The Islamic Republic of Iran holds regular elections, but they fall short of democratic standards. Political power ultimately lies in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the undemocratic institutions under his control. In March, Iranians will vote to select the 290 members of the country’s parliament. A record number of people have registered to appear on the official ballot. However, the unelected Guardian Council vets all candidates and has the authority to disqualify those deemed insufficiently loyal to the clerical establishment. As of early January, the Council had disqualified around 30 percent of all candidates, including more than 20 incumbent lawmakers.

Voters will also select representatives for the Assembly of Experts, the 88-member body that chooses the Supreme Leader. Former president Hassan Rouhani as well as his more conservative successor President Ebrahim Raisi have both signaled intentions to run for the Assembly of Experts. While the Assembly of Experts typically wields little political influence, the body elected in 2024 – who would serve for the next eight years – could have the consequential responsibility of choosing Khamenei’s replacement given his advanced age. One of the top choices for the job is Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who would likely follow in the footsteps of his hardline father. To accede to Supreme Leader, he would need support from two thirds of the Assembly of Experts, and currently only half the seats are controlled by hardliners. 

Voter turnout is expected to be low in 2024, although growing dissatisfaction with the regime could inspire more voters to turn out on election day. However, a change from the political status quo remains unlikely given Iran’s highly manufactured electoral processes, such as the Guardian Council’s practice of disqualifying many moderate or reformist candidates, benefit those aligned with the conservative establishment. In past elections, reformist candidates and parties have often boycotted the vote in protest of Iran’s fundamentally unfair election process. During this election, the political establishment is counting on low turnout and the marginalization of reformist candidates to further cement their control of the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. A reformist boycott could pave the way to an easy win for Khamenei’s hardline allies, but it would also further damage the regime’s claims of holding legitimate elections. 

The election will take place amid ongoing economic challenges and social unrest, and will be the first vote since massive antigovernment protests broke out in September 2022 following the death in custody of Mahsa Amini.  The regime responded with disproportionate violence, internet shutdowns, and increased repression of women and Iran’s Kurdish population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests. Hundreds of demonstrators have been killed since September 2022, and the regime continues to carry out protest-related death sentences. 

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:  

• Information manipulation: The online media environment is tightly controlled by Iranian authorities. The national broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), serves as a vehicle for state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, which may impact the reliability of election-related information. The regime relies on its extensive cyber army to amplify progovernment disinformation, counter criticism, and smear political opponents, including during election periods. State-affiliated online outlets have already accused the opposition of participating in pre-election fraud and manipulation. Iranian authorities also issue guidelines and pressure the media to avoid “government red lines” when covering sensitive topics. Ahead of the June 2021 presidential election, several journalists received judicial warnings about election coverage, with some reporting harassment from security forces and the IRGC’s cyberunit.
• Website blocking: Authorities operate a highly sophisticated online censorship system that restricts access to thousands of websites, particularly those of international news and information services, the political opposition, ethnic and religious minority groups in Iran, and human rights organizations. Websites promoting reformist candidates were blocked and filtered during the 2016 elections; the parliamentary monitoring platform Majlis Monitor was filtered shortly before the election. Iran’s history of extensive blocking, including around elections, suggests that more sites conducting fact-checking and independent election monitoring could be blocked ahead of the vote.
• Arrests and prosecution for online activity: The Iranian regime routinely arrests journalists and social media users for their online activities, which will likely encourage self-censorship ahead of the vote. In September 2023, Majid Tavakoli, a prominent intellectual and staunch opponent of the regime, was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a subsequent 2-year social media ban on charges of spreading propaganda after his commentary supporting the political opposition was circulated on social media. Throughout 2023, multiple online journalists have been arrested, detained, or sentenced to prison for their critical reporting. Even journalists working with state-affiliated online news outlets have been summoned for investigation or arrested in recent months, signaling a growing crackdown on online journalism ahead of the elections.
• Internet shutdowns: The state maintains legal and technical control over Iran’s internet backbone, facilitating restrictions on connectivity. Localized internet shutdowns are often used to immobilize protests and have been repeatedly used to hinder demonstrations in Iran’s predominantly Kurdish provinces since September 2022. While no internet shutdowns were reported during the June 2021 presidential election, any sign of public unrest around the March election could trigger restrictions by the regime.

Iran has a score of 10 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a significantly authoritarian environment where basic political rights are restricted and an online space rife with censorship and disinformation. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 14 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 16 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Iran country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.