2024 for a post on X criticizing the government’s economic strategy4 and was released three days after the arrest.5

In June 2023, the public prosecutor posted on Instagram about two cases in which women allegedly used social media for “encouraging prostitution and publishing an unethical picture.”6 The post stated that one of the women was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and had her phone confiscated.7 In September 2023, a TikTok user discussed one of the country’s historical leaders on the platform. Two days after her post, and following a campaign of social media users calling for her arrest, she was detained and charged with “defamation and insult to a person who is glorified by the people of his religion.”8 Another individual was reportedly sentenced to two months’ imprisonment for criticizing the Ministry of Education on Instagram.9

Several internet users were arrested for their religious speech during the coverage period. In Nov 2023, the MOI arrested Jassim Hussein al-Abbas, a well-known historical researcher who was giving a lecture about the history of religion in Bahrain, charging him with challenging “religious and national constants of Bahraini society” with the Cybercrime Directorate stating that “incorrect history would cause strife in society and threaten civil peace.”10 Al-Abbas was detained for 10 days before being released on a travel ban. In February 2023, three individuals associated with the Al-Tajdeed Society, a cultural organization with a large social media following, were arrested and sentenced to one year in prison for posting videos on their Twitter accounts in which they discussed and questioned some tenants of Islam.11 They were charged with “insulting” religious texts and “violating foundations of Islam.”12 In May 2023, two of the individuals were each sentenced to one year in prison;13 they received a royal pardon and were released in December 2023.14

In March 2024, Sayed Yusuf Almuhafdha, a well-known human rights activist who lives in exile, discovered that in 2019 he had been sentenced to six months imprisonment in absentia due to a post he made alleging that the National Security Agency (NSA) committed torture. Almuhafdha stated that neither he nor his lawyer were informed about the trial.15 This sentencing was one of the few cross-border trials by the authorities that related to freedom of expression.16

Internet users have been summoned by the public prosecutor and interrogated over political online content. In January 2024, activist Ali Muhanna was summoned due to his participation in protests and his online activity. Muhanna has been summoned dozens of times, and is routinely asked to sign pledges that he will halt his political participation and social media posts addressing the mistreatment of prisoners.17 In September 2022, lawyer Abdulla Hashim was summoned to a Bahraini court because of his posts about unemployment figures on Twitter.18 Activist Nawal Atteya was summoned several times, by both the public prosecutor and the cybercrime unit, because of material she posted to Twitter that criticized the parliament.19 In all cases those summoned were released the same day.

During the previous coverage period, GCC countries collaborated to penalize online journalists. In August 2022, journalist Wafa Alam was denied entry to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and was told that her name was blacklisted by the Bahraini MOI.20 In September 2022, another journalist, Nazeeha Saeed, was also denied entry to the UAE but was not told why.21

At least three other internet users are still serving prison sentences for their online activities, including Abduljalil al-Singace, a human rights defender and blogger who has been serving a life sentence since 2011 on charges of being linked to a terrorist organization,22 disseminating false news, and inciting antigovernment protests.23, 24

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 1.001 4.004

The government restricts the use of many VPNs, imposes onerous registration requirements on mobile phone users, and has sought to uncover the identities of anonymous or pseudonymous users in order to prosecute them. A 2014 cybercrimes law criminalizes the use of encryption to commit or conceal “criminal intentions,” and perpetrators may face imprisonment or a fine.1 Observers contend that “criminal intentions” could include criticism of the government.

The TRA requires users to provide identification when registering for telecommunications services, and the government prohibits the sale or use of unregistered prepaid SIM cards.2 A TRA regulation introduced in July 2017 requires people to be physically present when registering SIM cards with providers,3 who must verify the identity of all subscribers, including through fingerprinting,4 a requirement justified as a security and anticrime measure.5 All prepaid SIM card users are required to renew their registration annually to avoid service cuts.6 In June 2020, the TRA ordered STC Bahrain to immediately deactivate all unregistered cards.7

Tech-savvy activists use VPNs to conceal their identities, but the websites of popular VPNs and anonymity services like TunnelBear, ExpressVPN, and Tor are blocked, making it difficult to download their client applications.8 Anonymous government critics have been sent malicious links that allow authorities to ascertain their identity and take legal action against them (see C5).

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006

State surveillance of online activities is widespread and targets both government loyalists and the opposition. Several reports have documented the government’s use of spyware against dissidents. In March 2023, the Bahraini government lost its bid for state immunity in an ongoing UK-based lawsuit filed by two Bahraini dissidents who had been previously targeted by government surveillance.1

In February 2022, Red Line for Gulf (RL4G), a London-based freedom of expression group, and Citizen Lab confirmed the use of Pegasus spyware in Bahrain.2 Pegasus is a targeted spyware software developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli technology firm.3 These reports confirmed that 13 Bahraini activists, including two living in exile, were successfully targeted by Pegasus. The targets, many of whom had their phones infected with the malware, included human rights defenders, political figures, and researchers. One such target was opposition lawyer Mohammed al-Tajer, who suspended his human rights activism in 2017 and has been targeted with surveillance in the past.4 Another target was Sharifa Siwar, a psychologist who was imprisoned for her online activity in 2019.5 Her phone was infected in June 2021, one month after she was pardoned by the king and released from prison.6 Between June 2020 and February 2021, nine additional activists were targeted with Pegasus,7 including three human rights activists.8

Reporting also revealed that authorities were using these spyware tools as part of a mass surveillance campaign.9 The RL4G report found that among potential Pegasus targets were around 40 percent of the members of parliament, including the chairman of the parliament and his deputy, more than 20 percent of the Shura Council, members of the royal family, ministers, a US state department official who was stationed in Bahrain, businessmen, journalists, and human rights defenders. According to reports, the malware attacks likely originated with the MOI.10

In October 2018, it was revealed that Bahrain had purchased espionage and intelligence-gathering software from private companies, including a system from the Israeli company Verint used for collecting information from social networks, and that Bahraini intelligence officers were trained in their use.11 Additionally, several government departments have purchased and used different surveillance software over the last decade, such as Cellebrite,12 which was used to target a Bahraini activist in 2016, and FinFisher, the use of which has been documented in Bahrain since 2008.13

The Cybercrimes Directorate includes a social media monitoring unit that seeks to “identify and prevent… crimes” on social media. Department officials receive training to identify “permitted speech and forbidden speech,” whether it is text, video, or audio.14 A Cyber Safety Directorate within the Ministry of State for Telecommunications Affairs was launched in November 2013 to monitor websites and social media networks, ostensibly to prevent the instigation of violence or terrorism and the dissemination of false news that may “pose a threat to the kingdom's security and stability.”15

In January 2017, the government ratified the Arab Treaty on Combating Cybercrime, a set of standards developed to stem the misuse of telecommunications devices, financial fraud, the promotion of terrorism, and access to pornographic content online. The treaty establishes rules on user data retention and real-time monitoring, as well as a mechanism for sharing information between signatories to help combat transnational crime. The lack of strong human rights standards in the treaty may increase the scope for privacy infractions.16

While there were no confirmed cases during the coverage period, at least three human rights activists received alerts from Apple in September 2023 informing them that their device was being targeted by spyware, such as Pegasus.17

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 0.000 6.006

Since 2009, the TRA has mandated that all telecommunications companies keep a record of customers’ phone calls, emails, and website visits for up to three years. Companies are also obliged to provide security forces with access to subscriber data and data content upon receiving a request from the public prosecutor or with a court order.1

In order to receive an operating license, service providers must develop a Lawful Access Capability Plan that would allow security forces to access communications metadata (see A4). In 2020, two ISPs were fined by the TRA for failing to have a Lawful Access Capability Plan.2

In July 2018, Bahrain introduced a personal data protection law similar to the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that delineates the requirements for entities collecting, processing, and storing personal data. These requirements include gaining user consent and informing users that data is being collected. Article 2.4(b) exempts national security–related data processing undertaken by the MOI, the National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Ministry, and other security services.3 The law took effect in August 2019.4 It is unclear what its enforcement might look like, but violators can be taken to court and may face criminal penalties. As of April 2024, the Personal Data Protection Authority had issued several executive orders specifying the details of data owners' rights, as well as procedures for processing data and handling complaints.5

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Violence, torture, and sexual assault against online activists and journalists at the hands of the authorities is common in Bahrain.1 Numerous online activists have fled Bahrain, and dissidents in exile are frequently harassed by government officials who threaten to harm their families in Bahrain.

Individuals commenting on the November 2020 death of Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa faced mistreatment at the hands of the authorities. A 60-year-old woman reportedly lost consciousness while being interrogated,2 while a teenage girl was interrogated and forced to sign a confession without her parents or lawyer present.3 Detainees, including minors, were prohibited from contacting their families or managing their hygienic needs while in detention.4

Bahraini activists living abroad are subject to online threats from people affiliated with the security forces.5 In March 2021, activist Hasan Abdulnabi received threats against his family as part of a campaign to force him to stop posting critical comments about Bahraini politics on Instagram.6 In May 2019, the MOI targeted the Twitter account of Adel Marzooq, an exiled journalist and chief editor of the Gulf House for Studies and Publishing, threatening to act against the organization and those who promoted its messages.7 The threats came after Marzooq speculated on a conflict within the royal family over replacing the prime minister.8 In January 2022, Marzooq said that his three-year-old daughter was not provided a Bahraini passport, in apparent retaliation for his online activity.9

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Cyberattacks against both opposition and government supporters are common in Bahrain. In July 2021, the Instagram and YouTube accounts and the website of the Al-Wafa opposition group were hacked by unknown attackers.1

Government websites and state-affiliated news agencies were hacked during the coverage period. Ahead of parliamentary and local elections in November 2022, unknown hackers targeted government websites and state-run news agencies, leaving the affected webpages inaccessible for several hours.2 In February 2023, a hacking group launched a cyberattack against the Bahrain International Airport website, as well as a state news agency, to mark the 12-year anniversary of the Arab Spring uprisings in Bahrain.3

In January 2022, the head of the National Center for Cyber Security said that Bahrain has been targeted with numerous “electronic terrorism” attacks from foreign countries.4 In June 2021, the Bahrain Development Bank was subject to an electronic attack that suspended its operations for over two weeks.5 The perpetrator of this attack is unknown.

In March 2024, an X account claimed that a group called Anonymous Sudan carried out a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against the ISP Zain’s infrastructure, although no explanation was provided by the authorities or Zain.6 The X user stated that the attack was due to Bahrain’s “clear and continuous support for Israel” and to raise awareness “of the tragic situation in Sudan.”7

In August 2021, Bahrain’s Information and eGovernment Authority (iGA) issued a warning about text messages purportedly containing infected links to register for COVID-19 booster shots. These messages contained malware that would give hackers access to infected mobile devices.8

On Bahrain

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Country Facts

  • Population

    1,472,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    12 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    30 100 not free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes