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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Costa Rica

Free
85
100
A Obstacles to Access 21 25
B Limits on Content 32 35
C Violations of User Rights 32 40
Last Year's Score & Status
85 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Costa Rica continues to have one of the world’s most open online environments, where users enjoy unfettered access to online content and their rights to free expression are largely protected by the laws and the courts. However, under President Rodrigo Chaves Robles, worsening online intimidation—particularly against critical journalists—has begun to undermine the country’s strong tradition of press freedom. In recent years, government institutions have struggled to build resiliency to disruptive cyberattacks.

  • Audio recordings published in December 2023 seemed to confirm a covert 2022 government directive to suspend all state advertising in four media outlets, including the digital media outlet CRHoy.com, raising concerns about the politicized allocation of state funding to media outlets (see B6).
  • In February 2024, an appeals court annulled journalist Marlon Mora’s March 2023 criminal defamation conviction, which was connected to the political satire show Suave un Toque, and ordered a new trial. However, the decision upheld the seizure of Mora’s assets pending further judicial action (see C3).
  • The prevalence of online hate speech and other forms of digital violence—including reports of death threats targeting journalists and others critical of the government—posed an ongoing challenge for free expression and the physical safety of internet users (see C7).

header2 Political Overview

Costa Rica has a long history of democratic stability, with a multiparty political system and regular rotations of power through credible elections. Freedoms of expression and association are robust. The rule of law is generally strong, though presidents have often been implicated in corruption scandals. Among other ongoing concerns, violence related to drug trafficking and organized crime is rising sharply.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Internet access in Costa Rica has been steadily increasing. As of January 2024, internet penetration reached 92.5 percent.1 There were 8.14 million mobile connections in the country at that time, equivalent to 155.7 percent of the total population, a 4.5 percentage-point increase from the previous year.2 Mobile networks with 3G and 4G technology are available to 100 percent of the population.3

According to the most recently available data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in 2022, 83 percent of Costa Rican households had internet access at home and there were 97 active mobile-broadband subscriptions for every 100 inhabitants.4

According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, in May 2024 the median download speed over fixed broadband connections was 94.58 megabits per second (Mbps) and the median upload speed was 48.45 Mbps. Over mobile connections, the same period showed a median download speed of 32.36 Mbps and a median upload speed of 9.22 Mbps.5

Costa Rica's fiber-optic infrastructure has steadily expanded in recent years. The Superintendency of Telecommunications (SUTEL) reported that the country's total fiber-optic infrastructure had increased to roughly 203,000 kilometers (126,000 miles) in 2023, with fiber-optic connections accounting for 47.5 percent of all fixed-line broadband subscriptions that year.6 In December 2022, the government presented an updated National Telecommunications Development Plan (PNDT) for 2022–27, aiming to reduce the digital divide, as well as to expand and improve connectivity across the country by boosting private investment (see A2).7

In January 2024, the Ministry of Science, Innovation, Technology and Telecommunications (MICITT) published a new regulation associated with Law No. 10216.8 This regulation is meant to help expedite the construction of telecommunications infrastructure by simplifying existing technical specifications and permit processes, particularly for the installation of 5G technology in the country.9

The nationwide deployment of 5G technology has faced delays and controversy. In August 2023, the government issued an executive decree that prohibited companies from countries that are not signatories to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, including China’s Huawei,10 from contributing to the development of Costa Rica’s 5G network, citing national security risks.11 After Huawei appealed the order in February 2024, the Administrative Litigation Court temporarily suspended the decree, though the MICITT minister vowed that she would continue to push for the measure.12 The 5G spectrum auction is expected to take place sometime in 2024.13

While the country's telecommunications infrastructure is generally efficient, connectivity can be affected by weather patterns and other natural phenomena. These include the rainy season that occurs between May and November, which brings flooding risks, as well as earthquakes caused by the country’s location in a subduction zone where three major tectonic plates interact.14 Hurricanes also bring flooding and can similarly damage infrastructure.15

Connectivity is also threatened by cable theft. In August 2022, the state-owned service provider Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE) announced a plan to disincentivize the theft of copper cables.16 In March 2023, President Chaves signed a law that strengthened sanctions against cable theft, introducing penalties of up to 10 years in prison.17 In August 2023 ICE reported that 135,000 customers, 8 percent of whom were small- and medium-sized companies, had been affected by copper-cable theft between 2018 to 2023, with a total economic cost of 11.5 billion colones ($21.2 million).18

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

While Costa Rica has recognized internet access as a fundamental right since 2010, disparities persist. Barriers are in part geographic: in 2022 only 76 percent of households in rural areas reported having internet access, compared with 86 percent of households in urban areas.1 The government has several ongoing initiatives designed to expand access, but the National Telecommunications Fund (FONATEL), which spearheads many of them, has faced occasional criticism of aspects of its operations.

In 2024, the average monthly cost of fixed-line broadband was 23,500 colones ($43.30) per month.2 In 2023, 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile service cost an average of 1,000 colones ($1.80) per month. The cheapest price for 1 GB of mobile service was 578 colones ($1.07), while the most expensive was 3,333 colones ($6.14).3 The average monthly income per household in July 2023 was 1,049,142 colones ($1,933),4 though there was a disparity between urban and rural areas: the average monthly household income in urban areas was 1,173,278 colones ($2,162), while in rural areas it was 719,885 colones ($1,327). Prepaid plans, which tend to be less expensive, constituted 41 percent of mobile internet plans as of June 2023.5

Costa Rica has local and regional internet providers. In many cases these providers are rural electric cooperatives, such as Coopelesca in the northern region and Coopeguanacaste in the Chorotega region. This model has diversified and democratized access to fixed-line internet at home in territories outside the central valley.6 FONATEL, which is administered by SUTEL, promotes universal access to the internet, aiming to expand coverage to areas and communities that lack service. FONATEL provides free internet services to Basic Integrated Health Care Teams (EBAIS), intelligent community centers (CECI), schools, and public colleges.7 FONATEL also provides connectivity for various vulnerable populations, with efforts funded by concessions from telecommunications companies.8 By May 2024 FONATEL had installed 60 telecommunications towers to improve connectivity in 15 Indigenous territories across the country, with 18 additional towers under construction.9 FONATEL has faced criticism in recent years, however, for the slow deployment of its plans and the redirection of funds earmarked for expanding access to pay for deficits generated by the telecommunications sector.10

Costa Rica has proactively sought to reduce a gendered digital divide. Data from SUTEL shows that one initiative, Connected Homes, had granted internet access to more than 820,000 people, including approximately 153,000 female-led households, by March 2024.11 While the program is still being implemented, by March 2024 some of its beneficiaries had already reached the end of the subsidies allotted to them under the initiative.12

FONATEL’s Connected Public Spaces is another initiative that aims to reduce the digital divide. The program seeks to bring free, high-speed internet to public areas throughout the country, including parks, squares, public libraries, train stations, and civic centers. This long-term program has a comprehensive sustainability model that includes the development of telecommunications infrastructure and the promotion of digital literacy.13 As of March 2024, 2,176 kilometers of fiber-optic cable had connected 513 public places, including 419 parks and squares, 66 public libraries and civic centers, and 28 train stations, with a presence in 316 of the 492 districts of Costa Rica.14 At that time, 112 of these 513 digital zones had reached the end of the subsidized period of the program.15

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

There are no government-imposed connectivity restrictions in Costa Rica.

Four fiber-optic submarine cables, two of which are partially owned by state-run provider ICE, connect the country to the global network.1 A fifth, the TAM-1 cable, is set to begin operations in 2025.2

Since April 2014, Costa Rica has had an internet exchange point (IXP) called the Costa Rica Internet Exchange (CRIX), operated by the Network Information Center Costa Rica (NIC-CR). The body is an independent department of the National Academy of Sciences that has been declared a project of public interest by the government through the MICITT.3 A second IXP, INFOCOM, was launched in 2019.4

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Until 2008, ICE held a state monopoly on telecommunications, but Costa Rica has since encouraged private investment into the industry.1 The PNDT 2022–27 outlines the current policy for the sector, while SUTEL promotes competition and seeks to ensure that operators and providers can compete without major barriers, such as market discrimination or manipulation.2

Costa Rica’s mobile internet market is dominated by three providers. According to SUTEL, ICE (under the brand Kölbi) provided service for 44.2 percent of mobile internet subscribers in 2023. Liberty provided service to 33.9 percent of users, followed by Claro at 21.9 percent.3 When postpaid mobile services were analyzed individually, ICE held 44.8 percent of the market, Liberty held 30.9 percent, and Claro held 24.3 percent.4 ICE also led the prepaid market, providing service to 40.8 percent of users, followed by Liberty with 39.7 percent and Claro with 19.5 percent.5 ICE held 84.5 percent of the USB data card market, which comprised just 2.6 percent of all mobile internet subscriptions.6

The fixed-line internet market is somewhat less concentrated. Liberty had the largest share of the fixed-line internet market in 2023, with 25.8 percent.7 Meanwhile, Telecable had 23.7 percent, ICE had 21.4 percent, Tigo had 16.8 percent, and other service providers made up the remaining 12.3 percent.8

In June 2022, during the previous coverage period, Movistar and Cabletica were both acquired by Liberty Latin America and merged to form Liberty Costa Rica.9 Because Movistar and Cabletica operated in different sectors of internet service provision, their integration was not expected to significantly alter the overall availability of services.

There are a number of requirements to establish and operate telecom services. All applications for frequency use must be submitted to the MICITT. Frequency concessions for public telecommunications network operations are determined in public contest procedures.10

SUTEL has clearly defined procedures, established in article 63 of Law No. 8642, for setting the fees telecommunication companies must pay for use of the radioelectric spectrum.11

According to the Regulations to the General Telecommunications Law No. 34765-MINAE, article 77 establishes the rights of way and shared use of physical infrastructure, whereby the public telecommunications infrastructure, which is the responsibility of ICE, should be shared with private operators.12

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4.004 4.004

Regulatory bodies are generally independent. The MICITT is composed of the Office of the Minister and two vice-ministries. The Vice-Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation focuses on promoting research, the use of digital technologies, and innovation in processes between the academic, governmental, and business sectors. The Vice-Ministry of Telecommunications is responsible for proposing telecommunications policies, setting the country's digital agenda, managing the use of the radio spectrum, and coordinating the preparation of the PNDT. It pursues this mandate with the assistance of other public institutions, SUTEL, and public and private network operators.1

SUTEL is responsible for overseeing the telecommunications regulatory framework, and also supports the MICITT by developing policies. It also administers FONATEL—the fund tasked with expanding internet access—and ensures that network operators and telecommunications service providers comply with universal access and service obligations. It is also responsible for imposing sanctions for anticompetitive practices, though its decisions must be approved by the Commission for the Promotion of Competition (COPROCOM)—which reports to the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce (MEIC)—at the start of the assessment process and again before sanctions are issued.2

However, the MICITT does not need to abide by SUTEL’s technical criteria; for example, it declined to accept a 2014 spectrum concentration measurement proposed by SUTEL.3 Thus, there is room to consolidate SUTEL’s independent and technical role.

Costa Rican authorities support a multistakeholder internet governance model. Proposed policies, as well as aspects of policy implementation, are discussed with private and public stakeholders and in public consultation processes in which civil society groups participate.4 The PNDT 2022–27 was presented in December 2022 after a period of public consultation.5

Although telecommunications regulatory bodies in Costa Rica are generally autonomous, stakeholders have expressed concern over the country’s “revolving-door” politics, in which former senior government officials have participated in government forums as representatives of private businesses.6

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

There are no reports of the government or other actors blocking or filtering online content.

In recent years, taxi drivers have pressured the government to block the transportation mobile applications Uber, DiDi, and inDrive, but have not been successful, in part because there is no regulation authorizing such action in Costa Rican law. In 2021 SUTEL reaffirmed that existing legislation does not allow the applications to be blocked, citing requirements under the Law of the Public Service Regulatory Authority (ARESEP) that telecommunications operators offer free, timely, and nondiscriminatory access to their networks to users and providers of online services.1

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 4.004 4.004

The state does not intervene to remove content, except when ordered by a court or under exceptional conditions, such as to remove child sexual abuse images. Costa Rican regulations limit the liability of service providers.1

In December 2023, the newspaper La Nación published audio recordings of conversations between President Chaves and other government authorities, allegedly revealing potential improprieties related to the awarding of a contract to a communications consultancy.2 After La Nación published the initial recordings, President Chaves and Minister of Communications Jorge Rodríguez Vives filed a criminal complaint against La Nación and former communications minister Patricia Navarro, who reportedly recorded the conversations and provided them to the newspaper. The criminal complaint alleged that they had committed the crimes of “improper capture of verbal manifestations and improper use of correspondence, which violated the protected legal right of privacy,” and requested that La Nación be ordered to stop publication of the recordings. However, prosecutors rejected this request days later, stating that the recordings fell within the public interest and that the request to stop the publication of the audio recordings would constitute prior censorship.3

In recent years, the legal protection of personal data, particularly the right to be forgotten, has compelled some outlets to remove content from their digital platforms. However, the powers of the Data Protection Agency (PRODHAB) to order the removal of content in the media has been ruled unconstitutional. In June 2020, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice struck down a 2015 resolution by PRODHAB ordering the newspaper Diario Extra to remove a photograph depicting the passport of someone who accused the border police of abuses. The court ruled that the resolution was detrimental to freedom of information, as the photograph was in the public interest, and said that the individual’s consent was not required to post it. The court reasoned that PRODHAB cannot use its power to enforce the Law for the Protection of Individuals Regarding the Processing of their Personal Data, because doing so would constitute indirect state censorship.

Between July and December of 2023, Facebook restricted more than 120 items that allegedly violated local laws.4

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 4.004 4.004

In Costa Rica, restrictions on digital content are narrow in scope, proportional to stated aims, and aligned with international human rights standards.

Content restrictions are derived from specific laws safeguarding the rights to honor, privacy, and the protection of personal data, as well as the protection of minors. The 2011 Law on the Protection of Children and Adolescents from Harmful Content on the Internet, for example, limits this population’s ability to access content considered harmful to their moral or psychological integrity. Content can only be removed by court order.

Regarding technical blocking, the Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents from Harmful Content on the Internet obliges service providers to apply filters for certain harmful content, such as child sexual abuse images.1

In line with the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement, Costa Rica has established an intermediary liability system for copyright infringement. Copyright holders who believe their rights have been violated must communicate, in writing, to the service provider, which has 15 days to take down the content if the request is legitimate. Takedowns can also occur through a judicial order. The system is relatively balanced, as it aims to limit the burden placed on service providers and mitigate harm to copyright holders. However, it has also been criticized for its ambiguity, as Costa Rican regulations limit the liability of service providers who voluntarily abide by the rules.2

The Constitutional Chamber has ruled that public entities that communicate using institutional accounts on social media cannot block other users who direct criticism to their accounts, citing the right to freedom of expression (see C1).3

In March 2023, ahead of national elections in October 2025, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) presented potential reforms that would amend the electoral code to prohibit the use of anonymous or inauthentic accounts to spread campaign propaganda.4 Additionally, platforms would be required to designate a legal representative in Costa Rica,5 and the TSE would be empowered to order the removal of certain offending content during electoral periods.6 The project, which was formally introduced in the Legislative Assembly in August 2023, remained stalled in the chamber through the end of the coverage period.7

In May 2023, the government introduced plans to regulate mobile transportation apps in line with traditional taxi drivers, appearing to end efforts to block the platforms in the country (see B1).8 Soon after, however, the COPROCOM announced that it opposed the bill proposed by the government, citing measures that could limit free competition.9 Efforts to regulate the apps remained ongoing in the Legislative Assembly through the end of the coverage period.10

In January 2023, Congresswoman Andrea Álvarez introduced a bill that would establish the so-called “right to be forgotten,” which refers to the right to have certain content removed or deindexed from the internet, in Costa Rica.11 The initiative appeared to remain pending in the Legislative Assembly at the end of the coverage period.12

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Though self-censorship online is not widespread among internet users in Costa Rica, it has become a more serious issue for journalists and other online critics of the current government.

In January 2023, during the previous coverage period, President Chaves accused journalists from CRHoy.com, a widely read digital news website known for its scrutiny of the government, as well as those from La Nación and Teletica, of being “political hitmen.”1 In May 2023, the Constitutional Chamber ruled that Chaves had violated press freedom through his repeated attacks on media outlets, including the targeted verbal attacks he issued in January 2023 (see C1).2

Recent polls show an increase in self-censorship among journalists. A November 2022 report by the University of Costa Rica’s Program for Freedom of Expression and Right to Information (PROLEDI), found that many Costa Rican journalists had stopped reporting on issues related to the government or had self-censored on social media. Among the Costa Rican journalists surveyed, 80 percent indicated that they had deleted material from their personal social networks or otherwise limited their digital identity; 60 percent said that they had deleted posts on social networks in order to protect their own or their family’s safety.3

A PROLEDI survey conducted in August and September 2023 underscored concerns about free expression in Costa Rica more generally, which could discourage speech online. The study, which included 1,004 telephone interviews, found that 64 percent of respondents agreed that freedom of expression was at risk in the country.4 It also showed that 43 percent of survey participants believed that the current government did not respect freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and that 48 percent were afraid to express their opinions on social media for fear of repercussions at work or in their daily lives.5

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 3.003 4.004

The Costa Rican government has not typically controlled or manipulated online information sources in the past.1 In recent years, however, President Chaves and other government officials have used social media to discredit the work of journalists and launch smear campaigns against critics of the government.2

In September 2023, the newspaper El Financiero reported that President Chaves, who is known to personally manage his social media accounts, had liked several offensive posts on X (formerly Twitter) throughout 2023. The posts denigrated members of the press, political opponents, the judiciary, and internet users, including by calling them “disgusting rats,” “vultures,” and “clowns.”3

In June 2023, businessman Leonel Baruch alleged that Congresswoman Pilar Cisneros had asked digital outlet CRHoy.com to help eliminate the newspaper La Nación, which has also been critical of the current government, and sought “a more benevolent attitude from CRHoy towards the government.”4 Cisneros, who denied the allegations, is close to President Chaves and is a well-known Costa Rican journalist.

During the last presidential election, held in February 2022, fake accounts were used to generate and amplify social media content. The Universidad Latina de Costa Rica found that over 11 percent of social media posts it examined were published by inauthentic accounts during the electoral period, reaching peaks of 19 and 21 percent in the weeks leading up to the vote.5 Additionally, in April 2022, Meta announced that it had removed a network of 233 Facebook accounts, 84 pages, 2 groups, and 27 Instagram accounts for violating its policy on coordinated inauthentic behavior. The network, which originated in and targeted both Costa Rica and Ecuador, spent more than $128,000 on digital advertising and reached more than 212,000 social media accounts. It ran pages that posed as news outlets and amplified the pages’ content about local politicians. The network was found to have links to the Noelix Media public relations firm, which has offices in both countries.6

In August 2023, during the current coverage period, Ukrainian computer scientist Remi Osman Mucondo testified before the Legislative Assembly’s Electoral Financing Investigative Commission that he offered “left-hand” services to Chaves’ 2022 presidential campaign. The precise details of Osman’s contract for “special services in the area of networks and communications” remain unclear, though he referenced the need to “counter” attacks on social media.7 That month, President Chaves declined to provide additional details about Osman’s involvement in his campaign.8

Various Costa Rican institutions, organizations, and media outlets have sought to combat online disinformation in recent years. Included among these are the TSE, which began offering free courses to help detect false information on social media in August 2023,9 and the University of Costa Rica, which has established a fact-checking initiative called Double Check.10

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 due to allegations that government ministers were ordered to suspend state advertising in four media outlets, including the critical digital media outlet CRHoy.com, and the apparent use of state resources to interfere in legal cases concerning CRHoy.com’s board president.

There are typically few economic, regulatory, or other constraints on users’ ability to express themselves or share information online. According to a 2020 report by PROLEDI and the Communication Research Center (CICOM), many media outlets rely heavily on advertising to operate, with most outlets reporting that they are supported by commercial advertising (78 percent), followed by state advertising (43 percent), and small donations or crowdfunding (16 percent). A high degree of market concentration has also led to a small group of outlets, largely television and radio outlets, receiving most state advertising.1

During the current coverage period, it was reported that senior government officials were ordered to halt all state advertising in certain media outlets and attempted to conceal those efforts. According to audio recordings provided by former communications minister Patricia Navarro and published by La Nación in December 2023—recordings which the government attempted to prevent the newspaper from publishing (see B2)—in July 2022 cabinet officials were ordered to not advertise in four outlets, including digital outlet CRHoy.com and newspaper La Nación, which maintains a significant online presence. The cabinet officials allegedly received the order via a private WhatsApp message rather than a formal administrative act, which, according to the recorded conversations, appeared to be an effort to avoid public and judicial scrutiny of the government’s actions.2 The director of La Nación claimed that the order was an effort “to use advertising to try to pressure the media, reward friends and punish critics.”3

In recent years, allegations have emerged that the Chaves government has attempted to interfere with legal matters concerning Leonel Baruch, a businessman and president of the board of CRHoy.com. In a January 2023 press conference, the Ministry of Finance announced that there was a tax fraud case involving Baruch but failed to mention that prosecutors had already requested that the case be dismissed.4 Baruch denied the ministry's accusations and alleged that the tax issues amounted to political persecution connected to CRHoy.com.5 Separately, in July 2023, the former president of the National Children’s Trust (PANI), a government entity tasked with the protection of children, testified to the Legislative Assembly’s Human Rights Commission that an adviser to President Chaves requested that she pay “special attention” to Baruch’s child custody dispute.6 The revelation sparked outrage among legislators, who claimed that the request was politically motivated.7

Costa Rica has not yet developed rules and regulations directly addressing net neutrality, but authorities have previously indicated support for the principle. The Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Government Institutions in the Telecommunications Sector (Law No. 8660) of 2008 obliges operators to provide open access to networks and services (Article 75), and promotes transparent and nondiscriminatory investment in the telecommunications sector.8

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 4.004 4.004

Costa Rica’s online information landscape is relatively diverse and reliable, though the public continues to have concerns about the trustworthiness of some digital news sources.

A study conducted by CICOM in November 2023 found that 90 percent of respondents used social networks, with Facebook (85 percent), Instagram (48 percent) and TikTok (45 percent) being the most popular social media platforms.1 These digital platforms are often a critical source of information. According to a 2023 PROLEDI report, 61 percent of respondents used social networks to follow national news at least some of the time; while 62 percent used online news sites to do so.2

Though the online information landscape remains largely reliable, the presence of disinformation may cloud users’ ability to identify credible news. According to a separate CICOM study, 21 percent of respondents said that they had shared false information on WhatsApp, while 12 percent acknowledged doing so on social networks.3 The 2023 PROLEDI report also found that 64 percent of those surveyed had low trust in social networks when it came to reporting on national issues.4

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Digital tools are used for political and social activism. Social media is notably used to organize movements, share information, and collect evidence for legal challenges. For example, activists have created social media campaigns to promote feminist causes and denounce violence against women.

A 2023 report from CICOM examined feminist activism online by analyzing 15 feminist organizations in Costa Rica. It found that all 15 groups maintained a profile on Instagram, 13 used WhatsApp, 13 had a profile on Facebook, and 7 had a website. According to the report, the feminist organizations tailored these digital tools to suit their target audience, which included activists and specific communities of women, such as Afro–Costa Ricans.1

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 6.006 6.006

Costa Rica’s constitution protects freedom of expression, access to information, and freedom of the press. Article 28 states that no one may be persecuted for the expression of their opinion or for any act that does not violate the law.1 Similarly, article 29 states that everyone may communicate in writing and publish without prior censorship, though individuals also assume responsibility if they break laws while exercising these rights.2 The judiciary is largely independent and protects freedom of speech and of the press.3

While Costa Rica lacks specific legislation on freedom of expression online, the issue is considered in other legislation and judicial decisions. In several rulings, the Constitutional Chamber has referenced the exercise of freedom of expression online, basing its discussion on articles 28 and 29 of the constitution as well as on various treaties to which Costa Rica is a signatory.4 Limits have also been established; for example, the Code of Children and Adolescents allows for some restrictions to freedom of expression online to protect the rights of children.5

In recent years, the Constitutional Chamber has issued several independent decisions that have protected press freedom and free expression online. In May 2023, following a complaint by CRHoy.com journalist Jason Ureña, the court condemned the insults made by President Chaves during a January 2023 press conference. The court determined that the president’s use of insulting language against journalists, which included referring to Ureña as “damned,” violated press freedom and could encourage harassment of the media.6 Ureña later reported that he received death threats online after the incident (see C7).

Since 2012, the Constitutional Chamber has issued rulings that prevent state authorities operating institutional social media accounts from blocking users, arguing that criticism of the government is encompassed in the right to free expression, and that such freedom is extended to the use of social networks and information and communication technologies.7 In May 2023, the Constitutional Chamber further clarified the scenarios in which public officials can and cannot block users on social media. That month, the court ruled that Congresswoman Sofía Guillén could not block an individual who criticized her on Facebook, and that doing so violated the plaintiff's right to freedom of expression, since the account was primarily used for official purposes. In the same ruling, the Constitutional Chamber stated that public officials can block anonymous profiles that use offensive language or incite violence, since such accounts can be used to post “openly outrageous” content.8

Similarly, in June 2023, the Constitutional Chamber ruled that the municipality of Alajuela had violated the right to freedom of expression after it prevented an individual from sharing images or photographs on the municipality’s official Facebook account.9 The court determined that the restrictions were made “arbitrarily” and “without notice,” and that sharing images on the page was in the public interest.10

Article 30 of the constitution guarantees “free access to administrative departments” for information in the public interest.11 Although Costa Rica does not have a law on access to public information, there is a vast Constitutional Chamber jurisprudence that guarantees this right to all citizens.12 The court has upheld the obligation of public administrations to provide “open data” that may be freely used and distributed.13 The country has also had an open government and open data policy since 2015, which promotes access to information, citizen participation, and the principles of transparency and government accountability.14

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

There are no specific laws establishing criminal or civil sanctions for online activities. However, crimes against honor, such as slander and libel, are defined as criminal offenses in the penal code1 and the Printing Press Law.2

Article 145 of the penal code criminalizes insults, and article 146 criminalizes defamation. Under article 147, falsely accusing someone of a crime is punishable by a fine of up to 150 days’ wages. Article 148 criminalizes harm to the reputation of a dead person via injurious or defamatory statements. The Printing Press Law contains similar provisions for media.3 These provisions could potentially be used to file criminal charges against the press or internet users for making statements online that denounce issues like corruption, environmental degradation, and other concerns.4

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

In recent years, reports of users being arrested or prosecuted for online activity have typically been related to cases where the internet was used for illegal activities like extorting public figures, sharing nonconsensual intimate imagery,1 and disseminating child sexual abuse images.2 However, during the coverage period, a journalist remained the subject to an ongoing criminal defamation trial over a political satire program that was broadcast online.

In March 2023, the Goicoechea Criminal Court sentenced Marlon Mora under the country’s defamation articles (see C2). Mora was found guilty of two counts of defamation against former 2018 presidential candidate Juan Diego Castro for material that appeared on the Suave un Toque program, in which journalism students produced satirical content about current affairs. The program was broadcast on television and online, and material about Castro went viral on social media during the presidential campaign period.3 At the time Mora was the director of Canal UCR, which hosted Suave un Toque.4 In the ruling, Mora was ordered to pay a fine of 600,000 colones ($1,100), as well as 15 million colones ($27,600) for civil damages and 3 million colones ($5,500) for the personal expenses incurred by Castro.5 The court also ordered Mora to publish the judge’s decision in full in a national media outlet. During the legal proceedings, authorities approved Castro’s request to seize Mora’s assets, which Mora denounced as “intimidating mechanisms.”6

PROLEDI condemned Mora’s conviction, arguing that it was contrary to inter-American standards on freedom of expression and set a dangerous precedent for the practice of journalism in Costa Rica. In a statement, the Association of Journalists and Professionals in Communication Sciences (COLPER) also criticized the decision as excessive and “a form of censorship.”7

In February 2024, during the current coverage period, an appeals court annulled Mora's March 2023 conviction and ordered a new trial.8 According to the appeals court, the verdict was flawed because it had not been sufficiently proven that Mora, in his capacity as the channel’s director, had acted with the intent to harm or dishonor the name of Castro. Despite the fact that the trial must be repeated, the judges decided to maintain the judicial embargo on Mora’s assets, creating a significant financial strain for the journalist.9 While Mora welcomed the decision, he criticized the lengthy judicial process, which has spanned several years.10

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

There are no reports of restrictions on anonymous or encrypted communications. SIM card registration is mandatory, though a data-privacy framework is in place.1

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 5.005 6.006

The rights to privacy, intimacy, freedom, and secrecy in communications are enshrined in the constitution and are applicable to online activities. Article 24 of the constitution establishes that private documents and written, oral, and other types of communications are inviolable, and that exceptions require special laws approved by a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly.1 These provisions have been reinforced by the Constitutional Chamber.2 Legislation passed after the coverage period could notably expand the government’s surveillance powers.

SUTEL and PRODHAB are legally empowered to protect the rights of users but only do so upon request of a user, rather than proactively.3

The government has typically not been known to collect communications metadata, intercept private communications, or monitor journalists, political figures, or human rights defenders.4 However, in 2020, during the government of then president Carlos Alvarado, the existence of an office attached to the Presidency of the Republic called the Presidential Data Analysis Unit (UPAD) was made public. The news generated political controversy, provoking the resignation of the minister of the presidency and resulting in a criminal case against Alvarado that has seemingly made little progress. In August 2022, the Constitutional Chamber determined that the decree creating the UPAD was unconstitutional, ruling that one of its articles related to personal data “infringed the right to informational self-determination” of individuals.5 A criminal investigation remained ongoing as of April 2024; at that time, Alvarado maintained that no illegal surveillance of Costa Ricans’ personal data had taken place.6

In July 2024, after the coverage period, President Chaves signed legislation that would expand the state’s surveillance powers under certain circumstances.7 The Law for the Modernization of Communications Interception (No. 23,690), approved by the Legislative Assembly in June 2024, expands the number of crimes for which courts are allowed to authorize the interception of communications, including “fixed, mobile, wireless, digital telecommunications and any other technological means,” during criminal investigations.8 Courts can now authorize the interception of communications for simple homicide, femicide, and extortion.9 The law also extends the period over which the interception of communications can take place from three to four months,10 with extensions in exceptional cases not to exceed one year. The law was drafted in response to growing concerns about violence and organized crime in Costa Rica.11

In March 2022, the permanent representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations in Geneva, Ambassador Catalina Devandas, called for an immediate moratorium on the use of spyware technology “until a regulatory framework that protects human rights is implemented.” Costa Rica became the first country to make such a call.12

In August 2022, an investigation by Lighthouse Reports revealed that Italian surveillance company Tykelab had exploited vulnerabilities in global phone networks to send secret “tracking packets,” enabling third parties to view phone locations and potentially intercept calls without being detected to individuals around the world, including in Costa Rica.13

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 5.005 6.006

The General Telecommunications Law establishes that service providers must guarantee the secrecy and privacy of communications, as well as the right to privacy and protection of personal data of internet users.1 Article 42 of the General Telecommunications Law obliges providers to guarantee that user communications and metadata will not be stored or monitored by third parties without their consent, except with a court order.2

In the same sense, the Law for the Protection of Individuals guarantees the right to informational self-determination, which encompasses guarantees regarding the legitimate processing of personal data. It also gives users the right to rectification and the right of data subjects to access their data.3 This recognition is one of the mechanisms to guarantee the constitutional right to privacy and intimacy and is, at the same time, the guideline that must be complied with to collect, retain, or inspect personal data of individuals in Costa Rica.

Some stakeholders have criticized the Law for the Protection of Individuals as incomplete and outdated, noting gaps that do not adequately address automated data collection and processing, data geolocation, and knowledge of where the data is stored.4 In addition, they have pointed out that the broad wording of some articles may be interpreted to the detriment of individual privacy.5

In recent years, legislators have proposed reforms that would address these shortcomings. In January 2021, with the support of civil society organizations,6 the Citizen Action Party proposed the Comprehensive Reform of the Law for the Protection of Individuals Regarding the Processing of their Personal Data (No. 22,388),7 which would update principles in existing data protection legislation, guarantee the rights of users in the digital era, strengthen the independence of PRODHAB, and regulate the extraterritoriality of data processing.8 In May 2022, the Progressive Liberal Party introduced a separate bill, the Personal Data Protection Act (No. 23,097), that would repeal and replace the Law for the Protection of Individuals altogether.9 Both proposals remained pending in the Legislative Assembly at the end of the current coverage period.

During the coverage period, broader concerns arose about the protection of personal data in Costa Rica. In August 2023, Rocío Aguilar, head of the General Superintendence of Financial Entities (SUGEF), disclosed that in November 2022 the Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR) had asked her to provide it with access to comprehensive and non-anonymized data of all credit operations in the country.10 After Aguilar refused to provide the information, arguing that it was the private information of citizens, the authorities of the BCCR sued her for the alleged crime of disobedience to authority.11 In September 2023, a month after Aguilar's refusal was made public, media reporting revealed that three of the country's largest banks, including Banco Popular, BAC Credomatic, and Banco de Costa Rica (BCR), had provided non-anonymized information to the BCCR.12

In August 2023, PRODHAB issued a precautionary measure ordering the BCCR to suspend any request for information that includes non-anonymized personal data, and at the same time instructed SUGEF not to provide this information.13 The following month, in September, PRODHAB determined that it would wait for a Constitutional Chamber ruling in an unconstitutionality action brought by the Costa Rican Banking Association (ABC) before making a final determination in the case, though it kept the precautionary measures in force.14 In April 2024, a Legislative Assembly commission recommended that President Chaves dismiss the BCCR’s president over the issue.15

Between July and December 2023, Facebook received 31 requests for information on 44 accounts. The company produced information in response to approximately 61 percent of those requests. Of the 31 requests, 28 were related to emergency disclosure requests.16

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Costa Rica’s relatively free environment for open online expression continued to come under strain during the coverage period. Threats against the press and political opponents of the government, coordinated harassment campaigns by accounts exhibiting apparent inauthentic behavior, and online intimidation including hate speech have resulted in an increasingly negative environment for online communication in recent years. Online harassment is also directed towards women politicians, LGBT+ people, migrants, people of African descent, and young people.

A study published by COES Communication and the United Nations in June 2023 documented a 50 percent increase in online hate speech and discrimination compared to 2022, and a 255 percent increase compared to 2021.1 The research, which analyzed posts from Costa Rica on X and Facebook, identified more than 1.4 million conversations containing hateful and discriminatory speech that occurred between May 1, 2022 and May 31, 2023, compared to the 937,115 during the previous year. According to the study, the most common forms of discriminatory online speech related to politics (approximately 480,000 conversations), xenophobia (236,000 conversations), gender (214,000 conversations), and sexual orientation (178,000 conversations). The research found that discriminatory speech related to race had increased by 181 percent over the previous year, while xenophobic speech increased by 110 percent and speech that discriminated on the basis of gender increased by 72 percent.

Women in politics are frequently the target of online harassment. The Digital Communication Observatory at the Universidad Latina de Costa Rica monitored digital platforms between June and August 2023 and published its findings in a report in September. According to its research, 41 percent of posts identified as digital violence focused on delegitimizing and discrediting women in politics, including comments that denigrated women or questioned their mental capacities. Meanwhile, 28 percent of posts mocked women’s political proposals or statements, and 23 percent attacked the physical appearance or age of women.2

High-profile women in politics, including both those who support the government and oppose it, are often singled out for online abuse. The Observatory’s December 2023 report, for example, identified Congresswoman Luz Mary Alpízar as the most frequent target of online digital violence between September and November 2023.3 That September, Alpízar—a member of President Chaves’ political party—voted to overturn the president’s veto on controversial tax legislation. At a press conference, Chaves subsequently called Alpízar a “Judas” for her “betrayal.”4 The Observatory’s report noted that negative online comments about Alpízar surged during the week of the vote on the tax legislation. Congresswoman Pilar Cisneros, a key ally of President Chaves, also remained a frequent target of digital violence during the coverage period.5

During the coverage period, journalists critical of the government continued to face intimidation, including the threat of physical violence. In November 2023, Vilma Ibarra, a well-known critic of President Chaves and radio journalist whose programs are also broadcast online,6 reportedly received a death threat through social media.7 According to reports, a supporter of President Chaves posted an invitation online for others to visit Ibarra's home and “give [her] the same fate as her grandfather Lucio Ibarra,”8 a communist politician who was assassinated during Costa Rica's civil war.9 The threat against Ibarra drew criticism from members of the Legislative Assembly.10

In November 2023, CRHoy.com journalist Jason Ureña reported that he started receiving death threats in May 2023 from anonymous “social media pages full of content in defense of the government and progovernment deputies,” forcing him to enter a special protection program. Ureña previously reported on the government's alleged use of trolls to attack opponents on social media and faced attacks by President Chaves and then health minister Joselyn Chacón at a January 2023 press conference.11

Similarly, the director of the digital media outlet No Pasa Nada, Pietro Cercone, reported on X in June 2023 that he had received two death threats during the previous six months, noting that such threats had never occurred under Chaves’ predecessor.12

In July 2023, opposition Congressman Ariel Robles revealed that he had received 14 threatening messages on Facebook from a man who had also threatened opposition legislators in person in a congressional hearing room.13 Previously, in December 2022, a network of accounts launched a seemingly coordinated attack against Robles after he posted criticism of the Chaves government on Facebook.14 The accounts, which appeared to originate from several countries, demonstrated signs of inauthentic behavior.15

Judicial authorities have also been targeted by hate speech. In February 2024, amid municipal elections, the head of the TSE raised concerns about hate speech directed at the court in the weeks leading up to the vote. Judge Eugenia Zamora noted that “never before” had the body faced such an “aggressive digital disinformation offensive, full of slander and hate speech directed against the judges of this court.”16

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because no cyberattacks of the same scale or severity as those experienced in 2022 were reported during the current coverage period.

In recent years, the websites of government entities have been subject to cyberattacks.1 While no comparable incidents were reported during the current coverage period, authorities have struggled to fully understand two major cyberattacks from 2022. Entities in the country remain under threat from regular attempted cyberattacks.2

In 2022, two major ransomware attacks paralyzed essential state institutions and services and caused the loss of millions of dollars from the private sector. From mid-April to early May 2022, a Russian-linked ransomware group known as Conti targeted nearly 30 government ministries, starting with the Ministry of Finance.3 Conti demanded that the government pay it a $20 million ransom to return the stolen information and refrain from leaking it.4 The group also warned that it intended to overthrow the government via cyberattack in a separate statement. The attacks, which disrupted tax collection and export systems for over a month, led President Chaves to declare a national emergency on May 8.5

Conti also targeted municipal governments and academic institutions during this time.6 The impact of the attacks was long-lasting: the online system for the Ministry of Finance’s Virtual Tax Administration (ATV) remained offline until June 13, 2022.7 Some commentators alleged that Conti was motivated by Costa Rica siding with Ukraine in the context of the Russian regime’s full-scale invasion, though cybersecurity experts believed that it was purely a matter of financial gain.8

Later in May 2022, while still grappling with the aftereffects of the first attack, Costa Rican institutions fell victim to another ransomware attack. On May 31, 2022, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), the country’s public health service, was targeted with Hive ransomware, which forced it to take its systems offline.9 The Hive ransomware group, which is believed to have links to Conti, demanded $5 million in bitcoin to decrypt the systems.10 The CCSS declared an institutional emergency a few days later. Reporting indicated that over half of the service’s 1,500 servers had been affected and detailed significant disruptions, like the rescheduling of nearly 35,000 health appointments.11

Since the cyberattacks, Costa Rican authorities have struggled to understand what happened and how much information was lost. In April 2023, during a legislative hearing, a privacy expert noted that “we don’t know what happened, we don’t know what data was stolen, we don’t know if we’ve recovered, we don’t know how much the recovery cost.”12 A report by the Comptroller General of the Republic of Costa Rica, covering January 2021 through November 2022, pointed out a lack of coordination between institutions in response to cyberattacks and the absence of timely management by the MICITT.13 In addition, the report found that the Costa Rican public sector lacked clarity on the prevalence of cybersecurity incidents.14

Since the 2022 cyberattacks, the government has implemented some resilience and recovery strategies. In September 2023, during the current coverage period, the MICITT reported that the government had spent $25 million to partially recover information stolen from the Ministry of Finance and CCSS between April and May 2022. Officials claimed that none of this money had been paid to the perpetrators of the attacks and acknowledged that it would be impossible to recover some CCSS health data.15 Previously, in December 2022, the MICITT and European Union (EU) signed a memo agreeing to cooperate on strengthening cybersecurity in the country.16 The US government offered the services of a specialist team to advise the MICITT on cybersecurity issues in January 2023,17 and later pledged $25 million to help strengthen Costa Rica’s cyberdefenses in March 2023.18

On Costa Rica

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Country Facts

  • Population

    5,181,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    91 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    86 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No