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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Nicaragua

Partly Free
41
100
A Obstacles to Access 11 25
B Limits on Content 16 35
C Violations of User Rights 14 40
Last Year's Score & Status
42 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom continued to decline in Nicaragua amid a broader crackdown on dissent that has been ongoing since the country’s 2018 antigovernment protests, contributing to an overall score reduction. Opposition figures, dissenting voices, and independent journalists have been increasingly forced to self-censor or opt for anonymity when expressing themselves online. While digital media remains one of the few spaces for independent journalism in Nicaragua, nearly all independent online outlets must operate from exile due to state repression.

  • In March 2024, the government presented the draft General Convergent Telecommunications Law in the National Assembly. The proposal would overhaul the country’s existing legal framework for telecommunications, expanding the regulatory authority of the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services (TELCOR) and raising severe concerns about data privacy. The draft law had not been enacted by the end of the coverage period (see A3, A5, B3, B6, and C6).
  • Authorities continued their efforts to manipulate the online information space through publicly financed “troll factories,” including through one cell reportedly based in the offices of the Supreme Court of Justice, the country’s highest court (see B5).
  • Journalists and other online critics of the government continued to face severe criminal penalties in retaliation for their online activities. In August 2023, journalist Victor Ticay was sentenced to eight years in prison in connection with an April 2023 Facebook Live broadcast. Ticay was one of 135 political prisoners released from prison and expelled to Guatemala in September 2024, after the end of the coverage period (see C3).
  • Online dissidents faced a repressive wave of extralegal harassment and intimidation in retaliation for their activities, including ill treatment in detention and efforts to conceal their whereabouts, amounting to forced disappearances in some cases (see C7).

header2 Political Overview

The 2006 election of Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega began a period of democratic deterioration marked by the consolidation of all branches of government under his party’s control, the limitation of fundamental freedoms, and unchecked corruption in government. In 2018, state forces, with the aid of informally allied armed groups, responded to a mass antigovernment movement with violence and repression. The rule of law collapsed as the government moved to put down the movement, with rights monitors reporting killings, extrajudicial detentions, disappearances, and torture. Since then, Ortega’s regime has consolidated its power by engaging in surveillance, curtailing press freedoms, arresting political opponents, and sending opposing voices into exile.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 3.003 6.006

Following sustained progress in recent years, more than half of Nicaragua’s population now has access to the internet. According to unofficial statistics from DataReportal, 4.36 million people in the country had internet access as of early 2024, amounting to an internet penetration of 61.5 percent.1 Official government statistics from TELCOR from June 2023 revealed that there were approximately 4.9 million total internet connections, of which 4.55 million were mobile and 354,785 were fixed-line connections.2 In recent years, growth in access has largely been driven by an increase in mobile internet connections; according to statistics from TELCOR, 1.19 million new mobile connections were added between 2020 and 2023.3

According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index data from May 2024, Nicaragua ranked 127th out of 147 countries surveyed for mobile broadband speeds and 97th out of 181 countries surveyed for fixed-line broadband speeds.4 Nicaragua’s median mobile data download and upload speeds were 18.07 megabits per second (Mbps) and 10.51 Mbps, respectively. Median fixed-line broadband download and upload speeds stood at 56.06 Mbps and 20.1 Mbps, respectively.5

Despite electrical coverage reportedly reaching 99.3 percent of the country as of May 2023,6 frequent power outages, caused by poor infrastructure and natural disasters, pose an ongoing threat to connectivity. A failure in the Central American electrical system in July 2021 caused a total blackout in Nicaragua that lasted five hours,7 for instance, with similar blackouts reported in June,8 August,9 and November of that year.10 In October 2022, Hurricane Julia temporarily left Nicaragua’s Caribbean region without power and telecommunications access due to the destruction of electric and fiber-optic lines, leading authorities to cut power to the region during the disaster, though the extent of these disruptions is unclear.11 In June 2023, during the coverage period, an unexpected power outage reportedly left 60 percent of the country without electricity, with service disrupted in some areas for multiple hours. According to the executive president of the National Electricity Transmission Company (ENATREL), these outages were caused by the failure of certain generation plants in Costa Rica.12

According to a survey conducted in 2021 by the World Bank Group and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 56 percent of internet users in Nicaragua cited power outages as a challenge to using the internet, while 55 percent cited poor internet quality.13

In January 2024, telecommunications service provider Claro was the victim of a reported ransomware attack that disrupted normal connectivity for at least several days in Nicaragua and other Central American countries (see C8).14 Beginning on January 25, some Claro users in Nicaragua reported that they could not access their mobile data,15 while others apparently experienced slow connections or had access to mobile data packages they had not paid for.16 Claro’s operations appeared to normalize by the end of February.17

In November 2023, the Ortega regime announced plans to cooperate with Chinese information and communication technology (ICT) company Huawei to develop the country’s fifth-generation (5G) network.18 TELCOR previously issued an administrative agreement in November 2022 reserving certain frequency bands for the 5G network.19 Since 2021, mobile service providers Claro and Tigo have offered 4.5G long term evolution (LTE) service in some coverage areas of the country.20

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 0.000 3.003

Access to the internet is expensive compared to the minimum wage, and there are large geographical disparities.

As of March 2024, Nicaragua’s minimum wage ranged from 5,721 córdobas ($154) to 12,803 córdobas ($345) per month, depending on the sector.1 Figures from the National Institute for Development Information (INIDE) indicated that the unemployment rate was 3.6 percent in March 2024; however, 39.2 percent of workers were underemployed or informally employed.2 Analysts have noted that the official unemployment figures mask underlying economic difficulties faced by Nicaraguans.3

Internet service in Nicaragua remains financially inaccessible for many, though it has become somewhat more affordable in recent years. The average monthly cost of fixed-line broadband service remained among the lowest in Central America. Analysis from UK-based Cable found that monthly fixed-line broadband service in the country cost an average of $34.50 in 2024, constituting between 10 and 22 percent of the average monthly salary of someone making minimum wage.4 The least expensive mobile data plans in Central America can also be found in Nicaragua; in 2023, the price for one gigabyte (GB) of data stood at $0.55 on average.5

According to a 2021 World Bank Group and UNDP survey, among Nicaraguan households without an internet connection, 64.2 percent said that the high price of internet packages was a barrier to connectivity, while 17.8 percent cited the total lack of available internet service.6

The cost of devices tends to be high, creating an additional barrier to access beyond the cost of a monthly service plan. According to the Alliance for Affordable Internet, the price of a basic smartphone constituted nearly 34 percent of the average Nicaraguan monthly income in 2020.7

As of 2022, Nicaragua continued to have one of the lowest rates of rural connectivity in Latin America and the Caribbean. At least 71 percent of the rural population lacked access to an internet connection of “sufficient quality,” partly because it is not profitable for internet service providers (ISPs) to develop infrastructure in rural areas.8 Women in rural areas are even less connected, as women in general face a disparity in access to technologies such as mobile phones.9 However, the government has made efforts to improve rural connectivity in recent years, through initiatives such as the Communications Infrastructure Program for the Caribbean Region (CARCIP).10

Other government initiatives have also improved access in recent years. For instance, official figures stated that the Broadband Program (PBA), implemented by TELCOR and ENATREL, brought 2,580 kilometers of fiber-optic infrastructure to 97 of the country’s 153 municipalities, also connecting 154 health centers to broadband internet.11 In February 2024, state-affiliated media reported that 115 kilometers of fiber-optic cables had been installed in the remote Caribbean region of Nicaragua, benefiting more than 37,000 residents of five municipalities in that area.12

Little information is available about Indigenous peoples’ internet access, though civil society organizations have created some initiatives to connect traditionally Indigenous communities.13

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

There have been a few instances in which the government restricted internet access in the past, though none were reported during the coverage period. The most recent occurred in 2018, in the context of massive antigovernment protests.1 Internet disruptions occurred on a regional basis that year, including in the departments of Jinotega, Matagalpa, León, and Masaya, and lasted around a day. The outages coincided with attacks against civilians by security forces and allied armed groups. Mobile service was also disrupted,2 and the government blocked Wi-Fi signals in public parks where protesters had connected their devices to report on the demonstrations.3

In December 2020, the Special Cybercrimes Law came into effect (see C2).4 According to the Nicaraguan Human Rights Center (CENIDH), the law authorizes TELCOR and the Foreign Ministry to block websites, networks, applications, and other online and communications services.5

In March 2024, the Ortega regime presented the General Convergent Telecommunications Law in the National Assembly, which is controlled by the ruling Sandinista party.6 The proposal, which has raised significant concerns over the expansion of TELCOR’s regulatory power and possible data privacy violations (see A5, B3, B6, and C6), would include “network interconnection obligations” for telecommunications providers.7 One journalist warned that the state “could control the server between international and national internet providers,"8 raising the possibility that the Ortega regime could seek to further centralize its control of the telecommunications infrastructure.

In terms of international connectivity, the country is linked to global internet traffic by the Americas Region Caribbean Ring System (ARCOS) submarine cable.9

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 3.003 6.006

Nicaragua's General Telecommunications and Postal Services Law (Law No. 200) stipulates the rules and procedures to be followed in the telecommunications sector, classifying the services and describing the types of permits or concessions that must be obtained for operation. It also states that there is free competition, ostensibly allowing any interested company to take the steps to establish itself in the country. A bill to replace this law, the General Convergent Telecommunications Law, remained pending in the National Assembly as of May 2024 (see A3, A5, B3, B6, and C6).1

There are at least three mobile service providers,2 in addition to others that provide internet service for homes and businesses.3 However, the market is led in practice by two providers, Claro, owned by the Mexican telecommunications giant América Móvil, and Tigo, held by Luxembourg-based Millicom.4 Though the state does not release official market share statistics, survey data from 2023 indicated that 49 percent of respondents preferred Tigo as their mobile service provider, while 46 percent chose Claro.5

Licenses or concessions to provide internet service may only be granted to Nicaraguan individuals or legal entities, and in the case of companies, at least 51 percent of shares must be held by Nicaraguan nationals. The provider is also required to sign an agreement with each customer that is fair to both parties.6

Reports indicate that the presidential family has close ties to a number of shareholders in Nicaragua’s telecommunications sector, and concerns have been raised recently that the regime could seek to influence the market further. Tecomunica, which is owned by both the state-held ENATREL and the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE), announced in November 2022 that it would provide internet services across Nicaragua, shortly after Ortega expressed a desire to raise taxes on existing service providers.7 Previously, Tecomunica had only taken a role in creating and maintaining Wi-Fi networks in public spaces. Some consider the timing of the announcement and Ortega’s public proposal of increasing telecommunications taxes to be odd, viewing it as an attempt by the regime to exercise greater control over the market.8

A report published by Confidencial in February 2022 found that shareholders in companies that partially comprise two ISPs—CooTel and Yota—have links to the presidential family. The investigation found that Ortega-linked lawyer José María Enríquez Moncada held 30 percent of shares in Inversiones Nicaragüenses de Telecomunicaciones, S.A., which operates the CooTel ISP alongside a Chinese company, Xinwei Telecom. Though some have expressed concern that this would also allow the family to exert control over the market, the potential impact has been limited by the relatively small market share held by the companies involved.9

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

TELCOR is the sole telecommunications regulator to oversee licensing, spectrum allocation, price regulation, and quality of service.1 Legally, it is meant to operate as a decentralized entity with independent assets,2 but in reality, it fails to uphold the principles of neutrality and independence. TELCOR is essentially a government institution, and its independence was further eroded by reforms approved in June 2023. These reforms define TELCOR as “a decentralized regulatory authority under the sectoral leadership of the Presidency of the Republic.”3 TELCOR’s general director, who was given the rank of minister under the new reforms, and up to three deputy directors are appointed by the president “for an indefinite period.”4

In May 2020, TELCOR amended a 2013 administrative agreement to require that telecommunications providers inform the body of their appointments for positions including information technology heads, financial managers, regulatory managers, and heads of security. Failure to do so can result in administrative or criminal sanctions.5

In November 2022, TELCOR issued an administrative agreement reserving certain frequencies on the radioelectric spectrum for the development and deployment of 5G technology in the country (see A1), suspending any new assignments or modifications to the use rights of these designated bands.6 The administrative agreement has raised speculation that TELCOR could provide preferential access to these 5G bands to Tecomunica, a telecommunications company partially owned by ENATREL (see A4).7

The proposed General Convergent Telecommunications Law, presented in March 2024, would impose new licensing requirements for audiovisual providers while potentially introducing further online content regulations and requiring telecommunications companies to turn over certain personal data of users (see B3, B6, and C6). TELCOR would be empowered to exercise broad regulatory authority to enforce these problematic provisions, including the ability to adopt new regulations after the law is passed and sanction telecommunications companies for noncompliance.8 The legislation remained pending as of May 2024.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

No evidence that the government or service providers block or filter content has been reported. Though the 2020 Special Cybercrimes Law allows TELCOR and the Foreign Ministry to block so-called dangerous websites, the government does not appear to have the capacity to implement and enforce such blocking.1

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

The Nicaraguan government and its allies continue to use copyright laws, including the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), to secure the removal of content produced by independent media outlets.1

Because only the progovernment media sector—much of which is controlled by Ortega’s family and others linked to the regime—has access to events and interviews with state officials, independent outlets depend on images and recordings from these sources, which then lodge copyright complaints.2 According to a digital security and human rights consultant who works with Central American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and journalists, independent journalists struggle to publish content due to these concerns, for fear of it being taken down.3

The director of one prominent digital newspaper disclosed that, in 2024, the outlet’s official YouTube channel received a copyright claim from a government-affiliated channel for a video uploaded in 2023 featuring a speech by President Ortega. Consequently, the channel accrued one “copyright strike” on the platform. According to YouTube’s copyright policy, if a channel accumulates three strikes within 90 days, YouTube permanently terminates the account,4 which the director said would have a major negative impact on the newspaper.5

In March 2024, a YouTube video titled “Así es Nicaragua: El país que prohíbe enseñar su propia bandera” (“This is Nicaragua: The country that prohibits showing its own flag”) by US-based Venezuelan content creator Oscar Alejandro Pérez Martínez was taken down after Juventud Presidente (JP+), a progovernment outlet, reported the video to the platform for alleged "breach of copyright." The video, which was 43 minutes long, reportedly used footage owned by JP+ for approximately 20 seconds. Pérez Martínez felt that YouTube’s action was unfair, objecting to the removal of the entire video.6 In April 2024, it was reported that all of Pérez Martínez’s recent videos about Nicaragua—including the video about the Nicaraguan flag that he reuploaded under the title “El video que la dictadura de Nicaragua no quiere que veas” (“The video that the Nicaraguan dictatorship doesn’t want you to see”)—had been made unavailable on YouTube after he was arrested and briefly detained in Venezuela.7

In May 2022, the website of the independent outlet Nicaragua Investiga was reportedly unavailable for several hours following an apparent copyright complaint from Banco de Producción S.A. (Banpro).8 Banpro allegedly objected to the use of its logo in photos published by the outlet as part of a profile of former Banpro executive Luis Rivas Anduray, who was arrested by the Ortega regime in June 2021.9

Previously, in March 2020, two YouTube accounts of the independent news broadcaster 100% Noticias—whose broadcasting license was revoked in Nicaragua in 2018—were shuttered after a progovernment outlet lodged copyright complaints over the use of their photos and video footage.10

In recent years, police have also reportedly coerced government critics into deleting videos or photos that depict antigovernment protests from their devices.11

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

Nicaragua lacks independent bodies that ensure oversight of content restriction processes. Authorities do not act transparently when it comes to the removal of online content.1 Under the 2020 Special Cybercrimes Law, decisions to block websites are to be made by TELCOR and the Foreign Ministry, both of which are effectively dominated by the presidency.2

For content removals that rely on the DMCA, a specific procedural framework is established in the US law itself, which is often invoked by Nicaraguan entities targeting material like YouTube videos (see B2).3 Journalists and activists have reported frustrations with social media companies providing vague justifications for removing their content and delays in recovering their accounts.4

In October 2022, Nicaragua’s National Assembly approved Law No. 1132, which establishes certain registration requirements for filmmakers and empowers the state’s National Cinematheque—a body originally created to promote and preserve films—to prohibit the creation and public distribution of noncompliant content.5 Critics have raised concerns that an overly broad interpretation of the law could be used to restrict content uploaded to TikTok or YouTube, particularly if it is deemed to violate the country’s so-called culture of peace, with few options available for an independent appeals process.6

Article 1 of the proposed General Convergent Telecommunications Law states that it aims to “regulate, plan, supervise, oversee, and develop the telecommunications sector.”7 Legal experts have suggested that the law could be interpreted in a way that allows TELCOR to regulate content, which the text defines in part as “information generated under any mode or form of expression, which can be distributed by any electronic means.”8 TELCOR’s control over the licensing of content providers (see B6), for instance, could grant it the power to control what is published, deleted, or blocked on the internet, though the full consequences of the draft law remained unclear during the coverage period.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1.001 4.004

Since early 2021, journalists, commentators, and ordinary users have experienced a climate of growing self-censorship that has continued to intensify amid heightening state repression of critical voices.1 Self-censorship has become more common as fears of reprisals for online speech under recently passed laws, including the 2020 Special Cybercrimes Law, were realized (see C2 and C3).

For many users, anonymity and the use of encrypted platforms have become the only avenues to safely share political speech online (see C4). A 2023 Derechos Digitales report noted that journalists and activists have migrated their "real" accounts on social media to anonymous profiles to avoid identification while criticizing the government.2 Additionally, since 2021, many journalists have stopped including bylines on their pieces, citing concerns for their own safety and that of their families and continuing to practice journalism anonymously.3

Facing censorship and prosecution, journalists frequently avoid reporting on certain politically sensitive topics. A quarterly report by the Foundation for Freedom of Expression and Democracy (FLED), covering the first three months of 2024, found that local media outlets refrained from covering events involving the Catholic Church, an entity targeted by the Ortega regime, during Holy Week and also avoided reporting on the Miss Universe organization; the winner of that organization’s 2023 beauty pageant represented Nicaragua and became a symbol of resistance to the government (see C3).4 According to FLED, many outlets instead opted to cover innocuous topics, such as summer leisure activities, in line with state-affiliated media.5

In March 2023, José Cardoza, a member of the Independent Journalists and Communicators of Nicaragua (PCIN) organization, affirmed that journalists who decide to remain in Nicaragua must often avoid any social, political, or economic topics in order to continue their work and to escape government closure of their media organizations.6

High levels of state surveillance have also contributed to self-censorship,7 as has extralegal pressure by forces aligned with the regime (see C5 and C7).

Nicaraguan journalists have remained determined to continue their work, though it is becoming increasingly difficult.8 One increasingly common practice is citizen journalism, with ordinary individuals anonymously contributing to independent media outlets, which enables them to report on events in Nicaragua despite the potential repercussions.9

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

The government and its allies manipulate online sources of information through a variety of means. As indicated in a March 2023 report by the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN), senior government officials, progovernment media, and social media users have used inflammatory rhetoric to stage disinformation and stigmatization campaigns against real or perceived opponents of the regime. According to the 2023 GHREN report, since 2018, such disinformation campaigns have been launched as part of “an attempt to justify the Government’s criminal actions and persuade the Nicaraguan community about the urgency of an alleged foreign attack against the very existence of the State of Nicaragua,” thereby framing government critics as enemies of Nicaragua itself.1

In recent years, members of the president’s family and other close government associates have purchased media outlets, including some that operate online. This has undermined the independence and credibility of the outlets in question, allowing regime forces to control the broader public discourse through their articles and social media posts. The government has also directed specific coverage; in 2018, for example, after mass protests erupted over a plan to lower pensions while raising social security contributions, Vice President Rosario Murillo—Ortega’s wife—instructed progovernment outlets, such as the news site El 19 Digital, not to report on the movement.2

The regime also organizes inauthentic social media activity to serve its political interests. In an initiative known as the Digital Project, more than 100 employees from various public institutions were revealed to work from a Nicaraguan Postal Service building to produce content and post it to multiple social media platforms, including TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, and X. Similar cells operate in other public buildings in different municipalities. One of their mandates is to create and disseminate false news and information to shed a positive light on the Ortega regime, smear critics, and cause anxiety—for example by insinuating that the police will arrest someone. Murillo reportedly first ordered the creation of these “troll factories” in 2018.3

Reporting during the coverage period revealed that one of these cells operates from the offices of the Supreme Court of Justice, allegedly coordinated by judicial union leader Carlos Alberto López Tinoco and overseen by Justice Marvin Aguilar. The operation is reportedly staffed by court employees who retain their salary and are promised meals and transportation as benefits for spreading progovernment narratives online.4

In October 2021, Meta reported removing “one of the most cross-government troll operations [they had] disrupted to date”: a network of over 1,400 assets (362 Instagram accounts, 896 Facebook accounts, 132 Facebook pages, and 24 Facebook groups) operated by the government and the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). These findings corroborated prior reporting, indicating that the network had used fake accounts to post and amplify progovernment, pro-FSLN, and anti-opposition content from 2018 onward.5 However, a 2023 investigation led by Confidencial identified at least 130 accounts that have resumed operations within this network following the 2021 suspension, often reopened with only slight modifications. In response, Meta said that it would address the issue “on an ongoing basis.”6

A December 2023 report by Divergentes and Connectas analyzed more than 162,000 messages posted in a network of 13 Telegram channels between 2018 and 2023. While some of the channels were operated by official state media, others, such as “El Father de la Revolución” (“The Father of the Revolution”), were Sandinista groups active on other social networks. The investigation found that these channels were used to amplify Murillo’s addresses and favored talking points and to discredit political opponents, among other activities. A digital marketing expert consulted for the investigation noted that, while the regime may have greater reach on other platforms like Facebook and TikTok, Telegram channels provide a largely unregulated platform for the regime to spread manipulated information.7

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Digital platforms have become virtually the only means to conduct independent journalism in Nicaragua, and these remaining outlets face significant economic and legal constraints. Independent digital journalists are forced to operate almost entirely in exile from abroad, and many private media outlets refrain from covering politically sensitive topics for safety reasons or to avoid closure (see B4).

At least 24 independent media outlets were reportedly established between April 2018 and May 2020,1 most of them formed in exile. As of February 2024, at least three of them, including Actualidad con Dino Andino, have closed due to financial constraints that have made it difficult to pay employees and continue reporting.2 FLED reported that 36 journalists abandoned their profession during the first three months of 2024, with 15 of them citing low wages, unemployment, or exile as their reason for leaving journalism.3

Independent media struggle to generate revenue from advertising. The general director of a Nicaraguan digital newspaper reported that their outlet had only one local advertiser as of 2024 and expressed fears that this company may soon be forced to stop advertising on its website.4 In March 2022, investigative journalism outlet Expediente Público (Public File) reported that media linked to the Ortega family received around half of all state advertising funds between 2018 and 2021.5

The enforcement of repressive laws also prevents journalists and other users from publishing content freely. In October 2020, the government enacted Law No. 1040, the Law on the Regulation of Foreign Agents, which obliges any individual or legal person who participates in any type of civic or public policy activity and receives foreign funds to enroll in the registry of foreign agents. Article 9 of the law explains that “foreign agents” must inform the government in advance of the origins of any funds they will receive and how said funds will be used;6 as a result, “foreign agents” are prohibited from receiving anonymous donations. The government will then have the authority to evaluate and determine whether the provided information is suitable. If an entity does not comply or register as a foreign agent within a set period of time after receiving notification from the relevant authority, the law authorizes the government to restrict any of its activities connected to the funding in question, impose fines, and cancel its legal status.

The General Convergent Telecommunications Law, if approved, would force media outlets and other online content creators to obtain an operating license from TELCOR, leaving it up to the government to decide whether to renew it or not.7 This licensing procedure, which would require an undetermined monthly fee to be paid to TELCOR, has raised concerns that it could be used to further silence criticism of the regime and regulate online content (see B3).8 Additionally, telecommunications operators that fail to comply with the law’s provisions, including the requirement to provide information to TELCOR (see C6), will be subject to fines ranging from 0.5 percent to 2.5 percent of their previous year’s gross revenue.9

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 2.002 4.004

The vast majority of traditional media outlets are controlled by people close to the government and maintain a progovernment editorial line. Those that have not been bought or co-opted by the government and its allies have difficulty accessing official information and remaining financially viable. Though online outlets have faced increasing financial and legal constraints in recent years (see B6 and C3), digital media has become one of the few remaining spaces for independent reporting in Nicaragua.1

According to the International Press Institute (IPI), at least 20 television or radio media outlets that faced censorship transitioned to online operations between April 2018 and April 2021.2 Nicaragua’s last newspaper with a print edition, La Prensa, suspended its printed version in August 2021, continuing operations exclusively online (see C3).3

During the coverage period, the situation for independent journalism continued to deteriorate, leaving Nicaraguans with fewer options to access reliable information online. In March 2024, the director of digital outlet República 18 said that there were fewer than 100 active journalists based in Nicaragua,4 and those who remain must refrain from criticizing the government or engaging in politically sensitive discourse (see B4). As a result, many areas of the country lack independent journalists entirely. According to FLED’s January-March 2024 report, there is no local independent journalism presence in seven departments, accounting for 41 percent of the country’s departments and autonomous regions, leaving state-affiliated media as the main source of information in these areas.5

False and manipulated content continues to saturate the online sphere, reducing the reliability of the information space. Progovernment media and social media users, often coordinated by the state, use messaging apps and social networks to maintain a ubiquitous presence and amplify content in support of the regime (see B5).

There remains a lack of online content dedicated to gender-based issues and representing women more broadly; as of May 2023, online outlet La Lupa seemed to be one of the few specifically focused on providing a gendered perspective.6 Because women journalists often face smear campaigns and other forms of harassment (see C7), they are often marginalized from online conversations, further threatening women’s representation within the online media landscape.7

The visibility of LGBT+ issues is notably limited in the online sphere, characterized by incidents of bias and hostility. For instance, Intertextual, one of the few digital outlets with an LGBT+ perspective in Nicaragua, criticized certain outlets, such as regime-aligned media La Nueva Radio YA, for making light of recent murders and other hate crimes targeting the LGBT+ community.8

In the past, civil society has undertaken initiatives to cultivate a digital environment that is more inclusive and representative of Indigenous voices, including through the creation of online content in Miskito and Mayangna Indigenous languages.9

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 3.003 6.006

Activists who organize online have faced arrests and other forms of persecution,1 both during the 2018 protests2 and in the years following. Faced with severe legal penalties and ongoing digital surveillance (see C3 and C5), the threat of repression has made it increasingly difficult for the population to participate in any form of mobilization or activism.

Despite such obstacles, citizens still engage in some digital activism to demand accountability and greater transparency from the government, as well as to call for an end to the Ortega regime. Such activism is increasingly carried out through anonymous accounts and on encrypted platforms, such as WhatsApp and Signal, as users try to avoid retaliation from and surveillance by the state.3

During the coverage period, press and human rights organizations, such as the outlet La Prensa, used the hashtag #LibertadParaPresosPolíticos (#FreedomForPoliticalPrisoners) to bring attention to the plight of political prisoners in the country, including to commemorate the one-year anniversary of journalist Victor Ticay’s arbitrary detention in April 2023 and to demand his release (see C3).4 Organizations, including the Nicaraguan University Alliance (AUN), also marked the sixth anniversary of the April 2018 protests using the hashtags #AbrilVive (#AprilLives), #AbrilNoSeOlvida (#AprilIsNotForgotten), and #SOSNicaragua—including by posting pictures, videos, and illustrations to commemorate the event and calling for justice and democracy in the country.5

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 1.001 6.006

Constitutional rights are not respected in practice, and the judiciary is dominated by regime loyalists who consistently fail to uphold basic standards of judicial independence.1

The constitution nominally protects the fundamental rights of freedom of expression (Article 30) and access to information (Article 66). Although there is no explicit mention of press freedom, citizens have the right to access “social mass communications media,” and there is a declaration that “public, corporate, or private mass communications” will not be subject to prior censorship (Article 68). However, the “right to inform” is subject to subsequent responsibilities established by law (Article 67). An Access to Information Law (Law No. 621) was enacted in 2007.2

The formal rights outlined in the constitution are often violated. According to the GHREN’s March 2023 report, the period since January 2022 has been characterized by the “total closure of the civic and democratic space” in Nicaragua.3 In practice, the judiciary is subservient to the executive and has been used to target the political opposition, religious figures, and other critics of the Ortega regime through significant criminal sentences (see C3).4 Consequently, Nicaraguan law is not aimed at safeguarding human rights; instead, the legal framework is used by the Ortega regime to maintain power and suppress any form of dissent.

In February 2023, the National Assembly modified Article 21 of the constitution to allow the government to revoke the citizenship of those it deems “traitors of the homeland.” This modification was formally ratified by the National Assembly, which is dominated by the Sandinista party, in January 2024.5

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

The 2020 Special Cybercrimes Law contains significant punishments for online activities that are protected under international human rights standards. Article 28 prescribes two to four years in prison for the use of information technologies to slander a person’s honor or prestige or to divulge a person’s secrets. Article 29 punishes anyone who uses information technologies to praise a crime or its perpetrator. Both provisions are written broadly enough to allow for the suppression of freedom of expression online. Article 30 assigns penalties of two to four years in prison for the dissemination of “fake news,” but it does not differentiate between deliberate disinformation and misinformation that is shared without malicious intent. The article also fails to explain how a news article can be labeled as fake, leaving ample room for abuse. The penalty increases to three to five years in prison if the content “incites hatred or violence, or puts at risk economic stability, public health, national sovereignty or law and order.” In addition, users can face four to six years in prison for revealing “unauthorized” information or eight years for accessing or spreading information that could harm national security.1 The law, which applies to both social media users and media outlets, could be used as a tool to punish dissent and control the flow of information online.2

Nicaragua’s existing penal code already criminalized defamation, insult, and contempt, which are punishable by fines ranging from 100 to 300 days’ worth of wages. These provisions could apply to online speech, though the code does not specify whether it does.3

Under constitutional reforms initiated in February 2023 (see C1), the National Assembly implemented new processes to allow for the removal of an individual’s citizenship through law and judiciary proceedings. That month, the National Assembly passed Law No. 1145, which declares that any person who has been convicted under Law No. 1055 (the Sovereignty Law), passed in 2020, will lose their Nicaraguan nationality.4 Several human rights organizations have condemned the constitutional reform and accompanying law as illegal and a violation of international treaties to which Nicaragua is a party.5 Despite the constitutional amendments not receiving formal ratification by the National Assembly until January 2024,6 Law No. 1145 was used in February 2023 to strip Nicaraguan citizenship from more than 300 people, including several individuals who had originally been arrested and convicted in connection with their online activities (see C3).7

The Sovereign Security Law of 2015 labels cyberattacks as threats to “sovereign security,”8 which is defined as the peaceful existence and permanent unity that give stability and prosperity to Nicaraguan citizens, encompassing matters such as education, health, and the economy. However, the law is overly broad.9 Members of CENIDH had filed an appeal against the Sovereign Security Law in 2016 on the grounds that it violated constitutional rights.10

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 6.006

Criminal penalties for individuals’ online activities continued during the coverage period. In recent years, journalists, activists, and ordinary users have faced increasingly repressive legal sanctions for online dissent, including arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, the loss of Nicaraguan citizenship, and forced exile.1

In January 2024, Bishop Rolando José Álvarez Lagos was among the 19 Catholic clergy members released from prison and expelled from Nicaragua to the Vatican, following negotiations between the Vatican and the Nicaraguan government.2 In February 2023, Álvarez had been sentenced to more than 26 years in prison and stripped of his nationality after being found guilty of several charges, including the propagation of false news through information and communication technologies and undermining national integrity. Álvarez regularly used his homilies to criticize the human rights abuses of the Ortega regime, often spreading religious messages through WhatsApp,3 and he also used other digital platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube, to broadcast the masses he said online.4

On April 6, 2023, digital and television journalist Victor Ticay, the director of Facebook-based news outlet La Portada, was arrested after covering a Catholic Easter procession in the municipality of Nandaime the previous day.5 Ticay had uploaded a 25-minute Facebook Live video that showed congregants participating in traditional processions around the local church, defying the government’s prohibition of public religious displays.6 The video was taken down shortly after Ticay’s arrest.7 After being detained, Ticay was denied access to an attorney and any outside communication for more than 40 days before being formally charged for alleged cybercrimes and treason in May.8 On June 9, 2023, during the current coverage period, Ticay was found guilty of spreading false news and undermining national integrity. He was sentenced to eight years in prison in August 2023.9 Many international human rights organizations and media outlets denounced his detention and have attempted to raise awareness about the poor conditions that he reportedly experienced in prison (see C7).

The Legal Defense Unit (UDJ) has documented the use of several repressive legal tactics during the coverage period, such as telematic trials, in which political prisoners are denied a trial in a courtroom and legal proceedings are instead held via video calls.10 Additionally, the regime has withheld information about political detainees from their families. In November 2023, for example, retired professor Freddy Quezada was arrested for criticizing the regime on social media.11 In February 2024, Quezada was found guilty via a video trial of alleged incitement to hatred, though his family remained unaware of his location at the time of the trial and was not permitted to watch the proceedings.12

Also in November 2023, TikTok and social media user Cristóbal Geovanny López Acevedo, known as Tropi Gamer, was arrested and accused of “threatening national security” after he posted a video that criticized how progovernment presenters treated Sheynnis Palacios, who won the Miss Universe beauty pageant representing Nicaragua.13 He was subsequently imprisoned in a maximum-security cell of the Modelo prison,14 a complex known for the inhumane treatment of political prisoners (see C7).15

In September 2024, after the coverage period, the Ortega regime freed 135 political prisoners, who were expelled to Guatemala following negotiations with the United States.16 Ticay, Quezada, and López were among those released.17 Days after the 135 individuals were released, the Supreme Court of Justice announced that it would strip them of Nicaraguan citizenship and confiscate their assets.18

During the previous coverage period, in February 2023, the Ortega regime freed 222 political prisoners, several of whom had been imprisoned under the Special Cybercrimes Law for their online activities. They were simultaneously stripped of Nicaraguan citizenship and exiled to the United States.19 Later that month, a Nicaraguan court stripped the citizenship of 94 additional individuals, including the directors of the independent digital outlets 100% Noticias and Artículo 66.20 Several individuals exiled in February 2023 had previously been charged and convicted under the 2020 Special Cybercrimes Law, including Donald Margarito Alvarenga Mendoza, who was the first person convicted under the law.21

Organizations such as the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and Derechos Digitales have noted that cybercrime legislation, including Nicaragua’s Special Cybercrimes Law, has been used to prosecute women and LGBT+ people for their legitimate criticism of the government, often under a politicized understanding of spreading so-called “fake news.”22

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 4.004 4.004

Nicaraguan authorities do not place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption, and the use of encrypted messaging and clandestine meetings have increased due to the dangers associated with expressing dissent publicly.1 SIM card registration is not required.2

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Authorities are increasingly using surveillance practices to identify, intimidate, and stifle dissenting voices within Nicaragua. Evidence has shown that, beginning in 2018, state surveillance could have become more extensive and sophisticated than previously thought.

A December 2022 report by the US-based National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), covering Russia’s influence in Latin America, claimed that Nicaraguan authorities have adopted and deployed the Russian government-linked System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM-3) surveillance technology since approximately 2018.1 SORM-3 is reportedly capable of intercepting a number of digital activities, including financial transactions, text messages, phone calls, emails, and posts on social networks, meaning that the Ortega regime has potentially been employing a sophisticated surveillance and monitoring system for several years.2 Such reporting comes as Nicaraguan authorities have sought to deepen the country’s cybersecurity cooperation with Russia (see C8).

In April 2024, Nicaragua and Russia finalized an agreement to establish a so-called police training center inside the country, ostensibly meant to assist members of Nicaragua’s National Police in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime.3 However, Russian officials—under the purview of Russia’s interior ministry—were granted near-blanket immunity for their actions at the center, leading to speculation that it would be deployed for Russian intelligence operations inside Nicaragua,4 though the precise functions of the center remained unclear during the coverage period. Russia previously established an “anti-narcotics” training center in Managua in 2017.5

In the past, authorities have reportedly targeted critics of the regime for digital monitoring.6 Under the 2020 Law on the Regulation of Foreign Agents (see B6), individuals and entities that are obliged to register as “foreign agents”—including civil society organizations and media outlets—would be subject to extensive government scrutiny.7 The 2020 Special Cybercrimes Law could also facilitate surveillance (see C2); according to CENIDH, the law implies that digital platforms would be closely monitored for violations, and government supporters have reportedly encouraged citizens to inform the authorities of any potentially illegal content.8

A recent study conducted by the Fake Antenna Detection Project (FADe Project) and South Lighthouse found evidence of at least 39 International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)-catcher devices in Nicaragua.9 While the study was not able to prove that the devices had been deployed by the Ortega regime for surveillance purposes, IMSI-catchers are “fake antennas” capable of intercepting mobile phone traffic, including information about communications and a targeted user’s SIM card.10 A 2018 report by Haaretz noted that the Nicaraguan government had purchased spyware and intelligence-gathering tools from Israeli companies, though experts have not been able to say definitively which software is in use.11

Public employees who are deployed as online “trolls” reportedly track public activity on websites and social media platforms, along with coverage in domestic and international media outlets, and report back to Vice President Murillo.12 This monitoring is apparently conducted through inauthentic accounts to identify public opposition to the regime.13 Despite little documentation on these practices, in 2024, a digital security consultant confirmed that these episodes continue to occur, with the source stating that his wife had been told to stop posting on Facebook due to concerns that her profile was being monitored.14

There are some legal protections against unchecked surveillance, though it is unclear whether they are observed in practice. Article 13 of the 2015 Sovereign Security Law stipulates that no state security institution may engage in political espionage, intercept communications without judicial authorization, or improperly disclose any type of information that is acquired through the exercise of its functions, among other prohibitions.15

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

The 2007 Access to Information Law guarantees the protection of personal data,1 and a Law on the Protection of Personal Data was adopted in 2012,2 but the Personal Data Protection Authority (DIPRODAP) that was meant to ensure compliance with the legislation had yet to be established by the end of the coverage period.3

Article 24 of the 2012 law allows the exceptional collection and processing of personal data—without the consent or awareness of the data subject—for administrative purposes and allows its retention for a maximum of five years.4 The article also grants these functions to the police and the army if necessary to guarantee national security, but it does not clarify whether they would similarly be allowed to keep the data for five years. The law adds that a company cannot disclose or transfer any private information that it stores to a government officer without judicial authorization.5

In January 2021, as part of the implementation of the Special Cybercrimes Law, TELCOR published Administrative Agreement 001-2021 on Regulations for the Preservation of Data and Information. This regulation has raised concerns among several organizations due to its threats to the privacy of data subjects. Article 3 requires telecommunications companies to collect and preserve any data necessary to trace a communication; identify the recipient of a communication; identify the time, date, and duration of a communication; identify the type of communication, such as mobile phone, internet, or landline phone; identify the equipment used to conduct a communication; and identify the geolocation of the equipment used for a communication. In addition, companies offering community repeaters and trunk links must be able to submit information on the services they provided.6

This administrative agreement further requires companies to store the relevant information for up to 12 months, subject to requests from the police or prosecutors preceding a warrant. Once one of these entities requests a warrant, a judge can order a variety of actions, such as the immediate delivery of information contained in the systems, the preservation of the information and integrity of the systems for up to 90 prorogue days, access to the system, extraction of the information, denial of access to the information, or any other applicable measure necessary to obtain and preserve the data.7

The proposed General Convergent Telecommunications Law has also raised significant concerns regarding its potential impact on privacy rights and freedom of expression (see A3, A5, B3, and B6). Analysts have warned that the proposed law would represent a significant expansion of the government’s access to private communications and personal communications.8 For instance, Article 109 stipulates that public telecommunications service operators and audiovisual communications service providers are “required to provide all information required, including statistical and geo-referential data,” at the request and discretion of TELCOR.9 Furthermore, Article 111 states that these operators are required to provide TELCOR with access to their facilities for technical inspections and review of internal documentation.10 Free expression organizations, such as Voces del Sur, have noted that these provisions could grant the Ortega regime essentially unfettered access to the personal user data of activists and other dissidents.11 The law had not been passed by the end of the coverage period.

Under the 2010 Law on the Prevention, Investigation, and Prosecution of Organized Crime, service providers are required to design their systems in a way that would facilitate surveillance.12 The law also requires companies to maintain a record of their users that can be accessed by the authorities investigating or prosecuting a crime.13

Between July and December 2023, Meta received two emergency requests from the Nicaraguan government to disclose information on two accounts; no data was granted in response to the requests.14

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to a deepening pattern of poor treatment in detention, forced disappearances, and exile in connection with online activities.

Internet users, and journalists in particular, have been subjected to intimidation and physical assaults in connection with their online activity. Torture and ill treatment in detention are common. In September 2024, after the coverage period, the Ortega regime released 135 political prisoners, who were sent to Guatemala and arbitrarily stripped of their Nicaraguan nationality.1

Individuals imprisoned by the regime often face poor conditions in detention. In December 2023, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) extended precautionary measures to journalist Victor Ticay, who was then imprisoned on an eight-year sentence for his online activities (see C3), and to seven additional political prisoners.2 This decision was made due to inadequate detention conditions that placed the detainees in a “serious and urgent” situation, including poor food and the denial of necessary medical care.3 Furthermore, in July 2024, the GHREN reported that there was credible reason to believe that Bishop Rolando Álvarez, who had been released and exiled in January 2024 (see C3), had faced “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and, in some cases, torture, both physical and psychological” while in prison. Álvarez was reportedly detained in a dark, poorly ventilated area of the Modelo prison, often in solitary confinement.4

Another common practice by the state is to conceal information about the health or whereabouts of detainees from their families, often amounting to forced disappearances. In October 2023, María Asunción Salgado and Salvador Paguaga, two journalists from Radio Fe (which was closed by TELCOR in 2022 and subsequently began broadcasting exclusively over the internet) who managed the outlet’s Facebook page, were forcibly taken from their homes.5 Prior to the incident, Radio Fe’s page had expressed solidarity with Catholic priests recently kidnapped by the regime, but there were otherwise few additional details about the journalists’ disappearance.6 Their whereabouts remained unknown as of January 2024.7 In another instance, the location of Freddy Quezada, an intellectual arrested in connection with critical social media posts in November 2023 and detained until September 2024 (see C3), remained unknown to his family through the end of the coverage period.8

Individuals who openly criticize the regime online, whether journalists or ordinary users, have been forced or otherwise pressured into exile. In May 2023, a Catholic parishioner identified as Edwin reportedly migrated to the United States on humanitarian grounds. Edwin had made social media posts regarding the regime’s repressive treatment of the Catholic Church, and he claimed that the authorities were monitoring these posts, a common practice in Nicaragua (see C5).9

Carlos Salinas, a journalist who had worked for El País and the news site Confidencial, had to leave the country in 2018 and now lives in exile in Mexico. In an interview with El País, he noted that the government used his homosexuality to spread defamatory claims about him on social media.10 He explained that regime supporters altered pictures of men to support assertions that he had physically abused his partners. Before leaving the country, Salinas said he was at times confined to his home due to the danger of physical violence while the authorities decimated his reputation online.11

According to FLED, at least 9 journalists were forced into exile between January and March 2024, and as of March, there were approximately 251 Nicaraguan journalists and communicators who had been forcibly exiled since 2018.12 Exiled journalists have also reported that their relatives who remain in Nicaragua have faced harassment and intimidation, including incidents in which the police have parked in front of their homes in an effort to intimidate them.13

In January 2024, Rafael Méndez, a host of the radio program Choque de Opiniones (Clash of Opinions), which is broadcast live on Facebook, referred to journalist Miguel Mendoza, a journalist who has used Facebook and X for his reporting,14 as ”labios de guabina“ (a derogatory term). The following month, Edgar Enrique Quiñones, the director of the same program, requested that a photo of Mendoza be displayed during the broadcast and proceeded to make light of his imprisonment and forced exile to the United States.15

Many victims of the regime’s repression refrain from making public statements due to the fear of retaliation against themselves or their families, which can make it more difficult for organizations to document the aggressions they face.

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Independent media outlets in Nicaragua have been subjected to cyberattacks since the 2018 protests.1 Independent outlets remain at risk from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and hacking, as well as less sophisticated forms of cyberattacks.

In April 2024, the media outlet Radio Camoapa reported that its Facebook page had experienced an undefined “partial attack,” directing followers to remain vigilant for fraudulent posts made to the account.2 The outlet was able to restore the Facebook page’s normal operations within hours.3

During the previous coverage period, in November 2022, online newspaper Confidencial’s YouTube channel was temporarily suspended by the platform after it was hacked as part of an apparent cryptocurrency scam.4 The outlet was able to recover its video catalogue following the hack, and access to the channel was fully restored one day later, after YouTube completed an investigation.5

In January 2022, Confidencial reported the hacking of a WhatsApp account it used to send alerts and receive complaints from readers. Some readers reported receiving pornographic images following the hack, though Confidencial denies that the hacker had access to dissemination lists or data on its readers.6 Users also reported receiving messages with sexual content from a WhatsApp account belonging to the media outlet BacanalNica, which was also hacked.7 Digital outlet Artículo 66 also reported attempts to hack its WhatsApp account around this time, amounting to 12 daily attempts over a period lasting 20 to 25 days.8 The same month, 100% Noticias’s Twitter account was also hacked by alleged progovernment forces.9

On January 25, 2024, mobile service provider Claro was the victim of a reported ransomware attack that impacted normal connectivity on its network over the course of several days (see A1).10 The cyberattack disrupted Claro’s internal systems, making it impossible for customers to pay their bills online or for employees to process such payments. Claro’s operations had begun to normalize by the end of February.11

Government entities have also been subject to cyberattacks, which are commonly linked to the hacktivist group Anonymous. Since 2018, Anonymous has struck the websites of entities such as the Central Bank of Nicaragua, the Finance Ministry and its Financial Analysis Unit, the Nicaraguan Institute of Tourism, the National Assembly, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Civil Aviation Authority, among others, while also targeting government-linked media outlets like Canal 6.12

In November 2022, authorities announced that Nicaragua and Russia had signed a cybersecurity cooperation plan for 2022–26.13 This was followed by a memorandum of understanding focused on responding to cybersecurity incidents signed between TELCOR and Russian authorities in May 2023.14 In September 2020, the government approved a National Cybersecurity Strategy by decree.15

On Nicaragua

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Country Facts

  • Population

    6,948,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    14 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    41 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes