STAY UP TO DATE: The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House
Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Thailand

Not Free
39
100
A Obstacles to Access 16 25
B Limits on Content 14 35
C Violations of User Rights 9 40
Last Year's Score & Status
39 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
thailand-hero_map

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom remained severely restricted in Thailand as prodemocracy activists and journalists faced arrest, surveillance, extralegal harassment, and violent attacks in retaliation for their online content. Internet users continued to be charged with lèse-majesté, with some receiving heavy prison sentences for defaming the monarchy online.

  • In November 2023, the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) approved the sale of broadband service provider 3BB to Advanced Info Service (AIS). The sale will make AIS the largest fixed-line broadband provider in Thailand and effectively establish a duopoly in the broadband market (see A4).
  • In November 2023, the Thai Public Broadcasting Service (Thai PBS) removed an interview it posted with Taiwan’s minister of foreign affairs. Thai PBS had facing public pressure from the Chinese embassy in Bangkok and the Thai Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to adhere to the “One China” policy, which considers Taiwan to be an inalienable part of China (see B2).
  • In January 2024, Mongkol “Bas” Tirakot, a jailed prodemocracy activist, was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison under Section 112 of the criminal code for 11 counts of lèse-majesté violations. This effectively extended his sentence to 50 years, which would be the longest sentence ever served under the provision (see C3).
  • In June 2023, Yingcheep Atchanont, a legal reform advocate, and Anon Nampa, a prodemocracy human rights lawyer and activist, filed a lawsuit against nine Thai government agencies, seeking 2,500,000 baht ($71,000) in damages for the violation of their privacy through the government’s alleged use of Pegasus spyware in previous years (see C5).
  • In July 2023, Chalermchai Sirinanthawitthaya, an editor at online financial news outlet Thunhoon Newspaper, received a package which included photos of his children, bullets, and a threatening note. That same day, attackers threw explosives at the home of Boonmee Onnom, another Thunhoon Newspaper editor, which Boonmee believed was in response to the paper’s reporting on stock price fluctuations, which may have resulted in investors pulling out of some companies (see C7).

header2 Political Overview

Following five years of military rule, Thailand transitioned to a military-dominated, semielected government in 2019. The combination of democratic deterioration and frustrations over the role of the monarchy, the military, and the political establishment in Thailand’s governance triggered large demonstrations in 2020 and 2021. In response, the authorities used repressive tactics, including arbitrary arrests, intimidation, lèse-majesté charges, and harassment of activists. While the 2023 elections were comparatively open and competitive, the leading opposition party, Move Forward (MFP), was blocked from forming a government by the military-appointed Senate; another opposition group, the Pheu Thai Party (PTP), entered government in coalition with several military-aligned parties. Press freedom remains constrained, due process is not guaranteed, and there is impunity for crimes committed against activists.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Internet access has improved in recent years, mainly because more people are able to go online using mobile phones. As of January 2024, the internet penetration rate stood at 88 percent, and there were 97.81 million mobile connections in the country.1

Speeds have also been increasing. According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, as of May 2024 Thailand’s median mobile download speed was 48.76 megabits per second (Mbps) and the median mobile upload speed was 13.87 Mbps. The median fixed-line broadband download and upload speeds were 235.86 and 205.68 Mbps, respectively.2

In February 2020, three private mobile service providers and two state-owned telecommunications firms submitted bids totaling 100 billion baht ($2.8 billion) for the spectrum required to set up 5G mobile service infrastructure.3 Advanced Info Service (AIS), the first mobile service provider to launch its 5G network, began rolling out 5G services in that month.4 According to AIS, as of July 2024, 95 percent of Thailand had access to its 5G services.5

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Disparities in internet access persist, largely based on socioeconomic and geographical factors. However, the cost of access has continued to decrease.

According to UK-based Cable’s 2023 study of global internet prices, Thailand’s average monthly price for fixed-line broadband was 833.95 baht ($23.72). Mobile users pay an average rate of 14.47 baht ($0.41) for 1 gigabyte (GB) of data,1 prices which are considered relatively affordable for most citizens.2

Government programs have sought to reduce the persistent digital divide between urban and rural areas.3 As of 2021, over 10 million individuals out of Thailand's total population of 66 million accessed the internet through the government’s free internet program, Village Broadband Internet Project (Net Pracharat), which was established in 2017.4 In November 2022, the National Digital Economy and Society Commission (NDESC) claimed that 74,987 villages had been connected to broadband internet through Net Pracharat so far.5 The next phase of the Net Pracharat project, which is expected to be completed in 2027, will reportedly involve reducing broadband fees to expand internet access across the country.

Two mobile service providers—AIS and TRUE, which merged with DTAC in March 2023 (see A4)—offer free access to online content through zero-rating services. TRUE is part of the Free Basics by Facebook project, which grants free access to entertainment content and social media platforms, including Facebook, Messenger, and Wikipedia, on mobile phones.6

As part of an effort to ensure transparency and limit the impact of the industry’s duopoly on service prices (see A4), Thailand's National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) is expected to roll out the country's first telecommunications price index by mid to late 2024. The index will utilize data from service providers and user reports to compare service price offerings across providers and detail their network quality.7

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

There were no reports of the state blocking or throttling fixed-line or mobile connections during the coverage period, though the government does have some capability to do so through technical control over internet infrastructure.

National Telecom was formed in 2021 through a merger of CAT Telecom and TOT, both of which were state-owned. CAT Telecom previously operated international telecommunications infrastructure, including international gateways and connections to submarine cable networks and satellites.1 Access to the international internet gateway was limited to CAT Telecom until it opened to competitors in 2006.2 While the merger of CAT Telecom and TOT was intended to help the public firms compete with private telecommunications companies,3 it was also seen by internet freedom groups as part of the government’s plan to consolidate control over the country’s telecommunication infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity Act centralizes authority over public and private service providers in the hands of government entities (see C6). Although restricting connectivity is not explicitly mentioned, the law makes it easier for authorities to compel service providers to remove material deemed a threat to national security.4 The law does not provide transparency concerning government decisions and lacks an effective system of accountability if connectivity restrictions were to be implemented.5

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Service providers face some obstacles to market entry, and mergers within the telecommunications sector may reduce market competition.

Although 20 internet service providers (ISPs) have licenses to operate in Thailand, the largest 3 control almost 99 percent of the market. According to a December 2023 NBTC report, in the fixed-line service market, National Telecom Public Company Limited (NT) led the sector with 66.31 percent of the market, followed by True Internet Corporation Company Limited (TICC), a subsidiary of TRUE, with 28.59 percent, and the AIS subsidiary Advanced Wireless Network Company Limited (AWN) with 2.71 percent.1

As of the end of the coverage period, there were two main mobile service providers in Thailand. In October 2023, TRUE held 52.77 percent of the market, with 51 million subscribers, and AIS held 46.65 percent of the market, with nearly 45 million subscribers.2 During the previous coverage period, in March 2023, TRUE subsidiary True Move H Universal Communication Company Limited (TUC) and Norwegian-controlled dtac TriNet Company Limited (DTN) merged under TRUE, despite concerns that their merger might result in a mobile-service duopoly. 3 Soon after, the Foundation for Consumers filed a lawsuit against the NBTC with the Central Administrative Court (CAC), in an attempt to compel the body to revoke its earlier endorsement of the merger.4 The CAC rejected the foundation’s complaint that same month. In October 2023, the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the CAC’s previous ruling, allowing the lawsuit against NBTC to proceed. As of the end of the coverage period the merger was still in place.

Until recently, the broadband service market has been dominated by four providers. TRUE held 37.6 percent of the market, 3BB held 28 percent, AIS held 16.4 percent, and NT 15.5 percent.5 However, in November 2023, the NBTC approved the sale of 3BB to AIS on the condition that AIS continue offering the lowest-priced promotions available before the merger for the next five years and not reduce its service quality.6 The deal will make AIS the largest fixed broadband provider in Thailand, surpassing TRUE, which has long held the largest share of the market.7

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

Following the 2014 coup, the military junta—known as the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)—implemented reforms that reduced independence, transparency, and accountability of the regulatory bodies overseeing service providers and digital technology. In 2023 these policies or their successors remained in place.

The NBTC, the former radio, television, and telecommunications regulator, was stripped of its authority, revenue, and independence when the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly (NLA) passed the NBTC Act in 2017.1 The NBTC endures as a government agency, though it is now half its original size. It is authorized to implement the policies created by a commission led by the prime minister and other new entities with overlapping functions. The government has significant influence over the decisions of the NBTC.2

The NBTC commissioners are selected in a process that is highly controlled by the government. The February 2021 NBTC Act also removed requirements that NBTC candidates have relevant experience.3 NBTC commissioners receive lucrative salaries and have significant influence over the telecommunications sector.4

The Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) was established by the NLA in 2016 to replace the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. It is responsible for implementing policy and enforcing the Computer Crime Act (CCA) (see C2).5 The Commission for Digital Economy and Society (CDES) provides directives to the MDES and is responsible for formulating policy under the 2017 Digital Development for Economy and Society Act.6 Chaired by the prime minister, the CDES is composed of government ministers and no more than eight qualified experts.7 It is not a government body and therefore not accountable to laws that regulate government agencies, though it has authority over the MDES and NBTC. Other bodies that influence policy include the Digital Economy and Society Development Fund and the Digital Economy Promotion Agency.

The Cybersecurity Act created the National Cybersecurity Committee (NCSC), the Cybersecurity Regulating Committee (CRC), the office of the NCSC, and the Committee Managing the Office of the NCSC (CMO).8 The NCSC develops policy, guidelines, and a code of practice, while the CRC administers these policy products with the support of the CMO.9 More than half of the members that make up these committees are government officials, with individuals from the same government bodies or authorities occupying positions in all of them, effectively limiting checks and balances and restricting opportunities to ensure accountability and independence.10 In January 2022, the Personal Data Protection Committee, the committee tasked with implementing the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), was established with mainly government officials as members.11

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

The blocking of content deemed critical of the monarchy is widespread, but a lack of transparency means that the full extent of this blocking is unclear. Websites have also been blocked for national security reasons, for alleged violations of intellectual property rights, and for hosting gambling content or unauthorized virtual private network (VPN) services.1

The government has never publicly revealed the number of URLs blocked by court orders. However, the MDES reported that it blocked access to 45,024 URLs between October 2022 and December 2023.2 Of these, 4,592 URLs belonged to gambling websites.3

The MDES reported that it blocked over 16,000 illegal websites in April 2024, nearly 26 times as many as the 625 it blocked the month prior. Of these, 6,515 were gambling websites.4

In February 2022, the MDES blocked no112.org, which hosted an online petition calling for the repeal of the lèse-majesté law, citing alleged violation of the CCA and the Gambling Act.5 The block was upheld in March 2023 and March 2024 court rulings (see B3), and the site remained intermittently blocked through the end of the coverage period.6

In October 2020, a secret MDES order was discovered which revealed the government’s unrealized plan to block Telegram, a messaging app used by protesters to communicate and organize; it directed ISPs and mobile-service providers to block four internet protocol (IP) addresses linked to Telegram.7 In the same month, the website Change.org was blocked for six months on the orders of the government after a petition calling for the king to be declared persona non grata in Germany was shared extensively on Twitter.8

Websites offering tools for online anonymity and the circumvention of censorship, including VPNs like Ultrasurf and Hotspot Shield,9 have been blocked by ISPs in the past.10

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Users, publishers, and content hosts are often pressured by authorities to remove content, and content providers or intermediaries often comply with removal requests to avoid criminal liability (see B3).

In November 2023, after the Thai Public Broadcasting Service (Thai PBS) aired an interview with Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s minister of foreign affairs, the Chinese embassy in Bangkok made a post on Facebook that condemned the outlet for hurting Chinese people’s sentiments by hosting content which “propagated ‘Taiwan Independence’ fallacies.”1 Later that month, the Thai Senate Foreign Affairs Committee confirmed that it had asked the broadcaster to adhere to the “One China” policy—which considers Taiwan to be an inalienable part of China—in an effort to maintain good relations with China, and Thai PBS removed the interview from its YouTube channel.2

Under Section 15 of the CCA, social media companies and other content hosts may be penalized if they fail to comply with a government or court order to take down content that is defamatory, harms national security, causes public panic, or otherwise violates the criminal code.3 Failing to comply with an order is punishable with a fine of 200,000 baht ($5,700) and an additional daily fine of 5,000 baht ($142) until the order is complied with.

Between July 2023 and December 2023, Facebook restricted access to over 820 posts that allegedly violated Section 112 of the criminal code on lèse-majesté.4 During that same period, Google received 80 requests from the government to remove 264 pieces of content across its products, almost all on YouTube. Of these requests, 80 percent were related to government criticism.5 Between July and December 2023, TikTok received 70 requests from the government relating to 427 pieces of content, of which 220 were removed for violating local laws.6

Content targeted for removal or blocking by social media platforms includes speech on political, cultural, historical, and social topics. In October 2023, the Court of Appeal upheld a July 2022 ban on a music video by Thai activist rap group Rap Against Dictatorship for allegedly violating the CCA and threatening national security.7 The music video called for royal reforms and showcased images of the 2020 youth-led antigovernment protests. The government previously ordered YouTube to restrict access to the video in January 2021.8

In January 2023, access to Royalist Marketplace, a popular Facebook group that features critical discussions about the monarchy, was blocked for Thai-based users for about one hour. According to Facebook, it was blocked in response to a legal request.9

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

Restrictions on online content lack transparency and are not proportionate to their stated aims.1 Attempts to challenge restrictions, which are often applied to antigovernment content or coverage of antigovernment activity, have played out in the courts with mixed results.

In February 2022, the government blocked the website no112.org, which the People's Party had been using as a petition, gathering the names of eligible voters advocating for the repeal of Section 112. In February 2023, human rights lawyer and activist Anon Nampa, a founder of the campaign to repeal Section 112, challenged the court’s decision to block no112.org, arguing that making a petition to amend or repeal a law is permissible under the constitution. In March 2023, the court upheld its decision, arguing that the campaign’s characterization of the monarchy as a “political institution” was illegitimate and disrupted public order.2 In March 2024, the court once again upheld an order to block access to the site for allegedly distorting facts and laws, citing the website’s use of the expression “the monarchy is a political institution.”3

The CCA allows the prosecution of providers or intermediaries for disseminating content deemed harmful to national security or public order. Under 2017 amendments, the MDES and other bodies were granted the ability to advance blocking requests.4 The amendments provided some protection for intermediaries through a notice-and-takedown system, but the law still holds individuals responsible for erasing banned content on their personal devices.5

Section 14(1) of the CCA bans introducing false or distorted information into a computer system; experts originally understood this to refer to technical crimes such as hacking.6 However, the clause has been broadly interpreted and used by the government to intimidate and silence critics (see C2).7

A December 2022 decree, which includes strict language that requires intermediaries to determine the legality of content on their own,8 incentivizes service providers and social media platforms to act on every complaint to avoid liability.9 If a complaint is lodged by a member of the public, service providers have 24 hours to remove any content that allegedly violates Section 14 of the CCA. As of December 2022, users may no longer appeal a removal decision.

The 2022 decree also granted the MDES authority to issue removal orders to service providers, without court authorization or judicial oversight.10 It further narrowed the window to remove national security–related content from 11 days to 24 hours.11

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1.001 4.004

Thailand’s restrictive political environment encourages self-censorship. Legal sanctions are frequently imposed for criticizing the government or businesses online (see C3). The government has made it known that it monitors social media to control political expression.1 Users who express dissenting views have faced online harassment and intimidation and have also had their personal information shared and their private lives scrutinized (see C7).

In February 2023, Jor Dub, a Facebook page which advocates for better worker protections in the media industry, deleted its posts about the death of a reporter at 24-hour news channel TNN—allegedly caused by health conditions that were exacerbated by being overworked—due to fears of being sued by the channel. 2

Most Thai internet users and journalists self-censor on public platforms when discussing the monarchy because of the country’s severe lèse-majesté laws (see C2).3 This was particularly true following the Constitutional Court ruling in November 2021 that protesters’ calls for reform of the monarchy amounted to an attempt to overthrow it (see C1). In the wake of the ruling, the NBTC warned the media against covering prodemocracy protests and said that noncompliant outlets risked criminal prosecution.4 This led to increased self-censorship by the media and ordinary users. In November 2022, the court expanded the application of Section 112 of the criminal code on lèse-majesté to prohibit other types of speech (see C2).

However, social media remains a space for relatively critical speech.5 In early 2023, a number of hashtags about the continuous refusal of bail for prisoners convicted of lèse-majesté and other political crimes gained popularity (see B8).6

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

Online propaganda, disinformation, and content manipulation are common in Thailand. State entities and some political parties are believed to engage in these practices using a variety of means to target the opposition, human rights defenders, and certain segments of the population. Official efforts to combat disinformation are allegedly selective, allowing progovernment campaigns to proceed with impunity.

Revelations by lawmakers and others in recent years have pointed to a well-funded information operations team run by the Thai army; it has spread progovernment sentiment, responded to criticism of the government, and targeted members of the political opposition.1

Manipulated, false, or misleading online content proliferated during the 2023 electoral period, and most of the content aimed to discredit opposition parties and prominent political figures.2 After the elections, rumors that MFP planned to allow the United States to establish a military base in Thailand circulated; observers claimed that the rumors were connected to the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC)—the political arm of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.3

Women and members of marginalized groups have also been targeted by information operations in response to their political activities.4 For instance, throughout 2023, disinformation targeting Malay-Muslim politicians, activists, and human rights defenders in southern Thailand proliferated online, linking them with the insurgency in southern Thailand.5

The government has invested in efforts to fight misinformation, but in some cases these tools are employed selectively. In February 2022, the cabinet approved a regulation that would establish centers to combat disinformation on social media at the national, ministerial, and provincial levels.6 The Anti–Fake News Center, established by the MDES in November 2019 to combat false and misleading information that violates the CCA,7 continued to identify news considered false and release “corrections.”8 In previous years, some observers noted that the government does not work to combat disinformation targeting opposition parties.9

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Many outlets struggle to earn enough in advertising revenue to sustain themselves, limiting their ability to publish diverse content.

Discussions on the draft Media Ethics and Professional Standards Promotion Act, which was approved by the cabinet in January 2022, opened in February 2023.1 The draft law would require media organizations to register with the new government-appointed Media Council, which would oversee their activities and set ethical standards for reporting. If they fail to align their activities with those standards, media outlets would risk losing their licenses and paying hefty fines, further limiting their resources.2 Thai media organizations are critical of the bill, arguing that it would enable further government control over the media.3

New value-added tax (VAT) rules that came into effect in September 2021 require foreign digital service providers to pay a 7 percent VAT on sales if they earn more than 1.8 million baht ($51,200) annually.4

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 2.002 4.004

The diversity of viewpoints available online is limited by the enforcement of restrictive laws, policies, and practices—including those specifically aimed at controlling online content—as well as by content removal, economic restrictions, and self-censorship. Nevertheless, Thailand has a relatively vibrant social media environment, and social networks and digital media provide opportunities for sharing information and engaging in prodemocracy activism that would typically be restricted in traditional media (see B8).1

State policies, including the designation of Thai as the country's only official language, limit the availability of news sources in regional and Indigenous languages.2 For example, very few news sites produce content in Lao Isaan,3 even though the Isaan language is spoken by roughly 22 million people in Thailand. Some regional nonprofits, like the Manushya Foundation, have begun producing content in minority languages in recent years.4

Ahead of the general elections, the Election Commission (ECT) and TikTok partnered to combat misinformation by removing online content that could mislead the public.5 The collaboration was strengthened by the involvement of COFACT, Thailand’s collaborative fact-checking platform, which helped ensure that accurate information was available to the public throughout the election process.6 Additionally, ahead of the election, Facebook required advertisers to go through an authorization process and required ads to include a label saying who paid for them.7

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 3.003 6.006

Most social media, chat applications, and online petition sites are available and serve as essential tools for digital activism. However, the risk of criminal charges and targeted harassment or violence has discouraged such activism in practice (see C3 and C7).

In January 2024, the Network for People's Amnesty (NPA) launched an online campaign, #นิรโทษกรรมประชาชน (Public Amnesty), to introduce a bill it was submitting to parliament calling for amnesty for all political expression–related charges since the 2006 coup. That same month, NPA, the Democracy Restoration Group (DRG), and the Committee Campaigning for a People’s Constitution (CCPC), organized a march through Bangkok, advocating for the amnesty bill. 1 In February 2024, NPA launched an online petition calling for an end to “the prosecution of people who express political opinions,” which collected nearly 36,000 signatures.2

Ahead of the May 2023 elections, hashtags such as #ThailandElection2023 and #เลือกตั้ง66 (Vote 66) were used to facilitate discussions.3 After the election, users began spreading the hashtag #RespectMyVote66 to urge senators, who have the power to elect the prime minister, to appoint the candidate who received the majority of the vote.4

Other hashtags from recent years remain prevalent online. For instance, the hashtag #ยืนหยุดขัง (Stand to Stop Imprisonment) calls for the release of political prisoners held in pretrial detention, and #หยุดคุกคามประชาชน (Stop Harassing the People) is used to raise awareness of human rights violations by the government.

However, users who organize online to advocate for political change or raise awareness about government corruption often face criminal charges (see C3). At least eight internet users have been charged for posts related to the hashtag #ตามหาลูกประยุทธ์ (Where Are Prayuts Daughters) that accused the former prime minister of misusing taxpayers money to pay for his daughters’ studies and lifestyles in the UK.5 In November 2022, an internet user was sentenced to a year in prison and fined 40,000 baht ($1,100) on defamation charges and under the CCA for commenting under the hashtag. After he pled guilty, his sentence was reduced to six months in prison with a two-year suspended sentence and 20,000 baht ($570) fine.6

In February 2022, the online petition platform no112.org was blocked on the orders of the MDES (see B1).7 The government also charged individuals for launching online campaigns against the monarchy. In October 2022, Tiwagorn Withiton was given a three-year suspended sentence on sedition charges for running a campaign on Change.org that called for a referendum on abolishing the monarchy.8

  • 1“Activists march for amnesty bill,” Prachatai, January 31, 2024, https://prachataienglish.com/node/10797; “ผู้ต้องหาคดีการเมืองกว่า 300 ชีวิต ร่วมแคมเปญนิรโทษกรรมประชาชน,” iLaw, February 11, 2024, https://www.ilaw.or.th/articles/18735.
  • 2“ลงชื่อเสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ. นิรโทษกรรมประชาชน,” Amnesty People, February 14, 2024, https://amnestypeople.com/; “เปิดร่างนิรโทษกรรมฉบับประชาชน รวมประชาชนทุกฝ่าย และคดี 112,” iLaw, November 19, 2023, https://www.ilaw.or.th/articles/6296.
  • 3“#ThailandElection2023,” Twitter, accessed June 1, 2024, https://twitter.com/hashtag/ThailandElection2023?src=hashtag_click; “#เลือกตั้ง66,” Twitter, accessed June 1, 2024, https://twitter.com/hashtag/%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%B7%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%….
  • 4“เปิดแคมเปญ #RespectMyVote66: ร่วมส่งเสียงประชาชนให้ถึง ส.ว. ก่อนลงมติเลือกนายก,” iLaw, July 6, 2023, https://www.ilaw.or.th/articles/6058.
  • 5"Prayut’s Daughters: PM Children files defamation against fake news spreaders," BBC, September 2, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-53995972; "Seven users who post with #WhereArePrayutsDaughters report to police for “defamation,” Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, September 14, 2020, https://tlhr2014.com/archives/21358; “12 ต.ค. 65 ศาลอาญากรุงเทพใต้พิพากษาลงโทษจำคุก 2 ปี ปรับ 60,000 บาท "เต่า" (นามสมมติ) เหตุแสดงความเห็นในโพสต์ #ตามหาลูกประยุทธ์ จำเลยรับสารภาพเหลือลงโทษจำคุก 1 ปีปรับ 30,000 (1/2),” Twitter, October 12, 2022, https://twitter.com/TLHR2014/status/1580043841603715074?s=20
  • 6“ศาลอาญากรุงเทพใต้พิพากษาจำคุก 1 ปี ปรับ 40,000 บาท กับ “พฤธิกร” ในคดีหมิ่นฯ ลูกประยุทธ์ กรณีเมนต์ #ตามหาลูกประยุทธ์,” Twitter, November 13, 2022, https://twitter.com/TLHR2014/status/1592013268067012608?s=20&t=TkPgehjQ….
  • 7“No112.oth showed signs of HTTP blocking (HTTPS requests failed) in Thailand,” OONI Explorer, June 15, 2022, https://explorer.ooni.org/search?test_name=web_connectivity&probe_cc=TH….
  • 8“อัยการลำปางสั่งฟ้อง “ทิวากร” คดี ม.116-พ.ร.บ.คอมฯ เหตุโพสต์ล่ารายชื่อทำประชามติคงไว้หรือเลิกระบอบกษัตริย์,” Thai Lawyer for Human Rights (TLHR), March 3, 2022, https://tlhr2014.com/archives/40925; "Lampang Court sentenced Tiwagorn to 3 years in prison for Article 116 violation for asking for a referendum about the monarchy but his sentence was suspended. Tiwagorn is preparing to appeal," Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, October 4, 2022, https://tlhr2014.com/archives/49191.

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 1.001 6.006

The 2017 constitution, which was drafted by the military government following the 2014 coup, enshrines basic rights, but Section 25 stipulates that all rights and freedoms are guaranteed “insofar as they are not prohibited elsewhere in the constitution or other laws,” and that the exercise of those rights must not threaten national security, public order, public morals, or any other person’s rights and freedoms.

The 2019 National Cybersecurity Act vaguely defines “critical information infrastructure” as accounting for anything related to national security, economic security, martial security, or public order. The act also provides that any organization can be identified as critical information infrastructure at the discretion of the NCSC.1

The government activated the 2005 Emergency Decree on Public Administration in a State of Emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, placing limits on freedom of expression, including online. The state of emergency lapsed in September 2022, but individuals continue to face charges under the law, with at least 670 emergency decree–related cases ongoing as of May 2024.2

The amended Communicable Diseases Act (CDA) became the primary legislation governing Thailand’s COVID-19 response upon the expiration of the state of emergency.3 Thai civil society groups and UN experts have expressed concern about the law’s repressive provisions and the lack of transparency around amendments to the CDA approved by the cabinet in September 2021.4 These amendments had not yet been made public as of the end of the coverage period.

Thailand’s judiciary is independent under the constitution, but in practice the courts suffer from politicization and corruption,5 and often fail to protect freedom of expression. In November 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that activists’ call for royal reform constituted an attempt to overthrow the monarchy, setting a dangerous legal precedent for freedom of speech.6 Hundreds of people charged with lèse-majesté are in prolonged pretrial detention (see C3).7

The Constitutional Court has summoned users for posting critical content, though the courts have also rejected government requests to block content deemed to be threatening to national security or critical of the monarchy and, at times, ruled in favor of free expression in criminal cases brought against individuals (see B3 and C3).8

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004

Several laws impose heavy criminal and civil penalties for online activities.

The CCA includes provisions that criminalize online activities (see B3).1 Section 14(3) criminalizes online content deemed to “affect national security.” Observers say the broad language has enabled strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), in which government officials and large corporations brought cases in order to intimidate and silence their critics.2

The criminal code imposes additional penalties for legitimate online activities. People can face up to seven years in prison for acts of sedition under Section 116, and lèse-majesté is covered in Section 112. Those charged with lèse-majesté could face up to 15 years in prison. In April 2023, the Court of Appeals ruled that the scope of lèse-majesté applies not just to the current monarch and the royal family, but also to all previous monarchs, including those who have since passed away, asserting that insulting them can harm national security and impact the monarchy (see C3).3 Defamation is punishable by a sentence of up to one year in prison and fines of up to 20,000 baht ($570).4 Insulting the courts or judges is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment and maximum fines of 140,000 baht ($4,000).5

The 2016 Organic Act on the Referendum for the Draft Constitution criminalizes speech, including via texts and online media, that may “instigate trouble in order to cause disorder in the voting” and prescribes up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a steep fine.6

Users have been arrested and charged under the CCA as well as Sections 112 (which addresses lèse-majesté) and 116 (sedition) of the criminal code for social media activities associated with the prodemocracy movement (see B8).

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 6.006

Authorities continued to exploit Section 14 of the CCA, the criminal code, and other broadly worded mandates to silence opposition politicians, activists, human rights defenders, and civil society groups. During the coverage period, at least 600 lèse-majesté cases were recorded, with over half of them in response to online commentary.1

Lèse-majesté defendants can face multiple prosecutions, with some potentially facing cumulative prison terms of up to 300 years if convicted,2 though such sentences are typically reduced after defendants pled guilty.

In 2023, prominent prodemocracy activist Mongkol “Bas” Tirakot was sentenced to 42 years in prison under Section 112 and the CCA for posting 27 videos on Facebook in which he was found to have defamed the monarchy,3 though the sentence was later reduced to 28 years.4 In January 2024, Bas Tirakot was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison under Section 112 of the criminal code for 11 counts of lèse-majesté violations. This effectively made his cumulative sentence 50 years, which would be the longest sentence ever served under the provision.5

In recent years, student activist Parit Chiwarak has faced 25 royal defamation charges under Section 112 and the CCA in response to his 2020 and 2021 social posts, which criticized judicial treatment of political prisoners. He had not yet been sentenced as of the end of the coverage period.6

In March 2024, a Bangkok-based 26-year-old was sentenced to 50 years in prison under Section 112 and the CCA for 18 posts she made on X (formerly Twitter) between December 2022 and October 2023, in which she was found to have defamed the monarchy. After she pled guilty her sentence was reduced to 25 years.7 In February 2024, a 51-year-old man was sentenced to 36 years in prison under Section 112 and the CCA for 2021 Facebook posts in which he defamed the monarch and the royal family. After he pled guilty his sentence was reduced to 12 years.8

In December 2023, a 32-year-old man was sentenced to nine years in prison under Section 112 for three posts he shared on Facebook about the COVID-19 vaccine rollout, police corruption, and the country’s limited free speech rights.9 His sentence was reduced to six years after he pled guilty.

In February 2024, two journalists, Nattaphol Meksobhon, a reporter for online news outlet Prachatai, and Nattaphon Phanphongsanon, a freelance photographer, were arrested as accomplices to vandalism and damaging a historical site after they reported on an artist who graffitied a Bangkok temple wall. They were released on bail and awaiting trial at the end of the coverage period.10

Private companies and individuals often file defamation SLAPP cases against human rights defenders, activists, and journalists for denouncing corporate impunity online. In April 2023, electric company Gulf Energy filed a defamation lawsuit against academic Sarinee Achavanuntakul,11 after she wrote a Facebook post about the increased cost of energy and the monopoly of power plants in Thailand.12 She received a Criminal Court summons that May and could be forced to pay the company 100 million baht ($2.8 million).13

Users arrested for social media activities associated with the prodemocracy protests in 2020 and 2021 continued to be sentenced during the coverage period. According to the nonprofit group Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, between the beginning of prodemocracy protests in July 2020 and the end of the current coverage period, “at least 1,954 individuals have been charged for participating in public assemblies or expressing their political opinions in 1,296 cases” under the criminal code and CCA.14 It remains unclear how many of these cases were directly related to people’s online activities.

Though individuals are frequently convicted for their online activities, charges are sometimes dropped. In December 2023, a 34-year-old man was acquitted of charges under Section 112 and the CCA after allegedly posting four defamatory messages about the monarchy on Facebook. The Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's decision to dismiss the case, citing the fact that the plaintiff’s primary evidence was screenshots from a mobile phone, rather than direct prints from a web browser, and also noting the court’s inability to verify the ownership of the Facebook account.15 In March 2024, human rights defender Chutima Sidasathian was acquitted of three out of nine charges of criminal defamation against her. The charges were brought over her Facebook posts about a local elected official’s alleged misappropriation of funds from Thailand's National Village and Urban Community Fund.16

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

The government has attempted to restrict encryption and has seen some success in limiting online anonymity.

In February 2018, the NBTC ordered all mobile service providers to collect fingerprints or face scans from SIM card holders,1 though in most of Thailand, citizens continued to register for SIM cards using their name, address, and ID card. in October 2019, facial scans became mandatory for SIM-card registration in three southern provinces.2 Civil society groups expressed concerns about potential privacy infringements and the potential profiling of the local ethnic Malay Muslim population.3

Section 18(7) of the CCA enables officials to order individuals to “decode any person’s computer data” without a court order and provides grounds to punish those who fail to decrypt data on request.4

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006

The government actively monitors social media and private communications with limited, if any, oversight. A complex set of policies aims to control online communication, but the country does not have a legal framework that establishes accountability and transparency mechanisms for government surveillance.

Sections 18(1) to 18(3) of the CCA allow the government to access user-related or traffic data without a court order and to compel ISPs to decode programmed data.1

Government agencies possess a variety of surveillance technologies. In July 2022, an investigation from Citizen Lab, iLaw, and Digital Reach identified at least 30 Thai human rights defenders, prodemocracy protestors, and monarchy-reform activists whose devices were infected with Pegasus spyware.2 The investigation was prompted after Thai politicians, activists, and academics received emails from Apple in November 2021 notifying them that “state-sponsored attackers” may have targeted their iPhones.3 Following this, the MDES minister admitted that some Thai government departments have been using Pegasus spyware for “national security” and to combat drug trafficking.4

In November 2022, eight Thai citizens jointly filed a lawsuit against Israeli company NSO Group for violating their rights after their phones were infected by its Pegasus software.5 The lawsuit was dismissed by a civil court in Bangkok.6 Thai activist Jatupat Boonpattararaksa refiled the suit against NSO, seeking 2,500,000 baht ($71,000) in damages for the violation of his privacy. Jatupat also sought to have the court request that NSO release details about the sale and use of the spyware in Thailand and cease its operations in the country. In June 2024, after the two parties were unable to reach a settlement, the first court hearing for the trial was set for September 2024.7

In June 2023, Yingcheep Atchanont, a legal reform advocate, and Anon Nampa, a prodemocracy human rights lawyer and activist, filed a lawsuit against nine Thai government agencies, seeking 2,500,000 baht ($71,000) in damages for the violation of their privacy through the government’s alleged use of Pegasus spyware. They also requested that the court mandate that the government publish data on the purchase and use of the spyware and cease its use of Pegasus in the country. As of the end of the coverage period, there had been no further updates on the case.8

A 2020 report by Citizen Lab identified Thailand as a likely customer of Circles technology.9 Thailand has also obtained licenses to import telecommunications interception equipment from Switzerland and the United Kingdom.10 According to Privacy International, the licenses indicate the probable acquisition of international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers—devices that intercept data from all phones in the immediate area regardless of whether they are the focus of an investigation.

Social media monitoring is also of concern in Thailand. The Anti-Fake News Center collects information from social media, including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI), that is then reviewed by human content monitors (see B5).11 There are no clear procedural guidelines or independent oversight mechanisms to ensure that collected data are protected.12 Activists and online journalists were listed on a police watchlist released in July 2022, along with their social media handles.13

The ISOC faced heavy criticism during the 2023 elections after it posted online hourly updates on the MFP’s activity in the Prachinburi Province, information that was allegedly gathered through surveillance.14

The 2019 National Intelligence Act authorizes the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to obtain from government agencies or individuals any information that will have an impact on “national security,” a term that remains undefined (see C6). If this information is not provided by a government agency or individual, the NIA may “use any means, including electronic, telecommunication devices or other technologies,” to obtain it.15

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006

The Thai government’s centralization of internet infrastructure and close relationship with ISPs facilitates surveillance by the authorities.1

Section 15 of the CCA effectively encourages service providers to monitor user information, as they can face penalties under Section 14 if they are found to have “intentionally supported or consented to” a given offense.2 Failure to monitor what is being shared by a user, take down that information, or share the user’s information with the government may be seen as support or consent for the activities in question. In addition, CCA amendments allow officials to instruct service providers to retain computer traffic data for up to two years. Providers must otherwise retain data for at least 90 days under Section 26 of the CCA. Failing to retain this data could lead to a fine of up to 500,000 baht ($14,000).3

In October 2019, the MDES directed coffee shops, restaurants, and other venues that offer public Wi-Fi to retain user data, including names and browsing history, for at least 90 days.4 The order was intended to preserve data for the Anti-Fake News Center and to combat the sharing of purportedly false content that is punishable under Section 14 of the CCA or any other law (see B5 and C2).

The 2019 PDPA, which fully entered into force in June 2022,5 outlines how businesses can collect, use, or disclose personal information.6 The law can apply to data controllers and data processes outside the country if they process the data of people in Thailand. However, the PDPA provides exemptions for certain activities and authorities. Section 4 exempts any activity of a public authority that has national-security responsibilities. It also allows an exception for the House of Representatives, the Senate, or any committee appointed by them.7 Under Section 26, the legal obligation to various public interests is considered a lawful basis to process sensitive personal data, including biometric data, without the data subject’s explicit consent.8 A royal decree carving out additional exemptions from the PDPA for activities related to national security, public safety, tax collection, international cooperation, and legal procedures came into effect in January 2024.9

The PDPA lacks significant safeguards for the automated processing of personal data.10 Though the National AI Ethics Guidelines, approved by the cabinet in February 2021, require that automated systems processing personal data comply with the PDPA, the limits of the legal regime may be insufficient to protect privacy.

In March 2024, two cross-border data transfer regulations came into effect under the PDPA: the Whitelist Notification and the Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) and Appropriate Safeguards Notification. The Whitelist Notification requires that parties receiving transferred personal data must uphold the criteria for data protection underlined in the PDPA. It empowers the Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC) to make a “whitelist” of countries and organizations that meet the PDPA data protection criteria, thus allowing businesses to engage in cross-border data transfers with them. The BCRs and Appropriate Safeguards Notification requires businesses to adjust, implement, and certify their data protection policies so that they comply with data protection criteria set by the PDPC.11

The PDPC, which is responsible for implementing the PDPA, was established in January 2022.12 The PDPC has 16 members; most are current and former government officials, rather than industry or other experts.

A 2012 cabinet decision allowed investigators to intercept internet communications and collect personal data without a court order in certain cases, including those involving CCA violations. Even where court orders are still required, Thai judges typically approve requests without serious deliberation.

The Cybersecurity Act fails to protect individual privacy and provides the government with broad powers to access personal information without judicial review or other forms of oversight.13 For issues designated “critical level threats,” officials can access computer systems or data and extract a copy of the information collected. No attempt is required to notify affected persons, and no privacy protections govern the handling of collected information.14

The Royal Decree on Measures for Protection and Suppression of Technology Crimes B.E. 2566 took effect in March 2023.15 The decree allows telecommunication companies to provide user data to the police and other approved agencies.

In recent years, Facebook,16 Twitter,17 and Google18 have reported a handful of government requests to access user data.

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Prodemocracy activists and individuals who criticize the monarchy have been subjected to doxing, online harassment, extralegal intimidation, and violence in apparent connection with their online actions.1 Additionally, individuals who criticize the monarchy receive online and offline threats and intimidation (see B2 and C3).2 Women in politics also receive online abuse, harassment, and gendered defamation, as do women rights activists and gender-nonconforming activists.3 The whereabouts of previously forcibly disappeared activists remain unknown.

In July 2023, two editors at Thunhoon Newspaper, an online financial news outlet, were attacked and harassed for their reporting. The first, Chalermchai Sirinanthawitthaya, received a package which included photos of his children, bullets, and a threatening note. Later that night, attackers threw explosives at the home of another editor, Boonmee Onnom. Boonmee later said in an interview that he believed the attacks were in response to the paper’s reporting on stock price fluctuations, which may have resulted in investors pulling out of some companies that were performing poorly.4

During the coverage period, journalists were harassed, threatened, and attacked while reporting on prodemocracy protests. In October 2023, during a protest against political sentences under lèse-majesté laws, promonarchy activists attacked the protesters and threatened two reporters, Sarayut Tangprasert, a journalist for the online news outlet Prachatai, and Paradorn Ketphuak, a citizen journalist, who were livestreaming the clash. Ketphuak later claimed that it was his third time being harassed by members of the promonarchy group, the People’s Center to Protect the Monarchy (PCPM), while covering protests that year.5

In February 2024, two citizen journalists were attacked by promonarchy activists while livestreaming a clash between prodemocracy activists and counterprotestors from a promonarchy group, the Citizens' Network to Protect the Monarchy (CNPM). Members of the CNPM damaged one journalist’s phone during the attack.6

During the previous coverage period, in November 2022, police violently repressed journalists covering the dispersal of a protest march that was proceeding towards the site of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bangkok. Journalist Sutthipath Kanittakul of the online news agency the Matter was attacked with a baton and kicked in the head by riot police as he was broadcasting scenes from the crowd. Waranyu Khongsathittum of the Isaan Record was likewise punched and kicked before he was arrested.7 Freelance photojournalist Chalinee Thirasupa’s eye was injured by a glass bottle thrown by the police towards a group of photographers.8 The Matter filed a lawsuit against the national police force over the violence.9 Several online journalists were also injured while reporting on 2021 prodemocracy protests, which police often repressed with violence.10

During the previous coverage period, in April 2023, Duong Van Thai, a well-known Vietnamese blogger and YouTuber, disappeared in Thailand. Shortly after, Vietnamese state media reported that he had been apprehended while allegedly attempting to cross into Vietnam.11 Duong Van Thai left Vietnam in 2018 due to concerns that he might face political persecution as a result of his online activities criticizing the Vietnamese government and the leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). He had previously been granted refugee status by the United Nations.12

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

While a number of cyberattacks occurred during the coverage period, civil society groups, journalists, and human rights defenders were not routinely affected by state-sponsored technical attacks in response to their work.

Major organizations, including high-level government bodies, political parties, and defense and energy institutions, frequently face technical attacks, as do private-sector entities and individuals.1

In January 2024, the Department of Older Persons experienced a data breach which leaked the personal information of an estimated 19.7 million individuals, including their names, identification numbers, identification photos, contact information, and salaries. The leaked data was available for sale on the dark web and reportedly used to defraud consumers.2

In March 2024, the personal information of 2.2 million Thai citizens was leaked and found for sale on the dark web. The seller claimed the data was stolen from the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), but the ministry has since denied experiencing such an attack.3

During the APEC meeting that took place in Bangkok in November 2022, at least 44 individuals, including activists, civil society members, and Thai refugees, received notifications from Facebook that their accounts may have been targeted by state-sponsored actors.4 In May 2023, reports surfaced that Dark Pink, a hacking group that frequently targets organizations in the Asia-Pacific region, had targeted a Thai military body with a cyberattack.5

The Cybersecurity Act came into force in May 2019.6 The law aims to protect against, address, and mitigate cybersecurity threats.7 However, the text fails to protect online freedom and privacy. For example, telecommunications and technology firms designated as operating critical information infrastructure must monitor and report all threats to the government as they develop, which could include sharing confidential information.

In December 2022, Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC) issued the Notification on the Criteria and Procedures for Handling Personal Data Breaches.8 The notification provides a definition of personal-data breach and outlines a data controller's responsibilities upon receiving notification of an actual or suspected personal-data breach.

On Thailand

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Population

    71,700,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    34 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    39 100 not free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes