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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022

Peru

Vulnerable
Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts
High
 39 85
Local Resilience and Response
Notable
 39 85
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least influence) to 85 (most influence)
People in Lima, Peru. Editorial credit: iluistrator / Shutterstock.com

header1 Key findings

Report by: Hernán Alberro and anonymous

  • Steady media influence: Beijing’s media footprint in Peru is the result of a careful strategy that benefits from an earlier expansion of media cooperation. Local cable and satellite television providers carry China Global Television Network (CGTN) and China Central Television (CCTV). Peruvian outlets distributed pro-Beijing content via special inserts, op-eds, and the magazine China Hoy. The embassy also expanded its social media activity during the coverage period of 2019–2021, and its posts were regularly referenced by Peruvian journalists as a source for reporting on China in the absence of more direct access to information.
  • Support for bilateral ties but increasing skepticism: Recent controversies involving Chinese companies’ local activities noticeably hurt China’s reputation during the coverage period. In 2020, opinions on Chinese influence in Peru were mixed, but a majority of polling respondents still supported increasing trade and improving bilateral relations.
  • Cooperation with local media: Chinese state media content was shared by both public and private mainstream outlets, including leading business newspapers. Peruvian state-owned media played a key role in disseminating pro-Beijing content. Most Chinese state media content is clearly labeled.
  • Subsidized press trips: Peruvian journalists participated in subsidized trips to China before the COVID-19 pandemic began. Both public and private media were represented at virtual regional media cooperation events organized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which sought to promote a “constructive journalism” model that privileged positive messaging.
  • Active and aggressive embassy: The Chinese embassy regularly engages with local broadcast outlets and provides opinion pieces that appear in mainstream publications. The embassy reacts strongly to local coverage of sensitive issues; in early 2020, for example, it challenged reports on the origins of COVID-19. It published “fact sheets” in response to local reporting of alleged influence-peddling by Chinese companies and official corruption; it also warned local politicians to “stop spreading lies immediately.” Diplomatic personnel reacted aggressively to local coverage that appeared to support Taiwanese independence and to perceived US efforts to “smear” Beijing’s regional relationships. This behavior may have prompted local journalists to engage more cautiously when covering China-related stories.
  • Propaganda and bilateral relations boosted by local voices: Chinese state media and diplomats regularly highlighted the strength of the Sino-Peruvian strategic partnership—bolstered by a large local ethnic Chinese, or tusan, population—as a foundation for mutually beneficial exchange. The embassy has actively engaged with the tusan community and has also worked to build relationships with local business leaders, academics, and politicians who often lend their influential voices to promote Beijing’s preferred narrative. Embassy communications frequently promoted strong trade links under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as growing overall cooperation. The embassy also highlighted bilateral landmarks such as the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2021.
  • Strong influence in diaspora media: The expatriate and diaspora population, which includes a significant Taiwanese population, is historic and large, estimated to be around 300,000. A variety of local Chinese-language outlets cater to both communities. Several diaspora outlets cooperate closely with the Chinese embassy, and researchers have noted that their editorial lines have become more supportive of Beijing. Relations between the diaspora and Beijing have grown alongside the overall Sino-Peruvian relationship, and pro-Beijing narratives now dominate the diaspora media environment.

 

  • No disinformation campaigns: There was no evidence of disinformation campaigns attributed to Chinese actors targeting or reaching news consumers in Peru during the coverage period. However, the Chinese embassy promoted misleading narratives to local audiences, including those aimed at countering US influence in the region or attempting to minimize Chinese actors’ culpability in local scandals related to the supply of COVID-19 vaccines and illegal fishing.
  • Strong journalism and legal protections: Peru has a strong history of investigative journalism, and major outlets have reported critically on environmental and labor issues related to Chinese investment in major mining projects. Local journalists revealed Chinese vaccine makers’ practice of sending “courtesy doses” to Peruvian officials as part of a wider vaccine-diplomacy effort. Established legal frameworks provide for the monitoring and regulation of media organizations and limit foreign ownership, serving as a foundation for resilience to corrupting or coercive Chinese media influence.
  • Media vulnerabilities: Researchers have noted the troubling rise of disinformation in Peru, particularly related to the pandemic and the 2021 elections. Government efforts to counter disinformation have been piecemeal and ineffective, and public trust in the media has diminished. Existing media regulations have failed to address a highly concentrated private media sector. The public media sector is highly centralized, posing a risk to journalistic pluralism. Powerful interests have wielded strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to punish critical reporting, particularly on controversial mining and environmental issues and on projects that have benefited from Chinese investment. According to local experts, most local coverage on China uncritically focuses on trade and investment. Local journalistic expertise on China is lacking, though private outlets use independent wire services to diversify their reporting.

header2 Background

Peru has a status of “Free” in Freedom in the World 2022, Freedom House’s annual study of political rights and civil liberties.1 The country has established democratic political institutions and has undergone multiple peaceful transfers of power. However, high-level corruption scandals have eroded public trust in government, while bitter divides within a highly fragmented political class have produced repeated political turmoil. Pedro Castillo of the leftist Perú Libre (Free Peru) party won the presidential race in June 2021, becoming Peru’s fifth president in five years, but he was impeached in December 2022 after attempting to dissolve Congress and form a provisional government. His vice president, Dina Boluarte, succeeded Castillo and called for a “national unity” government with support from right-wing forces.2 As the turmoil continued with Castillo’s supporters in the streets, she imposed a state of emergency.3 The Peruvian Armed Forces and police have been documented using severe force against left-wing and indigenous protestors who have led massive demonstrations against the government.4

The country has a robust and dynamic media sector, although high levels of ownership concentration have impacted pluralism. While television and radio are the most popular sources, significant majorities of the population also get their news from print and online media.5 The country has a significant urban-rural digital divide, and Peru ranks sixth in social media usage in Latin America.6 Platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok are the most popular, and Twitter’s reach in Peru is very limited7—although a large portion of its active users are likely to come from the country’s agenda-setting elite. A 2021 study showed that television and social media are trusted over radio or print as news sources.8 Peru has struggled with disinformation, particularly amid the pandemic and a highly polarized political climate.9 The country has a strong tradition of investigative journalism. However, reporters occasionally face harassment or intimidation, including physical assault, when reporting on sensitive topics such as corruption, social conflict, environmental issues, and organized crime. Harsh defamation laws and restricted access to public information also pose significant challenges to press freedom.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Peru established formal diplomatic relations on November 2, 1971. The two countries upgraded their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2013,10 and issued a statement in 2016 committing themselves to deepening this partnership in 2016.11 China is Peru’s largest trading partner, and the two countries signed a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2009. However, this FTA has not helped Peruvian efforts to diversify the country’s export sector, which remains reliant on the extraction of copper and other mineral commodities.12

Chinese state-owned companies have invested heavily in Peru, especially in the mining sector but also in telecommunications and construction.13 China Railway and several other Chinese companies were allegedly involved in a corruption scheme to rig the public tender process for at least 15 public works. The so-called Chinese Construction Club scandal became public during the Castillo administration but potentially involved corruption dating back to 2018. According to the Peruvian press, the Ministry of Transport tailored bidding requirements so that only Chinese banks could meet its conditions. As a result, the bidding process was cleared of competitors and the work was awarded to Chinese construction companies in exchange for a bribe.14

According to a 2022 estimate, Chinese companies held up to 19.7 percent of Peru’s mining investment portfolio, becoming the largest foreign investor in Peru’s mining sector.15 Chinese companies have invested in mega-infrastructure projects such as the $3.6 billion Chancay port project, currently the most important infrastructure project in Latin America.16 China’s COSCO Shipping holds a majority stake in this multipurpose port, which had potential military uses and has ignited many complaints both over its environmental impact17 and its geopolitical implications.18 In another major deal taking place beyond the coverage period, in April 2023, Italian energy firm Enel announced it was selling its Peruvian electricity business, which supplies power to northern Lima, to China Southern Power Grid International for $2.9 billion. The rest of Lima’s electricity supply had been sold in 2020 to another Chinese company, Three Gorges Corporation, which also owned Chaglla, one of Peru’s biggest hydroelectric dams.19 The Enel-CSGI agreement is still pending government approval. Despite these projects, China’s foreign direct investment in Peru is eclipsed by that of other countries like Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom.20

Peru is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum21 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).22 It joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 201923 and participates in the BRI’s Digital Silk Road initiative promoting Chinese cooperation on telecommunications and high-tech projects.24 Chinese diplomats regularly highlight the two countries’ close cultural ties, which they say are rooted in Peru’s strong Chinese diaspora population. Peru hosts four Confucius Institutes.25

In April 2019, Alan García, who had served as Peru’s president between 1985 and 1990 and again between 2006 and 2011 and was a close friend of China and the CCP, committed suicide as the police were on the way to his home to arrest him.26 García was under investigation in a multinational corruption scandal centered around Brazil’s Odebrecht construction company.27 During his time in office, he had moved Peru closer to China, pushing for the establishment of a strategic partnership and signing the FTA still in effect today. After the end of his second term, García even published a book in 2014 on Confucius and globalization in which he set out “to explain China” in order to “grow with it.”28

The Chinese expatriate and diaspora community in Peru is large, with a significant population of tusan Peruvians claiming at least partial Chinese heritage.29 Tusan population estimates vary widely, ranging from 14,307 people aged 12 and up self-identifying as tusan in the 2017 national census,30 to the PRC Ministry of Commerce’s estimating the community’s numbers at around 3 million.31 While this community’s roots date back to the 19th and 20th century—including a population with historic ties to Taiwan—a more recent generation that began arriving in the 1980s and 1990s was made up of relatively richer, more educated immigrants who maintained a stronger sense of national pride and closer ties with the PRC.32 The first wave of migrants arrived in Peru as indentured laborers in the mid-19th century to act as a replacement workforce as slavery was abolished, and gradually integrated into the Peruvian society by marrying Peruvians and forming families.33 They lost some of their connection to their homeland amid this integration, but many aspects of Chinese culture persisted, such as the Peruvian-Chinese chaufa cuisine that remains widespread in Peru.34 More than 200 Chinese associations focusing on business, community assistance, cultural heritage and more have developed over these waves of migration, and the CCP has leveraged these institutions as part of its campaign to appeal to Peruvian elites and to society at large.35

Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations with Peru but maintains an Economic and Cultural Office in Lima to represent its interests.36 A small but active community of practitioners of Falun Gong—the spiritual movement denounced by the CCP as a cult and banned in China—meets regularly in Lima and has worked to raise awareness about the CCP’s religious persecution and human rights abuses.37

Although Peru has suffered from constant political instability over the last decade, the relationship with the PRC has never been called into question.38 However, a growing number of civil society organizations have raised their voices against many of the Chinese-funded projects in the mining and infrastructure sectors. Those projects include the construction of 4G and prospective 5G telecommunications infrastructure using hardware and technology made by Huawei, a PRC-based company with close CCP ties and a record of building censorship and surveillance systems in China and abroad.39

header3 Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts

Propaganda and promotion of favored narratives

Key narratives

Between 2019 and 2021, the most dominant Chinese state media narratives in Peru focused on rhetoric that showcased the PRC’s strong economy and successful development model. Diplomats frequently promoted strengthening economic and trade ties between China and Peru,1 and pointed to Peru’s historic Chinese-heritage population as evidence for the two countries’ strong cultural ties.2 A special insert published in the state newspaper Diaro Oficial El Peruano commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Peru highlighted the progress of bilateral cooperation projects, such as the Chancay port and another project by China’s state-owned Shougang Group to build an iron mine in the Peruvian city of Marcona, and included articles written by friendly Peruvian voices with titles like “China: Our Most Important Commercial Partner.”3 The anniversary served as means to portray the relationship between the two countries as mutually beneficial.4

Efforts by the PRC to spread the narrative that the Chinese model had brought the country economic prosperity and lifted millions out of poverty have born fruit in Peru.5 Political leaders including President Castillo6 and Martín Vizcarra,7 who served as president from 2018 to 2020, as well as academics and intellectuals, have all played a part in disseminating these ideas.8

Op-eds by Chinese diplomats9 published in Peruvian media have highlighted China’s dedication to multilateralism and its leadership in green development, presenting the PRC as a benign and generous partner for international cooperation.10 These articles have particularly focused on the Chancay port and its importance for the BRI, portraying Peru as a key partner of China within that initiative.11 At the same time, Peruvian media outlets have not dedicated much coverage to the environmental impact of Chinese projects, or indeed to environmental issues in general.12

During the pandemic, Peruvian media narratives about China focused on the trials conducted at two top Peruvian universities—the National University of San Marcos (UNMSM) and Cayetano Heredia University (UPCH)—of the Chinese COVID-19 vaccine Sinopharm,13 and the so-called Vacunagate (Vaccinegate) scandal that first broke in February 2021 concerning the vaccine’s irregular distribution to members of Peru’s elite, including serving cabinet ministers and former President Vizcarra and his wife.14 Freedom House interviews with journalists corroborate the claims that politicians and other elite members of Peruvian society in Lima received doses of the vaccines outside of regular protocols.15 The scandal led to the resignations of President Francisco Sagasti’s health and foreign ministers.16

Of 3,200 extra vaccine doses media reports said were brought into Peru in September 2020, the Chinese embassy in Lima allegedly requested 1,200 doses to vaccinate embassy staff and employees of Chinese companies.17 When the scandal broke, China’s embassy published an official document denying that there had been any irregular vaccinations.18 The embassy published a second official document in July 2021 pushing back against doubts about Sinopharm’s effectiveness and safety.19 Despite the embassy’s efforts, the Vacunagate controversy continued and created a degree of distrust toward China and Chinese products. This is also one of the very few instances in which the Chinese embassy has publicly condemned and clarified what it qualified as “misinformation” by Peruvian politicians and media.

Peruvian media and journalism regarding China has largely concentrated on business, investment, and development. Peruvian journalists covering China usually focus on these issues, and even when demonstrations or political incidents take place, mainstream media do not provide in-depth coverage--at least from the perspective of the organizations involved.

Key avenues of content dissemination

  • Cooperation agreement between Peru’s and China’s state media: In 2016, the National Institute of Radio and Television of Peru (IRTP), the Peruvian state broadcaster also known as TV Perú, signed agreements with CCTV and with the agency that controlled the network and other Chinese state-owned television and radio stations, known at the time as the State Administration of Press and Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT). These broad agreements included the possibility of cooperation between the state media entities on coproductions, media training trips, management knowledge exchanges and content swaps. As a result, TV Perú has aired documentaries produced by CCTV’s international division CGTN, and CGTN also reportedly paid for Peruvian journalists to travel to China to receive training and produce a documentary.20 This agreement was followed by others reached in 2017 and 2019. El Peruano and the Andina news agency, both state-owned, frequently publish information provided by Xinhua and CGTN. In particular, El Peruano publishes all activities and information shared by the Chinese embassy in Lima,21 and was “honored” to receive a visit from Ambassador Song Yang in 2022.22
  • Growing number of Peruvian journalists trained in China: Since the 2018 creation of the China–Latin America and the Caribbean Press Center (CLACPC), the Chinese government has paid for Peruvian journalists, mainly from state media, to take training trips of up to six months to China to learn about Chinese culture and the media and journalism landscape there.23 These trips were interrupted by travel restrictions due to COVID-19, but a roundtable on Latin American and Caribbean journalism held in Beijing in 2023 included representation from Peruvian media.24
  • State-sponsored content in Peruvian media: Peru’s state publisher, the Peruvian Editorial Services Company (Editora Perú), has printed and distributed China Hoy magazine since 2009.25 The Spanish-language version of China Today, the official CCP outlet promotes Chinese government positions and has the stated objective of “sharing content on the reform and development of China, the life of its people and foreign relations, giving a timely and complete introduction to contemporary China, and interpreting the basic national situation of China,” as well as disseminating “Chinese positions and points of view … on pressing international affairs.”26 For example, an interview published in October 2022 with Carlos Aquino, director of the Center for Asian Studies at UNMSM, was entitled “China has eliminated extreme poverty and is a great example.”27 Mainstream Peruvian media like the newspaper El Comercio has also published advertorial content portraying a positive image of China,28 though El Comercio clearly labels this content as advertising.29
  • Vocal support from influential elites: Researchers have described a general positive consensus among the Peruvian political class towards China.30 The PRC has developed a “sharp power” strategy in Peru cultivating prominent elites, including former diplomats and high-ranking officials, journalists, opinion leaders, academics, and Sinologists, who frequently write in or are consulted by the local media and always “avoid sensitive topics and are never publicly critical of Beijing.”31 In addition, many members of the large population of Chinese descent living in Peru have become influential businesspeople and social leaders. They include José Sam, a vocal PRC supporter who has admitted to recruiting false donors as part of a scheme to violate campaign finance laws on behalf of the failed 2011 presidential bid of Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, and is currently under investigation.32
  • Chinese embassy’s role: The Chinese embassy in Peru is a frequent source of information for the local media. The Lima embassy’s account on Twitter, @ChinaEmbPeru, has over 11,000 followers.33 Although it is not the most active Chinese diplomatic account in the region, the embassy uses it not only to provide information to the media34 but also as a tool to “attack” or “respond” to articles or statements critical of China.35
  • Reliance on Chinese agencies in the absence of Peruvian correspondents: There are no Peruvian correspondents in the PRC, so media outlets in the Andean country use major international news agencies such as EFE, Reuters or the Associated Press (AP) as sources, mixing their reporting with information provided by Chinese state media like Xinhua or CGTN.

Disinformation campaigns

For the purposes of this report, disinformation is defined as the purposeful dissemination of false or misleading content, especially by engaging in inauthentic activity (such as via fake accounts) on global social media platforms. Researchers found no evidence of Chinese state-linked disinformation networks targeting or reaching audiences in Peru between 2019 and 2021. However, both in Peru and globally, Chinese state media and diplomats promoted misleading CCP talking points on topics such as China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the origins of COVID-19.36 A 2021 report by Global Americans found that Chinese and Russian state media outlets were “manipulating information, omitting data, and pushing propaganda with a political bias” in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and noted that the Chinese embassy’s social media statements in response to Sinopharm vaccine efficacy concerns and Vacunagate were uncritically reproduced by Peruvian state media and may have exacerbated Peruvian citizens’ existing frustrations with their government.37 More recently, in 2023, Chinese ambassador Song published a misleading op-ed in the major Peruvian newspaper La República referring to “Chinese-style democracy” contributing “to the creation of a new human civilization,” although the piece did not get much traction.38

Censorship and intimidation

In 2021, Ernesto Bustamante, a molecular biologist then running for a seat in Peru’s Congress, denounced the Chinese embassy over the Vacunagate scandal, and alleged that the Sinopharm vaccine’s effectiveness against COVID-19 was comparable to that of distilled water. Bustamante also had stridently criticized Chinese human rights violations.39 The Chinese embassy responded swiftly with a press release, republished by major media outlets, that accused Bustamante of defamation, and he retracted his statements.40 Months later, after entering Congress and being named chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Bustamante met with the Chinese ambassador and expressed they had a “friendly and positive” meeting, with no indication that they had discussed Chinese human rights issues.41

Another strong response by the Chinese embassy in Peru was targeted towards Peruvian Nobel Prize winning–novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. After alleging in a March 2020 column—which ran in Spain’s El País newspaper and was syndicated in Peruvian and other Latin American newspapers—that the PRC had tried to cover-up the emergence of the coronavirus in China,42 he said in interviews that if “China was a democracy and not a dictatorship the story of the coronavirus would be much different.”43 The Chinese embassy in Peru replied in a statement that “we respect free speech, but that does not imply accepting arbitrary defamations and stigmatizations.”44 The same day, El País reported that books by Vargas Llosa were being censored in China.45

The Chinese embassy in Peru also appears to have attempted to censor and intimidate the local Falun Gong organization, the Falun Dafa Association of Peru. In 2019, an art exhibit organized by the Falun Dafa Association at the Peruvian Ministry of Culture was abruptly canceled three days after it opened for unclear reasons. The association and some media outlets stated that the closure was connected to pressure from the Chinese government.46 Months after this incident, the Falun Dafa Association and organizers of the Falun Gong–affiliated Shen Yun dance show alleged that the Grand National Theater in Lima had succumbed to diplomatic pressure and had refused to rent the hall to them.47 This case got more attention from the press, and the Chinese embassy in Lima issued a statement on the “truth of the so-called Shen Yun spectacle.” The embassy said that the shows “contain a large number of elements that encourage the heretical doctrines of Falun Gong and sneakily attack China and its people,” and that the Falun Gong movement “seriously violated human rights and deeply harmed society,” and urged Peruvians not to go to the Shen Yun show.48

Control over content distribution infrastructure

Over 60 percent of Peruvians use the TV to inform themselves daily, while less than 30 percent use newspapers.49 Major paid TV operators offer CGTN, but only 21 percent of the houses have cable and satellite television.50

In December 2021, there were more than 43 million mobile lines in Peru—almost 130 lines per 100 people in the country.51 The market for mobile service providers is split almost equally between four companies, none of which are linked to the PRC participation. However, all four companies use Huawei hardware.52

In July 2019, Peru’s National Telecommunications Program (Pronatel), a program linked to the Ministry of Transport and Communications aimed at expanding telecom services throughout the nation, signed contracts with a Chinese-Peruvian consortium to build a fiber-optic network connecting nearly 1 million people in rural Amazonian and Andean regions to the internet. The group awarded the contracts, the YOFC Network, had been formed by the Chinese telecommunications company Yangtze Optical Fiber and Cable (YOFC) and Peru’s Yachay Telecomunicaciones.53 The project is underway, but very little information is available on its progress.54

Most recently, the PRC minister of industry and information technology visited Lima in May 2023 and expressed Chinese operators’ intention to cooperate with the Spanish-based telecommunications multinational Telefónica and learn how to navigate the Latin American market.55 In Peru, Telefónica controls 51 percent of the market for telephone landlines, 28 percent of mobile lines, 46 percent of the internet service provider (ISP) market and 52 percent of paid TV subscriptions.56 Should the cooperation between the PRC and Telefónica come to fruition, Chinese companies could benefit from Telefónica’s historical experience in the telecom sector in Peru and its strong market position there.

Chinese companies have an important presence in Peru’s cellular phone market. Xiaomi is the country’s second-largest cellphone brand, and Chinese phone makers have a combined market share of 42 percent, surpassing South Korea’s Samsung, the leader in the Peruvian mobile phone market.57

Peru has over 28 million social media users.58 The short-form video platform TikTok, a subsidiary of the Beijing-based social media company ByteDance, reported that it had 12.17 million users in Peru aged 18 and older in early 2022,59 and it was the most downloaded social media app in the country according to data reported later that year.60

Dissemination of CCP media norms, tactics, or governance models

In November 2016, President Xi Jinping participated in the opening ceremony of the China–Latin America Media Leaders Summit at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile. In front of over 70 Latin American representatives of media outlets (all selected by the Chinese authorities),61 Xi promised to train 500 Latin American and Caribbean media professionals over the following five years, with the intention to “show the world a more authentic and vibrant China as well as Latin America.”62 Among those present in the audience was Carlos Becerra, then president of the board of Editora Perú, which published El Peruano and operated the Andina agency.

Following the Santiago meeting, CGTN and Latin American and Caribbean media leaders, with Peru represented by the head of Andina, launched an initiative in 2021 to promote media cooperation between the regions.63

The Peruvian state broadcaster IRTP has signed three cooperation agreements with Chinese state media: the first one in 2016 with CCTV,64 a content- and professional-exchange agreement with the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA) in 2017,65 and another in 2019 with Chongqing Radio and Television Association.66 The initial 2016 agreement signed between IRPT and CCTV was at the time the most comprehensive signed by Peru with a non–Latin American or Spanish-speaking country.67

The Latin American Informative Alliance (AIL), a non-profit association for private television companies across Latin America that includes the Peruvian station Latina Televisión, signed another such content-sharing agreement with CMG in August 2020 with the stated goal of facilitating better coverage of COVID-19.68 The deal was inked at the Latin America Partners Media Cooperation Online Forum organized by CCTV and ECLAC in Beijing, at which Juan Pablo Olivares, Latina’s CEO at the time, was one of the invited speakers.69

A number of Peruvian journalists have been invited to the PRC for training following Xi’s 2016 pledge. One such journalist, Sonia Millones of Andina and El Peruano, went to Beijing in 2018 to take part in a six-month training at CLACPC.70 Since the press center was created, there has frequently been a Peruvian journalist among the more than 100 journalists who have participated in residencies there.71

A clear attempt to explain and justify CCP media norms from a Peruvian media perspective can be seen in a video project produced by the communications program at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP) called “Doing journalism in China: Peruvian experiences.” In this video, five Peruvian journalists explain to journalism students in Peru what it is like to be a journalist in the PRC. One of their main pieces of advice is to be “humble” when arriving in Beijing, and they emphasize China’s size, importance and long history, implying that viewers should not question the system.72

Chinese diaspora media

The Chinese community in Peru is the biggest in Latin America, after three migration waves that began in the mid-1800s.73 China’s Ministry of Commerce considers there to be about 3 million tusans, meaning that almost 10% of the Peruvian population is of Chinese descent.74 This community includes people who maintain a strong bond with the PRC because they came to Peru in the third and most recent wave and still hold Chinese citizenship, as well as others who are very supportive of their motherland regime even though they are not Chinese citizens.75 The latest Peruvian census in Peru, conducted in 2017, indicated that the tusan population is much smaller. In a question asking respondents ages 12 and over to self-identify their ethnicity, 14,307, or less than 0.1 percent, self-identified as tusan out of a total 23 million.76 That question was widely criticized, however, because it listed Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian ethnicities to choose from, but required respondents wanting to list other ethnic origins like tusan or Chinese to select “other” and write those ethnicities in.77

The report Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, published by the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the U.S-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED), includes a chapter explaining the importance ascribed by the PRC to the migrant community in Peru. China, the report says, deploys a policy of seduction toward the community known as qiaowu, “an evolving strategy of behavioral control and manipulation of Chinese groups abroad through micro-management techniques.”78 In Peru, these efforts are channeled through the Chinese Central Benevolent Association and the Association of Chinese Companies in Peru (AECP), both of which acknowledge that they receive support from the PRC.79

Accordingly, the diaspora media in Peru is diverse. The CCP-linked Global Chinese Media Cooperation Union (GCMCU) lists three Peruvian outlets amongst its members: the Chinese-language newspapers La Voz de la Colonia China (秘鲁《公言报》), Diario Nuevo Mundo (秘鲁新世界日報), and Diario Comercial Peruano Chino (秘华商报).80

La Voz de la Colonia China is the oldest Chinese newspaper in South America.81 Founded in 1910, it is currently supported by the Chinese Central Benevolent Association. Its director, Ming Kexin, is also a reporter for the CCP’s Global Times tabloid and published a book with the support of Editora Perú.82 The GCMCU states that La Voz de la Colonia China “has a rich historical heritage” and is “an overseas Chinese newspaper that has been cared for by the Chinese party and state leaders.”83

Diario Nuevo Mundo, which is published by the Peruvian-Chinese Friendship Foundation,84 and Diario Comercial Peruano Chino85 frequently use PRC-linked media sources, as do Oriental86 and another Spanish-language magazine, Integración, both of which focus on non-sensitive cultural issues.87

Though La Voz de la Colonia China does not have a website, it is active on the Chinese social media app WeChat, where it has thousands of followers.88 Diario Nuevo Mundo and Diario Comercial Peruano Chino publish online as well as print editions, but both newspapers’ websites have low traffic.89

header4 Resilience + Response

Underlying media resilience

  • Concentrated but dynamic media ecosystem: Peruvian media outlets are mostly privately owned. There is a high level of concentration: Grupo El Comercio, which has a business-friendly approach, controls more than 80% of the print market, while the remaining market share belongs to Grupo La República, whose flagship La República newspaper takes a leftist and anti-American approach.1 However, the media ecosystem has proved to be dynamic, creating new digital media outlets serving different audiences with quality journalism.2
  • Active investigative journalism: Peru has a strong tradition of investigative journalism,3 with digital outlets such as Ojo Público or IDL-Reporteros, working to uncover corrupt practices against all odds.4. However, they largely focus on Peruvian internal political affairs. Media in Peru largely lack specialized personnel or knowledge on China.
  • Active defenders of press freedom: Despite restrictions, threats, and other obstacles to sharing information, freedom of expression and the press prevails in Peru. Peruvian media outlets and journalism display a diversity of opinion, and citizens and civil society organizations are active in the defense of freedom of expression.5
  • Legal safeguards against media monopolies and foreign investment: Peru’s constitution prohibits media exclusivity, monopoly, and concentration, calling them illegal practices that undermine the freedom of expression and information.6 However, this prohibition only applies to radio and TV monopolies, and does not include printed or other media. Peru has passed legislation protecting net neutrality, but exceptions allow the government to block websites and apps and enforcement is reportedly nonexistent.7

China-specific resilience

  • Environmental civil society organizations’ attention to the PRC: A strong alliance of civil society organizations works to protect the Amazon region, which includes 60 percent of Peruvian territory as well as parts of Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. Coalitions like the Collective on Chinese Financing and Investments, Human Rights and Environment (CICDHA),8 Red Muqui,9 and the Regional Group on Financing and Infrastructure (GREFI)10 monitor Chinese investments in the region, providing information to journalists and policy makers to shine a light on Chinese companies’ activities. Combining their concerns about the environment and the human rights of Indigenous peoples in the Amazon and beyond, they advocate for more transparent and horizontal relations with the PRC.11
  • Critical investigative journalism: Peruvian investigative journalists have done a meticulous work on Vacunagate.12 However, many media platforms remained notably silent on the Chinese embassy’s role in the scandal, possibly in order to avoid implicating Chinese diplomats.13

header5 Vulnerabilities

  • Lack of knowledge and elite capture: Peruvian journalists and academics overall have very little knowledge on China affairs and pay little attention to them, except for those who have taken part in training trips to China or have a strong relationship with the PRC. Mainstream media reports tend to convey these Chinese-linked experts’ widely positive views on China to the public, leaving little or no space for critical views.
  • Political instability, widespread corruption and business as usual: Peru has gone through six different presidents over the last five years, meaning that, since 2016, no president has been able to complete their term.1 A highly polarized and fragmented Congress and widespread corruption are frequently cited as the causes of this political instability.2 However, the Peruvian economy has managed to maintain a certain level of macroeconomic stability, allowing for Chinese companies operating in Peru to continue doing business as usual.3 This combination of political and social turmoil with economic stability is beneficial for PRC-connected companies seeking to avoid scrutiny.
  • Ongoing political risks to freedom of expression: Political instability and social unrest have an impact on press freedom, and freedom of the press and of free expression have deteriorated over the last several years.4 Social and political actors use disinformation to disseminate narratives that ultimately deepen polarization and political conflict, increasing risks that impede quality journalism.5
  • Lack of transparency in media ownership: Radio and television ownership and market share are opaque. While the Radio and Television Law of 2004 limits the number of radio and television licenses that a single operator can hold, print and online media are not subject to any specific antimonopoly laws. Media cross-ownership is also not prohibited. The state broadcaster IRTP lacks editorial autonomy, and production is highly centralized.6

header6 Impact and Public Opinion

According to Latinobarómetro’s 2020 survey, almost 50 percent of Peruvian respondents said they had a positive opinion of China, more than nine percentage points lower than the number of Peruvians who thought positively of the United States but slightly better than Peruvian opinion about Russia.1 Journalists have a slightly worse opinion of Chinese influence in Peru, since 54 percent of those surveyed by the China Network in 2022 considered it to have a negative effect.2 Researcher Kerry Ratigan said in a 2021 paper that data collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) over the preceding decade “suggest a stable and favorable impression of China but do not point to a strong or dramatically increasing interest in adopting China’s system as a model for Peru.”3 Ratigan also found that Peruvians who follow the news more frequently were more likely to choose China as a model in a 2017 LAPOP survey, although she did not find statistically significant differences in data collected in 2012 or 2014.

A 2022 China Index project ranked Peru fifth on a list of countries that were most exposed to PRC influence. Even more concerning, the project’s work showed that that influence has had a high level of effect on Peru, which it defined as the “degree of accommodations the target country makes to the PRC, and the actual effects and impacts.”4

The high level of Chinese influence and its positive perception in Peru is likely due to the Peruvian media usually portraying the PRC as a success story and an emerging world power that brings economic stability and earnings to Peru, paying little or no attention to China’s flaws or the environmental and social impact of doing business with China.5

Some concerns are finally being raised about the future of the Chinese economy and its impact on Peru, given how entwined the two economies have become; in 2021, almost 50 percent of Peru’s mining-sector exports went to China. Over the last decade, mining has contributed 9 percent to the Peruvian GDP, and represented 60 percent of Peruvian exports.6

  • 1Latinobarómetro, “K_004 Opinión sobre paises” [K_004 Opinion about countries] in “Latinobarómetro 2020: Peru,” Latinobarómetro, accessed September 21, 2023, https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp.
  • 2Worthington, The China Network.
  • 3Kerry Ratigan, “Are Peruvians Enticed by the ‘China Model’? Chinese Investment and Public Opinion in Peru,” Studies in Comparative International Development 56, no. 1 (March 18, 2021): 87–111, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-021-09321-0.
  • 4Doublethink Lab and China in the World, “Peru,” 2021, in China Index 2022, Doublethink Lab and China in the World, accessed September 21, 2023, https://china-index.io/country/Peru.
  • 5Cardenal, “Reframing Relations in Peru.”
  • 6“¿Qué impacto tendría la desaceleración china sobre la economía peruana?” [What impact would the Chinese slowdown have on the Peruvian economy?], Sociedad de Comercio Exterior del Perú (ComexPerú), July 1, 2022, https://www.comexperu.org.pe/articulo/que-impacto-tendria-la-desacelera….

header7 Future Trajectory

The following are key areas related to Beijing’s media influence in Peru that researchers, journalists, media experts and officials should watch in the coming years.

  • Internal political situation: As a young and fragile democracy, Peru is struggling to sustain its democratic institutions amidst a wave of social unrest, political polarization, and widespread corruption. Although this is not obviously linked to Peru’s economic and political relations with the PRC, constant changes in leadership, sluggish decision-making, and massive street protests may harm and endanger the PRC’s economic interest in Peru. At the same time, if democracy in Peru deteriorates, Beijing will continue supporting any government in power with no regard for its ideology or adherence to rule of law.
  • Chinese investments in question: As the PRC continues to invest in big infrastructure projects, like the Chancay port and mining projects in the Andes and the Amazon that affect Indigenous populations, more social unrest should be expected in those areas. The way an unstable government deals with these situations that at the same time impact Peru’s economy will be instructive, as will how the mainstream media portrays claims, demands and denunciations arising from this tension.
  • Media financial stability: As with political stability, the financial stability of Peru’s media is in question. The business model of media outlets is being tested by the rise of social media and the dissemination of disinformation. New outlets with new business models, like nonprofit media organizations, are on the rise, but it is not yet clear if they will be sustainable. The PRC will likely take advantage of this situation in Peru to continue consolidating its positive image and increasing its leverage within government and society.

On Peru

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Country Facts

  • Population

    34,050,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    67 100 partly free