France
A Obstacles to Access | 22 25 |
B Limits on Content | 30 35 |
C Violations of User Rights | 24 40 |

France registered a slight improvement in internet freedom during the coverage period, despite lingering concerns about censorship and surveillance stemming from counterterrorism measures passed after the 2015 terrorist attacks. The internet remains accessible for most of the population. Website blocks and content removals are typically subject to careful judicial or administrative oversight. However, electronic surveillance has increased in both scope and frequency. The coverage period also saw spikes in online content manipulation surrounding the European Union (EU) parliamentary elections and the ongoing yellow vest protest movement.
The French political system features vibrant democratic processes and generally strong protections for civil liberties and political rights. However, due to a number of deadly terrorist attacks in recent years, successive governments have been willing to curtail constitutional protections and empower law enforcement to act in ways that impinge on personal freedoms.
- With the advent of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), complaints about the misuse of personal data spiked: the National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL) received more than 11,900 complaints in 2018, an increase of 32 percent. In January 2019, the CNIL levied the highest fine yet under the GDPR, a 50 million euro ($55 million) fine against Google for processing personal data for advertising purposes without valid authorization (see C5 and C6).1
- French companies and institutions were frequently attacked through ransomware during the coverage period, reflecting global trends in cybercrime (see C8).
- In April 2019, internet service providers (ISPs) were ordered to block two well-known websites engaged in piracy, Sci-Hub and LibGen, both of which offer free access to millions of paywalled academic papers (see B1).
- 1Martin Untersinger, “Que s’est-il passé en un an de RGPD, la loi censée protéger vos données ? [What happened after a year of GDPR, the law protecting your data?],” Le Monde, May 25, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/05/25/protection-des-donnees…
The internet penetration rate continued to increase, although regional disparities persist. The current information and communication technologies (ICT) market is open, highly competitive, and has benefited from the privatization of the state-owned company France Telecom (now Orange).
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 6.006 6.006 |
Infrastructural limitations generally do not restrict access to the internet. According to 2018 EU data, France has a fixed broadband internet penetration rate of 42.97 percent and a mobile penetration rate of 90.52 percent.1 Between 82 and 89 percent of households had access to the internet as of 2018.2
Committed to providing widespread access to high-speed broadband with connection speeds of at least 30 Mbps, the government has been implementing an ambitious national plan to deploy fiber-optic, very high speed digital subscriber line (VDSL), terrestrial, and satellite networks throughout the country by 2022, mobilizing public and private investments totaling €20 billion ($22 billion) over ten years.3 By early 2019, high-speed broadband coverage had reached 57 percent, according to the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications and Post (ARCEP), the telecommunications regulator.4
Reforms approved in 2015, known as the “Loi Macron,” sought to improve mobile broadband coverage by requiring mobile service providers to deploy 2G networks in underserved municipalities by 2016 and ensure 3G/4G coverage by 2017.5 According to a 2017 ARCEP report, between 67 and 74 percent of rural areas had 4G coverage, depending on the service provider.6 However, according to current ARCEP data, the 4G networks of three major mobile service providers cover more than 99 percent of the metropolitan French population, while the fourth major provider’s 4G coverage extends to 93 percent of the same population.7 5G networks are expected to be deployed in 2020.8
Internet speeds are high. According to May 2019 data from Ookla, the average download speed on a fixed broadband connection was 115.8 Mbps, while the average mobile download speed was 45.8 Mbps.9 For both types of connections, France ranks among the top 20 countries in the world.
- 1European Commission, “Country Profile for France: Broadband Take-up and Coverage Indicators,” October 29, 2019, https://perma.cc/47BN-5VWK
- 2International Telecommunication Union, “France Profile,” 2018, https://www.itu.int/itu-d/apis/clients/res/pdf/country_profile/report_F…; European Commission, “Country Profile for France, Internet Usage Indicators,” 2018 https://digital-agenda-data.eu/charts/country-profiles-the-relative-pos…{%22indicator-group%22:%22internet-usage%22,%22ref-area%22:%22FR%22,%22time-period%22:%222018%22}
- 3French Digital Agency “Plan France Très Haut Débit [French Very High Speed Plan],” http://www.francethd.fr
- 4ARCEP, «Observatoire haut et très haut débit : abonnements et déploiements [High and very high speed observatory: subscriptions and deployments],” June 06, 2019, https://www.arcep.fr/cartes-et-donnees/nos-publications-chiffrees/obser…
- 5TeleGeography, “French government approves amendment mandating rural mobile expansion,” April 20, 2015, https://www.commsupdate.com/articles/2015/04/20/french-government-appro…
- 6ARCEP, Les déploiements mobiles dans les zones peu denses [Mobile deployments in sparsely populated areas],” December 05, 2019, https://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=13111
- 7ARCEP, “Mon Reseau Mobile [My Mobile Network],” July 10, 2018, https://www.monreseaumobile.fr/
- 8Bate Felix, “France to push ahead with 5G launch in 2020 despite Huawei woes,” Reuters, May 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-telecoms-huawei-tech/france-t…
- 9Speedtest, “Speedtest Global Index,” May 2019, http://web.archive.org/web/20190629201034/https://speedtest.net/global-…
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 3.003 3.003 |
Internet connections are relatively affordable. In 2019, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranked France seventh out of 100 countries in terms of the affordability of connections.1 According to 2017 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data, a monthly entry-level fixed broadband subscription cost 0.89 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while a 1 GB monthly mobile data plan cost 0.36 percent of GNI per capita.2 Both prices were lower than those in neighboring Germany and the United Kingdom.
There are a number of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in France,3 which contribute to improved access and lower consumer prices.4
However, demographic disparities in internet usage persist. A map produced by ARCEP illustrates some of the regional disparities in mobile penetration, showing patchy 4G coverage in rural areas and overseas territories.5 Most at-home users have access to broadband connections, while the remaining households, usually in rural areas, must rely on dial-up or satellite services.6 There are no significant digital divides in terms of gender or income.
- 1The Economist Intelligence Unit “The Inclusive Internet Index 2019,” 2019, https://theinclusiveinternet.eiu.com/explore/countries/FR/performance/i…
- 2International Telecommunications Union, “ICT Prices,” 2017, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/ICTprices/default.aspx
- 3Data Center Map, “Internet Exchange Points,” https://www.datacentermap.com/ixps.html
- 4DrPeering International, “Internet Service Providers and Peering v3.0,” August 23, 2010, http://www.drpeering.net/white-papers/Internet-Service-Providers-And-Pe…
- 5ARCEP, “Mon Reseau Mobile [My Mobile Network],” July 10, 2018, https://www.monreseaumobile.fr/
- 6Ariase, “Les réseaux internet et mobile en France [Internet and mobile networks in France],” November 21, 2019, https://www.ariase.com/couverture
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 6.006 6.006 |
There were no restrictions on connectivity reported during the coverage period. There is no central internet backbone, and ISPs are not required to lease bandwidth from a monopoly holder, as is the case in other countries. Instead, the backbone consists of several interconnected networks run by ISPs and shared through peering or transit agreements. The government does not have the legal authority to restrict the domestic internet during emergencies.
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 3.003 6.006 |
There are no significant business hurdles to providing access to digital technologies in France. Service providers do not need to obtain operating licenses.1 However, the use of frequencies (for mobile networks) is subject to strict licensing by ARCEP.2 Only four providers are licensed in this regard: Orange, Free, Bouygues Telecom, and SFR.3 Others, such as NRJ Mobile, make use of these providers’ networks, reselling internet and mobile services.4
Orange, Free, Bouygues Telecom, and SFR dominate both the fixed and mobile markets. Competition between these four providers is fierce, but there is little room for other players to compete.
In 2017, ARCEP announced that it would impose certain constraints on market leader Orange in an effort to open up competition for high-speed fiber services among small- and medium-sized companies.5 The government is the main (but not majority) shareholder in Orange.
- 1Diane Mullenex, Annabelle Richard and Florent Lallemant, “Communications: regulation and outsourcing in France: overview,” January 1, 2018, https://content.next.westlaw.com/3-619-2685?transitionType=Default&cont…
- 2Diane Mullenex, Annabelle Richard and Florent Lallemant, “Communications: regulation and outsourcing in France: overview,” January 1, 2018, https://content.next.westlaw.com/3-619-2685?transitionType=Default&cont…
- 3International Trade Administration, “France Commercial Guide,” October 13, 2019, https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/france-market-overview?section-…
- 4ARCEP, “Liste des MVNO et des accords de licence de marque [list of MVNO and licencing agreements in France],” January 16, 2020, https://www.arcep.fr/professionnels/operateurs-des-telecommunications/l…
- 5Mathieu Rosemain, “French telecoms regulator to impose new constraints on Orange,” Reuters, July 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/france-telecoms/update-2-french-telecom…
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 4.004 4.004 |
The telecommunications industry is regulated by ARCEP,1 while competition is regulated by Competition Authority and, more broadly, the European Commission (EC).2 ARCEP remains an independent and impartial body, and regulatory decisions are usually seen as fair. ARCEP is governed by a seven-member college. Three members are appointed by the president, while the National Assembly and Senate appoint two each.3 All serve six-year terms. As an EU member state, France must ensure the independence of its telecommunications regulator. Given that the government is the main shareholder in Orange, the leading telecommunications company, the EC stated in 2011 that it would closely monitor the situation in France to ensure that European regulations were met.4
The Digital Republic Act enacted in 2016 broadened ARCEP's mandate, granting the body investigatory and sanctioning powers to ensure compliance with the principle of net neutrality introduced by the law.5 In 2017, ARCEP reiterated its commitment to promote net neutrality and digital transformation.6
- 1ARCEP, “Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes,” https://www.arcep.fr
- 2“Autorité de la concurrence,” https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/fr
- 3ARCEP, “Nomination des membres et fonctionnement du college [Appointment of members and functioning of the college],” January 30, 2020, https://www.arcep.fr/larcep/le-college-et-les-directions/nomination-des…
- 4“ARCEP must remain independent vis-a-vis government – EC,” Telecompaper, January 14, 2011, https://www.telecompaper.com/news/arcep-must-remain-independent-vis-a-v…
- 5ARCEP, “The Digital Republic Act strengthens Arcep's powers, opens the way for new forms of regulation and tasks the Authority with protecting net neutrality,” October 10, 2016, https://archives.arcep.fr/index.php?id=8571&no_cache=1&L=1&no_cache=1&t…
- 6ARCEP, “Annual Report and Strategic Review 2017,” July 05, 2018, https://perma.cc/C3H3-BB6Y
The government continued to actively legislate the digital public sphere. In December 2018, Parliament passed a law aimed at fighting disinformation around elections. In February 2019, President Emmanuel Macron announced a complementary proposal aimed at curbing online hate speech and ending impunity on social networks. The text was being discussed in Parliament at the end of coverage period. The coverage period saw widespread digital mobilization in the form of the yellow vest protest movement, although disinformation accompanied the movement’s growth.
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content? | 5.005 6.006 |
The government does not generally block web content in a politically motivated manner. All major social media platforms are available.
However, France is one of the few countries that has blocked two well-known websites engaged in piracy, Sci-Hub and LibGen, which offer free access to millions of paywalled academic books, journals, and papers. Following a complaint from academic publishers Elsevier and Springer Nature, a court ordered the four major ISPs to block the two websites in April 2019.1
Earlier, in December 2018, a court, acting on a complaint from six associations fighting movie piracy, ordered the same set of ISPs to block seven illegal streaming websites.2
Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, terrorist-related content and incitements to hatred have been subject to censorship. In November 2018, a Paris court ordered nine French ISPs to block Participatory Democracy, a racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-LGBT+ French-language website hosted in Japan that was inciting hatred. The website is affiliated with French far-right and extremist communities.3
A decree issued in 2015 outlined administrative measures to block websites containing materials that incite or condone terrorism, as well as sites that display child abuse.4 Shortly after the decree was promulgated, five websites were blocked with no judicial or public oversight for containing terrorism-related information.5 In the ensuing years, many more websites have been blocked in France. According to the data protection agency CNIL, the Central Office for the Fight against Crime Related to Information and Communication Technology (OCLCTIC) issued 879 blocking orders to ISPs between March 2018 and February 2019, compared to 763 during the previous period. Among the orders were 82 sites targeted for hosting terrorism-related information; the remaining 797 were targeted for displaying child abuse.6 The CNIL does not offer details on the content of blocked websites, but it does disclose the OCLCTIC censorship decisions that it disputes. During the coverage period, CNIL disputed three such decisions, all related to content removals rather than website blocks (see B2).7
- 1Marc Rees, “Les principaux FAI français doivent bloquer Sci-Hub et LibGen“ [French ISP have to block Sci-Hub and LibGen], Next Inpact, March 30, 2019, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/107689-les-principaux-fai-francais-doiv…
- 2Marc Rees, “La justice ordonne à Google le déréférencement dynamique de sept sites de streaming illicites [Court orders Google to dynamically deregister seven illegal streaming sites],” February 19, 2019, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/107624-la-justice-ordonne-a-google-dere…
- 3“La justice ordonne aux opérateurs de bloquer le site extrémiste « Démocratie participative » [Justice orders operators to block the extremist website "Participatory Democracy"],” Ouest France, November 27, 2018, https://www.ouest-france.fr/societe/justice/la-justice-ordonne-aux-oper…
- 4“Décret n° 2015-125 relatif au blocage des sites provoquant à des actes de terrorisme ou en faisant l'apologie et des sites diffusant des images et représentations de mineurs à caractère pornographique [Decree 2015-125 related to the blocking of sites provoking or glorifying acts of terrorism and sites distributing images and representations of minors of a pornographic nature],” Legifrance, February 5, 2015, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00003019….
- 5Lucie Ronfaut, “La France bloque pour la première fois des sites Web de propagande terroriste” [France blocks terrorist propaganda websites for the first time], Le Figaro, March 16, 2015, https://www.lefigaro.fr/secteur/high-tech/2015/03/16/32001-20150316ARTF…
- 6M. Alexandre Linden, « Rapport d’activité de la personnalité qualifiée [Qualified personality activity report], » Commission Nationale Informatique & Libertés, March 1, 2018, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_rapport_blocag…
- 7CNIL, « Contrôle du blocage administratif des sites : la personnalité qualifiée présente son 4e rapport d’activité [Control of the administrative blocking of sites: the qualified person presents his 4th activity report],” May 27, 2019, https://www.cnil.fr/fr/controle-du-blocage-administratif-des-sites-la-p…
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content? | 2.002 4.004 |
The government sometimes orders online platforms to delete or deindex content. For example, in December 2018, after a year of heated debate, a French court ordered Google to deindex search engine results related to seven illegal streaming websites for a year.1
According to Google’s transparency report, the government issued 244 requests to remove content in the first half of 2018, invoking national security in a majority (54 percent) of cases.2 Google acceded to 71 percent of these requests. In 2018, Facebook “restricted access” to 667 items of content in France, the plurality of which related to Holocaust denial.3 Not all of these items were restricted at the government’s request; 208 of the 667 items were restricted “in response to private reports of defamation,” for example. Facebook did not disclose how many content removal requests it received. In 2018, Twitter received 243 removal requests in France, including two court orders.4 The company acceded to about 5 percent of these requests. Finally, from July to December 2018, Microsoft received 206 content removal requests from the government.5 The company acceded to 74 percent of these requests.
A government decree issued in 2015 allows for the deletion or deindexing of online content related to child abuse and terrorism using an administrative procedure supervised by CNIL.6 According to CNIL, between March 2018 and February 2019, the OCLCTIC issued 18,014 removal requests (a decrease from the previous year’s 34,110) targeting such content as well as 6,581 deindexing requests (compared to 3,115 the previous year).7 Content was deleted in response to 13,421 removal requests (75 percent of the total number issued), 6,625 of which related to child abuse and 6,796 of which related to terrorism. CNIL disputed two removal and deindexing requests, successfully reversing the deindexing of a satirical tweet.8 In addition, CNIL referred a third set of requests, which concerned online articles about police vehicle arson, to a court.9 The court found that the requests were invalid because, in its judgement, the articles neither incited nor condoned terrorism.
In a separate CNIL report, the authority noted that it had received 373 right to be forgotten (RTBF) deindexing requests in 2018 after search engines had rejected them.10 The RTBF was introduced in France in 1995 and institutionalized throughout Europe with the implementation of the GDPR in May 2018.11 During the coverage period, Google deindexed some 53,198 URLs in France under the RTBF.12 Between July and December 2018, Microsoft deindexed just 945 URLs in France under the RBTF.13 Both companies deindexed only about half the URLs requested by users and other entities in France.
Technology companies also proactively removed content during the coverage period. Facebook withdrew over 10,000 ads in early 2019 because they violated its new political advertising policy. Some of the deleted ads were EU-sponsored posts encouraging participation in the upcoming EU parliamentary elections, posts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) including Greenpeace, Médecins du Monde, and UNICEF, and posts promoting media outlets (including Le Figaro).14 Similarly, Twitter’s guidelines on political content led the company to block a government-sponsored voter registration ad campaign in April 2019.15 These guidelines were adopted in reaction to France’s new law against election-related “fake news” (see B3).
- 1Marc Rees, “La justice ordonne à Google le déréférencement dynamique de sept sites de streaming illicites [Court orders Google to dynamically deregister seven illegal streaming sites],” February 19, 2019, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/107624-la-justice-ordonne-a-google-dere…
- 2Google, “Transparency Report: Government requests to remove content, France,” https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/by-country/FR
- 3Facebook, “Transparency: France country overview,” December, 2018, https://transparency.facebook.com/content-restrictions/country/FR/jul-d…
- 4Twitter, “Transparency report: France, June, 2019,” https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/fr.html
- 5Microsoft, “Content Removal Requests Report,” June, 2019, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/crrr
- 6“Décret n° 2015-253 relatif au déréférencement des sites provoquant à des actes de terrorisme ou en faisant l'apologie et des sites diffusant des images et représentations de mineurs à caractère pornographique [Decree No. 2015-253 on the delisting of sites that provoke or glorify acts of terrorism and sites containing images and representations of minors of a pornographic nature],” Legifrance, March 4, 2015, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2015/3/4/INTD1504662D/jo/texte
- 7M. Alexandre Linden, « Rapport d’activité de la personnalité qualifiée [Qualified personality activity report], » Commission Nationale Informatique & Libertés, March 1, 2018, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_rapport_blocag…
- 8M. Alexandre Linden, « Rapport d’activité de la personnalité qualifiée [Qualified personality activity report], » Commission Nationale Informatique & Libertés, March 1, 2018, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_rapport_blocag…
- 9Tribunal administratif de Cergy-Pontoise, “Internet : premier jugement rendu sur saisine de la personnalité qualifiée désignée par la CNIL [Internet: first judgment handed down on referral to the qualified person designated by the CNIL],” February4, 2019, http://cergy-pontoise.tribunal-administratif.fr/A-savoir/Communiques/In…
- 10CNIL, “Présentation du Rapport d’activité 2018 et des enjeux 2019 de la CNIL [Presentation of the CNIL's 2018 Activity Report and 2019 issues],” April 15, 2019, https://www.cnil.fr/fr/presentation-du-rapport-dactivite-2018-et-des-en…
- 11CNIL, “Grâce au RGPD, plus de droits pour vos données! [Thanks to RGPD, more rights for your data!],” May 25, 2018, https://www.cnil.fr/fr/grace-au-rgpd-plus-de-droits-pour-vos-donnees
- 12Google, “Transparency Report: Requests to delist content under European privacy law,” https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?delisted_urls…
- 13Microsoft, “Content Removal Requests Report,” June, 2019, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/crrr
- 14Jean-Marc Manach, “En France, Facebook a censuré 84 % des publicités (soi-disant) « hautement politisées » [In France, Facebook censored 84% of its so called ‘highly political ads’],” Next Inpact, May 22, 2019, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/107900-en-france-facebook-a-censure-84-…
- 15BBC World News, “Twitter blocks French government with its own fake news law,” April 3, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47800418
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 3.003 4.004 |
Authorities are fairly transparent about what content is prohibited and the reasons behind specific content removal requests. Incitement of hatred, racism, Holocaust denial, child abuse and pornography, copyright infringement, and defamation1 are illegal and may be grounds for blockings or takedowns. Article R645-1 of the criminal code outlaws the display of the emblems, uniforms, or badges of criminal organizations under penalty of a fine and can justify blockings or takedowns of such symbols when they appear online.2
Notably, in December 2018, Parliament passed a law first proposed by President Macron that aims to combat disinformation around elections by empowering judges to order the removal of “fake news” within three months of an election.3 The proposal was rejected twice by the Senate before it was passed. The law places a significant strain on judges, who will have 48 hours to decide whether a website is spreading fake news following a referral by a public prosecutor, political party, or interested individual. Under the law, social media platforms are also required to disclose who is paying for sponsored ads during electoral campaigns.4 Commentators have expressed concern that the law could be used as a political tool.5
In February 2019, President Macron announced a complementary proposal to act against all forms of hate speech and put an end to impunity on social networks.6 In July 2019, after the coverage period, the proposal was formally introduced as a bill in Parliament.7 It is modelled, at least in part, on Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, or NetzDG. The EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market is also on the legislative horizon and must be implemented at the national level in all EU member states, including France, following the measure’s final approval in Brussels in April 2019.
A decree issued in 2015 outlined administrative measures to block websites containing materials that incite or condone terrorism, as well as sites that display child pornography (see B1). The decree implemented Article 6-1 of the Law on Confidence in the Digital Economy (LCEN), passed in 2004, as well as Article 12 of a new antiterrorism law passed in 2014.8 The OCLCTIC is responsible for maintaining a blacklist of sites that contain prohibited content, and must review the list every four months to ensure that blacklisted sites continue to contravene French law. The OCLCTIC can ask editors or hosts to remove the offending content, and after a 24-hour period, it can order ISPs to block sites that do not comply.9 Users attempting to access blacklisted sites are redirected to a website from the Ministry of Interior providing avenues for appeal.
The lack of judicial oversight in the blocking of websites that allegedly incite or condone terrorism remains a concern. The procedure outlined above is supervised by CNIL. As an administrative authority, CNIL can also refer requests to the administrative court system should it object to any action taken by the OCLCTIC. In May 2019, a CNIL official asserted that the body lacks the technical means and human resources to efficiently supervise the OCLCTIC.10 Some commentators have lamented that, while CNIL was founded to protect internet freedom, it is now overseeing restrictions of the online space.11
A government decree issued in 2015 also allows for the deletion or deindexing of online content from search results using an administrative procedure supervised by CNIL (see B2). Under this decree, the OCLCTIC submits requests to search engines, which then have 24 hours to comply.12 The OCLCTIC is responsible for reevaluating deindexed websites every four months and requesting the reindexing of websites when the incriminating content has been removed. CNIL can dispute the OCLCTIC’s orders by recommending an alternative course of action or referring cases to the administrative court system.
Legal debates over the RTBF have also escalated in recent years. CNIL has been battling with Google to enforce the RTBF ruling across all of the sites that can be accessed within the country, including Google.com in addition to Google.fr.13 Google raised concerns that the move would set a dangerous precedent for authoritarian governments, who could also request that Google apply national laws extraterritorially.14 In 2016, Google was fined $112,000 by CNIL for not complying with demands to remove results across its global domains.15 Google appealed to France’s Council of State, which in 2017 decided to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).16 The case was still under consideration at the CJEU at the end of the coverage period.17
A ruling in 2016 by a Paris court established that Facebook could be sued in France for removing the account of a French user who posted an image of a Gustave Courbet painting of a naked woman. Facebook had argued that cases concerning its terms and conditions could only be heard by a court in the United States. The case was finally judged in March 2018; a French court dismissed the user’s suit. The user appealed this first decision in April 2018.18
- 1Legalis, “Jurisprudence: Diffamation. TGI de Marseille, 2ème ch. civile, jugement du 5 février 2019 [Case law: Defamation. TGI of Marseille, 2nd civil chapter, judgment of 5 February 2019],” June 19, 2019, https://www.legalis.net/jurisprudences/tgi-de-marseille-2eme-ch-civile-…
- 2Elissa A. Okoniewski, “Yahoo!, Inc. v. Licra: The French Challenge to Free Expression on the Internet,” American University International Law Review 18, 1, 2002, https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&ht…;
- 3“Proposition de loi relative à la lutte contre les fausses informations [Proposal for a law on the fight against false information],” Assemblée Nationale, March 21, 2018, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/propositions/pion0799.asp
- 4Nicolas Berrod, “Ce que prévoit la nouvelle loi anti-fake news [What the new anti-fake news law provides for],“ Le Parisien, December 27, 2018, http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/ce-que-prevoit-la-nouvelle-loi-anti-…
- 5Thomas Liabot, « Loi contre les "fake news" : ce qu'en pensent 3 fact-checkeurs [Fake news law: what 3 fact-checkers think about it],» Le Journal du Dimanche, March 16, 2018, http://www.lejdd.fr/politique/loi-contre-les-fake-news-ce-quen-pensent-…
- 6Laura Kayali, “Macron vows measures to tackle online hate speech and anti-Semitism,” Politico, February 21, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-vows-measures-to-tackle-online-h…
- 7Aurelien Bredeen, “France Will Debate a Bill to Stop Online Hate Speech. What’s at Stake?,” The New York Times, July 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/world/europe/france-bill-to-stop-onl…
- 8“Décret n° 2015-125 relatif au blocage des sites provoquant à des actes de terrorisme ou en faisant l'apologie et des sites diffusant des images et représentations de mineurs à caractère pornographique [Decree 2015-125 related to the blocking of sites provoking or glorifying acts of terrorism and sites distributing images and representations of minors of a pornographic nature],” Legifrance, February 5, 2015, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00003019….
- 9“LOI n° 2014-1353 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme [ACT No 2014-1353 strengthening the provisions relating to the fight against terrorism],” Legifrance, November 13, 2014, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2014/11/13/INTX1414166L/jo#JORFS…
- 10Harold Grand, “En France, les demandes de retrait de contenus terroristes ont chuté en 2018 [In France, requests for the removal of terrorist content declined in 2018], Le Figaro, May 27, 2019, http://www.lefigaro.fr/secteur/high-tech/en-france-les-demandes-de-retr…
- 11EDRI, “France implements Internet censorship without judicial oversight,” European Digital Rights, March 11, 2015, https://edri.org/france-censorship-without-judicial-oversight/
- 12M. Alexandre Linden, « Rapport d’activité de la personnalité qualifiée [Qualified personality activity report], » Commission Nationale Informatique & Libertés, March 1, 2018, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_rapport_blocag…
- 13CNIL, “Right to delisting: Google informal appeal rejected,” September 21, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20180305190537/https://www.cnil.fr/fr/node/…
- 14Peter Fleischer, “Implementing a European, not global, right to be forgotten,” Google Europe Blog, July 30, 2015, https://europe.googleblog.com/2015/07/implementing-european-not-global-…
- 15Mark Scott, “Google fined by French privacy regulator,” New York Times, March 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/technology/google-fined-by-french-pr…
- 16Mathieu Rosemain, “French court refers 'right to be forgotten' dispute to top EU court,” Reuters, July 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-litigation/french-court-refer…
- 17Owen Bowcott, “'Right to be forgotten' by Google should apply only in EU, says court opinion”, The Guardian, January, 10, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/10/right-to-be-forgotte…
- 18Boris Barraud “Durand contre Facebook : L’Origine du Monde de Courbet a-t-elle été censurée par le réseau social ? [Durand versus Facebook: Has Courbet's Origin of the World been censored by the social network?],” La Revue Européenne des Médias et du Numérique, n°46-47, Summer 2018, https://la-rem.eu/2018/07/durand-contre-facebook-lorigine-du-monde-de-c…
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? | 4.004 4.004 |
Online self-censorship is minimal. However, a proposal aimed at countering online hate speech might lead to increased government oversight of internet users, raising concerns that it could cause greater self-censorship. In January 2019, President Macron said, “We should move progressively toward the end of anonymity” online.1 The proposal was outlined in further detail in February 2019 by then Secretary of State for Digital Mounir Mahjoubi and Secretary of State for Equality Marlene Schiappa; it would, among other things, pressure social media platforms and other websites to provide identifying information about users.2 The full proposal was made public in July 2019 (see B3).3
- 1“Démocratie participative: Emmanuel Macron souhaite ‘une levée progressive de toute forme d'anonymat’ [Participatory democracy: Emmanuel Macron wants ‘a progressive lifting of all forms of anonymity’],” BFM TV, January 18, 2019, https://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/democratie-participative-emmanu…
- 2Nicolas Berrod, “Peut-on vraiment interdire l’anonymat sur les réseaux sociaux ? [Can we really forbid online anonymity?],” Le Parisien, February 14, 2019, http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/peut-on-vraiment-interdire-l-anonymat-…
- 3Damien Licata, “ Haine en ligne: comment le gouvernement voudrait réguler les réseaux sociaux |Online hatred: the government wants to regulate anonymity on social networks], ” Le Parisien, February 14, 2019, http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/haine-en-ligne-comment-le-gouverneme…
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? | 3.003 4.004 |
There were no reports of the government proactively manipulating content online during the coverage period. However, there were strong concerns about disinformation and misinformation campaigns in the run-up to European parliamentary elections held in May 2019. Several online tools were employed to fight against such manipulation, including the EU’s EUvsDisinfo initiative1 and the nonprofit FactCheckEU.2 According to the EC, Facebook “acted specifically against 1,574 nonEU-based and 168 EU-based pages, groups, and accounts engaged in inauthentic behavior targeting EU member states” between January and May 2019.3 Pursuant to the EU’s voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation, major social media platforms restricted misleading ads ahead of the elections.4
Content manipulation remains a problem outside the context of elections. In March 2019, false reports of child abductions by members of the Roma community spread on social networks, notably Facebook and Snapchat, triggering real-world violence against Roma living in the suburbs of Paris.5
The yellow vest movement that began in France in October 2018 has seen the spread of misinformation in and about the movement’s protests. Traditional media outlets highlighted the spread of fake news within the movement, such as images of violence against protesters in other countries that were wrongly attributed to France.6
- 1EUvsDisinfo, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/
- 2Fact Check EU, https://www.factcheckeu.info/fr/
- 3High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions,” European Commission, June 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation…
- 4High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions,” European Commission, June 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation…
- 5Jack Guy “Fake news sparks anti-Roma violence in France,” CNN, March 27, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/27/europe/paris-fake-kidnapping-scli-in…
- 6Blandine Le Cain, “Les «gilets jaunes», un mouvement sans leader dans lequel les «fake news» prospèrent [Yellow Vest, a headless movement where fake news circulate freely],” Le Figaro, November 30, 2018, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/11/30/01016-20181130ARTFIG…
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? | 3.003 3.003 |
France has a long history of anti-piracy laws and regulatory constraints on online content publication. However, users face few obstacles to publishing online.
An antipiracy law administered by the High Authority for the Dissemination of Works and the Protection of Rights on the Internet (HADOPI) was originally passed in 20091 and supplemented by a second law also passed that year.2 HADOPI functions by responding to copyright infringers with a graduated response, starting with an email warning for the first offense, followed by a registered letter if a second offense occurs within six months. If a third offense occurs within a year of the registered letter, the case can be referred to a court, and the offender may receive a fine.3 In 2018, HADOPI filed more than 1,045 referrals to prosecutors. Most fines ranged from €50 to €1,000 ($56 to $1,140).4
A new copyright proposal may increase HADOPI’s power by implementing the newly passed EU Copyright Directive (see B3).5 The proposal is currently in draft form and will likely be debated in early 2020. In its present form, the proposal would, inter alia, blacklist websites that host pirated content and promote the use of measures similar to YouTube’s Content ID on other social media platforms to automatically detect and remove copyright violations.6 It has been criticized by freedom of speech activists who fear that measures like Content ID will limit the ability of content creators to benefit from the fair use of copyrighted materials.7
The net neutrality principle is enshrined in the law. In November 2018, a joint study published by ARCEP and Northeastern University indicated that net neutrality was better respected in France than in the rest of the EU.8
- 1“LOI n° 2009-669 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet [LAW No. 2009-669 promoting the dissemination and protection of creation on the Internet],” Legifrance, June 12, 2009, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00002073…
- 2“LOI n° 2009-1311 relative à la protection pénale de la propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet [LAW No. 2009-1311 relating to the criminal protection of literary and artistic property on the internet],” Legifrance, October 28, 2009, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00002120…
- 3Julien Lausson, “Hadopi: une FAQ pour tout savoir [Hadopi: a FAQ to know everything],” Numerama, December 17, 2018, https://www.numerama.com/politique/129728-hadopi-faq-savoir.html
- 4HADOPI, “Rapport d'activite 2018 [Activity report 2018],” Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Œuvres et la Protection des droits d'auteur sur Internet, June 2018, https://www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/ckeditor_…
- 5European Parliament, “Texts Adopted 2014-2019,” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0231_EN.pdf
- 6Marc Reese, “Le chantier de la nouvelle Hadopi avance, filtrage et liste noire compris [Work on the new Hadopi progresses, including filtering and blacklisting],” September 07, 2018, NEXT Inpact, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/107008-le-chantier-nouvelle-hadopi-avan…
- 7Dern, “Article 13 : youpi, un Internet sous tutelle [Article 13: yipp, an Internet under guardianship],” Contrepoints, April 05, 2019, https://www.contrepoints.org/2019/04/05/340948-article-13-youpi-un-inte…
- 8Clément Nicolas, “La neutralité du Net mieux respectée en France qu’ailleurs en Europe [Net neutrality is better in France than anywhere else in Europe],” Euractiv, November 18, 2018, https://www.euractiv.fr/section/economie/news/la-neutralite-du-net-mieu…
Does the online information landscape lack diversity? | 4.004 4.004 |
France is home to a highly diverse online media environment. There are no restrictions on access to independent online media. There is no censorship of platforms providing content produced by different ethnic, religious, or social groups, including the LGBT+ community. However, commentators have observed increased online harassment against LGBT+ users (see C7).1
- 1Marie-Violette Bernard, “Grand Format : agressions, insultes, harcèlement, 5 mois de violences contre les LGBTI [Assaults, insults, harassment… 5 months of violence against LGBTI in France],” France Info, May 14, 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/lgbt/grand-format-agressions-insult…
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? | 6.006 6.006 |
There are no restrictions on digital mobilization in France. The state and other actors do not block online organizing tools and collaboration websites.
A number of digital rights and advocacy groups, such as Squaring of the Net (LQDN), are active and play a significant role in protesting the government’s recent moves to expand censorship and surveillance measures without judicial oversight.1
The yellow vest movement was rooted in digital mobilization platforms like Change.org, along with social media platforms. The first protests were planned using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in May 2018.2 The movement organized its first mass protest in Paris in November 2018 through Facebook. Protests are still organized online every weekend by the yellow vests. When the number of followers of yellow-vest-aligned Facebook groups dropped precipitously in January 2019, some suspected that Facebook was censoring the movement,3 but Facebook asserted that the reduction in followers was due to a change in the platform’s policies for counting followers, seeking to dispel misinformation about the issue.4 After the coverage period, several yellow vest leaders were arrested for organizing “illicit manifestations” on Bastille Day in July 2019.5
- 1La Quadrature du Net, “Qui sommes nous? [Who are we?],” https://www.laquadrature.net/nous/
- 2Elsa Trujillo, “Comment Facebook a contribué à l'éclosion des gilets jaunes [How Facebook contributed to the emergence of the yellow vest movement],” BFM TV, November 23, 2019, https://www.bfmtv.com/tech/comment-facebook-a-contribue-a-l-eclosion-de…
- 3Alexandra Saviana, “Facebook, accusé de censurer les groupes de gilets jaunes [Facebook accused of censoring yellow vests groups],” Marianne, January 18, 2019, https://www.marianne.net/societe/facebook-gilet-jaune-censure
- 4Alexis Orsini, “La panne de Facebook, une «censure» déguisée des «gilets jaunes»? Gare à l'intox [The Facebook blackout, a "censorship" disguised as "yellow jackets"? Beware of intoxication],” 20 Minutes, November 21, 2018, https://www.20minutes.fr/high-tech/2377371-20181121-panne-facebook-cens…
- 5Claire Terve, “Les gilets jaunes Drouet, Rodrigues et Nicolle interpellés [Yellow vests Drouet, Rodrigues and Nicolle challenged’,” Huffpost, July 14, 2019, https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/14-juillet-2019-les-gilets-jaunes-d…
Laws to address threats to national security have bolstered the state’s surveillance powers and introduced stricter measures to tackle terrorist propaganda online. In 2018, a new amendment to the Military Planning Law increased the state’s surveillance capabilities.
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 4.004 6.006 |
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of speech,1 recent actions by the government in response to the 2015 terror attacks have curtailed digital rights in practice. The European Convention on Human Rights, to which France is a signatory, provides for freedom of expression, subject to certain restrictions considered “necessary in a democratic society.”2 Since the Charlie Hebdo attack and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the government has suggested on a number of occasions that limiting fundamental rights would serve public safety.3
Broad new powers under the state of emergency proclaimed in 2015 have raised concerns among human rights and digital activists.4 While then prime minister Manuel Valls declared that it was a “short term response,”5 the state of emergency was subsequently extended six times until November 2017.6 The state of emergency included provisions on electronic searches7 and empowered the interior minister to take “any measure to ensure the interruption of any online public communication service that incites the commission of terrorist acts or glorifies them.”8 The new counterterrorism law that came into effect in 2017 has also raised concerns among civil rights campaigners for giving prefects and security forces wide-ranging powers with limited judicial oversight. It also introduced a new legal framework for surveillance of wireless communications (see C5).9
- 1Guy Carcassonne, "The Principles of the French Constitution,” Embassy of France in Washington, D.C., November 28, 2007, https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article562
- 2European Court of Human Rights, “European Convention on Human Rights,” June 1, 2010, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
- 3La Depeche, “Valls : La sécurité est la première des libertés [Valls: ‘Security is the first freedom’],” January 7, 2016, https://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2016/01/07/2251151-valls-la-securite-e…
- 4Human Rights Watch, “France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights,” November 24, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/france-new-emergency-powers-threate…
- 5République Française, “Discours de Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, Projet de loi sur la prorogation de l’état d’urgence, Assemblée nationale” [Speech by Manuel Valls, Prime Minister: bill on the extension of the state of emergency, National Assembly], November 19, 2015, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/document/2015/…
- 6Library of Congress, “France: Final Extension of State of Emergency,” Global Legal Monitor, August 24, 2017, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-final-extension-of-…
- 7La Quadrature du Net, “A Police State to Avoid any Critical Evaluation?” November 19, 2015 https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2015/11/19/police-state-in-france/; Glynn Moody, “French state of emergency allows website blocking, device search powers,” Ars Technica, November 20, 2015, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11/france-passes-new-emergency…
- 8“LOI n° 2015-1501prorogeant l'application de la loi n° 55-385 relative à l'état d'urgence et renforçant l'efficacité de ses dispositions [LAW No. 2015-1501 extending the application of Law No. 55-385 relating to the state of emergency and strengthening the effectiveness of its provisions],” Legifrance, November 20, 2015, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00003150…
- 9République Française, “Reinforcing internal security,” June 22, 2017, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/reinforcing-internal-security-and-the-fi…
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities? | 2.002 4.004 |
There are a number of laws that assign criminal or civil penalties for potentially legitimate online activities. In particular, the myriad counterterrorism laws threaten to punish users for such activities. Measures to address terrorism were already in place prior to the 2015-2017 state of emergency. The counterterrorism law passed in 2014 penalizes online speech deemed “apology for terrorism” with up to seven years in prison and a €100,000 ($114,000) fine. Speech that incites terrorism is also penalized. Penalties for online offenses are harsher than offline offenses, which are punishable by up to five years in prison and a €75,000 ($85,000) fine.1
Another counterterrorism and organized crime law enacted in 2016 imposes up to two years in prison or a €30,000 ($34,000) fine for frequently visiting sites that glorify or incite terrorist acts, unless these visits are in “good faith,” such as conducting research.2 The Constitutional Council rejected this law in 2017, arguing that the notion of “good faith” was unclear and that the law was not “necessary, appropriate, and proportionate.”3 An amended version was reintroduced as part of a public security law, imposing prison sentences on users who also “manifest adherence” to the ideology expressed at the visited sites,4 but was once again struck down by the Constitutional Court in December 2017.5 While at least one member of Parliament contemplated reintroducing the law during the coverage period, the government has opposed this effort.6
Defamation can be a criminal offense in France, punishable by fines or, in certain circumstances, such as “defamation directed against a class of people based on their race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation or handicap,” prison time.7
- 1“LOI n° 2014-1353 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme [LAW No. 2014-1353 strengthening the provisions relating to the fight against terrorism],” Legifrance, November 13, 2014, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00002975…
- 2“LOI n° 2016-731 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, et améliorant l'efficacité et les garanties de la procédure pénale [LAW No. 2016-731 strengthening the fight against organised crime, terrorism and their financing, and improving the efficiency and guarantees of criminal procedure],” Legifrance, June 3, 2016, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=81C139B095F020…
- 3EBLnews, “French ban on habitual viewing of jihadist websites struck down”, February 10, 2017, https://eblnews.com/news/europe/french-ban-habitual-viewing-jihadist-we…
- 4Marc Rees, “Le nouveau délit de consultation de sites terroristes : six questions, six réponses [The new offence of consulting terrorist sites: six questions, six answers],” NextInpact, March 1, 2017, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/103497-le-nouveau-delit-consultation-si…
- 5Conseil Constitutionnel, “Décision n° 2017-682 QPC du 15 décembre 2017 [Decision No. 2017-682 QPC of 15 December 2017],” https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2017/2017682QPC.htm
- 6Julien Lausson, “Le gouvernement défavorable à un éventuel retour du délit de consultation de sites terroristes [Government opposed to a possible return to the offence of consulting terrorist sites],” Numerama, June 12, 2018, https://www.numerama.com/politique/384915-le-gouvernement-defavorable-a…
- 7Scott Griffen, “Defamation and Insult Laws in the OSCE Region: A Comparative Study,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), March, 2017, https://www.osce.org/fom/303181?download=true
Are individuals penalized for online activities? | 5.005 6.006 |
While no citizens faced politically motivated arrests or prosecutions in retaliation for online activities, users have been convicted of inciting or apologizing for terrorism online. The broad terms “inciting” and “glorifying” terrorism risk targeting speech that has tenuous connections to terrorist acts.
In June 2019, after the coverage period, a 21-year-old woman was handed a six-month suspended prison sentence for possessing, but not sharing, videos and pictures glorifying terrorism. Following an electronic search, the police found 82 incriminating videos, along with 735 pictures. She was also accused of being in contact with the Islamic State (IS) militant group through social networks.1
In May 2019, a man from the Douai region was sentenced to four years in prison for “apology for terrorism.” Under the pseudonym “Imam of the North,” he organized multiple online campaigns promoting terrorist activities on social networks and on his websites.2
Penalties for threatening state officials are applied to online activities. In May 2019, a man was fined €500 ($570) for sending President Macron a death threat on Facebook.3
In June 2019, Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, was ordered to stand trial by a correctional court for sharing videos of IS terrorists beheading a journalist on Twitter.4
- 1Y.P., “Elle détenait des photos et des vidéos à la gloire de Daech [She had photos and videos of ISIL’s glory],” Le Republicain Lorrain, June 12, 2019, https://www.republicain-lorrain.fr/edition-de-briey/2019/06/12/elle-det…
- 2J.C. “Douai Il avait fait de l’apologie du terrorisme sa spécialité sur Internet |Douai: apology for terrorism online was his specialty],” La Voix du Nord, May 15, 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/583523/article/2019-05-15/il-avait-fait-de-…
- 3Midi Libre “Perpignan : condamné pour avoir menacé Emmanuel Macron de mort sur internet [Perpignan: Convicted of threatening Emmanuel Macron with death on the internet],” Midi Libre, May 24, 2019, https://www.midilibre.fr/2019/05/24/perpignan-condamne-pour-avoir-menac…
- 4L’Obs avec AFP, “Photos d'exactions de l'EI sur Twitter: Marine Le Pen renvoyée devant la justice [Twitter Abuse Pictures: Marine Le Pen Sent Back to Justice],” L’Obs, June 12, 2019, https://actu.orange.fr/politique/photos-d-exactions-de-l-ei-sur-twitter…
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? | 2.002 4.004 |
Users are not prohibited from using encryption services to protect their communications, although mobile users must provide identification when purchasing a SIM card, potentially reducing anonymity for mobile communications.1 There are no laws requiring providers of encryption services to install backdoors, but providers are required to turn over decryption keys to the government.2 In June 2019, a drug dealer who was using encryption services refused to unlock his phone during his arrest and was also charged for this refusal. A court later ruled that the suspect was not required to unlock his phone in the absence of a court order, setting a legal precedent.3
Anonymous communication using tools such as Tor is not prohibited.
- 1Privacy International, “Timeline of SIM Card Registration Laws,” June 11, 2019, https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3018/timeline-sim-card-regis…
- 2Julien Lausson, “Monsieur Macron, vous n’avez toujours pas compris ce qu’est le chiffrement [Mr. Macron, you still don't understand what encryption is],” Numerama, June 2017, https://www.numerama.com/politique/267141-monsieur-macron-vous-navez-to…; Marc Rees, “Contre le terrorisme, Macron et May rêvent de filtrage, liste blanche et accès aux données chiffrées [Against terrorism, Macron and May dream of filtering, white listing and access to encrypted data],” NextInpact, June 15, 2017, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/104566-contre-terrorisme-macron-et-may-… ; see also https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=57478070E1A5BE8…; and https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=57478070E1A5BE8…
- 3Julien Constant, “Il refuse de donner son code de portable en garde à vue, la justice lui donne raison [He refuses to give out his cell phone code while in custody, so the law rules in his favour],” Le Parisien, June 11, 2019, http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/garde-a-vue-et-deverrouillage-des…
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 2.002 6.006 |
Surveillance has escalated in recent years, including through the enactment of a new surveillance law in 2015, which was passed in the wake of the attack on Charlie Hebdo that year.
The 2015 Intelligence Law allows intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order.1 An amendment passed in 2016 authorized real-time collection of metadata not only from individuals “identified as a terrorist threat,” but also those “likely to be related” to a terrorist threat and those who belong to the “entourage” of the individuals concerned.2
The Constitutional Council declared three of the law’s provisions unconstitutional in 2015, including one that would have allowed the interception of all international electronic communications. However, an amendment enabling surveillance of electronic communications sent to or received from abroad was adopted later in 2015, shortly after the Paris attacks, for the purposes of “defending and promoting the fundamental interests of the country.”3 In 2016, the Constitutional Council struck down part of the Intelligence Law related to the monitoring of hertz wave communications, ruling it “disproportionate.”4 Article 15 of the new counterterrorism law of 2017 reintroduced a legal regime for monitoring wireless communications, but limits surveillance to certain devices such as walkie-talkies and does not encompass Wi-Fi networks.5
During the coverage period, an amendment passed as part of a routine military spending bill (the Military Planning Law, or LPM) extended the state’s surveillance capabilities. The amendment, to be implemented from 2019 to 2025, expands access to data collected outside France’s borders by providing domestic antiterrorism investigators with information obtained by the General Directorate for External Security, France's foreign intelligence agency.6 According to Article 37 of the new LPM, it will be possible to "perform within the intercepted connection data spot checks for the sole purpose of detecting a threat to the fundamental interests of the nation, linked to subscription numbers or technical identifiers attributable to French territory and geographical areas.”7 Digital rights groups have criticized this expansion of surveillance that previously only affected French citizens living abroad.8
The LPM covering 2014 to 2019 extended administrative access to user data by enabling designated officials to request such data from ISPs for “national security” reasons, to protect France’s “scientific and economical potential,” and to prevent “terrorism” or “criminality.”9 The Office of the Prime Minister authorizes surveillance, and the National Commission for Security Interception (CNCIS, later renamed the National Intelligence Control Commission, or CNCTR) must be informed within 48 hours in order to approve it.10 Early critics pointed out that the CNCIS lacked appropriate control mechanisms and independence from potential political interference, given that the body was comprised of only three politicians in 2014.11 While the government argued that the law provided an improved legal framework for practices that had been in place for years,12 it finally replied to these criticisms at the end of 2015 by enlarging its composition from three members to nine, making room for judges.13
A law related to the fight against organized crime and terrorism, enacted in 2016, also elicited strong reactions from the public.14 The law notably expanded the range of special investigation methods available to prosecutors and investigating judges, which were previously reserved for intelligence services. These include bugging private locations, using phone eavesdropping devices such as international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers, and conducting nighttime searches.15 Relatedly, Article 23 of the Law on Guidelines and Programming for the Performance of Internal Security (LOPPSI 2), adopted in 2011, granted the police with the authority to install malware—such as keystroke logging software and Trojan horses—on suspects’ computers in the course of counterterrorism investigations, although a court order must first be obtained.16
The Digital Republic Act adopted in 2016 seeks to enhance individuals’ rights to control the use of their personal data. Companies will face hefty fines if they fail to comply; with the GDPR coming into force in 2018, CNIL will be able to fine a company up to 4 percent of its total worldwide annual turnover for any data protection violations.17
- 1“LOI n° 2015-912 relative au renseignement [LAW No. 2015-912 relating to intelligence],” Legifrance, July 24, 2015, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00003093…
- 2Senat Commission des lois, “Prorogation de l’état d’urgence [Extension of the state of emergency],” July 20, 2016, http://www.senat.fr/amendements/commissions/2015-2016/803/Amdt_COM-15.h…
- 3“LOI n° 2015-1556 relative aux mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationals [LAW No. 2015-1556 relating to measures for monitoring international electronic communications],” Legifrance, November 30, 2015, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2015/11/30/DEFX1521757L/jo/texte
- 4Anne Brigaudeau, , “Loi renseignement : le Conseil constitutionnel censure l'article sur la surveillance des communications hertziennes [Intelligence Act: Constitutional Council censors article on surveillance of radio communications],” France Info, October 21, 2016, http://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/loi-sur-le-renseignement/loi-rense…
- 5Le Monde, “Loi antiterroriste : de multiples mesures qui étendent le domaine de la surveillance numérique [Anti-Terrorism Act: multiple measures that expand the field of digital surveillance],” Le Monde, October 3, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2017/10/03/loi-antiterroriste-de-…
- 6“LOI n° 2018-607 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2019 à 2025 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense [LAW No. 2018-607 relating to military programming for the years 2019 to 2025 and laying down various provisions relating to defence],” Legifrance, July 13, 2018, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00003719…
- 7Senat Espace Presse, “Programmation militaire pour les années 2019 à 2025 [Military programation for years 2019 to 2025],” December 4, 2018, http://www.senat.fr/espace_presse/actualites/201804/programmation_milit…
- 8Thierry Noisette, “Renseignement : le gouvernement offre aux services une surveillance étendue [Intelligence: Government provides services with extensive oversight],” L’Orb, June 20, 2018, https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20180620.OBS8473/renseignement-le-g…
- 9Alexandre Entraygues, “France—New ‘Patriot Act’ imposes surveillance obligations,” Linklaters, January 31, 2014 https://www.linklaters.com/en-us/insights/publications/tmt-news/tmt-new…
- 10Kim Willsher, “French officials can monitor Internet users in real time under new law,” The Guardian, December 11, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/11/french-officials-internet…
- 11Guillaume Champeau, “La DGSI investi du pouvoir de surveiller les communications sur internet” [The DGSI granted surveillance powers over the internet], Numerama, May 2, 2014, http://bit.ly/2extbqS
- 12Scott Sayare, “France broadens its surveillance power,” The New York Times, December 14, 2013, http://nyti.ms/1MBpsFD
- 13CNCTR, “La présentation de la CNCTR [The submission of the CNCTR],” Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement, 2019, https://www.cnctr.fr/2_presentation.html
- 14“LOI n° 2016-731 [Law 2016-731],” Legifrance, June 03, 2016, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00003262…; Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, “La France se dote de la loi antiterroriste la plus sévère d’Europe [France gets the strictest antiterrorist law in Europe],” Le Monde, May 12, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/05/12/la-france-se-d…; Donald Hebert, “Ce qui fait polémique dans le projet de loi Urvoas contre le terrorisme [What is generating constroversy with the Urvoas bill against terrorism],” Nouvel Obs, March 3, 2016, https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20160303.OBS5748/ce-qui-fait-polemi…
- 15République Française, “No Government has done more to counter terrorism to date,” gouvernement.fr, July 17, 2016, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/no-government-has-done-more-to-counter-t…; Laetitia Valy, “Lutte contre le terrorisme : les 3 nouveautés à ne pas manquer ! [Fight against terrorism: three novelties not to miss!],” Net-Iris, June 13, 2016, https://www.net-iris.fr/veille-juridique/actualite/35232/lutte-contre-l…
- 16Emilien Ercolani, “Loppsi : qui pourra installer les mouchards informatiques? [Loppsi: Who could install spywares?],” L’informaticien, November 7 2011, https://www.linformaticien.com/actualites/id/22101/loppsi-qui-pourra-in…
- 17“LOI n° 2016-1321 pour une République numérique [LAW No. 2016-1321 for a Digital Republic],” Legifrance, October 7, 2016, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPubliee.do?idDocument=JORFDOLE0…
Are service providers and other technology companies required to aid the government in monitoring the communications of their users? | 3.003 6.006 |
Service providers are required to aid the government in monitoring their users’ communications under certain circumstances. For instance, they must retain user metadata for use in criminal investigations.1 The 2015 Intelligence Law requires ISPs to install so-called “black boxes,” algorithms that analyze users’ metadata for “suspicious” behavior in real time.2 The first black box was set in 2017.3 Intelligence services released data on the use of three black boxes in 2018, as two additional black boxes were added during the coverage period.4 Related to this increase in surveillance capabilities, 10,562 “security interceptions” were undertaken in 2018—an increase of 20 percent over 2017. Real-time geolocation tracking in the context of individual surveillance for national security purposes increased by 38.4 percent (from 3,751 to 5,191). The number of individuals subject to this surveillance only slightly increased (from 21,386 to 22,038).5
In June 2019, after the coverage period, the Ministry of the Interior proposed a new intelligence law in order to extend the use of black boxes, with the aim of improving automation, prolonging data collection, and taking into account new technologies such as 5G.6
On the other hand, the data protections enshrined in the GDPR are strongly enforced in France. In January 2019, CNIL fined Google a record €50 million ($57 million) for violating the regulation.7
- 1“Code des postes et des communications électroniques [Postal and Electronic Communications Code],” Legifrance, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=27DD49D0B31844A…
- 2Angelique Chrisafis, “France passes new surveillance law in wake of Charlie Hebdo attack,” The Guardian, May 5, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/france-passes-new-surveil…
- 3Julien Lausson, “Loi Renseignement : les boîtes noires sont désormais actives » [Intelligence Act: blackboxes are now activated],” Numerama, November 2017, https://www.numerama.com/politique/305959-les-boites-noires-de-la-loi-r…
- 4Marc Rees , “Renseignement : trois « boîtes noires » actives en France en 2018 [Intelligence: three "black boxes" active in France in 2018],“ NextInpact, April 25, 2019, https://www.nextinpact.com/news/107823-renseignement-trois-boites-noire…
- 5CNCTR, “2018 Annual Report,” April 2019, https://www.cnctr.fr/_downloads/NP_CNCTR_2019_rapport_annuel_2018.pdf
- 6Nextinpact, “L’intérieur annonce une nouvelle loi Renseignement [Ministery of the Interior announces a new intelligence law],” June 3, 2019, https://www.nextinpact.com/brief/l-interieur-annonce-une-nouvelle-loi-r…
- 7Mathieu Rosemain, “France fines Google $57 million for European privacy rule breach,“ Reuters, January 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-privacy-france/france-fines-g…
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in retribution for their online activities? | 4.004 5.005 |
There were no reported physical attacks against journalists or ordinary users during the coverage period. However, there were several high-profile cases of online harassment.
In February 2019, a group of mostly male journalists were accused of online harassment against women, obese people, and LGBT+ people. Though they carried out harassment campaigns primarily on Twitter, they coordinated their activities in a private Facebook group called the “League of LOL.”1
Notably, online harassment of the LGBT+ community has increased. In January 2019, two associations defending LGBT+ rights filed 213 complaints related to insults, incitements to hatred, and calls to murder LGBT+ users on social networks.2 Also in January 2019, YouTuber and LGBT+ advocate Bilal Hassani filed a lawsuit asserting that he was the victim of a large-scale cyberbullying campaign.3
Furthermore, in April 2019, journalists from the investigative online outlet Disclose were summoned to the DGSI (France’s domestic intelligence agency) after publishing confidential documents about the export of weapons later used by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the war in Yemen.4
- 1Anne-Aël Durand et Adrien Sénécat, “Ligue du LOL : cinq questions pour comprendre l’affaire et ses enjeux [LOL League: five questions to understand the case],“ Le Monde, February 12, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2019/02/12/ligue-du-lol-ci…
- 2Nicolas Berrod, “Insultes homophobes : Twitter pointé du doigt pour son manque de régulation [Homophobic slurs: Twitter highlighted for its lack of regulation],“ Le Parisien, January 18, 2019, http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/insultes-homophobes-twitter-point…
- 3AFP, « Eurovision: Victime d’homophobie, le réprésentant de la France Bilal Hassani porte plainte » [Bilal Hassani, France Eurovision representative file a complaint for homophobic cyber bullying], 20 Minutes, January, 29, 2019, https://www.20minutes.fr/arts-stars/culture/2438931-20190129-eurovision…
- 4France 24, “French intelligence summons journalists after release of classified report on arms in Yemen,” April 26, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190426-france-journalists-summoned-questi…
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 2.002 3.003 |
According to the Global State of Information Security Survey 2018, French business losses related to cyberattacks grew by 50 percent in 2017, with companies losing an average of €2 million. More than 4,550 cybersecurity incidents were recorded by French companies in one year.1 Companies and institutions also frequently experience ransomware attacks, which are sometimes targeted attacks where cybercriminals manually intrude the network and encrypt data; the petroleum company Picoty SA suffered such an attack in May 2019.2 There are also automated infections using ransomware from the black market, which are injected via phishing. A public hospital was infected in this manner in May 2019.3
During the 2017 presidential campaign, Macron’s campaign team announced that they were the “victim of a massive and coordinated hacking attack” after thousands of leaked emails and documents were dumped on the internet in a last minute effort to destabilize the race.4 Macron had previously confirmed being the target of phishing operations by a group of hackers and denounced “interference.”5 Later, an investigation by Le Monde indicated that these cyberattacks were directed by a US neo-Nazi group.6 Observers noted that there was no real police investigation into the leaks.7 Indeed, after Macron was elected, the government did not follow up on the investigation of the origins of this cyberattack.
In June 2019, the government’s tax collection website went down on the last day for fiscal declarations. The National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) is investigating the case and suspects that the attack originated from abroad.8 It was also reported that 2,000 fiscal declarations were altered by hackers.9
- 1PWC France, “Global State of Information Security Survey 2018,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, https://www.pwc.fr/fr/publications/systemes-d-information/cybersecurity…
- 2BFM TV “Des cybercriminels réclament une rançon de 500.000 euros à une PME française [Cybercriminals demand a 500.000 euro ransom from a French SME],” BFM TV, May 14, 2019, https://www.bfmtv.com/tech/des-cybercriminels-reclament-une-rancon-de-5…
- 3Clément Barbet, “Le CHU de Montpellier victime d’une attaque informatique : plus de 600 ordinateurs infectés [Montpellier public hospital victim of a cyberattack, more than 600 computers infected],“ France3, May 17, 2019, https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/occitanie/herault/montpellier/c…
- 4En Marche, “Communiqué de presse - En Marche a été victime d’une action de piratage massive et coordonnée [Press release - En Marche was the victim of a massive and coordinated piracy action],” En Marche! Press release, May 5, 2017, https://en-marche.fr/articles/communiques/communique-presse-piratage
- 5Emmanuel Jarry, “L'équipe Macron confirme avoir été la cible de cyber-attaques [Macron team confirms being targeted by cyber attacks],” Reuters, April 26, 2017, http://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRKBN17S150-OFRTP; Nicole Perlroth, “Russian Hackers Who Targeted Clinton Appear to Attack France’s Macron,” The New York Times, April 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/world/europe/macron-russian-hacking…
- 6Damien Leloup and Martin Untersinger, “« Macrongate » : quand des néonazis américains cherchaient à faire basculer la présidentielle française [‘Macrongate’: when US neonazis tried to interfere into the French presidential election],“ Le Monde, June 15, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/06/15/macrongate-quand-des-n…
- 7Damien Leloup , Martin Untersinger and Alexandre Piquard, “Les coulisses du piratage des « MacronLeaks » [Behind the cyberattack ‘Macronleaks’],“ Le Monde, June 15, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/06/15/les-coulisses-du-pirat…
- 8Julien Lausson, “Plantage du site des impôts : l’État enquête sur la piste de l’attaque informatique [Tax site crash: State investigates computer attack trail],“ Numerama, June 2019, https://www.numerama.com/politique/523755-plantage-du-site-des-impots-l…
- 9Le Monde, “Les déclarations d’impôts de plus de 2 000 contribuables français modifiées par un pirate [Tax returns of more than 2,000 French taxpayers modified by a hacker],“ Le Monde, August 20, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/08/20/les-declarations-d-imp…


Country Facts
-
Global Freedom Score
89 100 free -
Internet Freedom Score
76 100 free -
Freedom in the World Status
Free -
Networks Restricted
No -
Websites Blocked
No -
Pro-government Commentators
No -
Users Arrested
No