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Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Nations in Transit 2023

Poland

Semi-Consolidated Democracy
59
100
DEMOCRACY-PERCENTAGE Democracy Percentage 58.93 100
DEMOCRACY-SCORE Democracy Score 4.54 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
59 100 Semi-Consolidated Democracy
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
People in Kraków, Poland. Editorial credit: brunocoelho / Shutterstock.com

header1 Authors

  • Anna Wójcik and Miłosz Wiatrowski-Bujacz

header2 Score changes in 2023

  • No score changes in 2023

header3 Executive Summary

In 2022, Poland’s democracy was heavily impacted by the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including security threats, millions fleeing the war, the energy crisis, and economic turmoil. The governing United Right coalition has not reversed key structural elements of the general democratic backsliding that has been ongoing since 2015 and specific human rights restrictions introduced in recent years.

Already operating in campaign mode ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for 2023, politicians from the coalition warned of threats to Poland from both the East and the West and have continued a dispute with the European Union (EU) over rule of law standards, notably judicial independence. At the end of 2022, pressured economically and planning further military spending, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) government promised to make certain concessions to the EU to unlock billion of euros for Poland from EU’s post-pandemic Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). However, due to deepening fractures in the ruling coalition and threat of a presidential veto of the proposed bills on the judiciary, the PiS party found itself unable to deliver on its promised reforms.

Poland has demonstrated leadership in providing political, military, humanitarian, and economic help to Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, which bolstered its international position and distanced it from Hungary, another EU member state with a rule-of-law–breaking record. Civil society in Poland has generously welcomed millions fleeing Ukraine and has borne most of the burden of resettling them, particularly during the initial months of the conflict. Polish authorities adopted an open-door policy for all fleeing Ukraine irrespective of citizenship and introduced legal protections to Ukrainian refugees, legalizing their stay, providing them Polish identification numbers (PESEL), and granting access to the labor market, health care, and welfare benefits. At the same time, authorities continued to illegally push back migrants and refugees crossing the Polish border from authoritarian Belarus. The authorities also harassed civil society activists providing humanitarian aid to those crossing the Belarusian border.

The government has significantly increased military spending, surpassing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) targets by a considerable margin. It aims to be a crucial ally of the United States in Europe and has actively advocated for assistance to Ukraine, as well as supporting its path towards NATO and EU membership—a stance aligned with the policies of most Central and Eastern European and Nordic democracies.

The early launch of the governing PiS’s campaign for the 2023 parliamentary elections has had a polarizing effect on society on cultural and identity matters. Leading PiS politicians, including the party chairman Jarosław Kaczyński, stirred anti-German sentiment, provoking tensions between the two NATO allies and EU partners. Given that the vast majority of Poles staunchly support Poland’s EU membership and moderate voters are wary of the prospect of Poland’s departure from the EU, which could result from an aggressive PiS policy towards Europe, the ruling party refrained from directly attacking the EU in its campaign. Instead, it opted to convey the message that the EU effectively represents Germany, historically perceived as one of Poland’s primary adversaries alongside Russia. In PiS propaganda, this influential neighbor was depicted as seeking to subordinate Poland under the guise of false friendship and partnership. This nationalist narrative gained traction in the initial weeks of Russia’s war against Ukraine, particularly as the German government’s communications about its policy regarding Russia and Ukraine appeared chaotic and inconsistent, raising suspicion among the Polish public about whether Berlin will alter its longstanding Russia-oriented Eastern policy.

Campaigning PiS politicians have also chosen to escalate a culture war, primarily focusing on issues of LGBT+ rights and visibility, as well as the societal position of young women. This strategy is aimed to mobilize core PiS voters, who tend to be more conservative, older, less affluent, and reside in rural areas or small towns.

Throughout the year, internal divisions within the ruling coalition became increasingly apparent. United Poland (now Sovereign Poland), the party of the influential justice minister and prosecutor general Zbigniew Ziobro, hardened its course towards the EU, defending the changes Poland had made to the judiciary made since 2015. However, the PiS leadership, including Kaczyński and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, have openly admitted that the changes in the courts have not brought the expected results and that it takes longer to hear cases as a result.

In July, President Andrzej Duda sponsored an amendment to the Act on the Supreme Court, which resulted in the abolition of the court’s controversial Disciplinary Chamber. This chamber had been widely criticized for its role in harassing judges who spoke out against the changes in the judiciary implemented since 2015. However, the replacement, the Chamber of Professional Responsibility, failed to adequately address key EU concerns regarding judicial independence. Consequently, the European Commission argued that rule of law milestones had not been met, leading to accusations from the PiS of broken promises and threats of legal actions against the EU. Despite these tensions, the PiS government, with a new minister for European affairs, attempted dialogue with the European Commission, especially as Poland’s economic situation worsened. However, by the end of the year, it had not implemented any meaningful changes to the judicial system. This lack of progress strained relations between Poland and the EU, raising concerns about Poland’s commitment to upholding the rule of law and meeting its obligations as an EU member state.

As the year progressed, Polish society has experienced severe cost-of-living challenges, due to skyrocketing inflation, high energy prices, supply chain disruptions, increased mortgage costs, and an economic slowdown. These pressures compelled the government to pursue compromises with EU institutions regarding access to EU funds. In June, Prime Minister Morawiecki agreed with the European Commission on the rule of law conditions, known as “milestones,” in Poland’s €35.4 billion ($36.9 billion) Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF) plan. PiS’s coalition partner United Poland criticized the terms negotiated by Morawiecki.

In 2022, Poland faced its most challenging security and economic circumstances in decades, leading to a significant decline in the ruling party’s popularity in opinion polls. Despite this, at the end of the year, the PiS remained the most favored party among those intending to vote. However, the coalition of opposition parties seemed to have certain advantages. Economic challenges constrained PiS from implementing generous new universal welfare benefits, forcing them to focus on alleviating economic hardships for their core supporters. Initiatives such as plans to increase pensions in 2023 or providing a coal allowance for rural residents who use that fuel to heat their homes exemplify this strategy. PiS opted to concentrate on mobilizing its core voters rather than seeking new support among younger demographics. In contrast, the opposition parties directed their attention towards younger voters, addressing economic issues, advocating for a friendly stance towards the EU, promising an effective energy transition and better agricultural policies, and pledging to uphold women’s rights and improve their social status. The differing strategies of PiS and the opposition reflect their approaches to governance and their perceptions of voter priorities. While PiS focuses on maintaining its existing base of support, the opposition aims to attract younger voters by addressing contemporary concerns and offering progressive policies.

header4 At-A-Glance

The institutional deterioration that has taken place in Poland over the past several years continues to undermine national democratic governance. Electoral integrity remains under pressure due to changes that impact election fairness, such as the politicization of the electoral commission and public television bias, and that have yet to be reversed. Civil society has led an unprecedented mobilization to help those fleeing war from Ukraine despite the government’s favoring of specific organizations and harassing providers of humanitarian aid to those crossing the border from Belarus. Journalists continue to face legal harassment, in particular through strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), while state-funded media offers one-sided, highly politicized coverage that closely mirrors the official narrative of the ruling party. The central government continues its policy of shifting additional financial responsibilities to local authorities without proper compensation, putting the local government’s budgetary health in peril. Only cosmetic changes were made to the Supreme Court, and no structural guarantees of judicial independence, which has been dismantled in recent years, have been reintroduced. At the same time, the government remains inactive on combating corruption despite its numerous proclamations to the contrary.

National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 3.504 7.007
  • The most consequential political event in Poland in 2022 was Russian president Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th. This act of aggression had far-reaching consequences for Poland on multiple fronts, including security, defense, economy, and society. Poland’s ruling PiS party responded to both the domestic and the international consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The deteriorating economic situation forced the government to offer concessions in the dispute with the EU over the rule of law in Poland. However, the government continued its illiberal course and anti-German campaign.
  • The impact of the Russian invasion led to a partial realignment of the PiS government's European policy. While the Polish government supported EU actions towards Ukraine and Russia, it still stirred anti-German sentiment due to Germany’s initial reluctance to provide comprehensive assistance to Ukraine and its relatively milder approach towards Russia. Poland’s government also criticized attempts by France’s President Emmanuel Macron to maintain open lines of communication with Putin.1,2
  • Since the onset of the invasion until the end of the year, Poland experienced an unprecedented influx of approximately 8.5 million refugees from Ukraine. At its peak, the daily number of individuals crossing the Ukrainian-Polish border reached nearly 150,000. In March, Poland established a new legal regime tailored for refugees from Ukraine and provided certain benefits to ease their integration into Polish society. Ukrainian citizens who fled the country after the invasion were allowed to reside in Poland for up to 18 months without additional requirements, and were guaranteed free access to various services, including rail travel.3
  • It was alleged in February that the state used Pegasus spyware software against opposition politicians and its prominent critics in civil society.4 The government confirmed its purchase of the spyware program from NSO Group, its Israeli developer. The opposition-controlled Senate—the upper house of Poland’s Parliament—created a special committee to investigate the use of advanced surveillance tools against politicians, journalists, judges, attorneys, and prosecutors.
  • Poland supported international and EU sanctions targeting Russia, including an embargo on the import of fossil fuels. In April, Russia’s state-owned energy company Gazprom ceased supplying Poland due to the Poland’s refusal to make payments in Russian rubles.5 Poland’s economy remained resilient in the face of the end to Russian fuel sales, avoiding any emergency suspensions of industrial production or halts in electricity or heating supply.
  • On the 12th anniversary of the plane crash near Smolensk on April 10th, 2010, that had killed Polish president Lech Kaczyński and 95 others, a special parliamentary subcommittee led by deputy PiS leader and former national defense minister Antoni Macierewicz released its final report. claiming that the crash resulted from an “act of lawless foreign interference” and alleged the presence of explosives on multiple parts of the plane wreckage. Previous official investigations had found no evidence of foul play. The findings of Macierewicz’s subcommittee lack international corroboration and were criticized for partisan appointments and disregard for countervailing evidence.6
  • In June, Kaczyński resigned as deputy prime minister overseeing security, stating he needed to focus on his duties as PiS leader ahead of the 2023 elections.7 National Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak succeeded him as deputy prime minister, while also keeping his former portfolio.
  • In July, a bill introduced by the president on the Supreme Court entered into force, replacing the court’s contested Disciplinary Chamber with a new Chamber of Professional Responsibility.8 However, the European Commission considered that the new chamber will not guarantee that judges’ disciplinary cases are heard by an independent court as required by EU law. Subsequently, the Polish government did not apply for the first tranche of funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
  • The Polish government formally requested war reparations from Germany in a diplomatic note in September, citing damages from World War II totaling $1.5 trillion. Germany responded that the request was unfounded, referring to the 1953 decision by the government of the Polish People’s Republic to waive further reparation claims.9
  • In November, two Polish citizens lost their lives when a missile struck a civilian building in Przewodów, just 4 miles from the Polish-Ukrainian border. The incident prompted initial concerns and raised questions about NATO’s collective defense obligations. However, Poland determined it was a tragic accident and that the missile was Ukrainian.10
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 5.756 7.007
  • Local elections were rescheduled to 2024 to avoid overlapping with the general elections anticipated to take place in 2023.1 In the latter half of 2022, the general election campaign was already in progress, although no specific date had been announced for the general elections. As the ratings of the PiS party declined, party chairman Kaczyński repeatedly warned of election fraud by the opposition and called for an “election protection corps.”2
  • Kaczyński rallied support from constituents in smaller towns and rural areas ahead of the official campaign throughout 2022. His party intensified its anti-German rhetoric, with the PiS pushing the narrative that the European Union serves as a facade for Germany and advocating for increased sovereignty.3 The party focused on redistribution, particularly targeting elderly and lower-income voters, and opposed what it perceived as the EU’s imposition of “ideological madness,” notably regarding LGBT+ rights.4
  • Opposition parties included the centrist-liberal Civic Platform (PO) led by former Polish prime minister and European Council president Donald Tusk, the moderate center-right Poland 2050 and Polish People’s Party (PSL), the Left, and the far-right Confederation, Liberty, and Independence party. PO focused on younger voters and women, with a message centered on good relations with the EU, restoring the rule of law, expanding LGBT+ rights and women’s rights, and liberalizing Poland’s abortion law.5 Poland 2050 and PSL focused on more conservative voters dissatisfied with both the PiS government and the PO-led administration that preceded it. The Left aimed to attract the young peoples’ and women’s votes by focusing on housing policy, women’s rights, and LGBT+ rights. The Confederation party targeted young men with a program of lowering taxes, promoting entrepreneurship, and enacting a conservative social agenda.
  • In November, a European Parliament committee of inquiry investigating the use of Pegasus and similar surveillance spyware found that the purported use of the spyware against a senator who headed an opposition party’s campaign may have influenced the general elections in Poland in 2019. Additionally, the alleged use of spyware against a prosecutor who was investigating the legality of a presidential election planned to be conducted entirely by mail during the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020—later rescheduled to June—may have had adverse effects on the election’s fairness.6
  • In November, PiS introduced a draft amendment to the electoral law, proposing a new method of vote counting and an expansion of the number of polling places with the aim of boosting voter turnout. This proposed change is particularly significant in rural areas, where the density of voting locations is lower and where PiS’s targeted voter demographic resides.7 The increased presence of polling places in these areas could potentially bolster support for PiS among its target constituency.
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 5.506 7.007
  • In January, the District Court in Płock, in a final judgement, upheld a ruling that three LGBT+ rights activists had did not breached criminal law provisions against “insulting religious feelings” by placing stickers with an image of a religious icon adorned with a rainbow halo in public spaces.1
  • Poland maintained a strict ban on abortion that barred the procedure unless it was necessary to save the pregnant person’s life or health or the pregnancy resulted from a crime, and a 2020 ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal narrowed the abortion law’s exceptions further by making it illegal to abort fetuses with congenital defects. In January 2022, a woman pregnant with twins died in Częstochowa Hospital after a month of declining health, when doctors first would not remove one fetus after it died in her womb, and then refused to terminate her pregnancy until days after the second fetus’s heart stopped beating. This case was interpreted as resulting from chilling effect on doctors due to Poland’s restrictive abortion law.2
  • Since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022, an estimated 7.5 million people fleeing from Ukraine have crossed to Poland, 1.5 million of whom registered for temporary protection allowing them to reside and work in the country.3 Civil society in Poland demonstrated great solidarity towards Ukrainians fleeing the war. Private individuals and businesses shouldered most of the burden of welcoming them, providing shelter, food, and transportation. According to a survey by the Polish Economic Institute (PEI), between the start of the war in February and May, 77 percent of Polish adults supported Ukrainians through financial and material assistance.4 At the end of 2022, positive attitudes towards Ukrainians remained highly positive.5
  • The migration crisis on the Belarus-Poland border, which began in mid-2021, persisted. Polish authorities kept pushing back people who crossed the border, denying them access to the asylum process despite court rulings deeming such actions illegal.6 In June, Poland finished work on a 186-kilometer (116-mile) border wall erected on the border with Belarus.7 Civil society groups continued to provide assistance to individuals who crossed the border and found themselves in the militarized border zone, and are often harassed by authorities.8 In March, the Border Guard detained four activists providing humanitarian help on suspicion that they were illegally smuggling people across the border, a crime punishable by up to eight years of imprisonment. In April, the District Court in Białystok rejected the prosecution’s request that they be detained prior to their trial.9
  • Dozens of local authorities in Poland maintained resolutions declaring their intention to protect the “traditional family” that were aimed against the LGBT+ community. However, in 2022, regional administrative courts continued to rule that local resolutions discriminatory to LGBT+ individuals are illegal. The rulings were appealed by politically controlled prosecutors and government-aligned civil society organizations.10 In June, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed one of these appeals.11
  • In December, President Duda vetoed a controversial bill that critics said would increase political control over schools and bar nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from giving lessons there.12
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 4.254 7.007
  • The ban on journalists’ activity within 200 meters (656 feet) of the Polish-Belarusian border, first introduced as part of a state of emergency in communes near the border in September 2021, remained in force throughout the entirety of 2022 despite the state of emergency having expired in December 2021.1
  • An EU-wide report on media freedom in 2022 prepared by the union’s Media Freedom Rapid Response (MRFF) project identified at least 21 instances of harassment of journalists in Poland. Polish cases mostly consisted of legal intimidation—in particular through strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)—and other forms of state-driven harassment.2
  • In March, Piotr Maślak, a TOK FM Radio journalist, was charged by the prosecutor’s office with defaming and insulting officers of the Polish Border Guard for criticizing their actions towards asylum-seekers. The case was brought by the minister of the interior and administration, Mariusz Kamiński of PiS, and by individual Border Guard members.3 In May, investigative journalist Grzegorz Rzeczkowski, a regular target of lawsuits brought by the ruling camp, was found guilty of defamation over articles he had written in the weekly newsmagazine Polityka in 2018 about a 2014 wiretapping scandal. Polityka had dismissed Rzeczkowski in January without a clear reason, in what media advocates said might be an attempt to avoid the legal costs associated with defending him against SLAPPs.4 In October, Tomasz Piątek, a well-known investigative journalist and author of a series of books accusing multiple high-ranked government members, including Prime Minister Morawiecki, of corrupt practices, was sentenced to eight months of community service after he lost a SLAPP brought by a businessman and former PO senator.5
  • In June, the District Court in Warsaw, the Polish capital, ruled that the public broadcaster TVP must issue an apology and pay approximately $2,200 to the Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH) rights group for airing the film Inwazja (Invasion) during prime time in the 2019 general elections campaign, as the film vilified the LGBT+ community and presented PiS as the sole defender against “LGBT ideology.”6
  • In October, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), a media regulator with the power to revoke broadcasting licenses, was appointed for a four-year term. Among its five members, four are affiliated with the ruling camp and are staunch critics of commercial media outlets that do not share the government’s perspective.7
  • Public media is aligned with the ruling party and actively participated in a smear campaign against PO party leader Donald Tusk. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, TVP referred to the European People’s Party, a European political party of which Tusk was the chairman, as the “European Putin’s Party.”8 In November, TVP refused to air Tusk’s paid 30-second Independence Day greeting, saying that it was submitted too late.9
  • In December, the KRRiT launched proceedings against the private broadcaster TVN after the channel aired an documentary that criticized the Macierewicz subcommittee investigating the 2010 Smolensk plane catastrophe. The documentary, which was produced in-house, did not support the subcommittee’s theory that the plane crash was a successful assassination attempt, and not an accident.10
  • The media sector experienced a wave of job cuts and the shuttering of outlets in 2022. Two of the largest media publishers—Ringier Axel Springer Media and Agora—carried out mass layoffs.11 Other important publishers, including Burda Media Polska, Time SA, and Bauer Media Group, also downsized their staff.
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 5.506 7.007
  • Local and municipal governments remain in a precarious financial position. In 2022, the largest Polish cities’ revenue fell below the level attained in 2018 when adjusted for inflation. While central government budget expenditures rose from 18.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018 to 19.9 percent in 2021, local government expenditures fell from 12.2 percent to 12 percent of the national GDP.1
  • The longstanding financial issues of local, and especially municipal, governments, such as the rapidly rising expenditures on education, were exacerbated by the admission of tens of thousands of Ukrainian pupils to Polish schools.2 Furthermore, the sudden spike in energy prices in the aftermath of the Russian invasion had a further deleterious impact on the budgets of local governments.
  • In June, Ryszard Terlecki, the deputy speaker of the Sejm—the lower house of Poland’s Parliament—and the leader of the PiS caucus, announced that the local elections scheduled for autumn 2023 would be postponed so as not to coincide with national elections.3 The government had extended the term of locally elected representatives from four to five years in 2018, leading to this overlap. In September, the PiS caucus presented a bill that would extend the terms of sitting local and regional representatives until April 30, 2024. The opposition criticized the proposal, describing it as an attempt to game the electoral calendar in PiS’s favor. The bill was adopted by the Sejm in late September without support from any opposition party and was signed into law by President Duda in late November.4
  • Responding to growing criticism over the lack of financial support for local authorities facing ever-increasing costs associated with the inflow of Ukrainian refugees and rising energy prices, the PiS majority adopted a new law in early September that guaranteed local governments almost 14 billion złoty ($3.2 billion).5 While local government representatives in general reacted positively to the ruling camp’s recognition of the financial hardships they were facing, some high-profile local politicians, including Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski of the PO, pointed out that the lack of access to EU resources allocated through the post-pandemic Recovery and Resilience Facility due to government’s rule-of-law conflicts with the EU continues to hamper their ability to carry out much-needed investments in physical and social infrastructure.6
  • On November 21, PiS lost its control over the regional assembly of the Silesian Voivodeship (province), Poland’s most populous region.7 PiS lost the majority there following an intraparty split after the PiS-appointed regional councilor and three other regional officials elected from the PiS list left the party and created a new political created a club of the recently founded local government movement Yes! For Poland.
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 3.253 7.007
  • The rule of law crisis that erupted following Law and Justice’s rise to power in 2015 continued into its seventh year. The government maintained political control over the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council for Judiciary, and the prosecution, and continued to threaten judicial independence, including through harsh disciplinary system for judges. Minor concessions to EU institutions regarding the judiciary did not lead to Poland meeting the conditions set by the European Commission, though the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) did issue interim measures in cases involving judges harassed for defending the rule of law.
  • In March, the ECtHR granted interim measures to four judges who risk suspensions for applying judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in their rulings, calling for the Polish government to give them 72 hours of notice before hearings.1 The European court granted interim measures to two more judges in December calling for Poland to suspend moves to transfer them until the court issued final decisions in their cases.2
  • In the first trial of its kind in the EU, Justyna Wydrzyńska, a Polish activist for legal abortion, was charged in July for giving abortion pills to a woman experiencing domestic violence who was seeking to end her pregnancy. Wydrzyńska faced up to three years of imprisonment if convicted.3 The ECtHR has agreed to hear several applications from Poland regarding access to legal abortion.4
  • Aiming to unlock money from the EU’s RRF, in July, Poland dissolved the Supreme Court’s contested Disciplinary Chamber in the Supreme Court under the amended Act on the Supreme Court. It was replaced by the new Chamber of Disciplinary Responsibility, which was composed of 11 judges; six of them were appointed in a procedure that the CJEU found violated EU standards on judicial independence.5 The European Commission deemed these changes insufficient. In December, PiS proposed another amendment to the Act on the Supreme Court, but discussion on the bill in the Sejm was cancelled due to pushback by Duda.6,7
  • In October, 30 Supreme Court judges declared that they refused to adjudicate with colleagues unlawfully appointed to the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the National Council of the Judiciary under rules changed by PiS. The protesting judges said those appointees could not considered independent and impartial under EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).8
  • In November, the Polish government requested that the European Commission stop levying fines of €1 million ($1 million) per day over Poland’s noncompliance with the ruling, with fines totaling more than 400 million euros at that point. However, the authority to halt fines lies with the CJEU rather than the European Commission.9
  • Also in November, the Sejm adopted amendments to the criminal code sponsored by Ziobro, the PiS justice minister and prosecutor general from the governing coalition. In an appeal to President Duda, 173 criminal law experts urged him to veto the repressive bill, which would introduce a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole that amounted to inhuman treatment under the ECHR.10
  • As of the end of 2022, the Polish government had not met the EU milestones concerning improvements in the law-making process and in establishing independent monitoring of the implementation of Poland’s National Recovery Plan.11 As a result, the government did not apply for a tranche of RRF funding. Another EU milestone was to give disciplined judges the right to submit their cases for review by an impartial and independent court by the end of 2023. In November, Judge Igor Tuleya was allowed to return to adjudicating, but two judges remain under suspension imposed by the Disciplinary Chamber.12
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 4.004 7.007
  • In December 2022, the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) published a damning report evaluating the Governmental Program for Counteracting Corruption for the Years 2018–2020. Adopted in 2018, the program was a flagship initiative designed to coordinate all state anticorruption efforts. However, according to the NIK, the program was rife with delays and suffered from an extremely incomplete implementation. The government had not taken action to pass new legislation on transparency rules for public office or revamp the system that public officials used to declare financial interests, despite their prominent inclusion in the document. Furthermore, the program suffered from a lack of clear impact indicators that would allow assessments of its effectiveness, making it impossible to verify its success. The final report on the implementation of the program, prepared by program officials for the Council of Ministers, contained no analysis, conclusions, or summaries that attempted to offer insight into the program’s impact. Finally, the government did not launch a new centralized anticorruption program following the expiration of the one adopted for 2018–20.1
  • At the end of October 2022, PiS presented a draft law proposing a mechanism that would allow its party nominees to remain in control of state-owned companies for the next six years. The project was withdrawn after a few days due to the opposition of its coalition partner United Poland (now Sovereign Poland).2
  • The Polish government continued to delay the implementation of the European Union directive on the protection of whistleblowers.3 By the end of 2022, the draft implementation bill has been through at least five iterations. The directive had been adopted by the EU in October 2019, with all member states committing to transpose it through national legislation and ensure its implementation by December 2021.

Authors: Dr. Anna Wójcik specializes in the rule of law and human rights law. Miłosz Wiatrowski is a PhD candidate in contemporary Polish history at Yale University and a senior editor at Wyborcza in English.

On Poland

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Country Facts

  • Population

    36,820,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    82 100 free