Iran
| A Obstacles to Access | 5 25 |
| B Limits on Content | 3 35 |
| C Violations of User Rights | 1 40 |
The Iranian regime is one of the world’s worst abusers of online rights, and internet freedom deteriorated substantially during the coverage period. As a result of the country’s tiered internet scheme, accessing the global internet is cumbersome and expensive, and a majority of Iranians are confined to a domestic version of the internet where authorities can more effectively control content and monitor online activity.1 The government deliberately shut down the internet during times of conflict and protest, including in June 2025 during a 12-day military conflict between Iran and Israel.2 Beginning in late February 2026, the regime implemented the country’s longest-ever internet shutdown, which lasted 88 days, amid the war with Israel and the United States.3 When nationwide antigovernment demonstrations broke out in January, the regime took similar steps to quell online protest mobilization and silence social media activism. Alongside a nationwide communications shutdown,4 authorities arrested over 50,000 demonstrators and security forces used excessive violence to quash the protests, killing at least 4,200 people.5
This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2026. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource. For additional information, see the 2024 full report and 2025 abridged report.
- 1Narges Keshavarznia, “Tiered Internet: A Case Study in Selective Access and Digital Inequality,” FilterWatch, August 1, 2025, https://filter.watch/english/2025/08/01/investigative-report-july-2025-….
- 2David Belson, “Shutdown season: the Q2 2025 Internet disruption summary,” Cloudflare Blog, July 22, 2025, https://blog.cloudflare.com/q2-2025-internet-disruption-summary/.
- 3Lai Yi Ohlsen, “Natural disasters and government interference: examining Q2 2026’s major Internet disruption events,” Cloudflare Blog, July 28, 2026, https://blog.cloudflare.com/q2-2026-internet-disruption-summary/.
- 4David Belson, “What we know about Iran’s Internet shutdown,” Cloudflare Blog, January 13, 2026, https://blog.cloudflare.com/iran-protests-internet-shutdown/.
- 5Durrie Bouscaren, “50,000 protestors were arrested in Iran. Some are facing the death penalty,” NPR, April 29, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/04/29/nx-s1-5771512/50-000-protestors-were-arr…; “Iran: UN experts demand transparency and accountability following nationwide protests,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, February 20, 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/iran-un-experts-demand-…; “The January 2026 Protest Killings in Iran,” Iran Human Rights, September 2026, https://iranhr.net/media/files/EN-The_January_2026_Protest_Killings_in_….
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 0.000 3.003 |
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because service providers required Iranians to purchase “Internet Pro” packages in order to access less-restrictive online content,1 which were prohibitively expensive for a majority of Iranians amid historic inflation; access to virtual private networks (VPNs) and satellite internet hubs, which enabled some to circumvent government censorship, was also prohibitively expensive.2
- 1Tim Lister and Aida Karimi, “Iran’s two-tier internet access fuels anger and exposes cracks in the regime,” CNN, May 10, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/10/middleeast/iran-internet-pro-blackout-ac…; “The Digital Frontline: Tiered Internet, Infrastructure Control, and Information Warfare in Iran,” FilterWatch, March 6, 2026, https://filter.watch/english/2026/03/06/network-monitoring-february-202….
- 2Tim Lister and Aida Karimi, “Iran’s two-tier internet access fuels anger and exposes cracks in the regime,” CNN, May 10, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/10/middleeast/iran-internet-pro-blackout-ac…; Imad Payande, “The price of access: How war restructured Iran’s internet into a tiered and monetised system,” Internet Policy Review, May 13, 2026, https://policyreview.info/articles/news/how-war-restructured-irans-inte….
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 0.000 6.006 |
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because authorities implemented an 88-day internet shutdown that began in late February 2026, the longest internet shutdown in Iran’s history,1 amid the country’s military conflict with Israel and the United States.
- 1
Daniel Ameri, “Iran: Internet blackout highlights real toll of censorship,” DW, April 17, 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/iran-internet-blackout-highlights-real-toll-of-ce…; Patrick Wintour, “Iran’s access to global internet starts to resume after 88-day blackout,” The Guardian, May 26, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/26/iran-internet-blackout; Elwely Elwelly, Emily Giles, et al, “Greetings after 88 days: Iranians reconnect after long internet shutdown,” Reuters, May 27, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/greetings-after-88-days-irani….
| Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers, digital platforms, and the internet more broadly fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, digital platforms, content hosts, or other intermediaries to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Do journalists, commentators, and ordinary people practice self-censorship online? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a favored interest? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Are there economic, regulatory, or other constraints that negatively affect individuals’ ability to publish content online? | 0.000 3.003 |
| Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Do conditions impede individuals’ ability to form communities, mobilize, and campaign online, particularly on political and social issues? | 1.001 6.006 |
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the regime cracked down on antigovernment protests in January 2026 including by implementing a nationwide internet shutdown1 and killing thousands of demonstrators.2
- 1David Belson, “What we know about Iran’s Internet shutdown,” Cloudflare Blog, January 13, 2026, https://blog.cloudflare.com/iran-protests-internet-shutdown/.
- 2“What happened at the protests in Iran?,” Amnesty International, January 26, 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/01/what-happened-at-th…; “The January 2026 Protest Killings in Iran,” Iran Human Rights, September 2026, https://iranhr.net/media/files/EN-The_January_2026_Protest_Killings_in_….
| Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Does the government place restrictions on anonymous online communication or encryption? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on individuals’ right to privacy? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on individuals’ right to privacy? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? | 0.000 5.005 |
| Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individuals subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 0.000 3.003 |
Country Facts
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Population
88,550,000 -
Global Freedom Score
10 100 not free -
Internet Freedom Score
9 100 not free -
Freedom in the World Status
Not Free