STAY UP TO DATE: The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House
Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Lebanon

Partly Free
50
100
A Obstacles to Access 9 25
B Limits on Content 22 35
C Violations of User Rights 19 40
Last Year's Score & Status
50 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Lebanon_hero_map

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Lebanon remains tenuous, with an ongoing crackdown on online criticism resulting in frequent summons, arrests, and defamation campaigns against internet users. The economic crisis and the Israel-Hamas war have created obstacles to accessing the internet, worsening an already-poor environment.

  • Bombing in southern Lebanon, due to the Israel-Hamas war, has damaged communications infrastructure. In May 2024, a telecommunications worker was killed in an Israeli airstrike while trying to repair equipment (see A1).
  • Several mobile service and internet providers’ staff went on strike to protest low wages, which have been heavily impacted following the 2019 economic crisis (see A2 and A3).
  • Journalists and comedians were summoned to the Cybercrimes Bureau in retaliation for their online content (see B2).
  • In July 2023, Dima Sadek, a television presenter, was charged with slander, defamation, and inciting sectarian tensions, and was sentenced to one year in prison due to a social media post (see C3).
  • Online disinformation and hate speech escalated during the coverage period, particularly affecting the LGBT+ community and Syrian refugees, resulting in offline harm (see C7).

header2 Political Overview

Lebanon’s political system ensures representation for its officially recognized religious communities, but limits competition and impedes the rise of cross-communal or civic parties. While residents enjoy some civil liberties and media pluralism, they also suffer from pervasive corruption and major weaknesses in the rule of law. Hezbollah, a Shiite political and militant group, maintains significant influence in the country. The country’s large population of noncitizens, including refugees and migrant workers, remain subject to legal constraints and societal attitudes that severely restrict their access to employment, freedom of movement, and other fundamental rights.

Note: This report’s coverage period is from June 2023 to May 2024, and concluded before the Israeli military’s retaliatory attacks against Hezbollah that killed hundreds of Lebanese civilians and displaced millions. The impact of these events on internet freedom in Lebanon will be covered in the next Freedom on the Net report.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 3.003 6.006

Lebanon’s telecommunications infrastructure is weak and constrains internet access. The ongoing economic crisis has impacted telecommunications services, and users experienced service disruptions and decreased internet speeds.1 In March 2024, the median fixed-line broadband and mobile download speeds were 12.49 megabits per second (Mbps) and 35.58 Mbps, and upload speeds were 8.80 Mbps and 9.80 Mbps, respectively.2 In early 2024, internet penetration in Lebanon stood at 90.1 percent. According to an analysis by Kepios, the number of internet users fell by 2.6 percent between January 2023 and January 2024.3

Israeli strikes on the south of Lebanon have been ongoing during the Israel-Hamas war. The strikes have damaged multiple phone towers, heavily impacting service in the south. A worker trying to repair equipment was killed by an Israeli airstrike in May 2024.4 Students in the affected areas have largely turned to digital learning, and have had difficulty maintaining their education due to poor internet coverage.5

Lebanon’s economic crisis, exacerbated by the collapse of its currency, threatens the viability of the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. Furthermore, rolling electrical blackouts have also curtailed internet access.6 Telecommunications companies struggled to cover the cost of the fuel needed to run and maintain their services,7 which led to increased prices for consumers in May 2022 (see A2).8 Fuel shortages caused several localized service disruptions during the coverage period.9

Employees of OGERO, the country’s official telecommunications distributor, went on strike in March 2023 to protest their low salaries,10 disrupting mobile and fixed-line service in various regions.11 In response, the government threatened to deploy the army to OGERO control centers, though it did not do so.12 OGERO workers held strikes in March and April 2024 over pay concerns, though the telecommunications minister said the government lacked the funds to meet those demands.13

Rural areas are often more affected by electricity blackouts than urban areas. For example, mobile networks are frequently disrupted by power outages in the Bekaa Valley and the north. In these regions, residents have often opted to connect to Syrian mobile networks, due to the lack of Lebanese network coverage.14 The safety of Syrian networks is questionable, and it is impossible to determine whether those who control Syrian mobile networks are collecting user metadata.

In May 2022, the Lebanese government approved two decisions concerning the ICT sector. The first was to raise the price of services (see A2). The second was to shut down the 2G network and parts of the 3G network.15 Shutting down these networks could leave more than 230,000 subscribers without access to mobile services until they upgrade their devices and will primarily impact rural users. It will also put a strain on the 4G network, which could decrease the quality of mobile connectivity.16 The government has stated that 2G services will be gradually phased out until 2025.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 0.000 3.003

Lebanon has expensive communications services, and costs have been exacerbated by the ongoing economic crisis. A significant divide in access exists between rural and urban areas.1 Disruptions are more frequent in rural areas like the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon, and rural dwellers often only have access to 2G or 3G networks.2

Many telecommunications stations were forced to shut down or were unable to be maintained due to the devaluation of the Lebanese pound and the subsequent fuel crisis. Due to this crisis, mobile and fixed-line coverage and quality have been jeopardized as the telecommunications sector had to rely on backup generators, which required fuel.3 The ongoing economic crisis has impacted people’s ability to afford telecommunications services, which have become prohibitively expensive for the nearly 75 percent of people living on less than $14 a day as of the end of 2022.4 In August 2023, OGERO announced significant price increases for data packages, with some prices increasing by 600 percent.5

According to the UK-based Cable, Lebanon ranked 157th out of 237 countries and territories for mobile data pricing in 2023.6 A gigabyte (GB) of mobile data cost $21.91, while the average monthly fixed-line broadband package cost $18.53 in 2023.7 To alleviate costs for students amid the Israel-Hamas war and the ongoing bombing in Lebanon, the telecommunications minister announced in May 2024 that students continuing their education would receive free internet services to facilitate digital learning.8

Internet subscription prices are set by the government, and internet service providers (ISPs) cannot lower prices unless a decree is issued by the Ministry of Telecommunications.9 In May 2022, the government raised telecommunications prices;10 SMEX noted that the government imposed a fivefold price increase for mobile services, while land-based-service prices increased by two-and-a-half-times,11 making service inaccessible to many users.12 In January 2023, after the Sayrafa exchange rate was set, the price of a basic 1.5 GB mobile phone plan nearly tripled, and by that March it cost users 530,000 Lebanese pounds ($35.33).13 Also that March, the Ministry of Telecommunications and Prime Minister Najib Mikati pushed for an even larger price increase.14 With no clear plan to restructure the sector or tackle corruption, the financial burden is left on the user.15 The Sayrafa platform was decommissioned in July 2023, after significant criticism over its lack of effectiveness.16 Following this, mobile-line recharge prices were set in US dollars on Alfa’s and Touch’s websites.17

The economic crisis has also affected residents’ ability to access electricity, and frequent power cuts leave people in some areas with only three or four hours of electricity per day (see A1).18 The crisis has particularly impacted at-risk communities such as people living under the poverty line, LGBT+ individuals, and migrants.19 For example, access to the internet was jeopardized for hundreds of thousands of people after the 2G network and parts of the 3G network were phased out to lower telecommunication costs, leaving it accessible only for those who could afford more recent phone models.20

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 4.004 6.006

While the government has periodically restricted mobile and internet connectivity in past years, and the Telecommunications Law provides the government with the authority to order internet shutdowns, no restrictions were reported during the coverage period.

The government maintains a monopoly over the internet backbone and over fixed-line and mobile telephone service, and exercises tight control over ISPs. Lebanon has three international border gateways—in Tripoli, Jdeideh, and Beirut—where underwater fiber-optic cables connect the country via the India–Middle East–Western Europe (I-ME-WE), Cadmos, and Berytar cables, respectively.1 The gateways are all operated by OGERO and all ISPs purchase services through OGERO.

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services are technically restricted under the 2002 Telecommunications Law,2 but this ban has only been sporadically enforced.3 OGERO installed equipment to block VoIP services in 2010 and used it on a handful of occasions to block the Vonage VoIP service, though not Skype or WhatsApp. However, OGERO stopped blocking Vonage after pressure from businesses, civil society, and politicians.4

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 1.001 6.006

The telecommunications industry is government-owned and tightly regulated.1

The fixed-line telephone and internet network is owned and operated by OGERO, from which all companies must purchase services. In addition to running the internet backbone, OGERO sets internet prices and collectively manages online subscriptions of private ISPs, including Cyberia, Terranet, Sodetel, and IDM.2

As of early 2024, there were 188 privately owned ISPs.3 ISPs currently obtain a permit by decree from the Ministry of Telecommunications,4 and political influence can affect the allocation of contracts to private ISPs and mobile service providers.5 The currency collapse has exacerbated financial issues within the ICT sector.

The government has functionally controlled the mobile telecommunications sector since October 2020. Previously, the country’s two government-owned mobile service providers, Alfa and Touch, were provisionally managed by private companies Orascom Telecom Lebanon and Zain, respectively.6 In early September 2020, the management contracts for the two companies were not renewed by the government. Later that month, Orascom announced that it had transferred management of Alfa to the Ministry of Telecommunications. In October 2020, Zain followed suit. Alfa and Touch have not financially recovered since 2022, and employees have threatened to strike due to low salaries.7 In February 2024, Alfa and Touch operators did so, affecting the operation of mobile networks and access to top-up cards.8

In March 2022, Alfa and Touch converted their subscribers’ balances from US dollars to Lebanese pounds.9 This was part of a larger strategy to eventually increase prices (see A2). While customers were alerted of this change, the conversion led subscribers to lose most of their balance’s value due to the difference between the official exchange rate and the rate set via Sayrafa.10 After Sayrafa was decommissioned in July 2023, however, some services were repriced in US dollars.

In January 2023, Nabil Bukhalid, the founder and manager of the .lb domain and an employee of the American University of Beirut (AUB), died, leading the Internet Society’s Lebanon chapter to reassure users that the system governing the .lb domain would remain functional. Since 2020, Bukhalid had managed the .lb domain at his own expense.11 The initial plan was to transfer the administration of the .gov.lb domain to the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform.12 In July 2023, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) noted and recognized that Bukhalid’s colleagues had continued to manage the .lb domain, removing AUB as a domain manager and making itself a caretaker interim manager.13 In a January 2024 decision, ICANN’s board made the Internet Society in Lebanon the domain’s manager.14

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 1.001 4.004

Lebanese media and telecommunications laws are regulated by three semi-independent advisory bodies that report to the Council of Ministers. The National Council for Audiovisual Media and the Committee for Establishing Model Bylaws and Practices deal mainly with audiovisual media (television, radio, and satellite), while the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) is responsible for liberalizing, regulating, and developing the ICT sector.1 Overall, the three bodies have limited power and are not considered particularly robust or independent regulators, making the Ministry of Telecommunications the de facto regulator.

The TRA is nominally independent, but in practice, influential political groups hold sway over the institution, often rendering it ineffective.2 Former telecommunications ministers have claimed that the TRA has no real authority, given that the law establishing its powers has not yet been implemented.3 Since its launch in 2007, many of the TRA’s objectives have not been met, including the analog-to-digital transition and the privatization of the ICT sector.

In 2022, the Court of Audit published a report documenting the misuse of money on the part of the Ministry of Telecommunications between 2010 and 2020. The audit showed that the ICT sector lost $6 billion of the $17 billion generated due to corruption. In May 2023, the court gave Telecommunications Minister Johnny Corm and five of his predecessors 60 days to mount a legal defense against corruption allegations.4

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 4.004 6.006

In recent years, the state has started to block more content, often related to gambling, pornography, and Israel, and has not been transparent about its decisions.

The popular LGBT+ dating platform Grindr, which was originally blocked on Alfa and Touch in 2019, remained inaccessible during the coverage period.1 Israel-based web-hosting platform Wix has been inaccessible on mobile networks and some ISPs since December 2018 based on a judicial order citing the Israel Boycott Law. Users were not given any advance notice of the blocking.2

In May 2023, the Union of Public Transport Drivers went on strike and demanded that unregistered rideshare applications, like Bolt, be banned.3 In response, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities addressed a letter to the Ministry of Telecommunications requesting that Bolt be blocked.4 However, the request was denied because it lacked a judicial order.

In May 2020, the prosecutor general ordered the Ministry of Telecommunications to block 28 applications, alleging that they were spreading misinformation about the unofficial exchange rate between the Lebanese pound and the US dollar. While the ministry was implementing the block, they also blocked Google’s Firebase service, which many developers and entrepreneurs rely on to build applications.5 In March 2021, OGERO was asked by the judiciary to block all online platforms offering unofficial currency exchanges. Several other ISPs followed suit, blocking applications and websites that did not reflect the government-approved exchange rate.6 It is unclear if these services remained blocked at the end of the coverage period.

YouTube, Facebook, X, and international blog-hosting services are freely available.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Government security officials pressure individuals to remove posts—mainly those criticizing government officials or the army—from social media pages, blogs, and websites. At times the government makes requests to social media platforms to remove content.

Individuals are frequently summoned to appear before the Cybercrimes Bureau and asked to sign a pledge and delete their social media posts. This practice increased in recent years, and several high-profile journalists and activists have been summoned by the Cybercrimes Bureau.

In September 2023, journalist Mariam Majdouline Lahham was summoned to appear in front of the Central Criminal Investigations Department (CCID) due to a social media post from July 2023 in which she criticized the president of the Sunni Higher Court of Beirut (see C3). 1 While Lahham was detained for 11 hours, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) searched her home and deleted the post from her social media account on her computer.2

In August 2023, after video from his show became popular online, comedian Nour Hajjar was summoned by the Military Police for his stand-up in which he discussed Lebanese soldiers’ low pay. He was briefly released, but following a rise in online hate against him, he was summoned again and detained by the CCID (see C7).3

In April 2023, Jean Kassir, the cofounder of Megaphone, and Lara Bitar, the editor in chief of Public Source, were summoned for interrogation and presumably asked to take down online articles that were critical of government officials or policies.4 Kassir, who was summoned twice in connection with an article that criticized the public prosecutor, refused to appear and the complaint against him was ultimately withdrawn.5 Bitar was summoned after publishing an article that discussed environmental crimes committed by the Lebanese Forces, a militia group active during the 1975–90 civil war.6 Bitar also refused to appear.7

The Beirut Bar Association (BBA) amended its code of ethics in March 2023, requiring its members to seek the president’s permission before engaging in public or social media commentary and restricting their ability to publicly criticize the BBA’s president. Lawyers, stating that these amendments are beyond the BBA’s scope, submitted two appeals to the Beirut Court of Appeals, which rejected both appeals that May.8 In April 2023, Nizar Saghieh, a lawyer and cofounder of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Legal Agenda, was summoned to a hearing by the BBA.9 The summons followed Saghieh’s online criticism of the BBA’s amended code of ethics.10

In June 2023, Hayat Mirshad, the cofounder and executive director of feminist organization Fe-Male and the editor in chief of feminist online platform Sharika Walaken, was summoned by the Beirut Court of Appeals after she was sued for defamation by actor and director Joe Kodeih (see C3).11 Although neither Saghieh nor Mirshad appeared at their respective hearings, they were presumably asked to remove the content in question.

In June 2022, Ghassan Rifi, the editor in chief of the Safir al-Shamal news site, was summoned after publishing an article questioning the relationship between a former political candidate in Lebanon and the Israeli government.12 A political analyst, Nidal al-Sabaa, was summoned by authorities in September 2022 for social media posts about former prime minister Saad Hariri.13 All were presumably asked to sign a pledge and remove the content in question.

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 2.002 4.004

Government decisions to restrict platforms have not always been fully transparent.

Article 125 of the 2018 Electronic Transactions and Personal Data Law allows the court to order “the suspension of certain electronic services” and to “block certain websites or cancel accounts on such websites” linked to crimes including terrorism, child pornography, gambling, fraud, money laundering, and “crimes against internal and external security.” Article 126 gives the public prosecutor the power to suspend services and accounts and block websites for up to 30 days (see C5).1

Generally, websites are blocked through court orders: The court receives a complaint and files it with the Cybercrimes Bureau for further investigation, later issuing a final order to the Ministry of Telecommunications, which then blocks the websites through OGERO. Website owners are not notified that their websites have been blocked, but must appeal the blocking within 48 hours in order to have the decision overturned. Grindr was first blocked in January 2019 without a court order (see B1).

Blocking orders are generally rooted in law. Escort service websites, for example, have been blocked in accordance with Articles 523 and 524 of the penal code. Israeli sites have been blocked in accordance with Decree 12562, issued in 1963, which called for the boycotting of Israel, while gambling websites were blocked in accordance with Law 417 of 1995, which gives the Casino du Liban a monopoly on gambling activity within the country. However, some past website blocks have been criticized for the seemingly haphazard manner in which the blocking orders were issued. 2

In November 2022, the Ministry of Information published a draft media law on its website, though the law has yet to be passed in the parliament.3 Despite promises from lawmakers, civil society has not yet been involved in the drafting process.4 While the draft prohibits pretrial detention for crimes related to publishing online, including on social media, it contains provisions that criminalize defamation.5 In April 2023, a new draft was made public by the ministry and UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).6 In November 2023, a parliamentary committee held closed-door sessions on another draft, denying NGOs from attending. The draft upholds criminal penalties, increases prison sentences and fines for certain cases of insult and defamation, and retains prison sentences of up to three years for insulting religion.7

In May 2023, US authorities sanctioned and took down 13 Hezbollah-related web domains after Hezbollah was listed as a terrorist organization by Washington. The removed domains included the website of Al-Manar TV—which has ties to Hezbollah—as well as online charities affiliated with the Martyrs’ Foundation in Lebanon and the Emdad Committee for Islamic Charity. Al-Manar’s Lebanese domain (.lb) is still accessible.8

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Self-censorship is common in the blogosphere and at top media outlets, which are owned by powerful figures from all sides of the political spectrum. Users often fear repercussions from the government or certain political and sectarian groups, including defamation lawsuits, if they post controversial content.

Recent crackdowns on online journalism have increased self-censorship among members of the media (see C3).1 Furthermore, the proliferation of anti-LGBT+ hate speech online2 has led to increased self-censorship within this community, particularly by previously outspoken activists (see C7).3

Lawyers and judges have increasingly self-censored after the BBA enacted a new code of ethics in March 2023, which prevents lawyers and judges from speaking publicly in the media without prior authorization from the BBA president (see B2).4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Lebanese media is highly partisan and controlled by the country’s dominant politico-sectarian actors, reflecting its political fragmentation. In December 2018, the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) released the Media Ownership Monitor, which found that “the top news websites in Lebanon belong to, or mirror, the same political parties that own the country’s traditional media. The same political agendas reflected in traditional media also exist online.”1

Elite families directly involved in politics own several prominent media outlets.2 For example, Parliament speaker Nabih Berri partially owns the National Broadcasting Network (NBN) and its affiliates, while Hezbollah controls a vast network of media outlets. Prominent political figures choose the heads of these outlets, and their news content often advances a particular partisan message. Politicians are also known to attempt to bribe the few independent news outlets and journalists that do exist, particularly during election periods.3

Hezbollah is able to manipulate online narratives through content on the websites it owns, which number over 20, as well as through its social media presence, where it disseminates propaganda both within Lebanon and abroad. In October 2022, its social networks shared rhetoric from the late Hassan Nasrallah—the Hezbollah leader who died in an Israeli airstrike in September 2024, after the coverage period—that the death of Mahsa Amini in Iran was a “vague incident” amid his attempts to downplay the resulting protests in Iran.4

Online disinformation was prevalent ahead of the May 2022 elections. According to a Maharat Foundation survey of social media content ahead of the elections, 49.5 percent of content analyzed included political and sectarian propaganda from political actors (see B8).5 Specifically, Hezbollah’s “electronic army” flagged comments and spammed articles deemed critical of the group and its leaders, at times resulting in the content being removed.6

The armed wing of Hezbollah has spread disinformation and propaganda online, targeting both Lebanese and international audiences.7 An investigation by the Telegraph, which it reported on in 2020, found that the network, which receives support from Iran, orchestrates defamation campaigns against opponents of Hezbollah and teaches its members how create inauthentic social media profiles, doctor pictures, spread propaganda, and avoid censorship by social media companies.8 The network has also been responsible for a number of cyberattacks across the region (see C8).9

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Independent digital media outlets struggle to achieve sustainability due to Lebanon’s relatively weak digital advertising market, as most advertising revenue is absorbed by television and other traditional media. Obstacles to boosting the digital advertising market include Lebanon’s slow and unreliable internet services and the ongoing economic crisis.1

Under the Press Law, it is “forbidden to issue a press publication without first obtaining a license.” Obtaining a license is difficult and expensive in practice, however.2

Outlets with formal or informal ties to politicians or powerful figures are financially more viable than those without connections.3

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Lebanese users have access to a variety of local and international news and media. While relatively pluralistic, the media landscape is dominated by the agendas of powerful politico-sectarian leaders and their allies, often overshadowing the voices of minority groups (see B5).1 However, several independent online media outlets launched after widespread protests took place beginning in October 2019.

Despite evidence of some filtering, taboo subjects that would normally be banned from mainstream media outlets, such as pornography, content supportive of Israel, and sectarian hate speech, are generally available online. Because Article 534 of the penal code has been used to prosecute LGBT+ individuals, content about the LGBT+ community operates in a legal gray zone and has been subject to censorship (see B1).

Channels and accounts dedicated to sexual health awareness have been blocked or restricted on social media, sparking controversy about sex education online and offline (see B2).2 A popular drag performer’s Instagram account was banned and later restored following a campaign to support the account owner. Individuals and groups advocating for LGBT+ rights sometimes self-censor so as not to lose their social media accounts (see B4).3

Social media is popular in Lebanon, and many news outlets have created dedicated social media pages to reach broader audiences.4 In 2021, the launch of the audio-only social media application Clubhouse allowed online users in Lebanon to debate and discuss social, political, and economic reforms in the country—topics that are rarely covered transparently in traditional media.5 However, some users have reported that they were targeted with harassment—including death threats—on Clubhouse for sharing anti-Hezbollah views (see C7).6

The economic crisis has led to the closure of several prominent outlets, limiting the diversity of online content. For example, the Daily Star stopped its traditional and online operations in 2021.7

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

In recent years, NGOs and individual actors have used the internet as a primary or secondary tool to extend the reach of their national awareness-raising campaigns.

In 2022, social media played an important role for political discussion and mobilization ahead of parliamentary elections. According to a Maharat Foundation survey of social media content ahead of the elections, 43 percent of 100 surveyed female candidates were subject to online harassment (see C7).1

Nonstate actors have also been limiting lawyers and judges’ freedom of expression online. The recent amendment to BBA’s code of ethics prevents lawyers from speaking publicly in the media without a prior authorization from the association’s president (see B2).2

In 2020, Lebanese people took to social media to campaign and mobilize around a number of causes, most notably following the Beirut port explosion. After the explosion—and the revelation of government corruption and mismanagement that led to it—the hashtag #علقوا_المشانق (Hang the Nooses) was used to demand accountability from Lebanon’s ruling parties.3 However, as online mobilization turned to in-person protests, authorities reportedly monitored online spaces, such as social networking sites and messaging services, to limit antigovernment demonstrations.4

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 2.002 6.006

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. However, articles in the penal code and the military code of justice place restrictions on freedom of expression (see C2). The judiciary also lacks independence, as it is subject to considerable political influence.1

Other issues persist. While Lebanon passed an access-to-information law in 2017,2 state agencies rarely comply. For example, when the Gherbal Initiative, a Lebanese NGO, sent access-to-information requests to 133 government bodies in 2019, they received just 34 responses.3

In August 2020, after the Beirut port explosion, the parliament approved a two-week state of emergency.4 The designation afforded the government broad powers, including the ability to set curfews, ban gatherings, and censor publications that threaten national security.5

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The Lebanese penal code prohibits defamation of the president, public officials, and the army. Article 157 of the military code of justice also prohibits insults against the army.1

In 2016, the Court of Cassation ended the debate over which law regulates speech promulgated on social media in Lebanon, opting to place it under the jurisdiction of the penal code instead of the Publications Law.2 Because the Publications Law does not explicitly refer to electronic publishing and websites, there is some confusion about what forms of online speech are subject to restriction under the law. The Publications Court has considered journalists’ social media posts to fall under its jurisdiction, even as other courts and nonjudicial bodies have prosecuted journalists for articles they had written. However, the Publications Court decided that other social media posts are not subject to the regulations relating to the Publications Law, but rather to the penal code, which contains fewer protections for individuals.3

The authorities prosecute legitimate online speech using Article 317, which penalizes those who incite sectarianism or racial strife; Articles 383 to 387, which criminalize the defamation of public officials and the insulting of national emblems; and Articles 473 and 474, which concern blasphemy and religious rituals. Various drafts of a media law have been introduced, without the input of NGOs, that uphold and increase criminal penalties for charges of defamation, insult, and insulting religion (see B3).

In March 2023, the head of the BBA called on the criminal courts to investigate cases of defamation, libel, slander, insults, and purportedly false news (see C3). He also announced the formation of a media committee within the BBA tasked with examining draft laws for current developments and technologies.4

  • 1“Lebanon: Pattern of Prosecutions for Free Speech,” Human Rights Watch, January 31, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/31/lebanon-pattern-prosecutions-free-s…
  • 2“ ما يرِد على صفحات «الفايسبوك» يخضع لقانون العقوبات لا «المطبوعات» [What appears on “Facebook” pages is subject to the penal code, not “publications”],” Addiyar, February 16, 2016, https://goo.gl/5bXAfG
  • 3“ما يرِد على صفحات «الفايسبوك» يخضع لقانون العقوبات لا «المطبوعات» [What appears on “Facebook” pages is subject to the penal code, not “publications”],” Addiyar, February 16, 2016, https://goo.gl/5bXAfG
  • 4“Coalition to Defend Freedom of Expression: Authorities must respect freedoms of the press and legal profession and fundamentally amend defamation laws,” Legal Agenda, April 5, 2023, https://english.legal-agenda.com/coalition-to-defend-freedom-of-express…
C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

A significant crackdown on online freedom of expression began in late 2017 and intensified during the coverage period.1

On July 10, 2023, television presenter Dima Sadek was convicted of slander, defamation, and inciting sectarian tensions; she was sentenced to one year in prison and fined 110 million Lebanese pounds ($7,330). Sadek was sued by the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in 2020 after she accused the FPM of Nazism via a social media post; FPM supporters had physically attacked a demonstrator, prompting the post. According to the Coalition to Defend Freedom of Expression, Sadek was the first person to receive a prion sentence for expressing their views on social media,2 though it noted that similar in absentia cases also ended with prison sentences. Sadek remained free and was expected to appeal the verdict.3

In September 2023, journalist Mariam Majdouline Lahham was detained for 11 hours by the CCID over an X post made in July. She had accused the president of the Sunni Higher Court of Beirut of having a conflict of interest in a case he was overseeing. The ISF took the key to her home to conduct a search and deleted the post from her computer (see B2). Drug-possession charges were later brought against her, and an ISF representative stated that she would be summoned by the Anti-Drug Bureau.4

In April 2023, lawyer Nizar Saghieh was summoned to a hearing by the BBA following his criticism of its amended code of ethics.5 In June 2023, Hayat Mirshad, the editor in chief of Sharika Walaken, was summoned by the Beirut Court of Appeals after the online platform campaigned to boycott a play by Joe Kodeih, who has been accused of harassment by multiple women and girls (see B2).6

Authorities used criminal defamation laws to silence government criticism and the public prosecutor ordered security forces to detain internet users, in violation of the current Publications Law (see C2).7 In July 2022, an officer in the General Directorate of the ISF, Michel Motran, criticized the traffic control office in a Facebook post; Motran was summoned by the Information Division of the ISF and detained for 10 days.8

High-profile activists and journalists are frequently summoned to the Cybercrimes Bureau in retaliation for their online content. In April 2023, Jean Kassir, the cofounder of Megaphone, and Lara Bitar, the editor in chief of Public Source, were summoned for interrogation, although both refused to appear.9 Both Kassir and Bitar were summoned over articles they published that were deemed critical of government agencies or policies (see B2).10

In November 2021, Radwan Mortada, a journalist working for Al-Akhbar, was sentenced to a year in prison in absentia by a Beirut military court. Mortada was charged with “defamation against the military institution” after criticizing the Lebanese military in his reporting for Al-Akhbar.11

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

The government requires registration for prepaid SIM cards and has considered introducing biometric registration.1

The Ministry of Telecommunications requires individuals to register their international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) number, which corresponds to their phone number, on an unsecure government website.2 In December 2017, the Ministry of Telecommunications proposed the introduction of biometric SIM cards, which would force every person who purchases a SIM card to provide biometric information.3

In May 2023, SMEX reported that mobile service provider Touch was enforcing a strict policy regarding identification documents needed to buy a new SIM card. According to the policy, purchasing a SIM card will require identification documents, a residential address, and a photograph of the customer taken at the point of sale. This policy limits nonresidents, including refugees, from purchasing SIM cards.4 In July 2024, after the coverage period, the Ministry of Telecommunications shared a new proposal that would impose SIM-card suspensions for individuals who are unable to provide such documentation.5

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Digital surveillance in Lebanon is facilitated by the weak legal framework on digital privacy, and a legal framework that gives the government a wide mandate to conduct surveillance.1

Article 14 of the constitution “ensures the inviolability of the home,” but it is unclear if this law applies to private communications.2 The Telecommunications Interception Act of 1999 nominally protects the secrecy of communications, but it has limitations and does not mention modern forms of electronic communication. Moreover, the law gives the government the right to monitor communications if a judge grants government agencies access, or if the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Defense submits a request to the prime minister for matters related to “combating terrorism, state security, or crimes related to state security.”3

In February 2024, the ISF’s General Directorate and the General Directorate for General Security (GDGS), through the telecommunications minister, requested an exception to the Public Procurement Law in order to contract with EXFO’s Astellia system, a service that provides monitoring and intelligence services to two telecommunications companies in Lebanon; the ISF and the GDGS both use Astellia to fulfill their counterterrorism and security mandates. Local rights groups voiced concern at this request due to its cost and because it would give security agencies real-time access to telecommunications data.4

Lebanese authorities are believed to have access to spyware. In a 2018 report by Citizen Lab, a Canadian internet watchdog, Lebanon is listed as one of 45 countries in which devices were likely breached by Pegasus, a targeted spyware product developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli technology firm.5 In 2021, reporting by the Washington Post found that Pegasus spyware was used to target and spy on politicians, journalists, and influencers in Lebanon, most notably former prime minister Saad Hariri and Lama Fakih, a journalist working on the Beirut port explosion investigation.6

In February 2020, Al-Akhbar revealed that mobile service provider Alfa purchased deep packet inspection (DPI) software from Sandvine in 2015 and used the technology to share information with security agencies. Additionally, Alfa spent $3 million on a newer DPI system, produced by NEXIUS, in 2018, but that system is still not functional.7

In January 2018, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and mobile-security firm Lookout reported that a surveillance operation called Dark Caracal operated out of a GDGS building in Beirut, targeting military personnel, government officials, activists, journalists, and lawyers in 21 countries.8 The operation relied on a unique mobile surveillance tool, dubbed Pallas, which was able to extract hundreds of gigabytes of data from Android devices and desktop devices. Using spear-phishing tactics, Dark Caracal sent malware-laden Facebook and WhatsApp URLs to users that allowed attackers to extract messages and phone calls, download applications, monitor calls, and upload files onto Android devices.

Security agencies have also used surveillance technologies such as FinFisher and international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers.9 WikiLeaks exposed the government’s use of FinFisher, which is sold exclusively to law enforcement agencies and allows them to exploit system updates on targets’ computers.

During protests in 2019, ISF officers infiltrated protesters’ WhatsApp groups and made arrests based on information shared in these groups.10 There were also reports of security agencies confiscating detainees’ phones for unusually long periods of time. Technical analyses revealed attempts at surveillance and unlawful searches.11

Authorities have increasingly employed biometric technologies. The GDGS adopted biometric passports in 2016,12 and a year later, the government announced that it would begin issuing biometric residence permits to foreigners (see C4).13 Additionally, intelligence agencies have links to different politicians or parties, and in turn their own agendas, which has led to privacy violations. Without a strong data protection law, it is unclear if biometric data could be used to increase surveillance (see C6).14

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Lebanon does not have comprehensive data protection laws and the government’s ownership and control over ISPs could facilitate unlawful data collection (see A4).

The Electronic Transactions and Personal Data Law, which was passed in October 2018, fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect user data and privacy. The law designates the Ministry of Economy and Trade as Lebanon’s data protection authority. While the law includes certain provisions around data rights, transparency requirements, data retention limitations, and security measures, it fails to adequately protect user data due to vague language, inadequate safeguards for user data, and the lack of an independent oversight authority.1 Article 97 gives the defense, interior, health, and justice ministers the authority to license data related to state security, court proceedings, and health, placing even more power in the executive branch. Moreover, the law only mentions the instances where a license is not required, rather than clearly outlining all the instances in which entities must obtain a license. Additionally, it does not define a number of key terms, such as “consent,” and fails to place limits on data storage.2 During the coverage period, the Ministry of Justice held an internal meeting to start working on amendments for Law 81/2018, which relates to electronic transactions and personal data. While it is unclear what amendments were discussed, digital rights groups expressed concern that this law does not provide safeguards for data privacy.3

In May 2023, SMEX executive director Mohamad Najem claimed that the government was pressuring the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide its data on refugees in Lebanon, including biometric data.4 As of June 2023, the government and UNHCR have not reached an agreement on this request.

At times the government requests user account information from major social media companies.5 In recent years, the cabinet has passed motions giving the security agencies temporary but unhindered access to all telecommunications metadata (see C5). Alfa and Touch are compelled to comply because they are owned by the government.

In October 2021, the prime minister formed a committee of ministries to investigate the possibility of “granting security agencies and armed forces full access to all telecommunication data.” The reason behind this potential move remains unclear, but activists raised the alarm at the concept, given the GDGS’s history of surveillance through operation Dark Caracal (see C5).6

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the bombing in Lebanon, Lebanese journalists have been severely injured and killed while conducting their work. Issam Abdallah, a video and digital journalist working for Reuters, died in an Israeli airstrike in October 2023 while documenting cross-border fire between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah. The airstrike also injured six other journalists. An RSF investigation concluded that the journalists were deliberately targeted and were not likely misidentified as combatants.1 Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reached similar conclusions in their own investigations of the airstrike. Similarly, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) called Abdallah’s death a murder, stating that he and the other journalists were targeted for their work.2

Journalists, activists, and online users sometimes face intimidation for their online comments. Political parties and armed groups have been known to target their critics through online harassment campaigns, which have led to offline attacks.3

Syrian refugees have faced a rising climate of violence, after Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi claimed that a “gang of Syrian nationals” were responsible for the April 2024 murder of Lebanese Forces official Pascal Sleiman, which occurred in unclear circumstances. Internet users, including high-ranking politicians, have called for the deportation of Syrians, reiterating claims that Syrians are responsible for economic crises in Lebanon. The ongoing spread of disinformation against Syrians online has resulted in offline repercussions and a rise in physical attacks against Syrians.4

In May 2024, a leaked video from Shaden Fakih’s stand-up comedy show about Islam sparked a wave of hate speech that included calls for violence.5 Following a protest in Tripoli that called for the imprisonment, assault, and murder of Fakih, the Islamic Shiite Council initiated legal proceedings against the comedian, charging her with blasphemy, insulting religious rituals, and sectarianism.6 Similarly, comedian Nour Hajjar was summoned by the Military Police in August 2023 for a stand-up sketch he posted online discussing socioeconomic challenges faced by Lebanese soldiers, and faced a wave of social media hate accusing him of committing crimes against Islam and undermining national unity (see C3).7

Following a September 2023 television advertisement that advocated for the abolishment of Article 534 of the penal code, which is often used to penalize homosexuality, anti-LGBT+ hate speech markedly increased on social media.8 Calls included a boycott of the television station which aired the advertisement, hateful language directed at the LGBT+ community, and threats of violence. Ministers and politicians also spread hateful language online. Human rights and political groups held a protest in Beirut in late September, but several dozen men surrounded the protesters, physically assaulted them, and prevented participants from escaping, reportedly in view of security personnel.9 Similarly, after false messages claiming that a Tyre restaurant was hosting a “queer party” were disseminated via WhatsApp in late September, individuals attacked the restaurant.10

In August 2022, freelance online photojournalist Hasan Chaaban was physically harassed by Hezbollah supporters in retaliation for his coverage of the Beit Yahoun protests, which included reporting that criticized the Hezbollah-aligned Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Chaaban received death threats and a bullet was left on his car window, reportedly as a threat to leave Beit Yahoun.11 Also that August, journalist Dima Sadek was subject to harassment campaigns orchestrated by Hezbollah supporters, which included death threats, rape threats, and violent online harassment. Sadek was later targeted after posting a social media post in support of Salman Rushdie and his controversial book, The Satanic Verses.12

Another online defamation campaign on social media was launched against the judge assigned to investigate the Beirut port explosion. Supporters of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement orchestrated a smear campaign to “electronically assassinate” judge Tarek Bitar after he summoned and accused two Hezbollah politicians of being involved in the blast.13

In February 2021, political activist and publisher Lokman Slim was assassinated, allegedly for his political views and critiques of Lebanese political parties and militias. Slim was a prominent Hezbollah critic and received death threats from the group in 2019, although no group took responsibility for his murder.14 He was active on social media and was frequently quoted and interviewed by online news outlets.15

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Cybersecurity breaches, cyberwarfare, and criminal hacks have been worrying trends in recent years.

In January 2024, the Social Affairs Ministry website and the Beirut International Airport website were hacked, and there was an attempted hacking on Parliament’s website. The airport’s screens displayed anti-Hezbollah messages, but functionality was restored in less than a day.1 The hackers of the Social Affairs Ministry website were allegedly hired by Israeli mercenaries, displaying text saying “Stand with Israel”, and threatened to publish private databases and documents; however, no information was revealed.2

Israel’s use of “jamming and spoofing technologies” during the Israel-Hamas war has affected geolocation services, endangering civil aviation and maritime routes in Lebanon. The use of these technologies is considered a violation of Article 45 of the constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).3 The GPS spoofing also caused a surge in Israeli Tinder profiles to appear for Lebanese users, with wrong indications about the distance of the Israeli profiles.4

In November 2022, the user data of over 1.8 million Lebanese WhatsApp users was leaked and sold on the dark web.5 Microsoft detected malicious activity originating from the Lebanon-based group Polonium, and their activity was reportedly coordinated with actors from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.6

In recent years, the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has provided Hezbollah with sophisticated cyberattack technology. Hezbollah’s “electronic army” has gathered intelligence on Lebanese government institutions and has orchestrated cyberattacks against financial institutions in Lebanon and abroad.7 In 2021, a group of hackers linked to Hezbollah breached 250 servers in different countries, including Lebanon, and stole sensitive data. According to cybersecurity reports, the hackers relied on a custom, remote-access virus, and their victims included individuals, companies, and institutions.8

Suspected Iranian hackers targeted Lebanese internet users through a variety of malware attacks. In one case, the attackers sent information about job opportunities that would deploy malware once the user clicked the infected link.9 While it is unclear who the specific targets of this attack were, it is suspected that the Iranian hacking group was targeting financial, energy, telecommunications, and government institutions.

A committee of ministry, military, intelligence, and private-sector representatives was established in November 2018 and tasked with presenting recommendations to the parliament on establishing a national cybersecurity agency.10 In 2019, a committee was formed to handle the implementation of the cybersecurity strategy until the creation of the National Cybersecurity Committee, which has not yet been established.11

On Lebanon

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Population

    5,490,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    39 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    50 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes