The president is chief of state and, as a result of the new constitution voted on in July 2023 and implemented the next month, is directly elected for a term of up to seven years, with no limit on the number of terms. The new constitution also creates the position of vice president, appointed by the president, and restricts the ability to run for the presidency to individuals with “Central African origins,” excluding Central Africans holding dual nationality. This new stipulation transforms candidate origins into a cornerstone of political legitimacy.

Faustin-Archange Touadéra was reelected in December 2020 to a second term with 53.1 percent of the vote. In January 2021, the Constitutional Court rejected appeals presented by the opposition and confirmed the election’s legality, despite significant electoral flaws.

The election was characterized by delays and voter-registration irregularities, and was held following more than a week of intense fighting outside Bangui. While the government and its international partners described the election as credible and legitimate, opposition parties denounced the polls as marred by widespread ballot-box stuffing and vote buying. Many citizens were prevented from voting due to threats and attacks perpetrated by a rebel coalition. There were no international independent observers outside of Bangui.

The prime minister is the head of government and is appointed by the president. In February 2022, Touadéra appointed then economy minister Félix Moloua as prime minister.

Legislators are directly elected to seven-year terms in the 140-seat National Assembly. The new constitution adopted in August 2023 established the National Assembly as the sole chamber. The previous constitution, adopted in 2015, had stipulated the creation of a second chamber, but it was never established.

The first round of legislative elections took place in December 2020 alongside the presidential election, and was plagued by insecurity, voter intimidation, and allegations of fraud. In January 2021, the Constitutional Court nullified some first-round results, citing electoral irregularities, violence, and intimidation. Another three rounds were held to fill the parliament’s seats.

The ruling United Hearts Movement (MCU) ultimately won 61 seats. No other party won more than 10. The MCU’s parliamentary group expanded to 86 by September 2021 as legislators defected to its banner. According to UN reports, that year’s polls were flawed but turnout was high and the elections were largely peaceful.

Local elections, scheduled for July 2023 after repeated delays, have been postponed again to October 2024.

Electoral laws permit multiparty competition, and adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage. However, electoral authorities operate opaquely. A 2020 law regulating the National Elections Authority (ANE) introduced mechanisms to enhance its independence. However, the ruling MCU still controls the ANE’s board.

In February 2023, President Touadéra enacted a bill governing the conduct of referendums that had been passed by the parliament in December 2022, despite ongoing tensions; the bill was seen by both supporters and opponents as a precursor to the constitutional referendum Touadéra was pushing for.

Announced by the president in May 2023, the constitutional referendum took place in July without any major incidents after Touadéra made the contents of the draft constitution public just twenty days before the balloting. According to the ANE, the new constitution garnered approval from 95.3 percent of the voters, with a turnout of 57.23 percent. However, the opposition, which had called for a boycott of the vote, vehemently criticized what they described as a “masquerade.” Reports from the field, citing a noticeable lack of crowds at polling stations, raise questions about the legitimacy of the results.

The new constitution extends the presidential term from five to seven years and eliminates term limits. Overall, it significantly strengthens the powers of the president while reducing the ability of RCA institutions to exercise oversight. It replaces the nine-member Constitutional Court with an eleven-member Constitutional Council, to which the president now appoints three members rather than one.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 following a constitutional referendum that demonstrated the executive branch’s complete control over electoral bodies.

While political parties are legally able to form and operate, party members conducting political activities risk intimidation and violence by the national police and progovernment militias in Bangui, and by armed groups and security forces outside the capital.

In October 2023, the United States cited a lack of pluralism as one of the reasons it was ending the RCA’s participation in its African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade program.

Several opposition parties hold seats in the National Assembly. However, most of the candidates in the 2020–21 elections were unable to campaign outside Bangui due to widespread violence and direct threats and aggression by armed rebel groups. After the elections, administrative and judicial authorities severely restricted the rights of several prominent opposition leaders, who were prevented from leaving the country and threatened with the loss of their parliamentary immunity. Others have chosen voluntary exile in France for fear of arrest. The new constitution’s ban on dual nationals serving as president would affect two prominent opposition figures.

Threats against Touadéra’s political opponents increased in 2023 ahead of the constitutional referendum. In April, the US-based NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report describing a decline in democracy within the country and condemning the repression of opposition parties, civil society organizations, and media outlets that opposed the constitutional referendum. According to HRW, the progovernment movements Les Requins (the Sharks) and La Galaxie Nationale (the National Galaxy), while campaigning for the referendum, harassed opponents, both online and in person. In July, the army searched the home of the father of Touadéra’s main opponent. The same month, the government banned a rally organized by the opposition to take place in mid-July, citing the “security situation” and the “subversive nature” of the initiative. A few days before the referendum, the RCA secret service briefly detained the spokesperson of one of the main opposition parties.

In September 2023, a high-profile group of opposition leaders signed a joint communiqué declaring that they did not recognize the new constitution and calling the regime illegitimate and dictatorial. In October, progovernment movements called for the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of those political opponents, who were described as enemies of the nation. In December, opposition MP Dominique Yandocka, who did not recognize the new constitution, was arrested at his home in Bangui and detained at the police’s Research and Investigation Services, while his bodyguard was beaten by the security forces. Yandocka was still being held at year’s end.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to increasing repression of the opposition and civil society in the months preceding a constitutional referendum.

Citizens are vulnerable to pressure and intimidation from national police and nonstate armed groups. Due to enduring insecurity, voters outside Bangui are largely unable to participate in political processes.

The Russian regime maintains significant influence over the RCA’s political affairs. President Touadéra assigned his security to the Wagner Group, a Russian security company with links to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Wagner mercenaries have supported RCA military operations and directly fought armed rebel groups, reportedly winning them public support.

In 2021, the European Union sanctioned the Wagner Group, citing serious human rights abuses and destabilizing activities in the RCA. In 2022, Michelle Bachelet Jeria, then the UN high commissioner for human rights, accused security forces and the Wagner Group of engaging in human rights violations. Following the death of Wagner’s chief in August 2023, Russia reiterated its determination to continue providing military assistance to the RCA.

Members of many ethnic, religious, and other minority groups are prevented from achieving political representation due to discrimination and an accompanying lack of access to the political process. Sectarian violence against Muslims affects their ability to participate in public space. In April and May 2023, Wagner Group mercenaries repeatedly targeted Muslim communities in the capital’s Muslim district.

Women are underrepresented in politics, with only 16 women sitting in the 140-seat National Assembly, though an electoral law passed in 2019 requires that 35 percent of candidates be women. Societal and legal discrimination against LGBT+ people prevent them from advocating for their interests via the political process.

Due to the long-lasting tribalization of politics, the country’s public institutions and army are dominated by the Gbaya ethnic majority, to which former president François Bozizé belongs. President Touadéra has promoted members of his group, the Mbaka-Mandja, to key positions and to the presidential guard.

While elected representatives can determine the policies of the government, their ability to implement policy is severely affected by poor governance and a lack of authority outside Bangui. Local decision-making is also impacted by Russian influence. Rwanda’s influence has also grown significantly. Rwanda, together with the Wagner Group, contributed to the security plan for the July 2023 constitutional referendum. In December 2023, it emerged that RCA authorities were working on establishing a security partnership with the US-based private security company Bancroft Global Development.

Corruption and nepotism have long been pervasive in government. Political will to address public-sector corruption is lacking.

Government operations are largely nontransparent, and civil society groups and others have limited opportunity to influence impending policy decisions. Citizens outside of Bangui have limited access to their legislators. Touadéra and his inner circle pursued constitutional reform without consulting legislators or the wider public.

There is little support for independent media. In Bangui, outlets are increasingly aligned with national politicians and foreign governments, especially Moscow. Media outlets and social media channels often carry material meant to incite hate, discrimination, or violence, mainly against minority groups and opposition leaders. The High Commission of Communication has not succeeded in improving the situation.

Security and progovernment militia forces regularly threaten journalists. The government prevents international media workers from traveling outside Bangui. Incidents of harassment and intimidation by government forces often go unreported for fear of reprisals. Journalists and activists say they have been reluctant to criticize the government to avoid being labeled as political opponents and threatened.

In 2022, journalist Jean Saint-Clair Maka Gbossokotto died after meeting an individual affiliated with the RCA government and the Wagner Group; friends feared Gbossokotto was poisoned. Later that year, Communications Minister Serge Ghislain Djorie threatened to close Radio Ndékèluka if it continued to discuss Touadéra’s efforts to amend the constitution.

While the RCA is officially secular, ethnic and religious cleavages often overlap with the country’s political divisions. Muslims and Christians in Bangui remain partially segregated in separate enclaves, and fears of identity-based or sectarian violence by armed actors impede free religious expression. Muslims living in the northwest and east are targeted by FACA and Russian mercenary forces.

Years of conflict, clientelism, and corruption have left the education system unable to produce prominent academics and constructive debates on the country’s growing authoritarianism. When given the chance, young Central African researchers apply for scholarships abroad and leave the country. Although extremely dysfunctional, the educational system is generally free of extensive political indoctrination. However, Russian-language studies were expanded at the university level in 2021, as Moscow continued to exert influence in the RCA. In June 2022, Moscow issued scholarships to provide Russian-language training to Central African professors.

Outside the capital, the school year is often disrupted, including by a lack of available teachers and the occupation of school buildings by a variety of armed actors.

State authorities surveil public discussion and political debates. Political instability and the growing risk of violent retaliation for discussing sensitive topics—including widespread abuses perpetrated by progovernment militias, FACA forces, and Russian mercenaries—inhibit free expression.

Although freedom of assembly and the right to political protest are constitutionally guaranteed, these liberties are curtailed due to government repression of the opposition in Bangui, and threats posed by armed groups, FACA forces, and Russian mercenaries elsewhere.

With the exception of an opposition rally held in August 2022, only progovernment, pro-Russian, and anti-French gatherings have been authorized in Bangui, though in July 2023, an opposition rally was held despite a government ban.

NGO operations are limited by poor security conditions, and aid workers are particularly vulnerable. The International NGO Safety Organization counted 164 security incidents in the country in 2023 involving NGO workers; 2 were killed, 16 injured, and 8 abducted.

In July 2023, RCA authorities indicated that they would file a direct action for defamation against the US-based NGO The Sentry after it published a report in June on the Wagner Group’s activities in the country.

Trade unions and collective bargaining are permitted, although union organizers are sometimes subject to arbitrary detention or arrest. Small-scale agricultural organizations and cooperatives exist throughout the country, including organizations for women farmers.

Between January and March 2023, a series of public sector strikes brought normal life to a halt in Bangui. In March, three leaders of the primary and secondary school teachers’ union were arrested and briefly detained after launching a 21-day strike.

Courts are generally inefficient and frequently hampered by corruption. The government has limited authority to enforce judicial decisions. Judicial salaries have often gone unpaid. Judicial personnel are often untrained and are reluctant to be deployed outside of the capital.

The Special Criminal Court (CPS), created in 2015, is struggling to fulfill its mandate. The Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, created in 2020, has yet to start its work.

The Constitutional Court was subjected to political interference during 2022. That March, a Russian diplomat called on then chief Danièle Darlan to help secure a third term for President Touadéra. That October, Touadéra dismissed Darlan by decree. The new constitution that entered into force in August 2023 replaces the Constitutional Court with a Constitutional Council, further strengthening the executive’s control over the judiciary.

Arbitrary detention and lengthy pretrial detention are commonplace, and the justice system has limited presence beyond Bangui. Impunity for violence, economic crimes, and human rights violations are widespread.

National and international courts made some steps in trying those accused of violence. In September 2023, the CPS charged veteran rebel leader Abdoulaye Hissène with war crimes and crimes against humanity following his arrest by RCA security forces. In December, the CPS opened its second trial since its 2005 creation, trying ten militia members accused of carrying out attacks in Ndélé in March and April 2020.

In September, the Bangui Court of Appeal sentenced 23 people in absentia, including exiled former president François Bozizé and several prominent rebel leaders, to hard labor for life on charges connected to an armed offensive that took place during the 2020 presidential election. However, in October 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the release of Maxime Mokom Gawaka, a former antibalaka (“Invincible”) militia leader accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 2013 and 2014, after the prosecution dropped all charges, citing the unavailability of witnesses. Mokom was one of the rebel leaders sentenced in absentia in Bangui the previous month.

In Bangui, the officials of the Central African Office for the Repression of Banditry and progovernment militias are often accused of abuse of power and excessive use of force. Elsewhere, armed nonstate actors operate with impunity. These groups are responsible for violent attacks against civilians, international peacekeeping forces, and humanitarian workers. In February 2023, UN independent expert Yao Agbetse called for strengthening the discipline within the national security forces; he cited statistics from the final quarter of 2022 showing that the Central African army and its Russian allies were responsible for 58 percent of recorded human rights and humanitarian law violations in the country.

Security forces and insurgent groups compete to control territory and natural resources, causing widespread internal displacement. Conflicts between farmers and nomadic pastoralists have also destabilized the country.

In July 2023, the UN Security Council extended a long-standing arms embargo on RCA, but exempted weapons destined for government forces.

Same-sex sexual activity is illegal, and punishable by fines and imprisonment. While enforcement of these laws is uncommon, societal discrimination against LGBT+ people remains acute. In September 2022, the interior minister expelled two Cameroonian nationals for engaging in same-sex activity.

Muslims, nomadic pastoralists, and the Ba’aka minority group face continued discrimination. The Gbaya majority, to which former president Bozizé belongs, is also targeted, while the Mbaka-Mandja are favored by Touadéra.

The independent High Authority for Good Governance is tasked with protecting the rights of members of minority groups and people with disabilities, though its reach is limited.

Free movement is inhibited by insecurity and targeted violence. Transportation routes are threatened by banditry and theft in many areas.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that there were 544,000 internally displaced persons as of November 2023.

Businesses and homes are regularly looted or extorted by armed militants, with little prospect for compensation or legal recourse for victims. The agricultural economy—the livelihood of the majority of the population—remains restricted by ongoing violence and insecurity.

The family code does not discriminate against women regarding their inheritance rights. However, in practice, the possibility for women to inherit faces many challenges, including eviction from the family home after the death or disappearance of men during conflict.

Women and girls are by far the primary victims of sexual violence, but men and boys are also affected. Sexual violence is used as a deliberate tool of warfare; attackers enjoy broad impunity. Such acts that are not related to ethnic conflict are most often perpetrated within communities by family or neighbors. Constitutional guarantees for women’s rights are rarely enforced, especially in rural areas. Allegations of sexual abuse committed by UN peacekeeping forces in the country have also been documented.

Economic opportunity is heavily restricted by widespread corruption and the presence of armed groups. Many armed groups exploit gold and diamond mines, and forced labor and child recruitment for soldiering are common practices.

In its Trafficking in Persons Report 2023, the US State Department reported that despite increasing efforts, Central African authorities did not fully meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government passed a comprehensive antitrafficking law, but reported no prosecutions or convictions of traffickers, and victim services remained inadequate, while concerns were raised about official complicity in trafficking.