Policy Recommendations

In addition to defending the international order from emboldened autocrats, democratic governments must attend to democratic renewal within Europe, particularly among nascent democracies. New leaders in countries with recent democratic breakthroughs—both inside and outside the EU—face internal and external pressure to reform as well as obstruction by antidemocratic forces. Policymakers and donors must recognize that many would-be reformers are struggling to push major changes through a legal and institutional framework that has been heavily damaged by previous illiberal governments. It is crucial for the democratic community to support new governments in the aftermath of breakthrough elections and for years to come. Specifically, EU member states should:

• Make addressing rule-of-law concerns a strategic priority within the EU. While continuing their efforts to condition financial assistance on countries’ compliance with European standards for the rule of law and human rights, EU institutions should prioritize rule-of-law concerns in all policy and decision-making processes, and set a goal of implementing all judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding member states’ actions.
• Be consistent and transparent in withholding and releasing EU funds related to fundamental treaty violations. The European Commission’s decisions to lock or unlock funds for member states in response to their actions to address treaty violations should follow a stringent procedure and avoid any use of treaty compliance as a “bargaining chip.” Proactive transparency on the commission’s application of EU law enforcement mechanisms is paramount in the context of nascent reform efforts in Poland, ongoing rule-of-law challenges in Hungary, and accelerating violations in Slovakia.
• Support voter education on obstacles to reform. Reform-minded governments must act in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law—the basis upon which they were elected—and be as transparent as possible with the public, noting where and when they have encountered obstacles and why they have decided on a given action. Transparency is particularly important in countries classified as Hybrid Regimes, where malign authoritarian influence and disinformation campaigns are commonly used to portray democratic reformers as enemies of democracy and undermine their public support. Strategic government communications about progress toward reforms, independent media coverage, oversight from civil society, and civic education initiatives should all play a role in providing clear and accurate information to citizens.

Military aggression from autocracies in the region has underscored the dangers of exclusion from democracy-based organizations like the EU and NATO, galvanizing the political will of policymakers in aspiring member states and generating further public pressure to undertake long-sought democratic reforms. The EU, with reinforcement from allied democratic governments and donors, must respond consistently to this increased demand for entry and help ensure that it leads to genuine progress. They should:

• Provide unambiguous messages, guidance, and parameters for EU aspirant countries. The fact that the EU has begun accession talks with nine countries presents an extraordinary opportunity to push for democratic reform—if the prospective members are provided with clear benchmarks and timelines. The EU, the United States, and donors should work with governments seeking EU accession negotiations to support reforms that are consistent with democratic principles and the rule of law, and complement government efforts with foreign assistance. The EU’s new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is a promising effort to spur reforms in exchange for meaningful economic benefits, which could help break the existing accession gridlock for these countries.
• Empower newer member states to share best practices on democratic reforms with EU aspirants. As the most recent beneficiaries of EU enlargement, member states in Central and Eastern Europe should actively impart lessons to EU-aspirant countries based on their own experience with democratization efforts. For example, Romania’s admirable strides to improve the independence of its judiciary suggest that it should strengthen its partnerships with Moldova, Ukraine, and the states of the Western Balkans as they work on the same issue. Similarly, there are important lessons to be shared between those aspirants that are new to the negotiation process and those that have been in the process for years. Donors should consider additional assistance along these lines.
• Tailor bilateral assistance and engagement to address the specific needs of Hybrid Regimes depending on their recent democratic trajectories. As this report explains, some Hybrid Regimes have been moving toward autocracy for several years, while others have been democratizing or seem trapped in a cyclical pattern. Each of these trajectories warrants a different approach by democratic policymakers as they engage bilaterally with such countries and provide foreign assistance. For example, democratic governments may need to utilize more “sticks” than “carrots” when dealing with countries on an antidemocratic path. This could include increased use of sanctions against corrupt or undemocratic officials, and more consistent repudiation of harmful actions by illiberal leaders. 

For decades, autocrats in the Nations in Transit region and beyond have reaped economic and other benefits from the prevailing democratic order, while simultaneously exempting themselves from its political norms and legal constraints. Even today they continue to flagrantly violate international rules and corrupt international institutions with considerable impunity. Seeking accountability for human rights abuses and justice for victims of political repression must be a priority for democratic governments. Democracies must also stand in solidarity with human rights defenders (HRDs) from authoritarian states, supporting their work on the ground and, if need be, in exile. To advance these overarching goals, democratic governments should:

• Consistently prioritize democracy and human rights in the region. When democracies fail to condemn human rights abuses consistently as a matter of principle, autocrats are emboldened and international norms are weakened. Some democracies have admirably supported Ukraine, but when the Azerbaijani military forcibly displaced over 120,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, the international community responded mostly with symbolic appeals and expressions of concern. The EU continues to rely on Azerbaijani energy exports and overlook human rights abuses by President Ilham Aliyev’s regime, apparently prioritizing political and economic expediency over core values and long-term interests.

Similarly, although EU member states have welcomed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees in an irrefutable act of solidarity, other foreign nationals seeking asylum in Europe have not found the same level of acceptance or welcome. Indeed, the December 2023 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum has been criticized by human rights groups for its lack of protections for asylum seekers. Some EU countries have also signed deals with non–member states to care for or block migrants on their behalf, effectively outsourcing their legal and moral obligations to countries with worse human rights conditions. Such agreements have notably funneled bilateral and multilateral assistance to authoritarian governments in countries including Turkey and Tunisia. Democracies must do more to track how this and other external aid is being used, and should consider making any further funding conditional on the recipients’ adherence to human rights and the rule of law.

• Use targeted sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy of accountability for human rights abusers and corrupt officials. Democracies should impose targeted sanctions in a coordinated fashion for maximum impact. EU member states should also pass their own targeted-sanctions laws, allowing groups of them to act in concert even when the entire EU cannot reach consensus. For example, they could adopt national-level legislation that mirrors the EU Magnitsky Act. Crucially, democracies must ensure that any sanctions are fully and effectively enforced, so that autocrats cannot disregard them as weak or symbolic gestures.
• Seek criminal charges against officials who engage in human rights abuses and corruption. Democratic governments should increase their collaboration with civil society to pursue criminal charges against human rights abusers and corrupt actors in the Nations in Transit region. The initiative could include cases in the perpetrator’s home country, in foreign countries where the invocation of universal jurisdiction is possible, or at international judicial venues. For example, democracies should seek to support and replicate recent efforts to prosecute Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his associates under the principle of universal jurisdiction for their widespread human rights abuses, particularly surrounding the suppression of mass protests in 2020.
• Leverage multilateral institutions to support collective responses to and documentation of rights abuses. Examples of this tactic include the repeated invocation of the Moscow Mechanism at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to officially document rights abuses committed by Russian and Belarusian authorities; the creation of the International Accountability Platform for Belarus, which was launched as a result of the Moscow Mechanism’s report to the OSCE Permanent Council in 2020; and the UN Human Rights Council’s appointment and renewal of a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Russia.
• Support HRDs, civil society, and independent media in their home countries. Donors should continue to assist front-line democracy activists and organizations across the Nations in Transit region, particularly when they are under duress. Recommended support includes emergency assistance; temporary relocation opportunities; psychosocial and psycho-emotional support; medical assistance; digital security installation, support, and training; legal advice; and strengthening of organizational resilience.
• Continue to support HRDs in exile. Autocrats in the Nations in Transit region are increasingly targeting individual activists and organizations through judicial harassment, violent political persecution, torture, and arrests, compelling many to seek safety abroad. Governments that host HRDs in exile should continuously evaluate their visa processes to facilitate the safe relocation of such activists. According to a 2023 report from the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, while there is no consistent EU approach to harboring HRDs, several countries have adopted effective models. Knowledge sharing among European countries is critical to ensuring that at-risk HRDs are not denied protection. In the United States, efforts are underway to create a special, limited visa category for HRDs facing imminent danger, which Freedom House has endorsed. Flexible financing and innovative technological solutions should also be provided so that HRDs can continue their work in exile and communicate securely with people in the countries they were forced to flee. As one Freedom House expert put it, “Instead of building bridges, we must dig tunnels.”