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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Ecuador

Partly Free
63
100
A Obstacles to Access 18 25
B Limits on Content 23 35
C Violations of User Rights 22 40
Last Year's Score & Status
64 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Ecuador_hero_map

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Despite some improvements in recent years, such as the continued expansion of internet penetration, internet freedom in Ecuador constricted during the coverage period, which saw President Daniel Noboa Azín declare an “internal armed conflict” against organized criminal groups. Amid broader concerns of violence in Ecuador, digital journalists and communicators face severe threats to their physical safety, especially when covering elections and politically sensitive topics such as corruption, environmental issues, and drug trafficking. While the government does not engage in technical censorship, critical online users have sometimes come under pressure from both state and nonstate actors.

  • Internet penetration rates and speeds continued to improve, and more than 75 percent of Ecuadorians had access to the internet during the coverage period. However, connectivity was significantly disrupted by unprecedented power outages, implemented in response to a severe drought and inadequate maintenance of hydroelectric power plants (see A1).
  • Journalists continued to face violent threats and other forms of harassment, including cases of forced exile in retaliation for online reporting about drug trafficking and corruption. A growing number of these incidents were perpetuated by organized crime, helping to reinforce self-censorship among online communicators (see B4 and C7).
  • In April 2024, Ola Bini, a Swedish digital security expert with links to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, was found guilty of attempting to access a public computer system without authorization, overturning a January 2023 decision that had acquitted him. Digital rights organizations have denounced irregularities in the yearslong case (see C3).
  • Almost three years after the passage of the Organic Law on Personal Data Protection, in April 2024, Fabrizio Peralta Díaz officially became the head of the Superintendence of Data Protection. However, the body’s institutional framework had yet to be established (see C6).

header2 Political Overview

Elections occur regularly in Ecuador, and some key state institutions have displayed greater independence in recent years. However, violent crime, which has markedly increased in recent years, has had a profound impact on the functioning of government and daily life for ordinary citizens. Due process violations, attacks on journalists, and official corruption are ongoing challenges.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Internet access in Ecuador continued to increase during the coverage period. According to the Agency for the Regulation of Telecommunications (ARCOTEL), 78.2 percent of the population had internet access by December 2023, up from 74.4 percent at the same point in 2022.1

Fixed-line broadband penetration has remained relatively low, at 15.4 percent as of December 2023, a slight increase from 14.5 percent in 2022.2 According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, the median fixed-line broadband download speed in May 2024 was 93.78 megabits per second (Mbps), and the median upload speed was 88.85 Mbps,3 an increase from the previous year.

Meanwhile, mobile internet penetration increased to 62.4 percent as of December 2023, up from 59.5 percent in December 2022.4 According to statistics from ARCOTEL, long-term evolution (LTE) subscriptions accounted for 61 percent of all mobile phone lines in November 2023.5 As of May 2024, the median mobile download speed was 25.13 Mbps and the median upload speed was 12.27 Mbps, as measured by Ookla.6

In recent years, the government has created plans to increase availability and access nationwide, including by deploying LTE technology and fiber-optic networks in previously underserved areas.7 The government’s Universal Service Plan 2022–25 includes goals and policies designed to connect underserved and rural populations, such as providing 79 percent of rural parishes with Advanced Mobile Service (SMA) coverage by 2025 (see A2).8

During the coverage period, a drought-fueled electricity crisis forced authorities to implement scheduled power outages across the country,9 causing some disruptions to telecommunications services. From October to December 2023, these outages typically lasted between one and four hours per day.10 At one point in April 2024, outages averaged eight hours per day—with blackouts of up to 13 hours scheduled in some areas.11 Amid the outages, users reported slowed internet connections in some cases,12 and telecommunications providers warned of possible service interruptions. In response, companies deployed mitigation strategies, such as power generators, in an effort to maintain reliable service.13

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

Internet access has become more affordable in recent years, although average broadband prices remain higher in Ecuador than in many South American countries. The cost of service varies depending on the type of connection and a customer’s geographic location, among other factors.

According to statistics from the UK-based company Cable, the average monthly broadband internet subscription cost $31.42 in 2024, down from $43.87 in 2019.1 The average cost of 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data fell to $1.00 in 2023, down from $3.24 in 2020.2 The minimum wage increased to $460 per month in 2024, up from $450 in 2023.3

Socioeconomic and geographic disparities in internet access persist in Ecuador. Most underserved communities are in the Amazon region, but the southern mountains, the coastline, and the Galapagos Islands also lack sufficient infrastructure. According to official statistics from the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Society (MINTEL), as of August 2023, almost 23 percent of rural parishes were unconnected; however, the Universal Service Plan envisions that 79 percent of rural parishes will have SMA coverage by 2025.4

The urban-rural access divide has persisted even as overall access has improved. By July 2023, 69.7 percent of urban households had internet access, compared with only 44.4 percent of rural households—though this represented an increase of 6.4 percent compared to 2022. Gaps in internet access also persist between households of different ethnicities. That same month, 69 percent of Indigenous, 54.2 percent of Montubio, and 46.5 percent of Afro-Ecuadorian households did not have internet access, compared to 32.4 percent of mestizo households.5

Urban-rural disparities are also evidenced at the individual level. The percentage of people in urban areas who reported using the internet increased from 78.5 percent in 2022 to 81.1 percent in 2023. There was also a reported increase in internet use among people living in rural areas, from 50.5 percent in 2022 to 54.5 percent in 2023.6 Meanwhile, fixed-line and mobile subscriptions continued to be concentrated in two provinces with higher levels of urbanization, Guayas and Pichincha, which together accounted for 57 percent of all internet subscribers as of September 2023.7

The government has introduced initiatives that aim to narrow disparities in access. In 2011, state-run “Infocenters” began providing free internet service in rural areas.8 In March 2024, MINTEL reported that there were 918 of these centers, now rebranded as “Free Digital Points” under Noboa, serving less-connected areas, including 185 in the Amazon region.9 The current government expects the total project investment for Free Digital Points to exceed $55 million by 2025.10 By December 2023, there were also 6,951 free Wi-Fi points spanning 20 provinces.11

Municipal governments have also introduced similar initiatives. By December 2023, the Quito metropolitan government had installed 1,000 Wi-Fi hotspots throughout the metropolitan district and added another 500 by June 2024.12 In December 2023, the coastal city of Manta reported that it had increased the number of free Wi-Fi hotspots from 171 to 201, claiming to benefit more than 50,000 people.13

During the coverage period, several efforts continued to improve internet access on the remote Galapagos Islands. In August 2023, state-owned internet service provider (ISP) National Telecommunications Corporation (CNT) collaborated with satellite company SES to launch a new satellite reception antenna, expanding the speed and availability of connectivity on the islands for almost 16,000 people.14 In September 2023, MINTEL launched a Free Digital Point in Bellavista, the third of these connection points in the Galapagos.15

Starlink, a satellite ISP owned by SpaceX, began providing service in Ecuador in April 2023.16 However, the monthly service price of $35 to $45 per month, on top of a $350 hardware fee, remains prohibitive for many rural users.17

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

There were no internet disruptions in Ecuador during the coverage period and no evidence of throttling or network shutdowns. Social media, communications, and video streaming platforms remained readily available.

A provision in the 2015 Organic Law of Telecommunications grants the president the power to unilaterally take over telecommunications services in times of national emergency.1 Civil society groups have raised concerns over the provision’s scope and the possibility for government abuse created by the law’s vague standards and lack of independent or impartial oversight.2 In January 2024, MINTEL said it would maintain uninterrupted telecommunications services after President Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” against organized crime groups that month.3

Disruptions to internet access have occurred in the past. Amid mass protests in October 2019 under then president Lenín Moreno Garcés, CNT users experienced general connectivity disruptions and issues accessing Facebook and WhatsApp (see B8).4 For a brief period later that month, mobile service provider Claro allegedly imposed connectivity interruptions in much of the country and in Quito.5

Ecuador’s physical infrastructure is largely centralized in the private sector. Three submarine cables connect Ecuador to the global internet, with construction continuing on two additional undersea cable projects during the coverage period. The first project, the Carnival Submarine Network-1 (CSN-1), will connect Ecuador and the United States, with landing points in Panama and Colombia. The second, the Galapagos Cable System, will connect mainland Ecuador and the Galapagos Islands.6 Both projects are expected to be completed by 2025.7 Three major ISPs—two of which are private—control their own national infrastructure.8

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Ecuador’s telecommunications market is concentrated among a relatively small number of service providers. As of December 2023, the country had five major ISPs covering more than 70 percent of the fixed-line market, with more than 1,000 smaller ISPs covering the rest. At that time, Megadatos held 30 percent of the market, followed by the state-owned CNT (15 percent), Conecel (Claro) (10.6 percent), Setel (8.9 percent), and Puntonet (5.6 percent). The mobile service market, on the other hand, is an oligopoly: Conecel (Claro) held 56 percent of the market, followed by Otecel (Movistar) with 29.5 percent and CNT with 14.5 percent.1

Analysis released by ARCOTEL in November 2021 acknowledged that Ecuador's mobile market remains “highly concentrated.”2 Effective January 2023, the government of then president Guillermo Lasso Mendoza repealed a telecommunications market concentration payment created in 2014. Operators with a market share of over 30 percent had been required to make a quarterly payment to ARCOTEL, with the amount determined by market share. While the payment was enacted to boost competition, analysts argued that the payment was ineffective and represented a potential barrier to entry.3

Previously, a January 2019 report from the country’s comptroller general investigated concessions awarded to Telconet to build a submarine cable and found irregularities in the process.4 The report was referred to the attorney general’s office for a criminal investigation.5 Audio leaks released by news site La Posta in January 2019 suggested that former ARCOTEL officials manipulated the ISP market’s competitiveness by awarding concessions to providers whose owners had ties to former vice president Jorge Glas Espinel.6 There appeared to be no further updates by the end of the coverage period. Glas, who has faced corruption-related charges in recent years,7 was arrested at the Mexican embassy in Ecuador in April 2024 following separate embezzlement allegations.8

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

Created by the 2015 Organic Law of Telecommunications, ARCOTEL is linked to MINTEL and is responsible for the technical aspects of administrating, regulating, and controlling the telecommunications sector and radioelectric spectrum.1 ARCOTEL’s board of directors, which in turn appoints the executive director, is comprised of the telecommunications minister, the secretary of planning, and a representative appointed by the country’s president—a structure that may undermine the body’s independence.2 Jorge Hoyos Zavala was appointed to become the executive director of ARCOTEL in June 2024, after the coverage period.3

The Organic Law of Telecommunications designates MINTEL as “the governing body for telecommunications and the information society, information technology, information and communications technologies [ICTs] and information security."4 It also requires the “competent bodies” to protect users “against legal, contractual or regulatory breaches” perpetuated by telecommunications companies or other actors, among other guarantees.5

ISPs and other internet-related organizations are allowed and, to a certain extent, encouraged to establish self-regulatory mechanisms. Examples of this include public assistance to develop public and private Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs); the local internet exchange point NAP.ec, which is managed by AEPROVI, an association of ISPs; and the Ecuadorian internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) Task Force; among others. The allocation of digital assets—such as domain names, which are designated by NIC.ec—is not controlled by the government.6

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Systematic blocking or filtering of content is not common in Ecuador. There were no reports of technical blocking of social media platforms, communication apps, blog-hosting platforms, or discussion forums during the coverage period. Likewise, there were no reports of blocking of tools used for anonymization of navigation or circumvention of censorship.

However, authorities have ordered blocks of certain websites to protect intellectual property rights. In March 2024, LigaPro, Ecuador’s professional soccer league, announced that it had secured a court order to block 22 sites used for streaming matches illegally.1 The president of LigaPro characterized it as a “historic” decision to protect intellectual property rights and said that the league had established an Integrity and Anti-Piracy Department to prevent future copyright violations.2 In August 2024, after the coverage period, a Guayas judge issued a similar order to block more than 180 internet protocol (IP) addresses accused of illegally streaming LigaPro soccer matches.3

Previously, in 2021, the government’s intellectual property agency, the National Service of Intellectual Rights (SENADI), ordered ISPs to block a number of popular sites used for stream ripping, or downloading content from a streaming platform for offline use without permission. Users who attempted to access any site subject to the order were redirected to an educational landing page.4 By 2023, SENADI had reportedly declined to implement similar blocks requested by content producers.5

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Under former president Rafael Correa Delgado, copyright law was frequently used to censor politically sensitive content online.1 This practice eased considerably, but not completely, under former president Moreno. Journalists have sometimes been pressured to remove content after receiving threats.

In December 2023, the Durán-based digital outlet Ferrodiario said that it had decided to delete an opinion piece from its social media after the author was threatened, though it did not remove the content from its website. That November 2023 article encouraged local political candidates to develop specific policy proposals.2 Journalists in Ecuador have reported worsening intimidation in recent years (see C7).

In January 2024, Assemblyman Ramiro Vela Jiménez introduced a proposal in the National Assembly that would explicitly criminalize slander via online communications (see C2).3 That month, Vela publicly responded to an article that La Hora published about the initiative under a headline that referred to progovernment legislators working to “criminalize” online speech, claiming that the outlet had misrepresented his proposal and invoking a right to rectification.4 By the end of the coverage period, the article remained accessible under the same headline on La Hora’s website.5

Previously, in July 2020, then president Moreno’s office used Iomart Group PLC, a firm based in the United Kingdom, to request the removal of five critical news reports from the media outlet La Historia, ostensibly due to copyright violations for the use of photographs of Moreno and other government officials that belonged to the presidency and the communication secretary. Ecuador’s ombudsman ordered the National Secretariat of Communications to withdraw the suit shortly thereafter and condemned the arbitrary use of copyright law by public institutions as censorship.6

The Spanish reputation management firm Eliminalia, which uses copyright law and other dubious legal tactics to remove content on behalf of well-connected clients, reportedly maintains an office in Guayaquil.7

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 2.002 4.004

A series of recent reforms to the Communication Law—the latest of which was enacted in November 2022—have seemed to promise a less restrictive online environment for media outlets. However, existing restrictions on content continue to lack transparency and proportionality and remain open to potential abuses by authorities.

Reforms made to the Communication Law in November 2022 affirmed that the state will not regulate media content. Article 3 of the reform provides for self-regulation of the media, guaranteeing that “journalistic and communication activity must be governed by ethical standards and self-regulation, in no case by standards imposed by the state.” The reform also contains explicit guarantees for freedom of expression online (see C1). Article 20 maintains the Communication Law’s prohibition of the dissemination of content that incites or encourages violence, or national, racial, or religious hatred.

Prior reforms to the Communication Law, enacted in February 2019, signaled a move away from the punitive system established under the Correa administration, which was highly politicized and prone to abuse. A significant element of the 2019 Communication Law reforms was the elimination of the Superintendence of Information and Communications (SUPERCOM). Under the Correa administration, SUPERCOM had aggressively accused media outlets of unbalanced reporting, an allegation that was often applied to investigative reporting in Ecuador.1 The reforms also removed digital media and content providers’ liability for user comments while upholding their responsibility for editorial content published by uncredited authors.2

ARCOTEL is still authorized to block internet domains that violate national laws. Article 24 of the Organic Law of Telecommunications prohibits telecommunications service providers from restricting legal content except in cases where users themselves request such restrictions or “by order of a competent authority.”3 There are currently no efficient and timely avenues of appeal for content subject to removal or blocking.

Platforms have suspended accounts belonging to online outlets in the past. In March 2022, Twitter had suspended an account belonging to Wambra, a digital community media outlet, for allegedly violating its community standards around publishing sensitive third-party content without consent. The offending post, which was removed, denounced an attack on a Wambra journalist by police during a Women’s Day march. The account’s other posts remained visible, though the account was blocked from posting new content.4 It is often unclear if such suspensions are justified by legitimate violations of the companies’ terms of use.

Ahead of the August 2023 snap elections, legal experts noted that the National Electoral Council (CNE) was unable to enforce electoral regulations on social media because the legal framework does not allow it to do so, raising concerns that certain online content violated campaign rules.5

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because organized crime-driven violence has worsened a climate of fear and intimidation among journalists, instilling self-censorship in those who report online.

Coverage of corruption cases and government abuses of power has increased in recent years. News related to drug trafficking and organized criminal groups on the Colombian border and other cities in Ecuador, such as Guayaquil and Manta, is treated carefully. Though state censorship of journalists has eased since the Correa presidency, the government has not fulfilled its obligations to ensure the physical safety of journalists, and a general climate of hostility persists.

Civil society group Fundamedios recorded 265 aggressions against freedom of expression—encompassing incidents including verbal harassment, threats, and physical violence—in 2023, including 224 attacks against journalists. The organization found that the number of attacks carried out by organized crime in 2023 had increased by 870 percent over the 2020 figure, with 68 incidents occurring in 2023.1 These attacks underscore the deteriorating environment for extralegal harassment and intimidation against online users in recent years—including cases of gender-based political violence (see C7).

These incidents have had a silencing effect on the country’s journalists, especially those who investigate organized crime, corruption, and other politically sensitive issues. In one example from November 2023, a journalist received an anonymous text message from someone threatening to kill them if they continued to publish news content—a threat the journalist believed was in retaliation for their recent investigative work.2 The Fundamedios report covering 2023 found that “any media outlet or journalist who spoke about crime or who warned about the issue was intimidated, violated, and threatened.”3

In the face of such challenges, the government’s efforts to guarantee the physical safety of journalists and other critical online users have been insufficient, which could compel vulnerable users to self-censor online. In April 2024, the Noboa government denied the Mechanism for the Protection of Journalists, an entity created by the 2022 Communication Law reforms (see C1), an operating budget for two years.4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

During the coverage period, the online information space was charged with polarization between supporters and opponents of former president Correa, who remains influential in Ecuadorian politics. In preparation for the snap 2023 presidential election, which was held in two rounds in August and October, networks of inauthentic accounts continued to influence online debate.

Coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) targeting Ecuadorian audiences sometimes seeks to influence public debate, including during electoral periods. There is evidence that inauthentic bot accounts were used to shape online discussions about leading presidential candidates Noboa, the eventual winner, and Luisa González Alcívar, an ally of Correa. In the days immediately following a 2023 presidential debate, from October 1 to 3, social media analysis found that 73 percent of posts mentioning Noboa were created by bots or potential bots, compared to 72 percent for González.1 Posts about Noboa included hashtags such as #DatoMataRelato (Data Tells a Different Story) and #DanielNosabeNoboaEvade (Daniel Know-Nothing Noboa Evades), while those mentioning González used #LuisaNoImprovisa (Luisa Does Not Improvise) and #PorElBienDeTodos (For the Good of All). One analyst claimed that Noboa’s campaign used bots to amplify his talking points from the debate, while González’s focused on discrediting Noboa.2 Others noted that troll accounts seeking to support or discredit certain candidates were seemingly deployed across social networks, including on platforms that had previously been utilized less for these purposes, such as WhatsApp.3

In August 2022, during the previous coverage period, the fact-checking platform Cazadores de Fake News reported that Twitter had suspended a “botnet” operation composed of 491 inauthentic accounts for engaging in CIB in support of then president Lasso between January and July 2022. The accounts amplified posts made by Lasso in a coordinated and automated or semiautomated way and were found to be associated with a group identified as the Network of Democratic Tweeters.4 In October 2022, Cazadores de Fake News reported that an additional 352 pro-Lasso accounts had been detected, with most of these accounts apparently being created after the original network had been suspended in August. These accounts regularly shared Lasso’s posts in a coordinated way, boosting hashtags such as #JuntosLoHacemosPosible (Together We Make It Possible) and #JuntosPorElAgro (Together for Agriculture).5 The origin and financial backing of this network remain unclear.

During the coverage period, online troll accounts were reportedly deployed on behalf of individuals involved in organized crime. Reporting from March 2024 revealed, as part of the so-called Purga case, the existence of a troll center allegedly operated by Mayra Salazar, a former public relations officer for the Provincial Court of Guayas.6 Salazar reportedly used X accounts such as @JenPPP and @JacintoMerchan, which both exceeded 10,000 followers, to post messages on behalf of former legislator Pablo Muentes Alarcón—the person at the center of the case—and Los Lobos, a criminal organization.7 According to prosecutors, Muentes directed Salazar to make specific posts using the troll accounts, including those that sought to insult and smear individuals that Muentes perceived as opponents.8

Political actors such as former president Correa and Guayaquil mayor Aquiles Álvarez Henriques used online platforms during the coverage period to discredit certain journalists for their work. In one incident from February 2024, Correa used the hashtag #LosCorruptosSiempreFueronEllos (The Corrupt Ones Were Always Them) in an X post to accuse the outlet Ecuavisa of falsifying a story about Correa’s prior experience in prison.9

According to Ecuador Chequea, false and misleading content generated by artificial intelligence (AI) has not yet had a major impact in the country, though this content has at times circulated online. In one case from February 2024, an AI-generated image posted by an account called “Ecuador Play” depicted President Noboa sitting on a throne with a golden umbrella while those surrounding him get wet from the rain.10

Previously, during the local elections and constitutional referendum held in February 2023,11 fact-checking initiatives Ecuador Verifica and Ecuador Chequea detected false news that harmed the political images of candidates and in certain cases alarmed citizens, and campaigns or candidates themselves sometimes spread disinformation. For example, Guayaquil mayor Cynthia Viteri was targeted by misleading images and text that spread disinformation about her management as mayor; these messages were widely shared via WhatsApp groups during her campaign for reelection.12

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

The 2022 reforms to the Communication Law maintained the Article 6 ban on foreign ownership of national media in Ecuador.1 Financial corporations and their shareholders are also banned from making media investments under Article 312 of the constitution and Article 256 of the organic monetary and financial code.2 Journalists have expressed concerns that media outlets are unable to financially support several investigative journalists.3

In December 2023, the Communications Secretariat said that it would offer a $2.5 million contract to “rethink actions and strategies” for the Noboa administration’s communications, with a particular focus on social networks and digital media. As a result, the administration claimed that it would be impossible to comply with the Communication Law’s requirement that state advertising be evenly distributed between public, private, and community media.4

In its 2023 accountability report, ARCOTEL stated that it granted 248 enabling titles for telecommunications services and networks during the year.5 The Telecommunications and Broadcasting Subscription Provision Regulation, enacted in May 2016, imposes several obligations on telecommunications providers that are granted qualifying titles, including a requirement that they provide “service to people who request it, in equitable conditions, without establishing discrimination.”6

Since 2020, a value-added tax (VAT) of 12 percent has been applied to foreign providers of digital services, including news outlets and social media platforms.7 In April 2024, President Noboa invoked recent reforms to increase the VAT to 15 percent, a rate which he claimed would be reviewed every six months.8

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

A wide array of digital media outlets has emerged in Ecuador in the last decade. Since websites are not typically blocked, regular internet users do not need to use virtual private networks (VPNs) or other circumvention tools to access online news. Limited funds for independent media and a history of censorship have allowed the digital versions of traditional outlets, such as the websites for popular outlets El Universo and El Telégrafo, to dominate the online sphere.1

According to a report published by the Communication Council in December 2023, there were 943 media outlets recorded in Ecuador’s public media registry, 97 percent of them privately owned or community-based. Of those recorded, only 65 were internet outlets, far fewer than the 117 print outlets and 627 radio outlets in the registry; additionally, 45 percent of the 65 digital media outlets are concentrated in the provinces of Guayas and Pichincha.2

Nonetheless, small independent digital media outlets like GK, Primicias, Tinta Digital, Código Vidrio, Los Irreverentes, Ingobernables, and Plan V have become influential because of their investigative reporting. Independent and alternative digital outlets in Ecuador often emphasize perspectives that are missing or underreported in the traditional media.

While there are a number of digital media outlets, including blogs and podcasts, that focus on matters affecting the Indigenous population and other underrepresented groups such as LGBT+ individuals or migrants, just over 3 percent of outlets listed in the public media registry identify as representatives of Indigenous nationalities.3 The digital community medium Wambra has positioned itself as a platform for perspectives on gender inequities and Indigenous communities, and broadcasts an online radio program produced by women, LGBT+ people, and social organizations.4 Another digital medium that has gained prominence in recent years is La Periódica, which centers the perspectives of women and LGBT+ people.5 However, LGBT+ people continue to face a significant degree of harassment online (see C7).

False or misleading content is often spread through digital platforms and social networks, including about government officials or political candidates, undermining the reliability of the online information environment. According to the 2024 edition of the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, the tendency of journalists to avoid covering organized crime in areas heavily affected by drug trafficking has created information “black holes” in parts of Ecuador,6 which could limit access to trustworthy information about critical events. One commentator noted that several false claims generated panic online amid an outbreak of violence in January 2024, including misleading images purporting to show an armed kidnapping at a Quito subway station.7

During the 2023 electoral period, there were several cases where disinformation was spread in an intentional and coordinated manner (see B5).8 To combat this, the Ecuador Verifica initiative—composed of media, academic, and civil society organizations (CSOs) and founded to combat the spread of false information and fact-check presidential candidates prior to the 2021 election—continued its work ahead of the August 2023 snap election and October runoff.9

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

There are no legal restrictions on digital advocacy or online communities, and social media continued to serve as a tool for social and political mobilization in Ecuador during the coverage period.

In recent years, there have been waves of social media activism around women’s rights, especially reproductive freedom. In 2022, the National Assembly enacted a bill allowing victims of rape to obtain an abortion, with several restrictions and requirements.1 During the coverage period, in March 2024, a coalition of eight CSOs known as Justa Libertad (Just Freedom) filed a Constitutional Court challenge seeking to eliminate abortion from the comprehensive organic criminal code (COIP),2 a suit which remained pending at the end of the coverage period. As part of its advocacy, this movement maintains an online presence across social media platforms using the hashtag #JustaLibertad.3

During the coverage period, an activist used social media to advocate for the decriminalization of physician-assisted death in Ecuador. In August 2023, Paola Roldán, who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), filed a constitutional challenge against Article 144 of the COIP, which defines the crime of simple homicide.4 Since being diagnosed with ALS in 2020, Roldán had used social media extensively to share her experiences living with the disease.5 In February 2024, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Roldán,6 who died in March.7

Indigenous communities have also used social media to mobilize protests and express demands in recent years. For example, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) used its social networks, especially what was then known as Twitter, to organize massive mobilizations against then president Lasso's economic and social policies in June 2022.8

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 3.003 6.006

The Ecuadorian legal framework guarantees protections for freedom of expression, though concerns remain about the independence of all branches of government and the protection of that right in practice. Article 16.2 of the Ecuadorian constitution grants “universal access to information technologies and communication” and Article 384 confers rights to communication, information, and freedom of expression.

The 2013 Communication Law—which originally included restrictive provisions for media that were used to muzzle and harass journalists and outlets under Correa—has been the subject of considerable debate in recent years. Several restrictive provisions in the 2013 law were previously reformed in February 2019.1 Important changes included the elimination of the mandatory media code of conduct (Article 10) and the prohibition on “media lynching,” which was used to prevent journalists from investigating corruption. Furthermore, SUPERCOM, which oversaw compliance, was eliminated.2

In November 2022, then president Lasso signed additional reforms to the Communication Law—a long-standing goal of his government.3 The reforms as passed contain several provisions that could improve freedom of expression online. Article 4 of the reform law explicitly protects freedom of expression on the internet and the expression of personal opinions on social networks, and pledges that the state will promote internet access and digital literacy. Article 13 contains protections for journalists and obliges the state to protect communication workers who are in physical danger, including those who report on organized crime, corruption, and prison violence.

As part of these commitments, the 2022 reforms outlined a Mechanism for the Protection of Journalists, which convened for the first time in November 2023.4 However, under President Noboa, the protection mechanism has not received a budget allocation, essentially negating its effectiveness to combat physical insecurity against journalists (see C7).5 Due to this lack of guarantees, Fundamedios spearheaded the creation of the Roundtable for the Protection of Journalists (MAPP) in September 2023, composed of civil society and media actors.6

In March 2024, President Noboa convened with an Inter-American Press Association (SIP/IAPA) delegation to sign the Chapultepec and Salta declarations, pledging to uphold freedom of expression and the press. At the time, SIP/IAPA’s president urged Noboa to fund the journalist-protection mechanism and to reform Ecuador’s restrictive slander and libel statutes (see C2).7

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

While former president Moreno reformed legislation that penalized various online activities, concerning penal code provisions that affect online speech remain.

Penal code changes that entered into force in August 2014 eliminated criminal charges for insult but retained them for slander and libel.1 Under provisions of the COIP, Article 182 maintains penalties ranging from 6 months to 2 years’ imprisonment for slander in the form of a false criminal accusation.2 A reform proposed in the National Assembly in January 2024, which had not passed by the end of the coverage period, would modify this article to explicitly include online communications, penalizing false accusations of a crime made “by any means, digital platform or social network” with the same prison sentence and a fine.3 Article 396 of the penal code notably punishes expressions, “including through any information and communication technologies,” that “discredit or dishonor” with imprisonment of 15 to 30 days.4 Article 179, which contains a public interest exception, establishes a prison sentence of six months to one year for any person “who, by virtue of [their] state or office, employment, profession, or art, has knowledge of a secret whose divulgement might cause harm to another and reveals it.”5 Article 229 places further restrictions on divulging information by establishing a one-to-three-year prison sentence for the revelation of registered information, databases, or archives through electronic systems in a way that violates another’s intimacy or privacy, with no exceptions for whistleblowers or journalists. Article 307 establishes a penalty of five to seven years in prison for creating economic panic by “publishing, spreading, or divulging false news that causes harm to the national economy in order to alter the prices of goods.”6

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Lawsuits threatening social media users and online journalists are regularly withdrawn or dismissed, though they continued to be filed during the coverage period. A prominent case from 2019 that had appeared to be resolved in favor of digital rights was overturned on appeal in April 2024.

The Ola Bini trial, which has received international condemnation for significant delays and due process violations during Bini’s initial detention, remained ongoing during the coverage period. In April 2019, Ecuadorian police arrested Bini, a Swedish digital security expert with links to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, for “alleged participation in attacks against the integrity of computer systems.”1 Human rights defenders said his arrest was arbitrary.2

Nearly four years after Bini was initially arrested, a three-judge court unanimously acquitted him in January 2023. In its decision, the court ruled that prosecutors had failed to present relevant evidence of a crime and had not sufficiently demonstrated that Bini had gained unauthorized access to computer systems.3 However, prosecutors decided to appeal the decision.4

In April 2024, during the current coverage period, the Provincial Court of Pichincha revoked the acquittal and found him guilty of “attempted unauthorized access to a public computer system.”5 Days later, the court agreed to suspend Bini’s one-year prison sentence, though required him to report to authorities every 15 days for one year and prevented him from leaving the country without judicial authorization,6 in addition to a fine of four basic salaries (totaling $1,840).7 A coalition of CSOs condemned the decision, saying that it lacked evidence and impartiality,8 and Bini’s legal team indicated that it would appeal to the National Court of Justice.9

In February 2024, Giovanny Marín, a regional director of the National Agency for Regulation, Control, and Health Surveillance (ARCSA), filed a criminal slander complaint against digital outlet Lo del Momento Loja. The outlet had published a story about unlawful appointments to public positions, as well as a quote from Marín distancing himself from the allegations.10 There were no further updates reported by the end of the coverage period.

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

Neither anonymous nor encrypted communications are banned in Ecuador, and users are not required to turn over their encryption keys without a court mandate. Reforms made to the Communication Law in 2019 eliminated a requirement that users must register their name and government identification number to make comments in digital forums and news sites.1

Cell phones and SIM cards, however, must be registered using a national ID.2 ARCOTEL can require ISPs to provide the IP addresses of their clients without a judicial order, a provision that could restrict the anonymity of online users.3

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

The government’s access to foreign surveillance equipment and history of using communications technology to surveil citizens, including journalists and activists, raise concerns for internet users’ privacy in Ecuador. Article 66.21 of Ecuador’s constitution protects the right to the “inviolability and secrecy of hard-copy and online correspondence,” saying that such communications “cannot be retained, opened or examined, except in those cases provided by law” and with a court order.1 However, certain laws infringe on this right in practice.

In March 2023, the National Assembly enacted the Organic Law to Reform Various Legal Bodies for the Strengthening of Institutional Capacities and Comprehensive Security, establishing potentially concerning online surveillance capacities related to national security. Article 77 of the law, for instance, allows prosecutors to authorize an “undercover computer agent,” who is empowered to mask their identity to “carry out patrols or digital actions in cyberspace, penetrating and infiltrating computer platforms such as forums, communication groups, or closed sources of information” in order to broadly “investigate or clarify criminal acts committed or that may be committed.” Prosecutors, however, must obtain a judicial authorization for undercover agents to record images, audio, or video of such conversations.2 Digital rights organizations Access Now and Derechos Digitales have expressed concern that this enables disproportionate cyberpatrolling without establishing clear limits on the purpose of such surveillance.3 Derechos Digitales also criticized the country’s lack of progress implementing recent data protection legislation (see C6).

In recent years, reporting has documented the government’s access to an array of surveillance equipment acquired from international companies. For instance, in December 2020, the Citizen Lab included Ecuador in a list of 25 countries where governments were likely customers of the Israeli surveillance company Circles. Circles’ clients can monitor calls, text messages, and mobile-phone geolocation by exploiting weaknesses in mobile telecommunications infrastructure.4

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

Under the rules of the Organic Law of Telecommunications, ISPs are obliged by ARCOTEL to “provide technical, economic, financial, legal documents, and in general, any form or request for information” and to “allow inspections to facilities and systems.”1 In October 2022, ARCOTEL modified a technical standard for the registration of subscribers or customers of telecommunications services and broadcasting services. This technical norm establishes that service providers “must guarantee the privacy and protection of personal data delivered or collected, compiled or obtained by any means from subscribers or customers, for which purpose they shall implement the necessary mechanisms to safeguard the security of such information, including the secrecy and inviolability of the content of their communications, with exceptions provided by law.”2

Judges can issue court orders compelling ISPs to provide communication data to law enforcement agencies. Content intercepted via internet surveillance is admissible in court and can be used to convict defendants under Article 476 of the COIP.3 A 2022 Constitutional Court decision modified this article to add that information not considered useful for criminal investigations will be deleted, including by order of a judge.4

Article 67 of the March 2023 Organic Law to Reform Various Legal Bodies for the Strengthening of Institutional Capacities and Comprehensive Security allows prosecutors, without judicial authorization, to order service providers to retain subscriber and traffic data, particularly in cases when the data is likely to be lost or modified. Under the order, data must be retained for up to 90 days, which can be extended in the same increments.5

The National Assembly approved the Organic Law on Personal Data Protection in May 2021.6 The law creates an independent body for data protection, the Superintendence for the Protection of Personal Data, and has been seen as potentially the most advanced data protection legislation in the region. The draft, introduced by the government in 2019 following a large data breach, was based on two years’ worth of work by government agencies in consultation with CSOs.7 In July 2021, academics and representatives from digital rights, free expression, and data privacy organizations established an observatory to monitor the implementation of the law.8

While the law outlined a two-year transition period to establish compliance—a deadline that passed in May 2023—implementation has faced delays. Fabrizio Peralta Díaz was appointed as the first superintendent of data protection in March 2024,9 and assumed the role for a five-year term the following month.10 However, the superintendence was established without an institutional framework or operating budget.11 In the role, Peralta Díaz will oversee compliance and enforce the law’s sanctioning regime.

Mobile operators are required to implement technology that automatically provides the physical location of mobile phone users for emergency purposes, within a range of 50 meters.12

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Journalists, including those who report online, face a serious threat of intimidation, harassment, and physical violence amid deepening insecurity in the country. These threats are sometimes leveled by state actors or organized crime. Fundamedios recorded 265 aggressions against free expression in 2023, including 43 instances of verbal aggression, 42 threats, and 10 physical attacks—with roughly a quarter of all incidents committed by organized crime.1 Periodistas Sin Cadenas separately recorded 289 attacks against journalists in 2023, including a 275 percent increase in death threats compared to 2022.2

Amid rising insecurity in Ecuador, journalists who report on politically sensitive issues have been forced into exile due to threats against their physical safety. In 2023, at least three journalists from digital media outlets were forced to leave the country after receiving death threats. Karol Noroña, a journalist for the digital outlet GK, left the country in March 2023 due to an immediate threat to her life. Noroña had been covering organized crime and prisons for the outlet.3 In July 2023, during the current coverage period, Mónica Velásquez Villacís and Andersson Boscán, investigative journalists for the digital outlet La Posta, left the country due to an imminent threat of deadly violence from an apparent Albanian criminal group.4 Velásquez and Boscán, who returned to Ecuador in October 2023, reported that threats against them worsened after publishing a recent investigation into corruption and drug trafficking.5 Later in the year, Fundamedios and Periodistas Sin Cadenas sharply criticized Boscán over evidence that he maintained a conversational relationship with drug trafficker Leandro Norero, who Boscán claimed was an important source for his investigations.6

Some journalists who were forced to relocate have remained anonymous to protect their identity, making it difficult to determine whether threats against them occurred in connection with their online reporting. One anonymous journalist who was forced to relocate in October 2023 reportedly received death threats after he removed another individual from a WhatsApp group chat, in addition to separate threats from an organized criminal group.7

According to Fundamedios, the number of aggressions against free expression worsened in recent years under former president Lasso, despite some efforts by his government to bolster protections for freedom of the press and expression (see C1).8 Lasso himself was responsible for stigmatizing the press at times. In a February 2023 speech, for example, Lasso directed several targeted insults at La Posta, which had published allegations linking Lasso to high-level corruption.9 Among other comments, Lasso derided the reporters as “news entertainment mercenaries.” His comments led journalists and communicators to issue alerts on social networks highlighting the efforts to discredit, as well as the lack of protection for, journalism on corruption and organized crime.10

Women and LGBT+ digital journalists face difficulties in their work,11 including an elevated threat of harassment and stigmatization. In recent years, however, digital media has provided more opportunities to cover feminist and LGBT+ issues (see B7). In March 2024, journalist María Sol Borja was the victim of gender-based harassment on X, including comments that denigrated her mental capacity, after she criticized remarks by first lady Lavinia Balvonesi that referred to women as “the delicate sex.”12

On May 31, 2024, Alondra Santiago, a Cuban journalist based in Ecuador, uploaded a video on social media in which she modified verses of the country’s national anthem to criticize the Noboa administration—prompting a wave of criticism and hateful comments toward Santiago in the days afterwards.13 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the government revoked Santiago’s visa, citing alleged national security concerns.14 However, the timing of the incident, as well as Santiago’s history of critical comments against the government, suggested that the decision was politically motivated.15

Despite a number of commitments on paper, recent efforts to implement stronger protections for journalists have stalled in practice, such as the Mechanism for the Protection of Journalists (see C1), helping to reinforce a climate of self-censorship among journalists facing threats of violence (see B4).

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Technical attacks have targeted media websites and their social media accounts in recent years. Analysis by cybersecurity company Kaspersky found that Ecuador received the third-highest number of cyberattacks in Latin America between August 2022 and August 2023, trailing only Brazil and Mexico.1 Government and financial institutions remain vulnerable to technical attacks, especially ransomware attacks.2

In February 2024, a cyberattack took the website of digital outlet Indómita offline for approximately seven hours. Jéssica Zambrano Alvarado, Indómita’s cofounder, indicated that the cyberattack could be due to a report on violence against minors in Ecuador that the outlet had published one day earlier. The outlet was targeted multiple times during the coverage period: Zambrano also said that Indómita was the victim of a cyberattack in November 2023 that took it offline for two weeks.3

In April 2023, during the previous coverage period, La Posta was the victim of two separate distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in a 48-hour period. A site hosting a recent investigation about public-sector corruption remained inaccessible for two days due to the attacks.4

Cyberattacks against government institutions have also disrupted operations and posed a threat to individuals’ personal information in recent years.5 In August 2023, a cyberattack compromised the electronic voting system used by voters located abroad for the snap election held that month. That month, Codigo Vidrio reported that “hackers” had breached the telematic voting system, preventing some voters from participating,6 while the Organization of American States (OAS) urged the CNE to investigate the incident.7 Elections in three overseas National Assembly constituencies, which utilized telematic voting, had to be reconducted. While the circumstances of the attack were not publicly disclosed by the CNE, it was reportedly caused by a denial-of-service (DoS) attack targeting the CNE’s servers.8

During the previous coverage period, in March 2023, the organization Usuarios Digitales alerted on Twitter that a public health vaccination database containing personal information such as names, identification numbers, and dates of birth was apparently for sale online. In response, the Ministry of Public Health denied that it had been hacked and issued assurances that its systems were protected in accordance with data-protection legislation.9

The government has taken some actions in recent years to strengthen cybersecurity efforts. In June 2022, the MINTEL minister presented the National Cybersecurity Strategy. Born out of multistakeholder engagement with private and public actors and cybersecurity experts, the strategy establishes guidelines for strengthening the country’s cybersecurity response in both the public and private sectors.10

In June 2024, after the coverage period, the National Assembly shelved a proposed Digital Security Bill, which would have created a National Security System to counteract digital security threats, among other provisions. The National Security System would have fallen under the Ministry of the Interior, an entity which Assemblywoman Lucía Posso said did not have the expertise to address cybersecurity issues.11

On Ecuador

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Country Facts

  • Population

    18,000,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    65 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    63 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No