Brazil’s four-year election cycle calls for voters to take to the polls on October 2 to choose a president, vice president, and legislative representatives—including one-third of the country’s 81-member Senate and all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies. The presidential contest is the most consequential in recent history for the country’s democratic trajectory. Incumbent Jair Bolsonaro of the far-right Social Liberal Party faces a strong challenge from popular former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva of the leftist Workers’ Party. Lula, as he is commonly known, returned to the political fray after serving three years of a 12-year prison sentence for his involvement in the “Operation Car Wash” corruption scandal. He maintains that the corruption investigation was politicized, and the UN Human Rights Committee recently concluded that the judge overseeing the case had not been impartial and violated Lula’s rights. Should no candidate secure 50 percent of the votes in the first round, the presidential election will head to a runoff on October 30.

Bolsonaro—who has used antidemocratic rhetoric, tripled the number of military personnel in civilian posts, and spread misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic—regularly warns that he might not accept unfavorable election results. He and his allies have cast doubt on the security of electronic voting machines and made allegations of an impending “rigged” election a centerpiece of his campaign. Bolsonaro loyalists have signaled support for these unfounded fraud claims, including by raising concerns about election vulnerabilities, calling for the use of paper ballots, and proposing a parallel, military-led audit of the vote. Some analysts have indicated that in the event of a close or drawn-out contest, Bolsonaro might refuse to concede and could even resort to extralegal attacks on election officials and political opponents. Specifically, there are fears that he will use false claims about electoral fraud to incite his followers to violently disrupt the democratic transfer of power.

Brazil is a democracy that holds competitive elections, and the political arena, though polarized, is characterized by vibrant public debate. However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack, and the government has struggled to address high rates of violent crime as well as disproportionate violence and economic exclusion affecting certain segments of the population—including Black, Indigenous, and LGBT+ Brazilians. Corruption is endemic in government and politics, contributing to widespread disillusionment with traditional political parties.

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to monitor ahead of the election period: 

• Information manipulation and disinformation: Candidates, parties, and their supporters—most often those aligned with Bolsonaro—manipulate online content in service of false and misleading narratives. While the messaging platform WhatsApp was a major vector of election disinformation in 2018, Telegram has emerged as a new hub for Bolsonaro’s camp. Supporters are often directed to prominent Telegram channels via hyperlinks posted to other social media platforms by high-profile Bolsonaro associates. Disinformation narratives in Brazil frequently intersect with online harassment of marginalized communities, such as LGBT+ people, women, and Afro-Brazilians. Given his sagging poll numbers, some experts expect Bolsonaro to double down on false narratives that include attacks against his perceived opponents that invoke these protected characteristics. However, observers also expect disinformation in this election to focus on the technical mechanics of voting. Bolsonaro has openly asserted that Brazil’s electronic voting system is unreliable and seeded the idea that fraud is inevitable in October. The system has been the object of previous disinformation campaigns, with federal police determining that Bolsonaro had a “direct and relevant” role in spreading disinformation about electoral processes in 2018. This year, both Bolsonaro and the military have called for parallel recounts and the use of printed ballots, an option that is not currently available, as Brazil’s direct recording electronic voting machines do not leave a paper trail. However, research has shown that the adoption of the electronic voting system in 1996, overseen by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), dramatically reduced election fraud. In order to protect Brazilian voters and the integrity of October’s elections, social media companies, media outlets, and Brazilian federal institutions must quickly distinguish between valid complaints of electoral fraud and baseless allegations designed to disrupt the democratic process.
• Online blocking and content removal: In past elections, politicians have attempted to use legal mechanisms to compel social media and messaging platforms to remove content. The Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (Abraji) recorded at least 500 such attempts during the 2018 election campaigns and warned against the trend of politicized content removals. Bolsonaro was among the most active complainants during the 2018 elections, according to Abraji. More broadly, the proliferation of disinformation has meant that platforms’ content moderation practices have been subjected to increased scrutiny. In March 2022, Telegram was banned for two days after it failed to comply with court orders demanding the removal of content and cooperation with Brazilian authorities. The ban was linked to a larger Supreme Court investigation targeting disinformation in the lead up to the October elections. In response to the restriction, Telegram complied with requests to remove content, including messages from Bolsonaro and an account affiliated with a prominent supporter, and appointed its first in-country legal representative. Telegram also indicated that it would establish a communication channel between itself and the court to receive reports on election-related disinformation. The court has signed similar cooperation agreements with Twitter, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Google, Instagram, YouTube, and Kwai.
• Harassment: Journalists, bloggers, politicians, activists, members of marginalized communities, and ordinary users have reported harassment on social media platforms in response to their identities, occupations, and online activities—including sharing views that are critical of Bolsonaro and the government. Some of these attacks are launched from inside the administration, at times by Bolsonaro himself. For example, in February 2020, the journalist and disinformation researcher Patrícia Campos Mello was subjected to misogynistic online attacks by users including the president’s son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who serves as a member of the Chamber of Deputies. Online harassment could lead to self-censorship on topics related to the elections and act as a barrier to political participation by potential candidates and voters alike. Bolsonaro’s tenure as president has also featured the revival of old fear-mongering narratives about the threat of a communist takeover and the crucial role of the military in preventing such an event. The recent murder of a member of the Workers’ Party, coupled with physical attacks on Lula campaign events by Bolsonaro supporters, suggest that political tensions could erupt into violence with a sufficient catalyst. Online accusations of communist affiliation are part of a harmful trend that exacerbates political polarization and recalls the era of anticommunist violence associated with Brazil’s military dictatorship, which endured for two decades until the restoration of democracy in the 1980s. 

Brazil has a score of 66 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a track record of elections that are generally regarded as free and fair, coupled with an online environment marred by disinformation, hyperpartisanship, harassment, and intimidation. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 73 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 64 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Brazil country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.