Venezuela’s presidential election is scheduled for July 28, 2024. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro, who took office in 2013, is running for reelection to another six-year term. In the lead-up to election day, Maduro and his ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) have engaged in repeated efforts to undermine the country’s main opposition coalition, the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), and its ability to contest the election. María Corina Machado, the winner of the PUD’s independently organized opposition primary, was banned in June 2023 from running for office for 15 years—a politically motivated decision that was upheld by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) in January 2024.

The Maduro regime’s ongoing efforts to manipulate access to the ballot have dimmed once modest hopes that the presidential election will be fairly contested. In October 2023, the Maduro government—with an eye toward relief from United States–imposed oil sanctions—struck several commitments with the opposition to hold a competitive presidential election. Despite making no assurances that it would reverse the ban on Machado’s candidacy, the government nevertheless vowed that it would allow parties to select their candidates, guarantee open access to the media, and permit electoral observers to assess the conduct of the vote.

However, with Machado still barred from the July ballot, the Maduro regime’s commitment to the so-called Barbados Agreement appears shaky in practice. Though the National Electoral Council (CNE)—which is controlled by a progovernment majority—ultimately allowed 13 candidates to officially register for the election, many of them are unlikely to pose a credible challenge to Maduro. In place of Machado, in March 2024, the PUD successfully registered former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia as its “provisional” candidate after the CNE blocked academic Corina Yoris—Machado’s initial choice to replace her on the ballot—from registering. In April, the United States reimposed oil sanctions on Venezuela, citing the Maduro government’s failure to comply with its election commitments. That month, the PUD announced that it would move forward with González Urrutia as its official candidate for the election.

Venezuela’s democratic institutions have been deteriorating since 1999, but conditions have grown sharply worse in recent years due to harsher government crackdowns on the opposition and the PSUV’s use of thoroughly flawed elections to seize full control of state institutions. The authorities have closed off virtually all channels for political dissent, restricting civil liberties and prosecuting perceived opponents without regard for due process. Although the country’s economy has returned to growth after years of recession, a severe, politically driven humanitarian crisis continues to cause hardship and stimulate mass emigration. Venezuela’s escalating border dispute with neighboring Guyana—widely viewed as an attempt by Maduro to shore up his political standing before the election—has created additional uncertainty ahead of the vote.

Venezuela has a score of 18 out of 100, with 0 being the most vulnerable to digital election interference, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key electoral indicators. The score reflects an environment where the government has made brazen efforts to control the electoral playing field and online information sphere ahead of the vote, making free and fair elections unlikely.

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

• Information manipulation: The Maduro regime manipulates online conversations and has sought to expand its influence online through state-controlled media. According to fact-checking organization EsPaja, Machado remained a frequent target of disinformation during the first three months of 2024. In March, for instance, government-aligned outlets Globovisión and Venezuela News published articles that misrepresented Machado’s willingness to accept the presidential election results. The head of the Ministry of Popular Power for Communication and Information (MIPPCI), an entity often responsible for amplifying progovernment disinformation, used X to repeat false claims that Machado sought a government transition “the hard way.” The Maduro regime has also sought to prevent the spread of critical reporting altogether. In October 2023, nongovernmental organization (NGO) Espacio Público reported that the National Commission of Telecommunications (CONATEL), Venezuela’s telecommunications regulator, had informally pressured or ordered radio and television stations to provide no coverage of that month’s opposition primary. Government-led efforts to control both online and offline narratives will likely intensify ahead of July.
• Website blocking: The Maduro government engages in widespread censorship of online content, particularly through the blocking of independent digital media outlets. As of March 2024, NGO VE Sin Filtro (VSF) recorded at least 51 blocked news websites and 14 blocked websites featuring political criticism. The government has also attempted to block certain censorship circumvention tools, including popular virtual private network (VPN) TunnelBear’s website. Such censorship tactics may make it more difficult for Venezuelans to access credible online reporting about candidates and the election itself.
• Arrests and prosecutions: Individuals regularly face arrests and other legal penalties for their online activities, frequently under spurious pretenses alleging instigation to hatred. Such allegations have already emerged in the context of this year’s election. In April 2024, Attorney General Tarek William Saab opened an investigation into journalist Orlando Avendaño, who resides outside Venezuela, for “incitement to hatred” after he posted on X that the mood surrounding Machado “transcends the electoral” and is “insurrectional.” In response to the post, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) raided Avendaño’s parents’ house and Saab accused Avendaño of being paid by Machado. That same month, Machado herself warned that she and her team remain at risk of arbitrary arrest and forced disappearance. Ahead of the election, journalists, activists, and social media users who criticize the government or express support for the opposition face potential detention and other legal sanctions.  
• Cyberattacks: Technical attacks often target digital media outlets and human rights organizations, and there is strong suspicion that the state is frequently behind them. In May 2023, digital outlet Aporrea, which is critical of the Maduro regime, reported that it had been targeted by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack over the course of two days. Media outlets that report critically on the government remain at risk of such attacks, and individual journalists could also be targeted by hacking and other attempts to sabotage their work. 
   
  The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2024, with a score of 15 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 29 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Venezuela country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.