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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022

Kuwait

Vulnerable
Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts
Notable
 30 85
Local Resilience and Response
Low
 31 85
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least influence) to 85 (most influence)
People in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Editorial credit: Matyas Rehak / Shutterstock.com

header1 Key findings

Report by: Mohammad J. al-Yousef and Patrick Poon

  • Limited but growing influence: Chinese diplomats and state media have increased their efforts to shape public opinion in Kuwait, building on long-standing ties with the state news agency and deepening relationships with political and media elites. During the coverage period of 2019–21, Chinese diplomats expanded their social media footprint and more intensely engaged with local media executives. One local mainstream outlet agreed to publish a column that served as a vehicle for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda.
  • Promoting shared strategic priorities: Ahead of the 50th anniversary in 2021 of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Kuwait, Chinese diplomats and state media highlighted the potential for further alignment, citing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Kuwaiti national development plan, Vision 2035. Chinese propaganda repeatedly stressed Beijing’s commitment to maintaining state sovereignty, security, and peaceful development around the world while emphasizing opportunities to deepen cooperation in technology, trade, health care, and green development.
  • Local government support for preferred media narratives: Chinese diplomats tailored their messaging to local audiences, presenting Beijing’s position on the Palestine issue and responding to local reports about forced labor in Chinese-backed projects in Kuwait. Diplomats actively promoted Beijing’s preferred narratives on controversial topics such as its repressive policy regarding the Xinjiang region and its position on Taiwanese independence. A narrative framework focusing on poverty and terrorism was employed to justify Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang. Notwithstanding some civil society and parliamentary pushback, Kuwait has supported Beijing’s position on human rights and territorial sovereignty. In at least one incident, the Kuwaiti government is believed to have helped censor commentary in a local outlet that was disfavored by Beijing.
  • Low knowledge and impact: A 2019 opinion poll found that 49 percent of Kuwaitis supported stronger economic ties with China. However, respondents also demonstrated a low level of knowledge on China, despite Kuwait having one of the Persian Gulf region’s strongest trade and diplomatic links with China.
  • No disinformation campaigns: There were no documented disinformation campaigns originating in China that targeted or reached Kuwaiti audiences during the coverage period. However, Chinese state media and diplomats actively pushed false or misleading narratives that sought to obfuscate Beijing’s role in the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, legitimize the persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang, and promote alternative definitions of democracy and human rights.
  • Small diaspora media environment: The Chinese expatriate and diaspora population in Kuwait is small, likely numbering in the thousands. A limited diaspora media ecosystem appears to consist primarily of digital news sources. Individuals may rely on WeChat or other mainland China–based applications for news content that is subject to Beijing’s domestic censorship regime.
  • Civil society and independent media as sources of resilience: Civil society and some media outlets have supported diaspora Uyghur groups in their attempts to raise awareness on the Chinese party-state’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Privately owned outlets have also reported on Beijing’s aggressive stance toward Taiwan and other subjects that are sensitive to the CCP, sometimes relying on international wire services to do so. Sitting lawmakers have publicly questioned the Kuwaiti government’s support for Chinese policies in Xinjiang.
  • Low media resilience and active state control: The Kuwaiti government heavily influences the country’s media environment via owners from the ruling elite and provides few legal or political safeguards for independent, critical journalism. Newer digital outlets operating in a regulatory gray zone have a higher degree of independence and offer relatively diverse news content. However, strict media licensing regulations have hindered the development of smaller independent and digital outlets. A 2016 cybercrime law, along with other censorship rules, forbids media coverage that could hurt foreign relations. Journalists’ access to information and freedom of expression remain restricted, although the media environment is relatively freer than in other Persian Gulf countries.

header2 Background

Kuwait is a constitutional emirate with a status of Partly Free in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2023 report on political rights and civil liberties.1 Interaction between the executive and legislature are affected by succession-related rivalries within the ruling family. Powerful members of the family are able to put pressure on rivals in ministerial roles by cultivating parliamentary allies who can question them and scrutinize their performance. In terms of freedom of expression, the government tightly controls traditional media, while Kuwaiti law assigns penalties for the publication of material that insults Islam, criticizes the emir, discloses information considered secret or private, or calls for the regime’s overthrow.2 In June 2022, for example, the authorities withdrew the licenses of 90 news websites and referred 73 media outlets to state prosecutors for alleged legal violations, including the publication of false news.3

Kuwaitis’ news mainly comes from print newspapers and social media, with many Kuwaities reportedly following international news closely in addition to national news.4 In a survey of university students from several Persian Gulf countries carried out in 2014, 39 percent of Kuwaitis respondents also said they relied on word of mouth for local news, given the emirate’s close communities and strong traditions of diwaniya and majlis social gatherings. Forty-five percent of the Kuwaiti respondents said they read the print versions of local newspapers, while 57.5 percent said they preferred social media as a favorite source of local news information. As of the beginning of 2023, there were 4.25 million internet users in Kuwait, representing 99 percent internet penetration) and more than 83 percent of the population uses social media.5 YouTube is the most popular social media platform in Kuwait, while TikTok, owned by the PRC-based company ByteDance, is the second most popular, used by over 90 percent of adults in Kuwait. As of early 2023, Instagram and Facebook had 2.05 and 1.8 million users in Kuwait, respectively, many of them from among the migrant population.6

The People’s Republic of China and Kuwait established diplomatic relations in 1971, the first Gulf country to do so,7 and 2021 marked the 50th anniversary of their establishing ties.8 Kuwait was also the first Middle Eastern country to sign a cooperation document under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) when the initiative was first announced by CCP leader and Chinese state president Xi Jinping in 2013.9 Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, Kuwait’s emir until his death in 2020, paid a state visit to China in July 2018, his seventh such trip according to Li Minggang, the Chinese ambassador to Kuwait at the time.

China is the largest exporter to Kuwait, and the second-largest importer of Kuwaiti goods. The main products exported to Kuwait from China in 2021 were broadcasting equipment, cars, and furniture, while Kuwait mainly exported crude petroleum, petroleum gas, and cyclic hydrocarbons to China.10 China is also Kuwait’s largest trading partner for non-oil goods, according to Chinese media.11 China is a key strategic partner in Kuwait’s development, most notably of Silk City (Madinat al-Harir), a large infrastructure project in northern Kuwait that includes the huge Mubarak al-Kabeer port. The Chinese expatriate and diaspora population in Kuwait is small, likely numbering in the thousands and mostly working as laborers on Chinese-funded projects.12

header3 Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts

Propaganda and promotion of favored narratives

 

Key narratives

The narratives set out by the diplomats of the People’s Republic of China and its state media targeting Kuwait focus on cooperation and the promotion of positive stories. Chinese propaganda repeatedly stressed Beijing’s commitment to maintaining state sovereignty, security, and peaceful development around the world while emphasizing opportunities to deepen cooperation in technology, trade, health care, and green development. The cooperation between China and Arab countries, including Kuwait, was highlighted in various platforms, including the fourth China-Arab Media Cooperation Forum, which took place online on November 24, 2020. At the forum, Xu Lin, at the time minister of the PRC’s State Council Information Office (SCIO), called on media outlets from China and Arab countries to “assume their due responsibilities and work together to create a sound environment for the two sides’ win-win cooperation amid the COVID-19 pandemic.”1 He also emphasized the need for media outlets on both sides to “publish stories of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fight against COVID-19, and deliver positive energy among the public.”

Sheikh Ahmad Nasser al-Mohammad, then Kuwait’s foreign minister and minister of state for cabinet affairs, and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, who at the time was also a state councilor, further affirmed their countries’ cooperation in a January 2022 meeting in Wuxi, in China’s Jiangsu province. Wang Yi noted Kuwait’s historic status as the first Gulf country to establish ties with China and praised “its strong support to China on safeguarding its own sovereignty, security and development interests,” according to a Xinhua article, while Ahmad reaffirmed that position and stated Kuwait’s opposition to outside interference in Chinese internal issues and the politicization of human rights.2

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the Chinese- and Arabic-language website of the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), an initiative established in 2004, to publicize the Chinese government’s positions on political issues in Arab countries.3 China advocates for its style of “democracy” with coordinated media campaigns through the platform. For instance, in response to the US-hosted Summit for Democracy in December 2021, Chinese ambassador to Kuwait Li wrote an article published in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba claiming that many Arab countries are democratic in the sense that they are open to negotiation and invite public discussion with the diwaniya (a traditional gathering space for socializing and discussion), and that democracy in the Arab world needs to be in line with national traditions and modern developments in the region. The CASCF website publicized Li’s articles and similar op-eds and interviews by the Chinese ambassadors to Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia.4

During the coverage period, Chinese diplomats crafted their messaging to address Kuwaitis’ specific concerns. Official communications linked the BRI with Kuwait’s Vision 2035, highlighted Beijing’s support for Palestine in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and addressed local media reports that Chinese-backed projects in Kuwait were using forced labor. In addition to these more local issues, diplomats also promoted official Chinese official narratives opposing an independent Taiwan and defending the PRC’s repression in the Xinjiang region.

  • Alignment between BRI and Vision 2035: In an interview published in Kuwait’s Al-Jarida newspaper in June 2021, Li Minggang, then the Chinese ambassador to Kuwait, drew connections between Kuwait’s Vision 2035 and the BRI and China’s 14th Five-Year Plan as he commemorated the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations.5 The ambassador highlighted the nearly 80 economic projects undertaken together by the two countries, including housing, university and airport projects, underlining that China has been Kuwait’s largest source of imports and non-oil trading partner for years. Li also emphasized cooperation on digital economy, port construction, and energy and the creation of a “green silk road,” as well as exchanges in the education, culture, media, sports, and religion sectors. He said China would advocate for multilateral negotiations on peace and security in the Gulf region.
  • Anniversary of diplomatic relations: Chinese official commentary in Kuwaiti publications also celebrated bilateral diplomatic relations and affirmed the “One China” policy to squeeze the international space for Taiwan. In an op-ed published in another Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Anba, in December 2021, Li wrote about the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Kuwait again, reiterating that the relationship between China and Kuwait was not only based on trade but that Kuwait, as the first Gulf country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, was a strategic partner. To promote China’s propaganda, he also mentioned that the Chinese embassy of Kuwait had published photos and stories about China’s relations with Kuwait in 22 issues of Al-Anba.6 Among other op-eds published in Kuwaiti newspapers was an article titled “Abandon the false efforts for ‘Taiwan independence’” in Al-Jarida aimed at promoting China’s “One China” policy.7
  • Xinjiang: China has actively engaged with Kuwait and other Gulf countries to garner support for its repressive policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In November 2019, a cultural exchange delegation from Xinjiang paid a two-day visit to Kuwait and promoted the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang, arguing that they were meant to maintain social stability, ethnic unity, religious harmony, and “de-extremism.” The delegation met with Kuwaiti diplomats and did interviews with the state broadcaster Kuwait Television and Al-Anba. They also co-organized a seminar with Kuwaiti academics to exchange views on antiterrorism, de-extremization, ethnic and religious policies, and occupational training in Xinjiang, according to the embassy. During the seminar, the delegation showed a video clip on Xinjiang’s antiterrorism campaign, boasting how the government in Xinjiang has applied various measures to combat terrorism and extremism.8 The Chinese embassy’s writeup of the visit claimed that it “has further promoted understandings of Xinjiang-related questions in Kuwait,” and that Kuwaiti media “made positive comments on the effective measures taken by China on fighting terrorism and deradicalization.”9 PRC propaganda also promoted what are portrayed as positive Chinese government developmental projects in Xinjiang to Kuwait and other Middle Eastern countries.10

These initiatives and other engagement with Kuwaiti officials appear to have borne fruit for the PRC. In October 2021, Kuwait issued a joint statement on behalf of three other Gulf countries supporting China’s actions in Xinjiang.11

Key avenues of content dissemination

China’s direct broadcasts and state media presence in Kuwait are relatively limited, mostly consisting of regional Arabic programming. CGTN Arabic, a channel owned by the state-run China Global Television Network (CGTN), has been broadcasting since 2009, and the Arabic version of the CCP’s China Today magazine has been circulating across the region to spread China-related stories and publicize Chinese activities in the Middle East. The website of the People’s Daily, China’s official newspaper, also has an Arabic version and it is accessible in Kuwait.12

More specific to Kuwait are the following avenues for disseminating content to local audiences:

  • Cooperation with Kuwait’s official news agency: The official Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) and Xinhua have had a content-sharing agreement in place since 1993, and KUNA regularly publishes news content sourced from Xinhua, while publishing critical coverage of China or the Chinese government only infrequently.13 In 2014, Xinhua’s editor in chief at the time, He Ping, met with Sheikh Mubarak al-Duaij al-Ibrahim al-Sabah, then KUNA’s board chairman and director general, to explore further cooperation and make plans to open a KUNA bureau in Beijing.14 In November 2019, KUNA announced that it was opening its China bureau.15
  • Diplomatic op-eds, column in Al-Anba, and social media presence: Al-Anba, one of Kuwait’s most popular newspapers, periodically published a column in late 2021 dedicated to China.16 While some items were authored by Kuwaiti journalists, many were written by Chinese diplomats or state media reporters. Beyond the column, the current Chinese ambassador to Kuwait, Zhang Jianwei, has authored other articles in Al-Anba, such as pieces published in June and October 2022 about China’s armed forces contributing to world peace and stability, that serve up the Chinese government’s propaganda to Kuwaiti audiences; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese embassy in Kuwait republished the articles on their websites.17 In December 2022, Kuwait’s English-language Arab Times also published a long interview with Zhang in which the ambassador promoted the China-Kuwait relationship, painting a positive image of the BRI as well as praising Arab countries’ adherence to the PRC’s “One China” policy.18 The Chinese embassy in Kuwait joined Twitter (later rebranded as X) in April 2020 and posts regularly, though, as of late 2023, it had fewer than 3,800 followers. To commemorate the 50th anniversary of China-Kuwaiti relations, the embassy tweeted a Chinese-Arab international video competition to promote friendship between the two regions. However, observers have noted that engagement with the embassy’s tweets is generally low.19
  • Subsidized travel to China for Kuwaiti academics and media professionals: The Chinese government has sponsored trips by Kuwaiti academics and journalists to China, in order to foster favorable attitudes towards the PRC and influence to them to accept and echo CCP narratives. In October 2018, a Kuwaiti academic delegation visited the China-Arab Research Center on Reform and Development (CARC) in Shanghai and exchanged views on China’s policies in the Middle East.20 In November 2019, another Kuwaiti delegation of media executives participated in discussions at CARC that touched on the BRI, Silk City and Five Islands, another Chinese-linked development project in Kuwait.21 In December 2019, about 10 Kuwaiti journalists from Al-Anba visited Xi’an to observe what the conditions were like for the central Chinese city’s historic Muslim population. An Al-Anba article that month highlighted a discussion between the media delegation and the Kuwaiti ambassador to China, Samih Gohar Hayat, in which the ambassador praised Chinese policies toward Muslims in Xinjiang and said, “We trust the Chinese government is dealing with different issues, and the Uyghur situation is considered China’s internal affairs.” Hayat claimed that “foreign reports” of anti-Uyghur discrimination are baseless, adding that he had traveled to Xinjiang with other diplomats and met Muslims living in “vocational rehabilitation centers” there who told him how well the Chinese government was treating them.22 Earlier, Al-Anba had published an article in May 2019 titled “The real life of Muslims in Xinjiang” that promoted China’s propaganda narratives regarding its policies in Xinjiang, such as insisting that there were no “concentration camps” in the autonomous region but rather “re-education camps.” The report also falsely claimed that China tolerates religious freedom and that the Chinese government was taking care of its Muslim minorities.23 More recently, in January 2023, a group of over 30 Islamic leaders and academics from 14 Islamic countries, including Kuwait, visited Xinjiang in a trip billed as displaying the Chinese government’s “antiterrorism” and “de-extremization” efforts in the region.24 A Kuwaiti media delegation also visited Xinjiang in July 2023; according to Chinese media coverage, the Kuwaiti media representatives described witnessing the real situation in Xinjiang in contrast to Western media reports about “forced labor,” “cultural genocide,” and “religious persecution.”25
  • Local officials repeating Beijing’s preferred narratives: In the article published in Al-Anba in 2019 following the Kuwaiti journalists’ trip to Xi’an, Kuwaiti ambassador Hayat praised China’s development, saying “China jumped significantly.” He said Kuwait’s stance that Chinese policies in Xinjiang were a purely internal issue also applied to the issue of Hong Kong and Taiwan. “We in Kuwait know but one China, and this is what Kuwait knows about China,” he said, in a reference to China’s policy opposing Taiwanese independence.26 The same year, Sabah al-Khaled, Kuwait’s prime minister and foreign minister at the time, also said that China treated Uyghurs fairly, in response to a parliamentary question.27 Citing an investigation done by the Organization of Islamic Countries that visited China upon the Chinese government’s invitation, he claimed that there was no discrimination against Uyghurs. In November 2021, then–Chinese ambassador Li met with Osama Ahmad al-Munawar, a member of Kuwait’s National Assembly, offering him a three-volume edition of The Governance of China, a collection of speeches and writings by Xi Jinping, as gift. In return, the Kuwaiti legislator commended Xi’s leadership and China’s development progress.28 Kuwaiti officials have also given interviews with Chinese television stations in which they make complimentary statements about the PRC, and those interviews have later been republished by Kuwaiti outlets or social media accounts. In 2018, the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV interviewed Sheikh Nasser Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwait’s deputy prime minister and defense minister at the time and the head of the planning committee that oversaw Kuwait’s 2035 and Silk City projects. Kuwait’s Almdar News posted the interview, which was conducted in English with Chinese subtitles, on its YouTube channel.29 In January 2022, Chinese state television in the city of Wuxi interviewed Kuwait’s then-foreign minister, Sheikh Ahmed Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah, on bilateral relations between China and Kuwait. The interview was posted on the Instagram account of Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.30

Disinformation campaigns

For the purposes of this report, disinformation is defined as the purposeful dissemination of false or misleading content, especially by engaging in inauthentic activity (such as via fake accounts) on global social media platforms. There have been attempts to spread disinformation and misleading Chinese government propaganda through social media in Kuwait, although no campaigns involving bots or fake accounts were detected. The Chinese embassy in Kuwait tweeted a video in December 2021 showing the happy lives of a Uyghur family in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The video spotlighted Rabihan, a 100-year-old Uyghur woman, and the four generations of her family, saying that their lives had been hard in the past but now are happy, with access to water and beautiful clothes. The tweet, in Arabic, challenged evidence of human rights atrocities published in Western media or by independent researchers by asking the viewers if the video showed “genocide,” and asked viewers to put an end to fake news.31

Censorship and intimidation

The Chinese embassy appears to monitor reporting on China in Kuwaiti media closely and has applied pressure regarding certain reports, complaints that carry extra weight given Kuwait’s laws criminalizing speech that could harm foreign relations. In one well-publicized example, in August 2021, Abdulaziz al-Anjeri, founder and CEO of the Kuwaiti think tank Reconnaissance Research, was threatened and condemned by the Chinese embassy in Kuwait after an interview he did with Taiwanese foreign minister Joseph Wu that was published in the Arab Times. The Chinese embassy condemned the interview in a tweet, tagging the Arab Times, al-Anjeri and Reconnaissance Research, and issued a statement reiterating the “One China” principle, while hinting that a complaint had also been lodged with the Kuwaiti government.32 Al-Anjeri tweeted his own statement in a reply to the embassy’s tweet, stating that the think-tank was not adopting any position on Taiwan and would continue to publish commentaries and analysis about China while respecting China’s position by adhering to the diplomatic norms set by the Kuwaiti government.33 However, the Arab Times removed the interview with Wu from its website on the next day, possibly due pressure by the Kuwaiti as well as Chinese governments. The Taiwanese Foreign Ministry condemned China for bullying Arab Times and its attempts to silence Taiwan.34

News about the situation of Muslims in Xinjiang is almost absent in Kuwaiti media. Nevertheless, conversations and observation of social media and analysts following the situation in Kuwait indicate that many Kuwaitis are aware about the reports on the dire conditions that Muslims in Xinjiang are facing, including the existence of concentration camps.

Control over content distribution infrastructure

Several China-based companies with ties to the CCP have made gains in Kuwait’s digital infrastructure and social media sectors, enhancing Chinese influence and creating potential vulnerabilities to future manipulation.35

Huawei—a PRC multinational with close CCP ties and a record of building censorship and surveillance systems in China and abroad—has established a local subsidiary, Huawei Kuwait, that is the infrastructure service provider for all three Kuwaiti telecom companies. Huawei Kuwait is the first Chinese-owned company in the country, and only the second company to have entered the Kuwaiti market without a local sponsor; Kuwait had formerly required foreign companies to have local sponsors, but ended the requirement after establishing the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority (KDIPA) in 2013 to encourage foreign direct investment. In the mobile device market, Huawei and fellow Chinese manufacturers Xiaomi and Oppo have a combined market share of about 18 percent, trailing the market leaders Apple and Samsung, which together occupy nearly 70 percent of the market.36

Huawei has been actively engaged in establishing partnerships with Kuwaiti businesses in communications technology and infrastructure. In July 2018, Kuwait signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Huawei to implement a “smart cities” strategy and improve telecom services as part of Kuwait’s new Vision 2035.37 In October 2019, Huawei’s founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei told a group of Arab journalists in Shenzhen that Huawei wanted to invest in Kuwait’s development projects, particularly high-tech smart cities and public services.38 Huawei also provided information technology and 5G training to 51 Kuwaitis, according to a report for its 2019–20 fiscal year.39

In October 2021, Zain, a digital services provider in Kuwait partially owned by the Kuwaiti government, signed an MoU with Huawei to develop Kuwait’s 5G infrastructure.40 Huawei signed another MoU the following month with Agility Logistics, a Kuwaiti global logistics company, to develop solutions for smart industrial campus services, including AI technologies, at facilities in Kuwait and other locations.41

Huawei’s influence in the country is seen to be increasing, as prominent Kuwaiti political figures have been keen to meet with Huawei’s senior executives. In September 2023, Sheikh Mishal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, Kuwait’s then–crown prince (and current emir as of December 2023), met with Guo Ping, the chairman of Huawei’s supervisory board, and Chang Yi, Huawei’s Middle East and Central Asia chairman, in Hangzhou. Several other senior Kuwaiti officials, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Salem Abdullah al-Jaber al-Sabah, were also in the audience.42

As of 2018, Huawei has completed the first two phases of Kuwait’s three-phase project to build a new fiber-optic cable infrastructure covering most of the country. The project aims at providing coverage for more than 130,000 households in Kuwait.43 The bidding process for these huge endeavors through the Central Agency for Public Tenders seemed to be transparent, although a strategic partnership between Huawei and the KDIPA raises the possibility of undue influence.44

The popularity of TikTok, a global subsidiary of the Beijing-based social media company ByteDance, presents another opportunity for China to influence Kuwait. It is the second most popular app in Kuwait, with 3.22 million users aged 18 and above in the country in early 2023, equivalent to 98.8 percent of all adults in the country. There have been some documented cases around the world in recent years of TikTok removing or downplaying politically sensitive content, including content that violates domestic Chinese censorship guidelines, although the company has subsequently reported correcting errors.45

Dissemination of CCP media norms, tactics, or governance models

Kuwait’s media professionals routinely propagated positive images of China, especially lauding China’s economic development, implying that Kuwait could also learn and benefit from the Chinese government’s approach to governance. For example, after his visit to China together with the delegation of Kuwaiti journalists in December 2019, Saad al-Ali, the KUNA editor-in-chief and deputy director general, commented during a press conference that his visit to China had left a good impression on him. “I felt that China had made great achievements that drew the world’s attention through its diligence and through mutually beneficial cooperation with the international community, becoming the second largest economy in the world,” al-Ali said.46

Chinese diaspora media

The Chinese expatriate and diaspora population in Kuwait is small, likely numbering in the thousands. A limited diaspora media ecosystem appears to consist primarily of digital news sources. Individuals may rely on WeChat or other mainland-based applications subject to Beijing’s domestic censorship regime for news content. Freedom House research identified at least two WeChat accounts run by the Chinese embassy in Kuwait and serving local Chinese speakers. Analysis of the accounts found that they primarily disseminate information like speeches by Xi Jinping, op-eds by the ambassador, and positive news about the BRI and PRC collaboration with Middle Eastern governments.47

header4 Resilience + Response

Underlying media resilience

 

  • Some digital media openness amid limited press freedom: Freedom of the press is limited in Kuwait, with the government exercising strong influence over traditional media. Major newspapers avoid significant criticism of the government, while cybercrime and other legislation criminalize certain reporting or online expression, including regarding the emir or the religion of Islam (see Vulnerabilities). Nevertheless, outside of these topics, media in Kuwait enjoy relative autonomy compared to other Persian Gulf countries, while digital magazines and podcasts have expanded the space for alternative voices.1 Publications like Al-Qabas, Dark Politics and Al-Jarida, among others, have periodically done investigative journalism. Despite criminal penalties imposed for certain online speech, Kuwait’s internet is relatively open, and users have wide access to international social media platforms where they can browse news from around the world, including related to China.
  • New access to information law, restrictions on foreign ownership: In 2020, the National Assembly enacted the Kuwaiti Right to Access Information Act.2 The law contains provisions requiring publication of certain information on government websites and creates a process for citizens or journalists to submit applications for information requests, including online.3 Implementation has reportedly been slow, however, as many Kuwaitis remain unaware of its potential uses to enhance transparency and a 2021 report by a Kuwaiti member of parliament found that 37 percent of public agencies had not yet complied.4 Separately, Kuwaiti law does not permit foreign entities to own media outlets, a more sweeping restriction than in most democracies, but one that also limits the possibility of Chinese state linked entities from purchasing stakes in local news outlets.5

China-specific resilience

  • Occasional critical reporting on China, COVID-19, BRI: In Kuwait, media outlets including Al-Seyasah, Al-Qabas, Al-Anba, the Arab Times, and the Kuwait Times, as well as the think tank Reconnaissance Research, all reported stories critical of Beijing during the coverage period. For example, during the pandemic, Al-Qabas challenged China’s claims on economic recovery, the Chinese government’s handling of the virus,6 the treatment of Uyghurs during the outbreak,7 and the detention of a journalist who exposed the Chinese government’s false claims about the virus.8 In April 2021, the Kuwait Times published an article discussing the implications of the BRI and Chinese influence in the Gulf countries, including comments from Al-Anjeri, the Reconnaissance Research founder and CEO, and from American experts critical of China.9 Instead of reporting on sensitive issues directly, media outlets sometimes would republish reports critical of China by other news agencies, as when the Arab Times ran a December 2020 report by the Associated Press (AP) about secret deals between the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) top disease control agency and several companies that hampered China’s testing capacity at the start of the COVID-19 outbreak.10
  • Independent and critical reporting on Xinjiang: Kuwaiti media occasionally covered the persecution of Uyghurs. For example, in April 2019, Al-Rai published a video report of a Uyghur delegation visiting Muslim countries to discuss China’s treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, providing a platform for the Uyghurs to promote their cause.11 The Uyghur activists said in the video that “Kuwait can be a center for Uyghur activism.” Some media outlets’ Twitter accounts also tweeted videos and reports about the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.12 In June 2020, Kuwait Times covered the release of a report by a German researcher who found that China was forcibly sterilizing Uyghurs.13 In January 2021, Al-Anba reposted a BBC News report critical of China’s treatment of Uyghurs and control of news about the Xinjiang region.14 In April 2021, the Arab Times even went as far as illustrating an article on the complications of dealing with the PRC and Chinese companies with a satellite image of a forced labor camp in Xinjiang.15 In July 2021, Reconnaisssance Research hired a Taiwanese professor as a China expert.16 The same year, the think tank published a study by a Canadian expert on China who has a critical perspective on the PRC.17
  • Parliamentarians question Kuwaiti officials, pro-Uyghur hashtag goes viral: Kuwait’s National Assembly is democratically elected, the only such parliament in the Gulf, and is able to exert some checks on the royal family as well as to give voice to public grievances on a range of issues.18 In this context, although Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs usually stands with the Chinese embassy’s positions, its pro-China narrative has been challenged by Kuwaiti lawmakers. In December 2018, Kuwaiti parliamentarian Osama al-Shaheen took the podium at a press conference to condemn the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs, showing pictures of the persecuted Uyghurs who were sent to the internment camps and urging the Kuwaiti government to punish China.19 The following month, parliamentarians and political figures held an event called “Stand in Solidarity with Muslims in China” on China’s persecution of Muslim minorities.20 Twenty-seven Kuwaiti members of parliament signed a statement in December 2019 condemning the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghurs and urged the Kuwaiti government to intervene and stop the persecution of Muslims in China.21 In February 2020, parliamentarian Mohammad Haif al-Mutairi publicly questioned Kuwait’s foreign minister on the Kuwaiti position toward China’s treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, rejecting both Chinese assertions that the PRC was treating Uyghur Muslims fairly and support for those claims from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).22 In a separate parliamentary meeting with a French delegation, Al-Multairi warned that he would disrupt Chinese-Kuwaiti economic and trade agreements if China continued its discrimination against Uyghur Muslims.23 Members of Parliament have welcomed Taiwanese delegations and Uyghur activists to their offices in parliament.24 For instance, in February 2021, al-Shaheen met with the representative of the Taiwanese commercial office in Kuwait and praised Taiwan’s democratic experience and their treatment of Muslim minorities.25 Such activism by politicians was accompanied by media campaigns, and pro-Uighur hashtags like #الصين_تقتل_مسلمي_الايغور (#China_is_killing_Uighur_Muslims) went viral. Religious organization, such as the Sunni religious group the League of Kuwaiti Preachers, and student unions have also shown support to the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.26
  • 1Reporters Without Borders (RSF), “Kuwait,” in 2023 World Press Freedom Index, RSF, accessed November 4, 2023, https://rsf.org/en/country/kuwait.
  • 2Khaled al-Rashidi, “Red Tape Is Strangling Kuwait’s Infant FOI Law,” 360info, December 1, 2022, https://360info.org/red-tape-is-strangling-kuwaits-infant-foi-law/.
  • 3“Law 12/2020 Right to Access Information,” KDIPA, accessed January 19, 2024, https://kdipa.gov.kw/contact-us/law-12-2020-right-to-access-information/.
  • 4Rashidi, “Red Tape”; عن تنفيذ الجهات الحكومية والشركات المملوكة للدولة أحكام القانون رقم 12 لسنة 2020 في شأن حق الاطلاع على المعلومات (Kuwait City: Office of Representative Dr. Abdulaziz Tariq al-Saqabi, National Assembly (Kuwait), November 2021), https://www.draalsaqobi.com/media/report.pdf.
  • 5“The First Section: The Prints; Article (3),” in “Law No (3) for the Year 2006 on Press and Publications: Kuwait,” MENA Rights Group, accessed January 19, 2024, https://menarights.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/KWT_PressAndPublicat….
  • 6القبس [Al-Qabas] (@alqabas), Al-Qabas Twitter @alqabas, “هل يعيد #كورونا.. اقتصاد الصين إلى نقطة الصفر؟!• المعركة ضد #الفيروس مكلفة جداً.. والمصانع لم تستجب لتوجيهات #الرئيس • محتوى من #الفاينناشيل_تايمز بعد اتفاقيتها مع #القبس”, Twitter, February 18, 2020, https://twitter.com/alqabas/status/1229479394248400897.
  • 7Christian Sheppard and Laura Bettel, Financial Times, “وثائق مسرّبة تكشف الجحيم الذي يعيشه المسلمون.. في الصين”, Al-Qabas, February 17, 2020, https://alqabas.com/article/5752806.
  • 8“الصين فشلت في امتحان «كورونا».. وقتلاه قد يبلغون 40 مليوناً”, Al-Qabas, February 18, 2020, https://alqabas.com/article/5753242; الجريدة [Al-Jarida] (@aljarida), “نشر أخباراً عن فيروس كورونا فغاب أثره... حملة للبحث عن صحفي تحدى الحزب الشيوعي في الصين”, Twitter, February 11, 2020, https://twitter.com/aljarida/status/1227179707474509824.
  • 9“Discussion Explores Implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for Global Economy,” Kuwait Times, April 6, 2021, https://kuwaittimes.com/discussion-explores-implications-of-chinas-belt….
  • 10Associated Press (AP), “Secret Deals Blamed for China Testing Blunders—Virus Spread Undetected,” Arab Times (Kuwait), December 3, 2020, https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/secret-deals-blamed-for-china-test….
  • 11“فيديو| الكويت محطة ناشطي الإيغور للتحدث عن قضية المسلمين”, Al-Rai, video, 5:58, April 13, 2019, https://www.alraimedia.com/article/845546/.
  • 12المقوع نيوز [Al-Maqwa News] @almqwa, “#فيديو لأحد مسلمي الإيغور يناشد فيه العالم للتضامن مع قضية #الإيغور والضغط على #الصين لوقف اعتداءاتها | "قفوا معنا في قضيتنا# صباح_الخير # الكويت #بالبرد_بس_نحتاج # قطر #السعودية @AlawadhiKhaled @AlnbhanMkhld @”, Twitter video, 0:49, December 25, 2019, https://twitter.com/almqwa/status/1209749467093704705; AlziadiQ8 Plus | الزيادي بلس (@AlziadiQ8Plus), “فيديو: تقرير.. الكويت محطة بعض ناشطي الإيغور للتحدث عن قضية المسلمين ومعاناتهم في تركستان الشرقية https://alziadiq8.com/?p=319813”, Twitter, April 13, 2019, https://twitter.com/AlziadiQ8Plus/status/1117159701479690240; سرمد Sarmad (@Sarmad), “فيديو > الكويت محطة بعض ناشطي الإيغور للتحدث عن قضية المسلمين ومعاناتهم”, Twitter video, 5:23, April 13, 2019, https://twitter.com/Sarmad/status/1117143752529850369.
  • 13“China Sterilizing Uighurs to Control Population: Report,” Kuwait Times, June 30, 2020, https://kuwaittimes.com/china-sterilizing-uighurs-to-control-population….
  • 14BBC News, “مسلمو الإيغور: كيف تتحكم الصين بالأخبار الخاصة بإقليم شينجيانغ؟”, Al-Anba, January 16, 2021, https://www.alanba.com.kw/BBCNews/8093.
  • 15“Dealing with China Can Be Complicated”, Arab Times (Kuwait), April 22, 2021, https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/dealing-with-china-can-be-complica….
  • 16Reconnaissance Research ريكونسنس للبحوث والدراسات (@ReconnResearch), “المركز يعين الباحث التايواني البارز، د. آلان هاو يانغ، كزميل غير مقيم وخبير في شؤون الصين. يشغل د. يانغ حالياً منصب أستاذ بجامعة تشنغتشي الوطنية @nccu1927 والمدير التنفيذي لمؤسسة Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation @taef_tw ⬇️الرابط⬇️https://alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news…”, Twitter, July 6, 2021, https://twitter.com/ReconnResearch/status/1412516543997661191.
  • 17Reconnaissance Research, “دراسة خاصة من الباحث الكندي د.تشارلز بيرتون بعنوان: لماذا قد يكون التعامل مع الصين معقدًا؟”, accessed November 5, 2023, https://www.reconnresearch.com/articles-single.php?ad=14.
  • 18Nick El Hajj, “Kuwait, Only Gulf Arab Nation with a Powerful Assembly, Holds Another Election Mired in Gridlock,” AP, June 6, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/kuwait-politics-election-assembly-0fe5240a61….
  • 19ترند [Trend News] (@trendnews_kw), “أسامة الشاهين: هناك اعتبارات شرعية تستوجب معابة #الصين ومحاسبتها لاعتقال مليون و100 ألف مسلم من الأقلية المسلمة ’#الإيغور‘ #مجلس_الامه @OALSHAHEEN,” Twitter video, 1:03, December 31, 2018, https://twitter.com/trendnews_kw/status/1079698122765410304.
  • 20كويتنا | Kuwaitna (@kuwaitnanews), “‌#كويتنا | #فيديو..‌‌‌‌‌ النائب عبدالله فهاد : بيان الحركات الدعوية والسياسية في الكويت : نستنكر جرائم القمع والتنكيل التي يقوم بها النظام الصيني ضد مسلمي تركستان الشرقية #الوقفة_التضامنية_مع_مسلمي_الصين @mhamdhaif @Nayef_Almrdas @Abdllah_fhhad”, Twitter video, 5:52, January 29, 2019, https://twitter.com/kuwaitnanews/status/1090210081864585217.
  • 21“Kuwaiti MPs Urge Help for Uighurs, Indian Muslims,” Anadolu Agency, December 25, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/kuwaiti-mps-urge-help-for-uighurs-….
  • 22ترند [Trend News] (@Trendntwork_kw), “مسلمو #الإيغور في #الصين محور سجال بين محمد هايف ووزير الخارجية #مجلس_الامه #قانون_العفو_الشامل #جلسه_العفو”, Twitter video, 2:11, February 18, 2020, https://twitter.com/Trendntwork_kw/status/1229858121687994368.
  • 23Sebastian Castelier, Twitter, “Kuwait | Parliament member Al Mutiri told me that #China should ‘stop slaughtering Chinese Muslims’ in #Xinjiang, or Silk City talks could be put on hold. On a…,” Twitter, June 6, 2019, https://twitter.com/SCastelier/status/1136361846544486400.
  • 24مرصد الأقليات المسلمة [Observatory for Muslim Minorities] (@turkistantuzbah), “#الكويت قام بعض العلماء والوجهاء الإيغور المقيمين بتركيا بزيارة إلى مجلس الأمة الكويتي بعد دعوة وجهت إليهم، وقد قام بعض النواب باستقبالهم وبالإستماع إليهم. نتمنى أن تتكرر مثل هذه البادرة التي من أهم ما فيها إحياء صلات الرحم بين المسلمين بعد انقطاع دام لعقود طويلة #تركستان_الشرقية”, Twitter, April 8, 2019, https://twitter.com/turkistantuzbah/status/1115320642990235653.
  • 25مكتب #أسامة_الشاهين [Office of #Osama_al-Shaheen] (@OALSHAHEEN_q8), “استقبل النائب #أسامة_الشاهين ممثل مكتب التمثيل التجاري لتايبيه - #تايوان - في #الكويت السيد/ كو تينج تان وبرفقته السكرتير الثالث/ كوان تشو هوانغ، وبحث اللقاء العلاقات التجارية وأشاد ’الشاهين‘ بالممارسة الديمقراطية والحريات الدينية في تايبيه” , Twitter, February 7, 2021, https://twitter.com/OALSHAHEEN_q8/status/1358378632734003203.
  • 26رابطة دعاة الكويت [League of Kuwaiti Preachers] (@do3atq8), “#بيان_رابطة_دعاة_الكويت بشأن المجازر الوحشية والتطهير العرقي ضد #مسلمي_الهند و #تركستان_الشرقية قال تعالى : (قَدْ بَدَتِ الْبَغْضَاءُ مِنْ أَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَمَا تُخْفِي صُدُورُهُمْ أَكْبَرُ ۚ قَدْ بَيَّنَّا لَكُمُ الْآيَاتِ ۖ إِن كُنتُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ #مسلمي_الإيغور”, Twitter, December 31, 2019, https://twitter.com/do3atq8/status/1212080358814031872; NUKS UK [National Union of Kuwaiti Students—UK Branch] (@UKNUKS), “يتضامن الاتحاد الوطني لطلبة الكويت فرع المملكة المتحدة مع شعب الإيغور المسلم في الصين، ويدعو الحكومات العربية والإسلامية لتحمل مسؤولياتها والتحرك العاجل لإنقاذهم والدفاع عنهم #NUKS”, Twitter, December 24, 2019, https://twitter.com/UKNUKS/status/1209527440240005122.

header5 Vulnerabilities

  • Tight media controls, lack of independent regulator: The Kuwaiti state actively controls the country’s media environment and provides few legal or political safeguards for independent, critical journalism. Strict media-licensing regulations have hindered the development of smaller independent and digital outlets. The 2016 Cyber Crimes Law imposes prison sentences of up to 10 years and fines for online speech that insults Islam or criticizes the emir or judicial officials. The media regulator, the Commission for Mass Communications and Information Technology (CMCIT), has sweeping powers to monitor, block, and censor online material. The government can seek the revocation of a media outlet’s license via the judiciary.1
  • Criminalization of reporting that could hurt foreign relations: The Cyber Crime Law also criminalizes speech that criticizes foreign leaders, including those in China. Article 13 of Kuwait’s penal code also criminalizes acts that could be considered to jeopardize relations with friendly nations. Such potentially harsh penalties, along with a zero-tolerance approach to negative reporting by the Chinese embassy—which has included complaints to the Kuwaiti government about coverage in local news outlets—incentivizes extreme caution by the media and think tanks when publishing information about China.
  • 1Freedom House, “Kuwait.”

header6 Impact and Public Opinion

There are no public opinion surveys on Kuwaiti views regarding human rights in China. However, in terms of economic relations, 49 percent of Kuwaitis responding preferred stronger economic ties with China, according to a 2021 Arab Barometer survey.1 Another survey by Arab Barometer found that China is the most popular global power in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with citizens from the region being more open to stronger ties with China than with the United States or Russia. On average, those living in the MENA region are 13 points more likely to favor closer economic ties with China than with the U.S. China’s greater popularity extends to Kuwait, which had some of the highest margins in favor of China—+19 points compared to the United States.2 However, in 2019, when Arab Barometer asked Kuwaitis if they thought Chinese were good people, 42 percent of them said that they did not know, revealing the overall relative ignorance of China among the population.

In another study published in 2018, 38 percent of Kuwaitis surveyed believed that the Chinese government’s position towards Arab issues is positive and supportive, while 30 percent believe that China supports Palestine. China has made statements backing Palestinian statehood. The belief among some Arabs that China backs Arab causes is in contrast to their view of the United States, which is seen as imperialist and a great supporter of Israel.3

Despite such apparent success, observations and conversations with locals indicate that most ordinary citizens and members of civil society are aware of China’s mistreatment of Uyghur Muslims, and condemn the Kuwaiti government’s position of supporting the Chinese government’s denials of abuse or “antiterrorism” justifications. Over 45 percent of Kuwaitis in one survey believed that Kuwaiti media lacks coverage of general China news, while about 30 percent said they follow China-related news on social media, which is likely how information countering the regime’s propaganda on Xinjiang has reached local audiences.4 From this perspective, it would appear that the Chinese regime’s influence is more significant in terms of affecting the Kuwaiti government’s decision-making than in changing the views of average citizens.

header7 Future Trajectory

The following are potential developments related to Beijing’s media influence in Kuwait that should be closely monitored in the coming years.

  • Increased efforts to influence public opinion on Xinjiang: As the human rights crisis facing Muslim populations in Xinjiang evolves and new revelations of abuse emerge from international media and scholars, watch for how the CCP’s propaganda apparatus in Kuwait responds and whether its narratives are able to gain traction among the public and lawmakers critical of the Chinese government’s policies in the region. Watch specifically for new op-eds by the ambassador; more visits to Xinjiang for journalists, officials, or Islamic leaders; or renewed government-sponsored delegations from Xinjiang or other parts of China visiting Kuwait.
  • Application of existing legislation for censorship or transparency: Watch for whether, in the interest of protecting bilateral ties, the Kuwaiti government makes use of the 2016 Cyber Crimes Law or penal code provision that criminalizes reporting that jeopardizes foreign relations to silence investigative reporting or commentary related to China. On the other hand, watch for whether any journalists or civil society groups makes use of the new 2020 Right to Access Information Act to uncover details regarding Chinese investments or ties to Kuwaiti elites.
  • Activating latent influence via information infrastructure: As China-based companies with close ties to the CCP—namely Huawei and ByteDance’s Tiktok—gain further market share in Kuwait’s content distribution infrastructure, including a new 5G network, watch for any indications of politicized content restrictions or surveillance being implemented in favor of the Chinese or Kuwaiti governments.

On Kuwait

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Country Facts

  • Population

    4,269,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    31 100 not free