General elections, which must be held by June 2023 as per Turkey’s constitution, could present major challenges to incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). President Erdogan—who has led Turkey as either prime minister or president since 2003—and his government have been strongly criticized for their heavy-handed response to a catastrophic earthquake that left over 43,000 people dead in southern Turkey in early February. President Erdogan issued a three-month state of emergency in 10 provinces that were heavily impacted, granting the government exceptional powers that allow it to restrict fundamental rights. The designation could allow authorities to limit campaign activities like rallies or the distribution of materials, including online materials, in areas where the state of emergency is in place, potentially curtailing opposition activities. Authorities also blocked Twitter for 12 hours in the earthquake’s aftermath, ostensibly to halt the spread of disinformation, and blocked popular social media platform Eksi Sözlük for its earthquake coverage. Elections are expected on May 14.

The AKP has ruled Turkey since 2002. In the second decade of the party’s dominance, President Erdogan marginalized other party leaders and placed himself at the center of government by altering the electoral framework, coopting the judiciary, and taking drastic steps to silence dissent. After initially passing some liberalizing reforms, the AKP government has pursued a wide-ranging crackdown on critics and opponents since 2016. Constitutional changes in 2017 transformed Turkey from a parliamentary system into a superpresidential one in which there is no prime minister, and the president appoints the government without parliamentary input or approval. The AKP’s low-interest economic policy has sent Turkey’s economy into a tailspin, with inflation reaching a 24-year high in 2022. 

Turkey’s six-party opposition alliance, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Good Party (?Y?), have called for a radical departure from Erdogan’s policies. Public outrage over the ongoing economic crisis and inadequate government aid following the earthquake could bolster opposition parties and severely undermine Erdogan’s chances of reelection. However, disagreements within the opposition alliance may undermine their effort to oust Erdogan. Moreover, recent amendments to the electoral framework could leave smaller parties at a disadvantage: notably, the six-party alliance does not include the left-wing and pro-Kurdish rights Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the country’s second-largest opposition party, which is expected to run its own presidential candidate. The HDP has been vocal in criticizing the AKP’s handling of the earthquake and has accused the government of prioritizing aid distribution to areas with more AKP supporters, an issue that could influence Kurdish voters.

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

• Website and social media blocks, and content removal: Thousands of websites are blocked in Turkey, including many independent media and citizen journalism outlets. This technical censorship hinders voters’ ability to access accurate and diverse sources of information ahead of the vote. In February 2022, Turkey’s High Council for Broadcasting (RTÜK), the media regulator, issued a 72-hour deadline for international news websites to obtain a national broadcast license or risk blocking; it then blocked the Turkish-language versions of Deutsche Welle and Voice of America that July, after the outlets refused to obtain licenses. Authorities have blocked access to social media during political and other crises. In February 2023, following the devastating earthquake, authorities blocked Twitter for 12 hours in response to “harmful disinformation” about the disaster. Authorities also blocked popular social media platform Eksi Sözlük after progovernment media outlets criticized the platform for its commentary lambasting the government’s response following the earthquake. While disinformation can pose a risk to electoral integrity, blocking websites or social media platforms under the guise of combatting disinformation limits access to independent journalism and improperly suppresses political speech. In addition to blocks on entire websites or platforms, the government can legally compel content hosts and intermediaries to limit access to individual pieces of content for Turkey-based users. For example, the 2020 Social Media Law has been used to force social media companies to comply with government-ordered content-removal requests. In the first year of its implementation, the law was used to remove at least 1,197 news articles, primarily about political issues.
• Information manipulation: AKP-aligned public media outlets and government manipulation of social media content adversely impact the online information landscape, making it difficult for voters to access independent analysis of candidates or of the election campaign. The government uses a multipronged approach to skew the online narrative, claiming that misinformation is rampant and encouraging users to rely on government-issued information that favors the ruling party. Numerous reports have revealed that the AKP has enlisted an “army of trolls”—numbering around 6,000 individuals—to manipulate online discussions, drive political agendas, and combat government critics on social media. In May 2019, ahead of Istanbul’s repeat mayoral election, numerous progovernment social media accounts spread an altered video of opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appearing to say that he would have terrorist groups run the country. 
• Arrests and prosecutions: Many journalists, activists, and ordinary people face criminal penalties for criticizing, reporting on, or discussing government officials online, an environment likely to encourage self-censorship ahead of the vote. In recent years, thousands of people have been investigated for insulting President Erdogan, and numerous activists, journalists, and members of the political opposition have been charged with defamation. In August 2021, Canan Kaftancioglu, the Istanbul chair of the opposition CHP, was investigated for social media activities from nearly a decade beforehand and was sentenced to 4 years and 11 months in prison in May 2022. In February 2023, at least 24 social media users were arrested for criticizing the government’s handling of the earthquake, setting a dangerous precedent for dissent ahead of the election. The new Law on Combating Disinformation, which includes provisions that impose criminal penalties on anyone who deliberately shares content online deemed “fake,” could further be used to prosecute internet users and facilitate the AKP’s efforts to silence dissent ahead of the vote.
• Harassment and intimidation: Harassment of journalists and online activists is rampant in Turkey, limiting free expression and the plurality of voices in the media. Reporters are occasionally subject to physical attacks, notably those who cover politics, corruption, or crime. In August 2021, political commentator Emre Ercis was shot in the leg and foot by an unidentified attacker; Ercis is known for his strident criticism of opposition groups and parties on Twitter. In February 2022, Güngör Arslan, the editor of local online newspaper Ses Kocaeli, was shot and killed. Arslan, who frequently reported on local politics, corruption, and fraud, had received death threats prior to his murder. In June 2021, journalist Ahmet Atmaca, a general reporter who covered crime, official events, and COVID-19 policies for the progovernment Demirören News Agency, was attacked as he visited a morgue while covering a murder case. Political candidates also face online harassment. In January 2022, CHP leader Kemal Kiliçdaroglu described an online harassment campaign against him that was orchestrated by thousands of pro-AKP Twitter trolls. 

Turkey has a score of 33 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects an election system designed to concentrate government power, strict laws criminalizing online expression, and extralegal attempts to stifle independent journalism and silence dissent. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 32 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 32 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Turkey country reports in Freedom in the World, and Freedom on the Net.