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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Indonesia

Partly Free
49
100
A Obstacles to Access 15 25
B Limits on Content 18 35
C Violations of User Rights 16 40
Last Year's Score & Status
47 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Indonesia_hero_map

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Indonesia improved during the coverage period, in part due to improved fixed-line internet speeds. However, online hate campaigns against Rohingya refugees circulated widely during the coverage period, and disinformation proliferated online ahead of the February 2024 general elections. Government critics, journalists, and internet users continued to face criminal prosecution, violent attacks, and harassment in retaliation for their online activities.

  • The government continued to restrict smartphone data packages in Bali during the Hindu festival of Nyepi, the “day of silence” (see A3).
  • Research released in October 2023 indicated that political and economic elites, including figures associated with major political parties and the military, continued to manipulate public opinion on social media using paid commentators, or “buzzers,” including ahead of the February 2024 general elections (see B5).
  • In January 2024, anonymous accounts spreading disinformation about Rohingya refugees doxed local staff from the UN Refugee Agency, after it spoke out extensively about a “coordinated online campaign” against Rohingya refugees (see B7 and C7).
  • In December 2023, the parliament passed amendments to the Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) Law that narrowed the law’s definition of defamation, require a stronger burden of proof, and lowered the maximum sentence for defamation from four to two years (see C2).
  • In September 2023, Lina Lutfiawati, a TikTok creator, was sentenced to two years in prison and fined 250 million rupiah ($16,000) under the ITE Law for posting “blasphemous” and “hateful” content. Lutfiawati had uploaded a video of herself eating pork after reciting an Islamic prayer (see C3).
  • In March 2024, three navy officers took journalist Sukandi Ali from his home, interrogated him for his reporting on the navy’s seizure of a barge, physically assaulted him, and only released Ali once he signed papers agreeing to cease practicing journalism and to never again pass through the Panimbang District of Indonesia (see C7).

header2 Political Overview

Indonesia has made impressive democratic gains since the fall of an authoritarian regime in 1998, establishing significant political and media pluralism and undergoing multiple peaceful transfers of power. However, major challenges persist, including systemic corruption, discrimination and violence against minority groups, conflict in Papua, and the politicized use of defamation and blasphemy laws.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 4.004 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 3 to 4 due to faster fixed-internet speeds.

Internet penetration in Indonesia has steadily increased, driven largely by rapid growth in the number of mobile subscriptions.1 There is a low number of fixed-line subscribers due to a lack of infrastructure, limiting coverage and keeping the price of monthly subscriptions high.

As of February 2024, Indonesia’s internet penetration rate was 66.5 percent of the total population, according to DataReportal.2

Disruptions to submarine telecommunications cables and other infrastructural problems are common, further complicating access to the internet.3 In January 2024, damage to PT Telkom Grup’s underwater optic cable from Timika to Merauke caused telephone and internet network disruptions that affected around 13,000 users in Merauke for nearly a month; the cable was restored in February 2024.4

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

Geographic disparities in internet access persist in Indonesia, with rural residents typically at a disadvantage. Connectivity remains highly concentrated in the western part of the archipelago, particularly on the more urbanized island of Java. According to the Communications Ministry, as of November 2023 at least 1,020 villages were not connected to the internet.1

Disparities in access also result from the high cost of internet subscription plans, particularly in eastern Indonesia.2 Affordable prepaid packages are not as widely available in underserved areas—such as Papua, Nusa Tenggara, and the Maluku Islands3—as they are in more populous areas like Java, where service providers face more competition. Telkomsel, a leading service provider, also imposes higher prices in some provinces in eastern Indonesia based on the claim that the operational costs there are higher.4 According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in 2023, a 5 gigabyte (GB) fixed-line broadband plan cost 4.86 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, and a 2 GB mobile broadband plan cost 0.24 percent of GNI per capita.5

In July 2022, Telkomsel began converting the vast majority of its third-generation (3G) networks to fourth-generation (4G) technology,6 completing the migration in May 2023.7 The process, which other telecom providers also undertook,8 presents a potential barrier to access for residents in villages without reliable 4G service and those who cannot afford new 4G-enabled devices.9 As of February 2022, Kominfo reported that 12,500 villages lacked 4G access.10

Government projects are underway to bridge the rural-urban digital divide. In 2021, Kominfo committed to allocating resources from the Universal Service Obligation Fund, which draws tax revenue from internet service providers (ISPs), to build internet infrastructure in rural and other underserved areas and subsidize internet access in eastern Indonesia.11 In June 2023, the government launched a new internet satellite, the Satellite Republic of Indonesia-1 (SATRIA-1), to help make internet more accessible in rural areas.12 Additionally, in May 2024, Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service, was launched in Indonesia and is expected to bring internet service to previously unconnected, remote areas.13

However, the government’s efforts to narrow geographic disparities in access have not always been successful.14 Funding and supply constraints have limited the development of base transceiver stations (BTS) that are necessary to support the Palapa Ring project, a three-part network of broadband backbone infrastructure extending thousands of kilometers across the country.15 As of December 2023, the government reported that 4,990 4G BTS had been built, with the remaining expected to be built in 2024.16

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 4.004 6.006

Authorities have restricted internet connectivity during religious events in order to “avoid and/or ward off hoaxes and negative content” online.1 In 2024, the government continued to restrict smartphone data packages in Bali during the Hindu festival of Nyepi, the “day of silence.”2 Fixed-line connections are not restricted. The government has suspended mobile connections during Nyepi since 2018.3

Previously, connectivity has been disrupted during protests and political events, and in Papua, in the context of security operations and other sensitive government activity in the region (see B8).4

In October 2023, the government requested that a BTS tower provider disconnect internet access to the Baduy community, an Indigenous group in Indonesia that rejects technology, after the community requested an internet blackout in their area, “to minimize the negative impact of smartphones on [their] people.”5

In October 2021, the Constitutional Court upheld the use of the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law to restrict connectivity, noting its procedural components.6 The ruling overturned a precedent set by the Jakarta State Administrative Court in June 2020, which held that the ITE Law should only be used to restrict online information or documents that are “unlawful,” not to terminate access in its entirety.7

Because most BTS sites in Indonesia are built by private providers, the distribution of sites largely reflects the market positions of the major players and their stakeholders. The leading mobile provider is Telkomsel, a subsidiary of Telkom Indonesia—a majority state-owned company that dominates the telecommunications sector and is heavily involved in infrastructure development. Internet infrastructure in the country is otherwise decentralized, with several connections to the global internet.8

The first internet exchange point (IXP), the Indonesia Internet Exchange, was created by the Association of Indonesian Internet Service Providers (APJII) to allow ISPs to interconnect domestically. An independent IXP, Open IXP, was launched in 2005.9

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

While opportunities for other entities to enter the market have grown in recent years, large telecommunications companies, some of which are state-owned, dominate the market.

The regulations governing entry are not excessively cumbersome, 1 though mergers can counteract the effects of competition from new providers.

The mobile market is approaching saturation, and three providers serve roughly 90 percent of subscribers.2 As reported in May 2022, market leader Telkomsel held 48 percent of the market, while Indosat Ooredoo, which merged with Hutchinson 3 Indonesia in January 2022, held 26.1 percent, and XL Axiata held 16 percent.3

Previously, the majority state-owned Telekom Indonesia held a 65 percent stake in Telekomsel, while Singtel, a Singaporean telecommunications conglomerate, held 35 percent. However, during the coverage period, Telekomsel merged with IndiHome—a service provider fully owned by Telekom Indonesia—effectively increasing Telkom Indonesia’s stake in Telkomsel from 65 percent to 69.9 percent.4

The fixed-line market remains at an early stage of development.5 The lack of existing infrastructure requires ISPs to invest heavily in development, so only major companies can compete in this sector. As a result, Telkom Indonesia has dominated fixed-line service.6

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

Experts have raised concerns about the independence of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo), in its capacity as a regulator, citing the ministry’s orders to censor content that is critical of the government (see B1, B2).

In November 2020, the government dissolved the Indonesian Telecommunication Regulatory Body (BRTI), which was responsible for ensuring fair competition, governing online platforms, resolving industry conflicts, and developing service-quality standards, and was seen as a more independent regulator. Its competencies were transferred to Kominfo.1

The Directorate General of Posts and Informatics Operations (PPI) and the Directorate General of Informatics Application (Aptika) oversee internet service regulation under Kominfo. The PPI is responsible for regulating posts, telecommunications, and broadcasting, and its mandate includes supervising private telecommunications providers, regulating the allocation of frequencies for telecommunications and data communications, and issuing ISP licenses.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 because the temporary blocking of several platforms under Ministerial Regulation No. 5 of 2020 was not repeated.

Websites are frequently blocked for hosting what the government defines as “negative” content, a broad term used to describe material deemed defamatory or violating social or moral norms.1 In 2023, Kominfo ordered the blocking of 791,540 web pages, including 1,098 pages that were identified as “negative” by government agencies, and a smaller number that were restricted for other reasons, including the spread of online fraud and radicalism.2

In July 2023, after Elon Musk renamed Twitter as “X,” users in the country were unable to access the new website domain due to allegations of the site containing negative content. The block was only lifted once Musk notified the Indonesian government that x.com was used by Twitter.3 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Indonesian government threatened to block X due to its new policy that allows pornographic content to be uploaded on the platform, but as of the time of writing, had yet to implement the block.4

During the coverage period, some websites were briefly blocked due to technical issues. For instance, in April 2024, bit.ly was inaccessible, and in September 2023, Google Drive was temporarily inaccessible—each for less than 24 hours.5

During the previous coverage period, in July and August 2022, Kominfo blocked access to some major sites, including those of Yahoo, the gaming service Steam, and the payment processor PayPal, for several days. They were unblocked after they complied with registration requirements under Ministerial Regulation No. 5 of 2020 (MR 5/2020) (see B3).6

In December 2023, Instagram briefly suspended the account of news media site Acehkini for not following its community guidelines. The outlet had recently been reporting on Rohingya refugees in Aceh and had received a flurry of comments reflecting anti-Rohingya sentiments. Within an hour, the account was reportedly returned online.7

Since June 2022, the website and YouTube channel of Khilafatul Muslimin, an Islamist group that advocated for a caliphate, has been blocked, for acting against national unity.8 Since May 2023, websites and blogs belonging to the Papuan Student Alliance (AMP), which had participated in protests marking the 60th anniversary of Indonesia’s annexation of the Papua region, have been blocked.9

In 2021, Kominfo blocked the platforms Snack Video, TikTok Cash, and VTube on the grounds that they engaged in financial and other services without licensing from the national financial services authority.10 Kominfo also blocked the LGBT+ dating apps Grindr and Blued in 2017 and 2018, respectively11, and the apps remained blocked through the coverage period.

Between 2016 and July 2020, Netflix was inaccessible to Telkom Indonesia and Telkomsel customers, despite there being no formal blocking notification from Kominfo.12 Kominfo removed blocking orders against Netflix in July 2020 after the platform agreed to fulfill content requirements and takedown requests.13

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The government routinely requires platforms and content hosts to remove allegedly negative content posted by users.

Ahead of the February 2024 general elections, the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) formed a social media monitoring task force, made up of Bawaslu personnel, the General Elections Commission (KPU), Kominfo, and the Indonesian National Police's cyber team,1 to monitor social media and order the takedown of “hoax” and polarizing content (see B2 and C5).2 In January 2024, Bawaslu announced that it would file takedown requests to social media companies to remove the accounts of any political buzzers from its platforms and file criminal charges against such individuals under the ITE law. (“Political buzzers” is a term used to describe social media users with large followings who are paid to boost a political candidate or attack their opponents, often using mis- or disinformation, or from fake accounts).3

In September 2023, TikTok signed a memorandum of agreement with Bawaslu agreeing to provide accurate election-related information and mitigate or remove online disinformation in the lead-up to voting.14 TikTok and Bawaslu collaborated to align the platform’s community guidelines with Bawaslu’s goals so that violating content could be “addressed promptly.”

In January and February 2024, ahead of the general elections, some X users reported receiving notifications from the platform alerting them that their posts had been deleted after Kominfo flagged them as in violation of Indonesian law, though the notifications did not detail which laws their posts had violated.4 Additionally, between July 2022 to June 2023, Facebook restricted access to 7,833 items in Indonesia, for reasons including containing misinformation, terrorism, and “antigovernment content such as divisive political speech.”5

Kominfo has demanded that some applications be removed entirely from app stores, or that certain pieces of content be blocked (see B1).6 Platforms that do not remove banned content risk being blocked entirely. For example, Kominfo blocked Tumblr from March to December 2018 until the platform complied with Indonesia’s antipornography laws.7 Previously, ByteDance—the China-based technology company that owns TikTok—censored Indonesian content on its news aggregator application, BaBe, that featured “negative” information about the Chinese government.8

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

Regulations that grant the government the ability to restrict online content are largely not grounded in democratic principles.

In December 2023, the government amended the ITE Law, which authorities had invoked to arrest journalists and human rights defenders. The amendments narrowed the definition of defamation, required a stronger burden of proof, and lowered the maximum sentence from four to two years.1 However, local and international civil society organizations said the amendments were inadequate, noting that the law retained problematic provisions on hate speech, defamation, and false news that could continue to be manipulated to censor speech and target journalists and activists (see C2).2

Under Article 40 of the ITE Law, Kominfo is authorized to directly restrict access to online content, or restrict ISPs to, and the regulation contains no mechanisms to appeal content-removal decisions. 3 Article 26 of the law establishes a “right to be forgotten” for Indonesian citizens, whereby electronic system providers, such as Google, are required to delete irrelevant information about an individual if they receive a court order from Kominfo. The law potentially hampers the public’s right to information, in light of issues surrounding Kominfo’s independence. 4

Since 2020, the government has discussed proposed revisions to the 2002 Broadcasting law. The most recent draft, which was finalized in October 2023, would restrict the broadcasting of a range of speech and content, including "exclusive investigative journalism,” reports on the LGBT+ community and “professions or figures with negative lifestyles.”5 Civil society and press freedom organizations have widely criticized the draft and its potential to further limit free expression in the country.6

In May 2021, the government amended the November 2020 MR 5/2020, which requires private-scope electronic system operators (PSEs)—defined as any foreign or domestic entity that operates electronic systems for Indonesian users—to ensure that their systems do not contain or facilitate any content that violates domestic law, creates community anxiety, or disturbs public order. After receiving a notice from Kominfo to remove prohibited content, PSEs have 24 hours to comply, and just four hours in “urgent” situations, or risk being fined or blocked. 7 The amendment added an obligation for PSEs to register with the government within six months of the launch of a designated online system.8

In June 2022, Kominfo announced at a press conference that PSEs would have to register under MR 5/2020 by July 2022, just one month later.9 After the deadline passed, major PSEs like Yahoo and PayPal were still unregistered and therefore briefly blocked.10 The restrictions were lifted after the companies came into compliance (see B1). In November 2022, the Legal Aid Institute Jakarta and Digital Freedom Advocacy sued Kominfo in the Jakarta State Administrative Court over enforcement of the law, claiming that it harmed users and relied on an “overly broad” legal interpretation.11

Kominfo shares the total number of blocked websites through official press briefings but does not provide further details on which sites are restricted and why.12

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Online discourse that is critical of the government is frequently labeled as hate speech by authorities.1 The government’s broad definition of negative content that can be blocked or removed encourages self-censorship among journalists and ordinary users alike.2

Many social media users have expressed their fear of the ITE Law, which, according to the International Commission of Jurists, has historically been used to “to wrongly criminalize and restrict free expression in online spaces” (see B3 and C2).3

Increased online harassment, prosecutions, and technical attacks against journalists, activists, and news outlets further deter free expression and information sharing (see C7 and C8). During the coverage period, anonymous political buzzers continued to attack the supporters of opposition candidates (see C5), which, experts have warned, may further incentivize self-censorship on political topics.4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Coordinated manipulation of online content by the government, its allies, and other political actors has distorted the information landscape. Manipulated content and disinformation spreads particularly during moments of political tension or emergencies.1

According to TikTok’s Covert Influence Operations reports for March and April 2024, the platform disrupted three networks of inauthentic accounts in Indonesia which “artificially amplif[ied] narratives in Indonesian language favorable to a specific presidential candidate, manipulating Indonesian elections discourse.”2

Research released in October 2023 indicated that political and economic elites, including figures associated with major political parties and the military, continued to manipulate public opinion on social media through paid commentators, or “buzzers.”3 Research released in November 2021 found that some buzzers were paid between 2 million and 7 million rupiah ($130 and $450) per campaign.4 Additionally, Indonesia Corruption Watch, a think tank, reported in 2020 that the government had budgeted 90 billion rupiah ($5.7 million) to hire buzzers to promote the government’s policies.5

Paid commentator networks have been found to manipulate trending topics and hashtags on X, often to suppress hashtags that appear organically.6 After the passage of the new criminal code in December 2022 (see C2), a pattern of progovernment posts proliferated under the hashtag #KUHPUntukKemajuanIndonesia, or “Criminal Code for Indonesian Progress.”7

A network of online news sites has also been utilized by political actors to spread propaganda. In January 2020, Reuters journalists discovered that the military was operating and funding a network of 10 news sites that published progovernment propaganda while criticizing dissidents and human rights advocates.8

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Users do not face significant economic and regulatory barriers to publishing content online. However, financial sustainability concerns and registration requirements, such as those under MR 5/2020, aimed at combating “prohibited online content,” have created constraints on publishing (see B3 and C6). The law requires all PSEs to register their systems with Kominfo and for PSEs based abroad to appoint a local liaison. It also allows the government to revoke companies’ registration and licenses if they do not provide electronic information, data, and system access to the authorities for monitoring and law enforcement purposes (see C6).

In February 2024, President Joko Widodo ratified the Presidential Decree on Publisher Rights, which requires digital platforms to promote and prioritize “quality journalism” and collaborate with news publishers. Under the new decree, tech platforms like Google and Meta must compensate Indonesian media for news content distributed on their platforms, with the goal of establishing a more sustainable and equitable online media industry.1 The decree was expected to take effect in August 2024, after the coverage period.

Journalists from the Papua Region often face economic constraints.2 In November 2022, the news site West Papua Media, which previously suspended its operations from 2018 to 2020 due to financial strain, shut down once again.3

To combat online misinformation, the Press Council, an independent body, oversees a verification process designed to help readers identify reliable media outlets.4 Some media groups have criticized the verification process as effectively an extralegal form of registration,5 warning that such registration requirements threaten the existence of smaller alternative media outlets.6

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

While Indonesia’s online information landscape remains diverse, concentrated ownership has limited the variety of content and viewpoints available in national and local media.

In 2023, approximately 48,000 media outlets operated online.1 The owners of some major media outlets are actively involved in politics, and the editorial stances of these outlets contribute to increasingly partisan online news. At the local level, many online outlets have become extensions of certain political parties.

Social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram are now key sources of news, significantly eroding the market position of mainstream media.2 Indonesia is also home to a thriving blogosphere. Members of the growing urban middle class are fervent users of social media and communication apps, and local blog- and website-hosting services are either free or inexpensive.

Ahead of and during the 2024 general election, false and misleading information about political candidates and parties circulated online,3 though reportedly less than ahead of previous elections.4

Tools to circumvent online censorship are largely accessible. In 2023, Indonesia had the third highest number of virtual private network (VPN) downloads in the world.5 However, research conducted in 2023 found that 22 websites providing anonymization and circumvention tools had been blocked (see B1).6 These resources continued to be blocked at the end of the coverage period.

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 4.004 6.006

Platforms and websites that facilitate social and political mobilization were largely available during the coverage period, and Indonesians regularly employ such tools to call on the government to change its policies and practices.

Social media users have amplified protesters’ messages online and signed online petitions,1 while others have crowdfunded to support demonstrations.2 Change.org is particularly popular in Indonesia.3

Although protesters have successfully used online mobilization tools, some face pushback including online threats and harassment (see C7). In November and December 2023, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) spoke out extensively about a “coordinated online campaign” against Rohingya refugees. The agency led an online campaign on X (formerly Twitter) targeted at Indonesia users to debunk disinformation and hate speech on the platform,4 published press statements,5 and organized online and offline with academia, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.6 In January 2024, anonymous accounts spreading disinformation about Rohingya refugees doxed local UNHCR staff. Staff subsequently experienced online harassment (see C7).7

Frequent restrictions on connectivity in Papua have hindered individuals’ ability to mobilize. For example, in May 2023, after the Papuan Student Alliance (AMP) protested to mark the 60th anniversary of Indonesia’s annexation of the Papua region, websites and blogs affiliated with the movement were blocked (see B1).8

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 2.002 6.006

Freedom of expression, including online, is nominally protected by the constitution and other laws, but the right is frequently curtailed in practice. The Law on Human Rights, which was adopted shortly after the country’s 1998 transition to democracy, guarantees freedom of expression and other fundamental rights; these protections were strengthened by the Second Amendment to the constitution passed in 2000 by adding special subchapters that regulate civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights. The Third Amendment guarantees freedom of opinion.1 The constitution also includes the rights to obtain information and communicate freely,2 and these are further protected by various laws and regulations.3 Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2005.4

However, the constitution features language allowing the state to limit rights based on “considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order.”5 This wording provides policymakers with ample room for interpretation.6 The authorities’ limited respect for the legal framework guaranteeing freedom of expression is illustrated by the frequency of prosecutions for legitimate online activity, as well as disruptions to internet connectivity and blocking of social media platforms.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Several laws impose criminal and civil liability for online activity. A December 2022 revision of the criminal code, known by the abbreviation RKUHP, and the ITE Law have criminalized a wide swath of expression-related actions, including those that should be protected under international human rights standards.

Provisions of the 2008 ITE Law have been used repeatedly to prosecute Indonesians for online expression. The law’s penalties for criminal defamation, hate speech, and inciting violence online are disproportionately harsh compared with those already established by the criminal code for similar offline offenses. In December 2023, the parliament passed amendments to the ITE Law that narrowed the law’s definition of defamation, require a stronger burden of proof, and lowered the maximum sentence for defamation from four to two years.1 The amended law maintains criminal penalties for slander of up to four years in prison and a fine of up to 750 million ($48,000) rupiah,2 and introduces new provisions criminalizing the intentional spreading of false statements that cause public unrest with sentences of up to six years in prison and fines up to 1 billion rupiah ($64,000). Experts have voiced concerns that the amended law retains articles that have been used to prosecute individuals for their online activities (see C3),3 and that the new provisions contain vague language that could be used to target individuals for their online activities (see C2).4

The parliament passed the RKUHP, a revision of the criminal code, in December 2022, imposing penalties for offenses including insulting public authorities and institutions; writing, promoting, or broadcasting information about contraceptives or abortion; spreading information about or associating with communism; distributing false or inaccurate information; and defamation.5 The law also expands the 1965 Blasphemy Law to include six broad provisions on religion-related speech, including the criminalization of attempts to persuade a person to be a nonbeliever in a religion.6 Critics including Indonesia’s Press Council have similarly argued that the code can be used to punish critical journalism.7

Individuals who insult the president and vice president face a maximum of five years in prison and fines of up to 200 million rupiah ($12,867) under the RKUHP. Those who insult public authorities and institutions face a maximum of three years in prison and fines of up to 200 million rupiah ($12,867). Individuals who write, promote, or broadcast information about contraceptives or abortion face up to six months in prison and a fine of 10 million rupiah ($643). Individuals can face up to four years in prison for spreading information about communism, and up to 10 years for “associating” with communism. Those found guilty of distributing false or inaccurate information face up to six years in prison and a maximum fine of 500 million rupiah ($32,168). Individuals found guilty of defamation face up to nine months in prison and a maximum fine of 10 million rupiah ($643), while those found guilty of libel face up to three years and a fine of 200 million rupiah ($12,867).8

In a March 2024 court ruling which Human Rights Watch (HRW) referred to as a “boon for free expression,” the Indonesian Constitutional Court annulled three clauses in the 1946 criminal code, Articles 14 and 15 and Article 310(1), which criminalize defamation and the spreading of false information that incites riot. However, similar provisions under the RKUHP remain in effect.9

Additionally, the 2011 State Intelligence Law prescribes penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and large fines for revealing or disseminating “state secrets.”10

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 6.006

Users frequently face civil and criminal penalties for legitimate online activities.1

In September 2023, Lina Lutfiawati, a TikTok creator, was sentenced to two years in prison and fined 250 million rupiah under the ITE Law for posting “blasphemous” and “hateful” content.2 Lutfiawati had uploaded a video of herself eating pork after reciting an Islamic prayer.

In February 2024, Dedy Chandra, a content creator on TikTok, was sentenced to two years in prison and fined 50 million rupiah under the ITE law for spreading defamatory and false content online. 3 Chandra had recently purchased an apartment and posted a series of reviews about the building, referring to it as a “Barbie house” that could easily collapse. The property developer later reported the videos after other buyers pulled out of their purchase agreements.

In March 2024, Boasa Simanjuntak was sentenced to 19 months in prison and fined 500 million rupiah ($32,000) under the ITE Law4 for spreading fake news and defamatory content against Lamsiang Sitompul, chairperson of the DPP Horas Bangso Batak (HBB), an organization which defends the rights of Batak descendants,5 on TikTok in November 2023.6

In April 2024, environmental activist Daniel Frits Maurits Tangkilisan was sentenced to seven months in prison and fined five million rupiah ($320) under the ITE Law for his posts on Facebook protesting pollution in Karimunjawa, which the court said had “created unrest” within the community.7

Political parties, organizations, and their supporters also use the ITE Law to deem online political criticisms as “hateful” and “defamatory,” effectively penalizing dissent. In December 2023, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) filed a complaint against a member of the Solo City People’s Representative, for allegedly defaming the PDIP in an Instagram video by claiming that some PDIP supporters supported different parties’ candidates in the general election.8

In April 2023, during the previous coverage period, the Solo City District Court in Central Java sentenced Sugi Nur Rahardja to six years in prison for disseminating hate speech and blasphemy. He was charged under the ITE Law and the criminal code over a podcast he posted on YouTube in which he claimed that Jokowi’s diploma was forged.9

There have been some positive developments in cases regarding online speech in recent years. In January 2024, activists Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti were acquitted of defamation charges brought against them in 2021.10 Azhar and Maulidiyanti filed for a judicial review of the 1946 criminal code, and in March 2024, after they were acquitted, the Constitutional Court revoked three provisions in the 1946 code related to defamation and false information (see C2). Azhar and Maulidiyanti had uploaded a podcast to YouTube in which they alleged that the military had conducted illegal operations in Central Papua to “protect mining interests” linked to Luhut Pandjaitan, the coordinating minister for maritime and investment affairs.11

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

Anonymous communication is somewhat restricted but not formally prohibited by law. Users have access to encrypted services, though some Kominfo policies and other regulations have indicated the government’s interest in gaining backdoor access to encrypted communication and personal data.

In 2017, Kominfo introduced a new regulation requiring SIM card users to register by submitting their national identity numbers and their family registration numbers, thereby limiting anonymity, or risk their access to data services being temporarily blocked.1 Users who failed to register within 15 days of the block’s initiation could have their SIM cards be permanently blocked from any telecommunications services.

In September 2023, the government announced that it was planning to implement biometric registration for SIM cards, including facial recognition, fingerprint, and iris technology.2

The government mandates International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) registration for devices purchased outside of the country. Since April 2020, unregistered devices have been prevented from connecting to networks.3

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Government surveillance of online activities limits the right to privacy. Although this right is constitutionally guaranteed, no specific law stipulates its protection.

Article 40 of Law No. 46 of 1999 on Post and Telecommunication prohibits the interception of information transmitted through any form of telecommunications.1 However, the legal framework fails to provide for judicial or parliamentary oversight of surveillance activity and remedies for those who allege abuse. At least 10 laws, including the ITE Law and 7 executive regulations, allow certain government or law enforcement agencies, like the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), to conduct surveillance.2 The laws do not clearly define the scope of interception, despite a 2010 Constitutional Court decision that requires government agencies to have detailed and regulated interception procedures.3

Authorities monitor social media platforms. Ahead of the 2024 elections, Bawaslu formed a social media task force to monitor content and false information, which could raise surveillance concerns (see B2 and B4).4 Previously, ahead of the 2019 elections, Kominfo created a “war room” that employed 70 engineers tasked with monitoring social media platforms in real time.5

In May 2018, the parliament adopted amendments to the 2003 Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Law (CT Law) that gave authorities sweeping surveillance powers to fight terrorism, which is broadly defined.6

Reports have linked authorities to the purchase and use of spyware and other sophisticated surveillance tools. Government officials and agencies have also been targeted with these tools.

A March 2023 report by Citizen Lab, a research center at the University of Toronto, found that QuaDream, an Israeli spyware company, had attempted to sell its products to the Indonesian government.7 The investigation, undertaken by rights watchdog Amnesty International’s Security Lab and news outlets, says the spyware was bought between 2017 and 2023 and used by state agencies such as the national police and Indonesia’s primary intelligence agency.8

In September 2022, Reuters reported that several high-ranking government and military officials in Indonesia were allegedly targeted in 2021 with ForcedEntry, a tool developed by the Israeli surveillance firm NSO Group to attack targets with its Pegasus spyware. Apple notified the officials in November 2021 that they had been targeted by this mechanism, which enables attackers to gain full access to iPhones.9 In June 2023, reports emerged that government agencies, including the BIN, had used Pegasus spyware to surveil opposition politicians and activists.10

In December 2021, Citizen Lab identified the Indonesian government as a likely customer of Cytrox, which sells the Predator spyware tool.11 A May 2024 Amnesty International report found that Predator had been deployed in December 2021 and said it believed the same customer of the technology “continued to be active in Indonesia as of December 2023.”12

Citizen Lab reported in December 2020 that Indonesian authorities had likely purchased Circles spyware technology.13 The same May 2024 Amnesty International report found that Circles’ surveillance systems were deployed in Indonesia, potentially by a company with a history of “procuring surveillance systems on behalf of Indonesian authorities.” The report additionally found, with “high confidence,” that Indonesian authorities was in possession of the Candiru spyware system.14

The Indonesian government has reportedly used FinFisher spyware, which collects data such as Skype audio, key logs, and screenshots;15 IMSI catchers purchased from Swiss and British companies;16 and surveillance products from the US–Israeli company Verint to track LGBT+ rights activists and members of religious minorities.17

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Several laws support the government’s ability to access personal data held by private companies. Some companies have complied with law enforcement agencies’ requests for data. Additionally, some international companies store user data domestically.1

Governmental Regulation No. 71 of 2019 (PP 71/2019) states that only data related to government administration, defense, and security are subject to data localization requirements;2 it replaced a previous regulation that required electronic system providers that offer “public services” to build local data centers.3

MR 5/2020, which the government began enforcing through registration deadlines and temporary blocking in June 2022,4 mandates that private-scope electronic system operators (PSEs) provide authorities with “direct access” to their systems and users’ personal data when requested, for monitoring and law enforcement purposes. Any electronic system operators whose digital content is used or accessed within Indonesia must also appoint an in-country representative to respond to content removal and personal data access orders (see B1, B3, and B6).5

In October 2022, the president signed the Personal Data Protection (PDP) Law.6 The measure outlines protections for users’ personal data, including the right to consent, and establishes a data protection authority (DPA) to enforce the law. The PDP Law sets criminal penalties of up to six years in prison for illegal data collection and illegal creation of false data.7

As of the end of the coverage period, the DPA has yet to be formally created. Critics have raised concerns that the DPA will not be sufficiently independent, since it falls under the authority of the president. They have also warned that the relatively weak sanctions for public-sector misuse of data will not prevent government agencies from engaging in such behavior.8

A 2016 Kominfo regulation stated that personal data must be encrypted if they are stored in an electronic system,9 though a separate ministry directive stated that over-the-top (OTT) service providers must allow legal data interception for law enforcement purposes, raising concerns about the security of encryption.10 Moreover, a government regulation issued in 2000 requires telecommunications providers to retain records of customer usage for at least three months.11

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Violence against journalists is a significant problem in Indonesia,1 and both journalists and internet users regularly face harassment and intimidation in retaliation for their online activities.2

In March 2024, three navy officers took journalist Sukandi Ali from his home, interrogated him for his reporting, and then physically assaulted him. Ali had recently published an article about the Navy’s seizure of a barge that was carrying fuel and kerosene. The officers released Ali once he signed papers agreeing to cease practicing journalism and to never again pass through the Panimbang District of Indonesia.3

In March 2023, Ari, an online journalist, was stabbed; he reported that the incident was related to his critical reporting on prominent businessmen in Kuala Tungkal.

Activists and journalists who report on and discuss the Papua Region can face intimidation. Previously, in January 2023, Victor Mambor, a senior Papuan journalist and founder of the independent news site Jubi was threatened by a bomb explosion three meters from his home.4 Mambor said the attack was likely connected to his reporting.5 Protesters and internet users in academic communities have also been targeted for their online activity.6

Indonesian internet users report experiencing online harassment, including nonconsensual distribution of intimate images and doxing.7 Additionally, victims of sexual violence who speak online about their experiences are often targeted by online harassment and retaliatory police reports.8

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Civil servants, journalists, activists, civil society groups, and news outlets have experienced technical attacks in recent years. SAFEnet, a network of digital rights defenders in Southeast Asia, found that at least 323 digital attacks were carried out in 2023, many of which targeted public institutions, academics, and journalists.1 The websites of government entities and private companies regularly face hacks and data breaches.

In November 2023, an anonymous hacker claimed that they were in possession of and willing to sell the data of 204.8 million Indonesians, allegedly from the General Election Commission’s (KPU’s) voter list. As proof, the hacker posted the personal data of 500,000 voters, including details like their full name, sex, date of birth, and place of residence.2 During the previous coverage period, in September 2022, a different hacker on the same forum leaked the personal data of 105 million Indonesian citizens, allegedly also from the KPU’s database.3

During the previous coverage period, various media outlets, including Nasari and news website Konde, were targeted by cyberattacks.4

On Indonesia

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Country Facts

  • Population

    275,500,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    56 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    48 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    Yes

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes