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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022

Brazil

Resilient
Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts
Notable
 35 85
Local Resilience and Response
High
 46 85
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least influence) to 85 (most influence)
brazil flags waiving in the street

header1 Key findings

Report by: Ellie Young, Sarah Cook, and anonymous

  • Increasing influence: Beijing’s media influence in Brazil is significant and growing. During the coverage period of 2019–21, Chinese state media and diplomatic actors actively engaged in public diplomacy and expanded their social media presence. Chinese state media outlets also signed or renewed cooperation agreements with both private and public Brazilian media.
  • Limited audience and impact: Experts interviewed for this report noted that there was a narrow audience for Chinese state media content in Brazil. Public opinion polling found widespread skepticism toward Beijing’s positions on issues such as the efficacy of Chinese-made vaccines, a broad anti-China sentiment that was sometimes fanned by Brazilian leaders for political ends, and a low level of general knowledge on China (see Impact and public opinion).
  • Propaganda emphasis on bilateral ties, vaccine diplomacy: Chinese state media and diplomats in Brazil became more proactive in responding to local leaders’ sometimes xenophobic comments, in addition to refuting what they saw as “erroneous” statements on sensitive topics such as Taiwan’s independence or the efficacy of Chinese-made vaccines. Positive messaging about the economic relationship underscored the importance of China to Brazil’s future development, including its rollout of 5G telecommunications service. In general, Chinese actors sought to present China as a generous and reliable partner for economic growth and multilateral cooperation (see Propaganda).
  • Strong state media presence via local partnerships: China Radio International (CRI), China Central Television (CCTV), China News Service (CNS), and the official news agency Xinhua all have regional offices in Brazil. A publishing house owned by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) works with local partners to publish the magazine China Hoje in Brazil, and Chinese state television programming is available to Brazilian audiences via content-sharing and coproduction agreements with major local broadcasters, including public media. China Daily has paid to publish advertorial content in the major newspapers Folha de S.Paulo, O Globo, and Correio Braziliense (see Propaganda).
  • Active embassy communications: Chinese diplomats were regularly interviewed by local print, radio, television, and online news outlets during the coverage period, although the use of signed articles to promote diplomatic messaging temporarily declined under the leadership of a new ambassador (2018–22). Both the embassy’s and the ambassador’s personal accounts were highly engaged with local audiences on Twitter and Facebook. The ambassador has promoted false or misleading narratives about human rights in China. He also used his platform to weigh in on local news issues, with some of his comments circulating widely (see Propaganda).
  • Subsidized press trips and journalism cooperation: Representatives from Brazilian outlets participated in regional media cooperation forums organized by Chinese state media that have sought to centralize news production on China-related issues. Journalists who participated in short subsidized press trips to China reported being instructed to write positive news stories after their return (see Dissemination of CCP media norms, tactics, or governance models).

 

  • No disinformation campaigns: There was no evidence of disinformation campaigns originating in China that used coordinated or inauthentic behavior to specifically target news consumers in Brazil. However, both Chinese state media and diplomatic actors exposed Brazilian audiences to misleading narratives that Beijing was spreading internationally (see Disinformation campaigns).

 

  • Heavy influence in diaspora media: Brazil’s Chinese diaspora population is large, numbering around 300,000, and concentrated in urban areas. It has historically coexisted with a large Taiwanese community. A variety of media outlets and online news platforms, including the largest Chinese-language newspaper in Latin America, serves Chinese readers. While some outlets support Taiwan, publications associated with China and the CCP now appear to dominate Chinese-language media in Brazil, though most seem focused on providing practical, local information for Chinese-language audiences rather than geopolitical news (see Chinese diaspora media).
  • Strong media sector and civil society, growing independent expertise: Brazil has strong limits on foreign ownership in the media and telecommunications sectors. The country also has a tradition of investigative journalism, a diverse media ecosystem, and an active civil society sector, all of which serve as a foundation for resilience in the face of foreign media influence. Brazil is one of the few countries in Latin America that has a foreign correspondent based in China, and independent expertise on China among Brazilian journalists and academics is growing (See Local resilience and response).
  • Gaps and vulnerabilities: The media sector is highly concentrated and politicized. Regulations governing media ownership transparency, partisan ownership, and cross-ownership are weak. Violence against journalists has increased in the last decade, and the government’s hostility toward the press under former President Jair Bolsonaro has damaged public trust in journalism and contributed to the spread of disinformation. Some media commentators and political leaders, including Bolsonaro himself, have leveraged rhetoric about the threat posed by the CCP—as well as broader anti-China and anti-Chinese sentiment exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic—for their own benefit, making accurate risk assessments and constructive democratic responses more difficult (see Local resilience and response).

header2 Background

Brazil is a democracy that holds competitive elections, and the political arena, though polarized, is characterized by vigorous public debate. It is rated as Free in Freedom in the World 2023,1 Freedom House’s annual study of political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, Freedom House’s annual study of internet freedom.2 The constitution guarantees freedom of expression and the country’s media environment is vibrant. However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack, political violence is high, and the government has struggled to address crime and disproportionate violence against and economic exclusion of minorities.3 Online news sources, including social media, have become increasingly prominent, accessed by 83 percent of the population according to 2021 data; however, many people (61 percent) still watch television news, while the number of people using print media as a source dropped to 12 percent by 2021.4 At the start of 2023, the most popular social media platform by far was WhatsApp, followed by YouTube , Instagram, and Facebook.5

As the largest economy in Latin America and with a population of over 214 million people, Brazil has been a critical partner for China. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1974 and upgraded relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2012.6 Brazil’s ties to China are uniquely close in the Latin American context as a member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), a forum for discussing matters of political, security, economic, and cultural interest that has evolved into a platform for these nations to advance their own ideas of global governance.

Economic ties and interdependent trade are an essential component of the bilateral relationship. China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009, with total trade exceeding $100 billion in 2020. Relative to other countries, Brazil is in the rare position of having a trade surplus with China, exporting $63.3 billion to China in 2019—led by soybeans, meat, iron ore, and crude oil7—while importing only $36 billion, with telecom equipment the top import.8 Chinese companies are also a growing source of investment in Brazil, with available data indicating over $65 billion of investment from 2005 through 2021, including $8.9 billion from early 2019 to the end of 2021.9

Brazil and China’s historical pattern of close cooperation was upended after ex-President Jair Bolsonaro took office in January 2019, although trade between the two countries remained strong. Bolsonaro and his foreign policy team adopted a strongly pro-United States foreign policy agenda, including frequently criticizing China. COVID-19’s onslaught in 2020 saw the Bolsonaro administration shift its approach to China somewhat, continuing to antagonize China at times while also softening its rhetoric in an attempt to attract Chinese assistance with the pandemic.10 Domestically, some sectors have been critical of the partnership with China, particularly the Brazilian manufacturing sector, which faces fierce competition from Chinese products and lacks reciprocal access to the Chinese market, as well as the nationalist-populist voters who support Bolsonaro.11 Agricultural exporters, on the other hand, prefer a strong relationship with Beijing because China is a major market for their products.

Such a confrontational dynamic is a marked departure from the historical trajectory of Brazil-China relations, which has trended toward deeper economic and political relations. Despite federal cooperation waning under Bolsonaro, cooperation continued to deepen at the subnational level. China has a long-term interest in a close diplomatic relationship with Brazil, which is important both for its strategy in Latin America and for maximizing its global leadership. Brazil too has a long-term strategic interest in maintaining a working partnership with China. In October 2022, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) was reelected president for a term of four years, defeating Bolsonaro and signaling a likely shift back to friendlier relations with China.12 During Lula’s first two terms as president, from 2003 to 2011, his administration had established a policy promoting close and amicable ties with China.13

Brazil has a relatively large Chinese expatriate and diaspora community whose historic roots date back to 1812. Chinese immigrants from the Portuguese-ruled colony of Macau traveled to Brazil in the 19th century, and immigration from both mainland China and Taiwan grew significantly throughout the 20th century.14 One figure, published by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2020, estimated the community’s population in Brazil at around 302,000.15 Another report describes the diaspora population as being mostly engaged in trade and commerce and concentrated around the cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Curitiba.16 A Taiwanese Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) report estimated that there were around 70,000 Taiwanese living in Brazil in 2012.17 Although it does not have formal diplomatic relations with Brazil, Taiwan maintains two active economic and cultural offices in Brasília and São Paulo.18

header3 Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts

Propaganda and promotion of favored narratives

Key narratives

Chinese government propaganda and narratives target Brazilian audiences through various channels with narratives aimed at reinforcing Brazil’s economic reliance on China.1 At times, these narratives also directly or indirectly discourage anti-China rhetoric or closer ties with the United States.

The Chinese government often presents China as a reliable and generous partner in Brazil’s economic growth, highlighting the strong trade and cooperative ties between the two countries as a crucial factor in shaping Brazil’s future. For example, Chinese state media such as the People’s Daily and Xinhua have emphasized that China has remained Brazil’s main trading partner and export destination for 10 consecutive years, and has become one of the country’s major sources of foreign investment.2 The embassy frequently publishes op-eds and articles in Chinese state media and local outlets and conducts interviews with local outlets and online briefings to promote Xi Jinping’s vision of a “community of shared future” between China and Brazil, highlighting the “like-minded and connected” nature of the relationship between the two nations.3 These communications emphasize that the strategic China-Brazil relationship will undoubtedly benefit both nations through deepening friendly and cooperative ties.4

Chinese state media strategically increased its presence in Brazil by using vaccine diplomacy to strengthen bilateral ties during the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020. In numerous articles and interviews, Chinese media and diplomats repeatedly emphasized China’s role as the first country to collaborate with Brazil in vaccine development and to provide vaccines to Brazil, helping the country combat COVID-19 and contributing significantly to the fight against the pandemic.5 Chinese state media, including the People’s Daily, Xinhua, and the Global Times, highlighted Brazilian officials’ gratitude for medical aid, Chinese-made vaccines, and supplies donated for pandemic prevention and control efforts.6 As part of this effort, Chinese diplomats launched a propaganda campaign via TV, radio, and op-eds to positively frame China’s anti-pandemic measures and cooperation with international partners, while embassy communications pushed back against critics blaming China for the pandemic as a “political virus.”7

Chinese state media and diplomats have been actively pressing Brazil to adopt 5G technology produced by Huawei, a PRC-based company with close CCP ties and a record of building censorship and surveillance systems in China and abroad, calling for a fair evaluation and defending against US criticism and concerns over national security. In response to what they view as “slander and smear against China” and attempts by the United States to undermine Brazil-China cooperation, Chinese state media and diplomats published articles and social media posts during the coverage period defending Huawei’s security measures and dismissing criticism of Huawei 5G technology as lies. There were also attempts to promote broader anti-US sentiment, describing US politicians as willing to engage in deceitful tactics to spread political lies and fabricate a so-called China threat to attack China’s 5G technology security and maintain US technological hegemony.8

A typical example of the above narrative used by the Chinese government appeared in a spokesperson’s remarks from November 2020, where they refuted “erroneous remarks” made by a Brazilian Federal Deputy about China:

“China is Brazil’s largest trading partner and one of the biggest sources of trade surplus and investment for Brazil. It is crucial for the two countries to maintain and develop China-Brazil cooperation and relations…China’s been actively supporting Brazil in fighting the pandemic, providing first hand humanitarian aid and sharing experiences…The United States has a bad record in data security issues, interferes with other countries’ 5G construction, and stubbornly blocks Huawei…. We urge Brazil to consider the benefits of cooperation with China, avoid following extreme US politicians, and stop spreading rumors that harm China-Brazil friendship. Failure to do so will have consequences.”9

Key avenues of content dissemination

The Chinese government has sought in recent years to expand the global reach of its state media outlets, but conditions in many Latin American countries present a different situation compared to other areas.10 Large commercial media conglomerates prevail in the region, which control most of the audience and local advertising funds, preventing new competitors’ entry.11 Aware of such difficulties, some Chinese state-owned media outlets—namely China Global Television Network (CGTN)—declined to open a new Portuguese channel in Brazil, although its English programming is available on cable and satellite television. State broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) opened its Latin American headquarters in São Paulo in 2010, with journalists based there mostly covering news from the region for Chinese audiences.12 Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China Radio International (CRI) have Portuguese versions and CRI has a local office, but programming appears to be available only online or via shortwave radio.13

Instead, Chinese state media have been signing large agreements for co-production and the sharing of content and technologies, while diplomatic representatives have sought to reach audiences via social media accounts and various appearances in mainstream local outlets. More specifically, the following are the main avenues through which Chinese party-state entities have attempted to—and to an extent succeeded—in reaching local audiences with their content:

  • Active embassy and social media presence: Beginning in 2019 and continuing throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the PRC created 25 new Twitter accounts for Chinese embassies, ambassadors, consuls, and consulates in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries. This trend reached Brazil, where during his three years in office from 2018 to 2022, Chinese ambassador Yang Wanming established a visible and growing presence on Twitter. As of March 2022, Yang’s personal account (@WanmingYang) and the local Chinese embassy’s account (@EmbaixadaChina) had each garnered more than 80,000 followers. Yang would often share messages in Portuguese, with some going viral—his farewell message received over 300 retweets and more than 4,600 likes.14 In some cases, he also posted provocative responses to comments made by members of the Bolsonaro family, attracting public attention.15

Yang was also a recurrent voice in mainstream media op-eds. From 2019 to 2021, his op-eds appeared at least 25 times in major publications like newspapers Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de S. Paulo, and Estado de Minas, and the weekly magazine Veja, and in interviews with newspapers such as Valor Econômico and O Globo and on the radio and television.16,A 2021 public speech “The Role of Political Parties in Modernizing Governance” (O papel dos partidos polticos na modernizaço da governança)17, hosted by the Fundação Getúlio Vargar University, was later published in Veja.18 In the speech, Yang responded to criticisms of the Chinese government model made by both ex-Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro and his son, Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, and commented on local political events.

  • Partnerships and content-sharing with mainstream television outlets: In recent years, the Chinese state-owned China Media Group (CMG), which includes CGTN, CRI, and other outlets, has established or expanded partnerships with multiple television content providers in Brazil. Those providers include the publicly funded Empresa Brasil de Comunicação (EBC), although the most significant partnerships are those with the privately owned Grupo Globo and Grupo Bandeirantes de Comunicação media groups.19

Globo is Brazil’s largest media conglomerate and one of the biggest media companies in the world. It owns multiple free-to-air television stations as well as dozens of cable and pay-per-view channels, news websites, major newspapers including O Globo and Extra, 14 magazines, and at least five radio stations with affiliates across the country. According to Media Ownership Monitor Brazil (MOM-Brazil), it reaches an audience of at least 100 million people.20 In November 2019, CMG president Shen Haixiong made a visit to Brazil, meeting with Globo owner and president Roberto Irineu Marinho and signing a memorandum of understanding between the two media giants. Few details of the agreement were made public, but cooperation in telenovela production, content exchanges, and use of 5G technology were cited by the two executives in media reports.21 In one example of how such agreements can influence content reaching Brazilian audiences, Globo aired a CGTN documentary in March 2020, “24 Hours in Wuhan,” about the COVID-19 lockdown in the Chinese city of Wuhan.22

Also in 2019, CMG was able to secure a significant agreement with Bandeirantes, the third-largest Brazilian media conglomerate.23 Headed by the Saad family, Bandeirantes comprises two free television channels, six cable television channels, a “Band International” channel aimed at Brazilian expatriates, three national radio networks, and one local radio network, as well as a daily newspaper, companies placing “out-of-home (OOH)” advertising such as on public transit, image marketing agencies, and a cable TV operator.

The collaboration between CMG and Bandeirantes is extensive, including having the CMG become an editorial collaborator on some news programming on the channel. The first outcome of this collaboration was the screening of CMG’s weekly “Xi Jinping’s Classical Quotes” series in 2019. 24 Soon after, Bandeirantes’s BandNews TV news station launched a new nightly news section, “Mundo China” (China world).25 The program is created, produced, and delivered by Brazilian reporters from BandNews TV and Portuguese-speaking Chinese journalists from CCTV. 26 For example, on weekdays, Brazilian anchors present the news, but on weekends, it features Chinese presenters. The visuals are created in CCTV’s São Paulo office, and the articles are generally translations of CCTV news broadcasts and, in some cases, extracts from CGTN reports. The show’s content varies, including cultural items, soft news, economics, and technology stories, but also sometimes veers toward propaganda, such a November 2019 story promoting Huawei investments in Brazil and overstating their amount.27 A detailed academic study on “Mundo China” published in January 2023 found that 81 percent of the show’s stories showed China in a positive light, while only 3 percent were negative and 15 percent were deemed neutral. It remains unclear how responsive Brazilian viewers are to content on “Mundo China,” but the above study analyzed coverage on BandNews TV beyond the show and found a statistically significant shift in how China was framed in news programs (excluding “Mundo China”) before and after the agreement, from a more negative or neutral framing to a more positive one. When coverage of China on “Mundo China” was included, the proportion of positive stories on BandNews TV about China exceeded negative ones by 42 percentage points after the agreement was signed (compared to a 6-percentage-point gap in favor of more negative stories prior to its implementation). These findings point to the broader impact that such content-sharing agreements can have on coverage of China.28

Such exchanges have also appeared in the entertainment sector. In 2021, Grupo Box Brazil, Brazil's largest independent pay-TV provider reaching an average of 16 million homes, struck a content-sharing agreement with China Media Group for entertainment programs, including dramas, documentaries, and feature-length films. According to the agreement, Box would launch a special series of Chinese films, documentaries, and other programming running through February 2022, while Brazilian programs would be screened in China.29 In an earlier example, during ex-Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro's October 2019 visit to Beijing, Osmar Terra, then Brazil’s minister of citizenship, proposed launching a streaming service for BRICS multimedia products. The platform, dubbed “BRICS’s Netflix” by the Brazilian press, would have been funded by the five bloc members, with each contributing 20 percent of the budget.30 The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic soon after, however, put the proposal on indefinite hold.

  • Print publications and local newspaper partnerships: There are several print publications distributed in Brazil that are produced via collaboration between a Chinese state-affiliated entity and a local partner. One example is Revista Confúcio (Confucius Magazine), published since 2014 by Hanban, which runs the Chinese Ministry of Education’s global Confucius Institute network, and São Paulo State University, home to the largest Confucius Institute in South America.31 Another publication is the magazine and news website China Hoje (China Today) published in Portuguese via a collaboration between local publishers Segmento and Go East Brasil and the CCP-owned China International Publishing Group (CIPG).32 Its content covers a wide range of topics on politics, economics, and culture and features opinion pieces from both Chinese and local Brazilian commentators. As recently as August 2023, it published its 44th issue.33 China Hoje’s reach, impact, and circulation is unclear, although its accounts on Twitter and YouTube have relatively small followings of 1,069 and 411 subscribers, respectively.34

Such seemingly limited reach via these coproduced publications stands in contrast to the potential audience reached via other partnerships —including paid inserts—in place between major Chinese state-run media and local mainstream outlets in Brazil. Filings by China Daily in the United States under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, for example, indicated that the Chinese state-run outlet had made advertising payments to the Brazilian media group Empresa Folha de Manha. The Brazilian firm, which publishes the Folha de S.Paulo daily newspaper, was paid $61,640 from November 2020 to April 2021 for running China Daily ads, according to the filings.35 Folha de S.Paulo also concluded a partnership with the China-based Caixin outlet in July 2020. In the Chinese media context, Caixin is known as a financial news outlet that is more autonomous from party-state mouthpieces like China Daily or China Radio International, and is occasionally subject to fines or censorship as a result. Nevertheless, Caixin’s independence is still limited by Chinese government restrictions and censorship. Within the first five months of the agreement, Folha de S.Paulo published 18 stories from Caixin on topics such as Chinese students in the United States, political developments in Hong Kong, and 5G networks in Guangdong province.36

Smaller Brazilian media outlets have also reached partnerships with Chinese state media. In 2019, the left-leaning news portal Vermelho signed a partnership deal with Xinhua to promote “free exchange of information and news between both newsrooms.”37 No information was made public about the duration of the partnership or about any payments.

  • Subsidized trips for journalists to China: A small number of Chinese government–subsidized trips to China for Brazilian journalists have been recorded in recent years. The CIPG invited a group of Latin American journalists and researchers from several news sources, including the Brazilian outlets Folha de S.Paulo and Jornal do Comércio, as well as China Hoje and Sputnik Brasil, the local outlet of the Russian state-owned news agency Sputnik, to visit the country in 2018, and they published articles on their respective platforms based on their experiences in China.38

As one of the journalists wrote in a first-person story published while participating in the program:

“Making journalism a tool of diplomacy was a strategy announced by the Chinese president in 2016, during the China and Latin America Media Summit. At the meeting, he revealed that, over the next five years, he would invest in a program to turn around 500 communications professionals into experts in China. And here I am, now living in Beijing, taking part in the program announced two years ago, in Chile.”39

Several Lusophone journalists were also invited to attend a Chinese government–sponsored conference in Beijing on August 23, 2019, in what was billed as an attempt to promote cultural, commercial, and economic contacts, as well as to foster in attendees a wide understanding of China and its economic growth model, history, culture, and sustainable projects. Brazil was represented by two journalists, one each from Jornal Brasília in Foco and Correio Braziliense.40. Some of the journalists invited to this press tour were interviewed by Pablo Morales, a professor at the London School of Economics. In an academic paper, Morales outlines how journalists who attend training seminars are routinely interviewed by Chinese media about their experiences in China. Several journalists mentioned how they were directed to create stories in accordance with China’s idea of constructive journalism; being constructive, in this case, meant portraying the Chinese people as “disciplined, harmonious, and optimistic.”41

Other Chinese initiatives aimed at building international ties include inviting filmmakers and students to participate in exchange programs in China like the Belt and Road Initiative Documentary Consortium (BriDoc), the Looking China Youth Film Project, or the BRICS Media Forum. Some of these are officially run by commercial entities; however, they ultimately have the support of the party (otherwise they could not function) because they serve the ultimate objective of “telling China’s narrative accurately.” In one example, in September 2019, the most popular Sunday show on Brazilian TV, “Fantástico,” aired a four-part series about China’s technological advances in areas like high-speed trains, electric cars, and smart cities that was reportedly viewed by at least 50 million people and helped bolster China’s image in Brazil. Viewed as an opportunity to improve China’s image, the film received visa and logistics support from the Chinese embassy in Brazil and funding from Huawei. The director acknowledged that he made a deliberate choice not to include any criticism of the Chinese government, including in discussing contentious issues like surveillance.42

  • Subsidized trips and influence efforts targeting Brazilian politicians: Chinese state officials have effectively established contact with a diverse spectrum of intellectual and political pundits who may supply influential perspectives and influence Sino-Brazilian relations. An example is the lobby for the implementation of 5G technology in Brazil.

In January 2019, 13 members of the Social Liberal Party (PSL)—which then-President Bolsonaro belonged to at the time—traveled to China to learn about the country’s facial recognition technology. The trip was organized by the Chinese government during a time of reconciliation between Brazil and the United States, and came one month after a Brazilian presidential campaign marked by strong anti-China sentiment. The Brazilian legislators were seeking support for a measure they were pushing in Congress that would define adoption of facial recognition technology in public areas to aid law enforcement and public security.43 The bill was presented in Congress in August 2019, but as of the publication of this report it has not yet been put to a vote.44 In September of the same year, another group of five senators from parties across Brazil’s political spectrum visited China to learn about the country and about Huawei and its 5G technology, with an eye toward possibly replicating Chinese regulatory models and broadcasting services in Brazil.45 During the coverage period of this report, at least 29 federal members of parliament and two senators visited China in total, including touring Huawei facilities.46 Brazilian telecommunications-related agencies also made a total of 12 visits to China in 2019.47

In some instances, upon returning to Brazil, legislators have made speeches or other comments covered in the media praising the Chinese government and Huawei. In October 2019, for example, Senator Chico Rodrigues who had joined the above-mentioned delegation the previous month, said on the Brazilian Senate floor that “what has most impressed all of us during our visits was the distance that separates our economic growth from the Chinese economic development,” and stressed that Huawei could “boost the revolution” that Brazil needs in telecommunications, including with the introduction of 5G.48

In another example of Brazilian officials echoing talking points favorable to Beijing, in September 2019, Brazil’s largest financial newspaper, Grupo Globo’s Valor Econômico, published a special edition featuring in-depth interviews with several Brazilian government officials and experts that highlighted China’s economy and its investment in Brazil and emphasized China’s impressive economic performance.49 These articles stressed that strengthening cooperation between the two countries would bring more benefits to both countries.50

Disinformation campaigns

For the purposes of this report, disinformation is defined as the intentional dissemination of false or misleading content, especially through inauthentic activity—such as the use of fake accounts—on global social media platforms. No evidence was found of disinformation campaigns that used fake accounts targeting Brazil, or of content from global campaigns linked to China on social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook reaching local audiences. That being said, in interviews with local media, Chinese diplomats such as Ambassador Yang often relayed points that distorted reality or spread falsehoods, such as claiming in response to the US-hosted Summit for Democracy in late 2021 that China’s system is actually a multi-party democracy.51

Censorship and intimidation

While there were no reported incidents of physical or technical intimidation from China-linked actors towards Brazilian journalists during the coverage period, there were several indications of the Chinese embassy closely monitoring Brazilian media commentary on China and responding to voice its disagreement. In the cultural sector, in March 2019, the Falun Dafa Association of Brazil, the local branch of a spiritual movement that has been persecuted by the CCP and banned inside China, reported that a Falun Gong exhibit in Brasília was shuttered early after pressure from the Chinese embassy. The same exhibit had been previously displayed at the University of Brasília in October 2018 without incident.52

Control over content distribution infrastructure

China-based companies do not have a substantial role in Brazil’s digital television infrastructure. However, certain companies with connections to the CCP have been making headway in the information technology and social media industries, which could potentially create vulnerabilities for future manipulation.

Huawei has been a prominent technology provider in Brazil for over two decades, with their coverage reaching 95% of the population.53 In December 2021, Brazilian telecommunications operator TIM Brasil confirmed that the company would be using Huawei’s equipment for its 5G network rollout, ahead of a July 2022 government deadline for the network’s launch.54 A significant number of telecom companies in Brazil already rely on Huawei equipment for their 3G and 4G networks. For instance, Brazil’s biggest mobile operator, Vivo (a subsidiary of Spain’s Telefônica), relies on Huawei’s 3G and 4G technology for 65% of its networks, while Claro Brasil, Oi, and TIM source 55%, 60%, and 45% of their equipment from Huawei, respectively.55

In the social media sphere, several applications owned by PRC-based companies have gained widespread popularity in Brazil. TikTok, a global subsidiary of the PRC-based social media company ByteDance, was the number one app downloaded in Brazil as of December of 2022, with 175 million downloads in 2022.56 Many news outlets—including Folha de S.Paulo, O Globo, and Correio Braziliense—have accounts on the app, and it has also been used by government representatives to communicate with constituents.57 The Brazilian Senate has a popular TikTok account, for example.58 There have been some documented cases around the world in recent years of TikTok removing or downplaying politically sensitive content, including content that violates domestic Chinese censorship guidelines.59 The company subsequently reported that it had corrected moderation errors. A media report from June 2022 based on leaked TikTok meetings also raised concern that ByteDance had made false statements regarding the data privacy of US users, and more broadly called into question other statements the company has made regarding its policies.60

Kwai, another short-form video app that is owned by the PRC-based firm Kuaishou and a top competitor to TikTok, has gained notable popularity in Brazil. By 2021 it was the third-most-downloaded app in the country, with over 45 million monthly active users and a growing number of content creators migrating there from Tiktok.61 In 2019, Kuaishou opened offices in São Paulo, its first Latin American branch, and in 2021 became an official sponsor of the Brazilian national soccer team.62 The app is especially popular among lower-income, blue-collar workers.

The WeChat social media platform is owned by the PRC-based technology company Tencent, which has close ties to the CCP. In Brazil, it is used predominantly by Chinese speakers, thereby integrating them into the PRC’s heavily monitored and censored information environment (see Chinese diaspora media).63 Given its e-commerce features, major economic players in Brazil have also started to use WeChat in some cases. In November 2020, for example, the Brazilian mining company Vale announced plans to launch an iron ore trading platform on WeChat to facilitate transactions in renminbi (yuan) with Chinese companies.64

Xiaomi, another PRC-based company whose mobile phone devices are sold globally, saw its market share in Brazil grow considerably during the coverage period, from near zero in early 2019 to over 10 percent by the end of 2021, although its popularity remained far behind competitors like Samsung, Motorola, and Apple.65 In 2021, a security audit of Xiaomi devices by the Lithuanian government found latent censorship blacklists in Chinese and English containing terms that might be sensitive to the CCP, as well as broader terms related to human rights, religion, and democracy; the lists were periodically updated but not active at the time of the investigation.66

There was no evidence in Brazil during the coverage period of control over content-distribution infrastructure being used to marginalize critical content or artificially amplify pro-Beijing content. Still, the potential activation of this control for future manipulation remains, particularly during a perceived moment of crisis for Beijing.

Dissemination of CCP media norms, tactics, or governance models

In interviews, media professionals from Brazil who traveled to China reported receiving some training aimed at disseminating Chinese state-centered Marxist norms of journalism, although it did not appear to affect their own journalistic practices in the long-term.67 Moreover, as noted above, some Brazilian officials traveled to China wishing to better understand the use of facial recognition and other surveillance technologies, and at least one Huawei “safe city” pilot was launched in Campinas in 2018, but there were no reports of subsequent attempts to adopt information manipulation tactics.68

Chinese diaspora media

As in many other countries, media outlets with close ties to Beijing have a strong, and growing, foothold in Brazil relative to other news sources serving the Chinese diaspora there. Brazil serves as a hub for Chinese-language media in Latin America as a whole, such as Nanmei Qiaobao (南美侨报), based in São Paulo, which publishes a daily paper and distributes its print edition (including various weekend editions) nationally.69 Nanmei Qiaobao reportedly has one of the largest circulations of any Chinese-language media outlet across Central and South America, and distributes its content in Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia. In addition to its various print editions, the newspaper maintains a website, accounts on WeChat and the microblogging platform Weibo, and a Portuguese-language Twitter account. It launched a mobile app, Latin America Today (今日拉美), in 2019.70

Nanmei Qiaobao, along with the biweekly newspaper Meizhou Shibao (美洲时报), the daily paper Meizhou Huabao (美洲华报), and the websites Baxi Qiaowang (巴西侨网) and Baxi Huarenwang (巴西华人网), are members of the Global Chinese Media Cooperation Union (GCMCU), a media association for Chinese-language news that is overseen by the state-controlled China News Service.71 These outlets republish materials from Chinese state media outlets or the Chinese embassy, and their editorial line appears to be consistent with Beijing’s preferred narratives. Nanmei Qiaobao has also published commentaries written by Chinese diplomats.72

There are also a few news outlets that appear to be oriented towards the long-standing overseas Taiwanese community. The daily publication Chinês América Times (美洲時報), which is in Traditional Chinese, occasionally shares content from Taiwan’s public-funded but editorially independent Central News Agency (CNA) and cooperates with the Taiwan OCAC in Brazil.73 A Taiwanese digital outlet, Baxi Huaren Tenxunwang (巴西華人資訊網), is available in Traditional Chinese, Simplified Chinese, Portuguese, and Spanish. It sometimes shares content from the China Times, a Taiwanese media outlet owned by the Want Want media group that is well-known for its pro-unification Pan-Blue alignment.74

The researcher Josh Stenberg has found that over time in Brazil’s media ecosystem, the Taiwanese-owned media presence has declined and Chinese-language media has become less pluralized, with many outlets shifting towards a more pro-Beijing editorial line. The widespread adoption of the PRC-based WeChat as a popular form of communication for Chinese diaspora communities has continued the integration of Chinese-language media in Brazil with the PRC’s information environment.75 Nevertheless, some Taiwanese and religious outlets remain, providing a degree of news diversity.

header4 Resilience + Response

Underlying media resilience

  • Constitutional protections and an independent judiciary: Brazil’s 1988 constitution protects freedom of the press and freedom of speech. The groundbreaking Marco Civil, a framework for internet-user rights was signed into law in 2014, protecting freedom of expression online, although other laws or legislative initiatives have sought to weaken these guarantees in recent years.1 The judiciary, including the Federal Supreme Court (STF), is largely independent and is empowered to try cases regarding rights infringements. In one example, the STF upheld free expression in 2021 when it nullified a ban on social networks removing posts containing disinformation that had been issued by ex-President Bolsonaro.2
  • Transparency mechanisms and competitive procurement for foreign investment, telecommunications: Brazil has legislative and regulatory frameworks in place that support investigative journalism and enhance transparency, including regulations on foreign investment. Freedom of information legislation exists and gives the public access to information on media ownership and advertising spending. Law 5250, the law on freedom of expression, thought and information, places limitations on foreign investment in critical sectors, including telecommunications.3 The third article states that “the responsibility and intellectual and administrative guidance of journalistic companies will lie exclusively with native Brazilians, with any type of technical assistance contract with foreign companies or organizations being strictly prohibited, which allows them, under any pretext or manner, to have direct, indirect, or surreptitious participation, or surreptitiously, through agents or employees, in the administration and guidance of the journalistic company.”4 Foreign direct investments must be registered with the Central Bank of Brazil (CBC) within 30 days.5 The Agência Nacional do Cinema (ANCINE) regulates audio-visual content. The Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações (ANATEL) is responsible for regulating telecommunications. It is perceived by civil society as independent, and auctions, such as for 5G technology, have been public and competitive.
  • Increased fact-checking and investments in media education: Amid the rise of social media use and growing awareness of problems like dis- and misinformation, media literacy has been incorporated into Brazil’s educational curriculum. The National Common Curricular Base (BNCC), a document that outlines key learning standards for students in Brazilian schools , currently includes media education, digital culture and the journalistic-media sphere.6 Over the past decade, there has also been an increase in organizations specializing in fact-checking, such as Agência Lupa and Estadão Verifica, whose work includes assessing the truth of politicians’ claims, refuting false online rumors, and preparing to tackle disinformation ahead of elections.7
  • Vibrant media ecosystem and civil society: Despite a high concentration of ownership, economic challenges, and growing attacks on the press (see below), Brazil is home to a vibrant media landscape and a strong tradition of investigative journalism. The country is also home to a variety of journalist unions and associations, many operating in different states under the umbrella of the National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ), which has represented Brazilian journalists since 1946.8 FENAJ and other such groups document and condemn attacks on journalists, advocate for legislation protecting free speech, and publish a code of ethics for Brazilian journalists, among other resources.9

China-specific resilience

  • Critical reporting on human rights violations in China and new journalism initiatives to fill gaps: Compared to other countries in the region and other parts of the Global South, Brazil is one of few countries with a China-based correspondent and with China-focused reporters at other outlets. Interviews with journalists indicate openness and even encouragement from editors to publish stories critical of the Chinese government, while many outlets also run stories from international news wire services that are at odds with pro-PRC narratives. Many mainstream news outlets, including media companies that also have content sharing or co-production agreements with Chinese state outlets, published stories about human rights violations in China or antigovernment protests in Hong Kong during the coverage period.10 Despite such coverage, journalists familiar with China have expressed concerns over gaps in reporting, lack of nuance and troubles getting Brazilian news consumers to engage with China-related stories.11 Several new initiatives have emerged in recent years to fill these gaps, including the Diálogo Chino nongovernmental organization (NGO) and Shūmiàn, a platform coordinated by volunteers with a website, newsletter, and Portuguese-language podcast that seeks to establish bridges of understanding between China and Latin America.12
  • Academic and think tank knowledge creation on China and bilateral ties are relatively high: The work of Luiza Duarte, Igor Patrick, Tatiana Prazeres, Evandro Menezes de Carvalho, and many others contribute to research and analysis of Brazil and China ties beyond their economic aspects. Academics in Brazil seem interested in comparing the dimensions of the two countries’ relationship at a societal level. Brazil also has a healthy ecosystem of institutes and research groups focused on disseminating the resulting knowledge to civil society at large—during the pandemic, through online forums and panels. Among these are independent institutes like Instituto Sociocultural Brasil-China (Ibrachina)13, Observa China14, and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) think tank’s Núcleo Ásia program,15 and university research centers such as the Centro de Estudos Asiáticos at the Fluminense Federal University (CEA-UFF),16 the Centro de Estudos da Ásia Oriental at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (CEAO-UFMG),17 and the Centro de Estudos Sobre a China at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP),18 to cite a few.

header5 Vulnerabilities

  • Gaps in media coverage and analysis on China: Despite the above strengths and emerging journalistic initiatives, Brazil has only one credentialed correspondent writing from China.1 Local outlets rely heavily on international news wires, and coverage of China can lack nuance and cultural context. As described in February 2021 by Folha de S.Paulo columnist Tatiana Prazeres, who at the time was a senior fellow at Beijing’s University of International Business and Economics, “there are passionate opinions, categorical positions, and definitive views on China” in Brazil, but there is a lack of information and analysis.2 According to Prazeres, Brazilian “analyses lack sobriety. From the outset, many stumble over the basic risk —that of romanticizing or demonizing China. Starting from one or the other, nothing useful is produced. Opinions became even more passionate after the pandemic.”3 An important contrast to mainstream media coverage is Diálogo Chino’s extensive and important reporting on Chinese investments and their impacts in Brazil, especially with an environmental focus; their coverage of the growing Chinese presence in the Amazon4 and the expansion of soybean plantations to supply the Chinese market5 present two notable examples.
  • Concentrated media ownership, weak regulatory framework: According to Media Ownership Monitor, the country’s media landscape features significant audience and ownership concentration, as well as a lack of transparency and significant media influence by religious, political, and economic interests.6 MOM-Brazil analyzed 50 media outlets in four categories—TV, radio, printed media, and web. These were found to be controlled by 26 communication groups, although four in particular control over 70 percent of the television market. Major news conglomerates like Grupo Globo and Grupo Record own newspapers, online portals, and radio stations.7 The country’s regulatory framework appears to contribute to this dynamic, with limited safeguards that might prevent concentration of ownership, cross-ownership, or political control over media, while rules governing ownership transparency are not mandatory.8 In a market with a highly concentrated audience like Brazil’s, the impact of Chinese state– and ruling party–linked actors’ outreach to media owners and content exchanges with major news conglomerates—as well as any media stakes purchased—can have an outsized impact and audience reach.
  • Increasing attacks on media and journalists: Violence against journalists has increased in the last decade, and the government’s hostility toward the press under ex-President Bolsonaro has damaged public trust in journalism and contributed to the spread of disinformation.9 Given the important role that investigative reporting plays in exposing problematic CCP influence and Beijing’s growing experimentation with foreign-facing disinformation campaigns, a threatened and mistrusted journalistic profession generally is less able to effectively expose and push back against such tactics from Beijing when they emerge.
  • Xenophobia and disinformation, especially surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic: With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, racist rhetoric and behavior towards Asians and those of Chinese descent in Brazil intensified, with interviewees sharing anecdotes of being cursed at, insulted, or losing business when using their Chinese names rather than Portuguese ones.10 Initially, the Bolsonaro government rejected the China-developed CoronoVac vaccine, with Bolsonaro casting doubt on the vaccine’s safety, although the administration reversed course in January 2021, purchasing 100 million doses as deaths from the virus climbed.11 Some pro-Bolsonaro columnists promulgated conspiracy theories involving China, some of which circulated in English on QAnon forums before being translated into Portuguese. Conservative writer Rodrigo Constantino argued in an opinion piece that CoronaVac was hazardous and referred to people who backed it as “Chinese livestock” who profited from the public’s fear of the epidemic. This story fueled diplomatic hostility between the two countries.12 Attacking China was seen as a proof of commitment to the government in Bolsonaro’s circles, contributing to harassment and hostility against Chinese communities in Brazil.

The prevalence of Sinophobic discourse was also evident on social media.13 One 2021 study of Brazilian discourse on Twitter in the early months of the coronavirus pandemic examined themes in reaction to the recent coronavirus-caused public health catastrophe in Brazil.14 The findings reveal that tweets were used to disseminate stigma, racism, and unfavorable emotion toward China. Sentiment analysis of the 50 tweets with the most retweets from Portuguese-language Twitter users found that the stigmatizing phrases “Chinese virus” or “virus from China” represented the studied Twitter users’ most prominent political perspectives in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak. The most common topics of tweets besides those phrases were the use of chloroquine (a drug widely touted on social media, without evidence, as being effective against COVID-19) cures for the coronavirus, the press and information quality, dictatorship, China, Bolsonaro, and communism.

header6 Impact and Public Opinion

Available public opinion surveys indicate that perceptions of China in Brazil have become less favorable towards the Chinese government over the past decade, pointing to the limited impact of Beijing’s media influence efforts. Survey data from AmericasBarometer, a project of Vanderbilt University’s LAPOP research laboratory, includes one question on perceptions of the Chinese government’s trustworthiness. In 2016, such trust reached a peak of 53.7 percent, but it has dropped significantly since, hitting 46 percent in 2018 and a low of 36.5 percent by 2021, the latest year of available data. Notably, perceptions of trust in the United States trended in the opposite direction during the same period, rising from 42 percent in 2016 to 61 percent in 2021.1 Data for Brazil from the Pew Research Center is less recent but shows a similar decline in favorability vis-a-vis China from 2013 to 2019 (65 percent to 51 percent).2

In his master’s thesis,3 Igor Patrick, a Brazilian journalist and academic studying China, analyzed the impact of Chinese state-owned media among Brazilians. He conducted a survey to evaluate how people in Brazil consumed and understood the contents of three sample TV news segments: two reports broadcast by “Mundo China” on BandNews TV and an excerpt from the documentary “24 Hours in Wuhan,” which, as mentioned, was produced by CGTN and initially distributed in Brazil by GloboNews. The study found that the Brazilian audience generally did not show significant interest in these efforts. Nevertheless, Chinese content associated with well-known Brazilian media brands received a generally favorable reception, suggesting a potential avenue for China’s long-term strategy in the region. In an interview, Patrick emphasized how cultural and geographical differences make Brazilians shy away from content from China, in contrast to their reaction to Western-based cultural products.4 Most Brazilians have neither unfavorable nor favorable emotions about China, although there is a significant dearth of understanding about the Asian country’s culture and history. This lack of information is prevalent across all age groups and socioeconomic strata, presenting a sizable untapped market for Chinese state-owned media.

The above findings indicate that Chinese state-owned media’s efforts to influence the Brazilian population’s views and create a positive image of China overseas have had minimal influence in Brazil. The majority of Brazilians are not attracted to content about China and do not engage with such content when they encounter it. Chinese state outlets’ lack of cultural awareness about non-Hispanic Latin Americans contributes to their lackluster results.5

header7 Future Trajectory

The following are key areas related to Beijing’s media influence in Brazil that researchers, media experts, and officials, and journalists should watch in the coming years.

  • Improved bilateral ties, more effective influence in the post-Bolsonaro era: As in other countries with governments that are not immediately receptive to engaging with the Chinese government, Chinese officials have continued investing and strengthening ties with Brazil’s private sector and with politicians across the political spectrum in recent years to ensure ongoing relationships after a democratic transfer of power. Indeed, in late 2022, the generally China-skeptical Bolsonaro was defeated in presidential elections by Lula, who early in his new term visited China with over two hundred business leaders to discuss improving trade and economic ties between the two countries. The outcome of the visit included fifteen bilateral agreements in various sectors, including agriculture, technology, telemedicine, and education. Lula also visited a Huawei technology development center and watched a presentation about how 5G can revolutionize telemedicine and education. Lula and Chinese president Xi Jinping both projected themselves as champions of the Global South, professing their desire to “balance world geopolitics,” advocating for their countries as mediators in Ukraine, and upholding the BRICS mechanism as a counterweight to the US-dominated international system. With closer ties between the Brazilian political elite and Chinese officials, watch for inroads gained by Chinese state media and companies in the information and technology space, or for Brazilian officials echoing preferred CCP narratives.
  • Ongoing and increased collaboration with major news conglomerates: Given the growing number of co-production and content partnerships between Chinese state-owned outlets and Brazil’s large media companies, including in primetime television slots, watch for more examples of Chinese state-produced content reaching local audiences. Watch also for Chinese outlets adapting their style, format, or content to create programming more convincing and engaging for Brazilians.
  • Increasing expertise and understanding of China: As China’s political and economic importance to Brazil continues to grow, watch for additional investment in building local Brazilian expertise on China and bilateral relations, and for the role that emerging journalistic and academic initiatives play in providing relevant context, conducting original research, and relaying nuanced analysis of events in China and Brazil. Watch also, however, for new overtures from Chinese state-linked entities to Brazilian scholars and think tanks—including subsidized trips to China or other offers of funding—aimed at influencing their writing.1https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-censor-china-critical-content-ui…
  • 1Trevisan, “Trade, Investment, Technology, and Training.”

On Brazil

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Country Facts

  • Population

    215,300,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    72 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    65 100 partly free