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Freedom on the Net 2024

Serbia

Free
70
100
A Obstacles to Access 21 25
B Limits on Content 25 35
C Violations of User Rights 24 40
Last Year's Score & Status
71 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Serbia_hero

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023–May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Serbia continued to decline during the coverage period due to reports that activists were targeted with spyware and the increasingly dominant position of the state-owned Telekom Serbia in both the telecommunications market. While Serbia features high levels of internet access, limited website blocking, and strong constitutional protections for journalists, progovernment news sites and trolls engage in disinformation campaigns and journalists continue to face strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

  • Telekom Serbia continued to increase its market share in the telecommunications markets and in October 2023, the government passed a law enabling the company to purchase news outlets, creating a potential avenue for the government to exercise influence over the online media market (see A4 and B6).
  • A report from the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) found that progovernment media “actively campaigned” for the ruling party ahead of the December 2023 elections, which civil society claimed was marred by alleged fraud and manipulation (see B5).
  • In October 2023, forensic analysis confirmed that two individuals who worked in civil society had their mobile devices targeted by a spyware attack consistent with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware (see C5).
  • In May 2024, the director of the daily tabloid Srpski telegraf attacked Vuk Cvijić, a journalist working at the independent weekly newsmagazine Radar, after Cvijić had published articles online about a former Novi Sad police official and his links to the tabloid director (see C7).

header2 Political Overview

Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with competitive multiparty elections. In recent years the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Serbia’s internet service is generally reliable, and the internet penetration rate has increased in recent years. According to 2023 data from the Statistical Office of Serbia, 85.6 percent of Serbian households had an internet connection, with 89.3 percent using fixed-line broadband service and 76.9 percent using mobile broadband.1 Based on 2023 data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 85.4 percent of Serbians have access to the internet. According to 2023 data from the ITU, Serbia has a mobile broadband penetration rate of 114 percent—indicating that the country had more mobile broadband subscriptions than people—and a fixed-line broadband penetration rate of 31.3 percent.2 Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index from February 2024 registered median download speeds in Serbia at 53.05 megabits per second (Mbps) for mobile connection and 77.07 Mbps for fixed-line broadband connection.3

Most internet users have some form of digital subscriber line (DSL) connection, and 4G mobile internet technology is also widely available. Telekom Serbia, the state-owned telecommunications firm, has dramatically accelerated the development of its fiber-optic network in the last few years. Cable companies, which have long been a major factor in the development of high-speed internet in the country, also continue to invest in fiber-optic technology. In 2020, the state launched a program to build fiber-optic infrastructure in previously neglected areas.4

Serbia has cultivated a strategic partnership in telecommunications with Chinese companies since 2017, when the government and the Chinese firm Huawei signed two nonbinding agreements concerning “smart cities” (see C5) and the development of broadband internet service. The relationship forms part of Beijing’s plan for a Chinese-led Digital Silk Road (DSR), for which Serbia would be a European hub, as part of China’s wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).5

Although Serbia is not formally part of the Clean Network, a US-led initiative that identifies the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE as “untrusted” technology vendors, the Serbian government signed an economic agreement with the US government in 2020, in which it pledged not to use 5G equipment from those deemed “untrusted.” That 2020 agreement did not explicitly name Chinese technology vendors as such.6

Originally planned to launch in 2021, the 5G network rollout in Serbia has been postponed.7 In March 2024, acting minister of information and telecommunications Mihailo Jovanović announced that Serbia will open an auction for the 5G network later in the year.8 There were no further updates as of the end of the coverage period.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Internet service in Serbia is relatively affordable, although access to fixed-line broadband connections is more expensive than mobile access. According to 2023 data from the ITU, a 5 gigabyte (GB) fixed-line broadband subscription costs 2.17 percent of monthly gross national income (GNI) per capita, and 2 GB of mobile data costs 0.72 percent of monthly GNI per capita.1 The Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development has stated that “entry level broadband services” should cost less than 2 percent of monthly GNI per capita in countries considered low- or middle-income.2

There is a digital divide between urban and less populous areas, though it has narrowed in recent years. Per 2023 annual data from the Statistical Office of Serbia, there are substantial differences in terms of internet connectivity between urban centers, where 88.9 percent of households have access to the internet, and smaller settlements and villages, where 79.8 percent of households have access to the internet. The highest penetration rate is in Belgrade (93.1 percent), the capital and most populous city in Serbia, while there is lower penetration in the northern province of Vojvodina (84.6 percent), central and western Serbia (83.3 percent), and southern and eastern Serbia (80.3 percent).3

Levels of internet access among households also depend on socioeconomic conditions. Internet connections are present in 99.1 percent of households with a monthly income of more than €760 ($830), while households with a monthly income between €255 ($279) and €426 ($466) lag at 77.1 percent.4

Although the Law on Electronic Communications prescribes that universal service be provided on a technologically neutral basis, with prescribed quality and at affordable prices for people with disabilities and socially disadvantaged people,5 in recent years there has been little progress in the implementation of universal service at more favorable prices for these users.6

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government did not disrupt or restrict access to the internet during the coverage period, and it has no past record of imposing internet shutdowns amid elections or other national events.

The infrastructure of internet service providers (ISPs) is not centralized, even though the state holds a majority stake in Telekom Serbia,1 one of the largest providers. Serbian Open eXchange (SOX),2 the country’s internet exchange point, is a private entity with a decentralized network.3

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 3.003 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 to reflect the increasingly dominant position of Telekom Serbia in both the mobile and fixed-line broadband markets.

Telekom Serbia holds the largest shares of both the mobile and fixed-line broadband markets. Already the most widely used and distributed ISP, following continued acquisition of smaller telecommunications companies it grew to control over 50 percent of the country’s broadband internet market as of 2021.1 A May 2023 European Parliament report urged the European Investment Bank (EIB) to review its €70 million loan ($72.5 million) to Telekom Serbia because of the company’s dominant market position (see B6).2

Based on an electronic communications market report issued by Serbia’s Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (RATEL) for the fourth quarter of 2023, 44.2 percent of the estimated 8.5 million mobile telephone subscribers have accounts with Telekom Serbia,3 while two other telecoms, Yettel and A1 Serbia, controlling most of the rest of the market with 31.9 percent and 24 percent, respectively. Telekom Serbia and Serbia Broadband (SBB) have a tight grip on the fixed-line broadband market. Of the 2.07 million fixed-line broadband subscribers in 2023, Telekom Serbia holds 55.9 percent, with SBB servicing 28.1 percent of the market.4

In July 2023, Telekom Serbia acquired Globaltel, a telecommunications company, for an undisclosed price.5 In January 2021, Telekom Serbia confirmed that it had signed an agreement to rent out fiber-optic cables to Yettel.6

In April 2021, United Media and SBB, which are both part of Netherlands-based United Group,7 filed a criminal complaint against Telekom Serbia and Telenor for allegedly concluding a restrictive agreement that would effectively force the plaintiffs out of the market.8 After almost two years, the prosecutor from the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor's Office that was initially assigned to the case was removed from her post, which an opposition National Assembly member alleged was linked to her separate investigation into a state-owned electric company,9 and the case was given to another prosecutor who promptly dismissed it.10 In response to the complaint, Telekom Serbia filed lawsuit suit alleging that the cable news channel N1 and the Nova.rs media portal, which are owned by the United Group, were reporting critically on the state operator in a way which could constitute an act of unfair competition, and asked for €80 million ($82.9 million) in compensation. That suit was dismissed by the Commercial Court in May 2022.11

There are no significant legal barriers to market entry. According to the Law on Electronic Communications,12 any company can provide telecommunications services if it fulfills general requirements and applies to RATEL.13 Individual licenses are only issued for limited resources such as radio frequencies. The Law on Electronic Communications mostly aligns with European Union (EU) rules.14

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4.004 4.004

RATEL, the agency that is responsible for regulating the telecommunications, including the fixed-line broadband sectors, operates transparently.1 The Ministry for Information and Telecommunications (MIT), formerly the Ministry for Trade, Tourism, and Telecommunications, is responsible for oversight of the agency, which is mandated by the Law on Electronic Communications as well as RATEL’s 2016 statute.2 There is no single state body or authority tasked with overseeing or regulating internet content in Serbia.

RATEL has two main operating entities—the Managing Board and the agency director. Members of the Managing Board are chosen by the National Assembly, based on a public competition administered by the MIT. The board’s members are not formally appointed based on political affiliation, though the assembly’s majority coalition can vote for its preferred candidates. The board in turn chooses the agency director from among candidates who are also selected based on a public competition. In August 2020, Dragan Pejović, who had previously worked on issues related to Serbia’s postal service, was unanimously elected to a five-year term as the director of RATEL, replacing Vladica Tintor.3

RATEL is financially independent from the executive branch, as its funding comes from various fees (for example, those for the use of frequencies) paid by service providers. However, any excess funds must be transferred to the state budget.4

The appointment process of RATEL’s Managing Board is formally transparent; the competitions are announced publicly, the list of selected candidates is also publicized, and the National Assembly sessions at which lawmakers discuss the appointments are streamed live on the internet. Different stakeholders, including industry associations, cannot officially propose candidates, since that could negatively affect RATEL’s commitment to impartiality. In practice, members of previous boards have not acted impartially.5 Decisions made by RATEL’s director and Managing Board are available on the agency website, along with records of board meetings and the permits the agency has granted.6 RATEL regularly holds public consultations on acts under its jurisdiction, as it and the MIT are obliged to do under Articles 36 and 37 of the Law on Electronic Communications.7

The Serbian National Internet Domain Registry (RNIDS), a privately owned and operated entity, manages the registry of Serbia’s top-level country code domains (.rs and .срб) and critical internet infrastructure.8

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 5 to 6 because there have been no reported incidents of website blocking in recent years.

In general, content is widely accessible, and no political, cultural, or social content has been blocked. During the coverage period, there were no reported instances of the government ordering website blocking or filtering.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

The government rarely removes online content that is protected under international human rights standards from the internet.

In April 2023, the Serbian daily newspaper Večernje Novosti released a profile on US ambassador Christopher Hill, in which they criticized his alleged negative attitudes towards Serbia. The article was promptly removed from the outlet’s website, but the title is still visible through search engines and news aggregators.1

Exclusion of intermediary liability for third-party content is established in the Law on Electronic Commerce,2 which is based on the principles of the EU Electronic Commerce Directive. The law contains a chapter titled “Intermediary Liability” (Articles 16–20), which establishes the criteria for exclusion of intermediary liability for different types of service provision, including hosting and caching, as well as the notice-and-takedown procedure.

However, amendments to Serbia’s Trademark Law adopted in March 2020 allow claims to be filed not only against those who have infringed upon the rights holder, but also against the intermediaries whose services were being used in the infringement.3 According to the amendments, a breach of license agreement is therefore considered trademark infringement, and violators can be subject to criminal liability. In this instance, the licensee may be obliged to reveal documents related to the breach, as well as the channels and persons who have participated in the infringement.4

In its transparency reports covering 2023, Meta disclosed that it did not remove any content based on requests from the Serbian government.5 Google received one removal request from the Serbian government in the period from January to June 2023 on the basis of privacy and security and four requests from July to December 2023 concerning copyright and defamation.6 The company fulfilled one of the requests in the latter period. X has not produced a transparency report covering Serbia since December 2021.7

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

Restrictions on the internet are minimal. Serbia does not have a specific law regulating online content, and general media laws, such as the Law on Public Information and Media and the Law on Electronic Media,1 are not currently used to stifle or restrict online speech.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Self-censorship does occur in Serbia, particularly among government-aligned media outlets. Local outlets are also especially prone to self-censorship because of fears of retaliation. As one journalist described it, “when the risks are assessed, the boundaries become pretty self-explanatory.”1 At some media outlets, journalists are implicitly aware of which topics they can and cannot discuss freely.2 The 2023 Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) report released by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) highlights self-censorship as a notable issue in the country.3 Additionally, SLAPPs filed against independent media outlets raise concerns about self-censorship (see C3).

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

The state continues to play an active role in influencing sources of information. Several news outlets have close ties to the government, and the political polarization of media is exacerbated by the administration's preferential treatment of tabloids that cover it in a positive light.

A package of media laws passed in 2014 empowered state bodies to cofinance media to serve the public interest. In practice, though, the law gave the government a mechanism to support private media outlets owned by members or sympathizers of the ruling party through direct advertising contracts and less-transparent subsidies.1 The internet portals of tabloids that are close to the government—which consistently manipulate facts and slander independent media outlets—have continued to receive significant public funding at both the state and local levels (see B6).2

According to a February 2024 report from the SHARE Foundation, a Belgrade-based digital rights nonprofit group, most progovernment tabloids, which have close ties with the ruling party and often receive state cofinancing (see B6), spread narratives that favored the ruling party during the electoral period leading up to the December 2023 elections. They often did so by directly broadcasting government statements and state officials’ social media posts. These outlets neglected to cover substantive sociopolitical issues and problems that were unfavorable to the government.3 The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), a coalition of media researchers funded by the EU, relayed that “several pro-government media outlets actively campaigned for the ruling party.” The false stories spread by these outlets included reports of the opposition purchasing votes.4

In Meta’s Adversarial Threat Report for the last quarter of 2022, the social media company detailed its removal of a widespread network in Serbia consisting of over 5,000 accounts and a dozen groups on Facebook and Instagram that engaged in “coordinated inauthentic behavior” to support President Vučić and criticize the political opposition.5 Meta found these networks were linked to a group of SNS employees known as the Internet Team, and to some Serbian state employees.6 In addition to Facebook and Instagram, the network also operated on Twitter (which would later rebrand as X), YouTube, and local media sites. Earlier, in August 2021, Twitter began labeling various Serbian progovernment media outlets as either “operated by a government representative or “a state-affiliated media entity.”7 The action has been linked to the platform’s removal in March 2020 of 8,500 progovernment accounts that amplified positive coverage of the Vučić administration.8

In July 2021, the press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) documented the rise of “ugly twins” websites, which are designed to confuse readers by mimicking existing independent media outlets and plagiarizing their work, while also publishing news directly from the ruling party and smearing employees of the actual independent media outlets. In December 2021, a court ruled in favor of the media outlet Južne Vesti, which had been targeted by an “ugly twin” website, ordering that the mimic portal be temporarily removed.9 Media outlets Ozonpress and Kolubarske, which were also targeted by such “ugly twin” sites, had been unsuccessful in their previous attempts to challenge them for copyright infringement in court.10

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Online media outlets in Serbia face some regulatory and economic obstacles, primarily due to the importance of government funding in the media market.

The state is active in influencing the media sector through public cofinancing (see B5). The 2014 package of media laws gives the government sizable influence over several outlets, though these outlets also generate revenue through other means. Additionally, a European Parliament report published in 2023 has raised concerns over “allegations that the ruling party is using [Telekom Serbia] to increase its influence over the media market in Serbia.”1

In October 2023, the new Laws on Public Information and Media and on Electronic Media were adopted, effectively legalizing ownership of media by the state-owned Telekom Serbia, which was not envisaged by previously enacted legislation.2 The return of state ownership in the media sector—which is also not in line with the media strategy Serbia had adopted covering the period from 2020 to 2025—was strongly opposed by media and journalists’ associations during the legislative process.3

Telekom Serbia owns more than 20 media outlets in the country, most of which broadcast sports and entertainment programs.4 However, the company’s ties with Mondo Inc. have raised questions about the state operator’s future ambitions in the media market because Mondo Inc. is a subsidiary of Wireless Media, which owns some of the biggest tabloid media outlets in the country including Kurir and Mondo.5 In 2018, Telekom Serbia and Mondo Inc. signed an agreement granting Telekom the option to purchase all the company shares of Mondo Inc, which would include tabloids Kurir and Mondo, after five years.6 The five-year deadline expired only days after the new Law on Public Information and Media and Law on Electronic Media were adopted in October 2023, giving Telekom the green light to move forward with the acquisition.7 However, Telekom had not completed the purchase as of the end of the coverage period, and the details of the deal remain unknown to the public, despite media inquiries.8

The Law on Electronic Communications does not explicitly mention “net neutrality,” but it defines the internet access service as a “publicly available electronic communications service that enables access to the internet and thus connection to almost all endpoints of the internet, regardless of the network technology and terminal equipment used.”9 There have been no recorded attempts to dismantle net neutrality in practice.

However, mobile operators in Serbia do engage in zero-rating, the provision of access to certain sites and services at no cost. As of 2023, all mobile service providers, including Yettel,10 A1 Serbia,11 and Telekom Serbia,12 continued to offer packages that included data for certain apps, such as Facebook, Viber, and WhatsApp.

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Serbia’s media landscape is diverse, though hybrid news sites that blur the lines between journalism and propaganda and troll farms that amplify misinformation are becoming more prevalent.

The SHARE Foundation has compiled a database of more than 1,500 online media platforms as well as print media that also operate as websites.1 The data was obtained from the Serbian Business Registers Agency, which maintains the country’s Media Register.2

The Law on Public Information and Media (Article 37, Paragraph 2) states that online platforms—such as internet forums, social networks, and other services that allow the free exchange of information, ideas, and opinions among their users, or any other independent electronic publications such as blogs, web presentations, and similar formats—are not legally considered “media” unless they choose to enroll themselves with the Media Register.3

In February 2023, the Serbian daily Danas published an interview with Daniel Smith, who was presented as a British expert on foreign relations specializing in the Balkan region. In the interview, Smith discussed the situation in Kosovo and rising tensions in the region, criticizing Serbia and President Vučić’s official position on Kosovo and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A few days later, a Twitter user seemingly debunked the existence of Daniel Smith, pointing to a number of inconsistencies in his credentials.4 This was soon followed by more information revealing that the account used a deepfake profile picture.5 Danas promptly removed the interview and published an article detailing how its journalist was tricked by the troll account.6 This was not the first instance of “Daniel Smith” giving interviews to regional media.

According to the SHARE Foundation’s analysis of online media portals amid the December 2023 elections,7 the majority of the country’s most popular tabloid news portals often lack credible sources and “recycle” stories from one another, which can make it difficult for readers to accurately assess the accuracy of the information.

Social media platforms have played a role in amplifying the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation, particularly regarding migration.8

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

Social media is regularly used to organize social movements and protests.1

In the wake of two mass shootings in and around Belgrade in early May 2023 that killed 18 people, including one that took place at an elementary school, citizens mobilized both online and offline over the lax response by the government and the continued promotion of violence in the media. The protests began on May 8 when thousands of people silently marched through the city center, and they continued through the end of the year, with their size fluctuating anywhere between thousands to tens of thousands of participants.2

Local and general elections took place in April 2022 and several organizations launched the Three Liberties Platform to monitor the election campaign as well as to help citizens and voters express their freedom to access information, associate, and assemble.3 Various civil society organizations and activists were also vocal online in the runup to the December 2023 parliamentary elections, calling on people to vote and to report any electoral violations.4

In December 2021, sexual abuse survivors took to Twitter and launched a social media campaign resembling the #MeToo campaign, using the hashtag #nisamprijavila (I Didn’t Report It).5 The campaign quickly spread on social media, with thousands of survivors sharing their stories and offering support to each other (see C7).

Several other social movements routinely organize online to address issues concerning the environment, labor, and local politics.6

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 4.004 6.006

Serbia’s constitution contains protections meant to safeguard free expression and protect journalists, though they are not always enforced. Additionally, While the judiciary is nominally independent, it often comes under the influence of government officials who publicly comment on the work of the judicial branch and, in some cases, openly antagonize judges. Moreover, successive reports from the European Commission (EC) have noted that judicial reforms intended to bolster judicial independence have stalled.1

Article 46 of the constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression, as well as the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through speech, writing, art, or in any other manner. Article 50 stipulates that everyone has the freedom to establish newspapers and other forms of media without prior permission and in a manner established by law. The article declares that censorship is not practiced in the Republic of Serbia. Article 51 guarantees the right to be informed accurately, fully, and in a timely manner about issues of public importance. Access to information kept by state bodies and organizations with delegated public powers, in accordance with the law, is also guaranteed by Article 51.2

Article 58 of the Law on Public Information and Media defines “journalistic privilege” and establishes that journalists are not obliged to disclose their sources of information, unless the information they hold relates to a criminal offense punishable by a prison sentence of at least five years and cannot be obtained by authorities in any other manner.3

The criminal code also provides protections to journalists, stating that “persons performing work of importance to public information” should be free from threats to their safety and the safety of persons close to them (Article 138, Paragraph 3). The sentence for threatening journalists in connection with their work ranges from six months to five years in prison—the same as that for threatening the highest-ranking state officials.4 However, these rights are not robustly guaranteed in practice. In late 2021, amendments to the criminal code were proposed with the intention of providing more protections to journalists, but the proposal also contained articles that could criminalize alleged insults, which threatens real freedom of speech (see C2).5

Constitutional amendments drafted to improve judicial independence were put to a referendum in January 2022. Most citizens who voted in the referendum were in favor of the amendments, and the National Assembly subsequently passed the necessary law to amend the constitution in February.6 Despite the amendments, a May 2024 report from prEUgovor, a coalition of Serbian civil society organizations that assess the impact of legislation on fundamental rights, noted that “the practice of electing judges and prosecutors in a non-transparent manner continued.”7

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

Some laws and constitutional provisions leave room for abusive enforcement designed to penalize legitimate online activities. In 2012, amendments to the criminal code decriminalized defamation; while Article 170 still regards insult as a criminal act, it is not punishable by prison time. However, draft amendments to the criminal code introduced in late 2021 would punish “rude insults or maltreatment, insolence or ruthlessness” with up to one year in prison.1 In recent years, insult charges have rarely been used to suppress online speech.

The constitution’s general restrictions on speech and expression are in line with international standards, though they could be interpreted to justify repressive actions. Article 46, Paragraph 2, for example, states that free expression may be legally restricted if necessary to protect “the rights and reputation of others,” the authority and impartiality of the courts, “public health, national security, and “morals of a democratic society.” Article 50, which guarantees freedom of the media, states that a competent court may prevent “the dissemination of information and ideas” only if it prevents calls for “the violent destruction of the constitutional order”; the violation of Serbia’s territorial integrity; the propagation or incitement of war or direct violence; or racial, national, or religious discrimination that could incite hostility or violence.2

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Users have been sued or detained for their online speech, and the media has been targeted by private lawsuits.1

Libel and insult lawsuits are used to intimidate journalists.2 In May 2024, a Belgrade Court of Appeals judge filed two lawsuits against the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK), a nonprofit investigative journalism outlet, for its investigations and the database of judges’ properties it maintained. The judge alleged violations to her and her husband’s right to privacy and requested that the reporters involved be imprisoned for 10 months, fined, and receive a two-year ban from journalism.3 KRIK had been sued 13 times over the prior three years since May 2021.4

In December 2021, when environmental protests against British-Australian mining company Rio Tinto’s lithium mining project were held across Serbia, citizens, journalists and local community activists were visited by the police.5 In seven cases, police came to the homes of activists who had posted about the protests on Facebook and discouraged them from attending.6 Journalists and activists who were branded as organizers of the environmental protests and roadblocks received misdemeanor charges—which can carry prison time—simply for sharing information on social media or reporting from these events.7

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

There are no legal repercussions for using encrypted services in Serbia.

There is no requirement for individuals to register with the government to use online services, However, in April 2023, the National Assembly adopted a new draft Law on Electronic Communications that, among other provisions, requires that all SIM cards be registered with the authorities starting in 2024. Proponents of the law, which will require disclosure of an individual’s first and last name and an identification number in order to obtain a SIM card, said it was needed to increase security.1 As soon as the law goes into effect, the MIT will have a six-month window to create rules on the registration of prepaid mobile phone services. Service providers and operators will have to start registering users a year after the rules are released. Users’ ability to remain anonymous will be stripped away under the law, potentially allowing authorities greater ability to monitor online activity.

In February 2024, the MIT published a rulebook detailing technical conditions for the registration of end users of prepaid services, which gave individuals a year to register SIM cards.2

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because individuals working in civil society had their devices targeted by a spyware attack that was consistent with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware

The constitution does not explicitly mention privacy, but it offers clear guarantees for the inviolability of dwellings (Article 40), the confidentiality of letters and other forms of communication (Article 41), and personal data protection (Article 42). Regarding confidentiality of communications, Article 41 states that exemptions are only allowed within a specific time frame and with a court order if they are necessary for the investigation of criminal activities or for the protection of Serbia’s national security.

In October 2023, the SHARE Foundation, in cooperation with international digital rights groups Access Now, Amnesty International’s Security Lab and the Citizen Lab, was able to confirm that two Belgrade residents working in civil society who had been critical of the government were targeted by an attack that leveraged vulnerabilities that had previously been targeted by NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.1 The individuals had brought their mobile devices to the SHARE Foundation after receiving an Apple threat notification, a system message notifying the user that their device might have been targeted by a state actor.

In May 2022, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported that “government-backed actors” in Serbia had likely deployed Predator, a spyware tool with advanced capabilities used to target and extract information from mobile phones, to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in Android devices.2 This report followed a December 2021 investigation by Citizen Lab, a research center at the University of Toronto, which identified customers in Serbia that were likely operating Predator. The tool is developed by Cytrox, a member of the Intellexa alliance of spyware developers.3 Previously, a December 2020 Citizen Lab report had mentioned Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) as a possible customer of Circles, a spyware tool that allows customers to monitor calls, texts, and mobile phone geolocation by exploiting weaknesses in mobile telecommunications infrastructure.4

Telecommunications companies in Serbia are forced to retain communications metadata for 12 months, and the authorities have accessed this information through dubiously legal means (see C6).

In more than one instance, SNS members have made comments about unreleased articles and correspondence between journalists and their sources. Such leaks have also found their way onto the front pages of government-affiliated tabloids.5 KRIK editor Stevan Dojčinović has had his personal correspondence repeatedly intercepted by state agencies and published in Informer, one of the government’s staunchest tabloid supporters.6

KRIK and other media outlets and civil society organizations have previously been accused of cooperating with criminal organizations and of working “against the state,” with high-ranking officials publicly threatening journalists by using knowledge of their personal information and openly admitting to wiretapping.7

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

The Law on Personal Data Protection,1 adopted in November 2018, aligned Serbia’s data protection regime with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its 2016 law enforcement directive.2 The Serbian law came into effect in August 2019, giving public and private entities adequate time to adapt to the new standards.

Serbia’s independent data protection authority is the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, which acts as a body for both freedom of information issues and personal data protection.3 Since its inception, the Office of the Commissioner has defended citizens’ data rights. According to its annual report for 2022, the office has resolved proceedings in more than 18,701 cases, with about 4,116 of them concerning personal data-protection issues.4

The Law on Electronic Communications requires ISPs and operators of mobile-phone and fixed-line networks to retain all metadata pertaining to communications on their systems for 12 months.5 The competent authorities, including the police and security agencies, can then request access to the metadata for the purposes of investigating crime and protecting national security. In 2013, the Constitutional Court, one of the two most important judicial institutions in the country, declared that access to communications metadata retained by network operators requires a court order, as they are an integral part of communication and as such have constitutional protections.6

However, the SHARE Foundation’s research on data retention practices in Serbia has shown that state authorities access the metadata stored by telecommunications firms directly through “applications for independent access,” which are of dubious legality.7

All network operators and state bodies authorized to access retained data are supposed to submit an annual record to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. In accordance with Article 130a of the Law on Electronic Communications, the annual records must contain the number of requests for access to retained data, the number of granted requests, and the number of days between the initial data retention and the time of requested access.8 The parliament’s Committee for the Control of Security Services also theoretically has oversight powers,9 but the majority of the committee’s members belong to the ruling party or its coalition partners.10 Serbia does not have a data localization requirement.

According to the Law on Electronic Commerce,11 which regulates matters including intermediary liability, ISPs are obliged to store data on the users of their services, including the internet protocol (IP) address from which a user gains access, both during use and a minimum of 30 days after termination of service (Article 16, Paragraph 3). The law does not explain the purpose of this collection, who can access the data, and how the rule is to be enforced, which leaves room for broad interpretation by the authorities.

Some major international tech companies, including Meta and Amazon, had not yet named a local representative for data protection issues in Serbia by the end of the coverage period, a step that is required under the Law on Personal Data Protection.12

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Journalists often face physical assaults and threats in connection with both online and offline reporting.

The Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS) documented 183 attacks in 2023 and 36 additional attacks between January and April 2024 on journalists, both online and offline; the 2023 figure represents an increase from 2022 when there were 137 attacks in total.1 Of the total 219 cases in 2023 and early 2024, 15 were physical assaults. The other attacks included verbal assaults, pressure and threats, and attacks on journalists’ property. When such cases make it to court, judicial procedures are lengthy and frequently feature obstructionism.

Several journalists reporting on June 2024 local elections, after the coverage period, were subject to harassment and physical attacks. On election day, the editor of the online portal Mašina was attacked in front of the SNS’s headquarters in Belgrade; during the assault, he was able to send his colleagues a video he took while being chased and physically attacked by SNS party members.2

In May 2024, Vuk Cvijić, a journalist at Radar,which operates online, was attacked on the street by the director of Srpski telegraf, Milan Lađević. Cvijić noted that the attack likely came in response to his stories linking a former official of the Novi Sad police to Lađević. Moments after the attack, Srpski telegraf published a story on its portal claiming that Cvijić was actually the one that attacked Lađević.3 Despite the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade issuing a warrant to the First Basic Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade to investigate, Radar reported a week later that no footage had been recovered from the more than 20 surveillance cameras on the street where the assault took place.4

In March 2024, Verica Marinčić, a journalist for the online outlet IN Media, was forcibly removed from a municipal building by a security guard. The guard said she “wasn’t on the list” to cover a conference on protests concerning the government’s decision to close a train station.5

In January 2024, journalists Željko Veljković and Vanja Ðurić were subjected to organized attacks on social media after they commented on a video of a young singer's performance. The video in question showed a 14-year-old singing songs with a nationalist sentiment, and the journalists questioned this use of a child to spread inflammatory rhetoric. Veljković and Ðurić were targeted by swarms of hateful and threatening messages, including gendered and ethnically based attacks, prompting Ðurić to deactivate her account on X.6

Death threats are not uncommon on social media, and are almost exclusively used against independent journalists, civil society actors, opposition politicians and even individuals whose opinions differ from state-sponsored narratives. Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (NDNV) president Ana Lalić, journalist and antiwar activist Aida Ćorović, and professor and journalist Dinko Gruhonjić were targeted online after altered videos of their participation on a panel discussion about nationalism in the region surfaced on X.7 The three received continuous death threats, and right-wing individuals posing as students at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad where Gruhonjić taught organized a blockade asking for his resignation.8 Shortly after, a list of notable academics, journalists, and civil society members, and others who allegedly supported Gruhonjić was circulated on X. The accounts that shared the list used ethnic slurs to denigrate some of the individuals on it. Other accounts stated, “it’s good that these lists exist,” referencing a quote from a notorious criminal in Serbia who spoke about the existence of an assassination list shortly before he was murdered. The phrase remains popular in the country and is often referenced when discussing those who are viewed as traitors and enemies within the state.

Writer and podcast host Marko Vidojković received death threats on social media after airing an episode in January 2023 that discussed the genocidal execution of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1995, and the massacre’s leader, convicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladić.9 Because Mladić is hailed as a hero by part of the Serbian population,10 the episode caused an uproar. Prior to the podcast episode, Vidojković had received more than 40 death threats in 2022 related to his writing and podcasts, with only two resulting in court cases and sentences.11 Ultimately, Vidojković and his family had to leave the country following the furor over the Srebrenica episode and resettle at a secret location because of the threats and legal pressure they faced, including multiple SLAPP from SNS vice president Aleksandar Šapić.12 Šapić, who the following year became mayor of Belgrade, also said he would “rip [Vidojković’s] heart out of his chest with his bare hands” if he ever saw him.13 Vidojković filed a criminal complaint against Šapić over the threat, which the prosecutor’s office encouraged him to drop. Soon after, prosecutors dismissed the case on grounds that Šapić’s was speaking in theoretical terms.14

In November 2023, ahead of December’s parliamentary elections, an intimate video of opposition politician Djordje Miketic was leaked and shared widely by progovernment tabloids.15

After the May 2023 mass shootings in and around Belgrade, both praise and criticism of the emerging protests against the government's reaction emerged on social media (see B8). Public figures, including actors and actresses, who showed support for the protests were smeared online,16 and some individuals experienced threats of physical violence against themselves and their family members.

In December 2018, the home of Milan Jovanović, an investigative journalist for the Zig.info news portal, was set on fire by a Molotov cocktail in the middle of the night. The attack was quickly connected to the local mayor, high-ranking SNS member Dragoljub Simonović, whose business dealings Jovanović had covered for years. The ensuing trial was plagued by obstructions from the defense and interference by progovernment tabloids, with the judiciary itself coming under pressure. Simonović was ultimately sentenced in February 2021 to four years and three months in prison for inciting the arson of Jovanović’s house.17 Jovanović has been under police protection since the incident. In December 2021, an appellate court overturned the initial ruling and ordered a retrial, due to procedural errors according to Jovanović.18 In the retrial, which concluded in March 2023, the Second Basic Court sentenced Simonović to five years’ imprisonment, and other collaborators and perpetrators to between three-and-a-half and five years.19 The Appeals Court in April 2024 reduced the sentences of Simonović and an accomplice to four years in prison and a $900 fine.20

Gender-based attacks on women journalists persist. In a report compiled from the results of research conducted in 2020 as part of the international Media4Women campaign,21 71 percent of women journalists working in Serbia said they had received misogynistic and gender-based harassment online in the past five years, and 54 percent said they experienced some form of online sexual harassment.22 Prior to the December 2021 #nisamprijavila (I Didn’t Report It) campaign,23 in which sexual abuse survivors shared their experiences on what was then known as Twitter (see B8), there had been reporting on Telegram groups in which members shared nonconsensual intimate images of former partners as a form of retaliation, as well as nonconsensual screenshots of women’s Instagram profiles and photos of women taken on the street.24 The group members solicited information about the women in the images and shared their personal details, including names, addresses, and social media profiles. The largest group consisted of more than 30,000 members, while the smaller groups were organized around individual cities in Serbia.25 An investigation was started in 2021 against an administrator of one of the groups, but in October 2023 the charges were dropped by the Cybercrime Department, which claimed there were no grounds for the administrator’s criminal prosecution.26 This development sparked criticism from women's rights organizations and civil society more broadly, and led to the revival of a campaign to explicitly ban the nonconsensual creation, processing, and distribution of intimate images and videos..

The migrant population in Serbia has been subject to online smears (see B7).27 In January 2024 an Instagram account was suspended for posting images of Black people in Serbia along with their locations.28 These “spotted” accounts have gained popularity in recent years and are often a hub for racist and xenophobic comments.

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Cyberattacks are relatively common in Serbia, often targeting civil society and media outlets. From June 2023 through May 2024, the SHARE Foundation recorded 28 information security breaches that were publicly disclosed. Five of the breaches involved the restriction or disabling of service through technical means, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. SHARE also recorded 18 instances of computer fraud, and three cases of data breaches where hackers gained unauthorized access to personal information.1

In December 2023, Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS)—one of Serbia’s largest public enterprises and the national power supplier—was targeted by a cyberattack believed to be caused by ransomware. Qilin, a cybercrime group, claimed that it carried out the attack and was in possession of large quantities of EPS’ data. Although there were no issues with the power supply, the cyberattack caused significant delays in delivery and payment of bills.2 The Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection initiated an oversight proceeding to determine whether there had been a personal data breach at EPS as a consequence of this incident.3

In January 2023, the websites of multiple state institutions,4 allegedly including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, and the Serbian army, suffered cyberattacks. Social media accounts linked to the hacker group Anonymous claimed responsibility for the attacks and noted they had accessed several government officials’ emails. They also criticized President Vučić’s relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Independent media and civil society groups regularly experience technical attacks. In May 2023, JUGpress, an online news outlet primarily covering the southern part of Serbia, was targeted with a cyberattack that limited its operations for two days. JUGpress’ website has been under frequent attack in recent years.5 Južne vesti, a prominent news site reporting on events in southern Serbia, used X to notify readers that it was under a heavy DDoS attack in early July 2023.6 Similarly, in August 2023, the analysis and research organization Demostat informed the public that their website had suffered a serious DDoS attack.7 In early March 2024, SOinfo, a small news outlet from the northern province of Vojvodina, suffered two heavy attacks in a matter of days, which led to their website experiencing disruptions.8

Serbia has signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) and has adapted its criminal laws to conform with the standards of the convention.9 The criminal code of Serbia contains a chapter focused on “crimes against security of computer data” (Articles 298–304a).10 There is a special Prosecution Office for Cybercrime in Belgrade,11 but given the sheer number of incidents and the fact that it is the only prosecution authority tasked with handling such cases in the country, it has struggled to keep up with a growing backlog.

On Serbia

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Country Facts

  • Population

    6,664,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    56 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    67 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    No