After more than a year of political deadlock, Lebanon’s next parliamentary election is due in March 2022. This election, which will determine who holds the National Assembly’s 128 seats, comes amid an economic crisis and ongoing political and sectarian unrest. Major establishment parties—which are formed along sectarian lines—have together held over 90 seats since the 2018 poll. Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced a new cabinet in September 2021, which observers considered too weak to address the country’s crises. Instead, the announcement was perceived as an attempt to provide a preelectoral boost for incumbent parties. The establishment will face an opposition bloc emboldened by public mistrust in the government, anger over economic woes, and mounting calls for reform.

Voters contend with a political system that ensures representation for officially recognized religious communities but limits competition and impedes the rise of cross-communal or civic parties. Individuals enjoy some civil liberties but also face pervasive corruption and major weaknesses in the rule of law, which could influence their ability to choose next March. This will be the first election since months long mass protests, prompted by economic stagnation, corruption, and sectarianism, began in October 2019. The subsequent political crisis was made worse by new corruption and mismanagement revelations that followed the August 2020 Beirut port explosion. Supporters of Hezbollah and Amal, the country’s two main Shiite parties, called for the dismissal of the judge investigating the explosion in an October 2021 demonstration, which turned violent when they were fired upon. Furthermore, the economic crisis has led to food and fuel shortages as well as rolling blackouts that could cause internet outages, potentially impeding voters’ ability to access accurate information. 

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of the election:

• Information manipulation: Lebanese media outlets are highly partisan and are controlled by politico-sectarian actors who seek to advance a particular political or religious message. Elite, politically active families own several prominent outlets, while Hezbollah also maintains significant media holdings. Politicians have been known to offer bribes to the country’s few independent outlets and journalists, particularly during electoral periods. Accessing reliable information is also made more difficult by the rise of online disinformation. For example, the armed wing of Hezbollah has orchestrated defamation campaigns against its opponents and has sought to disseminate and promote sectarian and partisan content online. Though bots have not been extensively documented in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia–based bots may have amplified the “Hassan Diab Is a Thief” hashtag popular in early 2020, when then prime minister Diab formed his cabinet. As the electoral campaign progresses, elites and political parties may disseminate more disinformation meant to influence voter perception.
• Harassment and violence: Political parties and armed groups have been known to target critics through online harassment and intimidation campaigns, sometimes leading to offline attacks. A number of online users have received threats from Hezbollah supporters via the social media application Clubhouse or have been targeted directly for criticizing the militia. In March 2021, journalist Mariam Seifeddine was violently assaulted and her family received death threats; Seifeddine attributed the incident to her widely published criticism of Hezbollah. A month before, political activist and prominent Hezbollah critic Loqman Slim was assassinated, allegedly for criticizing political parties and militias including Hezbollah. Slim was active on social media and was frequently quoted by news outlets. This pattern of harassment, intimidation, and physical attack has led to increased self-censorship, a trend that may persist as the election approaches. 
• Forced removal of online content: Security officials frequently pressure individuals and internet service providers to remove online comments, mainly those criticizing government officials or the army. In March 2021, the Cybercrimes Bureau summoned Ragheb al-Shoufi for Facebook posts that were deemed insulting by a former interior minister. He was released after being asked to delete the posts and sign a pledge promising to refrain from similar activity in the future. In October 2020, Saeed Abdullah was arrested and detained for 47 days for Facebook posts criticizing the government. He was charged with insulting the president and insulting religion and was forced to delete content. Government officials may seek to remove more online content ahead of the polls.

Lebanon has a score of 51 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a fractured media environment, high levels of self-censorship, and the use of legal and extralegal measures to silence online users. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 43 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 51 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Lebanon country report in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.