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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Singapore

Partly Free
53
100
A Obstacles to Access 19 25
B Limits on Content 17 35
C Violations of User Rights 17 40
Last Year's Score & Status
54 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Singapore

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Singapore declined during the coverage period, as the remaining provisions of the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) of 2021 came into effect in December 2023, giving authorities broad latitude to restrict online activity. The government continued to exercise control over the digital environment, ordering online outlets to publish correction notices on articles or risk being blocked under POFMA, as two outlets were during the coverage period. At times, internet users were intimidated and investigated by police, and some faced investigations and penalties for sharing political and social content on digital platforms.

  • In September 2023, East Asia Forum was blocked for less than a week for not complying with a correction direction. Similarly, the Asia Sentinel was blocked for not complying with a correction direction in June 2023, and remained blocked at the end of the coverage period (see B1).
  • In February 2024, Camira Asrori, a Singaporean influencer, claimed that she was detained by officers at Singapore Customs when reentering the country, questioned about her social media posts related to the Israeli military’s campaign in the Gaza Strip, and forced to delete her Instagram post about a pro-Palestine protest she attended while in Japan (see B2).
  • Government officials repeatedly invoked the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) to force independent news websites, opposition politicians, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social media users, and social media platforms to publish correction notices pertaining to their online content (see B2 and B3).
  • The Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) was passed in July 2023, giving authorities new powers to block online content, services, and applications (see B3).
  • In December 2023, the remaining provisions of FICA, which allows authorities to designate individuals and organizations as “politically significant persons,” came into force. Under the designation, individuals are required to submit regular reports to the government on their foreign affiliations and donations they received from foreign citizens (see B3 and C2).
  • In July 2023, the Ministry for Communications and Information (MCI) designated the website and social media pages operated by The Online Citizen—including its Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and LinkedIn pages—as “declared online locations” until July 2025, effectively prohibiting the outlet from accepting donations or selling advertisements or subscriptions (see B6).

header2 Political Overview

Singapore’s parliamentary political system has been dominated by the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and the family of current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong since 1959. The electoral and legal framework that the PAP has constructed allows for some political pluralism, but it constrains the growth of opposition parties and limits freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Singapore’s internet penetration rate is high, as is the general quality of service. As of the last quarter of 2023, 92.1 percent of resident households had broadband internet access,1 and there were more than 9.6 million wireless broadband subscriptions on the island.2 In May 2023, the number of mobile subscriptions using 3G, 4G, and 5G network technology also stood at 9.6 million.3

Mobile data usage reached 84.79 petabytes (PB) in the final quarter of 2023.4 Singapore is the first country in the world to achieve nationwide 5G coverage.5 Network providers like StarHub claim to have 5G coverage across 99 percent of the country,6 while Singapore Telecommunications Limited (Singtel) even claims to provide 5G coverage in underground subway tunnels.7 Opensignal’s November 2023 report on mobile network experience in Singapore found that users were able to connect to a 5G network about 38 percent of the time if they were on the M1 or StarHub networks.8 In January 2024, Singtel announced that it had added Starlink connectivity to the digital services it offers for vessels in the maritime industry.9

The government has pledged to invest up to S$100 million (US$75 million) to upgrade the fiber-optic Nationwide Broadband Network (NBN), allowing households to receive internet service at a speed of up to 10 gigabits per second (Gbps) by 2028. The upgrade is expected to be completed in 2026.10 In January 2024, the median speed of downloads on fixed broadband networks was 277.57 megabits per second (Mbps), while the median speed of downloads on mobile networks was 88.91 Mbps.11 During the same period, Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index ranked Singapore first among 181 countries in fixed-line broadband performance and 23rd out of 144 countries in mobile performance.12

The national wireless network Wireless@SG offers free internet access via public hotspots, with speeds of up to 5 Mbps. As of February 2023, a list compiled by the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) showed that there were 5,867 Wireless@SG hotspots across the island.13

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 3.003 3.003

The internet is generally available to all users in Singapore, and the government is undertaking projects to limit any residual disparities in access, such as those between different age and income groups.1

On average, broadband service costs about US$33.27 per month,2 while the average cost of 1 GB of mobile data is about US$0.63.3 According to the Ministry of Manpower, the country’s gross median monthly income is about S$5,200 (US$3,900), although this number only includes citizens and permanent residents who are employed full-time.4

About 10 percent of households in Singapore do not have access to a computer, and 1 percent do not have internet access.5 To address this gap, the MCI launched a S$80 million (US$60 million) initiative called DigitalAccess@Home in February 2023. The program will provide 60,000 low-income Singaporean families with subsidized broadband service and laptop or tablet computers. The initiative replaced the NEU PC Plus and Home Access programs, which connected 46,000 households between 2020 and 2022.6

The disparity in internet access is partly generational. A 2022 survey by the IMDA found that 99 percent of residents between 18 and 39 years old reported using the internet within the last three months, as did 98 percent of residents between 40 and 59 years old. However, only 78 percent of those aged 60 and older reported using the internet during the same period.7 The government offers the Mobile Access for Seniors program, which provides eligible senior citizens with subsidized smartphones and mobile plans. 8

Mobile network operators planned to shut down their 3G services by the end of July 2024.9 The majority of internet users in Singapore have already transitioned to 4G or 5G services, but low-income households and low-wage migrant workers might find it difficult to upgrade their devices and mobile subscriptions.10

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

No known restrictions have been placed on connectivity to information and communication technologies (ICTs), either permanently or during specific events. The Singapore Internet Exchange (SGIX), a nonprofit entity established by the government in 2009, provides an open, neutral, and self-regulated central point for service providers to exchange traffic with one another directly, instead of routing it through international carriers.1

Singapore’s “Next Generation” NBN infrastructure was built, and is currently owned and operated, by NetLink Trust, an entity responsible for supplying wholesale-only, open-access, nondiscriminatory services to all telecommunications carriers and service providers.2 To avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure a competitive broadband market, separate companies manage passive fiber-optic infrastructure, active infrastructure (such as routers and access-network equipment), and retail-level service provision.3

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Service providers do not face onerous obstacles to market entry or ongoing operations within Singapore. However, users’ choices among internet service providers (ISPs) and mobile providers remain limited.

The dominant ISPs are also the main mobile service providers: Singtel, StarHub, and M1. The government awarded 5G licenses to Singtel, StarHub, and M1 in April 2020.1 A fourth service provider, TPG Telecom, launched commercial services in 2020,2 and rebranded as SIMBA Telecom in 2022.3

Singtel, formerly a state telecommunications monopoly, is majority owned by Temasek Holdings, the government’s investment arm.4 Temasek Holdings is similarly the parent company of ST Telemedia, an investment portfolio company that owns the majority of shares in StarHub.5 Through Temasek Holdings, the Singaporean government also owns the largest number of shares in M1’s parent company, Keppel Limited.6 As of March 2023, Singtel reported holding 45.6 percent of the mobile market and 43.1 percent of the fixed-line broadband market.7 As of June 2024, StarHub reported holding a 22.3 percent share of the mobile market.8

There are 14 mobile virtual network operators that lease network infrastructure from Singtel, StarHub, or M1 and sell mobile plans to users.9 MyRepublic, which launched a broadband service in 2014, began offering mobile services in 2018.10 In March 2022, the IMDA approved StarHub’s bid to buy a 50.1 percent stake in MyRepublic’s residential and enterprise broadband business.11

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 1.001 4.004

The hallmark of the regulatory framework in Singapore is close government oversight of service providers and digital technology. Under the Telecommunications Act, licenses for telecommunications systems and services can be issued either unconditionally or with conditions specified by the authorities.1 The IMDA is responsible for both the development and regulation of the converging communications and media sectors.2 The IMDA is not an independent public agency, but rather a statutory body of the MCI.

Following the passage of POFMA in 2019, the POFMA Office was set up to convey orders issued by ministers to service providers, publications, and users. The POFMA Office is situated within the IMDA and enforces compliance with directions and codes of practice stipulated by the law (see B3).

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 4.004 6.006

During the coverage period, the government ordered ISPs to block access to websites under POFMA.

In May 2023, after the independent news website Asia Sentinel published an article that allegedly contained false statements about authorities harassing and intimidating political dissenters, the MCI issued a correction direction against the outlet, requiring the outlet to place a correction notice “at the top of the article and at the top of the main page of the website.”1 Instead, Asia Sentinel placed the correction notice under an editor’s note stating that the outlet stood by its story.2 In June 2023, the MCI directed the IMDA to issue access-blocking orders to ISPs because of the outlet’s failure to comply with the correction direction under Section 11 of POFMA.3 As of the end of the coverage period, Asia Sentinel remained blocked.4

In September 2023, the MCI issued a correction direction for an article published on East Asia Forum the previous month, which covered recent government scandals in Singapore and allegedly contained false statements. The direction required the outlet to carry a correction notice “at the top of the article and at the top of the main page of the website.”5 East Asia Forum placed the correction notice at the bottom of the article instead, and the MCI directed the IMDA to issue access-blocking orders to ISPs on the grounds that the website had failed to comply with the correction direction.6 Later that month, after the author of the article requested that it be taken down and issued a public apology (see B4), 7 the MCI directed the IMDA to cancel the blocking order.8

In July 2024, after the end of the coverage period, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued account restriction directions under FICA, which came into full effect in December 2023, to Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube and X. The directions require the platforms to “take all reasonable steps” to block 95 social media accounts affiliated with Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui. Guo was convicted of racketeering, conspiracy, and wire fraud that same month in the United States.9

Previously, in March 2023, the government blocked a number of fraudulent news websites designed to trick users into submitting their financial and personal information.10 In February 2022, Minister for Communications and Information Josephine Teo said that the government was exploring the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to detect and block scam websites.11

Additionally, many media and civil society websites previously blocked by authorities remain blocked, including the website for the Malaysian NGO Lawyers for Liberty, while others have ceased publishing content altogether, such as the Singapore Herald and the States Times Review. In addition, the Canada-based extramarital dating website Ashley Madison has been blocked since the 2013 announcement of its plan to launch in Singapore.12

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

The state regularly employs legal, administrative, and other means to remove content.

Between the implementation of POFMA in October 2019 and the end of the coverage period in May 2024 over 140 POFMA correction directions, including targeted directions, were issued, including over 30 issued during the coverage period. 1 Recipients of correction directions are required to publish notices drafted by the government stating that their content contains “falsehoods.”2 Targeted directions are issued to internet intermediaries, and require them to directly communicate the correction notice “to all users in Singapore who access the falsehood through its service.”

In September 2023, the MCI directed the IMDA to issue a blocking order against academic website East Asia Forum for noncompliance with a correction direction (see B1). The block was later lifted after the article that was the subject of the POFMA direction was removed from the website at the request of its author.

In July 2023, the Ministry of Law and the MCI issued two correction directions to the independent news magazine Jom for allegedly publishing false information on two occasions: when reporting on corruption allegations against Law and Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam and Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan (see C3), and when reporting on Instagram’s blocking of a post about the same allegations by opposition politician Charles Yeo. 3 Jom complied with the correction directions, but its editor in chief wrote in a post that the outlet “respectfully disagree[s] with the POFMA office’s findings” and that it did not make the statements listed in the direction.4 Jom appealed both correction directions in July 2023, and in September 2023 the High Court dismissed the appeal.5

In May 2024, the Ministry of Law issued a correction direction to the chief of the opposition party, Kenneth Jeyaretnam, for a Facebook post he made claiming the prime minister and law minister could determine the performance bonuses granted to certain High Court judges. 6 It was the seventh correction direction issued to Jeyaretnam. Months earlier, in December 2023, the MCI designated his website and social media accounts as declared online locations (see B6).7

The Online Citizen, one of Singapore’s longest running and most well-known alternative news media sites, has received multiple POFMA orders in recent years (see B6).

Individual government officials are also known to demand retractions or apologies for comments posted on social media. For instance, in February 2024, Camira Asrori, an online influencer in Singapore, claimed that she was detained by officers at Singapore Customs when reentering the country and questioned about her social media posts on the Israeli military’s campaign in the Gaza Strip. The officers requested that Asrori delete her Instagram post about a pro-Palestine protest she attended while in Japan, citing concerns that the post might encourage other Singaporeans to protest overseas and could therefore jeopardize their safety (see B2).8

Streaming platforms have also complied with requests to remove content, including in 2022 when Netflix removed the series How to Change Your Mind following a government request.

At least 11 news sites have been licensed under a notice-and-takedown framework, which requires them to comply with government orders to remove content within 24 hours (see B3). Nine are run by either Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) or MediaCorp, which, as newspaper and broadcasting companies, are already subject to discretionary individual licensing and traditionally have cooperated with the government (see B6).

Since the Class License system was introduced in 1996 (see B3), it has been used to restrict access to sensitive websites.

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

There is a lack of transparency in the process for restricting online and digital content. Recent laws that are ostensibly aimed at addressing online falsehoods, foreign influence operations, and criminal activity online also lack independent appeals mechanisms.

In July 2023, Parliament passed the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA), which enables authorities to issue directions when there is “reasonable suspicion” that activities are being conducted online to commit crimes.1 Specifically, the OCHA requires service providers, app stores, and individuals to comply with directions that may include disabling access to content, account blocking, domain-level blocking of websites, and removal of applications from app stores. Offences under the act include “abetting or conspiring to finance or provide material support for the commission of acts of terrorism,” as well as activities already criminalized under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990, laws criminalizing the incitement of violence, and legislation related to drugs, gambling, and malicious cyber activities.2

In July 2023, the IMDA enacted its Code of Practice for Online Safety, which requires that social media platforms produce annual transparency reports related to their online safety initiatives for children on the platform.3

The Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act was adopted by Parliament in November 2022 and came into effect in February 2023. The law empowers the IMDA to direct social media platforms to disable access to “egregious content.” This includes content that encourages self-harm or violence and material involving child sexual abuse, but also a more ambiguous category of content “dealing with matters of race or religion in a way that is likely to cause feelings” of ill will and hostility between groups. Platforms that fail to comply face fines of up to S$1 million (US$750,000) or outright blocking in Singapore. ISPs may be subject to fines of up to S$500,000 (US$370,000) if they fail to block noncompliant social media platforms.4

FICA was passed by Parliament in October 2021. The law grants the minister for home affairs the power to issue censorship orders—including content removals, website blocks, social media account restrictions, app store restrictions, and the publication of government notices—if the minister suspects that the content in question is linked to foreign interference and believes it is in the public interest to act. The law defines foreign interference expansively, encompassing a range of conduct undertaken by foreign citizens, foreign entities, and their collaborators in Singapore. Provisions of FICA that permit authorities to order social media platforms to investigate purported foreign interference in Singaporean politics took effect in July 2022. The law was fully implemented in December 2023 (see C2).5

FICA also allows authorities to designate individuals and organizations as “politically significant persons,” which requires them to submit regular reports to the government on their foreign affiliations and donations from foreign citizens.6 The law lacks an independent appeals process. Appeals of FICA decisions can only be directed to the minister for home affairs, or to a reviewing tribunal made up of political appointees. Judicial reviews are limited to procedural matters.7

POFMA, which came into effect in October 2019, provides any government minister with the power to order correction notices and to remove or restrict access to content if they find that it contains false statements and are of the opinion that it would be in the public interest to take action (see C1 and C2). Ministers do not need a court order to enforce a directive; instead, the directives must first be complied with, even if the recipient of a notice intends to file an appeal with the High Court.8 Beyond content publishers, internet intermediaries can be held liable if they do not comply with correction or removal orders. There is a lack of transparency regarding how and when the government decides to invoke POFMA against online content.9 Only a small number of POFMA correction directions have been challenged in the High Court, and the cases were dismissed.10 In September 2023, the editor in chief of the independent magazine Jom wrote that, even with pro bono legal representation, the cost of appealing the POFMA orders the outlet had received would exceed S$20,000 (US$15,000).11

In April 2024, the Ministry of Home Affairs began soliciting public feedback on the proposed Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill, which would empower the minister for home affairs to issue restraining orders “against the production or distribution of content that prejudices the maintenance of racial harmony in Singapore.” In its press statement, the ministry stated that such orders would enable the authorities to “act quickly and preemptively against content that threatens racial harmony, without having to establish that the person is engaging in criminal conduct.”12

The Broadcasting Act has included explicit internet regulations since 1996. Under the act, internet content providers and ISPs must comply with the act’s Class License conditions and the Internet Code of Practice, requiring them to take “all reasonable steps” to filter any content that the regulator deems “undesirable, harmful, or obscene.”13 The law also empowers the minister for communications and information to prohibit disclosure of any orders to censor content.14 When coupled with the close ties that most ISPs and major online media companies have with the government, the law has made online content regulation more opaque and less accountable to the public. The Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act amended the Broadcasting Act.

Introduced in 2013, the notice-and-takedown framework removes the identified sites from the class license and subjects them to individual licensing, under which they are required to comply with any takedown notice within 24 hours. The sites are obliged to put up a “performance bond” of S$50,000 (US$37,000) as an incentive to remain in compliance.15 The bond is similar to the requirement for niche television broadcasters.16 Because takedown orders are not public and major media organizations generally do not reveal removal requests, it is difficult to gauge how often this mechanism is used.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Self-censorship is common among journalists, commentators, and ordinary users, who are generally aware that there could be repercussions, including civil and criminal penalties, for certain types of speech or expression (see C3).1 Matters of race and religion, as well as any comment on the independence of the judiciary or alleged government malfeasance, are considered particularly sensitive, given Singapore’s laws relating to religious harmony, contempt of court, and defamation (see C2).2

The communication practices of online journalists are significantly impacted by the dominance of state-owned media groups (see B5). According to Reporters Without Borders, this dynamic engenders widespread self-censorship in the print, radio, television, and digital media sectors.3 A 2021 survey on academic freedom in Singapore, conducted by Academia SG, found that academics researching “politically sensitive” topics were more likely to “feel constrained” in their work than colleagues with different research subjects. As many as 93 percent of these academics reported interference and self-censorship.4

In September 2023, for instance, the POFMA office issued a correction direction to East Asia Forum after the platform published an article by Ying-Kit Chan, an academic at the National University of Singapore. The article covered recent government scandals in Singapore, including alleged corruption by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (see B1). Chan subsequently requested that the article be removed and issued a statement “sincerely and unreservedly” apologizing to the prime minister, the CPIB, his university and everyone he had named in the piece.5

Authorities also have a practice of issuing conditional warnings, which may lead people, particularly journalists and human rights activists, to regulate their behavior (see B6).

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

The dominance of the ruling PAP generally leads mainstream online sources of information to toe the government line, though these outlets occasionally publish critical content. There is no concrete evidence indicating that there is large-scale covert deployment of paid online commentators.

The government exerts influence over online information through formal ownership or executive oversight of mainstream outlets. While mainstream newspaper and broadcast outlets owned by SPH and the state-owned MediaCorp1 are among the most popular online news sources, commercial outlets like Mothership.sg and Yahoo News are also widely viewed.2

In May 2021, SPH transitioned its media businesses to a nonprofit organization, citing falling revenues. The SPH Media Trust (SMT) launched in December 2021,3 resulting in a number of major local news outlets in all of the country’s official languages being directly funded by the government.4 In March 2024, the minister for communications and information, Josephine Teo, said that SMT had received S$320 million (US$240 million) in government funding across the 2022 and 2023 financial years.5

Since the 1980s, every SPH chairperson has been a former cabinet minister. The government is known to influence the appointment of SPH’s chief executives and chief editors.6 Khaw Boon Wan, a former PAP official with deep connections to the ruling party’s elite, currently serves as SPH Media’s chairman.7 In April 2024, SPH Media announced that Chan Yeng Kit—previously secretary of the Ministry of Information, Communications, and the Arts—would be appointed as the chief executive of SPH, effective July 2024.8

Government ministries reputedly complain about and seek corrections from the media, including by requesting newsrooms use specific words.9 Some outlets publish branded content produced or paid for by government ministries.10

Additionally, certain pro-PAP websites and Facebook pages that attack the opposition have been described as engaging in “guerrilla-type activism,” with supporters responding quickly to anti-establishment comments online.11

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Online-only news outlets struggle to remain financially viable, due in part to restrictions on foreign funding and registration rules.

Both POFMA and FICA can undermine an outlet’s financial stability by allowing the government to demonetize websites (see B3 and C1). Under these laws, government ministers can designate any website or page as a “declared online location” if it has repeatedly published allegedly false information or is suspected of being involved in foreign interference activities. Websites with a declared online location designation are not allowed to accept donations or sell advertising or subscriptions.1 Service providers are also required to ensure that paid content included on declared online locations is not accessible in Singapore.

As of the end of the coverage period, since POFMA’s implementation in 2019, 13 websites or social media pages had been designated declared online locations (see B2).2

In December 2023, the minister for communications and information designated opposition politician Kenneth Jeyaretnam’s blog, The Ricebowl Singapore, and his social media profiles on Facebook, Instagram, X, and LinkedIn, as declared online locations. The designations were made after Jeyaretnam posted allegedly false claims about government policies and the police force’s investigation practices on his accounts and blog.3

Additionally, special IMDA registration rules require sites to provide details about their funding sources and prohibit foreign funding, an essential form of revenue for most independent political sites in the region.4 The Online Citizen and the Independent, both known for their critical commentary, are subject to these registration rules, undermining the outlets’ ability to generate enough revenue to produce original daily news or regular investigative features.5

The IMDA revoked The Online Citizen’s license in 2021, and in September 2022 the site’s editor in chief, Terry Xu, left Singapore and announced that he would continue running the outlet from Taiwan.6 In July 2023, the MCI designated the website and social media pages operated by The Online Citizen—including its Facebook, X, and LinkedIn pages—as “declared online locations” until July 2025, after the outlet, according to the MCI, “carried at least three different false statements of fact” on its website and social media profiles in 2023. 7

The government practice of issuing “conditional warnings” to citizens based on their online comments risks being abused for the purposes of silencing or intimidating government critics (see B2 and C3).

In December 2019, Google said it would not accept any advertising that is regulated under Singapore’s Code of Practice for Transparency of Online Political Advertisements,8 which requires hosts, platforms, or other intermediaries to disclose who requested or paid for political ads, provide the government with a record of all such ads, and implement government reporting channels.9

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

While the online information landscape is significantly more diverse than offline media, most independent and opposition-oriented online news outlets are too small and financially weak to counterbalance the media aligned with the PAP establishment. The consolidation of SMT in 2021 further inhibited the diversity of online content (see B5).

The country’s press accreditation system designates approved journalists as “bona fide media personnel reporting in Singapore” and confers certain government benefits.1 According to a Yahoo Singapore editor writing in 2020, this “caste system of press accreditation” contributes to a media landscape of “unequal access.”2

In 2015, Mothership.sg became the first individually licensed site that was not part of a major corporation.3 The outlet appears to be financially stable, with advertising partners that include the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, and Economic Development Board.4 This relationship has contributed to what analysts call a “normalization” of online space, with the PAP’s ideological dominance of the offline world increasingly reflected online. In September 2023, Mothership.sg’s press accreditation was suspended for six months for breaking an embargo on a government announcement about increased water prices.5 Its press accreditation was previously suspended in February 2022 for breaking an embargo on information about the national budget.6

In recent years, other commercial outlets, such as Rice Media,7 have gained traction online. So far, these outlets have managed to sustain themselves through branded content, advertising, and seed funding from venture-capital investors.8

YouTube, Facebook, X, and international blog-hosting services are freely available. All major opposition parties and many NGOs are active online. Activists and other civil society groups can air their views on a variety of issues on social media platforms.

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 3.003 6.006

Groups from across the political spectrum regularly use the internet for popular mobilization, and organizing tools are unrestricted. The success of these efforts is significantly constrained, however, by police investigations and arrests of those participating in online activism, as well as by offline restrictions on fundraising and public assembly. There is only one location—a small downtown park area known as Speakers’ Corner—where Singaporeans can gather without a police permit. The country’s restrictive laws generally limit public demonstrations, including individual protests (see C2 and C3).

In October 2023, the authorities announced that “cause-related events” regarding the Israeli military’s campaign in the Gaza Strip would not be granted permits, effectively criminalizing in-person public demonstrations on the issue.1 Singaporeans took to social media to air their views on the issue, but their online activities also triggered state responses.

In February 2024, Camira Asrori, a Singaporean influencer, claimed that she was detained by officers at Singapore Customs while reentering the country and questioned about her social media posts about the Israeli military’s campaign in the Gaza Strip. The officers requested that Asrori delete an Instagram post she made about a pro-Palestine protest she attended while in Japan, citing concerns that the post might encourage other Singaporeans to participate in protests overseas and therefore could jeopardize their safety (see B2).2 That same month, police opened an investigation into an offline pro-Palestine solidarity demonstration for allegedly inciting hostility between racial or religious groups in Singapore after photos and video of attendees chanting “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” circulated on social media.3

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 1.001 6.006

The constitution enshrines freedom of expression, but it also grants Parliament the authority to impose limits on that freedom.1 There is no legislation guaranteeing freedom of information in the country. Journalists and citizens face great difficulties obtaining information that is not voluntarily disclosed by the government.

A suite of recent legislation grants the government the power to issue “directions” that do not require initial authorization by the courts. POFMA enables such directions in order to combat “false statements of fact,” while FICA allows the home affairs minister to issue directions against individuals, publications, and platforms suspected of being involved in foreign interference. The OCHA, adopted in July 2023, functions similarly (see B3).

Contempt of court charges have been lodged to stifle public debate in Singapore, including cases against bloggers for their writing about issues such as discrimination against LGBT+ people and the treatment of opposition politicians in the courts.2 A contempt of court law was passed by Parliament in 2016, and it came into force a year later (see C2).3 Activists, opposition politicians, and critics of the government have been investigated or charged under this law.

The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act and the Broadcasting Act, which also covers the internet, grant sweeping powers to ministers and administrative officials to apply vaguely articulated subsidiary regulations as they see fit, including website licensing and registration rules (see B6). Other laws that have been used to restrict online communication are open to broad interpretation by the authorities (see C2).

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the full implementation of the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) in December 2023. The act assigns criminal penalties for covert electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign entity, including fines of up to S$100,000 (US$75,000) and 14 years’ imprisonment.

Several laws apply criminal and civil penalties to online activities.

FICA, which was passed by Parliament in October 2021, came into force in two parts: In July 2022, provisions relating to countering foreign interference by hostile information campaigns came into force. In December 2023, provisions relating to politically significant persons came into force. FICA includes criminal penalties for covert electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign entity, which can be punished with a fine of up to S$100,000 (US$75,000) and 14 years’ imprisonment (see B3). Preparing or planning for such an offense is also criminalized, with penalties of up to S$60,000 (US$45,000) in fines and prison terms of up to nine years (see B3).1

The OCHA, which came into effect in February 2024, imposes a range of financial and legal penalties (see B3). These penalties vary based on the order that was violated and whether the offender is an individual or a company. For example, individuals found to be noncompliant with a stop-communication direction may face a S$20,000 (US$15,000) fine and imprisonment of up to two years, while companies risk S$500,000 (US$370,000) in fines.2

The 2018 Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act gives the authorities the power to ban communications—including videos, images, text, or audio messages—in the event of a “serious incident.” The definition of a “serious incident” encompasses terrorist attacks as well as peaceful protests, such as large sit-down demonstrations.3 Those found guilty of violating the law could receive sentences of up to two years in prison and a fine of S$20,000 (US$15,000).4 The measure effectively allows heavy restrictions on online journalism and information-sharing surrounding major public events.

In 2017, the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act came into effect, criminalizing the publication of material that interferes with ongoing judicial proceedings or “scandalizes” the court by casting doubt on the court’s “integrity, propriety, or impartiality.” The act also allows the attorney general to “direct the publisher of any matter to refrain from or cease publishing” content that might be in contempt of court. The maximum penalty under the law is three years in prison and a fine of S$100,000 (US$75,000), a harsher punishment than judges had previously imposed.5

The Sedition Act, which dated to the colonial era, was repealed in October 2021.6 At the same time, provisions in both the penal code and the criminal procedure code were amended to cover some aspects of the repealed law.7 Section 298 of the penal code provides for prison terms of up to three years for offenders who act through any medium with the “deliberate intention of wounding the religious or racial feelings of any person.”8 Section 298A of the penal code provides similar penalties for expression that “is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different racial groups and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquility.” Police appear to regularly investigate such complaints, and recently investigated a private gathering held in solidarity with Palestine (see B8).

POFMA includes harsh penalties for online activities. For example, the malicious communication of statements that are “false or misleading” can lead to fines of up to S$50,000 (US$37,000), or up to five years’ imprisonment. Failure to comply with orders to correct or remove content can draw fines of up to S$20,000 (US$15,000), or up to one year of imprisonment (see B3).

Defamation is criminalized in the penal code (see C3).9 In addition to criminal charges, civil defamation suits remain a powerful deterrent. PAP leaders have been awarded damages ranging from S$100,000 (US$75,000) to S$300,000 (US$220,000) in defamation suits brought against opposition politicians and foreign media corporations.10

Under the 2014 Protection from Harassment Act, a person who uses “threatening, abusive, or insulting” language likely to cause “harassment, alarm, or distress” can be fined up to S$5,000 (US$3,700).11 Victims can also apply to the court for a protection order, which could include a ban on continued publication of the offending communication. Another provision in the law provides civil remedies for the publication of “false statements of fact” about a person. The affected party can seek a court order requiring that the publication of the falsehood cease, unless a notice is inserted to correct the record. The law was amended in 2019 to outlaw doxing with intent to either harass or provoke the use of violence. The amendments also allow victims of harassment to seek protection for family members or prevent similar material from being circulated.12

Defendants’ online activity has been cited in prosecutions under Singapore’s broad public assembly laws, such as the Public Order Act.13 Those convicted of organizing public assemblies without a permit can be fined up to S$5,000 (US$3,700), while repeat offenders can be fined up to S$10,000 (US$7,500) and imprisoned for up to six months.

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Police opened investigations into individuals for their online activities during the coverage period, and cases initiated prior to the coverage period continued to be adjudicated. Penalties for defamation were also applied against individuals.

In July 2023, rapper Subhas Nair was convicted on four counts of attempting to promote ill will among racial and religious groups in Singapore; he was sentenced to six weeks in prison that September.1 Police had previously issued conditional warnings to Nair and his sister, social media influencer Preeti Nair, for publishing a parody rap video on YouTube.2

In May 2024, the High Court ordered Lee Hsien Yang to pay S$200,000 (US$150,000) in damages to the law and home affairs minister, K. Shanmugam, and foreign affairs minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, for allegedly defaming them on Facebook.3 A post Lee made on Facebook in July 2023 claimed that the state had paid for the ministers’ renovations to their houses, alongside other corruption allegations against the ministers and the state-owned SMT. That same month, the minister for culture, community and youth and the minister for law issued a correction direction to Lee under POFMA.4

In October 2023, police investigated activist Gilbert Goh after he posted a photo of himself

carrying a sign protesting the Israeli military’s campaign in the Gaza Strip while standing outside Speakers’ Corner, one day after the police said that they would turn down permit applications for public events related to the issue (see B8).5 Activist Jolovan Wham later reported that Goh was questioned by police for about five hours, and that the police banned Goh from using his Instagram account for two months and required him to turn over his Instagram login details.6 In February 2024, police questioned an influencer who had posted on Instagram about attending a pro-Palestine protest in Japan. Participants of pro-Palestine demonstrations were also questioned that month (see B2 and B8).

During the previous coverage period, in October 2022, content creator Titus Low was sentenced to three weeks’ imprisonment for accessing the subscription service OnlyFans—known for its pornographic material—despite a police order not to. He was also fined S$3,000 (US$2,200) for distributing obscene content.7 Low is believed to be the first OnlyFans creator charged for his content in Singapore. His case sparked discussions in the country about whether adult content behind a paywall—requiring people to actively choose to view the posted material—should be criminalized.8

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

While many people attempt to communicate anonymously online in Singapore, their ability to conceal their identities from the government is limited.

Registration is required for some forms of digital interaction. Government-issued identity cards or passports must be produced when buying SIM cards, including prepaid cards, and buyers’ personal details must be electronically recorded by vendors. Individuals are only allowed to register for a maximum of three prepaid SIM cards each. Registration for the Wireless@SG public Wi-Fi network also requires providing identifying information.

The government does not restrict the use of encryption tools. However, the criminal procedure code allows authorities to require access to decryption information or technology if it is available.1 With authorization from the public prosecutor, police can require individuals to hand over decryption codes. Failure to provide decryption information can result in fines of up to S$10,000 (US$7,500), jail terms of up to three months, or both.2

FICA criminalizes electronic communications activity designated as foreign interference if it is “covert or involves deception.” The term “covert” is “intended to cover any conduct that is hidden or secret, or lacking transparency,” and the law mentions use of encrypted communication platforms as an example of covert behavior (see B3 and C2).3

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Singapore has no constitutionally recognized right to privacy, and law enforcement authorities have broad powers to search electronic devices without judicial authorization, including while people are in custody (see C3).1 The full extent of the government’s surveillance capabilities and practices is unknown.

In April 2023, Citizen Lab published a report on the Israeli surveillance firm QuaDream, concluding that Singapore was an “operator location” for the company.2 In February 2022, reporting revealed that QuaDream had the ability to exploit a flaw in Apple’s software and that the Singapore government was a QuaDream client.3 Desmond Tan, the minister of state for home affairs and for sustainability and the environment, has said that state agencies “rely on a range of intelligence capabilities, including harnessing technology” to safeguard Singapore, and that the government cannot discuss specifics for national security reasons.4

In December 2021, multiple Singaporeans—including The Online Citizen editor in chief Terry Xu and journalist Kirsten Han—said they had received security notices from Facebook warning that their accounts had been targeted by surveillance companies.5

Privacy International notes that Singapore’s law enforcement agencies have sophisticated technological capabilities to monitor telephone and other digital communications. According to the group, surveillance is facilitated by the fact that “the legal framework regulating interception of communication falls short of applicable international human rights standards, and judicial authorization is sidelined and democratic oversight inexistent.”6

Several laws provide the government with access to users’ personal information.7 Under the criminal procedure code, police officers investigating arrestable offenses may, at any time, access and search the data of a computer they suspect has been used in connection with the offense.8 No warrant or special authorization is needed and confiscation of electronic devices during police investigations is fairly common.

Investigations into individuals’ social media posts have suggested that authorities monitor people’s online activities (see B2). Individuals have also been asked to provide the login information for their social media accounts to investigating officers (see C4).9 Penalties for noncompliance can include a fine of up to S$5,000 (US$3,700), six months in jail, or both.

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

In the absence of a constitutional right to privacy, service providers and technology companies can be required to hand information over to the government.

Website registration requirements, though imposed on only a small number of platforms, have raised concerns about unwarranted official intrusion into the sites’ operations and the personal information of subscribers (see B6).

Under laws like FICA, the government can demand a wide range of information from individuals, whether they are in or outside of Singapore. This information could include any relations with foreigners, the provision of voluntary labor by noncitizens, or financial data used “for the administration and management of activities undertaken by the person which are directed towards a political end in Singapore.”1

Government authorities have said they can request metadata and content from international social media platforms and other technology companies when required for the investigation of offenses.2 The Personal Data Protection Act exempts public agencies and organizations acting on their behalf from compliance with its privacy safeguards.3

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Internet users did not experience violence in retaliation for their online activities during the coverage period. However, due to the lack of protections for the expression of unpopular or dissenting views, Singaporeans do not operate in an online environment free of intimidation or harassment.

In May 2024, in a speech before Parliament, Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam singled out individuals and organizations that had criticized the death penalty in Singapore and accused them of spreading falsehoods, including online. Shanmugam referenced May 2023 POFMA directions “against 10 social media posts and two online articles for containing false statements about a capital sentence meted out by the Courts.” He also gave the full email address of activist Kirsten Han, accusing her of helping death-row prisoners file post-appeal legal applications, which he described as “a clear abuse of process.”1

Similarly, in October 2021, Shanmugam identified three Singaporeans—The Online Citizen editor in chief Terry Xu, New Naratif managing director Thum Ping Tjin, and independent journalist and activist Kirsten Han—as possible agents of foreign interference.2 The remarks came amid the parliamentary debate over FICA. The minister described Thum and Han, who had campaigned online against the passage of FICA, as “chief” among those spreading misinformation about the bill, and noted that they had received funding from the Open Society Foundations, a grant-giving body founded by US philanthropist George Soros.

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Cyberattacks against government entities, media outlets, and civil society organizations have historically not been a widespread problem in Singapore.

However, during the coverage period a number of cyberattacks were directed at media outlet Gutzy Asia. In May 2024, Terry Xu, the outlet’s editor in chief, reportedly received two separate alerts from the company Wordfence about over 180 attempted attacks on Gutzy Asia that took place in the span of 10 minutes. None of the attacks were successful.1

Additionally, consumer data breaches are common and affect thousands of Singaporeans. In November 2023, the websites of several Singaporean public healthcare institutions—including Singapore General Hospital, National University Hospital, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, and the Agency for Integrated Care—were disrupted for up to eight hours by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.2 Synapxe, the national health technology agency, said there was no indication that internal networks or data had been compromised.3 That same month, the Marina Bay Sands hotel announced that its systems had been breached in October 2023, compromising the personal data of 665,000 customers.4

The 2018 Cybersecurity Act requires owners of computer systems that deal with essential services pertaining to national security, public safety, or the economy to report cybersecurity incidents and conduct audits and risk assessments, among other obligations.

On Singapore

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Country Facts

  • Population

    5,637,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    48 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    53 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes