Thailand is preparing to hold general elections in May 2023. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has ruled the country since 2014, when he led a coup against the democratically elected government and assumed the premiership at the head of a military junta. The junta imposed a new constitution in 2017 and held elections in 2019, which were marred by political repression, censorship, and a lack of independent oversight by the national election commission. After the 2019 election, a promilitary coalition led by the Palang Pracharat Party (PPP) selected Prayuth to serve again as prime minister.

Now, Thai voters will participate in the second general election under the 2017 constitution and the first since the outbreak of mass prodemocracy demonstrations in 2020 and 2021. Voters will select all 500 members of the House of Representatives, 400 of whom are elected directly and 100 by nationwide party-line balloting. The 2017 constitution favors military control of the premiership: under a special system in place until 2024, the House jointly elects the prime minister with the Senate—all 250 members of which are appointed by the military—by simple majority.

Public discontent with the military-backed government has been growing. In May 2022, an independent candidate won the Bangkok governor’s election in a landslide, and this year opposition parties appear positioned to capture a majority of seats in the House. Early polls show a wide margin of support for the opposition Pheu Thai Party (PTP), followed by the prodemocracy Move Forward Party. The PTP plans to nominate as prime minister its leader Paetongtarn “Ung-ing” Shinawatra, whose father (Thaksin Shinawatra) and aunt (Yingluck Shinawatra) both had served as prime minister before being ousted in the 2006 coup and days before the 2014 coup, respectively.

However, electoral interference to undermine support for opposition parties or those otherwise not aligned with the military is likely. Though the PTP won the most votes in the 2019 general election, it was unable to form a coalition after the Electoral Commission of Thailand dissolved another prominent opposition party and changed its formula for distributing party-line votes to favor promilitary parties.

Meanwhile, shifting allegiances in the ruling promilitary coalition may present a challenge for Prayuth’s hold on the premiership. In January 2023, Prayuth announced that he would join the United Thai Nation Party (RTSCP), a promilitary party formed in 2021. The decision marks a split with the PPP and its head, Prawit Wongsuwan, a fellow coup leader and now first deputy prime minister. Prawit is likely to seek the premiership himself. He briefly served as acting prime minister in late 2022, when the Constitutional Court suspended Prayuth while considering a lawsuit by opposition lawmakers alleging that Prayuth had violated term limit restrictions. The 2017 constitution sets an eight-year term limit for the premiership; Prayuth assumed the title of prime minister in 2014, after the year’s coup. The court eventually ruled that Prayuth’s term would be considered effective from the date of the constitution’s ratification in April 2017, effectively preserving his eligibility.

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

• Arrests and prosecutions for online activity: People who criticize the monarchy or the government on social media risk arrest and conviction under Thailand’s repressive lèse-majesté and sedition laws, contributing to self-censorship among activists, political candidates, and ordinary civilians. Some prodemocracy activists, particularly those affiliated with the protest movement that began in 2020, face charges with cumulative sentences amounting to hundreds of years. In June 2022, Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, secretary general of the opposition Progressive Movement, was charged under the lèse-majesté law over a Twitter post calling for democratic reforms. During the 2019 election, opposition figures were prosecuted on charges of “uploading false information.”
• Information manipulation: In 2021, a Thai lawmaker shared documents that appeared to show that authorities had spent millions of dollars employing personnel to disseminate progovernment views online, as well as to respond to antigovernment criticism and discredit opposition figures. Social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook have removed networks of military-linked accounts in recent years, including over similar activities aimed at smearing opposition figures. Though it is not yet clear to what extent the networks have mobilized ahead of the 2023 election, the structures to facilitate influence operations remain in place. The government is likely to manipulate existing concerns over false and misleading information to favor promilitary parties and progovernment opinions: for example, government initiatives against “fake news” have labeled legitimate criticism about policies as false. Such influence operations could limit peoples’ access to reliable information about voting and opposition parties.
• Website blocks and content removals: The government has previously blocked online content that is deemed critical of the monarchy. For example, authorities intermittently blocked an online petition calling for the repeal of the lèse-majesté law in 2022. Meanwhile, a ministerial decree that entered into force in December 2022 empowers authorities to order internet service providers and social media platforms to remove content deemed unlawful within 24 hours. The decree specifically targets content barred under Section 14 of the Computer Crime Act, which is often broadly interpreted to target online dissent. If imposed, website blocks and content-removal orders targeting online content that criticizes the government or supports prodemocracy reform would limit access to information relevant to the balloting. 
• Harassment and intimidation: Thai activists have faced online harassment, doxing, and offline violence in retaliation for their online activities. Opposition candidates and their supporters face these risks ahead of the election, potentially driving them to keep silent to stay safe.

Thailand has a score of 30 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a semidemocratic election system designed to favor promilitary parties, strict laws criminalizing online expression, and few protections against human rights violations. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 29 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 39 out of 100. Scores and ratings for Thailand in the Freedom in the World 2023 report, covering the 2022 calendar year, will be released with the publication on March 9. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Thailand country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.