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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022

Colombia

Resilient
Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts
Low
 29 85
Local Resilience and Response
Notable
 38 85
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least influence) to 85 (most influence)
Cartagena, Colombia. Editorial credit: sunsinger / Shutterstock.com.

header1 Key findings

  • Low influence, but growing media presence: Beijing’s media footprint in Colombia is small, due in part to the country’s historically close ties with the US and, until recently, a limited relationship with China. However, bilateral trade, Chinese direct investment, and public private partnerships have grown significantly in recent years. Under the leadership of a highly engaged and telegenic ambassador who took office in 2020, the Chinese embassy has developed a sophisticated media engagement strategy and sought to deepen ties with major national news outlets. Former president Iván Duque’s pursuit of close ties with Beijing has also opened new cooperation opportunities with the CCP in the media sector and beyond.
  • Limited direct dissemination of Chinese state media content: Spanish-language Chinese state media such as Xinhua Español or Pueblo en Línea are available online, although these cater to broader regional audiences. Within Colombia, China Global Television Network (CGTN) and China Central Television (CCTV) are available online or via satellite television, but their popularity and audiences are limited. National media outlets such as El Tiempo, El Espectador, La República, and the newspaper Portafolio sometimes publish free and paid content provided by Chinese diplomatic or state media entities, although at least one media outlet turned down Xinhua’s efforts to establish a formal content sharing agreement during the report coverage period due to lack of interest (see Propaganda).
  • Growing cooperation with media outlets and friendly voices: Colombian media outlets have participated in Chinese initiatives to centralize and boost regional media cooperation, such as the 2021 China-CELAC Media Action Project. While efforts to disseminate Chinese state media content directly have had limited success, the co-option of friendly local voices has arguably been more successful. Influential local leaders, including former president Duque, have lent their voices in support of China’s policies, including its vaccine diplomacy and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics (see Propaganda).
  • Media narratives tout multilateral cooperation, economic partnership: Chinese state media and diplomats portrayed China as a reliable partner for economic development and promoted multilateralism—often presenting China as an alternative to the 'hegemonic' US efforts by highlighting China's contributions to global public health during the pandemic, which appears to have had some success in combating widespread conspiracy theories that demonized China as the source of the coronavirus. Chinese diplomats worked to allay local criticisms and promote their preferred media narratives on controversial topics such as China’s early handling of the coronavirus, national security legislation in Hong Kong, and China-US diplomatic and trade frictions. At times, the Embassy has embarked on specific messaging campaigns around key anniversaries. There was also a notable counter-messaging push to shore up the legitimacy of Chinese-style “democracy” ahead of the US-led Summit for Democracy (see Propaganda).
  • Decreasing trust in China but support for growing ties: Public opinion surveys suggest that negative views on China have grown across Latin America since 2012. Reflecting this, 53 percent of Colombians believed that Chinese influence in the region was negative in 2023. A majority of Colombians continued to view bilateral relations as being broadly good and thought that trade with China was good for Colombia’s development. In 2020, 42 percent of Colombians reported having a favorable opinion of China. This trend is more pronounced within the business community, where a strategic approach influences such opinions based on the perceived opportunities stemming from the presence of Chinese investment projects in the country.1 However, along with these positive views, there are emerging concerns in local media coverage regarding Chinese companies operating in the country and their actions regarding human rights and environmental protection.
  • No disinformation campaigns: During the coverage period, there was no evidence of disinformation campaigns involving inauthentic bot activity that targeted or reached news consumers in Colombia (see Disinformation campaigns).
  • Chinese diaspora: Colombia’s ethnic Chinese population, including the Chinese diaspora, is one of the smallest in Latin America. The diaspora media ecosystem is likely minimal, although individuals may consume regional Chinese-language media or rely on WeChat or other applications for news content (See Chinese diaspora media).
  • Media and legal safeguards to foreign influence: Colombia has strong laws restricting foreign media ownership and a historically robust press, providing a foundation for resilience to potential malign or coercive media influence. The constitution includes protection for free expression and a free press, although the judiciary has occasionally ruled against these rights in practice. Colombia’s vibrant civil society has also been active in researching disinformation and foreign influence, and during the report coverage period new initiatives to monitor and respond to Beijing’s state-sponsored disinformation and influence efforts were developed (See Local resilience & response).
  • Media vulnerabilities: Journalists face systemic challenges, including government surveillance and intimidation or harassment by non-state actors that impede their work. Regarding China, local knowledge of the country is low, and there are no journalists specializing in the issue. This is aggravated by the absence of Colombian correspondents in China. This lack of expertise and interest leads to weak coverage of China, limited scrutiny of its activities, and a friendlier atmosphere for China’s increasing propaganda efforts.

header2 Background

Colombia is among the longest-standing democracies in Latin America, although it has a history of widespread violence and serious human rights abuses. Public institutions have demonstrated the capacity to check executive power, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s main left-wing guerrilla group, signed a peace treaty with the government in 2016. Nevertheless, it continues to face enormous challenges in consolidating peace and guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties outside of major urban areas.

In Freedom in the World 2023, Freedom House’s annual study of political rights and civil liberties, Colombia’s status was rated as Free, improving from the 2022 report’s Partly Free determination due to more open and competitive national elections, declines in restrictions on assembly and movement, and the decriminalization of abortion.1 Colombia has a status of Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, Freedom House’s annual report on internet freedoms.2 In 2022, Colombians elected their first left-wing president, Gustavo Petro, marking a historical political moment in the country. Generally, public institutions in the country act as effective checks on executive power, and freedom of expression is well-established and protected by law. Civil society and active media sectors play an important role in public debates, contributing to the country’s dynamic democracy. Despite legal protections, journalists continue to face harassment and violence, mainly when covering issues related to the armed conflict, corruption, human rights violations, and drug-related crimes.

A heavy concentration of media ownership among a few families and a lack of transparency into these ownership structures across television, print, and radio has affected media pluralism, with press freedom groups raising concerns about bias in coverage and potential conflicts of interest.3 Colombian media outlets rely heavily on major international news agencies to cover China due to a lack of resources and local expertise. Nonetheless, regional and smaller media outlets do provide limited coverage of China.

Colombia and China established diplomatic relations in 1980.4 Colombia has historically focused its foreign policy on the US and Europe, and its strong security, business, and political ties to the US have thus significantly influenced and determined its limited relations with China for decades.5 Colombia-China relations began strengthening in the early 2000s, mainly through increased trade and investment. In terms of trade, over the past two decades, Colombia’s imports from China have increased from around $10 million to over $16 billion, leading to a trade deficit with China that reached $7.65 billion as exports have only increased marginally, generating increasing concerns.6 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have recently tripled, leaping from $84 million in 2021 to $266 million by the end of 2022.7 Chinese FDI practices have also evolved, initially focusing on sectors like commodities, energy, and transportation infrastructure but recently shifting towards more high-tech sectors like automotive, information and communications technologies (ICTs), and renewable energies.8 The number of public-private partnerships with the Colombian government in infrastructure and clean energy has also increased.9 Despite these dynamics, the United States remains the largest investor, accounting for 29.19 percent of the total in 2022, while China accounted for only 1.56 percent.10 There was some public discussion of deepening trade relations between Colombia and China through a free trade agreement (FTA) beginning in 2011, but neither the private sector nor the government has shown much interest since.

Since 2015, Colombia has been a member of the Forum of China and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum), but it has not joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2019, then–Colombian president Ivan Duque and Chinese president Xi Jinping launched the Colombia-China Initiative during Duque’s visit to Beijing, which appeared to be aimed chiefly at promoting the BRI.11 It is yet unclear the approach Duque’s successor Petro will take regarding the initiative.12

The Chinese expatriate and diaspora community in Colombia is small, especially compared to other Latin American countries, and primarily concentrated in urban areas. A 2021 PRC Ministry of Commerce report estimated there were 8,000 people of Chinese descent living in Colombia, mostly concentrated in urban areas. Other estimates put the number of Chinese citizens and descendants in Colombia at around 25,000.13 The most significant influx of Chinese immigrants to the country occurred during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, primarily to work on constructing the Panama Canal, which was still under Colombian administration until 1903.

header3 Key narratives

Under the leadership of a highly engaged and telegenic ambassador who took office in 2020, the Chinese embassy in Bogotá has developed a sophisticated media engagement strategy and has sought to deepen ties with major national news outlets. President Duque’s pursuit of close ties with Beijing from 2018 to 2022 also opened new cooperation opportunities with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the media sector and beyond. In general, between 2019 and 2021, Chinese state media content directed at Colombian audiences sought to influence public opinion on three main topics: Chinese-Colombian economic ties, China’s international reputation as a global leader, and promoting the efficacy of Chinese aid to Colombia during the COVID-19 pandemic.1

Chinese state media and diplomats regularly emphasize the PRC’s successes in lifting millions of people out of poverty, which does not receive pushback in Colombian media.2 In op-eds and paid content placed in Colombian media, they portray China as a technologically and economically developed nation, serving as a benchmark for other Global South countries.3 China and Chinese companies are also portrayed as valuable trade and investment partners. This narrative emphasizes China’s economic openness and highlights advancements in numerous economic sectors, pointing to the CCP as the driving force behind its development.

Chinese state media also seek to present China as an international leader aligned with the Global South, a perspective which is often framed in opposition to the image of the US as a coercive global hegemon. In contrast, Chinese diplomats present China as a champion for multilateralism, South-South cooperation, and brotherhood among developing countries. For example, paid content published in Colombia’s newspaper of record El Tiempo, headlined, “A Swiss army knife for the world’s problems,” discusses CCP-led China as a powerful international actor in solving global problems such as nuclear threats and climate change.4 The party’s historical successes are also highlighted in a Xinhua article headlined, “A meeting about the past and the future” published by El Tiempo in November 2021.5 Interestingly, the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio published a virtually identical article with only minor variations during the same week, indicating a degree of regional coordination.6 Chinese state media articles published in Colombian papers depict Xi Jinping as the most important figure of the CCP, an accomplished politician, and a visionary 21st-century global leader.7

At the onset of the pandemic, China’s vaccine distribution strategy in Latin America was multifaceted, involving exports, donations, and collaborations with governments at different levels. This approach extended beyond vaccines, encompassing the provision of medical supplies such as COVID-19 testing kits and masks to countries worldwide, including Colombia. Once vaccines became available, the Chinese-made Sinovac was also one of the first to become available to citizens in countries like Colombia, while domestic stockpiling made European and American vaccines scarce.8 The first batch of Sinovac vaccines arrived in Bogotá in February 2021, and they were received at the airport by former president Duque, former vice president Marta Lucía Ramírez, and other Colombian government officials, as well as the Chinese ambassador to Colombia, Lan Hu.9 Later on, Colombia received vaccines through the COVAX mechanism and from the United States.10 However, the Chinese were seen as the first on the scene with aid. Furthermore, cooperation with China was glowingly portrayed by Chinese state media content and diplomats’ appearances in Colombia media, bolstering China’s reputation as a scientific powerhouse and a reliable partner for international public health.11 For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a video speech to the Colombian people to commemorate the occasion of the third batch of Sinovac vaccines, stating that he hoped the China-Colombia relationship could reach “new heights” in the era of post-pandemic cooperation. Xi’s remarks aired on national television during one of President Duque’s addresses.12 This vaccine diplomacy improved China’s image significantly.13 His speech confirmed what many see as a new friendship between the two nations.14

Key avenues of content dissemination

Chinese media content is available to Spanish-speaking audiences in Colombia through online platforms and paid satellite television. However, it is not popular, and although audience estimates are not publicly available, it is likely that its viewership and impact in the country remain low.

In Colombia, paid satellite television provider DirecTV offers CGTN en Español, also known as CGTN-E, on channel 790.15 Previously, DirecTV also offered a CCTV channel, CCTV-4, in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.16 However, in 2022, the company stopped offering CCTV-4.17

CGTN, CCTV, and Xinhua news agency content is readily available to Colombian audiences. Cultural issues, such as history, food, language, and tourism, are the main focus of their content, along with positive content about Chinese politics or China–Latin America relations. CGTN-E streams free 24-hour programming online.

Chinese social media presence with Spanish-language content is substantial, although Colombian audiences must only account for a fraction of the audience. CGTN-E has a robust social media following with over 440,000 YouTube subscribers, 16 million Facebook followers, and over half a million Twitter followers worldwide. Meanwhile, CCTV’s Spanish Facebook account boasts almost 50 million followers, and its Spanish YouTube account has over 206,000 subscribers. Xinhua Español has 116,000 Twitter followers and s Pueblo en Línea, the Spanish-language digital outlet of the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily, has almost 150,000 Twitter followers.

Xinhua and the People’s Daily maintain Spanish-language websites, as does China Radio International (CRI); the magazine China Today, published by the China International Publishing Group, has two. CGTN has correspondents based in Colombia, while Xinhua and China Daily rely on local reporters to support their coverage.18 The Spanish version of Xinhua’s website publishes cultural, political and economic content with a positive perspective on China and its role at the global level. CRI’s Spanish website presents cultural audio and video content about Colombia. It includes interviews with diplomats and Colombians living in China and information regarding business opportunities in Colombia. CRI also broadcasts in Spanish over short-wave radio.19 Interestingly, CGTN-E’s YouTube channel features more than 90 videos about Colombia, covering a wide range of topics such as trade, investment, culture, and politics. The following are the primary channels through which Chinese state-run media content, official communications, and Beijing-preferred narratives reach news consumers in Colombia.

  • Embassy public diplomacy and legacy media content placements: The primary channels for spreading the Chinese government’s narratives are op-eds and paid content in prominent national media outlets.20, In Colombia, these publications increased when Ambassador Lan Hu took office in 2020.21 The 48-year-old diplomat, known for his fluency in Spanish, presents himself as a youthful and dynamic ambassador. Thus, he seems open to talking with the media and has participated in various TV and radio interviews with La República, Blu Radio, and NTN24 TV news, among other Colombian outlets.22 Most of those interviews focused on how China managed the pandemic and the importance of the bilateral relationship vis-à-vis China’s economic and investment interests in Colombia.23 The ambassador has published several op-eds. His first one in Colombia, “Common proposal from China and Colombia: Commitment to multilateralism as a response to the pandemic and current challenges,” appeared in Portafolio, the country’s most important economic and business publication.24 Other examples include “A century-long quest”, a business-oriented op-ed published in La República, emphasizing China’s peaceful rise and the importance of the CCP in the country’s economic development.25 Similarly, other op-eds have been published in El Espectador, where he discusses the importance of international cooperation in facing the pandemic and China’s interest in helping the entire world in times of need.26
  • Social media: Twitter and Facebook are the primary platforms for public conversation in Colombia. Younger audiences are more active on Instagram and TikTok, while older adults prefer Facebook and WhatsApp. Telegram has not yet gained much popularity. Thus, it is understandable that Chinese media in Colombia share and disseminate information primarily through Facebook and Twitter. The Chinese embassy employs social media platforms, maintaining an active presence on both Twitter (@china_embajada) and Facebook (@chinaembajada).27 Notably, those accounts’ follower counts significantly grew from 2022 to 2023, with Twitter followers increasing from 3,200 to 7,560 and Facebook followers expanding from 2,000 to 6,700 during this period. The account mainly publishes information regarding cultural activities and government propaganda. For example, in April 2022, the Chinese embassy in Colombia tweeted out links to a white paper and a video discussing the so-called Chinese democratic model.28 The embassy’s account does not engage with other users by retweeting or replying to comments, but more than a third of the embassy’s follows are prominent Colombian newspapers, magazines, radio stations, TV channels, and journalists in the media industry.
  • Free content placements: Various national newspapers have given free press to the Chinese government.29 In those cases, the embassy shares information they deem relevant to Colombian audiences, like the 40th anniversary of China-Colombia diplomatic relations or the arrival of a Chinese delegation. The embassy mostly looks for free press in Colombia’s most important newspapers, such as El Tiempo, El Espectador, Portafolio, and La República. Chinese state media content does not appear to be placed in local and regional papers.
  • Content sharing agreements: Chinese and Colombian media cooperation has been limited, and interest in China has increased only recently due to the growing presence of Chinese companies in Colombia. Xinhua attempted to negotiate a content sharing deal with various newspapers, but it was never completed. It’s uncertain if they reached agreements with other outlets, as there was never any official confirmation of such deals.30 Various Colombian media outlets explicitly label Xinhua as state-led media, implying to users that the agency’s content will favor the Chinese government. Nevertheless, some of those same outlets have featured Xinhua’s paid content in the past.31

One of Colombia’s leading private TV networks, Canal Caracol, is indirectly part of a content sharing agreement with the China Media Group (CMG) through its membership in the Latin American Informative Alliance (AIL). In August 2020, AIL signed an agreement with CMG to launch a special news cooperation program.32 Similarly, Colombia’s RTVC Public Media System established an alliance with “Classic Media Films China Latina” to broadcast two series, including one about martial artist, actor, director, and cultural icon Bruce Lee, and three documentaries aimed at introducing Colombian audiences to Chinese culture.33 In the future, it is expected that Chinese state media will continue their efforts to customize content production for Latin American and Caribbean audiences and use local media partnerships to shape their messaging so it better resonates with these regions.34

  • Support from prominent local voices: In contrast to other countries, Colombia has almost no local opinion leaders publicly discussing China-related issues. However, the CCP has a track record of advancing its influence and building relationships with influencers to promote favorable narratives about China while denying human rights abuses.35 Colombian politicians do not often make public statements supporting Beijing’s position on political issues. However, three cases stand out. First, in March 2021, Alicia Arango, then the Colombian ambassador to the United Nations office in Geneva, Switzerland, praised China’s improvements in “promoting human rights” during Xi Jinping’s government, after Colombia received more than 700,000 Sinovac vaccines.36 The second example is that of former president Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), who shows constant public support for China’s engagement agenda in Latin America and the world. He sees China’s economic growth as a means to reshape global dynamics, even to the point where China could facilitate a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine-Russia conflict.37 Third, in December 2021, Simón Gaviria, former national director of the Liberal Party, wrote an op-ed, “China for a while,” for La República. In it, he warned that Colombia must cultivate of its longstanding and special relationship with the US but argued that stronger economic links with China are inevitable.38

Some Colombian academic experts on China have also produced media commentaries that align with Beijing’s preferred media narratives. That being said, many scholars seem to avoid sensitive topics such as those related to China’s “internal affairs” to maintain their access to funding and research opportunities in China. Professors who worked as freelance journalists for the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo have also been contributors to CGTN.39 One professor wrote an article discussing an invitation by academics in China to share his research and gain a deeper understanding of the country. In the article, he praised China’s development under the CCP and suggested that it is a safe place to visit if one does not challenge the government.40

header4 Disinformation campaigns

For the purposes of this report, disinformation is defined as the intentional dissemination of false or misleading content, primarily through inauthentic activity—such as using fake accounts—on global social media platforms. In the case of Colombia, no evidence of disinformation campaigns targeting national audiences was found. The Chinese government and companies in Colombia have not been linked to smear or disinformation campaigns from Chinese state media.

header5 Censorship and intimidation

Beijing’s influence on Colombian media is limited. There are no reported cases of intimidation from China-linked actors toward Colombian journalists during the coverage period. Interviewees agree that the Chinese embassy and its officials have been respectful of journalists and politicians.1 Embassy officials present themselves as not interested in getting involved in sensitive national affairs. However, they closely monitor Colombian media commentary (see Social media).

In contrast to efforts by Chinese government representatives and companies in Colombia to avoid interfering in sensitive public political discussions and to keep a low media profile, the Chinese ambassadors in Chile, Panama, and Peru frequently make public comments on national politics there.2

Colombian media has reported on China’s human rights violations, though that reporting comes from information reproduced from international agencies, mostly Agence France-Presse (AFP), Spain’s EFE, and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).3 El Espectador is the leading example of a media outlet presenting information regarding attacks on freedom of speech, human rights violations committed against Uyghur communities, and repression against Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan, even as it has sometimes published paid content from Chinese media outlets. In addition, El Espectador has reported on human rights violations among peasant and indigenous communities in Colombia, particularly in areas where Chinese mining companies operate.4

The prevalent narratives about China in Colombia tend to emphasize the economic benefits of the relationship between the two countries, which could lead to self-censorship among journalists. This optimistic perspective, combined with a lack of detailed knowledge, might decrease journalists’ inclination to scrutinize China-related actors and information, with potential long-term consequences for critically evaluating information from or about China.

header6 Control over content distribution infrastructure

Chinese control over content distribution infrastructure is low, but there is a possibility for growth as the presence of China-based companies increases. Huawei, the PRC-based company with close CCP ties and a record of building censorship and surveillance systems in China and abroad, is interested in developing digital infrastructure in Colombia.1 Despite the limitations imposed upon Huawei in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the company has been met with a favorable reception in Colombia.2 Huawei has emerged as a significant investor in the telecommunications sector, fuelling speculations about its potential as a 5G technology provider if it participates in a government auction set for 2023.3

The shortform video platform TikTok, a global subsidiary of the PRC-based social media company ByteDance, was the most downloaded app in Colombia in 2021.4 At the beginning of 2023, according to ByteDance data published in DataReportal’s “Digital 2023: Colombia” report, TikTok’s ads reached 52.1 percent of the country’s adults and 51.1 percent of all internet users in Colombia. Of those internet users seeing TikTok ads, 59.8 percent were female and 40.2 percent were male, ByteDance said.5 There have been documented cases around the world in recent years of TikTok removing or downplaying politically sensitive content.6 However, that has not been the case in Colombia. In 2022, several politicians, including President Petro (@gustavopetrooficial) and Vice President Francia Márquez (@franciamarquezmi), created TikTok accounts to reach larger audiences, particularly young people.7

Xiaomi, a major PRC-based consumer electronics company, has gained a meaningful market share in Colombia’s mobile phone devices sector. In 2022, it was the most popular mobile phones maker in Colombia with 26.2 percent of the market, followed by Samsung (23.9 percent) and Motorola (15.0 percent).8 A security audit published in 2021 by the Lithuanian government found latent censorship blacklists on phones made by Chinese companies like Xiaomi and Huawei, containing terms in Chinese and English that might be sensitive to the CCP.9 During the coverage period in Colombia, though, Xiaomi and Huawei phones were not found to be blocking websites prohibited by the CCP. Additionally, there was no evidence of control over the content-distribution infrastructure aimed at suppressing critical content or amplifying pro-Beijing content.

Dissemination of CCP media norms, tactics, or governance models

The close relationship between Colombia and the United States has traditionally influenced national media. However, with the growing Chinese trade and investment ties in recent years, Colombian media interest in China has increased (while Chinese media interest in Colombia has also grown). However, there is no evidence that Colombian authorities have or would embrace the CCP’s state-controlled and restrictive approach to media regulation.

Media workers in Colombia did not undergo training programs or trips aimed at disseminating Chinese information control tactics or influencing them to adopt CCP media governance models between 2019-2021. However, Colombian media workers participated in regional media organizations and events that have effectively worked to circulate Beijing-approved news production on China-related content in Latin America. The Colombian television station Caracol is a founder and member of AIL, a non-profit association for private television companies across Latin America that has cooperated closely with Chinese state media entities such as CMG, CGTN, and CCTV+, CCTV's on-demand video service. .10 AIL supported the Latin-America Partners Media Cooperation Online Forum 2020 jointly organized in Beijing by CMG and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ELAC), where CMG Editor-in-Chief Shen Haixiong declared, “Media should report the truth instead of spreading rumors and creating trouble; seek to build a consensus instead of creating divisions; strive to battle the pandemic scientifically instead of shifting the blame onto other countries; and finally broadcast confidence, not air malicious attacks.” Shen called on Chinese and Latin American media groups to strengthen content sharing and other forms of cooperation.11 A press statement about the event noted that CMG and its Latin American partners had afterwards issued a joint statement supporting “the construction of a Sino-Latin American community with a shared future and a community of health for humanity,” echoing a common CCP propaganda slogan calling for global cooperation.12

In December 2021, a representative of Colombia’s publicly funded radio and television service RTVC virtually attended the launch of the China-ALC Media Action initiative, which would reportedly use programs like co-produced documentaries about China and Latin America and a film and television tour sponsored by CGTN to promote China-Latin America media cooperation.13

Before pandemic-related restrictions ended travel to China, the Chinese government had offered journalism scholarships. However, one Colombian journalist interviewed for this report noted that because the fellowships required time commitments of at least six months—potentially jeopardizing Colombian journalists’ jobs back home—only a few journalists ended up participating.14 Executives from the most important Colombian media outlets are frequently invited to high-level events organized by the Chinese embassy.15

Chinese diaspora media

Freedom House was unable to find examples of any independent or CCP-aligned Chinese-language news outlets serving Colombia’s small Chinese expatriate and diaspora population, and there are no Colombia-based members of the Global Chinese Media Cooperation Union (GCMCU).16 However, it is worth mentioning that there are two magazines—Camino a China (Road to China) and Amigos de China (Friends of China), both published by the Colombia China Association—that share content in Spanish and Chinese. Camino a China is a biannual magazine focusing on Chinese culture, history, and current affairs. Amigos de China is published quarterly and focuses on the personal stories of Colombians who have lived or worked in China.17 Freedom House found two WeChat public accounts focused on the Chinese diaspora community that occasionally published embassy press releases and news articles up until 2020, but both are inactive as of the time of writing.18 WeChat is owned by the PRC-based technology company Tencent, which has close ties to the CCP, and public accounts on the platform are subject to domestic censorship regulations in China.

header7 Underlying media resilience

Press freedoms in Colombia have been severely challenged in recent years, and the media watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) describes Colombia as one of the Western Hemisphere’s most dangerous countries for journalists.1 However, the country has various resilience mechanisms. Some of the most important include the following:

  • Regulatory framework: Colombia has established numerous legal frameworks and instruments to promote transparency in media ownership and foster competition. However, while there are regulations checking foreign ownership in general, there are no specific regulatory frameworks to counter the effects of the Chinese government or CCP media influence.

The Communications Regulation Commission (CRC) supervises communications networks and services. Law 1507 of 2012 and Law 29 of 1944 both require companies to notify the CRC of any ownership changes, and all information regarding these changes is publicly available. Law 29 also bars Colombian newspapers and publishing companies from receiving subsidies from foreign governments or companies without the national government’s permission.2 Law 1341 of 2009 limits foreign ownership of television stations to a maximum of 40 percent of the market.3 Furthermore, Article 333 of the constitution promotes and guarantee free and fair competition and commit the government to protecting against abuses from companies with dominant market positions. Regarding political interference in media, the National Television Authority (ANTV) has established regulations for political parties’ ownership of TV channels and networks. The constitution’s Article 109 regulates the amount of time available to run state-funded political advertising on the radio and television.4 Colombian law requires that companies publishing newspapers have a Colombian director or general manager, although it is legal for such companies to have as much as 100 percent foreign capital investment.5

  • Investigative journalism: Several independent civil society organizations monitor and advocate for press freedom. As a result, there have been significant developments to limit lawsuits against journalists. For example, on May 13, 2021, the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared unconstitutional a 75-year-old law that had facilitated strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), which were lawsuits filed in order to silence or intimidate critics.6 Even though conditions have improved, investigative journalism in Colombia remains a high-risk activity. Journalists working on issues such as the armed conflict, illegal armed groups, corruption, or environmental damages often face threats, displacement, pressure, and assassinations, among other types of violence.

Colombian individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Consejo de Redacción and the Foundation for Freedom of the Press (FLIP) have established initiatives supporting freedom of the press and investigative journalism in Colombia.7 They often rely on funding from international organizations and NGOs and focus on addressing domestic issues, particularly the impacts of Colombia’s decades-long armed conflict, with limited or no interest in global issues beyond human rights.8

  • Growing initiatives to counter disinformation: State and nonstate actors in Colombia are increasing their efforts to combat domestic disinformation. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021 points out that disinformation constitutes a means for political manipulation.9 In the case of Colombia, disinformation is mainly spread through WhatsApp and Facebook. The Global Disinformation Index (GDI) assessed Colombian news websites for disinformation risk in 2022 and reported that they scored an average of 58 out of 100, with higher scores indicating lower risk.10 The GDI suggests that current online media models monetize readers’ attention without considering the quality of the information provided, with detrimental effects on neutrality, independence, and transparency.

Initiatives aimed at countering disinformation include the Detox Information Project (DIP), which provides a digital platform with tools for people to identify their vulnerability to misinformation and polarization.11 Consejo de Redacción also maintains its ColombiaCheck platform, which fact-checks potential fake news.12 In addition, Colombia was one of four pilot countries the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) used as pilots to launch its Social Media 4 Peace project, with financing from the European Union. The project brought together representatives from civil society, academia, the media, social media platforms, and the international community to discuss critical issues surrounding the dissemination of potentially harmful online content.13

China-specific resilience

  • Civil society pushback on mining and environmental issues: Public demonstrations are one of the most visible displays of civil society’s increasing criticism of Chinese companies. The town of Buriticá, which is the site of the largest gold mine in Colombia, operated by the PRC-based Zijin Mining, is the most prominent example of residents expressing concern over the adverse environmental, economic, and social effects of Chinese companies’ operations, including harms to informal small-scale miners.14 Despite these concerns, the mine is considered a strategic and nationally important project, leading to military protection from the National Army during civil demonstrations.15 National media coverage of these issues is limited, with regional news outlets and social media being the primary sources of information.16 These discussions have limited visibility and may have been suppressed by the alignment of Colombian business interests with China. Nonetheless, in response to the deaths of two informal miners in Buriticá in August 2022, the Colombian minister of energy, Irene Vélez, stated that the government is conducting a thorough review of the conflict between large mining companies and artisanal miners to take the necessary measures.17 In this context, Colombian media outlets have been able to openly express criticism toward Chinese companies’ activities within the country, a situation not often seen consistently in other Latin American countries.
  • Growing academic expertise on China: Universities in Colombia have research centers dedicated to studying Asia generally, but there are none explicitly focused on China.18 Nonetheless, the pool of Colombian researchers working on topics related to China is increasing, and they take a more clear-eyed view towards China than those in other Latin American countries. Student exchanges between China and Colombia are on the rise.19 China offers scholarships to Colombian students each year through Colombian Institute of Educational Credit and Technical Studies Abroad (ICETEX), a Colombian public scholarship-granting entity, and through the Chinese embassy. Most scholarships target Ph.D.-level academics interested in China-Latin America research topics. Furthermore, many Colombian and Chinese universities have carried out bilateral exchanges. Additionally, China has been promoting Mandarin study in Colombia by establishing three Confucius Institutes at universities in Bogotá and Medellin.20

header8 Vulnerabilities

Significant challenges facing the media sector in Colombia and a lack of expertise on China are key vulnerabilities impacting Colombia’s resilience to Beijing’s media influence.

  • Journalists’ vulnerability: Despite the government and FARC signing the peace agreement in 2016, continued low-level violence in several areas still endangers press freedoms making it difficult for journalists to practice their profession.1

In addition to threats to press freedom, journalists in Colombia face other challenges. They include high unemployment rates and a shortage of paid opportunities, making it difficult for freelance journalists to sustain their livelihood, and even more so if they cover international issues. For example, Portafolio’s correspondent in China, the only Colombian reporter stationed in the country, does not receive a full-time salary, relying on working for multiple international agencies to make additional income.2 Similarly, the only Colombian reporter at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 was a journalist visiting China who El Tiempo contracted to cover the event.3

  • Little media pluralism: While press freedom in Colombia is generally upheld and news consumers have access to a diverse range of editorial viewpoints, the sector’s ownership structure has led to a lack of media pluralism, which can raise concerns about conflicts of interest and bias in coverage.4 A small group of wealthy and politically connected families control most of the country’s TV networks, radio stations, and newspapers. For example, the conglomerate founded by the late Carlos Ardila Lülle runs the RCN TV and radio networks, Alejandro Santo Domingo’s family conglomerate owns Caracol Televisión and El Espectador, and Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo owns El Tiempo. These business magnates and companies may provide financial support for electoral campaigns, which can compromise editorial independence and lead to self-censorship among journalists. Furthermore, as the outlets are often part of larger companies with investments in various economic sectors, they may be vulnerable to Chinese media influence as their parent companies prioritize potential business opportunities over their commitment to freedom of the press.
  • Lack of expertise: In Colombia, expertise on China and the CCP is limited within academia and media. Despite this, the number of experts working on China-related issues has increased, although their focus is generally on Asia as a whole rather than on China. Additionally, China-focused experts in Colombia often steer clear of sensitive topics, such as China’s internal affairs, to preserve their current and future access to Chinese funding, colleagues and research opportunities. Nonetheless, various initiatives have emerged to advance the study of China’s relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean.5 Examples include the Andrés Bello Foundation, a nonprofit organization that conducts China-related research, and Diálogo Chino, a regionally focused independent journalism platform dedicated to understanding the China-Latin America relationship. New media ventures such as Diálogo Chino also provide a venue for journalists to develop their expertise in reporting on China.6 In 2021, Chino organized an event  for a group of journalists from Andean countries to discuss the influence of Chinese media in the region and the importance of increased knowledge and understanding of China.

header9 Impact and Public Opinion

Despite difficulties, Colombia’s media reports independently on issues related to China. However, according to the 2022 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends

Question Database, the perception of China among Colombians has significantly shifted over the years.1 In 2006, 70.9 percent of Colombians held a favourable view of China. However, that view has steadily declined, reaching its lowest point in 2020 at 34.9 percent. On the other hand, the number of Colombians with negative views toward China has increased. In 2001, 17.8 percent had a bad opinion of China; in 2020, the number rose to 27.6 percent. Similarly, Colombians with a very bad opinion of China rose from 4.4 percent in 2001 to 23.6 percent in 2020.

Regarding the influence of China and the United States in Latin America, 53.5 percent of Colombians held a negative view of China’s influence in 2020, while 61.6 percent had a positive impression of the United States. Opinions were divided on Colombia’s trade balance with China, with 36.7 percent viewing it favorably and 22.6 percent unfavorably. When asked about their perception of Xi Jinping as a world leader, 55.9 percent of participants were unfamiliar with the Chinese president, 12.8 percent had a negative opinion of him, and only 0.7 percent held a positive view.

The pandemic had an undeniable effect on Colombian public opinion regarding China and its citizens. On the one hand, the pandemic’s origination in China undeniably affected the country’s image among Colombians. Furthermore, misinformation campaigns spread conspiracy theories blaming the CCP for creating and spreading the virus. On the other, though, people also saw China as an ally providing vaccines, presenting itself as a global leader and an alternative to the US and European powers. Within this context, a shift in Colombian views on democracy is notable. In 1996, 61.0 percent preferred democracy over any other form of government, while 20.7 percent believed that an authoritarian government could be preferable under certain circumstances. In 2020, the number of people who preferred democracy decreased to 49.5 percent, although those who thought an authoritarian government could be preferable also decreased to 12.3 percent. The number of people with no preference for either form of government increased from 18.2 percent in 1996 to 38.2 percent in 2020.2 This suggests increasing disillusionment with both democratic and authoritarian systems and the need to explore the root causes of such shifting in political attitudes.

An analysis of media representations of Chinese investment projects in Colombian newspapers and magazines showed that 67 percent of the articles were positive towards these projects, 18 percent were neutral, and 15 percent were negative.3 Opposing views mainly arose from concerns over the environmental impact and noncompliance with national standards; violations of indigenous and peasant communities’ rights; and the geopolitical implications of China’s advance and its impact on Colombia’s relationship with the United States.

  • 1Eric Asen, “Enfoque en la confianza en el gobierno de China en Latinoamérica y el Caribe” [Focus on trust in China’s government in Latin America and the Caribbean], AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), December 2020, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/spotlights/Spotlight-Asen-MIL10A-spa-f…; “Datasets,” AmericasBarometer , accessed August 18, 2023, http://datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/; Torres and Guzmán, Local Perceptions of Chinese Investment.
  • 2“Datasets,” AmericasBarometer; Asen, “Confianza en el gobierno de China.”
  • 3Urrego-Sandoval, “New Horizons for Chinese Investment.”

header10 Future trajectory

The following are key areas researchers, media experts, and Colombian officials and journalists should watch for related to Beijing’s media influence in Colombia in the coming years.

  • Local media responses to Chinese companies: It is essential to monitor the coverage of Chinese companies in local Colombian media. This includes exploring how media outlets address the impact of these companies’ investments and operations on the environment, local communities, and human rights, and those companies’ ability to adapt to local conditions. This is especially important considering that Chinese companies have made major investments in infrastructure and extractive industries, which can greatly impact local communities. As major Chinese corporations such as Huawei continue to expand their presence in the country, their lobbying and influence efforts will likely increase, potentially facilitated by strengthened relationships with media and PR firms. A crucial project to keep an eye on is the public-private partnership (PPP) for constructing Bogotá’s first metro line. The outcome of this project will have significant repercussions on the perceptions of the Chinese consortium involved.
  • The involvement of Colombian media moguls with Chinese state media and companies: Increased ties between Colombian media outlets and Chinese business conglomerates raise concerns that press freedom could be compromised in favor of financial gains. This could result in media pressure and censorship when journalists report on China, which in turn could negatively impact Colombia’s democracy. Despite a lack of public interest, the China Media Group has managed to disseminate its content to broader audiences through paid outlets.
  • Telecommunications technologies and social media growth: The growing use of telecommunication technologies and social media by Chinese state media and diplomatic actors, as well as the popularity of PRC-owned platforms such as TikTok in Colombia, highlights not only the need for ongoing monitoring of Beijing’s media influence in the region but also the potential for abuse of personal data and privacy. The commodification of personal data raises concerns about the collection, storage, and exploitation of personal information. Another issue to watch is the emergence and diffusion of a narrative—spread in part through articles in both international outlets and in Spanish-language Chinese media—suggesting that claims regarding China’s human rights violations and repression against minorities are part of a US and Western strategy aimed at harming China’s image and should not be trusted.1 This narrative is gaining purchase on social media and among those who oppose the United States politically.2 Thus, it is crucial to closely monitor and assess the sources and veracity of the information on China in Colombia, including those coming from international and China sources.
  • The new government’s approach toward China: Gustavo Petro, the new president of Colombia, has expressed his interest in diversifying Colombia’s foreign policy and strengthening ties with China. This approach does not imply a shift from traditional partners like the United States and the European Union. The prospect of Colombia entering into a free trade agreement (FTA) with China during Petro’s administration appears unlikely. Throughout his tenure as a senator and during his presidential campaign, he criticized FTAs and their adverse effects on Colombia’s economy and trade balance.3 With Decree 2598 of December 23, 2022, he expanded tariffs on imported clothing, which primarily affects China, Colombia’s largest source of clothing imports.4 Turning around and removing trade barriers with China would represent a reversal of Petro’s trade policy thus far. A few academics and media outlets have said that Colombia appears increasingly likely to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.5 However, Colombia’s government has not made any official statements indicating that it intends to increase Colombia’s geopolitical engagement with China.

In August 2022, Petro appointed renowned Colombian film director Sergio Cabrera as the country’s ambassador to China.6 Cabrera`s diverse life experiences—lightly fictionalized in Colombian writer Juan Gabriel Vásquez’s 2020 novel, Volver la vista atrás (Look back)—include an adolescence spent in China during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, where he joined of the Red Guard, attended Beijing University and gained fluency in Mandarin.7 Cabrera later returned to Colombia and was involved with the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) guerrilla movement for several years, before moving again to China where he started his film career. While Cabrera’s appointment might be considered an unusual choice, it holds strategic value. His nuanced perspective on China’s past and present could be useful to establish a more methodological approach to China, as Colombia seems unprepared to deal with this emerging power and its ambitions.

On Colombia

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Country Facts

  • Population

    51,870,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    70 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    64 100 partly free