On October 27, Uzbekistan will hold parliamentary elections for the Oliy Majlis, the 150-member lower chamber of the country’s legislature. Voters will also elect deputies to Uzbekistan’s 12 regional councils, 208 district councils, and the Tashkent city council. These are the first elections to be held under the country’s new mixed electoral system following reforms that were signed into law in December 2023. Under the new system, half of the chamber’s seats will be elected by a majority of the vote share; the other half of the seats will be administered proportionally based on party.

This assessment was last updated on August 30, 2024. 

Elections in Uzbekistan lack genuine competition. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev maintains tight control over state institutions, including the Central Election Commission (CEC), while Uzbek electoral laws and frameworks are implemented in ways that offer no meaningful opportunities for independent politicians or parties to participate in elections. Both the legislature and the judiciary effectively serve as instruments of the executive branch. As a result, opposition parties are frequently denied registration to operate legally, and unregistered opposition groups function primarily in exile. Currently, only five political parties are registered in the country, all of which are government-aligned: President Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party (O’zLiDep) holds 53 legislative chamber seats; the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (XDP) holds 22 seats; the Justice Social Democratic Party (Adolat) holds 24 seats; the Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party (Milliy Tiklanish) holds 36 seats; and the Ecological Party holds 15 seats. 

In recent years, the government has introduced a veneer of electoral transparency by expanding access to international observers and introducing electronic voting systems that aim to reduce bureaucracy and improve the public’s access to election-related information. There has also been greater room for discussion of candidates and criticism of authorities more freely on social media than under the previous regime, which has led to a slightly more open environment for political speech. However, limits on free expression and access to information including ongoing censorship, reports of torture and mistreatment of journalists and bloggers, and a media ecosystem dominated by state-owned and progovernment outlets threaten the integrity of the country’s information landscape. The state’s increased consolidation of digital infrastructure and services further facilitate the government’s control over online information and its ability to crackdown on political speech. For example, authorities restricted mobile and fixed-line internet access in the autonomous region of Karakalpakstan in June and July 2022 amid protests around proposed constitutional changes. As a result, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state with few signs of genuine efforts towards democratization, and the upcoming election, like previous ones, is unlikely to be considered free and fair.  

Uzbekistan has a score of 20 out of 100, with 100 representing the strongest defenses against digital election interference. Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index is based on a selection of key electoral indicators. The score reflects an authoritarian environment where the executive maintains influence over the legislature and judiciary as well as a repressive online and offline environment for journalists, human rights defenders, opposition groups, and government critics.

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

• Information manipulation: Authorities tightly control the online media environment through state-owned news outlets that push progovernment narratives and discredit the few independent information sources in the country. Additionally, Uzbek authorities employ coordinated networks that spread disinformation online. For example, government-affiliated groups, such as the Union of Youth of Uzbekistan, have been known to recruit trolls to smear critics and counter negative commentary about the government on social media. The integrity of the upcoming elections could be threatened by authorities’ near total control of the information landscape, which may limit voters’ access to independent information and reliable reporting or guidance about the vote.
• Arrests and prosecution: President  Mirziyoyev's government remains hostile toward its critics. Leveraging disproportionate laws that criminalize online expression, authorities frequently arrest and take legal action against bloggers, journalists, and ordinary individuals, especially those who are critical of the government. For instance, in August 2023, a Tashkent court sentenced blogger Abdukodir Muminov to seven years and two months of imprisonment on trumped up charges concerning “privacy infringement, fraud, money extortion, bribery, and a violation of commercial rules.” Muminov was originally charged while investigating the business affairs of President Mirziyoyev’s sons-in-law. Additionally, during the Summer 2022 protests against proposed constitutional amendments in Karakalpakstan, many individuals were arrested and convicted because of their online activities. There could be a heightened threat of prosecution for those that criticize the government ahead of the elections.
• Harassment and violence: Those who criticize the government online, including journalists, regularly face attacks, violent assaults, and torture while in detention in response to their online activities. In June 2022, Karakalpakstan-based blogger Kural Rametov was reportedly tortured after he was detained for criticizing proposed constitutional amendments. Following his detention, law enforcement authorities allegedly left him without any clothes on a road in Nukus. Also in June, other journalists in Karakalpakstan, including Bakhtiyar Kadirbergenov and Mustafa Tursinbaev, were reportedly beaten.
• Internet shutdowns and website blocks: The government routinely blocks and filters websites and social media platforms that host political and social content. For example, Uzbek news websites such as Eltuz and Radio Ozodlik, the Uzbek-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), have been blocked. Public opinion platforms including Avaaz and Change.org as well as the website for Forum 18, a religious freedom organization, are also inaccessible. TikTok has remained blocked since 2021, although users have been reportedly able to access the application intermittently since the initial blocking order. The government has also restricted internet connectivity during times of unrest. The most recent shutdown occurring in Karaklpakstan in 2022 amid antigovernment protests. If protests occur during the electoral period, the government may limit internet access to quell dissent, which could hinder voters’ ability to access credible information about the candidates or election results.

Uzbekistan is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2024, with a score of 12 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 25 out of 100; and as a Consolidates Authoritarian Regime in Nations in Transit 2024, with a score of 3 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn, please visit the Uzbekistan country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, Nations in Transit and Freedom House’s Uzbekistan country portal.