On February 14, 2024, in the largest single-day election in the world, 205 million people will be eligible to cast ballots for Indonesia’s president and legislature, made up of the 575-member House of Representatives (DPR) and the 136-member House of Regional Representatives (DPD). Three candidates are vying to succeed term-limited president Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi): Prabowo Subianto, the current defense minister and former special forces commander, backed by the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party; Ganjar Pranowo, the former governor of Central Java, backed by the ruling Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P); and Anies Baswedan, the former governor of Jakarta, who was nominated by a coalition of three parties, including the National Democratic Party and the conservative Prosperous Justice Party. If no candidate for the presidency receives a simple majority of the vote, the two candidates with the largest vote shares will compete in a runoff election in June 2024.

The upcoming election could play a decisive role in determining whether Indonesia will hold on to its democratic gains or face further backsliding. Although proposals floated by some senior officials to delay elections or allow Jokowi to seek a third term did not move forward, the outgoing president has sought other ways to cement his legacy. He stated publicly that he would meddle in the election to ensure a smooth transition of power. More recently, Jokowi has taken steps to ally himself with other elites and build his own political dynasty: his former rival and defense minister, Prabowo, announced Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his running mate in October. Thirty-six-year-old Gibran’s eligibility was determined earlier the same month by the constitutional court, which ruled that individuals already serving as elected officials are exempt from the minimum age requirement of forty. The court was headed by Jokowi’s brother-in-law, who was later dismissed for failing to recuse himself despite his conflict of interest.

Prabowo, the frontrunner in the presidential race as of November 2023, has previously supported policies with authoritarian elements. During his 2014 campaign, he signaled his intent to roll back democratic reforms, including direct elections. After both his 2014 and 2019 losses, he refused to accept the election results, claiming the vote tallies were fraudulent. In 2019, these claims were amplified by supporters online and off, spurring protests in Jakarta that left ten dead and hundreds injured. Prabowo has also faced allegations of human rights violations under the Suharto regime, including the kidnapping and torture of pro-democracy activists in 1998. He has denied these allegations. 

Indonesia has made impressive democratic gains since the fall of an authoritarian regime in 1998, enjoying significant political and media pluralism and undergoing multiple peaceful transfers of power. Significant challenges persist, including systemic corruption, discrimination and violence against minority groups, conflict in Papua, and the politicized use of defamation and blasphemy laws.

Indonesia’s elections are generally considered free and fair, with limited irregularities reported during the 2019 elections. Elections are administered by the General Election Committee (KPU) and the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), a separate body that oversees the conduct of elections and resolves electoral disputes between the KPU and candidates. Disputes that are filed with Bawaslu may then move to the constitutional court or other appropriate bodies for resolution.

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

• Influence operations: Recent elections in Indonesia have been marked by teams of “buzzers”—people and groups hired, including by state actors and political parties, to use networks of inauthentic accounts with large social media followings to spread narratives that favor a particular political campaign or issue, often incorporating false or misleading information. Previously, buzzers have also flooded the online space to mobilize support for and counter criticism of government policies, and to spread hate speech to exploit ethnic and religious tensions. The antigovernment hashtag #MahasiswaBergerak (“students on the move”) and progovernment hashtag #SayaBersamaJokowi (“I’m with Jokowi”) rose to prominence in April 2022 as students protested the potential postponement of the 2024 general elections; both hashtags may have been supported by automated accounts. Online information manipulation is expected to surge ahead of election day, which could increase political polarization, make it difficult for voters to access independent sources of information, and undermine public confidence in the electoral process.
• Content removal: In January 2023, electoral authorities, the Ministry of Communications and Information, and a police cyber team formed a social media taskforce to monitor and request the removal of content deemed false, inflammatory, or polarizing ahead of the election. Free-expression advocates have criticized the taskforce’s lack of multi-stakeholder inclusion and called for transparency into both the criteria and the process for content takedown orders. Indonesian authorities have previously restricted access to online content critical of the government, and experts worry that the taskforce could limit access to speech protected under international human rights standards.
• Website and social media blocks: Websites are frequently blocked for hosting what the government defines as “negative” content, a broad term used to describe material that is defamatory or that violates social or moral norms. Amid the violence that followed the 2019 elections, authorities also ordered service providers to block social media and communications platforms. Blocks on websites and social media platforms would limit people’s ability to report on conditions on the ground, share reliable news, and express their support for candidates during the pre- and post-election period.
• Harassment and intimidation: Journalists in Indonesia regularly face harassment and intimidation in retaliation for their online activity, particularly for their critical reporting on government figures or corruption allegations. In 2019, for example, an online journalist was doxed after publishing an article that included a quote from a leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) calling for people to vote against incumbent president Jokowi. Similarly heightened levels of online harassment of journalists and government critics in 2024 could drive many to self-censor to avoid such attacks, restricting people’s ability to freely express their views and make their voices heard online.

Indonesia has a score of 58 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a history of elections that have been considered free and fair by international monitors; problems with due process, equal treatment, and physical security; a wide range of restrictions on online political and social content; and a legal environment that harshly punishes people for online activity. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 58 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 47 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Indonesia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.