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Freedom on the Net 2024

Ukraine

Partly Free
59
100
A Obstacles to Access 18 25
B Limits on Content 22 35
C Violations of User Rights 19 40
Last Year's Score & Status
59 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

The February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian military continues to undermine internet freedom in the country. The Russian military’s attacks have caused severe damage to Ukraine’s internet infrastructure, resulting in network disruptions. The Ukrainian government blocks a wide variety of Russian and Kremlin-backed websites including blogs and news outlets, social media sites, and sites that provide other services. Additionally, courts have sentenced individuals accused of producing pro-Kremlin propaganda, collaborating with the Russian government to produce online content, or posting information online about evading the draft. Cyberattacks by Russian actors against state institutions, critical infrastructure, and the media are routine.

  • The Kremlin’s full-scale invasion has resulted in damage to least 30,000 kilometers (18,600 miles) of fiber-optic cables, 4,300 mobile base stations, and a quarter of Ukraine's internet networks, and caused severe network disruptions throughout the coverage period (see A1 and A3).
  • In December 2023, Kyivstar, a major internet service provider (ISP), suffered a severe Russian hacking attack, disrupting infrastructure and user connectivity (see A1 and C8).
  • Since September 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation has become the leading authority in safeguarding and expanding internet infrastructure, including coordinating the restoration of internet and mobile networks in previously occupied areas (see A5).
  • In November 2023, reports emerged that Oleksiy Matsuka, the director general of state news agency Ukrinform, had followed instructions from the office of the Ukrainian president about how to cover news (see B5).
  • Reports emerged that employees of two leading investigative journalism agencies faced a conscription attempt and unlawful surveillance, respectively, by members of the State Security Service (SSU). Meanwhile, anticorruption activists were targeted by disinformation campaigns (see B5 and C7).
  • The Russian occupying authorities in Melitopol detained several administrators of critical Telegram channels in August 2023 (see C3 and C7).

header2 Political Overview

In the past decade, Ukraine has enacted a series of reforms to address issues like widespread corruption, a politicized judiciary, and attacks against journalists, activists, and members of ethnic and other minority groups. However, government initiatives to solve these problems sometimes suffer from a lack of political will, and have experienced setbacks. While the 2022 invasion forced the government to shift its primary focus from reform programs to more pressing wartime needs, authorities have continued work toward aligning legislation with European Union (EU) law. Since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian government has prosecuted individuals or groups perceived as threatening Ukrainian sovereignty.

Note: To align this survey with Freedom House’s Freedom in the World survey, Freedom on the Net has excluded Russian-occupied eastern Donbas, based on boundaries established prior to the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Crimea from its analysis of Ukraine in recent years. Disputed or occupied territories are sometimes assessed separately by Freedom in the World if they meet certain criteria, including boundaries that are sufficiently stable to allow year-on-year comparisons. Readers can access Freedom House’s criteria for evaluating territories separately here.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 4.004 6.006

During the reporting period, damage caused by the Russian military’s full-scale invasion continued to interrupt internet access for many, though the government has taken action to restore access in liberated areas.1

According to the latest data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as of 2021, Ukraine’s internet penetration rate was 79.2 percent, with the fixed- and mobile-broadband penetration rates reaching 18.3 percent and 80.1 percent respectively.2 As reported by Ukrainian governmental officials, by the end of February 2022, 90 percent of Ukraine was covered by fiber-optic networks and around 89 percent of citizens had access to mobile communication services from at least two operators.3 According to the research service DataReportal, as of February 2024, some 20.8 percent of Ukrainians remained offline, while the number of internet users increased by 1.1 million (3.7 percent) between 2023 and 2024.4 Internet availability and ease of access vary by region, and access remained significantly affected by war during the coverage period.

Mobile internet speeds remain poor. The median mobile download speed in May 2024 was 20.99 megabits per second (Mbps), compared to a global average of 52.48 Mbps, according to the network intelligence company Ookla.5 The median fixed-broadband speed was much faster, per Ookla, at 81.18 Mbps.

Due to emergency blackouts resulting from targeted Russian military air strikes on energy and telecommunications infrastructure, Ukrainians were again periodically disconnected from broadband internet during the coverage period. Under such circumstances, resulting heavy mobile internet usage has overloaded mobile operators’ networks, resulting in poor quality service or the total loss of mobile service. Ukrainian internet providers use electricity generators to keep Ukrainians connected.6 In frontline regions, the critical and social infrastructure facilities have been equipped with compact lithium battery, to bolster power supplies during outages.7

Subscribers faced issues accessing the internet for several days in December 2023, when Russian hackers disabled Kyivstar, a large broadband and mobile operator (see C8).8

In April 2024, the Ministry of Digital Transformation reported that Russia’s full-scale invasion had damaged 30,000 kilometers of fiber optic cables, 4,300 mobile base stations, and a quarter of the country’s internet networks.9 When Ukrainian forces have retaken territories, reestablishing internet connection has been one of their priorities.10 However, restoring infrastructure has been challenging due to mines, constant shelling, and power outages. While repairs are ongoing in liberated territories, Ukrainian providers have established makeshift Wi-Fi spots where residents sometimes must queue for hours to connect to the internet for just 15 minutes.11 In May 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Nokia signed an agreement to launch a pilot project modernizing networks in front-line settlements and those that had previously been occupied by the Russian military.12

As of May 2024, the government had also equipped 730 “invincibility points,” specially equipped places where Ukrainians can charge their devices, warm up, and get free internet access.13

In 2022, after the full-scale Russian military invasion, Ukraine became one of the countries with the highest rate of SpaceX’s Starlink usage (see A4). By the end of 2023, Ukraine had at least 47,000 Starlink receivers,14 which have been operationalized to provide internet access to individual users and critical infrastructure facilities even during the blackouts and in the areas most heavily affected by war.15 Ukrainian soldiers have reportedly used the SpaceX-operated systems to coordinate military action and stay in touch with their families.16 Moreover, after a successful testing, the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Ukrainian Railways announced in 2023 that they plan to equip all high-speed intercity trains with Starlink receivers.17 The Russian military has tried to target Starlink service on battlefield, leaving Ukrainian military without the only reliable source of connection.18 In August 2023, Elon Musk, the chief executive of SpaceX, refused to activate Starlink satellites in Russian-occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, at the request of the Ukrainian government, which wanted to use the network in an attack against a Russian fleet there.19

The government has also worked with mobile operators to help them launch a national roaming service allowing subscribers to switch between networks in cases where a signal is jammed.20 In April 2022, 27 mobile operators in the European Union (EU) and Ukraine reached an agreement to provide roaming calls to Ukraine at a free or reduced price.21 The preferential roaming regime was prolonged until July 2024.22 By the end of the reporting period, in order to comply with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the Ukrainian parliament had adopted a draft law introducing a single roaming zone in the EU. The president signed it shortly thereafter and it currently awaits follow-up approval by the EU (see A4).23

In 2020, three major mobile operators—Kyivstar, Vodafone, and Lifecell—began work on a nationwide program to provide fourth-generation (4G) technology for mobile networks to 90 percent of the population by 2024.24 By the end of 2021, Kyivstar’s 4G network reached 90 percent of Ukraine’s population, closely followed by Vodafone Ukraine with 83 percent coverage,25 and the two networks had covered four international highways with high-quality 4G connection.26 However, growth of the 4G network was put on hold after the full-sale invasion, with operators’ attention shifting to emergency restoration of base stations destroyed by Russian military.

In mid-February 2022, the parliament approved a bill that simplifies the procedure for deployment of 4G base stations by mobile operators, and halves the time required to obtain the necessary permit.27 As of the end of this reporting period, the parliament was still considering a draft law that would allow mobile operators to obtain land for construction of base stations in 1 to 3 months—twice as fast as is needed currently, according to the Digital Transformation Ministry.28

The first government tender for a 5G implementation plan was to be announced in 2021, but it was postponed until February 202229 and then put on hold following the Russian military invasion. In late 2023, the government adopted a radio frequency spectrum usage plan aiming to facilitate 5G implementation, bridge the urban-rural digital divide, and improve e-services quality. The new license terms do not establish any qualification or organizational requirements for licensees.30 In May 2024, Vodafone and Nokia conducted the first 5G testing in Ukraine.31

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Internet infrastructure is more developed in urban areas, though inequality along an urban-rural divide has continued to narrow. There has been limited data on disparities in internet access since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion.

With an average monthly wage of 14,308 hryvnia ($363) in 2023,1 monthly internet subscription rates are fairly affordable for most of the population. According to 2023 data from the ITU, the average cost of a 5 gigabyte (GB) monthly fixed-broadband subscription was 2.25 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while that of a 2 GB mobile subscription was 1.36 percent of GNI per capita.2 High competition among operators generally keeps internet subscription prices affordable. As reported by the Ministry of Digital Transformation, during 2023, 540 villages were connected to 4G network for the first time.3

In February 2023, Ukrtelecom launched free public Wi-Fi zones in the largest Ukrainian cities—Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv, Odesa, and Kharkiv—that have a capacity to remain functional for two to four hours during electricity blackouts.4 The Ministry of Digital Transformation planned to expand the number of such free public Wi-Fi zones by installing Starlink receivers, including in recaptured territories,5 though no updates on achieved progress were available during the reporting period.

  • 1“Показник середньої заробітної плати за 2023 рік [Average Salary Indicator for 2023],” Pension Fund of Ukraine, November 27, 2023, https://www.pfu.gov.ua/2158510-pokaznyk-serednoyi-zarobitnoyi-platy-za-…
  • 2International Telecommunication Union, “ICT Prices,” accessed April 2023, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/ICTprices/default.aspx.
  • 3Ministry and Committee of Digital Transformation Ukraine, “Понад 30 послуг у Дії та розвиток Defence Tech: головні досягнення Мінцифри за 2023 рік [More than 30 services in Diia and the development of Defence Tech: the main achievements of the Ministry of Digital Transformation in 2023], December 28, 2023, https://thedigital.gov.ua/news/ponad-30-poslug-u-dii-ta-rozvitok-defenc…
  • 4Vadim Karpus, “”Укртелеком” запустив безплатні Wi-Fi-зони, які працюють за відсутності енергоживлення – мережа охоплює Київ, Дніпро, Львів, Одеса та Харків [Ukrtelecom" launched free Wi-Fi zones working in absence of power supply - the network covers Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv, Odesa and Kharkiv],” IT Community, February 1, 2023, https://itc.ua/ua/novini/ukrtelekom-zapustyv-bezplatni-wi-fi-zony-yaki-….
  • 5Valentyna Dudko, “Ціна Starlink, розмови з Маском, дрони проти дронів та цифровізація грального бізнесу. Велике інтервʼю Михайла Федорова [The price of Starlink, conversations with Musk, drones vs. drones and digitalization of gaming business. Big interview with Mykhailo Fedorov],” Forbes Ukraine, October 31, 2022, https://forbes.ua/innovations/nastupniy-tekhnologichniy-krok-viyna-dron….
A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 4.004 6.006

Ukraine’s diverse and open internet infrastructure poses structural obstacles for any government authority seeking to enact a large-scale connectivity blockage. The backbone connection to the global internet is not centralized, and major ISPs manage their own channels independently.1 The country has at least 23 internet exchange points (IXPs),2 12 of which were operational as of May 2024.3 Ukraine’s largest IXP, UA-IX, allows Ukrainian ISPs to exchange traffic and connect to the global network. Ukraine’s internet has proven resilient even during the full-scale war due to availability of numerous exit points with neighboring countries, a well-provisioned network of international connectivity providers, a strong local peering fabric, and well-secured networks to mitigate security issues. 4

As reported by Access Now, in 2023, Russian military air strikes resulted in at least 8 network disruptions in Ukraine.5

Beginning in the spring of 2022, the Russian military compelled ISPs in occupied areas to reroute connections through Russian networks.6 Individuals connected to these ISPs are unable to access websites that are blocked in Russia, including Instagram and Facebook. Russian-backed authorities in occupied areas of Ukraine also restrict access to virtual private networks (VPNs),7 websites, and messaging applications that are not blocked in Russia, including Google, YouTube, and the messaging application Viber (see C4).8 After the liberation of territory in Kherson in October 2022, local ISPs in those territories stopped rerouting internet traffic through Russia.

The Russian occupying authorities took a similar approach with mobile operators. The authorities forced people to switch to SIM cards of Kremlin-run mobile operators, which block calls into Ukraine.9 The Russian military had previously taken similar actions in Crimea, which is outside of this report’s scope.10

Ukrainian legislation on states of emergency and martial law could be used to restrict connectivity. In December 2020, Parliament passed the Law on Electronic Communications (see C6), which amended the Law on Combatting Terrorism to enable the government to temporarily restrict access to the internet for the sake of antiterrorist operations. The law also allows the restriction of internet access during states of emergency or martial law,11 when the government may introduce “special rules” concerning “the connection and transmission of information through computer networks.”12 Under martial law (see C1), the military is empowered to prohibit “the transmission of information through computer networks.”13 As of the end of the coverage period the government had refrained from implementing these provisions, even after martial law was declared in response to the Russian invasion.14

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 5.005 6.006

The Ukrainian information and communications technology (ICT) market is fairly liberal. According to the National Commission for State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum and Provision of Postal Services (NCEC), there were 2,091 ISPs in the country at the end of the coverage period.1 The diversity of ISPs and absence of strict state control over the networks were key factors that enabled Ukraine to avoid a nationwide internet shutdown during massive and continuous attempts by Russia to destroy telecommunications infrastructure since the beginning of full-scale invasion (see A1).

Because Ukrtelecom, which was 93 percent state-owned prior to its privatization in 2011, owns much of the ICT infrastructure, and some providers lack the resources to build their own networks,2 there is some dependency on leased lines. However, Ukrtelecom does not exert pressure or regulatory control over other ISPs. During the coverage period, Kyivstar maintained its leadership in the fixed-broadband market, followed by Ukrtelecom, Datagroup-Volia, and Vodafone (having acquired Vega and Freenet). Other major ISPs in Ukraine include Lanet, Triolan, Fregat, and Uarnet.3 Following the invasion, subscribers regularly shifted between ISPs looking for stable internet connection during electricity blackouts.4 In November 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, along with the nongovernmental organization LUN Misto, launched a map of internet availability during blackouts, primarily covering ISPs in the city of Kyiv, and sporadically issuing updates on blackouts in the Kyiv, Odesa, and Lviv regions.5

As of November 2023, Russia’s military has destroyed a quarter of all internet networks across Ukraine, leaving over 90 ISPs on the verge of bankruptcy (see A1). The German government has allocated financial support of €700,000 ($765,000) for 68 Ukrainian ISPs to restore internet connection on de-occupied territories, improve network resilience, and connect remote settlements.6

The mobile-broadband market is dominated by three main competitors: Kyivstar (VEON), Lifecell (owned by Turkey’s Turkcell), and Vodafone Ukraine (owned by Azerbaijan’s BakCell). 7

An April 2021 decision by the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine concluded that there are no significant administrative barriers to entering the ICT market and financial expenses at the startup phase are relatively low. Moreover, major players often allow new providers to access existing infrastructure for nominal fees when they are establishing their operations. Easy entry to the market and the ability of users to change the provider of their choice keep the competition among ISPs high.8

In September 2019, the government removed a licensing requirement for telecommunications operators, introducing a simplified notification procedure in its stead.9 Additionally, Diia Business, a digital platform launched by the Ministry of Digital Transformation, offers guidelines for those looking to launch an ISP.10 However, mobile operators must still license the radio frequencies they use to provide cellular services. At the same time, mobile operators received additional frequencies to enhance network capacity during wartime.11

  • 1National Commission for the State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum and Provision of Postal Services, “Register of providers of electronic communication networks and/or services,” , accessed June 2024, http://nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=55&language=uk; Lyuba Balashova, “Тінь блекауту. Українські провайдери витратили сотні мільйонів, щоб інтернет точно працював без електрики. Хто підготувався найкраще? (спойлер: Vodafone – добре, Ахметов та «Київстар» – гірше) [Shadow of a blackout. Ukrainian providers have spent hundreds of millions to ensure that the Internet works without electricity. Who prepared the best? (spoiler: Vodafone is good, Akhmetov and Kyivstar are worse)],” Forbes Ukraine Magazine, October 20, 2023, https://forbes.ua/innovations/tin-blekautu-ukrainski-provayderi-vitrati….
  • 2“Укртелеком продан [Ukrtelecom Sold],” Dengi, March 11, 2011, http://dengi.ua/news/77761_Ukrtelekom_prodan_.html.
  • 3Lyuba Balashova, “Тінь блекауту. Українські провайдери витратили сотні мільйонів, щоб інтернет точно працював без електрики. Хто підготувався найкраще? (спойлер: Vodafone – добре, Ахметов та «Київстар» – гірше) [Shadow of a blackout. Ukrainian providers have spent hundreds of millions to ensure that the Internet works without electricity. Who prepared the best? (spoiler: Vodafone is good, Akhmetov and Kyivstar are worse)],” Forbes Ukraine Magazine, October 20, 2023, https://forbes.ua/innovations/tin-blekautu-ukrainski-provayderi-vitrati… ; Oleksandr Kuzmenko, “«Придивляємось, і придивляємося дуже серйозно». «Укртелеком» Ахметова може придбати одного з операторів фіксованого інтернету ["We look closely, and we look very seriously." Akhmetov's Ukrtelecom may acquire one of the fixed Internet operators],” dev.ua, March 19, 2024, https://dev.ua/news/ukrtelekom-mozhe-prydbaty-odnoho-z-operatoriv-fikso… ; Maria Brovinska, “Хто краще? 10 інтернет-провайдерів України за швидкістю завантаження та за обсягом переданих даних [Who is better? 10 Internet providers in Ukraine in terms of download speed and data transfer],” dev.ua, January 15, 2023, https://dev.ua/news/internet-1673802693
  • 4Taisa Melnyk, “Українці масово змінюють провайдерів домашнього інтернету. У виграші Vodafone, «Укртелеком» Ахметова і дрібні компанії (але не у плюсі) [Ukrainians are changing home internet providers en masse. Vodafone, Akhmetov's "Ukrtelecom" and small companies benefit (but not in the plus)],” Forbes Ukraine Magazine, December 13, 2022, https://forbes.ua/innovations/piv-tsarstva-za-pon-ukraintsi-masovo-zmin….
  • 5“Мінцифра та ЛУН Місто запустили Мапу інтернету під час знеструмлень [Ministry of Digital Transformation and LUN Misto launched the Internet Map during blackouts],” Lun Misto, https://misto.lun.ua/about-internet
  • 6Ministry and Committee of Digital Transformation Ukraine, “Стійкий зв’язок на звільнених територіях: 68 провайдерів отримали €700 тисяч на відновлення інтернету [Stable communication in the liberated territories: 68 providers received €700K to restore the Internet],” February 26, 2024, https://thedigital.gov.ua/news/stiykiy-zvyazok-na-zvilnenikh-teritoriya…
  • 7Pete Bell “Ukraine’s Telecom Market, Explained,” TeleGeography, March 23, 2022, https://blog.telegeography.com/ukraines-telecom-market-explained
  • 8Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, “Рішення Антимонопольного комітету України № 222-р “Про результати розгляду справи про концентрацію” [Decision of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine No. 222-p on the results of consideration of concentration case],” April 22, 2021, https://amcu.gov.ua/storage/app/uploads/public/609/53b/714/60953b7140cd…
  • 9“Скасовано ліцензії у сфері телекомунікацій [Licenses in the field of telecommunications have been abolished],” Jurliga, September 18, 2019, https://jurliga.ligazakon.net/ua/news/189406_skasovano-ltsenz-u-sfer-te…
  • 10“Інтернет-провайдер [Internet provider],” Diia Business, accessed September 2023, https://business.diia.gov.ua/en/idea/it-ta-telekom/internet-provajder.
  • 11”Ukrainian Internet Saved Through Decentralization: Officials And Telecom Industry Reflecting On 2022 Lessons,” Internews Ukraine, May 31, 2023, https://internews.ua/en/opportunity/Press_Release_communications_and_in….
A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 3.003 4.004

In February 2022, the previous ICT regulator, the National Commission for the State Regulation of Communications and Informatization (NCCIR), was transformed into the National Commission for State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum, and Provision of Postal Services (NCEC). The new body features a more transparent procedure for selection of its members, involving an independent selection commission and final approval by the government. The NCEC has seven members; its chair is selected by members from among themselves for a three-year term.1 The current members and chair, who were appointed under the NCCIR’s presidential decree system, will perform their duties until the end of their terms.2

The Ministry of Digital Transformation is responsible for articulating and implementing state policy for online-government efforts and is in charge of efforts to build digital skills among Ukrainians.3 Zelenskyy’s administration has created digital transformation leadership positions in each ministry, regional administration, state company, and state agency.4 When the Law on Electronic Communications entered into force in January 2022, the Ministry of Digital Transformation assumed powers from the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP) related to shaping policy in the field of electronic communications and radio frequency spectrum.5 In September 2023, the ministry assumed primary responsibilities for restoring internet connection and mobile networks on de-occupied territories, expanding high-speed internet coverage, facilitating a single roaming area with the EU, and simplifying rules in telecom sector. As a result, the SSSCIP is now mostly focused on protection of critical infrastructure.6

Several civil society groups provide input on ICT and media regulation in Ukraine, including the Internet Association of Ukraine and the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, and their recommendations are often implemented.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

The Ukrainian government blocks numerous Russian and pro-Russian websites. Russian-owned web platforms, including Vkontakte (VK), Odnoklassniki (OK), and Mail.ru; a wide variety of websites deemed to contain Russian propaganda; and Russia-affiliated companies like Dr. Web, Kaspersky, and Yandex have been blocked via “sanctions,” which have been repeatedly renewed, since 2017.1 In May 2021, sanctions were levelled against Russian and pro-Russian Crimean media, payment systems, and information technology companies.2 At different periods, blocking orders also included the online resources of the self-proclaimed governance bodies of the Kremlin-controlled Luhansk People’s Republic, as well as those of Rostelecom, RT, National Media Group, All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, Channel One, Information Agency ITAR-TASS, and others.3 The actual implementation of website blocking has been inconsistent,4 disputed in the court,5 and never properly monitored.6

After instituting martial law (see C1) in response to the February 2022 invasion, the NCEC asked ISPs to block a massive number of Russian websites that allegedly spread disinformation7 or facilitated cyberattacks.8 By March 2022, the NCEC ordered the blocking of more than 48 million Russian IP addresses. The penalty for noncompliance is exclusion from the register of telecom operators and providers, and the regulator is empowered to apply more severe measures. At least one such case has been reported so far.9

In March 2023, the National Center for Operational and Technical Management of Telecommunications Networks began deploying a filtration system for phishing domains used for fraudulent purposes in banking and financial sector. The decision met some resistance from the industry, including from the Ukrainian Internet Association, partially because the measure could lay the ground for future indiscriminate blocking of online resources.10 Similar measures had previously been applied to fraudulent online casinos.11

In September 2023, a group of volunteers launched UABlockList, a website that aims to register online resources that are blocked in Ukraine. According to the register, 5,230 websites are blocked in total. During the reporting period, according to UABlockList, Ukrainian authorities ordered the blocking of 475 Russian websites, out of which 236 were blocked upon the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) decision, and 238 ordered by the SSSCIP.12

According to an August 2023 report from the European Commission, which has also sanctioned Russian websites across the European Union, restrictions introduced by Ukraine since the full-scale invasion are “legitimately rooted in national security concerns. However, the Ukrainian government should provide a clear vision for the reestablishment of rights and freedoms after martial law ends.”13

The NSDC has also issued sanctions against non-Russian media outlets that adopt a pro-Russian stance. For example, in August 2021, Zelenskyy banned the online news outlet Strana and sanctioned its editor in chief, Ihor Huzhva, and blogger Anatoliy Shariy, on grounds of disseminating pro-Russian propaganda (see C3).14 Blocking also was ordered for related channels and pages on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram, and affiliated individuals and businesses were also affected.15 The sanctions against online resources related to Huzhva and Shariy were extended for three and ten years respectively in February 202216 and January 2023.17 In 2024, the NSDC continued ordering blocking of YouTube channels of sanctioned Russian propagandists.18

In January 2024, the SSU ordered the blocking of a Viber channel that was sharing information about locations where representatives of the territorial recruitment centers were handing out draft notices in Lviv region, thus helping Ukrainian men to avoid mobilization.19 Seven Telegram channels and Viber groups were blocked in the Cherkasy region on similar grounds (see C3).20

The authorities occasionally direct ISPs to block websites involved in cybercrime, fraud, illegal gambling, the drug trade, and money laundering.21 In the past, courts have also blocked websites on grounds that hosting content allegedly violated intellectual property rights.22

  • 1Office of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, “УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №184/2020 [DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No184/2020],” May 14, 2020, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1842020-33629.
  • 2Dmytro Gubenko, “Зеленський увів у дію санкції проти кримінальних авторитетів і злодіїв у законі [Zelensky imposed sanctions against criminal authorities and thieves in law],” Deutsche Welle, May 21, 2021, https://p.dw.com/p/3tnQs.
  • 3Office of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, “УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №726/2022 [DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No726/2022],” October 19, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/7262022-44481.
  • 4“Укртелеком, Ланет, Паутина.Net. Провайдери починають блокувати сайти Шарія та strana.ua [Ukrtelecom, Lanet, Pautyna.Net. Providers start blocking Shariy and strana.ua websites],” Dev.ua, August 23, 2021, https://dev.ua/news/blokirovka; Official Website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Кіберполіція викрила одеського провайдера у наданні доступу абонентам до російського контенту [Cyber police exposed Odesa provider in providing subscribers with access to Russian content],” December 15, 2022, https://mvs.gov.ua/uk/news/kiberpoliciia-vikrila-odeskogo-provaidera-u-….
  • 5“Київський провайдер НетАссіст відмовився блокувати вконтакті та подав до суду” [Kyiv Based ISP NetAssist Refused to Block Vkontakte and Filed a Lawsuit], Detector Media, September 6, 2019, https://ms.detector.media/videoteka/post/23466/2019-09-06-kiivskii-prov…; Decision by Kyiv District Administrative Court in Case No. 640/17037/19, Unified State Registry of Court Decisions, May 18, 2020, http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/89350804.
  • 6Ksenia Savoskina, “Три года без “ВКонтакте”: сколько украинцев все еще пользуются соцсетями РФ [Three years without VKontakte: How many Ukrainians still use social networks in the Russian Federation],” Hromadske TV, May 22, 2020, https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/tri-goda-bez-vkontakte-skolko-ukrainskij-…
  • 7National Commission for State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum and Provision of Postal Services, “НКЕК просить постачальників електронних комунікаційних мереж та/або послуг негайно заблокувати веб-ресурси відповідно до розпорядження НЦУ від 01.04.2022 [‎NCEC asks providers of electronic communication networks and/or services to immediately block web resources in accordance with the order of the NSU as of 01.04.2022‎],”, accessed September 2023, https://nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=99&id=2294&language=uk.
  • 8National Commission for State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum and Provision of Postal Services, “НКЕК просить постачальників електронних комунікаційних мереж/послуг посприяти знищенню інформаційної навали з боку РФ [NCEC asks suppliers of electronic communication networks / services to contribute to the destruction of the information invasion by the Russian Federation],” accessed September 2023, https://nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=99&id=2252&language=uk.
  • 9“За відмову блокувати роспропаганду інтернет-провайдерів почали виключати з реєстру [For refusing to block Russian propaganda Internet providers are excluded from the register],” Ukrinform, March 31, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-technology/3444548-internetprovajderiv-….
  • 10“В Україні створюється “троянський кінь” - централізована система автоматичного блокування інтернет-ресурсів ["Trojan horse" - centralised system of automatic blocking of Internet resources is being created in Ukraine],” Internet Association of Ukraine, February 28, 2023, https://inau.ua/news/novyny-inau/v-ukrayini-stvoryuyetsya-troyanskyy-ki….
  • 11“В Україні розпочала роботу система блокування сайтів та збору даних користувачів [A system for blocking websites and collecting user data has been launched in Ukraine],” News N, March 5, 2023, https://novosti-n.org/ua/news/V-Ukrayini-rozpochala-robotu-systema-blok….
  • 12UAblocklist, accessed September 2024, https://uablocklist.com/,
  • 13European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document Ukraine 2023 Report”, November 8, 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/bb61ea…
  • 14European Federation of Journalists, “Ukraine: President bans opposition media Strana.ua and sanctions editor-in-chief,” August 26, 2021, https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2021/08/26/ukraine-president-bans-…; Institute of Mass Information, “NSDC imposed sanctions against Shariy and Guzhva,” August 23, 2021, https://imi.org.ua/en/news/nsdc-imposed-sanctions-against-shariy-and-gu….
  • 15Office of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, “УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №375/2021 [DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No375/2021],’ August 20, 2021, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3752021-39741, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3762021-39745.
  • 16“Зеленський розширив санкції проти Шарія та Гужви [Zelenskyy expanded sanctions against Shariy and Huzhva],” Ukrainska Pravda, February 16, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/16/7324274/.
  • 17Office of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, “УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №23/2023 [DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No23/2023],” January 15, 2023, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/232023-45589
  • 18Yuliia Lavryshyn, “Андрій Коваленко: Завдяки роботі ЦПД заблоковано 200 ютуб-каналів, які поширювали російську дезінформацію [Andriy Kovalenko: Thanks to the work of the CCD, 200 YouTube channels that spread Russian disinformation have been blocked],” Media Detector, April 19, 2024, ; Yuliia Lavryshyn, “Андрій Коваленко: Завдяки роботі ЦПД заблоковано 200 ютуб-каналів, які поширювали російську дезінформацію [Andriy Kovalenko: Thanks to the work of the CCD, 200 YouTube channels that spread Russian disinformation have been blocked],” Detector Media, April 19, 2024, https://detector.media/infospace/article/225685/2024-04-19-andriy-koval… ; Center for Countering Disinformation “За запитом Центру протидії дезінформації РНБО на території України заблоковано YouTube-проєкт «ПАНЧЕНКО», який просував наративи російської пропаганди [At the request of the Center for Countering Disinformation of the National Security and Defense Council, the YouTube project "PANCHENKO", which promoted Russian propaganda narratives, was blocked on the territory of Ukraine],” Facebook, April 3, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/protydiyadezinformatsiyi.cpd/posts/pfbid02bhXf….
  • 19SBU Office in Lviv region, “СБУ заблокувала Viber-канал, який допомагав громадянам призовного віку уникати мобілізації [SSU blocks Viber channel that helped citizens of conscription age avoid mobilization],” Facebook post, January 18, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/ssu.lviv/posts/pfbid0PacNSJadhcjQpNPmUuix1Rq9U…
  • 20SBU Office in Lviv region, “СБУ викрила адмінів груп у популярних месенджерах, які сприяли ухилянтам уникненню мобілізації [SSU exposes admins of groups in popular messengers who helped draft evaders avoid mobilization],”Facebook post, January 29, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/ssu.cherkasy/posts/pfbid02VR4Ng9UkZTsMLQRUExNs…
  • 21“В Україні заблокують 59 сайтів, з них вісім новинних (СПИСОК) [Ukraine will block 59 websites, including eight news aggregators (LIST)],” Detector media, February 2, 2020, https://detector.media/rinok/article/174680/2020-02-12-v-ukraini-zablok…
  • 22National Commission for the State Regulation of Communications and Informatization, “До уваги операторів, провайдерів телекомунікацій [To the attention of operators, telecommunications providers],” February 24, 2021, https://nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=99&id=2055&language=uk; “Печерський суд заблокував “Главком” [Pechersk court blocked Glavcom],” Glavcom, March 25, 2021, https://glavcom.ua/country/incidents/pecherskiy-sud-zablokuvav-glavkom-…; Olena Tokmach, “Свобода слова перемогла: суд скасував блокування українських сайтів [Freedom of speech won: court lifted blocking of Ukrainian websites],” Glavcom, April 28, 2021, https://glavcom.ua/columns/oksana_tokmach/svoboda-slova-peremogla-sud-s…; Olena Tokmach, “Свобода слова перемогла: суд скасував блокування українських сайтів [Freedom of speech won: court lifted blocking of Ukrainian websites],” Glavcom, April 28, 2021, https://glavcom.ua/columns/oksana_tokmach/svoboda-slova-peremogla-sud-s….
B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The government sometimes refers content to third parties, seeking its removal. During the coverage period, social media platforms and search engines also removed inauthentic content in response to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine (see B5).

In the first half of 2023, Meta restricted access to 137 items of content based on Ukrainian government requests for “alleged violation of local laws.” In the last six months of 2023, Meta restricted access in Ukraine to 107 items of such content. These numbers demonstrated a sharp decrease compared to 2022.1 In the first half of 2023, Google received 28 requests from the government covering 133 items and removed 22.5 percent of items for legal and policy reasons. In the second half of 2023, Google received 40 requests regarding 382 items, removing 5.2 percent of them on legal and policy ground. Most of the requests related to defamation and national security.2 X did not produce a transparency report covering the reporting period.

Several Ukrainian social media pages that have shared information about the war or tried to organize support for the Ukrainian army have also had their pages removed, or otherwise limited since the start of the full-scale invasion. For example, in July 2023, a commemoration post for a Ukrainian writer killed in a Russian missile attack was marked by Facebook as hate speech.3 Meta has also deleted and later restored the Instagram account of a memorial project commemorating people killed by the Russian military.4 In October 2023, YouTube blocked a Ukrainian version of a documentary about environmental damage caused by the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion, which was published by the Ukrainian Armed Forces Strategic Communications Department; however the English version remains available.5 The platform has also been deleting links to charity foundation Come Back Alive, allegedly for obscene pictures. Reportedly some content was restored after users’ complaints.6

Since December 2023, Ukrainian media can challenge their accounts’ restrictions on TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook via the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism platform,7 which was launched by the Global Forum for Media Development.

In April 2024, without any prior notification, Telegram temporarily blocked some official chatbots, including those of the SSU, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, and Defense Intelligence.8 Shortly before the blocking, Telegram founder Pavel Durov stated that the company allegedly received a request from Apple to block certain news and propaganda channels for iPhone users with Ukrainian SIM cards, and that Telegram would take action to comply.9

The same month, the NSDC Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) announced official cooperation with TikTok to block, within Ukraine, Russian propaganda channels according to a previously submitted list of 83 such channels.10 However, by the end of the reporting period the negotiations had not progressed significantly.11 Similarly, the CCD and the SSU Cybersecurity Department have released a list of 66 X accounts that reportedly promulgate Russian disinformation,12 but no action was taken against them.

In April 2024, Telegram began considering an SSU request to block 26 pro-Russian channels,13 while the CCD has reported blocking of YouTube channels associated with sanctioned television channels NewsOne, and Nash.14 In early March 2024, a Telegram representative confirmed that the company has received from the Ukrainian authorities a list of “problematic” channels spreading Russian propaganda and will consider undertaking actions based on the terms of service.15

In March 2024, the television channel Espreso reported that its representatives had been approached by an intermediary who offered a payment for removing an article alleging unethical lobbying by Olena Shuliak, the head of the Servant of the People Party, and Oledsandr Kubarov, the deputy prime minister.16

The Cyber Police, a law enforcement department charged with fighting cyber crime, has collaborated with volunteers to develop the Mriya project, which allows Ukrainians to flag Russian propagandistic websites and channels for further investigation. The project had led to over 22,000 removals by the end of 2023.17 In March 2024, the Cyber Police rebranded Mriya into the Brama project, which has expanded its aims to include improving media literacy and safe behavior online.18

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 2.002 4.004

During wartime, certain laws provide government agencies with the authority to restrict content. Legislation also permits the government to restrict child sexual abuse imagery.1

The sanctions against Russian web platforms and websites prohibit “internet providers” from allowing access to the sanctioned resources, even though this term has not been defined in domestic law. (The Law on Telecommunications, for instance, regulates “operators and providers of telecommunications.”) Further, the Law on the National Security and Defense Council implies that sanctions are only binding upon state bodies—and not upon “internet providers” or “operators or providers of telecommunications.”2 These inconsistencies have gone unaddressed when authorities have extended the sanctions.

In March 2024, the parliament registered a draft law that would subject “information-sharing platforms” to Ukrainian laws on ownership and funding transparency. The draft law mostly targeted Telegram, which, unlike many other widely used social media platforms and messengers, has not been designated as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the EU’s Digital Services Act.3 Thus, Telegram is the main platform in Ukraine that would be subject to the law. The draft law would recognize providers of information-sharing platforms as stand-alone actors in the media sphere and compel these platforms to appoint an official legal representative in Ukraine, unless they are registered or have a representative in the EU. When requested by the regulator, providers of information-sharing platforms would be required to disclose their ownership structure and funding sources. Inability to do so would lead to the recognition of provider’s ownership structure as “nontransparent.” Existing legislation prohibits state and local self-government authorities, civil servants, and providers of financial services from using platforms that have nontransparent ownership structures, with similar restrictions to be considered for armed forces.4

In September 2024, after the coverage period, the Ukrainian government banned the use of Telegram by government officials.5

The Law on Media (see B6), which came into force in March 2023, enables the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting to issue fines, order the removal of content in violation of the law, and block websites in cases of noncompliance. The law classifies the dissemination of information that denies or justifies criminal nature of the 1917–91 communist totalitarian regime and Nazi totalitarian regime, or creates positive image of their leaders; contains any symbols of these regimes, or humiliates or insults Ukrainian language as significant offenses. Additionally, the law prohibits incitement to discrimination based on sexual or gender identity.6

In the conditions of a full-scale war, there are further regulations that apply from the moment a state is recognized by the Ukrainian parliament as an aggressor state and until five years after this status is canceled, subject to annual revision of the necessity to sustain limitations. Among them, media, including online outlets, are prohibited from disseminating information that presents armed aggression against Ukraine as an internal conflict or civil war; or inaccurate information about armed aggression and actions of an aggressor state with the aim to fuel hatred, forcefully change the constitutional order, or violate the territorial inviolability—all of which constitute “severe” offenses. They are also prohibited from disseminating materials, except for informational and analytical ones, from participants who have been included in the list of persons that present a danger to national security; that violation constitutes a “significant” offense.7

Online media outlets found guilty of violations are subject to fines, and repeated violations can lead to suspensions by the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting or bans by the courts.8 ISPs will have three days to restrict access to websites of fully or temporarily banned online media. National groups, including the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine, and international organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) have criticized the law for giving the National Council too much power to ban outlets and block websites.9

The Law on Media also allows the National Council to request providers of information-sharing platforms and representatives of search engines to restrict and exclude from search results material that is in violation of the law.10

A year since the Law on Media came into force, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting had registered 290 online media, which include 229 websites, 21 YouTube channels, 13 Facebook pages, 12 Telegram channels, 8 Instagram pages, 4 TikTok accounts, 1 X account, 1 channel in Viber, and 2 channel in WhatsApp. For online media registration is voluntary but if completed provides official media status.11

In March 2023, following the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, the Ukrainian parliament amended the Law on Sanctions to allow for the blocking of online resources that promote terrorist groups.12

The 2017 Law on State Support of Cinematography in Ukraine requires website hosts to limit access to pages containing unauthorized reproductions of certain categories of copyrighted materials upon a request from a copyright owner, if the owners of the pages fail to remove said materials. The website host can hide pages without a court order for up to 10 days. Hosting providers risk liability for noncompliance.13

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Online journalists and ordinary internet users have faced pressure to self-censor, especially on topics related to separatism, collaborationism, terrorism, and Russia. Self-censorship in Ukrainian media also results from outlets’ financial dependence on their owners, pressure on journalists, and impunity for perpetrators of many attacks on media or journalists. According to a May 2023 survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Human Rights Centre ZMINA, which covers the challenges journalists have faced since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 78 percent of respondents said the Russian invasion has led to more self-censorship cases.1 Likewise, IREX’s 2024 Vibrant Information Barometer report notes that “journalists exercise self-censorship when covering defense issues” and “tend to refrain from criticizing the government or investigating misconduct” over fear that they might “ignite public outrage.”2

Following the Russian military’s invasion in February 2022, journalists avoided disclosing information about the location of Ukrainian military units, losses among Ukrainian soldiers, and specific places hit by Russian airstrikes, as doing so could have provided the Russian military with details about Ukrainian defenses.3 Such disclosures may also have been prohibited by the implementation of martial law (see C1), which limits the topics journalists can cover.

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Domestic and foreign dis- and misinformation, particularly from Russia,1 increased significantly following the 2022 full-scale invasion. Beyond social media manipulation, the online media landscape is highly polarized and frequently distorted. Media outlets tend to promote the political sympathies of their owners.2

Online news outlets and social media accounts affiliated with the Russian state have created fabricated content, including doctored videos and images, to intentionally mislead online audiences.3 The SSU has also accused Russian actors of creating Telegram channels that mimic Ukraine government officials’ channels and using them to spread disinformation.4 In same way, Russian actors have mimicked fact-checking resources to spread false information about the war.5

Fabricated or intentionally misleading information disseminated by actors linked to the Russian government and presenting Kremlin-friendly narratives are regularly circulated in online articles that mainly target Ukrainians in areas occupied by the Russian military.6 A February 2024 Washington Post report revealed that in January 2023 Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian president, assembled a team to attempt to “destabilize” Ukraine through the spread of false or trumped-up narratives that aim to refute Ukrainian government talking points, emphasize splits between Ukrainian officials and other public figures, confuse residents of Ukraine, and “demoralize” the military.7 Journalists in occupied territories have been forced to cooperate with occupying authorities and obtain approval from the Russian military before publishing. In occupied territories, people who have shared information that challenges the Russian military’s narrative have been arrested, tortured, and killed on the spot.8

Additionally, as the Russian military continued its assault on Kharkiv throughout the coverage period, those who live in the city have received fake text messages, which are purportedly sent by government employees, instructing them to flee. The Russian military has used drones that “imitate cellular base stations,” an unnamed Ukrainian security official told Reuters news agency, to spread these messages, which are often accompanied by similar campaigns on social media.9

To circumvent blocking in Ukraine, Russian actors spreading false information largely operate on social media platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram, and messenger apps, including Telegram and Viber, with Facebook and Telegram becoming the most popular channels of Kremlin supporters.10

Throughout the coverage period, social media platforms routinely removed networks spreading disinformation among Ukrainian users (see B2). In Meta’s Adversarial Threat Report for the fourth quarter of 2023, the company said it had removed a network of 1,020 Facebook accounts, 711 Instagram accounts, 5 Facebook Pages, and 2 Facebook groups, that engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior to post in support of Ukrainian politician Viktor Razvadovskyi. The Ukraine-based network was also active in promoting the current Kazakh government and criticizing the political opposition in comments on Kazakh news accounts. Meta also observed that Russian government-linked actors’ targeting of Ukraine with disinformation narratives has been “particularly aggressive and persistent.”11 In Meta’s Adversarial Threat Report for the second quarter of 2024, the company noted it removed a network of 12 Facebook accounts, 32 pages, 5 groups, and 3 Instagram accounts, originating from Russia but operated by a firm in Sri Lanka, that criticized the Ukrainian government. The network established Facebook pages mirroring Ukrainian organizations and others that posed as influential figures in “the West.” Meta removed several other operations that targeted the EU, and the United States and other countries in an effort to shift public opinion on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.12

Between July and December 2023, TikTok removed six distinct covert influence operations’ networks composed of 15,624 accounts, which primarily operated from Russia, though some operated from Ukraine, and aimed to influence public opinion about the war across the European Union. The company also removed 6,304 videos for violation of misinformation policy when reporting on the invasion of Ukraine, and continued removing livestream videos originating in Russia and Ukraine from the For You feed of users located in the EU to minimize risk of harmful content. As of December 2023, TikTok had tagged 114,218 videos with the state affiliated media label for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.13

Between the beginning of full-scale invasion and August 2024, the SSU reported that it shut down 86 bot farms, including over three million fake accounts, for spreading false information.14

The reporting period was also marked by a scandal around the largest state online news agency, Ukrinform. Leaked material posted online indicated that director general Oleksiy Matsuka, who had been expeditiously appointed in November 2023, had been following the instructions from president’s office, on what topics and individuals should receive news coverage and which should be avoided. The six months of Matsuka’s leadership were also marked by numerous dismissals of journalists who have been working in Ukrinform for many years, as well as unjustified salary bonuses for those loyal to new leadership and its managerial style. The revelations led to Matsuka’s resignation in May 2024. Appointment of the new Ukrinform’s director general Serhiy Cherevatyy also raised some concerns in the journalistic community who worry that his military background might impact the unprejudiced news coverage.15

In early 2024, several online media outlets and popular Telegram channels falsely claimed that a number of anticorruption activists were avoiding mobilization (see C7).16

Several Ukrainian groups work to identify content manipulation (see B7).

The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, part of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, has a mandate of countering disinformation.17 In late November 2023, the center, along with few journalistic organizations, created a working group to develop recommendations addressed towards YouTube aimed at combatting the impact of Russian propagandistic channels. The group is also working on voluntary recommendations for establishing quality and transparency standards for Ukrainian YouTube channels and bloggers.18 The National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) also has its own Center for Countering Disinformation.19

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Online media in Ukraine are generally less constrained by economic pressures and owner interests than print and broadcast media. Lower production costs and generally liberal regulations have also contributed to the development of a vibrant online media landscape. There are no obligatory registration requirements for online media, though the Law on Media establishes a system of voluntary registration, which affords registered outlets more protections.

In 2022, at least 217 Ukrainian media outlets shuttered their operations due to loss of subscribers and advertisers, problems acquiring electronic and other supplies, lack of staff, and financial losses resulting from destruction, according to a February 2023 report from the Institute of Mass Information (IMI) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF).1 However, during 2023, the internet advertising market in Ukraine increased by 78 percent, recovering to prewar levels.2

Prior to the war, many online media outlets already struggled to remain financially viable in a market deeply distorted by consolidated media conglomerates whose backers are willing to lose money in order to maintain the political influence afforded to them through media ownership. Independent online outlets rely mainly on advertising for funding, though some generate revenue by publishing jeansa—paid commercial or political materials disguised as journalistic content.3 The amount of jeansa in Ukrainian online media sharply decreased at the beginning of the war, but in early 2024 political jeansa was on the rise again, according to a report from the IMI.4

In May 2022, the so-called Oligarchs’ Law, aimed at preventing threats to national security related to the excessive influence of oligarchs, entered into force. Significant influence on media is listed among criteria defining a person as oligarch. According to the law, oligarchs are banned from funding political parties and campaigns and must submit an income e-declaration. In June 2022, the president approved the NSDC decision to create the oligarchs’ register, the launch of which was postponed until three months after the end of martial law in Ukraine. The Ministry of Justice was appointed in charge of the register instead of the NSDC.5 According to initial NSDC estimates, 86 individuals might qualify as oligarchs.6 However, the creation of the register was postponed.

The Law on Media, which entered into force in March 2023 (see B3), defines online media as “media that regularly disseminates digital information in textual, audio, audiovisual, or any other form via internet on its own website, except for media that are classified as audiovisual media.” Bloggers are not considered online media unless they register under the law. The law also covers providers of video-sharing platforms, but only includes those that are not registered in EU member states and have either parent or subsidiary companies registered in Ukraine.7 In mid-May 2023, to comply with the Law on Media, the regulator adopted procedure for registration of online media.8 Additionally, the law includes transparency requirements and forbids ownership and funding of media in Ukraine by individuals and legal entities based in Russia.9

Press freedom organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists, have criticized the SSU’s efforts to influence journalists covering the Ukrainian military, prevent them from covering certain operations, or withhold accreditation for journalists.10

Since January 2022, foreign technology companies providing services to users in Ukraine are obliged to pay a 20 percent value added tax (VAT) if the cost of the services they provide exceeds 1 million hryvnia ($25,300). Companies that fail to pay could be fined 195,000 hryvnia ($4,900).11 Companies, like Adobe, Amazon, Meta, and Google, added the tax to customers’ fees. In 2023, the state budget of Ukraine received 8 billion hryvnia ($202 million) from the tax.12 In 2023, the tax authorities began monitoring to identify the companies that still have not registered as taxpayers,13 with PornHub having become the first one to pay fine in the amount of $5,543.14

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

The online media landscape in Ukraine is generally pluralistic and diverse. Although the media sector in Ukraine faces challenges due to politicization (see B5 and B6), many online publications continue to publish quality reporting, including investigative journalism. At the same time, Ukrainian media face certain fact-checking and attribution challenge when reporting on developments where Russian media are the original source of information.1 According to a 2023 study from the Institute of Mass Information, 68 percent of the top 50 online media outlets meet the Institute’s transparency standards, which assesses publicly available data on staff, ownership, and funding, compared to 38 percent in 2022.2 Although many television news channels have online presences, most are owned by oligarchs. And, while social media has been beneficial to the growth of independent media outlets, it has also facilitated the spread of Russian disinformation.3

The invasion created difficulties for independent media. Many outlets face financial struggles, and even major outlets have had to reduce salaries, shift to remote modes of work, ask for donations, and launch crowdfunding campaigns. Journalists must also contend with threats to their physical security (see C7) and psychological distress. In some cases, news outlets were unable to continue operations under occupation, and journalists evacuated. Nevertheless, local media play a critical role in documenting the Russian military’s war crimes4 and delivering news to people living in cities under Russian occupation, even as disrupted internet connectivity has made this coverage difficult.5 To avoid broadcasting Russian propaganda, some local media outlets in cities under Russian siege closed their operations.

Journalists, politicians, and activists use social media, particularly Facebook and Telegram. Russian social media platforms remain available through VPNs and via some ISPs that did not comply with sanctions orders, but their use among Ukrainians is low.6

According to a 2023 study by the Internews media support program in Ukraine, social media platforms have become the main source of news for many Ukrainians, with messengers gaining momentum during the war. Out of all platforms and messengers, 72 percent of Ukrainians use Telegram to consume news, while 15 percent use Viber for this purpose. Facebook and YouTube serve as a source of news for 19 and 16 percent of Ukrainians, respectively. News consumption on Instagram, TikTok and X were the lowest.7

Several Ukrainian groups work to identify content manipulation (see B5), such as TrollessUA, which identifies and flags suspicious accounts on Facebook,8 and the Feykogryz project, which is a browser extension designed to identify disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda.9 Following the full-scale Russian invasion, the independent analytical platform VoxUkraine launched a “Propaganda Diary,” which logs Russian propaganda in Italian and German media, identifying those countries as among those intensively targeted by Russian disinformation.10 Ukrainian Radio has also launched an “anti-fake program” to debunk Russian disinformation.11 #DisinfoChronicle, started by the online portal Detector Media, collects and documents disinformation about the Russian invasion in real time.12 Many Ukrainian media outlets also focus efforts on uncovering Russian mis- and disinformation related to the war. In 2022, Meta provided Ukrainian fact-checking partners StopFake and Vox with emergency funding to support their teams’ safety and sustain their work during war time.13 In February 2024, StopFake launched a Telegram bot for automated fact-checking of text, audio, and video content.14

As of May 2024, Tor, a browser that allows anonymous use, identified Ukraine as sixth on the list of countries in which users access Tor daily through relays.15

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

The Ukrainian social media sphere is an important space for debate about politics, reforms, and civil society. Telegram channels are growing rapidly and are largely focused on political issues.1 However, in territories occupied by the Russian military, authorities prohibit public officials from using Telegram, Viber, and WhatsApp, when they are connected to Ukrainian mobile numbers. This effectively forces those users to register email addresses in the .ru domain.2

Ukrainians and Ukrainian government officials actively use e-petitions and online resources to publicize their activities and advocate for social and political issues. Since 2014, investigative journalists and activists have worked to maintain a digital database of officials’ tax declarations.3

Ukrainians have launched several online campaigns to highlight the devastating impact of the war and rally international support. The global campaign #SuspendKremlin urged major social media platforms to ban Russian government officials from their platforms, in an effort to combat the spread of Russian state-sponsored disinformation.4 Another group of volunteers created a website called Post to Stop War, which showcases key messages about the invasion in over 30 languages to audiences abroad.5 Multiple online fundraising campaigns run by volunteers across the country have helped to collect funds to provide ammunition and equipment to Ukrainian soldiers.6 Ukrainians have been actively using hashtags on social media to draw attention to the war and its consequences (e.g. #SaveUkraine, #StopWar, #PeaceforUkraine, and #RussiaIsATerroristState).7 Dedicated online campaigns have been launched to collect evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine8 and to track the damage inflicted by the Russian military.9 In May 2022, President Zelenskyy launched UNITED 24, billed as “the official fundraising platform” to help Ukraine,10 which had raised $658.8 million by June 2024.11 However, critics have noted the funds are distributed in a centralized manner.12

Marginalized and underrepresented groups actively use online platforms to advocate for their rights. LGBT+ people in Ukraine regularly use social media tools to organize offline events, such as Kyiv Pride. However, they sometimes face resistance, also organized online, by far-right groups.13

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 3.003 6.006

The right to free speech is granted to all citizens of Ukraine under Article 34 of the constitution, but the state can restrict this right in the interests of national security or public order, and it is sometimes restricted in practice. Article 15 of the constitution prohibits censorship.1 Martial law has been in effect since February 2022, when the full-scale Russian invasion began, and some restrictions limiting speech have been enforced.

Ukrainian courts still feature corruption and political interference, which at times undermines their ability to uphold fundamental rights.2 However, steps have been made during the reporting period to improve transparency and efficiency of the judicial system to align legislation and enforcement with EU requirements. Notably, in August 2023, the Ukrainian government enacted legislation that enabled it to appoint judges to vacant posts on the Constitutional Court based on a transparent procedure. In May 2024, the parliament approved the candidacy of the first judge selected through the new procedure via the Advisory Group of Experts.3 Additionally, the High Qualification Commission of Judges and the High Council of Justice were reestablished and able to begin filling more than 2,000 open judicial posts. 4

In May 2024, the parliament adopted in the first hearing a draft law that would limit access to court decisions concerning national security, state secrets, the inviolability of state borders, conscription and mobilization processes, and established order of military service under martial law.1 The draft law would also apply retroactively to all decisions since February 24, 2022, when martial law was introduced for the first time. The access is suggested to be renewed one year after the cancelation of martial law.5 Human rights activists and journalists expressed concern that the draft measure could negatively influence both the freedom of speech environment and the transparency of judicial processes.6

Following the Russian military’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian government imposed martial law, which, according to the constitution, enables the government to restrict some rights, including the right to freedom of expression.7 Specifically, martial law gives the government the right to “control the media,” prohibits “public demonstrations and other mass gatherings,” and transforms civilian authorities into military administrations.8 The law has been repeatedly extended and the ban on mass gatherings have occasionally been enforced. In April 2024, Ukraine has submitted to the Council of Europe an updated list of derogation measures, some of which are permitted by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms during martial law.9

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Some laws criminalize online activities, while others do not explicitly criminalize them, but have been used to penalize individuals for their online activities. The criminal code penalizes extremism, separatism, and terrorism, including through online activities. Article 109(2) of the criminal code prescribes prison sentences of three to five years for public calls to violently overthrow the constitutional order. Article 110 criminalizes public calls for the infringement of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including those made online, with a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Article 161 prohibits “inciting national, racial, or religious enmity and hatred” and assigns a maximum penalty of five years in prison.1 Neither defamation nor insult are criminally penalized.2

In March 2022, following the Russian military’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Political Parties and the Law on Civic Associations. The amendments allowed courts to ban political parties, and prohibited the creation of civic associations that undertake actions or aim to liquidate the independence of Ukraine, make violent attempts to change constitutional order, undermine sovereignty and territorial integrity, disseminate war propaganda, propagate communist or Nazi totalitarian regimes and their symbols, or disseminate information containing justification, legitimization, or denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. In the same month, the parliament adopted amendments to the criminal code specifying punishments for justification, legitimization, or denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine launched in 2014, including by calling it internal civil conflict, as well as of temporary occupation of some parts of Ukraine’s territory.3 Under Article 436-2, which criminalizes justification, recognition as legitimate, or denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine violators can face up to eight years in prison if the offenses are committed on mass media or by a public official.

In the same month, the parliament criminalized collaborationism with the Russian government under article 111 of the criminal code in the form of public denial of the armed aggression against Ukraine; supporting the occupation of Ukrainian territory; or public calls by a citizen of Ukraine for cooperation with the aggressor state, its armed formations, or occupation administrations. The law, which applies to online speech, also criminalized denying Ukrainian sovereignty over the occupied territories‎. Individuals found guilty can be deprived of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a period of 10 to 15 years. Certain nonspeech related offenses under the amendments carry heavier punishments.4 A December 2022 coalition of Ukrainian civil society organizations criticized the breadth and vagueness of some of the measures included in the amendments.5

In June 2022, the president signed a law prohibiting “propaganda of the Russian neo-Nazi totalitarian regime and the act of aggression against Ukraine.” Among other things, the law envisages a ban on the usage of symbols associated with the Russian military invasion in Ukraine, including in online advertising and social media publications. However, there are a few exceptions when such usage is considered legal, including media reporting on false narratives, publications condemning the Russian regime, museum exhibitions, research activities, and school textbooks.6

Article 173-1 of the code of administrative offenses prescribes fines for spreading false rumors that sow panic; the law was periodically invoked during the COVID-19 pandemic.7 Since January 2019, the code of administrative offenses penalizes bullying, including via electronic communication, punishable by fines or community service. Individuals who fail to report bullying can also be penalized.8

  • 1“Criminal Code of Ukraine (2001, Amended 2016),” Legislationline, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/documents/91/Ukraine_CC…
  • 2OSCE Representative on Freedom on the Media, “Defamation and Insult Laws in the OSCE Region: A Comparative Study,” March 2017, https://www.osce.org/fom/303181?download=true.
  • 3Official Website of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Закон про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України (щодо заборони виготовлення та поширення інформаційної продукції, спрямованої на пропагування дій держави-агресора) [Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine (on Prohibition of Production and Distribution of Information Products Aimed at Promoting the Actions of the Aggressor State)],” March 31, 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2109-IX#Text; Official Website of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Закон про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України (щодо посилення кримінальної відповідальності за виготовлення та поширення забороненої інформаційної продукції) [Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine (Regarding Strengthening Criminal Liability for Production and Distribution of Prohibited Information Products)],” March 3, 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2110-IX#Text.
  • 4Official Website of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо встановлення кримінальної відповідальності за колабораційну діяльність” [Law of Ukraine on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Establishment of Criminal Liability for Collaborative Activities], March 3, 2022 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2108-IX#top.
  • 5Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Civil Holding, GROUP OF INFLUENCE, NGO, Donbas SOS, Crimea SOS, VostokSOS, Stabilization Support Services, and Crimean Human Rights Group ”CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR COLLABORATIONISM: analysis of current legislation, practice of its application, and proposals for amendments,” December 2022, https://zmina.ua/en/publication-en/criminal-liability-for-collaboration….
  • 6Official Website of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Пропозиції Президента до Закону "Про заборону пропаганди російського нацистського тоталітарного режиму, збройної агресії Російської Федерації як держави-терориста проти України, символіки воєнного вторгнення російського нацистського тоталітарного режиму в Україну" [Proposals of the President to the Law "On Prohibition of Propaganda of the Russian Nazi Totalitarian Regime, Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation as a Terrorist State Against Ukraine, Symbols of the Military Invasion of the Russian Nazi Totalitarian Regime in Ukraine"],” May 22, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39284.
  • 7Official Website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Кодекс України про адміністративні правопорушення (статті 1 - 212-24) [Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offense (Articles 1 – 212 -24)],” March 20, 2023, https://web.archive.org/web/20230318104402/https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/la….
  • 8“На Хмельниччині школяра засудили за булінг учителя [In Khmelnytskyi region, a schoolboy was convicted of bullying a teacher],” Zmina, March 5, 2019, https://zmina.info/news/na_khmelnichchini_shkoljiara_zasudili_za_buling… .
C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Since the start of the Russian military’s full-scale invasion, several individuals have been charged under criminal code articles 109, which criminalizes actions aimed at the violent change or overthrow of the constitutional order or at the seizure of state power; 110, which prohibits public calls for the infringement of Ukraine’s territorial integrity; 111-1, which criminalizes collaborationism or high treason; and 436-2, which criminalizes justification, recognition as legitimate, or denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. These charges sometimes solely concern online activities, while other charges include material collaboration with the Russian military or intelligence agencies. Proceedings opened under Article 436-2 were commonplace throughout the coverage period.1 Russian authorities in occupied territories have also detained individuals who criticize Russia or promote a free Ukraine (see C7).

The SSU has frequently invoked criminal code Articles 109 and 110 against alleged Russian agents for various forms of speech online.2

In March 2024, a first instance court in Khmelnytskyi found a local resident guilty of collaborationism under Article 111-1 for Odnoklassniki posts in support of Russia’s invasion and imposed a 10-year ban on occupying civil servant positions.3 In February, the same court found another individual guilty under Article 111-1 and issued a 10-year ban preventing them from holding managerial and administrative positions.4

In December 2023, the SSU charged an ISP owner, who provided internet services in the temporarily occupied areas of Luhansk region and cooperated with occupation authorities to broadcast sanctioned Russian channels, under Article 111-1 in Kyiv.5 The SSU also invoked Article 111-1 to charge a former civil servant, who the SSU alleged was an FSB agent, calling for the Russian annexation of eastern Ukraine on social media.6 In December 2023, a Vinnytsia court found a freelance journalist, who was working for a pro-Russian propagandistic online media, guilty of high treason and sentenced him to 14 years in prison with property confiscation.7 However, the decision was appealed and sent back to the first-instance court for a new hearing in May 2024. The new decision was still pending as of the end of the coverage period.8 In July 2023, an Odesa court ruled that calls by a blogger to bomb Ukraine were collaborationism and imposed a 10-year ban on working for the state.9

In 2024, the courts started invoking Article 114-1 of the criminal code on obstruction of legitimate activity of the armed forces against users who shared information about where draft summonses were being issued. In March, the court in Lutsk sentenced a woman to five years in prison for administering a Telegram channel that notified residents about the places in the city where draft notices are handed out. The imprisonment was substituted with a two years’ probation period, and the Telegram channel was shut down.10 In May 2024, a court in the Cherkasy sentenced a man who had administered a similar Viber group to five years of imprisonment with one year of probation period.11 In January 2024, three administrators of Telegram channels and Viber groups in Cherkasy Region also had their channels shut down for similar activity.12 In April 2024, the SSU detained a TikTok blogger and confiscated his mobile phone, laptop, and memory drives with video materials for sharing online military checkpoints’ location in his city.13

In February 2024, the authorities charged or sentenced several individuals under Article 436-2, the article about justifying Russian military aggression against Ukraine, which was also increasingly used during the coverage period, For instance, a Poltava resident was sentenced to five years in prison, which was substituted with two years’ probation, under Article 436-2 for Odnoklassniki posts denying Russia’s war against Ukraine.14 The SSU also charged a blogger in Kyiv, who had allegedly used his YouTube channel and social media accounts to deny Russian aggression, discredit the armed forces leadership, and share disinformation about the social and political situation in Ukraine, under Article 436-2 of the criminal code. The man faces 8 years in prison with property confiscation.15 Also in February, another woman was charged under Articles 109, 110 and 436-2 for coordinating propagandistic messages of former prime minister Mykola Azarov in Azarov’s Telegram channel and on social media, as well as setting up anti-Ukrainian interviews and commentaries for Russian media. The case was in the court as of the end of the coverage period, and the accused woman remained in custody.16 In February 2024, the SSU charged a man in Poltava under Article 111 and 436-2 for drafting over 60 publications for Russian online media, which were financially supported by Russian intelligence agencies, that justified shelling of civilian infrastructure and aimed to discredit Ukrainian military and its leadership.17 In April 2024, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.18

In January, authorities in Mykolaiv invoked Article 110 to charge a woman for creating and sharing anti-Ukrainian posts in pro-Russian Telegram channels.19 In December 2023, a Khmelnytskyi resident was sentenced to five years in prison, which was substituted with 18 months’ probation period, for a similar offense.20

In July 2023, a court in Poltava Region imposed a fine of approximately $1,300 on the administrator of an online media outlet who published Russian ads and accepted payments via a banned payment system.21

In late 2020, the SSU charged politician and pro-Kremlin blogger Anatoliy Shariy under Articles 111 and 161 (infringing upon citizens’ equality) of the criminal code for posting a map of Ukraine on his YouTube channel that excluded the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas. The SSU put Shariy—who lives in Spain, where he had received asylum—on its wanted list.22 In May 2022, Spanish authorities detained Shariy,23 and later released him to house arrest pending extradition.24 Reportedly, in October 2022, the Spanish court closed the case after Ukrainian officials failed for a second time to file extradition paperwork.25 In July 2023, the SSU charged him with committing high treason at the behest of the Russian security services, namely for editing and disseminating videos about the torture of Ukrainian war prisoners.26

In the occupied city of Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia Region, the Russian occupying authorities have conducted random checks of Ukrainian citizens’ mobile phones with the aim to identify whether they follow “propagandistic resources of the Kyiv regime.” If found guilty, a person first gets a warning, which then can be followed by fine and criminal liability according to Russian law.27

  • 1Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ затримала ще 4-х ворожих агітаторів: серед них – тіктокер, який вихваляв удар «Іскандерами» по Харкову 2 січня [SSU detains 4 more enemy agitators: among them is a tiktoker who praised the Iskander strike on Kharkiv on January 2],” January 22, 2024, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-zatrymala-shche-4kh-vorozhykh-ahitatoriv-…
  • 2Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ викрила 6 агітаторів рашизму: серед них блогерка з «медіа-пулу» Медведчука та депутат міськради, який хотів втекти до рф [SSU exposes 6 racist agitators: among them is a blogger from Medvedchuk's 'media pool' and a city council deputy who wanted to flee to Russia],” Telegram, March 20, 2024, https://t.me/SBUkr/11481; Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ затримала ще 5 проросійських агітаторів, які виправдовували агресію рф та закликали до захоплення Києва [SSU detains another 5 pro-russian agitators who justified russia's aggression and called for the seizure of Kyiv],” Telegram, February 14, 2024, https://t.me/SBUkr/11183; SBU Office in Cherkasy region, “СБУ викрила ворожу агітаторку, яка закликала до військового перевороту в Україні [SSU exposes enemy agitator who called for military coup in Ukraine],” Facebook, February 1, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/ssu.cherkasy/posts/pfbid0HEh7ePsS1dZPLewSs6uW8…; Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ затримала колишніх «антимайданівців», які працювали на фсб і готували атаки на залізничну інфраструктуру Одещини [SSU detains former 'anti-Maidan' activists who worked for FSB and prepared attacks on railway infrastructure in Odesa region],” May 27, 2024, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-zatrymala-kolyshnikh-antymaidanivtsiv-yak….
  • 3Khmelnytskyi City-Raion Court of Khmelnytskyi Oblast “ВИРОК ІМЕНЕМ УКРАЇНИ Справа № 686/5876/24 [Sentence In The Name of UkraineFromLaw No. 686/5876/24],” Unified State Register of Court Documents, March 6, 2024, https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/117469319.
  • 4Khmelnytskyi City-Raion Court of Khmelnytskyi Oblast “ВИРОК ІМЕНЕМ УКРАЇНИ Справа Справа № 686/27433/23 [Sentence In The Name of Ukraine FromLaw No. 686/27433/23],” Unified State Register of Court Documents, February 8, 2024, https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/116862073
  • 5Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ затримала у Києві бізнесмена, який транслював кремлівську пропаганду на тимчасово окупованій Луганщині [SSU detains businessman in Kyiv who broadcast kremlin propaganda in temporarily occupied Luhansk region],” December 26, 2023, https://t.me/SBUkr/10723.
  • 6Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ затримала у Києві ексчиновника, який був агентом фсб і пропонував приєднати східні регіони України до ростовської області рф [SSU detains ex-official in Kyiv who was FSB agent and offered to annex eastern regions of Ukraine to Rostov region of Russia],” January 3, 2024, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-zatrymala-u-kyievi-ekschynovnyka-yakyi-bu….
  • 7Кореспондента пропагандистського сайту «ПолітНавігатор» посадили на 14 років [Correspondent of the propaganda website "PolitNavigator" was imprisoned for 14 years],” Court Reporter, December 10, 2023, https://sudreporter.org/korespondenta-propagandystskogo-sajtu-politnavi….
  • 8Vinnytsia Court of Appeal, “УХВАЛА ІМЕНЕМ УКРАЇНИ ВСТУПНА ТА РЕЗОЛЮТИВНА ЧАСТИНИ [Resolution in the name of Ukraine introductory and operative parts],” May 28, 2024, https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/119362681
  • 9Center for Public Investigators, “В Одесі тік-токерка, яка просила росію бомбити українців, відбулася забороною працювати у владі [In Odesa, a TikToker who asked Russia to bomb Ukrainians was banned from working in government],” July 25, 2023, https://cpi.org.ua/news/v-odesi-tik-tokerka-yaka-prosila-rosiyu-bombiti…
  • 10Justyna Lisova, “Адміністраторка Telegram-каналу в Луцьку отримала 2 роки умовно за те, що публікувала місця видачі повісток [The administrator of the Telegram channel in Lutsk received a 2-year suspended sentence for publishing the places where summonses were issued],” Hromadske, April 1, 2024, https://hromadske.ua/posts/administratorka-telegram-kanalu-v-lucku-otri….
  • 11Elena Shchepak, “На Черкащині умовно засудили адміна Viber-групи, де повідомляли місця вручення повісток [In Cherkasy region, the administrator of a Viber group was conditionally sentenced, where the places of delivery of summonses were reported],” Institute of Mass Information, May, 9, 2024, https://imi.org.ua/news/na-cherkashhyni-umovno-zasudyly-administratora-….
  • 12SBU Office in Cherkasy region, “СБУ викрила адмінів груп у популярних месенджерах, які сприяли ухилянтам уникненню мобілізації [SSU exposes admins of groups in popular messengers who helped draft evaders avoid mobilization],” January 29, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/ssu.cherkasy/posts/pfbid02VR4Ng9UkZTsMLQRUExNs…
  • 13SBU Office in Kirovohrad Region, “СБУ затримала тіктокера, який «зливав» у соцмережу локації блокпостів у Кропивницькому [SSU detains tiktoker who ‘leaked’ checkpoint locations in Kropyvnytskyi to social media],” Facebook post, April 1, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/ssu.kropyvnytskyi/posts/pfbid024JzhRaufeqwJCWE…
  • 14Kobelyatsky District Court of Poltava Region, “Case Category No. 532/255/24: Категорія справи № 532/255/24: Кримінальні правопорушення проти миру, безпеки людства та міжнародного правопорядку; Виправдовування, визнання правомірною, заперечення збройної агресії Російської Федерації проти України, глорифікація її учасників [Criminal offences against peace, human security and international legal order; Justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants.],” February 19, 2024, https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/117075771
  • 15Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ повідомила про підозру київському блогеру, який готував фейки для кремлівських ЗМІ [SSU serves suspicion notice to Kyiv blogger who prepared fakes for kremlin media],” Telegram, February 20, 2024, https://t.me/SBUkr/11228
  • 16Office of the Attorney General of Ukraine, “Судитимуть посадовицю столичної РДА, яка вела Телеграм-канал експрем’єр-міністра України [An official of the capital's District State Administration, who ran the Telegram channel of the ex-Prime Minister of Ukraine, will be tried],” February 8, 2024, https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/suditimut-posadovicyu-stolicnoyi-rda-yaka-ve…
  • 17SBU Office in Poltava region, “Завдяки СБУ на Полтавщині перед судом постане «політексперт»-зрадник, який готував замовні статті для російських інтернет-видань [Thanks to the Security Service of Ukraine, a traitor 'political expert' who prepared commissioned articles for russian online publications will be put on trial in Poltava region],” Facebook, February 16, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=791835622973611&id=100064…
  • 18Daryna Antoniuk, “Ukrainian sentenced to 15 years in prison for spreading Russian propaganda,” The Record, April 19, 2024, https://therecord.media/ukrainian-sentenced-for-russian-propaganda.
  • 19SBU Office in Mykolaiv Oblast (Region), “СБУ затримала у Миколаєві фрілансерку, яка придумувала антиукраїнські фейки для проросійських Телеграм-каналів [SSU detains freelancer in Mykolaiv who came up with anti-Ukrainian fakes for pro-russian Telegram channels],” Facebook, January 15, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/ssu.mykolaiv/posts/pfbid031gbvZL3sJpfRaDsaFdPq…
  • 20Khmelnytskyi City-Raion Court of Khmelnytskyi Oblast, “Категорія справи № 686/27364/23: Кримінальні правопорушення проти миру, безпеки людства та міжнародного правопорядку; Виправдовування, визнання правомірною, заперечення збройної агресії Російської Федерації проти України, глорифікація її учасників [Case Category No. 686/27364/23: Criminal offences against peace, human security and international legal order; Justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants],” December 5, 2023, https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/115427535?fbclid=IwAR1H2m9FafKE9C5f…
  • 21Avtozavodskyi District Court of Kremenchuk, “Категорія справи № 524/4198/23: Кримінальні правопорушення у сфері господарської діяльності; Незаконні дії з документами на переказ, платіжними картками та іншими засобами доступу до банківських рахунків, електронними грошима, обладнанням для їх виготовлення [Case Category No. 524/4198/23: Criminal offenses in the field of economic activity; Illegal actions with transfer documents, payment cards and other means of access to bank accounts, electronic money, equipment for their production],” July 5, 2023, https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/111994616
  • 22“Ukraine Puts Pro-Kremlin Blogger Living In Europe On Wanted List,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 25, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-puts-pro-kremlin-blogger-living-in-euro…; “Суд Києва дозволив затримати Шарія – джерело [Kyiv court allowed to detain Shariy - the source],” Interfax, March 2, 2021, https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/727392.html.
  • 23Official Website of the Security Service of Ukraine, “В Іспанії затримано проросійського блогера Анатолія Шарія, якого СБУ підозрює у державній зраді (відео) [Pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Shariy, whom SSU suspects of treason, detained in Spain (video)],” May 5, 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/v-ispanii-zatrymano-prorosiiskoho-blohera-ana….
  • 24“Венедіктова спрогнозувала терміни екстрадиції Шарія з Іспанії [Venediktova predicted the date of extradition of Shariy from Spain],” Slovo i Dilo, May 11, 2022, https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/05/11/novyna/pravo/venediktova-sprohnozu….
  • 25“Spain shelves pro-Russia Ukrainian blogger's extradition,” The Local, October 13, 2022, https://www.thelocal.es/20221013/spain-shelves-pro-russia-ukraine-blogg….
  • 26“SBU adds high treason charge against pro-Russian blogger Anatoliy Shariy,” The New Voice of Ukraine, June 6, 2023, https://english.nv.ua/nation/sbu-adds-high-treason-charge-against-pro-r… ; Office of the Attorney General of Ukraine, “За держзраду судитимуть відомого проросійського блогера та ексочільника поліції Вінниччини, які працювали на фсб рф [A well-known pro-russian blogger and ex-head of the Vinnytsia police, who worked for the FSB of the russian federation, will be tried for treason],” July 25, 2023, https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/za-derzzradu-suditimut-vidomogo-prorosii… ; Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ повідомила про нову підозру Шарію, який допомагав фсб робити постановочні відео з допитів українських полонених (відео) [SSU serves new notice of suspicion to Shariy, who helped FSB make staged videos of interrogations of Ukrainian prisoners (video)],” July 6, 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-novu-pidozru-shariiu-yakyi….
  • 27“В окупованому Бердянську відбуватиметься «вибіркова перевірка» телефонів [In occupied Berdyansk, there will be a "random check" of phones],” Radio Svoboda, October 27, 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-berdyansk-perevirka-telefoniv/32103….
C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

There is no obligatory registration for internet users or prepaid mobile device subscribers. Users can purchase prepaid SIM cards anonymously and may comment anonymously on many websites. The Law on Electronic Communications (see A3 and C6) preserves the right to use communication services anonymously.

There are no restrictions related to encryption tools in government-controlled territory, though the commercial provision of these tools is subject to licensing.1 VPNs are widely used in Ukraine.

However, in occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Regions, users reportedly experienced issues accessing VPNs. In March 2024, the authorities in the Russian-occupied territories banned the “promotion” of VPNs, mirroring a recently passed Russian law.2 The occupying authorities also prohibit residents from using Ukrainian mobile numbers and force employees of public institutions to register email addresses in .ru domain.3 In occupied settlements of the Zaporizhzhia Region, payment for utilities, internet, and mobile credit is conditioned upon obtaining a Russian passport.4

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Little information about surveillance or communications interception in Ukraine is publicly available. The SSU and police can initiate criminal investigations and use wiretapping devices on communication technologies, but existing legislation, such as the Law on Operative Investigative Activity,1 does not specify the circumstances that justify these measures or set limits on the time frame or scope of their implementation. However, during the coverage period investigative journalists alleged that an SSU unit wiretapped their phones (see C7). 2

Previous governments had purchased equipment compliant with the Russian-designed System for Operational Investigative Measures (SORM) surveillance architecture.3 Some analysts believe that Ukrainian law enforcement and intelligence services make use of an analogous architecture, requiring operators to install equipment that facilitates the lawful interception of user data.4

Deep packet inspection (DPI) technology can be used to filter internet traffic and surveil users. Authorities have repeatedly tried to oblige providers to install DPI for these purposes, but their efforts have been unsuccessful. Mobile operators Kyivstar and Vodafone use DPI systems, ostensibly to allocate resources more effectively, analyze subscribers’ preferences, and enhance targeted advertisements. Kyivstar claims its system handles depersonalized data. Lifecell has not disclosed whether it has a DPI system.5

In March 2024, given the intensified shelling of Kyiv by Russia’s military, city authorities announced new security measures that including monitoring social media for disinformation and provocative content aimed to destabilize the situation in the Ukrainian capital. There is no clear evidence how this measure was (if at all) enforced.6

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Previously, ISPs were not legally required to aid the government in monitoring the communications of their users in the absence of a court order, but recent laws on Electronic Communications and Intelligence have provided the government with ways to circumvent a court order.

The Law on Electronic Communications obliges providers of electronic communication services to retain users’ personal data, location data, and data-transfer routes. This data can be shared with the government only when the law is violated and when an investigating judge or court has issued a request. The law stipulates that electronic communications services must give the state the technical ability to access communications; the state may do so autonomously. The law also envisages that operators must ensure the integrity of their subscribers’ data, which can only be disclosed after subscribers have given explicit consent or if they have violated the law.1 In March 2022, the parliament amended the law to allow prosecutors, along with courts and investigative judges to gain access to subscribers’ information and metadata.2

The Law on Intelligence enables the intelligence authorities to autonomously intercept information from telecommunications networks. According to the law, interception can begin up to 72 hours before a court order is issued. Moreover, court orders (both approving and denying interception) are not subject to being recorded in a unified register. Civil society claims that the law was adopted without proper public consultation and contains significant contradictions to the country’s constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.3

  • 1Official Website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Закон України “Про електронні комунікації” [Law of Ukraine About Electronic Communications],” https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1089-20#top.
  • 2Official Website of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Закон України “Про внесення змін до Кримінального процесуального кодексу України та Закону України "Про електронні комунікації" щодо підвищення ефективності досудового розслідування "за гарячими слідами" та протидії кібератакам [Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine "On Electronic Communications" to increase the efficiency of pre-trial investigation "in hot pursuit" and counter cyberattacks],” March 15, 20222, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2137-%D0%86%D0%A5#top.
  • 3Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre, “Громадянське суспільство вимагає накласти право вето та повернути на повторний розгляд до Верховної Ради України Закон “Про розвідку” [Civil society demands to veto and return Law on Intelligence to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for reconsideration],” accessed August 2024, https://acrec.org.ua/news/hromadians-ke-suspil-stvo-vymahaie-naklasty-p….
C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

Following the full-scale Russian invasion, journalists in Ukraine have faced extreme danger due to Russian attacks while conducting their work. According to human rights experts at the United Nations, journalists have been “targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked, and killed, or refused safe passage”1 from cities and regions under Russian siege. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) filed eight war crimes complaints with the International Criminal Court and Ukraine’s prosecutor general covering 53 total acts of violence and abuse involving 121 journalists by May 2023.2 A May 2024 report from IMI found that during 27 months of war, Russian forces had committed 599 crimes against both online and offline journalists and media in Ukraine, including the forced disappearance of administrators of two pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels, and the seizure of 20 editorial offices of Ukrainian media for dissemination of propaganda in occupied territories. The report also notes that 80 journalists have been killed, 10 of whom were performing editorial assignments.3

In 2023, the IMI recorded 150 “violations of freedom of speech” against both online and offline journalists (almost a fourfold decrease compared to 2022) out of which 67 were attributed to Russia. The number of violations committed by Ukrainian private and public actors dropped from 97 to 83 during the same period, with 29 recorded violations involving obstruction of legitimate journalistic activity.4 In 2023, law enforcement opened 77 criminal cases involving violations of journalists’ rights, out of which seven have been sent to courts with the charges classified under Articles 171 (obstruction of legitimate journalistic activity) and 345-1 (threat or violence against a journalist). However, the number of investigated crimes against journalists still demonstrates a 74 percent decrease compared to prewar period.5 In the first quarter of 2024, 22 additional criminal proceedings were registered, out of which six were closed and one sent to the court.6

Human rights groups have reported that Russian soldiers have forced Ukrainians in occupied cities and towns to turn over their cell phones and have killed people who refused to comply.7 The Russian occupying authorities in Zaporizhzhia have also detained those who operate critical Telegram channels. In August 2023, the Russian military captured Oleksandr Malyshev, Heorhiy Levchenko, Maksym Rupchov, Yana Suvorova, Mark Kaliush, and Kostiantyn Zinovkin, who ran the “RIA Melitopol South” and the “Melitopol Is Ukraine” Telegram channels. The Russian occupying authorities announced their detention two months later in October, and that they faced between 12 and 20 years in prison for treason.8 Anastasia Glukhovskaya, who worked for the online news outlet RIA Melitopol prior to the invasion, was also captured in August. In May 2024, the Russian occupying authorities announced they had detained Vladyslav Herson, who also contributed to the Melitopol is Ukraine Telegram channel.9 In May 2023, the Russian occupying authorities captured retired journalist Iryna Levchenko and her husband in Melitopol. In August 2023, Victoria Roschyna, a freelancer working for Ukrainian Pravda, was taken captive in Berdiansk and her family was informed that she was held prisoner in Russia in May 2024.10

Nonphysical acts of harassment and doxing remain a problem.11 In January 2024, reports indicated that key anticorruption activists faced a coordinated harassment campaign by some online media and Telegram channels accusing them of avoiding mobilization (see B5).12 Later in April, following a search of the chairman of the board of Kharkiv Anticorruption Center, civil society activists issued a demand towards the president and other respective authorities to stop the persecution of anticorruption activists and investigative journalists.13

In May 2024, the police opened criminal proceedings in the case of Mykhailo Tkach, lead investigative reporter at the online media outlet Ukrainska Pravda, who became a target of anonymous online threats after publishing an investigation about the travels of wealthy Ukrainians. His fellow colleagues received similarly threatening emails.14

In April 2024, the SSU attempted to issue a military summons to a journalist of the investigative agency Slidstvo.Info in retaliation for his reporting about luxury properties of the head of the SSU cybersecurity department.15 After the case went public, the commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces ordered an internal investigation,16 which immediately resulted in the suspension of the head of the respective territorial mobilization center.17 Subsequently, the head of the cybersecurity department was fired by presidential decree.18

In January 2024, investigative media outlet Bihus.Info reported that the 30 individuals in the SSU‘s Department for the Protection of National Statehood had surveilled their team for months, including by attending a party in December where they filmed employees ordering illegal drugs. The outlet also claimed that their team members’ phones had been wiretapped for around a year (see C5).19 At the end of the month, Roman Semenchenko, the head of the SSU Department for the Protection of National Statehood was fired by Zelenskyy. In the wake of the scandal, the SSU launched an investigation into the potentially illegal use of “technical means” to surveil the outlet.20

The intimidation of marginalized groups online is common. LGBT+ individuals frequently face online harassment.21 In March 2024, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting issued an order to a nongovernmental organization for publishing on its website an article that incited hatred and discrimination towards LGBT+ individuals.22 Earlier in July 2023, a regional online media outlet in Sumy was harassed and its employees doxed for their coverage of LGBT+ issues on YouTube and their website.23

In July 2020, the prosecutor general filed charges against Vladislav Manger and Oleksiy Levin, two officials from Kherson, of ordering the 2018 murder of journalist Kateryna Handziuk, who used social media platforms and the local citizen journalism website MOST to expose corruption. Five people found guilty for carrying out the acid attack were jailed in 2019.24 During the coverage period, the court sentenced Manger and Levin to 10 years each in prison, inclusive of time spent in the pretrial custody.25 The civil lawsuit for compensation of moral damages was satisfied, with around $380,000 paid to Handziuk’s parents and husband.26 Both convicted have challenged decision in the appellate court, and the hearings were ongoing at the end of the reporting period.27

Investigations and prosecutions for the 2016 murder of Pavel Sheremet, a journalist with the online newspaper Ukrainska Pravda, have been characterized by delays and mismanagement.28 In September 2021, the judge leading Sheremet’s case was found dead.29 In June 2023, after three years of hearings, the composition of the jury was changed, and as a result the case will be heard again from the scratch.30 In January 2024, the court hearings were suspended as two out of three suspects are serving in the military.31

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Cyberattacks, including distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, from Russian-aligned actors intensified significantly during Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though Ukrainian government agencies have worked to mitigate the impact of these attacks. While online media outlets, journalists, and human rights defenders, are frequently subject to cyberattacks, there is no indication that the Ukrainian state is involved in these attacks.

In 2023, the SSU reported that it had neutralized over 4,000 cyberattacks on public authorities’ databases and informational resources, and objects of critical infrastructure.1 In 2023, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) processed 2,543 cyber incidents, a 15.9 percent increase from 2022. CERT-UA classified 367 of these attacks as “serious,” representing a 65 percent decline compared to 2022. I February 2024, the SSSCIBP reported that cyberattacks by Russian hackers against Ukrainian information systems had intensified in comparison to 2023.2

In December 2023, the leading Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar suffered a massive attack by Russian hackers, resulting in partial destruction of company’s IT infrastructure and loss of mobile connectivity and internet by users (see A1). The services were gradually restored throughout the next several days. During this period, the national roaming system allowing users to switch between mobile operators was disabled to avoid network overload.3 Subsequently, Kyivstar has allocated $90 million to repair damage, strengthen the system and fund a client-loyalty program.4 In April 2024, CERT-UA announced it successfully identified an attempt by Sandworm hacking group, which is linked to Kremlin intelligence services, to disrupt information and communication systems of over two dozens of critical infrastructure providers across 10 regions in Ukraine.5

Between February 2022 and May 2024, IMI recorded 86 cyberattacks on websites and social media channels of Ukrainian online media. Moreover, some local media’s websites are periodically suffered distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks following publications unfavorable towards the local authorities and public persons.6 Russian hackers have regularly disrupted broadcasting of Ukraine’s television channels7 and online media.8 Hackers have also targeted news outlets’ social media accounts; for instance, in February 2024, Ukrainian Pravda’s X account was hacked to display pro-Russia messages.9 In late February 2024, the parliament’s website was hacked to display a link to a fake Telegram channel.10 In November 2023 and May 2024, Hromadske Radio suffered massive DDoS attacks, rendering its website unavailable.11

Russia-aligned actors have also sent phishing emails,12 offered Ukrainian regional media to purchase their websites,13 hacked computer systems of law enforcement agencies14 and tablets used by Ukrainian military to plan combat operations,15 the websites of ministries,16 Kyiv Regional Council,17 the leading gas supply provider,18 the Kyiv city train,19 and the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War20, as well as mimicked legitimate media resources21 and created fake Telegram channels, such as those of Ukrainian military brigades and battalions.22

According to the CERT-UA report, in the second half of 2023, the Russian hackers increasingly targeted the mobile phones of Ukrainian military, actively using messengers, mostly Telegram and Signal, to disseminate malicious software.23 Similar attacks via Signal targeted civil servants, military, and defense sector employees.24

In January 2024, the SSU issued a warning of a massive email campaign offering monetary rewards for collaborating with Russian intelligence services. The campaign targeted both ordinary citizens and employees of state authorities and private companies.25

Note on sources: The reports cited in footnotes 121 and 245 produced by Human Rights Centre ZMINA and the Institute of Mass Information were funded in part of or in full by Freedom House.

  • 1Security Service of Ukraine, “З початку року СБУ нейтралізувала майже 4 тис. кібератак на органи влади та критичну інфраструктуру України [Since the beginning of the year, the SBU has neutralized almost 4 thous. cyberattacks on the authorities and critical infrastructure of Ukraine],” October 3, 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/z-pochatku-roku-sbu-neitralizuvala-maizhe-4-t…
  • 2State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, “Урядова команда CERT-UA в 2023 році опрацювала 2543 кіберінциденти [The government CERT-UA team processed 2543 cyber incidents in 2023],” February 8, 2024, https://cip.gov.ua/ua/news/uryadova-komanda-cert-ua-v-2023-roci-opracyu…; State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, “Russian hackers have been attacking Ukraine more intensely since the start of the year: Yurii Myronenko,” March 21, 2024, https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/vid-pochatku-roku-rosiiski-khakeri-aktivizuv…
  • 3Igor Pylypiv and Yaroslav Vinokurov, “Зірка, яку погасили. Що сталося з "Київстаром"? [A star that was extinguished. What happened to Kyivstar?],” Economic Truth, December 12, 2023, https://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2023/12/12/707628/; “Ілля Вітюк, начальник Департаменту кібербезпеки СБУМатеріали справи за фактом кібератаки на «Київстар» спрямують на розгляд МКС [Illia Vitiuk, Head of the Cybersecurity Department of the Security Service of Ukraine The materials of the case on the fact of cyberattack on Kyivstar will be sent to the ICC for consideration],” Ukrinform, April 4, 2024, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3848169-illa-vituk-nacalnik-departa….
  • 4“Ukraine's Kyivstar allocated $90 million to deal with cyberattack aftermath,” Reuters, May 20, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/ukraines-kyivstar-allo….
  • 5State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, “CERT-UA розкрила задум угруповання Sandworm атакувати два десятки об'єктів критичної інфраструктури [CERT-UA revealed the plan of the Sandworm group to attack two dozen critical infrastructure facilities],” April 22, 2024, https://cip.gov.ua/ua/news/cert-ua-rozkrila-zadum-ugrupovannya-sandworm….
  • 6“599 crimes against the media and journalists in Ukraine committed by Russia in the two years and three months of the full-scale war,” Institute for Mass Information, June 24, 2024, https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/599-crimes-against-the-media-and-jour….
  • 7“1+1 media's response to the enemy's attempts to jam Ukraine's satellite broadcasting,” 1+1 Media, March 28, 2024, https://media.1plus1.ua/en/news/reakciia-11-media-na-sprobi-voroga-zagl…; “Телеканал “Прямий” зазнав російської хакерської атаки [Priamyi TV channel was hacked by Russia],” Prryam, February 24, 2024, https://prm.ua/telekanal-priamyy-zaznav-rosiyskoi-khakerskoi-ataky/#goo… ; “Через кібератаку стався збій в роботі частини вебресурсів ДП "МПІУ [Due to the cyberattack, there was a failure in the work of part of the web resources of the SE "MPFM"],” Dim, January 25, 2024, https://kanaldim.tv/cherez-kiberataku-stavsya-zbij-v-roboti-chastyny-ve…; “З росії намагались глушити сигнал Суспільного на супутнику [From Russia, they tried to jam Suspilne's signal on the satellite],” Public Speech, March 13, 2024, https://corp.suspilne.media/newsdetails/9400; “Зловмисники зламали ефірну систему телеканалу Еспресо [Attackers hacked the on-air system of the Espresso TV channel],” Espreso, February 19, 2024, https://espreso.tv/suspilstvo-zlovmisniki-zlamali-efirnu-sistemu-teleka….
  • 8“Заради фейків про Авдіївку росіяни "ломанули" кілька популярних українських новинних сайтів — серед них і "Телеграф [For the sake of fakes about Avdiivka, the Russians "hacked" several popular Ukrainian news sites, including the Telegraph],” Telegram, February 19, 2024, https://t.me/Telegraf_UA_channel/39781?single.
  • 9Kateryna Tyschenko, “Акаунт УП у соцмережі Х зламали [Ukrainska Pravda's account on social network X was hacked],” Ukrainska Pravda, February 18, 2024, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/02/18/7442445/.
  • 10Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “ДО УВАГИ ШАНОВНИХ ЧИТАЧІВ ТЕЛЕГРАМ-КАНАЛУ ВЕРХОВНОЇ РАДИ УКРАЇНИ! [TO THE ATTENTION OF DEAR READERS OF THE TELEGRAM CHANNEL OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE!], Telegram, February 28, 2024, https://t.me/verkhovnaradaukrainy/64384
  • 11Elena Rebryk,”Громадське радіо звернулося до кіберполіції за фактом DDoS-атак [Hromadske Radio appealed to the cyber police on the fact of DDoS attacks],” Public Radio, November 9, 2023, https://hromadske.radio/news/2023/11/09/hromadske-radio-zvernulosia-do-…; Elena Rebryk, “Громадське радіо продовжує відбиватися від потужних DDoS-атак [Hromadske Radio Continues to Fend Off Powerful DDoS Attacks],” Hromadske Radio, May 14, 2024, https://hromadske.radio/news/2024/05/14/hromadske-radio-prodovzhuie-vid….
  • 12Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ попереджає про фішингову розсилку нібито від її імені та закликає не скачувати шкідливі файли [SSU warns of phishing mailing allegedly on its behalf and urges not to download malicious files],” January 18, 2024, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-poperedzhaie-pro-fishynhovu-rozsylku-niby…; Derzhspetszvyazku, “Хакери атакують українські органи юстиції та нотаріусів [Hackers Attack Ukrainian Justice Authorities and Notaries],” Telegram, August 23, 2023, https://t.me/dsszzi_official/6195 ; Vitaliy Kropman and Violetta Tchaikovsky, “Хакери РФ атакували посольства в Києві рекламою дешевого BMW [Russian hackers attacked embassies in Kyiv with an advertisement for a cheap BMW],” Deutsche Welle, July 12, 2023, https://www.dw.com/uk/rosijski-hakeri-atakuvali-posolstva-v-kievi-rekla….
  • 13Nadia Kucher, “Регіональні медіа масово отримують пропозицію продати сайти через російський сервіс (доповнено) [Regional media massively receive an offer to sell websites through a Russian service (updated)],” Institute of Mass Information, December 8, 2023, https://imi.org.ua/news/nyzka-regionalnyh-media-otrymaly-propozytsiyu-p….
  • 14Tom Balmforth and James Pearson, “Exclusive: Russian hackers seek war crimes evidence, Ukraine cyber chief says,” Reuters, September 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-hackers-seek-war-crimes-ev….
  • 15Sean Lyngaas, “Russian military hackers take aim at Ukrainian soldiers’ battle plans, US and allies say,” CNN, August 31, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/31/politics/military-hackers-russia-ukr….
  • 16Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, “UPD: сайт працює. [UPD: the site works.],” Facebook, February 7, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=723204386586043&set=a.258589106380…; Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food in Ukraine, “Змушені повідомити, що на офіційний сайт Міністерства аграрної політики та продовольства України було здійснено кібератаку, внаслідок якої сайт зазнав пошкоджень [We are forced to report that a cyberattack was carried out on the official website of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, as a result of which the site was damaged.],” Facebook, January 30, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/mapfu2021/posts/pfbid026CArYeLGyW4yA1tWxo6mMJr…
  • 17Kyiv Regional Council, “УВАГА САЙТ КИЇВСЬКОЇ ОБЛАСНОЇ РАДИ АТАКУВАЛИ ХАКЕРИ [Attention The Website of the Kyiv regional council was attacked by hackers],” Facebook, November 2, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/kyivoblrada/posts/pfbid0vm5zjjPHho28rb5H36um5i…
  • 18NaftogazUA, “Роботу всіх онлайн-сервісів Газопостачальної компанії "Нафтогаз України" та Газмереж відновлено! [The operation of all online services of the Gas Supply Company "Naftogaz of Ukraine" and Gas Networks has been restored!],” Telegram, January 29, 2024, https://t.me/NaftogazUA/1841
  • 19Kyiv City Express, “Спостерігаємо тимчасові проблеми з продажем квитків через чат-бот та термінали Укрзалізниці через хакерську атаку на сервери [We are observing temporary problems with the sale of tickets through the chatbot and terminals of Ukrzaliznytsia due to a hacker attack on servers],” Telgram, January 25, 2024, https://t.me/kyiv_city_express/516
  • 20Coordination Headquarter for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, “Сьогодні зафіксована DDoS-атака на інформаційні ресурси Координаційного штабу з питань поводження з військовополоненими [Today, a DDoS attack on the information resources of the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War was recorded],” Telegram, January 28, 2024, https://t.me/Koord_shtab/4003
  • 21“Кремль запустил дезинформационную кампанию против Украины через фейковые сайты-клоны Der Spiegel, Fox News и РБК [The Kremlin has launched a disinformation campaign against Ukraine through fake clone sites of Der Spiegel, Fox News and RBC],” The Insider, October 30, 2023, https://theins.ru/news/266332 ; Larisa Gnatchenko, “Шановні мешканці Харківської області! Шановні наші читачі! У Слобідський край з'явився сайт-кло [Dear residents of Kharkiv region! Dear readers! A clone site appeared in the Sloboda region],” Facebook, January 8, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid027DnbwUsJWxRwDT…
  • 22Center for Countering Disinformation, “У мережі активізувалося створення фейкових TG-каналів українських бригад і батальйонів [The creation of fake TG channels of Ukrainian brigades and battalions has intensified on the Internet], Telegram, December 16, 2023, https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/8294.
  • 23Dmitriy Mikhailov, “Хакери з РФ активізували атаки на мобільні пристрої військовослужбовців ЗСУ. У Держспецзв'язку дали відповідні поради [Hackers from the Russian Federation have intensified attacks on mobile devices of servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The State Special Communications Service gave appropriate advice],” Suspilne News, May 15, 2024, https://suspilne.media/746431-hakeri-aktivizuvali-ataki-na-mobilni-pris….
  • 24Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine, “UAC-0200: Цільові кібератаки з використанням DarkCrystal RAT та Signal як засобу довіреного розповсюдження (CERT-UA#9918) [UAC-0200: Targeted cyberattacks using DarkCrystal RAT and Signal as a means of trusted distribution (CERT-UA#9918)],” June 4, 2024, https://cert.gov.ua/article/6279561.
  • 25Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ викрила російську ІПСО, яка через email-розсилку намагається посіяти паніку серед українців [SSU exposes russian PSYOP, which tries to sow panic among Ukrainians via email newsletter],” January 23, 2024, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-vykryla-rosiisku-ipso-yaka-cherez-emailro….

On Ukraine

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Country Facts

  • Population

    38,000,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    51 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    62 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes