The president is elected to a six-year term and cannot be reelected. In June 2024, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo of Morena took 59.4 percent of the vote. Xóchitl Gálvez Ruiz—backed by an opposition coalition comprised of the National Action Party (PAN), Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and Democratic Revolution Party (PRD)—received 27.9 percent. Jorge Álvarez Máynez of Citizens’ Movement took 10.4 percent. Turnout stood at 60.9 percent.

The election period was marked by significant violence. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project recorded more than 330 violent incidents between March 2024 and election day. Local candidates represented the single largest group of targets, though former officials, officials not running for reelection, and relatives also faced violence. According to Integralia, a security firm, 37 political candidates were assassinated during the election campaign.

Senators, numbering 128, are elected for six-year terms through a mix of direct voting and proportional representation, with at least two parties represented in each state’s delegation. In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the bicameral Congress, 300 members are elected through direct representation and 200 through proportional representation, each for three-year terms. Senators are eligible to serve up to two six-year terms, and deputies are permitted to serve up to four three-year terms.

In the June 2024 legislative elections, held concurrently with the presidential and gubernatorial races, an alliance of Morena, the Workers’ Party, and the Green Party received 54.7 percent of votes for the Chamber of Deputies. However, electoral authorities interpreted guidelines for the allocation of proportional-representation seats in such a way as to grant Morena and its allies 364 seats, or 73 percent of the chamber. In the Senate, Morena and its allies initially won 83 seats. In August, the PRD’s two senators joined Morena, leaving the governing coalition just short of a supermajority in that chamber.

Morena candidates won seven of the nine gubernatorial races held in June 2024.

The National Electoral Institute (INE) supervises elections and enforces political party laws, including strict regulations on campaign financing and the content of political advertising. While recent elections were generally considered free and fair, the INE and the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) struggled to comprehensively address problems including misuse of public funds, vote buying, and nontransparent campaign financing.

The administration of the June 2024 balloting was considered successful. However, electoral authorities were constitutionally unable to sanction López Obrador despite TEPJF rulings that he had violated electoral law with his conduct and statements. The INE and the TEPJF interpreted constitutional guidance on allotting proportional-representation seats in a way that gave the Morena-led coalition a lower-house supermajority, though observers and former electoral officials argued that their interpretation was incorrect.

While in office, López Obrador made two attempts to alter the Mexican electoral system and weaken the INE and TEPJF, with the second struck down by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) in 2023. A draft budget considered by lawmakers in December 2024 included cuts for the INE, despite it being tasked with administering the election of judges under the government’s judicial reform plan.

Mexico’s multiparty system features few official restrictions on political organization and activity. Opposition parties have been competitive in many states, and independent candidacies are becoming more common. Morena includes a wide range of ideological and political currents, and internal tensions are visible. The major opposition parties have tended to form anti-Morena alliances bridging supposed ideological differences.

While power had routinely changed hands at the national level since 2000, Morena appears to be consolidating its position as the country’s dominant party. Morena’s legislative position was bolstered by the electoral authorities’ interpretation of the constitution when deciding seat allotments after the June 2024 elections, giving the Morena-led alliance a lower-house supermajority. Morena and its allies performed well at the municipal level, though opposition parties won significant local representation.

Opposition candidates and members are incentivized to defect to Morena due to its prominence. Many notable Morena members were formerly affiliated with opposition parties. Morena has also used social spending to consolidate its political advantages.

One of Mexico’s most important historical opposition parties, the PRD, failed to pass the necessary 3-percent vote threshold to retain its registration in the June 2024 election. Two PRD senators defected to Morena at the start of the legislative term.

Proposed constitutional reforms to the electoral system, which President Sheinbaum plans to introduce in early 2025, could weaken the INE and TEPJF and eliminate proportional representation in Congress, making it more difficult for opposition parties to gain power.

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 due to the electoral authorities’ interpretation of proportional-representation rules, which allowed the governing alliance to obtain a lower-house supermajority and placed opposition forces at a significant disadvantage in their efforts to win office.

Criminal groups exert powerful influence on Mexico’s politics through threats and violence against candidates, election officials, and campaign workers, particularly at the local level. During the 2023–24 electoral cycle, 37 candidates were assassinated, and in October 2024, the mayor of Guerrero was murdered days after taking office.

Mexico has a large Indigenous population, and Indigenous people and groups are free to participate in politics. There are some provisions for the integration of Indigenous community customs in electing leaders in some states, though only for local authorities. In practice, Indigenous people remain severely underrepresented in political institutions. Mexico’s small Afro-Mexican population is similarly underrepresented in national politics, though they are recognized in the constitution. For the June 2024 elections, parties were obliged to meet affirmative-action quotas for the inclusion of women candidates, and congressional candidacies were allocated to Indigenous, Afro-Mexican, disabled, and LGBT+ individuals.

Gender parity exists in both chambers of Congress after the June 2024 polls. Additionally, 68 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 11 seats in the Senate held by are affirmative-action candidates. Women won four of the nine gubernatorial elections held in June 2024. President Sheinbaum is the country’s first woman and first Jewish person to become president. After taking office, Sheinbaum announced the creation of a new cabinet-level women’s ministry and has sent Congress several constitutional reform proposals regarding women’s rights.

Organized crime and related violence have limited the governing authority of elected officials in some areas. Members of organized crime groups have infiltrated some local governments in order to plunder municipal coffers and ensure their own impunity, a practice that has influenced electoral dynamics.

In some regions, the provision of public services has become more difficult, as public-sector employees face extortion and pressure to divert public funds. In other areas, violent conflicts have forced officials to leave. SEDENA has considerable leverage over the design of security policies, and its increasing involvement in civil engineering projects has prompted concern about further institutional politicization.

While former President López Obrador is no longer in elected office, he maintains significant influence through the ruling party. His son, Andrés Manuel López Beltrán, was named to a high-ranking position within Morena in September 2024 and the former president appears likely to remain the country’s chief political power broker.

Official corruption remains a serious problem. Despite Mexico’s relatively comprehensive anticorruption framework, implementation is lacking and high levels of impunity persist. The billions of dollars in illegal drug money that enter the country each year from the United States profoundly affect politics, as does rampant public-contract fraud and other forms of siphoning off state funds. Weak police and judicial capacity limits efforts to prosecute government officials.

The López Obrador administration made the pursuit of corruption a mantra, and a series of prominent figures from the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto, López Obrador’s immediate predecessor, have been indicted or arrested on graft charges. However, critics described López Obrador’s anticorruption efforts as politicized and generally ineffective, resulting in few convictions. Investigations involving government allies and favored institutions are rare or perfunctory.

Several freedom-of-information laws passed since 2002 have strengthened transparency at the federal level, though enforcement is uneven across states, and the López Obrador administration systematically failed to provide accurate or transparent information. In recent years, the government has failed to release relevant information on some of the country’s most controversial issues and has generally performed poorly in terms of transparency.

In late November 2024, Congress approved a constitutional reform that eliminated several autonomous institutions, including the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Personal Data Protection (INAI), the independence of which López Obrador had previously sought to curtail. Under the reform, which was rapidly ratified by state congresses, a new ministry would be charged with providing access to government information. Experts believe that the reform will result in less transparency and have noted that the loss of integrated access-to-information systems will make it harder to hold government to account.

The military is the country’s least transparent institution. The National Guard and the military remain largely unaccountable, particularly regarding security operations. Both institutions routinely fail to fully report arrest records to the National Detention Registry or release legally mandated reports on use of force. SEDENA has obstructed efforts to investigate the high-profile disappearance of 43 students in Guerrero in 2014 and refused to cooperate with government-backed commissions examining abuses committed by the military between 1965 and 1990. In August 2024, the commission investigating that period released its report, stating that the government had engaged in widespread human rights abuses.

Compounding the government’s lack of transparency is the expanding role of the military in civilian tasks. Under López Obrador, SEDENA was tasked with administering the construction of several signature projects. A 2021 decree shielding public infrastructure projects from transparency and other administrative requirements was denounced by transparency advocates and has allowed military construction projects to remain largely free of independent oversight.

The security environment for journalists remains highly challenging. Reporters probing police issues, drug trafficking, and official corruption face serious risk of physical harm. According to the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), seven journalists were killed in Mexico in 2024, one of whom was originally reported missing in 2020. Journalists have also been kidnapped, threatened, and held hostage due to their work. Despite several convictions in prominent cases of murdered journalists in recent years, approximately 90 percent of cases of journalists who are killed are unresolved.

López Obrador persistently and publicly attacked the press while in office, often chastising and demeaning specific reporters and news outlets. Gangs have engaged in threats and violence against bloggers and online journalists who report on organized crime. Self-censorship has increased, with many newspapers in violent areas avoiding publishing stories concerning organized crime.

The Federal Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists (MFPPDDHP) within the Ministry of the Interior has successfully protected hundreds of activists and reporters, providing them safe houses, panic buttons, and bodyguards. However, the mechanism is underfunded and has not always proved effective. Journalists actively receiving protection have been murdered; in March 2024, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that eight journalists receiving MFPPDDHP protection had been murdered over the last seven years.

Media outlets depend on government advertising and subsidies, which can limit critical coverage and journalists reporting on government media spending have been harassed. The López Obrador administration failed to comply with guidelines on media spending and channeled funds to outlets that provided friendly coverage.

Religious freedom is constitutionally protected and is generally respected in practice, though religious minorities, particularly Indigenous Evangelical communities in Chiapas, face occasional persecution by local authorities.

While the government has generally refrained from restricting academic freedom, López Obrador and other officials have frequently stigmatized universities as “neoliberal” institutions whose political orientation had “moved right.”

While there are no formal impediments to free and open discussion, fear of criminal monitoring restricts citizens’ willingness to converse publicly about crime in some areas. Government agencies, including the military, also monitor online speech. In February 2024, the Network in Defense of Digital Rights reported that a covert division of SEDENA was monitoring the social media profiles of those who criticize the government or the military.

The constitution guarantees the right to peacefully assemble. Protests are frequent, though political and civic expression is restricted in some regions, and police frequently use excessive force and detain protesters arbitrarily. Security forces have used sexual violence as a form of oppression against women protesters in recent years.

Mexicans opposing Morena’s judicial reform plans held protests beginning in August 2024, when judicial workers began a strike. In early September, as legislators began a new session, protesters sought to block entry into the Chamber of Deputies, prompting members to meet elsewhere. In mid-September, as senators met to decide on the reform proposal, protesters stormed the Senate floor, though senators went to a different location to cast their votes.

Although highly active, NGOs sometimes face violent resistance. Environmental activists and representatives of Indigenous groups contesting large-scale infrastructure projects have been particularly vulnerable. According to a report released by Global Witness in September 2024, 18 environmental and land rights activists were killed in Mexico in 2023. At least seven human rights activists were murdered in 2024 according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, including prominent peace advocate and priest Marcelo Pérez, who was killed in Chiapas in October. The MFPPDDHP has provided physical security for hundreds of activists since its 2012 inception, though rights groups consider it sluggish and subject to government neglect.

In 2023, investigative reporting revealed that SEDENA used Pegasus spyware to surveil human rights defenders and civil society actors in recent years, despite then-President López Obrador’s claims that the military does not engage in such activities. SEDENA has not reported obtaining judicial authorization for such surveillance.

Civil society members freely criticize state policies, but López Obrador’s penchant for dismissing criticism and insulting perceived opponents generated tension between the former president and civil society organizations.

Trade union membership has diminished significantly in recent decades. In 2019, major labor reform brought hope of an end to the rampant use of informal, nontransparent negotiations between employers and politically connected union leaders creating “protection contracts” never seen by workers. Violations of union protections and antiunion practices remain commonplace.

In September 2024, lawmakers passed a sweeping judicial reform championed by then-outgoing President López Obrador, making all judges, including magistrates, SCJN justices, and TEPJF members, elected rather than appointed. The SCJN will have 9 justices under the reform, down from 11. While professional career judges had uneven success in addressing corruption and organized crime, observers voiced deep concern that the reform will threaten judicial independence.

With the reform, candidates for judicial positions who meet established criteria will be evaluated and selected by committees. Judges will then be chosen in popular elections overseen by the INE, with the first polls due in June 2025. Many members of these committees have strong ties to Morena. The reform also allows for anonymous judges in organized crime cases for their protection, though that provision has been criticized by international organizations for violating due process. Profound concerns persist about whether the process will result in elected justices owing loyalty to political parties.

The SCJN has been regarded in recent years as generally independent, but a series of justices viewed as close to the government were appointed under López Obrador, raising concerns about its autonomy. López Obrador has also acknowledged exerting pressure on SCJN decisions while in office. In late 2023, López Obrador directly appointed a Morena party member and former legislator, Lenia Batres Guadarrama, to the SCJN after the Senate failed to garner two-thirds majority support for candidates he had nominated.

Mexico’s justice system is plagued by delays, unpredictability, and corruption, which often lead to impunity for perpetrators of crimes. A lack of political commitment to prosecutorial autonomy and disinterest in deep reform has limited the efficacy of a 2018 overhaul of the prosecutorial services. There is considerable concern about the autonomy of the Attorney General’s Office from the executive branch.

Widespread bribery, limited capacity, and weak coordination undermine the integrity of the lower courts and law enforcement agencies. Mexican government statistics from 2023 indicate that over the past decade, more than 90 percent of crimes have gone unreported, largely because police were viewed as either inept or in league with criminals. Widely publicized raids often result in the release of accused criminals due to grave procedural deficiencies. The militarization of law enforcement has contributed to the problem, as military operations often fail to obtain proper judicial orders, collect evidence, and follow due process.

Amid faltering efforts to improve investigative and prosecutorial competence and efficacy, the López Obrador administration sought to harden penalties and limit defendants’ rights, producing a sharp rise in the use of preventive detention and a rapidly increasing rate of prisoners in pretrial detention, most of whom are poor people charged with minor crimes. Notably, the judicial reform passed in September 2024 expands mandatory pretrial detention, despite criticism of this practice from human rights organizations.

Mexicans are subject to the threat of violence at the hands of multiple actors, including individual criminals, criminal gangs that operate with impunity, and police officers who are often susceptible to bribery. Under López Obrador, violence remained at record levels, and security strategy became increasingly militarized, leading to concerns about human rights and transparency.

Under the constitutional reforms passed in September 2024, control of the National Guard was ceded to SEDENA, formally militarizing an institution that had been created in 2019 as a nominally civilian force. With this reform, all branches of the military received expanded powers of domestic law enforcement, with the National Guard receiving new powers of investigation. Additionally, National Guard members will largely fall under the military justice system.

Abuses during arrests and criminal investigations are rife, and detainees report routine physical abuse while being detained and held. Though the 2017 General Law on Torture has contributed to mild progress in excluding torture-based confessions from prosecutions, impunity remains almost universal. Mexican prisons remain highly unsafe, with inmates commonly engaging in criminal activity while incarcerated.

Human rights advocates consistently express concern about a lack of accountability for abuses committed by members of the military, including torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. A 2023 independent journalistic investigation documented more than 1,500 enforced disappearances or extrajudicial executions by security forces between 2006 and 2022. Only a handful of soldiers have been convicted in civilian courts for abuses against civilians, despite myriad reports implicating state security forces in grave human rights abuses.

Forced disappearances remain a nationwide crisis. The 2017 General Law on Disappearances removed the statute of limitations on missing-persons crimes, but progress remains very limited and prosecutions are exceedingly rare. As of late 2024, missing-persons cases in the national registry numbered over 120,000.

Homicides have plateaued in recent years but remained near historic highs in 2024. Forensic capacity continues to lag: more than 72,000 bodies were unidentified as of September.

Violence linked to organized crime was particularly acute in Baja California, Chihuahua, Colima, Morelos, and Sinaloa. While large organizations like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel continue to drive insecurity in some areas, the splintering of other criminal groups, along with the diversification of their revenue sources, has made efforts to combat the violence even more daunting.

Mexican law bans discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, age, religion, and sexual orientation, and a September 2024 constitutional reform enshrined protections for Indigenous and Afro-Mexican communities. Nevertheless, lighter-skinned Mexicans enjoy substantial social advantage compared to Indigenous people and other distinct groups including Afro-Mexicans. The large Indigenous population experiences social and economic discrimination, and approximately 77 percent of Indigenous people live in poverty. Southern states with high concentrations of Indigenous residents suffer from deficient services.

LGBT+ people have strong legal protections which are unevenly enforced. Transgender women in particular face discrimination and violence.

Migrants from Central America and other regions, many of whom move through Mexico to reach the United States, have long experienced persecution, abuses by police and officials, and criminal predation. In October 2024, soldiers opened fire on a truck carrying migrants in Chiapas, killing six.

Citizens are legally free to change their place of residence, employment, and education. However, criminal activity has significantly impacted freedom of movement across much of the country. In certain zones, criminal groups monitor and restrict movement. In conflict zones such as Michoacán and Guerrero it is unsafe to travel across certain territories controlled by criminal groups. It is also common for criminal groups to block roads. Ordinary citizens report feeling unsafe when traveling on highways and avoid roads in many rural areas after dark.

Forced displacement has also affected many communities, including rural ones. In a September 2024 data sheet, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that increasing criminal violence and land disputes had driven internal displacement. The UNHCR cited data from the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights covering the first 11 months of 2023, which recorded 42 incidents displacing at least 10,850 people. Later in 2024, the UNHCR reported large-scale displacement in several states between August and October due to criminal violence.

Property rights in Mexico are protected by a modern legal framework, but the weakness of the judicial system, frequent solicitation of bribes by bureaucrats and officials, and the high incidence of criminal extortion harm security of property for many individuals and businesses. Large-scale development projects, including high-priority López Obrador–era initiatives, have been accompanied by corruption and rights-related controversy in recent years.

Criminal actors illegally dispossess individuals of properties by violently occupying ranches or farms. Individuals have also been coerced to transfer legal ownership of property to criminals or corrupt officials.

Sexual abuse and domestic violence against women are common in Mexico and impunity for perpetrators is the norm. Government policies intended to address gender-based violence have been largely ineffective. Implementation of a 2007 law designed to protect women from such crimes remains halting. According to official statistics, 733 femicides were recorded through November 2024; some nongovernmental sources say the true number is likely much higher.

The government has made some efforts to combat violence and promote gender equality, but the López Obrador administration cut funding for women’s services, and the former president often dismissed feminists as allies of the political opposition. The incumbent Sheinbaum administration’s proposed budget for 2025 contained cuts for women’s-issues initiatives, including programs to combat gender-based violence.

Abortion has been a contentious issue in recent years. In a landmark ruling in 2021, the SCJN declared laws criminalizing abortion unconstitutional. A September 2023 ruling found that laws prohibiting abortion were unconstitutional, violated women’s rights, and must be removed from the federal penal code. Although the ruling fully decriminalized abortion nationwide, it did not alter local-level laws, and abortion remains illegal in many states. However, the ruling required the country’s federal public health service and institutions to offer abortion-related care across the country, even in states where the procedure remains illegal.

Mexico has taken steps toward equality for LGBT+ people, though significant cultural and legal barriers persist. A 2015 SCJN decision overruled state laws defining the purpose of marriage as procreation. Legislators in the states of Guerrero and Tamaulipas voted to legalize same-sex marriage in late 2022, becoming the last of Mexico’s 32 states to do so. Some 23 states allow gender-identity changes on identification documents as of 2024.

Economic opportunity is limited in Mexico, which maintains a high rate of economic inequality. Migrant agricultural workers face brutally exploitative conditions in several northern states. In 2018, the SCJN ruled that Mexico’s millions of domestic workers—the vast majority of whom are women—must be incorporated into the formal sector and receive social security and health benefits, though progress remains faltering. While in office, López Obrador increased some forms of redistributive spending and sharply increased Mexico’s minimum wage.

Labor rights provisions of the 2020 United States–Mexico–Canada free trade agreement have facilitated some workers’ demands against abusive employers and complicit unions.

Mexico is a major source, transit, and destination country for trafficking in persons, including women and children, many of whom are subject to forced labor and sexual exploitation. Organized criminal gangs are involved in human trafficking in Mexico and into the United States.