STAY UP TO DATE: The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House
Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022

India

Resilient
Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts
Notable
 31 85
Local Resilience and Response
Notable
 40 85
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least influence) to 85 (most influence)
Hundreds of protestors on Saturday took to streets in Delhi’s Jantar Mantar against the recent amendments made to the Citizenship Act. New Delhi, India. 14 December 2019. Editorial credit: Sauvik Acharyya / Shutterstock.com

header1 Key findings

Report By: Antara Ghosal Singh and Sarah Cook

 

  • Influence efforts ongoing, as bilateral relationship deteriorates: The deadly military clash between India and China in June 2020 in the disputed Galwan Valley border region prompted a marked deterioration in bilateral relations and in Indian public opinion toward China during the coverage period of 2019–21. There was a corresponding uptick after the incident of Chinese state media articles that contained negative narratives about Indian governance, Indian foreign policy, and the Indian government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. These narratives and other content penetrated the Indian media landscape through a variety of means. Initial evidence of China-linked disinformation tactics targeting India—notably fake social media accounts amplifying Chinese diplomats’ posts or spreading false claims related to the Galwan Valley clash—were also documented during the coverage period.
  • Widespread negative public opinion of China: The Galwan Valley clash has had a significant impact on public opinion in India. A survey of young Indians in 2021 found that 77 percent of respondents distrusted China, for example. The Indian government’s nationalistic response to the clash also has trickled into the Indian media, where most outlets are critical of the Chinese government. Media organizations that published interviews with the Chinese ambassador at the time, Sun Weidong, have faced public criticism.
  • Local-language engagement draws large social media following: Chinese state media outlets operate accounts on social media in Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, and Urdu, and have a vast number of followers. The state broadcasting conglomerate China Media Group’s Hindi Facebook page has 11 million followers, comparable to the British Broadcasting Corporation’s Hindi Facebook page. China Media Group’s Tamil Facebook page, China Radio International’s Bengali page, and Xinhua’s Urdu page have 10 million, 10 million, and 1.8 million followers, respectively. While these languages are also spoken widely in the neighboring countries of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (which are also the targets of Chinese Communist Party influence efforts), there are millions of speakers of these languages in India. China Radio International (CRI) broadcasts also target Indian radio listeners with programming in Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, and Urdu. One Tamil-language influencer with reported ties to Chinese state media uses the name Ilakkiya and has over 1.3 million followers on Facebook; her account is not labeled as being affiliated with Chinese state media.
  • Placement of articles via paid inserts, news wires, and ambassador outreach: Two major mainstream newspapers published by the Hindu Group, the Hindu and the Hindu Business Line, have run full-page advertorials paid for by the Chinese embassy, including a 2021 spread on the National Day of the People’s Republic of China, which marks the establishment of the country on October 1, 1949. Chinese state media articles are also placed in Indian outlets through existing content-sharing agreements with Indian news wire services. China’s ambassador to India during the coverage period had over 90,000 followers on Twitter, and his account received significant engagement from Indian netizens. The ambassador also had at least 13 op-eds published in English during the coverage period in outlets including in the Hindu, the Times of India, the Free Press Journal, and the Economic Times, and was interviewed by numerous local media outlets. Before the Galwan clash and the pandemic, Chinese state actors were actively engaged in efforts to cultivate ties with Indian journalists by offering subsidized trips to China, though these have since ebbed due to COVID-19–related travel restrictions.
  • Chinese government blocking of websites and cyberattacks: Indian mainstream media outlets are generally outspoken, and have broadly been critical of the Chinese government since the military clash in 2020. Many Indian news sites such as the Hindu, the Times of India, the Wire, the Quint, and their apps have been blocked in China in response to coverage of the Galwan Valley clash. In September 2021, researchers linked a hack of the media conglomerate Bennett Coleman (commonly known as the Times Group and the parent company of the Times of India, the Economic Times, and other outlets) to the Chinese state.
  • Pressure on Tibetans in exile: Tibetan media and civil society groups in exile are important independent sources of information on Chinese government repression in Tibet, with many maintaining contacts with those inside the region. Tibetan journalists and activists based in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh—which borders Tibet and is the seat of the Tibetan government in exile—have faced pressure from both Chinese and Indian authorities. Tibetans in exile and members of the Tibetan diaspora have faced relentless phishing and hacking attacks, as well as intimidation and threats online, from the Chinese government. When ties between the Chinese and Indian governments were warmer, Indian authorities launched their own crackdowns, such as when 15 Tibetans from a youth exile group were arrested in 2019 ahead of Xi Jinping’s visit to India.
  • Limited presence of small diaspora: The Chinese diaspora in India is small and mostly based near Kolkata; the number of Chinese expatriates and diaspora is unknown, with even the Chinese government declining to provide an estimate. There is only one local Chinese-language newspaper, Seong Pow (印度商报, Overseas Chinese Commerce of India), based in the country, though the fate of the paper is unclear after its founder died in 2020. WeChat, typically a major source of news and information for Chinese speakers around the world, was banned in India in June 2020 after the military clash. It can be reached by virtual private networks (VPNs) but does not appear to have any significant social media penetration.
  • Media pushback against Chinese government influence complicated by India’s declining press freedom: India’s Ministry of External Affairs has expressed public support for reporting on Chinese government influence attempts: for instance, it declared that “there is a free media in India” after journalists revealed efforts by the Chinese embassy to instruct Indian outlets on how to cover Taiwan. However, journalists’ ability to expose Chinese efforts to influence or coerce Indian media workers is complicated by an increase in the number of attacks on Indian media by the Indian government and by politically connected individuals. The risk of arrest, legal prosecution, targeted censorship, online harassment, and other intimidation from the Indian government officials, state-aligned actors, and supporters of the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has exacerbated overall self-censorship in India. The deteriorating press freedom situation may create further opportunities for the Chinese Communist Party to attempt to co-opt elites, scholars, and politicians without scrutiny from the press.
  • Independent expertise on China and robust press freedom community: During the coverage period, Indian media outlets had multiple foreign correspondents based in China and Hong Kong; a subsequent diplomatic row resulted in reciprocal visa denials, so that by June 2023, the last correspondent had departed China. Independent scholars, journalists, and researchers working on China in India are often consulted by local media. Indian civil society, though embattled due to increasing legal harassment and other threats, has continued working to protect press freedom, track disinformation networks, and foster a reliable, diverse, and resilient information ecosystem more broadly. Media literacy programs in India are supported by the government, international technology companies, and international broadcasters.
  • Regulatory vulnerabilities and deteriorating environment for civil society: India’s regulatory environment allows the government to exercise control over the registration, accreditation, and travel of local and foreign journalists and media outlets, threatening their independence. The Information Technology Rules introduced in 2021 impose an onerous regulatory structure on digital news outlets that civil society groups say may be abused to enact censorship. The state-owned All India Radio (AIR) exercises a monopoly over radio news content. While there are legal limitations on foreign ownership in the media sector, recent legislation on foreign funding of civil society groups has been wielded by the government against perceived critics. Activists also risk severe harassment and arrest for engaging in rights work, contributing to self-censorship and potentially complicating any investigative work on Chinese influence.
  • Problematic pushback: The Indian government has banned over 200 apps made by companies based in China on national security grounds, including WeChat and TikTok, which are owned by companies with a history of censorship inside China. The ban on such apps, however, limits the freedom-of-expression and access-to-information rights of Indians. The blocking of WeChat has particularly affected Tibetans in exile, who are cut off from their families in China, since WeChat is the most commonly employed means of communication with relatives. Jingoistic political rhetoric toward China has also created an atmosphere of fear for the small community of Chinese Indians.

header2 Background

India is a multiparty democracy and has a status of Partly Free in the 2023 edition of Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual report on political rights and civil liberties.1 The country also has an internet freedom status of Partly Free in the 2023 edition of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report.2

The private media space in India is vast and diverse. However, attacks on press freedom have increased dramatically under the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which has used methods including “security, defamation, sedition, and hate speech laws, as well as contempt-of-court charges,” to silence critical voices in the media.3 The Modi government and his Hindu nationalist BJP have also presided over discriminatory policies and increased violence affecting the Muslim population. Although the Indian constitution guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of religion, harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and government critics has increased in the present political climate. Conditions have also stagnated for economically and socially marginalized communities like Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis).

Newspapers and magazines are India’s most trusted news sources, followed by television and radio broadcasts.4 Meanwhile, with the rapid penetration of smartphones and mobile internet in India, digital media has emerged as an important player in the news industry. Recent research indicates that large numbers of Indian news consumers use social media apps such as YouTube (53%) and WhatsApp (51%) for accessing news.5 The number of rural internet users is also fast increasing and may overtake urban users by 2025.6

On April 1, 1950, India became the first non-socialist country to establish diplomatic ties with communist China.7 The relationship between the two countries soon deteriorated over the disputed border and Tibet, escalating into full-scale war in October 1962. India was soundly defeated and lost territory to China. In India, the war was largely seen as a betrayal by China, casting a long shadow on the future course of China-India ties. The leaders of both countries made periodic efforts over the following years to improve ties and sign agreements to manage the border dispute, but with limited success.8

Beginning in 2005 and extending through the 2010s, China and India gestured toward a closer relationship with a series of official visits and summits.9 The border remained largely peaceful during this period, although both sides often blamed each other for periodic transgressions and incursions, while buildups of roads and other infrastructure by both governments fueled distrust.

Bilateral relations deteriorated dramatically when, in June 2020, there was a deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, reportedly killing 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers.10 Indian authorities claimed Chinese soldiers had set up tents on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while Chinese diplomats claimed Indian soldiers crossed the border.11 Although no gunshots were fired—the soldiers fought with clubs and other improvised weapons—this was the first clash between the two countries in 45 years that resulted in fatalities.12

In the years following the 2020 border clash, the government of India has banned more than 250 apps made by PRC-based companies13 and excluded the Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE from 5G infrastructure trials.14 Chinese-manufactured surveillance and smart-device technology, however, remains widely used in India.15

Economic ties between China and India have made steady progress in the last decade despite political disputes, but the trade balance remains heavily tilted in China’s favor. According to the Indian embassy in China, China has been India’s largest goods trading partner since 2008.16 Meanwhile, India was China’s 16th largest trading partner in 2020.17 The official level of mutual investments is also low, with Chinese direct investments in India pegged at $200 million in 2020 and Indian investments in China at a miniscule $12 million. However, other accountings of Chinese investment put the figure much higher: one 2020 study by Brookings estimating total current and planned Chinese investment at that time at $26 billion, compared to the official figure of $5.3 billion in cumulative Chinese investment.18

China and India do not have a free trade agreement, although the issue has been under discussion since 2006.19 In 2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian regional cooperation forum established by China and Russia.20 India is not part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and publicly objects to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI project, on the grounds that it infringes upon India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.21

The ethnic Chinese population of India was once between 50,000 to 70,000, according to varying estimates, with most Chinese immigration taking place during the colonial period in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, the number has been declining since the 1962 war, and today the figure stands at somewhere around 2,500 to 4,000.22

India is also home to a substantial number of Tibetan refugees. In 1959, the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans escaped to India after China’s takeover of Tibet, with many others fleeing to India over the coming decades. The Dalai Lama and other community leaders established a formal government in exile based in Dharamsala. In recent years, the Chinese government has severely cracked down on the cross-border movement of Tibetans, with some reports citing a 97% drop in the number of Tibetan refugees’ arriving in India annually since 2012.23

The number of Tibetan refugees living in India was estimated at around 150,000 in 2011.24 However, that number had fallen to 72,312 by 2022, according to a survey conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in association with the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs.25 Tibetan authorities say that most Tibetan refugees who leave India are going to countries like the United States, Canada, Germany and Switzerland, while a small proportion are returning to Tibet.

header3 Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts

Propaganda and promotion of favored narratives

 

Key narratives

Chinese state narratives about India and targeting Indian audiences attempt to weave together condescending depictions of India’s supposedly chaotic and corrupt state, as opposed to China’s reformed and modernized Marxist-Leninist state-led economy, with calls for cooperation between the two countries based on their shared status as emerging markets, developing countries, and ancient civilizations.1 Op-eds and television interviews by former Chinese ambassador to India Sun Weidong in early 2020 emphasized cooperation and solidarity during the pandemic, as well as common goals of “national rejuvenation,” China’s commitment to “peaceful development,” and the two countries’ “history of friendly exchanges dating back 2,000 years,” including the spread of Buddhism from India to China.2 A slew of such articles was published in major media surrounding the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations.3

Following the Galwan Valley clash in mid-2020, the tone and focus of Chinese state media and diplomatic commentary shifted to be more defensive,4 blaming India for the deterioration in bilateral ties.5 At the same time, diplomats and commentators still tried to reiterate that India and China are “partners,” not “rivals,” and that those in India calling for improved relations and fewer restrictions on Chinese companies based on security concerns are “rational voices,” versus “provocative” or “misguided” China hawks.6 Articles published by Chinese state outlets like the Global Times emphasized the economic losses suffered by India as a result of restrictions on Chinese investment.7

Chinese state narratives also disparage India’s quest for great power status as audacious and reckless, while belittling its military. In a January 2022 article, for example, the Global Times stressed that the Indian economy would not grow as expected due to inferior infrastructure, low education levels, and an underperforming industrial sector, particularly if it continued to restrict access for Chinese companies as India did after the Galwan Valley clash.8 The Global Times has also argued that India cannot take care of its own defense, has a “loser mentality,” 9 and that its military modernization is flawed and its army lacks discipline and combat preparedness.10 India’s former colonial status contributes to China’s view of India as an upstart state.11

China’s biggest concern vis-à-vis India seems to be India’s increasingly close ties with the United States. Over the last decade China has been particularly concerned about the re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific idea among both countries in the region and Western nations; the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan; and the strengthening of the US-Indian strategic partnership. Despite India’s reassurance that its vision for the Indo-Pacific is inclusive and not a containment strategy, China’s state propaganda frequently describes the idea as anti-China, the Quad as Asia’s North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), and India as a US stooge.12 One article in 2022 warned against India further tightening relations with the West lest it become “a vassal of Washington just like a ‘second Japan.’”13 Chinese state media also often stressed India’s “mismanagement” of the COVID-19 crisis and its vaccine nationalism, and claimed that the United States and others members of the Quad had abandoned India in its time of need.14 Such commentary seems more likely to enflame anti-China sentiment in India rather than convince local audiences in the country.

Key avenues of content dissemination

Chinese state media has some presence in India, particularly on social media and via reporting by mainstream outlets about controversial statements made by Chinese state media like the Global Times, but direct broadcasts to Indian news consumers are relatively limited. State broadcaster China Global Television Network (CGTN) does not appear to broadcast on major Indian satellite and cable networks. The English-language China Daily newspaper claims printing facilities in New Delhi, but circulation numbers are unavailable.15 Commentaries carried by Chinese state-run platforms, especially the Global Times, typically attract considerable attention from the Indian public, especially the policy community. The national media houses are also sensitive to such commentary and generally weave debates and discussions around such issues.16 Local and regional media outlets then pick up those narratives for their audiences, although often this is from a critical perspective rather than face-value repetition of Beijing’s talking points.

In practice, the following are the key avenues by which Chinese state narratives, content, and commentary reach audiences in India, at times in large numbers:

  • Active diplomatic communications: The Chinese embassy publishes a quarterly printed magazine, China-India Review, where it provides regular updates on the state of China-India relations from a Chinese perspective. 17 The embassy launched a Facebook page in 2021, but as of mid-2023 it had fewer than 700 followers.18 By contrast, the Twitter accounts of the Chinese ambassador to India and the embassy spokesperson are very active with 96,000 followers and 12,900 followers, respectively, as of October 2023.19 During the coverage period, many Indian accounts could be seen interacting with then–Chinese ambassador Sun on Twitter, including occasional positive interactions.20 Chinese officials and diplomats in India regularly write op-eds or are featured in interviews in local news outlets. From 2020 to 2022, Freedom House research identified more than 20 such publications by Chinese diplomats and officials in the Indian media. Ambassador Sun wrote opinion pieces for nearly all major Indian newspapers, including the Hindu,21 the Times of India,22 the Indian Express,23 and the Economic Times,24 and appeared in interviews with Indian television stations such as Cable News Network-News18 (CNN-News18)25 and the pay channel CNBC-TV18,26 and with news agencies like Press Trust of India (PTI).27 PTI was criticized for giving the interview with Sun, after the diplomat blamed India for the violent clash in Galwan Valley that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers.28
  • Paid print content and exchanges with Xinhua: Various mainstream news outlets have published advertorials from Chinese official sources, including the Hindu,29, the Hindustan Times, 30 and the Indian Express.31 On April 1, 2020, for example, the Hindu and the Hindu Business Line published full-page advertorials to commemorate the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and India. Although the papers mentioned that the advertorials were part of a marketing initiative, the Chinese embassy in India instead touted them as running in the newspapers’ “special pages.”32 The Hindu Group drew much flak from netizens later that year when, amidst the turmoil in India-China relations that followed the Galwan crisis, it published two full-page advertorials: one in July 2021 celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),33 and another in October 2021 celebrating the 72nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.34 News agencies in India have also signed cooperation agreements with the Chinese state news agency Xinhua, and published Xinhua content during the coverage period. In November 2018, United News of India (UNI), one of the country’s largest wire services, signed an agreement with Xinhua to exchange news reports and photographs.35 The outlet has since used Xinhua content for some foreign affairs and China coverage, as well as for sports and cultural reporting.36 Asian News International (ANI), another major multimedia news agency serving Indian and other South Asian media outlets, also republished large amounts of content from Xinhua, typically related to COVID-19 outbreaks in various countries, but also international news on natural disasters or United Nations announcements.37 Both outlets were continuing to publish Xinhua stories as of mid-2023.
  • Subsidized journalist trips: Starting in 2016, China’s foreign ministry began hosting 10-month-long fellowships for around 100 foreign journalists from leading Asian and African media organizations every year. A number of reputable news media organizations in India, like the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), the Indian Express, and Jansatta, a Hindi-language newspaper owned by the Indian Express Group, have sent their journalists to the Chinese program. Participating journalists are provided a stipend and residential accommodation in Beijing, as well as language classes and a degree from a Chinese university. They get access to Chinese government officials, but are not allowed to take unaccompanied trips to sensitive areas like Xinjiang or Tibet. In response, the Indian embassy in Beijing has kept journalists accredited under this fellowship away from its official events due to questions over the program’s scope and objectives.38 According to Chinese state media reports, at least one Indian journalist joined a delegation of reporters from 16 countries in a Chinese government-organized trip to Xinjiang in August 2019, which included a visit to a “vocational training center” for Uyghurs undergoing so-called deradicalization efforts in the city of Kashgar.39 Several journalists from India also attended the China-South Asia Media Forum held in Yunnan in June 2019, where the president of Xinhua news was among the keynote speakers.40
  • Strong social media, radio presence in local languages: Some outlets, like Xinhua and China Radio International (CRI), are also available in dominant local languages like Hindi,41 Bengali,42 Tamil,43 and Urdu.44 CRI also transmits short- and medium-wave English-language broadcasts. A list of Xinhua overseas bureaus published by the agency in 2021 includes offices in New Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata.45 Chinese state media also has strong social media presence in India. For instance, the Chinese state-funded magazine China-India Dialogue has 34,000 followers on Facebook (though only 1,300 followers on Twitter),46 Xinhua’s Hindi Facebook page has 159,000 followers, while its Urdu page has 1.8 million followers.47 Meanwhile, CRI’s Bengali-language Facebook page has 10 million followers48 and another Tamil-language page, which references both CRI and China Media Group (CMG), also has 10 million followers.49 In some cases, social media accounts publish Chinese state media content but do not make their affiliation clear. For example: CRI’s Bengali broadcasts are posted on YouTube under the name “Bangla Sis,” but that account does not clearly mention its association with CRI. Bangla Sis had almost 6,000 subscribers as of October 2023.50 Some individual Chinese state-linked influencers have also gained large followings in India. For instance, one such influencer, Sun Quing, who uses the Tamil alias Ilakkiya and reportedly worked for CRI and went to university in Tamil Nadu, was profiled in a 2014 article in the New Indian Express. 51 As of late 2023, Ilakkiya’s Tamil-language Facebook page was still active with 1.3 million followers.52
  • Scandals alleging payments to Indian media company, journalists: Amid the concern over Chinese influence in Indian media, two scandals hit in recent years involving allegations that China-linked sources had paid Indian journalists and an online media outlet to turn over sensitive information and promote CCP narratives. The cases generated debate over whether the Indian government claims were genuine or being used as excuses to clamp down on the press. In September 2020, the Delhi Police’s Special Cell arrested freelance journalist Rajeev Sharma on charges of espionage for allegedly passing on information about the Indian Army’s deployment and the country’s border strategy to Chinese intelligence officers in exchange for payments.53 The Delhi High Court released Sharma on bail in December because charges were not filed in time, but the Enforcement Directorate (ED)—an agency that investigated economic crimes—brought new money-laundering charges against him in connection with the espionage case in February 2021 and arrested him in July.54 The Delhi High Court released him on bail in January 2022.55 Sharma had written a number of articles favoring the CCP’s narratives in the Global Times and in Indian media outlets, and the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)—Tibet’s Dharamsala-based government in exile—accused him of publishing “a series of fake, misleading articles targeting the institution of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and CTA leadership.”56 The Global Times, however, sought to disassociate itself from the case once it started attracting public attention in India.57 In the other case, the ED raided the offices of the news media portal NewsClick and the homes of several NewsClick journalists and officials, including founder and Editor in Chief Prabir Purkayastha, in February 2021, in connection with a money-laundering case involving funds received from foreign sources.58 The ED reportedly investigated the outlet’s financial dealings with Neville Roy Singham, a Sri Lankan-Cuban businessman allegedly associated with the CCP’s propaganda arm. ED sources said NewsClick had been paid to publish articles promoting China’s role in Africa and defending the Chinese government’s crackdown on Jack Ma, the billionaire entrepreneur and founder of Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba.59 In October 2023, Purkayastha was arrested under an anti-terrorism law and the homes of 44 journalists connected to NewsClick were raided, raising the profile of the investigation, but also concerns that the heavy-handed response violated press freedom.60
  • Select associations and scholars publishing Beijing-aligned content: There are a few examples where local scholars, journalists, and businesspeople have collaborated with Chinese government entities to publish content aligned with Beijing’s favored narratives. However, their numbers and influence on India’s overall China discourse remain limited. Manish Chand is the CEO of TGII Media, a consulting company that helps publish the Chinese embassy’s China-India Review, and is on the publication’s board of advisers. Other members of the China-India Review’s board include Mohammed Saqib, the secretary-general of the India China Economic and Cultural Council (ICEC); Professor B. R. Deepak of New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University; and J. N. U. Kaushal Goyal, the CEO of GBD Books.61 Saqib’s ICEC is a consultancy that, according to its official website, builds links between China and India by aiding cross-border business development, conducting economic research and advocacy and organizing educational and cultural exchanges.62 Goyal’s GBD Books reportedly had plans to publish Chinese books in India,63 while Deepak often writes in Chinese state media and participates in high profile exclusive Chinese conferences.64 Beyond collaborations at the individual level, there have been some people-to-people programs initiated by the governments of the two countries, but most stalled after the 2020 border clash. For instance, the China-India Media Forum was aimed at “enhancing media understanding, promoting a closer development partnership, and proposing a roadmap for future media cooperation.”65 The India-China Media Forum last met in Beijing in August 2019.66 The India-China Think Tanks Forum, yet another bilateral platform, was established by India’s Ministry of External Affairs and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China in May 2015. However, that forum has been on hold since 2018. Another active organization that appears closely aligned with Beijing’s priorities and has planned events promoting the regime’s preferred narratives, but whose impact in Indian society appears limited, is the India-China Friendship Association (ICFA), established in 1949.67 In August 2022, the ICFA was forced to cancel a seminar titled “Interference of US Imperialist in the Internal Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” after the name of an Indian opposition politician was included as a speaker on the invitation although he had declined to speak at the event, claiming that “my party’s and my position are against the agenda of the program.” The Indian president of the ICFA chapter in Karnataka had also been expected to speak alongside appearances by both China’s ambassador and a consul general.68 One of the organization’s national leaders has received awards from Chinese leaders Xi Jinping and Wen Jiabao during their visits to New Delhi.69

Disinformation campaigns

For the purposes of this report, disinformation is the intentional dissemination of false or misleading content, especially by engaging in inauthentic activity (such as via fake accounts) on global social media platforms. In India, there have been some documented attempts by entities seemingly linked to the Chinese party-state to push Chinese propaganda, manipulate social media conversations using fake accounts, or insert falsehoods into news feeds.

Several examples from the coverage period include:

  • Global Times spreading misleading claims on COVID-19, Ukraine war: In April 2020, the Chinese state-owned Global Times published an article claiming that Tibetans in exile wished to return to China due to a lack of quality medical care in India related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tibetan government in exile quickly issued a statement questioning the claim and pointing out false or misleading information contained in the article, including that one of the alleged Tibetan interviewees was in Nepal, not India, and that there was no record of a Chinese physician quoted in the article who claimed to have studied Tibetan medicine in India.70 In a more recent example, during the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as India took a neutral position on the war, the Global Times published a tweet claiming that the prominent Qutub Minar building in Delhi—which had been colorfully illuminated as part of Janaushadhi Diwas celebrations meant to boost the availability of generic drugs —was lit up with the colors of Russia’s flag in support of that country. The Indian government’s Press Information Bureau (PIB) quickly rebutted the claim, and the tweet was subsequently deleted.71
  • Chinese diplomats’ posts retweeted by fake accounts: A seven-month-long investigation into Chinese diplomats use of social media around the world that was published in May 2021 by the Associated Press (AP) and the Oxford Internet Institute found that “China’s rise on Twitter has been powered by an army of fake accounts that have retweeted Chinese diplomats and state media tens of thousands of times, covertly amplifying propaganda that can reach hundreds of millions of people—often without disclosing the fact that the content is government-sponsored.”72 The trend has made its way into Indian social media space. For example, per the study, about 27 percent of posts by China’s consul general in Kolkata, Zha Liyou, were retweeted between June 2020 and February 2021 by accounts that were later suspended.73
  • Fake Twitter accounts spreading false claims of Galwan Valley clash: During and after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, alongside Chinese state media propaganda claiming huge Chinese troop deployments, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises in Tibet, and threats of a repeat of the 1962 war,74 evidence emerged of networks of fake accounts on Twitter sharing false information related to the clash that favored Beijing.75 In one of the best documented examples, Indian cybersecurity firm Technisanct identified a network of 400-500 Twitter accounts that were activated during the Ladakh standoff or shortly thereafter and “spread fake narratives in favor of China.” Examples included manipulated satellite images of events at the Line of Actual Control, and false claims that China had occupied Ladakh and killed more than 86 Indian soldiers. Accounts on the network, many of which had prior ties to Pakistan, retweeted each other’s posts with the aim of making hashtags trend.76 In another instance reported by local media, a Twitter user claiming to be a Chinese person in Pakistan, but whose profile is a stock image, reported that captured Indian soldiers had been given medical treatment by the PLA and that there had been no Chinese casualties; it included a video from a Chinese state outlet that was later shown to be from 2017. Despite the manipulation, the post was reportedly shared by Indian journalists, garnering hundreds of retweets and likes.77 The same account was found to have posted other fake or misleading content related to India’s ties to neighboring countries.78

Censorship and intimidation

Indian media outlets face various restrictions when trying to report inside China or access news consumers there, while Chinese diplomats and hackers periodically attempted during the reporting period to pressure outlets over their coverage or to obtain information about their inner workings, although they faced some pushback. Specifically:

  • Within China, websites blocked, Indian diplomats censored, Indian correspondents restricted: A June 2020 ANI article published two weeks after the Galwan Valley clash reported that Indian newspapers and websites had been made inaccessible in China amid tensions over the clash.79 Many Indian news sites and apps, such as the Hindu, the Times of India, the Wire, and the Quint, were blocked in China in response to their coverage of the violent clash. The Indian Newspaper Society (INS) criticized the move and called on the Indian government to ban access to Chinese media in India and block Chinese investment and joint ventures in India’s media ecosystem.80 During the coverage period of this report and up until early 2023, there were at least four foreign correspondents from India reporting in China. However, two were barred from returning to China in April 2023 after their visas were frozen, and a third was made to leave at the beginning of June. That month, the Chinese government asked the last Indian journalist operating in China to leave by the end of June, while the last Chinese journalist left India the same month after the Indian government refused to grant a visa extension.81 Beijing alleged that Chinese journalists had been treated unfairly in India, and India countered that Indian journalists in China “have been operating with certain difficulties such as not being able to hire locals as correspondents or as journalists.” On June 16, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China issued a statement that it was “concerned and saddened” that all four Indian journalists had been expelled from China and that there was no longer any journalistic presence from India.82 Indian diplomats and officials have also faced censorship on Chinese social media platforms and media spaces. For example, when India published transcripts of speeches by Prime Minister Modi and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson about the Galwan Valley clash on the Chinese social media platforms Weibo and WeChat in June 2020, they were subsequently found to have been removed.83 Similarly, in August 2020, the Indian embassy in China alleged that the Global Times had refused to give India’s ambassador space to respond to what it characterized as false allegations about the reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan’s ambassador to China.84 This contrasts with the considerable latitude given to Chinese diplomats in India to express their views, as in the PTI interview with former Chinese ambassador Sun in which the Chinese envoy blamed India for the Galwan clash.85
  • Attempted Chinese diplomatic pressure on Taiwan coverage: In October 2020, the Chinese embassy in India issued a series of directives to the Indian media aimed at influencing their coverage of Taiwan’s upcoming National Day. The embassy instructed them to follow the “One China” policy, including by not referring to Taiwan as a “country” or to its democratically elected leader as “president.”86. The incident generated strong indignation from journalists and the Indian government, with India’s MEA spokesperson commenting that Indian media is free to report on issues as it sees fit.87
  • Hack on Times of India linked to China: In September 2021, the cybersecurity company Recorded Future reported that a unit of hackers linked to the Chinese government had launched a series of cyberattacks that February against Bennett Coleman, which owns the Times of India, the country’s largest media conglomerate. The Times of India had covered the India-China border tensions extensively, and the investigators said the hacks were likely aimed at getting access to journalists, their news sources, and stories related to China that had not yet been published. While Bennett Coleman claimed that it managed to thwart the attacks, Recorded Future said it appeared that the hackers had managed to steal data and implant malware in the company’s networks.88 In the same report, Recorded Future also said the Chinese hackers had hit the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), an Indian government agency that maintained a national biometric information database known as Aadhaar, in June and July 2021. Other hacks against Indian targets in recent years allegedly connected to China included a malware-connected October 2020 power outage in Mumbai, hacking activity targeting Indian vaccine makers in March 2021, an April 2022 attack on the Ladakh power grid, and a December 2022 cyberattack on the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in New Delhi.89
  • Pressure on Tibetan government in exile, journalists, and activists: Given the CCP’s tight control over the flow of information inside and outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region, anyone seeking to report on Tibet, and particularly exile media, face severe restrictions and repression. Tibetan journalists and communicators living in exile compensate for their lack of physical access to Tibet by depending heavily on Chinese apps like WeChat and Weibo to collect information, which makes them particularly vulnerable to digital espionage by the Chinese government. They also face the possibility of threats to family members who still live inside Tibet; in some cases those family members also serve as sources for information and fact checking, putting them further at risk.90 Exile Tibetan institutions and media is also often targeted by social media trolling. For example, when the Central Tibetan Administration held its annual Geneva Forum virtually in November 2020, thousands of pro-CCP trolls attempted to hijack the forum’s livestreams on social media platforms by posting disruptive and offensive comments in an apparently coordinated campaign, according to Tenzin Dalha, a cybersecurity researcher at the CTA’s Tibet Policy Institute think tank.91 Meanwhile, certain Indian government policies have further complicated matters for exile media and activists. For instance, in 2020, India banned several Chinese apps including WeChat, a move that made it difficult for Tibetan journalists in exile and other Tibetans living outside of Tibet to remain in contact with their contacts. According to Dalha, for those not technically savvy enough to circumvent the ban with virtual private networks (VPNs), the result has been “a communication vacuum between inside and outside Tibet.” In addition, since India and China asserted in a joint declaration signed in 2003 that the Indian government “does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India,” India has maintained a rather confusing approach towards political activities by the Tibetan refugees depending on fluctuations in its own relations with China. For example, in 2018, India banned Tibetans from holding a rally to mark the 60th anniversary of a failed uprising against Chinese rule.92 The following year, authorities in India’s Tamil Nadu state arrested at least 15 Tibetans, including the head of the Tibetan Youth Congress exile group, ahead of a visit by Xi as they protested an informal summit between the Chinese leader and Modi.93

Control over content-dissemination infrastructure

Between 2016 and 2019, apps owned by China-based companies grew in popularity in India, including social media and video sharing applications, mobile games, and news aggregators. By February 2018, for example, the Alibaba-owned aggregator UC Browser had reached 130 million users in India.94 Video and live-streaming apps like Helo, Kwai, and most notably TikTok—owned by the China-based firm ByteDance—also expanded in the Indian market. In January 2020, users in India accounted for over one-third of global downloads of TikTok that month, according to Sensor Tower.95 According to one dataset, between December 2017 and December 2018, the number of China-based mobile apps among the top 100 in India’s Google Play digital distribution service more than doubled, from 18 to 44.96

This trend came to an abrupt halt beginning in June 2020, shortly after the Galwan Valley clash, when the Indian government banned 59 apps with ties to China.97 This was followed by additional rounds of bans: 47 apps in July 2020, 118 in September 2020, and 43 in November 2020, bringing the total to over 250 applications. Beyond the coverage period of this report, a ban on an additional 54 apps was announced in February 2022.98 The banned apps range from social media platforms like TikTok, Weibo, WeChat, and Kwai to search engine Baidu, Alibaba’s UC Browser and e-commerce sites like Alipay and Shein, as well as mobile games and dating apps. The Indian government imposed the bans under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, claiming that the apps were “engaged in activities which are prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.”99 The first ban was enacted shortly after WeChat censored messages about the Galwan Valley clash posted by India’s embassy in China—including Prime Minister Modi’s own remarks.100

The bans have largely won public support, and were even preceded by voluntary initiatives by many Indian users to remove China-based apps from their phones.101 Recently available lists of popular social media apps are void of China-based platforms.102 Local media have reported, however, that thousands of users, especially gamers and Indians studying remotely at Chinese universities, have been using VPNs to access banned apps.103 Some policy experts and internet freedom advocates have criticized the bans as disproportionate and have raised concerns about the lack of transparency and due process surrounding them, including the limited public notice offered by the Indian government to technology firms and users.104 Meanwhile, although the Indian government justified the bans as necessary to protect the personal data of users, a March 2023 investigation by Forbes claimed that TikTok employees reported still having extensive access to data of former users from India, years after the ban was first put in place.105

Even as usage of China-based apps shrank dramatically during the coverage period, the market share of Chinese companies in the Indian mobile phone market increased, growing from 71 percent in 2019 to 75 percent by the end of 2020,106 with domestic-made phones only capturing 1 percent in 2022. 107 This marked a stark reversal of the ratio compared to 2015, when Indian-made phones held 68 percent of the market. Xiaomi is the most popular Chinese device manufacturer, holding 26 percent of the market in 2020, but Oppo, Vivo, and Realme are also top sellers. In 2021, a security audit of Xiaomi phones by the Lithuanian government found latent censorship blacklists in Chinese and English containing terms that might be sensitive to the CCP, as well as broader terms related to human rights, religion, and democracy, including ones related to India such as Hindu and Hindi (in English) and references to the Communist Party of India and a local student Islamic Council (in Chinese); the lists were periodically updated but were not active at the time of the investigation.108 There have also been concerns voiced over the past decade of the potential for Chinese authorities or the PLA to access Indian user data given this growing market footprint. In 2014,109 the Indian army warned personnel and their families against purchasing Xiaomi phones, advice that was reiterated as recently as March 2023.110 In early 2022, the Indian government also reportedly opened a multi-agency probe into Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo over potential concealment of income, tax evasion, and abuse of their dominant market share to the detriment of local competitors.111 Since then, news has emerged periodically of authorities seizing assets or arresting executives of the companies.112

Several major mobile phone carriers rely on the PRC-based Huawei for 4G network equipment, but this appears set to change amid the transition to 5G technology.113 In May 2021, the Indian government announced that trials for 5G mobile infrastructure would include equipment made by Sweden’s Ericsson, the Finnish-based Nokia, and South Korea’s Samsung, omitting Huawei and ZTE, another major Chinese firm.114 In 2022, India’s Ministry of Communications updated its rules to require mobile network operators to only use “trusted sources” as suppliers, which would reportedly disqualify Huawei and ZTE.115

Adoption of Chinese media governance model and norms

The Indian government’s increased restrictions on internet freedom in recent years, including controversial initiatives to regulate social media content, have been compared by both domestic and international observers to the censorship regime in China. Proposed regulations governing content moderation—including the controversial Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules) that have faced legal challenges from global social media platforms116—have led to international observers arguing that the Modi government is seeking to impose “Chinese-style internet censorship.”117 Ramping up of facial recognition surveillance technology to assist police118 and proposed data privacy rules have drawn similar comparisons, with some media and civil society activists expressing concern that “India’s new rules for data privacy may be more like China’s than Europe’s.”119 These initiatives, while reminiscent of Beijing’s information controls, appear to be motivated by domestic political and governance considerations rather than any direct influence from the CCP or Chinese government, although some facial recognition technology is provided by China-based companies.

Chinese diaspora media

The Chinese diaspora in India is limited to a small community in Kolkata, which until the early 2000s maintained at least two Chinese-language newspapers that helped the community retain a sense of identity. However, due to insufficient readership and funds and a lack of modern technology, they have both stopped printing.

The Chinese Journal of India was established in 1935 and published regularly120 until it went out of business in December 2001 amid trade union disputes.121

Kolkata’s other newspaper serving the Chinese diaspora community, Seong Pow, was founded in 1969 and functioned as the only Chinese-language newspaper in India for almost two decades after the Chinese Journal of India folded. It initially catered to the leather tanning industry, the main occupation of the Chinese community in that area, but soon started to include news about the local community.122 Later editions had sections for international news, especially news related to China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia.123 The paper mostly refrained from analyzing China’s politics; for instance, the newspaper carried factual reporting about the Tiananmen Square massacre but no commentary. Seong Pow was popular among the city’s small Chinese population, and the deputy director of China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAC) visited the newspaper in 2016.124 However, the pandemic forced it to stop printing in March 2020. Its elderly editor Kuo-tsai Chang died soon after in July 2020, leaving the future of the newspaper uncertain.125 Efforts to revive the newspaper were reportedly frustrated by a lack of Chinese-speaking journalists, although, after the coverage period, a new editor was appointed in 2023, reigniting the prospects of renewed publication.126

header4 Resilience + response

Underlying media resilience

 

  • Constitutional protections for free speech, independent courts: Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression. In a landmark judgement in 1978, the Supreme Court held that this freedom includes the right to gather information and exchange thoughts within and outside India. The Right to Information Act, 2005 mandates that the government respond in a timely manner to citizen requests for government information.1 The Constitution’s free expression article also safeguards the media’s right to publish and circulate journalism and protects outlets from pre-publication censorship.2 The exercise of these rights is, however, subject to “reasonable restrictions” under Article 19(2) of the Constitution “in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offense.” The Indian Constitution enshrines judicial independence,3 and although commentators lately have questioned the extent to which that holds, in most cases judgments continue to protect free expression and other constitutional rights.4
  • Increased regulation and oversight of foreign ownership: India has foreign media ownership laws, which cap foreign direct investment (FDI) in media entities at 26 percent ownership and require the CEO of such a company to be an Indian citizen5. The foreign ownership cap for television news stations was increased to 49 percent in 2015,6 while entertainment channels can be 100-percent foreign-owned.7 All foreign investments in Indian media are subject to approval by the government. In April 2020, foreign investments across all sectors were made subject to government screening to avoid opportunistic takeovers during the COVID-19 crisis, in what was meant to act as a deterrent against Chinese investments.8 Media reports in mid-2022 revealed that the Indian government had since approved 80 proposals for foreign direct investment from Chinese entities, per information obtained under the Right to Information (RTI) Act. These were reportedly out of proposals from 382 Chinese entities and were granted following a new vetting procedure, with many involving acquisition of minority stakes or investment in manufacturing rather than digital services.9 In 2019, the government announced that the 26 percent FDI cap would apply to digital news and current affairs outlets.10 Foreign ownership of digital-only news platforms had not previously been limited, and such firms had attracted investment from global private equity companies and other investors, including China-based corporations like ByteDance.11 In October 2020, the government clarified that the FDI cap and the Indian CEO requirement would also apply to news agencies that produce and distribute originally reported news content, and to news aggregators that collect and disseminate content from other outlets. The clarification required foreign employees and consultants of digital media companies to obtain security clearances, and said such clearances could be withdrawn for any reason.12 Advocates have criticized the FDI cap for limiting the viability of online media outlets, which may rely on international funding because of constraints in the Indian market.13
  • Press associations and civil society advocacy for free expression: A variety of NGOs, journalist associations, and press freedom advocacy groups operate in India. Organizations like the Press Council of India,14 a quasi-judicial body established by parliamentary legislation, and the News Broadcasting and Digital Standards Authority15 and Editors Guild,16 both set up by members of the industry, work to protect press freedom, track disinformation networks, and foster a reliable, diverse, and resilient information ecosystem, despite facing challenges like the increased legal harassment of journalists.17 On the issue of China-India border confrontation, these civil society groups have consistently demanded greater transparency from the government.18 In one example of pushback against government pressure on the media, journalist groups criticized a letter the public broadcaster Prasar Bharati sent to PTI in June 2020 expressing displeasure with comments made by then-Chinese ambassador Sun about the Galwan Valley Clash during his interview with the news agency and threatening to cancel the broadcaster’s PTI subscription.19 The letter from Prasar Bharati said PTI’s news coverage was “detrimental to national interest and undermined India’s territorial integrity.” Press freedom groups including the Indian Journalists Union and the Indian Women’s Press Corps condemned Prasar Bharati’s move as a “blatant attack on the freedom of the press” and accused the government of failing to “appreciate the meaning of a free, objective and unbiased media which is the touchstone of a democracy.”20
  • Media literacy programs and fact-checking initiatives: Media literacy programs in India are supported by the government and by international technology companies and broadcasters. For instance, the government Press Information Bureau21 has started a fact-checking unit—which has now expanded to cover media in regional languages as well as English—to track foreign disinformation and media influence, including that emanating from China. Similarly, in the private realm, FactShala, a news and information literacy program run by the Indian digital media company DataLEADS with support from the Google News Initiative, helps people from small cities and villages across India to critically assess online information and sift facts from misinformation.22 In 2021, BBC News also partnered with DataLEADS and the U.S.-based media support nonprofit Internews to give media literacy training to about 8,000 students in more than 100 Indian schools, in an effort to combat the spread of fake news and mis- and disinformation among young people.23

China-specific resilience

  • Critical news reporting and commentary on the CCP and Chinese government: Indian media closely follows developments in China, and regularly produces reports, analysis, and op-eds on China-related topics, including Chinese investments24 and activities25 in India, that are independent, informative, investigative, and at times critical.26 Indian media extensively covers issues considered sensitive in China, like Xinjiang, Hong Kong,27 corruption in China, dissidents,28 Beijing’s role in the COVID crisis,29 Huawei30 and 5G.31 Media outlets with substantial China coverage include the Hindu,32 the Wire, Scroll.in,33 the Quint,34 the Caravan,35 and ANI.36 The Galwan Valley clash has put the spotlight back on China and has made anti-China sentiment somewhat mainstream in India. Anger and resentment against Chinese aggression on India’s borders plays out in prime time, ensuring extremely critical and vigilant coverage on China-related issues. For example, in October 2020, the Hindustan Times carried an article that sought to establish a link between an ambush in the Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh—a state on the India-China border—that led to the death of a soldier from the Assam Rifles paramilitary force and alleged Chinese aid to insurgents in India’s northeastern states. It said the attack came a week after Chinese media warned the Indian government that Beijing could retaliate against the potential signing of a trade pact with Taiwan by supporting separatists in northeastern India and withdrawing recognition of the border state of Sikkim as a part of India.37 In yet another example, in October 2020, when the Chinese embassy in New Delhi asked Indian media not to recognize Taiwan by marking its National Day, Indian journalists reacted by circulating the open letter sent by the embassy and its veiled threats on social media,38 and rejected the attempt at censorship.39 The negative responses from Indian media, citizens40 and government illustrate the country’s resistance to Chinese influence.41 Similarly, there has been strong public backlash against Chinese anti-India propaganda. During the peak of the deadly second wave of COVID-19 in India, a Weibo account belonging to a Chinese law enforcement agency shared a post juxtaposing an image of a rocket launch in China with another of a cremation ground in India, with the caption, “China lighting a fire, India lighting a fire.”42 The post mocking India’s COVID crisis received huge criticism in India as well as among Weibo users themselves, and was subsequently removed.43
  • Expertise on China at local thinktanks, universities: India has a number of foreign policy think tanks working on China, including the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi (ICS),44 the Observer Research Foundation (ORF),45 Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA),46 and Takshashila Institution,47 which regularly assess the role of China in international politics and the evolving dynamics of India-China bilateral relations. These organizations host experts, from journalists to academics, who study and comment on China’s overt and covert influence operations in India. These organizations play a central role in exposing China’s disinformation tactics in India.48
  • Tibetan exile media and civil society groups: Given the large population of Tibetans in Dharamsala and other locations in the country, India has emerged as an important hub for Tibetan media in exile and civil society groups supporting refugees and the needs of the community. Tibetan civil society in exile comprises a range of NGOs working on issues related to human rights, refugee assistance, and social and economic development for Tibetans in India and Nepal. For example, the Tibet Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) plays an important role in disseminating of information from Tibetan refugees and serves as a global source of information on events within Tibet.49 Tibet is one of the most restrictive places in the world in terms of press freedom.50 With no physical access to Tibet, exile journalists face myriad challenges while reporting about Tibet, from relentless phishing and hacking attacks, to intimidation, trolling and online threats. Nevertheless, a number of outlets persist, include several based in India, that are supported by governmental or philanthropic grants, as well as by advertisements and reader donations. Tibetan exile media’s commitment, courage, and collaboration have made authoritative reporting on Tibet possible.51
  • Parliamentary discussions: Although Indian political leaders do not like to publicly express concern over Chinese government influence operations, the Indian Parliament sometimes debates important topics related to China. For example, on June 26, 2019, Minister of State for External Affairs V. Muraleedharan replied to a question on how India sees projects like China’s Belt and Road Initiative and their impact in the region.52 On February 5, 2020, the minister once again replied to a question regarding India’s countermeasures against the BRI, and particularly the CPEC collaboration with Pakistan.53 In both cases, the minister highlighted India’s opposition to the CPEC and clarified the government’s official stance that “connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness, transparency, and financial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty, equality, and territorial integrity of other nations.”

header5 Vulnerabilities

  • Reciprocal expulsion of correspondents: In 2016, the Indian government refused to renew the visas of three Xinhua journalists—the New Delhi bureau chief and the chief correspondent and another reporter from the Mumbai office—who were reportedly being investigated by security services, and ordered them to leave the country. Indian officials said that Xinhua was welcome to send new journalists to work in India.1 Nevertheless, over the following years and throughout the coverage period, the Chinese authorities reciprocated by refusing to renew visas for Indian correspondents in China. By June 2023, the last two Indian journalists based in China lost their visas after China declined to renew them in apparent retaliation for India’s declining to support the visas of Chinese state journalists.2
  • Gaps in legislation and transparency: Though the media landscape in India is vast and diverse, the sector faces challenges from legislative and transparency gaps and from government repression. Laws to protect India’s critical media and information technology infrastructure are still a work in progress,3 and Parliament has not passed legislation on data privacy and security.4 Government control over journalists’ and media outlets’ registration, accreditation, and travel of journalists and media outlets can pose a threat to their independence. Civil society groups have warned that the burdensome regulations imposed on digital news outlets by the 2021 IT Rules pose additional censorship threats.5 Government regulations limit foreign media ownership,6 and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA) extended those limits to cover foreign funding of civil society groups, giving the government a potent weapon to use against critics.7 Journalists criticizing the government and covering sensitive topics also risk severe harassment by Modi supporters and arbitrary arrest, contributing to self-censorship and potentially complicating any investigative work on Chinese influence.8 The state-owned broadcaster AIR has a monopoly on radio news, with private stations banned from playing news content not produced by AIR.9 There are concerns over a lack of independence among media regulators and lack of transparency surrounding media ownership. According to RSF, “ownership structures of almost all major media houses are characterised by highly complicated cross-shareholdings designed to either hide beneficial owners or to circumvent certain laws—or both.”10 However, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) initiative was able to find the owners of all but one Indian media group; MOM’s work also highlighted that most of the data related to ownership structures was publicly available on the Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) website upon payment of a fee of 100 rupees ($US1.44) per company. Television market and audience data is hard to come by, as the Broadcast Audience Research Council (BARC) industry association refuses to disclose it publicly. Indian law is “protective in theory” toward journalists facing legal challenges, according to RSF, “but charges of defamation, sedition, contempt of court and endangering national security are increasingly used against journalists critical of the government, who are branded as ‘anti-national.’”11 India does not have an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law, although some free-speech activists are calling for such legislation.12
  • Increased attacks on media, civil society: Reports by various international watchdogs indicate a sharp rise in attacks on press freedom in Modi’s India, silencing dissenting voices.13 Scholars and commentators have been warning against the rise of majoritarianism and political polarization and the criminalization of organizations promoting human rights and civil liberties, all of which has adversely impacted India’s independent institutions.14 The current administration has used legal and extralegal avenues—including arrests, threats of prosecution, politicized tax investigations, and online harassment campaigns—to muzzle critical voices in the media in retaliation for their reporting and commentary.15 According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, five deadly attacks on journalists were reported in 2021, including four journalists reported killed in retaliation for their work.16 The government has also targeted civil society groups by using the restrictive FCRA and even forced some to leave the country.17 Besides the broader implications, such government pressure on media and civil society also presents a challenge to the ability to do investigations into Chinese influence and investments, especially on topics that the Indian government might deem sensitive.
  • Hypernationalist coverage, racist language: Given the high degree of vigilance against China in the Indian media, it is not uncommon to see extreme, hyper-nationalist cases of tabloid journalism on China-related matters. This is particularly prominent in digital media coverage of China.18 Indian media subjects China to heightened scrutiny, and in some cases that coverage can be hyperbolic.19 After the Galwan Valley clash, with a surge in anti-China sentiment in India unprecedented since the 1962 border war, the Chinese Indian community has been particularly fearful about rising risks of racism and persecution.20
  • Problematic pushback, blanket app bans: Section 69A of the IT Act is read by the government to empower authorities to restrict websites that threaten India’s defense and sovereignty. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology used this law to ban multiple Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser, in the last few years.21 In 2020, Indian government had banned a total of 224 Chinese apps, over several rounds of restrictions, on grounds that these apps have stolen data from Indian users. In February 2022, the Indian government once again banned 54 Chinese apps on similar grounds.22. The bans drew criticism23 from free expression groups, both within and outside India, and questions were raised about their proportionality, reasonableness,24 and legality.25

header6 Impact and Public Opinion

Despite efforts by the Chinese government and state media to influence public debate in India, public opinion polls indicated that overall sentiment towards China and its government remained quite negative in India during the coverage period, with many Indians strongly favoring closer ties with the United States and other democracies, as well as limits on China-linked technological penetration. For example, a 2019 poll by the Pew Research Center found that 46 percent of Indians view China unfavorably—similar to the 41 percent who expressed an unfavorable opinion in 2014.1 More recently, a 2021 ORF poll of Indian youth found that about 77 percent of respondents felt that China was the most distrusted nation, while the same proportion of respondents saw the US as the most trusted leading global power.2 About 86 percent felt that the ban on Chinese apps was a good move and around 64 percent supported strengthening India’s Quad partnership with the US, Australia and Japan.3

Immediately following the 2020 border clashes, CNN-News18 conducted a poll across its digital and social news platforms in which 70 percent of respondents said they were willing to boycott Chinese goods amid escalating tensions.4 An earlier poll done by the same network showed overwhelming majorities of respondents saying that they saw China as unfriendly to India and a strong supporter of Pakistan, that they would support India siding against China in a major conflict, that they did not want Chinese companies building 5G infrastructure or making more investments in India, and that China had been dishonest about COVID-19.5

Despite these public opinion trends and increased military tensions, bilateral trade and Chinese investment in India continue to grow.6 Although the Indian government showed apprehension around allowing larger investments from China, Chinese firms have made strong investments in technology startups,7 and India resumed approving Chinese investment proposals after a hold prompted by the Galwan Valley clash.8

header7 Future Trajectory

The following are potential developments related to Beijing’s media influence in India that should be closely monitored in the coming years.

  • Adjustment of PRC propaganda narratives: The India-China border conflict is likely to remain the primary determinant of Indian public opinion on China. To date, the Chinese government has appeared either unable or unwilling to address the negative public sentiment in India born of such border tensions. Watch for whether this changes, as well as any intensification of anti-US or anti-Western narratives in Chinese state-affiliated media, including with regards to the war in Ukraine. China may try to take advantage of reservations in India about closer relations with the United States.
  • Increase in targeted disinformation: Considering the apparent ineffectiveness of overt Chinese state propaganda towards Indian audiences alongside global trends of growing covert manipulation on social media by Beijing-linked actors, the coming years may see an increase in disinformation campaigns targeting Indian audiences. This could especially occur in the context of any renewed fighting at the border, in advance of Indian general elections in the spring of 2024, or to amplify domestic divisions surrounding religion or relations with the United States.1
  • Impact of press freedom restrictions on China coverage: Following the expulsion of India’s last foreign correspondents in China, watch for the impact on reporting in India about China and the rise of alternative news sources, as well as whether any Indian journalists working for independent outlets are able to re-enter China in the coming years as correspondents. Within India, amid tightening controls on media, watch for Indian government pressure on media outlets that are either perceived to be reporting too favorably about China or that engage in investigative reporting about bilateral ties that embarrasses the Modi government or paints it in a negative light.

On India

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Population

    1,417,170,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    63 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    51 100 partly free